THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF
SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY
UPON HIS
PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL OPINIONS.

EDITED BY
PROFESSOR SHEDD.

IN SEVEN VOLUMES.
VOL. II.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

The present edition of The Friend comprises all the corrections, and most of the notes, found in the author's handwriting in an interleaved copy of the work, bequeathed by him to his daughter-in-law. The Editor has revised the text with as much care as circumstances would permit, and has added a preliminary sketch of the plan and details of the whole, with an appendix, containing several passages, parts of the scattered essays originally published in 1809, and omitted in the recast of the work in 1818, but which seem worthy of separate preservation. It is earnestly hoped that what has thus been done may further the more general acceptance of a work, which, with all its imperfections, is, perhaps, the most vigorous of Mr. Coleridge's compositions; and which, if it had contained nothing but the essays, in the first volume, on the duty and conditions of communicating truth, and those in the third, on the principles of scientific method, with the reconcilement of the Platonic and Baconian processes of investigation, would still, as the Editor conceives, have constituted one of the most signal benefits conferred in this age on the cause of morals and sound philosophy.

Lincoln's Inn,  
11th Sept. 1837.
OBJECT AND PLAN OF THE WORK.

The Friend consists of a methodical series of essays, the principal purpose of which is to assist the mind in the formation for itself of sound, and therefore permanent and universal, principles in regard to the investigation, perception, and retention of truth, in what direction soever it may be pursued; but pre-eminently with reference to the three great relations in which we are placed in this world,—as citizens to the state, as men to our neighbors, and as creatures to our Creator,—in other words, to politics, to morals, and to religion. The author does not exhibit any perfect scheme of action or system of belief in any one of these relations; and that he has not done so, nor meant to do so, are points which must be borne in mind by every reader who would understand and fairly appreciate the work. For its scope is to prepare and discipline the student's moral and intellectual being,—not to propound dogmas or theories for his adoption. The book is not the plan of a palace, but a manual of the rules of architecture. It is a προσαρέσμα,—something to set the mind in a state of pure recipiency for the specific truths of philosophy, and to arm its faculties with power to recognize and endure their presence.

In pursuing, however, this main design, the author has examined with more or less minuteness many particular systems and codes of opinion lying in his way; and in stating the grounds of his rejection of some, and entire or partial admission of others of them, he has in effect expressed his own convictions upon several of the most important questions, yet disputed in moral and political philosophy. But it is not so much to any given conclusion so expressed that the reader's attention seems to be invited, as to
OBJECT AND PLAN OF THE WORK.

the reasoning founded on principles of universal application, by which such conclusion has been evolved;—the primary and prevailing aim throughout the work being, as well under the forms of criticism, biography, local description, or personal anecdote, as of direct moral, political, or metaphysical disquisition, to lay down and illustrate certain fundamental distinctions and rules of intellectual action, which, if well grounded and thoroughly taken up and appropriated, will give to everyone the power of working out, under any circumstances, the conclusions of truth for himself. The game from time to time started and run down may be rich and curious; but still at the end of the day it is the chase itself, the quickened eye, the lengthened breath, the firmer nerve, that must ever be the huntsman's best reward.

The Friend is divided into two main sections; the first comprising a discussion of the principles of political knowledge; the second treating of the grounds of morals and religion, and revealing the systematic discipline of mind requisite for a true understanding of the same. To these is prefixed a general introduction, for the greater part devoted to a statement of the duty of communicating the truth, and of the conditions under which it may be communicated safely; and three several collections of essays, in some degree miscellaneous and called Landing-Places—interposed in different places for amusement, retrospect, and preparation—complete the work.
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FRIEND! were an author privileged to name his own judge,—in addition to moral and intellectual competence I should look round for some man, whose knowledge and opinions had for the greater part been acquired experimentally; and the practical habits of whose life had put him on his guard with respect to all speculative reasoning, without rendering him insensible to the desirableness of principles more secure than the shifting rules and theories generalized from observations merely empirical, or unconscious in how many departments of knowledge, and with how large a portion even of professional men, such principles are still a desideratum. I would select, too, one who felt kindly, nay, even partially, toward me; but one whose partiality had its strongest foundations in hope, and more prospective than retrospective would make him quick-sighted in the detection, and unreserved in the exposure, of the deficiencies and defects of each present work, in the anticipation of a more developed future. In you, honored friend! I have found all these requisites combined and realized: and the improvement, which these essays have derived from your judgment and judicious suggestions, would, of itself, have justified me in accompanying them with a public acknowledgment of the same. But knowing, as you can not but know, that I owe in great measure the power of having written at all to your medical skill, and to the characteristic good sense which directed its exertion in my behalf; and whatever I may

* Dedication to the second edition.—Ed.
have written in happier vein to the influence of your society and to the daily proofs of your disinterested attachment;—knowing, too, in how entire a sympathy with your feelings in this respect the partner of your name has blended the affectionate regards of a sister or daughter with almost a mother's watchful and unwearied solicitudes alike for my health, interest, and tranquillity;—you will not, I trust, be pained,—you ought not, I am sure, to be surprised—that
TO

MR. AND MRS. GILLMAN,

OF HIGHGATE,

These Volumes are dedicated,

IN TESTIMONY OF HIGH RESPECT AND GRATEFUL AFFECTION,

BY THEIR FRIEND,

S. T. COLERIDGE.

October 7, 1818.
Highgate.
THE FRIEND.

ESSAY I.

Crede mihi, non est parva fiducia, polliceris opem decertantibus, consilium dubiis, lumen cecis, opem dejectis, refrigerium fessis. Magna quidem hac sunt, si sient; parva, si promittantur. Verum ego non tam aliis legem ponam, quam legem vobis meae propria mentis exponam; quam qui probaverit, teneat; cui non placuerit, abjiciat. Optarem, fateor, talis esse, qui posses possem quam plurimis. PETRARCH. De vita solitaria.*

Believe me, it requires no little confidence, to promise help to the struggling, counsel to the doubtful, light to the blind, hope to the despondent, refreshment to the weary. These are indeed great things, if they be accomplished; trifles if they exist but in a promise. I, however, aim not so much to prescribe a law for others, as to set forth the law of my own mind; which let the man, who shall have approved of it, abide by; and let him, to whom it shall appear not reasonable, reject it. It is my earnest wish, I confess, to employ my understanding and acquirements in that mode and direction, in which I may be enabled to benefit the largest number possible of my fellow-creatures.

ANTECEDENTLY to all history, and long glimmering through it as a holy tradition, there presents itself to our imagination an indefinite period, dateless as eternity; a state rather than a time. For even the sense of succession is lost in the uniformity of the stream.

It was toward the close of this golden age (the memory of which the self-dissatisfied race of men have everywhere preserved and cherished) when conscience acted in man with the ease and uniformity of instinct; when labor was a sweet name for the activity of sane minds in healthful bodies, and all enjoyed

* Lib. I. tract. iv. c. 4. Some clauses in the original are omitted, and one or two changes of words have been made, by the Author, in this quotation.—Ed.
in common the bounteous harvest produced, and gathered in, by common effort; when there existed in the sexes, and in the individuals of each sex, just variety enough to permit and call forth the gentle restlessness and final union of chaste love and individual attachment, each seeking and finding the beloved one by the natural affinity of their beings; when the dread Sovereign of the universe was known only as the universal parent, no altar but the pure heart, and thanksgiving and grateful love the sole sacrifice.—

In this blest age of dignified innocence, one of their honored elders, whose absence they were beginning to notice, entered with hurrying steps the place of their common assemblage at noon, and instantly attracted the general attention and wonder by the perturbation of his gestures, and by a strange trouble both in his eyes and over his whole countenance. After a short but deep silence, when the first buzz of varied inquiry was becoming audible, the old man moved toward a small eminence, and having ascended it, he thus addressed the hushed and listening company:

"In the warmth of the approaching mid-day, as I was repos- ing in the vast cavern, out of which, from its northern portal, issues the river that winds through our vale, a voice powerful, yet not from its loudness, suddenly hailed me. Guided by my ear, I looked toward the supposed place of the sound for some form, from which it had proceeded. I beheld nothing but the glimmering walls of the cavern. Again, as I was turning round, the same voice hailed me: and whithersoever I turned my face, thence did the voice seem to proceed. I stood still, therefore, and in reverence awaited its continuation. 'Sojourner of earth!' (these were its words) 'hasten to the meeting of thy brethren, and the words which thou now hearest, the same do thou repeat unto them. On the thirtieth morn from the morrow's sunrising, and during the space of thrice three days and thrice three nights, a thick cloud will cover the sky, and a heavy rain fall on the earth. Go ye therefore, ere the thirtieth sun arise, retreat to the cavern of the river, and there abide, till the clouds have passed away, and the rain be over and gone. For know ye of a certainty that whomever that rain wetteth, on him, yea, on him and on his children's children will fall—the spirit of madness.'
Yes! madness was the word of the voice: what this be, I know not! But at the sound of the word trembling came upon me, and a feeling which I would not have had; and I remained even as ye beheld and now behold me."

The old man ended, and retired. Confused murmurs succeeded, and wonder, and doubt. Day followed day, and every day brought with it a diminution of the awe impressed. They could attach no image, no remembered sensations, to the threat. The ominous morn arrived, the prophet had retired to the appointed cavern, and there remained alone during the appointed time. On the tenth morning, he emerged from his place of shelter, and sought his friends and brethren. But alas! how affrightful the change! Instead of the common children of one great family, working toward the same aim by reason, even as the bees in their hives by instinct, he looked and beheld, here a miserable wretch watching over a heap of hard and innutritious small substances, which he had dug out of the earth, at the cost of mangled limbs and exhausted faculties. This he appeared to worship, at this he gazed, even as the youths of the vale had been accustomed to gaze at their chosen virgins in the first season of their choice. There he saw a former companion speeding on and panting after a butterfly, or a withered leaf whirling onward in the breeze; and another with pale and distorted countenance following close behind, and still stretching forth a dagger to stab his precursor in the back. In another place he observed a whole troop of his fellow-men famished and in fetters, yet led by one of their brethren who had enslaved them, and pressing furiously onward, in the hope of famishing and enslaving another troop moving in an opposite direction. For the first time, the prophet missed his accustomed power of distinguishing between his dreams and his waking perceptions. He stood gazing and motionless, when several of the race gathered around him, and inquired of each other, Who is this man? how strangely he looks! how wild!—a worthless idler! exclaims one: assuredly, a very dangerous madman! cries a second. In short, from words they proceeded to violence: till harassed, endangered, solitary in a world of forms like his own, without sympathy, without object of love, he at length espied in some foss or furrow a quantity of the maddening water still unevaporated, and uttering the last words of reason, IT IS IN VAIN TO BE SANE IN A
WORLD OF MADMEN, plunged and rolled himself in the liquid poison, and came out as mad as, and not more wretched than, his neighbors and acquaintances.

The plan of The Friend is comprised in the motto to this essay. This tale or allegory seems to me to contain the objections to its practicability in all their strength. Either, says the skeptic, you are the blind offering to lead the blind, or you are talking the language of sight to those who do not possess the sense of seeing. If you mean to be read, try to entertain, and do not pretend to instruct. To such objections it would be amply sufficient, on my system of faith, to answer, that we are not all blind, but all subject to distempers of the mental sight, differing in kind and in degree; that though all men are in error, they are not all in the same error, nor at the same time; and that each, therefore, may possibly heal the other, even as two or more physicians, all diseased in their general health, yet under the immediate action of the disease on different days, may remove or alleviate the complaints of each other. But in respect to the entertainingness of moral writings, if in entertainment be included whatever delights the imagination or affects the generous passions, so far from rejecting such a mean of persuading the human soul, my very system compels me to defend not only the propriety, but the absolute necessity, of adopting it, if we really intend to render our fellow-creatures better or wiser.

But it is with dullness as with obscurity. It may be positive, and the author's fault; but it may likewise be relative, and if the author has presented his bill of fare at the portal, the reader has himself only to blame. The main question then is, of what class are the persons to be entertained?—" One of the later school of the Grecians (says Lord Bacon) examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it that men should love lies, where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets; nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie's sake. But I can not tell: this same truth is a naked and open daylight, that doth not show the masques and mummeries and triumphs of the world half so stately and daintily, as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that sheweth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that sheweth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken
from men's minds, vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men, poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?"

A melancholy, a too general, but not, I trust, a universal truth!—and even where it does apply, yet in many instances not irremediable. Such at least must have been my persuasion; or the present volumes must have been wittingly written to no purpose. If I believed our nature fettered to all this wretchedness of head and heart by an absolute and innate necessity, at least by a necessity which no human power, no efforts of reason or eloquence, could remove or lessen; I should deem it even presumptuous to aim at other or higher object than that of amusing a small portion of the reading public.

And why not? whispers worldly prudence. To amuse, though only to amuse, our visitors is wisdom as well as good-nature, where it is presumption to attempt their amendment. And truly it would be most convenient to me in respects of no trifling importance, if I could persuade myself to take the advice. Released by these principles from all moral obligation, and ambitious of procuring pastime and self-oblivion for a race, which could have nothing noble to remember, nothing desirable to anticipate, I might aspire even to the praise of the critics and dilettanti of the higher circles of society; of some trusty guide of blind fashion; some pleasant analyst of taste, as it exists both in the palate and the soul; some living gauge and mete-wand of past and present genius. But alas! my former studies would still have left a wrong bias! If instead of perplexing my common sense with the flights of Plato, and of stiffening over the meditations of the imperial Stoic, I had been laboring to imbibe the gay spirit of a Casti, or had employed my erudition, for the benefit of the favored few, in elucidating the interesting deformities of ancient Greece and India, what might I not have hoped from the suffrage of those, who turn in weariness from the Paradise Lost, because compared with the prurient heroes and grotesque monsters of Italian romance, or even with the narrative dialogues of the melodious Metastasio, that adventurous song,

Which justifies the ways of God to man,—

* Essays. I. Of Truth.—Ed.
has been found a poor substitute for a Grimaldi, a most inapt medicine for an occasional propensity to yawn! For, as hath been decided, to fill up pleasantly the brief intervals of fashionable pleasures, and above all to charm away the dusky gnome of ennui, is the chief and appropriate business of the poet and the novelist! This duty unfulfilled, Apollo will have lavished his best gifts in vain; and Urania henceforth must be content to inspire astronomers alone, and leave the sons of verse to more amusing patronesses. And yet—and yet—but it will be time to be serious, when my visitors have sat down.
ESSAY II.

Sic oportet ad librum, presentim miscellanei generis, legendum accedere lectorem, ut solet ad convivium conviva civilis. Convivator annititur omnibus satisfacere: et tamen si quid apponitur, quod hujus aut illius palato non respondeat, et hic et ille urbane dissimulant, et alia fercula probant, ne quid contristent convivatorem. Quis enim eum convivam ferat, qui tantum hoc animo veniat ad mensam, ut carpens quae apponunter, nec vescatur ipse, nec alios vesci sinat? Et tamen his quoque reperias inciviliores, qui palam, qui sine fine damnent ac lacerent opus, quod nunquam legerint. Ast hoc plusquam sycophanticum est damnare quod nescias. ERASMUS.

A reader should sit down to a book, especially of the miscellaneous kind, as a well-behaved visitor does to a banquet. The master of the feast exerts himself to satisfy all his guests; but if after all his care and pains there should still be something or other put on the table that does not suit this or that person's taste, they politely pass it over without noticing the circumstance, and commend other dishes, that they may not distress their kind host, or throw any damp on his spirits. For who could tolerate a guest that accepted an invitation to your table with no other purpose but that of finding fault with every thing put before him, neither eating himself, nor suffering others to eat in comfort. And yet you may fall in with a still worse set than even these, with churl that in all companies and without stop or stay, will condemn and pull to pieces a work which they have never read. But this sinks below the baseness of an informer, yea, though he were a false witness to boot! The man, who abuses a thing of which he is utterly ignorant, unites the infamy of both—and in addition to this, makes himself the pander and sycophant of his own and other men's envy and malignity.

The musician may tune his instrument in private, ere his audience have yet assembled; the architect conceals the foundation of his building beneath the superstructure. But an author's harp must be tuned in the hearing of those, who are to understand its after-harmonies; the foundation stones of his edifice must lie open to common view, or his friends will hesitate to trust themselves beneath the roof.

From periodical literature the general reader deems himself vol. π.
entitled to expect amusement, and some degree of information, and if the writer can convey any instruction at the same time, and without demanding any additional thought (as the Irishman, in the hackneyed jest, is said to have passed off a light guinea between two good halfpence), this supererogatory merit will not perhaps be taken amiss. Now amusement in and for itself may be afforded by the gratification either of the curiosity or of the passions. I use the former word as distinguished from the love of knowledge, and the latter in distinction from those emotions which arise in well-ordered minds, from the perception of truth or falsehood, virtue or vice:—emotions, which are always preceded by thought, and linked with improvement. Again, all information pursued without any wish of becoming wiser or better thereby, I class among the gratifications of mere curiosity, whether it be sought for in a light novel or a grave history. We may therefore omit the word information, as included either in amusement or instruction.

The present work is an experiment; not whether a writer may honestly overlook the one, or successfully omit the other, of the two elements themselves, which serious readers at least persuade themselves that they pursue; but whether a change might not be hazarded of the usual order, in which periodical writers have in general attempted to convey them. Having myself experienced that no delight either in kind or degree is equal to that which accompanies the distinct perception of a fundamental truth, relative to our moral being; having, long after the completion of what is ordinarily called a learned education, discovered a new world of intellectual profit opening on me—not from any new opinions, but lying, as it were, at the roots of those which I had been taught in childhood in my catechism and spelling-book; there arose a soothing hope in my mind that a lesser public might be found, composed of persons susceptible of the same delight, and desirous of attaining it by the same process. I heard a whisper too from within, (I trust that it proceeded from conscience, not vanity) that a duty was performed in the endeavor to render it as much easier to them, than it had been to me, as could be effected by the united efforts of my understanding and imagination.

Actuated by this impulse, the writer wishes, in the following essays, to convey not instruction merely, but fundamental in-
struction; not so much to show the reader this or that fact, as to kindle his own torch for him, and leave it to himself to choose the particular objects, which he might wish to examine by its light. The Friend does not indeed exclude from his plan occasional interludes, and vacations of innocent entertainment and promiscuous information, but still in the main he proposes to himself the communication of such delight as rewards the march of truth, rather than to collect the flowers which diversify its track, in order to present them apart from the homely, yet foodful or medicinal herbs, among which they had grown. To refer men's opinions to their absolute principles, and thence their feelings to the appropriate objects, and in their due degrees; and finally, to apply the principles thus ascertained, to the formation of steadfast convictions concerning the most important questions of politics, morality, and religion—these are to be the objects and the contents of his work.

Themes like these not even the genius of a Plato or a Bacon could render intelligible, without demanding from the reader thought sometimes, and attention generally. By thought I here mean the voluntary production in our own minds of those states of consciousness, to which, as to his fundamental facts, the writer has referred us: while attention has for its object the order and connection of thoughts and images, each of which is in itself already and familiarly known. Thus the elements of geometry require attention only; but the analysis of our primary faculties, and the investigation of all the absolute grounds of religion and morals, are impossible without energies of thought in addition to the effort of attention. The Friend will not attempt to disguise from his readers that both attention and thought are efforts, and the latter a most difficult and laborious effort; nor from himself, that to require it often or for any continuance of time, is incompatible with the nature of the present publication, even were it less incongruous than it unfortunately is with the present habits and pursuits of Englishmen. Accordingly I shall be on my guard to make the essays as few as possible, which would require from a well-educated reader any energy of thought and voluntary abstraction.

But attention, I confess, will be requisite throughout, except in the excursive and miscellaneous essays that will be found interposed between each of the three main divisions of the work. On
whatever subject the mind feels a lively interest, attention, though always an effort, becomes a delightful effort. I should be quite at ease, could I secure for the whole work as much of it, as a card party of earnest whist-players often expend in a single evening, or a lady in the making-up of a fashionable dress. But where no interest previously exists, attention (as every school-master knows) can be procured only by terror: which is the true reason why the majority of mankind learn nothing systematically, except as school-boys or apprentices.

Happy shall I be, from other motives besides those of self-interest, if no fault or deficiency on my part shall prevent the work from furnishing a presumptive proof, that there are still to be found among us a respectable number of readers who are desirous to derive pleasure from the consciousness of being instructed or meliorated: and who feel a sufficient interest as to the foundations of their own opinions in literature, politics, morals, and religion, to afford that degree of attention, without which, however men may deceive themselves, no actual progress ever was or ever can be made in that knowledge, which supplies at once both strength and nourishment.
ESSAY III.

When I received the Muse from you, I found her puffed and pampered, with pompous sentences and terms, a cumbrous huge virago. My first attention was applied to make her look genteelly, and bring her to a moderate bulk by dint of lighter diet, I fed her with plain household phrase, and cool familiar salad, with water-gruel episode, with sentimental jelly, with moral mince-meat: till at length I brought her within compass.

IMITATION.*

In the preceding essay I named the present undertaking an experiment. The explanation will be found in the following letter, written to a correspondent during the first attempt, and before the plan was discontinued from an original error in the mode of circulation.

When I first undertook the present publication for the sake and with the avowed object of referring men in all things to principles or fundamental truths, I was well aware of the obstacles which the plan itself would oppose to my success. For in

* This imitation is printed here by permission of the author, from a series of free translations of selected scenes from Aristophanes: a work, of which (should the author be persuaded to make it public) it is my deliberate judgment, that it will form an important epoch in English literature, and open out sources of metrical and rhythmical wealth in the very heart of our language, of which few, if any, among us are aware.
order to the regular attainment of this object, all the dryest and least attractive essays must appear in the beginning, and thus subject me to the necessity of demanding effort or soliciting patience in that part of the work, where it was most my interest to secure the confidence of my readers by winning their favor. Though I dared warrant for the pleasantness of the journey on the whole; though I might promise that the road would, for the far greater part of it, be found plain and easy, that it would pass through countries of various prospect, and that at every stage there would be a change of company; it still remained a heavy disadvantage, that I had to start at the foot of a high and steep hill: and I foresaw, not without occasional feelings of despondency, that during the slow and laborious ascent it would require no common management to keep my passengers in good-humor with the vehicle and its driver. As far as this inconvenience could be palliated by sincerity and previous confession, I have no reason to accuse myself of neglect. In the prospectus* of The Friend, which for this cause I reprinted and annexed to the first essay, I felt it my duty to inform such as might be inclined to patronize the publication, that I must submit to be esteemed dull by those who sought chiefly for amusement: and this I hazarded as a general confession, though in my own mind I felt a cheerful confidence that it would apply almost exclusively to the earlier essays. I could not therefore be surprised, however much I may have been depressed, by the frequency with which you hear The Friend complained of for its abstruseness and obscurity; nor did the highly flattering expressions, with which you accompanied your communication, prevent me from feeling its truth to the whole extent.

An author's pen, like children's legs, improves by exercise. That part of the blame which rests on myself, I am exerting my best faculties to remove. A man long accustomed to silent and solitary meditation, in proportion as he increases the power of thinking in long and connected trains, is apt to lose or lessen the talent of communicating his thoughts with grace and perspicuity. Doubtless too, I have in some measure injured my style, in respect to its facility and popularity, from having almost confined my reading, of late years, to the works of the ancients and those of the elder writers in the modern languages. We insensibly imitate

* See Appendix A.—Ed.
what we habitually admire; and an aversion to the epigrammatic unconnected periods of the fashionable Anglo-Gallican taste has too often made me willing to forget, that the stately march and difficult evolutions, which characterize the eloquence of Hooker, Bacon, Milton, and Jeremy Taylor, are, notwithstanding their intrinsic excellence, still less suited to a periodical essay. This fault I am now endeavoring to correct; though I can never so far sacrifice my judgment to the desire of being immediately popular, as to cast my sentences in the French moulds, or affect a style which an ancient critic would have deemed purposely invented for persons troubled with the asthma to read, and for those to comprehend who labor under the more pitiable asthma of a short-witted intellect. It can not but be injurious to the human mind—never to be called into effort: the habit of receiving pleasure without any exertion of thought, by the mere excitement of curiosity and sensibility, may be justly ranked among the worst effects of habitual novel reading. It is true that these short and unconnected sentences are easily and instantly understood: but it is equally true, that wanting all the cement of thought as well as of style, all the connections, and (if you will forgive so trivial a metaphor) all the hooks-and-eyes of the memory, they are easily forgotten: or rather, it is scarcely possible that they should be remembered.—Nor is it less true, that those who confine their reading to such books dwarf their own faculties, and finally reduce their understandings to a deplorable imbecility: the fact you mention, and which I shall hereafter make use of, is a fair instance and a striking illustration. Like idle morning visitors, the brisk and breathless periods hurry in and hurry off in quick and profitless succession; each indeed for the moments of its stay prevents the pain of vacancy, while it indulges the love of sloth; but all together they leave the mistress of the house (the soul, I mean) flat and exhausted, incapable of attending to her own concerns, and unfitted for the conversation of more rational guests.

I know you will not suspect me of fostering so idle a hope, as that of obtaining acquittal by recrimination; or think that I am attacking one fault, in order that its opposite may escape notice in the noise and smoke of the battery. On the contrary, I shall do my best, and even make all allowable sacrifices, to render my manner more attractive and my matter more generally interesting. In the establishment of principles and fundamental doc-
trines, I must of necessity require the attention of my reader to become my fellow-laborer. The primary facts essential to the intelligibility of my principles I can prove to others only as far as I can prevail on them to retire into themselves and make their own minds the objects of their steadfast attention. But, on the other hand, I feel too deeply the importance of the convictions, which first impelled me to the present undertaking, to leave unattempted any honorable means of recommending them to as wide a circle as possible.

Hitherto I have been employed in laying the foundation of my work. But the proper merit of a foundation is its massiveness and solidity. The conveniences and ornaments, the gilding and stucco work, the sunshine and sunny prospects, will come with the superstructure. Yet I dare not flatter myself, that any endeavors of mine, compatible with the duty I owe to truth and the hope of permanent utility, will render The Friend agreeable to the majority of what is called the reading public. I never expected it. How indeed could I, when I was to borrow so little from the influence of passing events, and when I had absolutely excluded from my plan all appeals to personal curiosity and personal interests? Yet even this is not my greatest impediment. No real information can be conveyed, no important errors rectified, no widely injurious prejudices rooted up, without requiring some effort of thought on the part of the reader. But the obstinate (and toward a contemporary writer, the contemptuous) aversion to intellectual effort is the mother evil of all which I had proposed to war against, the queen bee in the hive of our errors and misfortunes, both private and national. To solicit the attention of those, on whom these debilitating causes have acted to their full extent, would be no less absurd than to recommend exercise with the dumb-bells, as the only mode of cure, to a patient paralytic in both arms. You well know, that my expectations were more modest as well as more rational. I hoped, that my readers in general would be aware of the impracticability of suiting every essay to every taste in any period of the work; and that they would not attribute wholly to the author, but in part to the necessity of his plan, the austerity and absence of the lighter graces in the first fifteen or twenty numbers. In my cheerful moods I sometimes flattered myself, that a few even among those, who foresaw that my lucubrations would at all
times require more attention than from the nature of their own
employments they could afford them, might yet find a pleasure
in supporting The Friend during its infancy, so as to give it a
chance of attracting the notice of others, to whom its style and
subjects might be better adapted. But my main anchor was the
hope, that when circumstances gradually enabled me to adopt
the ordinary means of making the publication generally known,
there might be found throughout the kingdom a sufficient num-
ber of meditative minds, who, entertaining similar convictions
with myself, and gratified by the prospect of seeing them re-
duced to form and system, would take a warm interest in the
work from the very circumstance, that it wanted those allure-
ments of transitory interests, which render particular patronage
superfluous, and for the brief season of their blow and fragrance
attract the eye of thousands, who would pass unregarded

Of sober tint, and herbs of med'cinable powers.

In these three introductory essays, the Friend has endeavored
to realize his promise of giving an honest bill of fare, both as to
the objects and the style of the work. With reference to both I
conclude with a prophecy of Simon Grynaeus, from his premoni-
tion to the candid reader, prefixed to Ficinus's translation of
Plato, published at Leyden, 1557. How far it has been gradu-
ally fulfilled in this country since the Revolution in 1688, I leave
to my candid and intelligent readers to determine:—

Ac dolet mihi quidem deliciis literarum inscatos subito jam
hominis aede esse, præsertim qui Christianos se profitentur, ut
legere nisi quod ad presentem gustum facit, sustineant nihil :
unde et disciplinæ et philosophia ipsa jam fere prorsus etiam a
doctis negliguntur. Quod quidem propositum studiorum nisi
mature corrigetur, tam magnum rebus incommodum dabit, quam
dedit barbaries olim. Pertinax res barbaries est, fator; sed
minus potest tamen, quam illa persuasa prudencia literarum si
ratione carat, sapientiae virtutisque specie misere lectores circum-
ducens.

Succedet igitur, ut arbitror, haud ita multo post, pro rusti-
In very truth, it grieveth me that men, those especially who profess themselves to be Christians, should be so taken with the sweet baits of literature that they can endure to read nothing but what gives them immediate gratification, no matter how low or sensual it may be. Consequently, the more austere and disciplinary branches of philosophy itself are almost wholly neglected, even by the learned.—A course of study (if such reading, with such a purpose in view, could deserve that name) which, if not corrected in time, will occasion worse consequences than even barbarism did in the times of our forefathers. Barbarism is, I own, a wilful headstrong thing; but with all its blind obstinacy it has less power of doing harm than this self-sufficient, self-satisfied plain good common sense sort of writing, this prudent saleable popular style of composition, if it be deserted by reason and scientific insight pitiably decoying the minds of men by an imposing show of amiableness, and practical wisdom, so that the delighted reader knowing nothing knows all about almost every thing. There will succeed, therefore, in my opinion, and that too within no long time, to the rudeness and rusticity of our age, that ensnaring meretricious popularness in literature, with all the tricksy humilities of the ambitious candidates for the favorable suffrages of the judicious public, which if we do not take good care will break up and scatter before it all robustness and manly vigor of intellect, all masculine fortitude of virtue.

* In the original of this passage, the words gulam and mortales stand respectively for præsentiæ gustum and lectores.—Ed.
ESSAY IV.

Si modo quae natura et ratione concessa sint, assumptionis suspicio a nobis quam longissime absesse debet. Multa antiquitati, nobismet nihil, arrogamus. Nihilne vos? Nihil mehercule, nisi quod omnia omni animo veritati arrogamus et sanctimonias.

ULR. RINOY. De Controversiis.

If we assume only what nature and reason have granted, with no shadow of right can we be suspected of presumption. To antiquity we arrogate many things, to ourselves nothing. Nothing? Aye, nothing: unless indeed it be, that with all our strength we arrogate all things to truth and moral purity.

It has been remarked by the celebrated Haller, that we are deaf while we are yawning. The same act of drowsiness that stretches open our mouths, closes our ears. It is much the same in acts of the understanding. A lazy half-attention amounts to a mental yawn. Where then a subject, that demands thought, has been thoughtfully treated, and with an exact and patient derivation from its principles, we must be willing to exert a portion of the same effort, and to think with the author, or the author will have thought in vain for us. It makes little difference for the time being, whether there be an hiatus oscillans in the reader's attention, or an hiatus lacrymabilis in the author's manuscript. When this occurs during the perusal of a work of known authority and established fame, we honestly lay the fault on our own deficiency, or on the unfitness of our present mood; but when it is a contemporary production, over which we have been nodding, it is far more pleasant to pronounce it insufferably dull and obscure. Indeed, as charity begins at home, it would be unreasonable to expect that a reader should charge himself with lack of intellect, when the effect may be equally well accounted for by declaring the author unintelligible; or that he should accuse his own inattention, when by half a dozen phrases
of abuse, as "heavy stuff, metaphysical jargon," &c., he can at once excuse his laziness, and gratify his pride, scorn, and envy. To similar impulses we must attribute the praises of a true modern reader, when he meets with a work in the true modern taste: namely, either in skipping, unconnected, short-winded, asthmatic sentences, as easy to be understood as impossible to be remembered, in which the merest common-place acquires a momentary poignancy, a petty titillating sting, from affected point and wilful antithesis; or else in strutting and rounded periods, in which the emptiest truisms are blown up into illustrious bubbles by help of film and inflation. "Aye!" (quoth the delighted reader) "this is sense, this is genius! this I understand and admire! I have thought the very same a hundred times myself!" In other words, this man has reminded me of my own cleverness, and therefore I admire him. Oh! for one piece of egotism that presents itself under its own honest bare face of I myself I, there are fifty that steal out in the mask of tu-isms and ille-isms!

It has ever been my opinion, that an excessive solicitude to avoid the use of our first personal pronoun, more often has its source in conscious selfishness than in true self-oblivion. A quiet observer of human follies may often amuse or sadden his thoughts by detecting a perpetual feeling of purest egotism through a long masquerade of disguises, the half of which, had old Proteus been master of as many, would have wearied out the patience of Menelaus. I say, the patience only: for it would ask more than the simplicity of Polypheme, with his one eye extinguished, to be deceived by so poor a repetition of Nobody. Yet I can with strictest truth assure my readers that with a pleasure combined with a sense of weariness, I see the nigh approach of that point of my labors, in which I can convey my opinions and the workings of my heart, without reminding the reader obtrusively of myself. But the frequency with which I have spoken in my own person, recalls my apprehensions to the second danger, which it was my hope to guard against; the probable charge of arrogance, or presumption, both for daring to dissent from the opinions of great authorities, and, in my following numbers perhaps, from the general opinion concerning the true value of certain authorities deemed great. The word presumption, I appropriate to the internal feeling, and arrogance to the way and manner of outwardly expressing ourselves.
As no man can rightfully be condemned without reference to some definite law, by the knowledge of which he might have avoided the given fault, it is necessary so to define the constituent qualities and conditions of arrogance, that a reason may be assignable why we pronounce one man guilty and acquit another. For merely to call a person arrogant or most arrogant, can convict no one of the vice except perhaps the accuser. I remember, when a young man who had left his books and a glass of water to join a convivial party, each of whom had nearly finished his second bottle, was pronounced very drunk by the whole party—he looked so strange and pale! Many a man, who has contrived to hide his ruling passion or predominant defect from himself, will betray the same to dispassionate observers, by his proneness on all occasions to suspect or accuse others of it. Now arrogance and presumption, like all other moral qualities, must be shown by some act or conduct: and this too must be an act that implies, if not an immediate concurrence of the will, yet some faulty constitution of the moral habits. For all criminality supposes its essentials to have been within the power of the agent. Either, therefore, the facts adduced do of themselves convey the whole proof of the charge, and the question rests on the truth or accuracy with which they have been stated; or they acquire their character from the circumstances. I have looked into a ponderous review of the corpuscular philosophy by a Sicilian Jesuit, in which the acrimonious Father frequently expresses his doubt, whether he should pronounce Boyle or Newton more impious than presumptuous, or more presumptuous than impious. They had both attacked the reigning opinions on most important subjects, opinions sanctioned by the greatest names of antiquity, and by the general suffrage of their learned contemporaries or immediate predecessors. Locke was assailed with a full cry for his presumption in having deserted the philosophical system at that time generally received by the universities of Europe; and of late years Dr. Priestley bestowed the epithets of arrogant and insolent on Reid, Beattie, &c., for presuming to arraign certain opinions of Mr. Locke, himself repaid in kind by many of his own countrymen for his theological novelties. It will scarcely be affirmed, that these accusations were all of them just, or that any of them were fit or courteous. Must we therefore say, that in order to avow doubt or disbelief of a popular persua-
sion without arrogance, it is required that the dissentient should
know himself to possess the genius, and foreknow that he should
acquire the reputation, of Locke, Newton, Boyle, or even of a
Reid or Beattie? But as this knowledge and prescience are
impossible in the strict sense of the words, and could mean no
more than a strong inward conviction, it is manifest that such a
rule, if it were universally established, would encourage the pre-
sumptuous, and condemn modest and humble minds alone to
silence. And as this silence could not acquit the individual's
own mind of presumption, unless it were accompanied by con-
scious acquiescence; modesty itself must become an inert quality,
which even in private society never displays its charms more
unequivocally than in its mode of reconciling moral deference
with intellectual courage, and general diffidence with sincerity
in the avowal of the particular conviction.

We must seek then elsewhere for the true marks, by which
presumption or arrogance may be detected, and on which the
charge may be grounded with little hazard of mistake or injus-
tice. And as I confine my present observations to literature, I
deem such criteria neither difficult to determine nor to apply.
The first mark, as it appears to me, is a frequent bare assertion
of opinions not generally received, without condescending to pre-
fix or annex the facts and reasons on which such opinions were
formed; especially if this absence of logical courtesy is supplied
by contemptuous or abusive treatment of such as happen to doubt
of, or oppose, the decisive ipse dixi. But to assert, however
nakedly, that a passage in a lewd novel, in which the Sacred
Writings are denounced as more likely to pollute the young and
innocent mind than a romance notorious for its indecency—to as-
sert, I say, that such a passage argues equal impudence and
ignorance in its author, at the time of writing and publishing
it—this is not arrogance; although to a vast majority of the
decent part of our countrymen it would be superfluous as a truism,
if it were exclusively an author's business to convey or revive
knowledge, and not sometimes his duty to awaken the indigna-
tion of his reader by the expression of his own.

A second species of this unamiable quality, which has been
often distinguished by the name of Warburtonian arrogance, be-
trays itself, not as in the former, by proud or petulant omission of
proof or argument, but by the habit of ascribing weakness of in-
tellect, or want of taste and sensibility, or hardness of heart, or corruption of moral principle, to all who deny the truth of the doctrine, or the sufficiency of the evidence, or the fairness of the reasoning adduced in its support. This is indeed not essentially different from the first, but assumes a separate character from its accompaniments: for though both the doctrine and its proofs may have been legitimately supplied by the understanding, yet the bitterness of personal crimination will resolve itself into naked assertion. We are, therefore, authorized by experience, and justified on the principle of self-defence and by the law of fair retaliation, in attributing it to a vicious temper arrogant from irritability, or irritable from arrogance. This learned arrogance admits of many gradations, and is aggravated or palliated, accordingly as the point in dispute has been more or less controverted, as the reasoning bears a smaller or greater proportion to the virulence of the personal detraction, and as the person or parties, who are the objects of it, are more or less respected, more or less worthy of respect.*

Lastly, it must be admitted as a just imputation of presumption

* Had the author of the Divine Legation of Moses more skilfully appropriated his coarse eloquence of abuse, his customary assurances of the idiocy, both in head and heart, of all his opponents; if he had employed those vigorous arguments of his own vehement humor in the defence of truths acknowledged and reverenced by learned men in general; or if he had confined them to the names of Chubb, Woolston, and other precursors of Thomas Paine; we should perhaps still characterize his mode of controversy by its rude violence, but not so often have heard his name used, even by those who have never read his writings, as a proverbial expression for learned arrogance. But when a novel and doubtful hypothesis of his own formation was the citadel to be defended, and his mephitic hand-granados were thrown with the fury of lawless despotism at the fair reputation of a Sykes and a Lardner, we not only confirm the verdict of his independent contemporaries, but cease to wonder, that arrogance should render men objects of contempt in many, and of aversion in all, instances, when it was capable of hurrying a Christian teacher of equal talents and learning into a slanderous vulgarity, which escapes our disgust only when we see the writer's own reputation the sole victim. But throughout his great work, and the pamphlets in which he supported it, he always seems to write as if he had deemed it a duty of decorum to publish his fancies on the Mosaic Law as the Law itself was delivered, that is, in thunders and lightnings: or as if he had applied to his own book instead of the sacred mount, the menace,—*There shall not a hand touch it but he shall surely be stoned or shot through.*
when an individual obtrudes on the public eye, with all the high pretensions of originality, opinions and observations, in regard to which he must plead wilful ignorance in order to be acquitted of dishonest plagiarism. On the same seat must the writer be placed, who in a disquisition on any important subject proves, by falsehoods either of omission or of positive error, that he has neglected to possess himself, not only of the information requisite for this particular subject; but even of those acquirements, and that general knowledge, which could alone authorize him to commence a public instructor. This is an office which can not be procured gratis. The industry, necessary for the due exercise of its functions, is its purchase-money; and the absence or insufficiency of the same is so far a species of dishonesty, and implies a presumption in the literal as well as the ordinary sense of the word. He has taken a thing before he had acquired any right or title thereto.

If in addition to this unfitness which every man possesses the means of ascertaining, his aim should be to unsettle a general belief closely connected with public and private quiet; and if his language and manner be avowedly calculated for the illiterate, and perhaps licentious, part of his countrymen; disgusting as his presumption must appear, it is yet lost or evanescent in the close neighborhood of his guilt. That Hobbes translated Homer into English verse and published his translation, furnishes no positive evidence of his self-conceit, though it implies a great lack of self-knowledge and of acquaintance with the nature of poetry.* A strong wish often imposes itself on the mind for an actual power: the mistake is favored by the innocent pleasure derived from the exercise of versification, perhaps by the approbation of intimates; and the candidate asks from more impartial readers that sentence, which nature has not enabled him to anticipate. But when the philosopher of Malmesbury waged war with Wallis and the fundamental truths of pure geometry, every instance of his gross ignorance and utter misconception of the very elements of the science he proposed to confute, furnished an unanswerable fact in

* At the time I wrote this essay, and indeed till the present month, December, 1818, I had never seen Hobbes' translation of the Odyssey, which, I now find, is by no means to be spoken of contemptuously. It is doubtless as much too ballad-like, as the later versions are too epic; but still, on the whole, it leaves a much truer impression of the original.
proof of his high presumption; and the confident and insulting language of the attack leaves the judicious reader in as little doubt of his gross arrogance. An illiterate mechanic, who mistaking some disturbance of his nerves for a miraculous call proceeds alone to convert a tribe of savages, whose language he can have no natural means of acquiring, may have been misled by impulses very different from those of high self-opinion; but the illiterate perpetrator of the 'Age of Reason' must have had his very conscience stupefied by the habitual intoxication of presumptuous arrogance, and his common sense over-clouded by the vapors from his heart.

As long therefore as I obtrude no unsupported assertions on my readers; and as long as I state my opinions and the evidence which induced or compelled me to adopt them, with calmness and that diffidence in myself, which is by no means incompatible with a firm belief in the justness of the opinions themselves; while I attack no man's private life from any cause, and detract from no man's honors in his public character, from the truth of his doctrines, or the merits of his compositions, without detailing all my reasons and resting the result solely on the arguments adduced; while I moreover explain fully the motives of duty, which influenced me in resolving to institute such investigation; while I confine all asperity of censure, and all expressions of contempt, to gross violations of truth, honor, and decency, to the base corrupter and the detected slanderer; while I write on no subject, which I have not studied with my best attention, on no subject which my education and acquirements have incapacitated me from properly understanding; and above all while I approve myself, alike in praise and in blame, in close reasoning and in impassioned declamation, a steady friend to the two best and surest friends of all men, truth and honesty; I will not fear an accusation of either presumption or arrogance from the good and the wise, I shall pity it from the weak, and welcome it from the wicked.
ESSAY V.

In eodem pectore nullum est honestorum turpiumque consortium: et cogitare optima simul ac deterrima non magis est unius animi quam ejusdem hominis bonum esse ac malum.

There is no fellowship of honor and baseness in the same breast; and to combine the best and the worst designs is no more possible in one mind, than it is for the same man to be at the same instant virtuous and vicious.

Cognitio veritatis omnia falsa, si modo proferantur, etiam quae prius inaudita erant, et judicium et subvertere idonea est.

A knowledge of the truth is equal to the task both of discerning and of confuting all false assertions and erroneous arguments, though never before met with, if only they may freely be brought forward.

I have said, that my very system compels me to make every fair appeal to the feelings, the imagination, and even the fancy. If these are to be withheld from the service of truth, virtue, and happiness, to what purpose were they given? In whose service are they retained? I have indeed considered the disproportion of human passions to their ordinary objects among the strongest internal evidence of our future destination, and the attempt to restore them to their rightful claimants, the most imperious duty and the noblest task of genius. The verbal enunciation of this master truth could scarcely be new to me at any period of my life since earliest youth; but I well remember the particular time, when the words first became more than words to me, when they incorporated with a living conviction, and took their place among the realities of my being. On some wide common or open heath, peopled with ant-hills, during some one of the gray cloudy days of late autumn, many of my readers may have noticed the effect of a sudden and momentary flash of sunshine on all the countless

* XII. 1. 4.—Ed.
little animals within his view, aware too that the self-same influence was darted co-instantaneously over all their swarming cities as far as his eye could reach; may have observed, with what a kindly force the gleam stirs and quickens them all, and will have experienced no unpleasurable shock of feeling in seeing myriads of myriads of living and sentient beings united at the same moment in one gay sensation, one joyous activity! But awful indeed is the same appearance in a multitude of rational beings, our fellow-men, in whom too the effect is produced not so much by the external occasion as from the active quality of their own thoughts. I had walked from Göttingen in the year 1799, to witness the arrival of the Queen of Prussia, on her visit to the Baron Von Hartzberg's seat, five miles from the University. The spacious outer court of the palace was crowded with men and women, a sea of heads, with a number of children rising out of it from their fathers' shoulders. After a buzz of two hours' expectation, the avant-courier rode at full speed into the court. At the loud cracks of his long whip and the trampling of his horse's hoofs, the universal shock and torrent of emotion—I have not language to convey it—expressed as it was in such manifold looks, gestures, and attitudes, yet with one and the same feeling in the eyes of all! Recovering from the first inevitable contagion of sympathy, I involuntarily exclaimed, though in a language to myself alone intelligible, "O man! ever nobler than thy circumstances! Spread but the mist of obscure feeling over any form, and even a woman incapable of blessing or of injuring thee shall be welcomed with an intensity of emotion adequate to the reception of the Redeemer of the world!"

To a creature so highly, so fearfully gifted,—who, alienated as he is by a sorcery scarcely less mysterious than the nature on which it is exercised, yet, like the fabled son of Jove in the evil day of his sensual bewitchment, lifts the spindles and distaffs of Omphale with the arm of a giant—to such a creature truth is self-restoration: for that which is the correlative of truth, the existence of absolute life, is the only object which can attract toward it the whole depth and mass of his fluctuating being, and alone therefore can unite calmness with elevation. But it must be truth without alloy and unsophisticated. It is by the agency of indistinct conceptions, as the counterfeits of the ideal and transcendant, that evil and vanity exercise their tyranny on the feel-
ings of man. The powers of darkness are politic if not wise; but surely nothing can be more irrational in the pretended children of light, than to enlist themselves under the banners of truth, and yet rest their hopes on an alliance with delusion.

As one among the numerous artifices, by which austere truths are to be softened down into palatable falsehoods, and virtue and vice, like the atoms of Epicurus, to receive that insensible *clina-mem* which is to make them meet each other half-way, I have an especial dislike to the expression, pious frauds. Piety indeed shrinks from the very phrase, as an attempt to mix poison with the cup of blessing: while the expediency of the measures which the words were intended to recommend or palliate, appears more and more suspicious, as the range of our experience widens, and our acquaintance with the records of history becomes more extensive and accurate. One of the most seductive arguments of infidelity grounds itself on the numerous passages in the works of the Christian Fathers, asserting the lawfulness of deceit for a good purpose. For how can we rely on their testimony concerning the supernatural facts? That the Fathers held, almost without exception, that "wholly without breach of duty it is allowed to the teachers and heads of the Christian Church to employ artifices, to intermix falsehoods with truths, and especially to deceive the enemies of the faith, provided only they hereby serve the interests of truth and the advantage of mankind,"* is the unwilling confession of RIBOF. St. Jerome, as is shown by the citations of this learned theologian, boldly attributes this management—*falsitatem dispensativam*—even to the Apostles themselves. But why speak I of the advantage given to the opponents of Christianity? Alas!

* De aenom. Patrum. Integrum omnino doctoribus et eatus Christiani antistitibus esse, ut dolos versent, falsa veris intermiserent, et imprimis religi-onis hostes fallant, dummodo veritatis commodis et utilitati inserviant.—I trust, I need not add, that the imputation of such principles of action to the first inspired propagators of Christianity, is founded on a gross misconstruc-tion of those passages in the writings of St. Paul, in which the necessity of employing different arguments to men of different capacities and prejudices, is supposed and acceded to. In other words, St. Paul strove to speak intelli-gibly, willingly sacrificed indifferent things to matters of importance, and acted courteously as a man, in order to win attention as an Apostle. A traveller prefers for daily use the coin of the nation through which he is passing, to bullion or the mintage of his own country: and is this to justify a succeeding traveller in the use of counterfeit coin?
to this doctrine chiefly, and to the practices derived from it, we must attribute the utter corruption of the religion itself for so many ages, and even now over so large a portion of the civilized world. By a system of accommodating truth to falsehood, the pastors of the Church gradually changed the life and light of the Gospel into the very superstitions which they were commissioned to disperse, and thus paganized Christianity in order to christen Paganism. At this very hour Europe groans and bleeds in consequence.

So much in proof and exemplification of the probable expediency of pious deception, as suggested by its known and recorded consequences. An honest man, however, possesses a clearer light than that of history. He knows, that by sacrificing the law of his reason to the maxim of pretended prudence, he purchases the sword with the loss of the arm that is to wield it. The duties which we owe to our own moral being, are the ground and condition of all other duties; and to set our nature at strife with itself for a good purpose, implies the same sort of prudence, as a priest of Diana would have manifested, who should have proposed to dig up the celebrated charcoal foundations of the mighty temple of Ephesus, in order to furnish fuel for the burnt-offerings on its altars. Truth, virtue, and happiness, may be distinguished from each other, but can not be divided. They subsist by a mutual co-inherence, which gives a shadow of divinity even to our human nature. Will ye speak wickedly for God; and talk deceitfully for him?* is a searching question, which most affectinglly represents the grief and impatience of an uncorrupted mind at perceiving a good cause defended by ill means: and assuredly if any temptation can provoke a well-regulated temper to intolerance, it is the shameless assertion, that truth and falsehood are indifferent in their own natures; that the former is as often injurious (and therefore criminal) as the latter, and the latter on many occasions as beneficial (and consequently meritorious) as the former.

I feel it incumbent on me, therefore, to place immediately before my readers in the fullest and clearest light, the whole question of moral obligation respecting the communication of truth, its extent and conditions. I would fain obviate all apprehensions either of my incaution on the one hand, or of any insincere

*Job xiii. 7.—Ed.
reserve on the other, by proving that the more strictly we adhere to the letter of the moral law in this respect, the more completely shall we reconcile that law with prudence; thus securing a purity in the principle without mischief from the practice. I would not, I could not dare, address my countrymen as a friend, if I might not justify the assumption of that sacred title by more than mere veracity, by open-heartedness. Pleasure, most often delusive, may be born of delusion. Pleasure, herself a sorceress, may pitch her tents on enchanted ground. But happiness (or, to use a far more accurate as well as more comprehensive term, solid well-being) can be built on virtue alone, and must of necessity have truth for its foundation. Add, too, the known fact that the meanest of men feels himself insulted by an unsuccessful attempt to deceive him; and hates and despises the man who has attempted it. What place then is left in the heart for virtue to build on, if in any case we may dare practise on others what we should feel as a cruel and contemptuous wrong in our own persons? Every parent possesses the opportunity of observing how deeply children resent the injury of a delusion; and if men laugh at the falsehoods that were imposed on themselves during their childhood, it is because they are not good and wise enough to contemplate the past in the present, and so to produce by a virtuous and thoughtful sensibility that continuity in their self-consciousness, which nature has made the law of their animal life. Ingratitude, sensuality, and hardness of heart, all flow from this source. Men are ungrateful to others only when they have ceased to look back on their former selves with joy and tenderness. They exist in fragments. Annihilated as to the past, they are dead to the future, or seek for the proofs of it everywhere, only not (where alone they can be found) in themselves. A contemporary poet has expressed and illustrated this sentiment with equal fineness of thought and tenderness of feeling:—

*My heart leaps up when I behold*
*A rainbow in the sky!*
*So was it, when my life began;*
*So is it now I am a man;*
*So let it be, when I grow old,*
*Or let me die.*

*The child is father of the man,*
ESSAY V.

And I would wish my days to be
Bound each to each by natural piety.*

Wordsworth.

Alas! the pernicious influence of this lax morality extends from the nursery and the school to the cabinet and senate. It is a common weakness with men in power, who have used dissimulation successfully, to form a passion for the use of it, dupes to the love of duping! A pride is flattered by these lies. He who fancies that he must be perpetually stooping down to the prejudices of his fellow-creatures, is perpetually reminding and reassuring himself of his own vast superiority to them. But no real greatness can long co-exist with deceit. The whole faculties of man must be exerted in order to noble energies; and he who is not earnestly sincere, lives in but half his being, self-mutilated, self-paralyzed.

The latter part of the proposition, which has drawn me into this discussion, that, I mean, in which the morality of intentional falsehood is asserted, may safely be trusted to the reader's own moral sense. Is it a groundless apprehension, that the patrons and admirers of such publications may receive the punishment of their indiscretion in the conduct of their sons and daughters? The suspicion of Methodism must be expected by every man of rank and fortune, who carries his examination respecting the books which are to lie on his breakfast-table, farther than to their freedom from gross verbal indecencies, and broad avowals of Atheism in the title-page. For the existence of an intelligent

*I am informed, that these very lines have been cited, as a specimen of despicable puerility. So much the worse for the citer. Not willingly in his presence would I behold the sun setting behind our mountains, or listen to a tale of distress or virtue; I should be ashamed of the quiet tear on my own cheek. But let the dead bury the dead! The poet sang for the living. Of what value indeed, to a sane mind, are the likings or dislikings of one man, grounded on the mere assertions of another? Opinions formed from opinions—what are they, but clouds sailing under clouds, which impress shadows upon shadows?

Fungum pelle procul, jubeo; nam quid mihi fungo?
Convenient stomacho non minus ista suo.

I was always pleased with the motto placed under the figure of the rosemary in old herbals:

Apae, sus! Haud tibi spiro.
First Cause may be ridiculed in the notes of one poem, or placed doubtfully as one of two or three possible hypotheses, in the very opening of another poem, and both be considered as works of safe promiscuous reading virginitibus puerisque: and this, too, by many a father of a family, who would hold himself highly culpable in permitting his child to form habits of familiar acquaintance with a person of loose habits, and think it even criminal to receive into his house a private tutor without a previous inquiry concerning his opinions and principles, as well as his manners and outward conduct. How little I am an enemy to free inquiry of the boldest kind, and in which the authors have differed the most widely from my own convictions and the general faith, provided only, the inquiry be conducted with that seriousness, which naturally accompanies the love of truth, and be evidently intended for the perusal of those only, who may be presumed capable of weighing the arguments,—I shall have abundant occasion of proving in the course of this work. Quin ipsa philosophia talibus e disputationibus non nisi beneficium recipit. Nam si vera proponit homo ingeniouis veritatisque amans, nova ad eam accessio fiet: sin falsa, refutacione eorum priores tanto magis stabilientur.*

The assertion, that truth is often no less dangerous than falsehood, sounds less offensively at the first hearing, only because it hides its deformity in an equivocation, or double meaning of the word truth. What may be rightly affirmed of truth, used as synonymous with verbal accuracy, is transferred to it in its higher sense of veracity. By verbal truth, we mean no more than the correspondence of a given fact to given words. In moral truth, we involvewise the intention of the speaker, that his words should correspond to his thoughts in the sense in which he ex-

* GALILEI, Syst. Cosm. p. 42.—Moreover, philosophy itself can not but derive benefit from such discussions. For if a man of genius and a lover of truth brings just positions before the public, there is a fresh accession to the stock of philosophic insight; but if erroneous positions, the former truths will by their refutation be established so much the more firmly.

The original is in the following words:—

La filosofia medesima non può se non ricever beneficio dalle nostre dispute; perché se i nostri pensieri saranno veri, nuovi acquisti si saranno fatti; se falsi, col ributtargli, maggiormente verranno confermate le prime dottrine.

Dial. I. 44. Padov. 1774.—Ed.
pects them to be understood by others: and in this latter import we are always supposed to use the word, whenever we speak of truth absolutely, or as a possible subject of moral merit or demerit. It is verbally true, that in the sacred Scriptures it is written: *As is the good, so is the sinner, and he that sweareth as he that feareth an oath. A man hath no better thing under the sun, than to eat, and to drink, and to be merry. There is one event unto all: the living know they shall die, but the dead know not any thing, neither have they any more a reward.* But he who should repeat these words, with this assurance, to an ignorant man in the hour of his temptation, lingering at the door of the alehouse, or hesitating as to the testimony required of him in the court of justice, would, spite of this verbal truth, be a liar, and the murderer of his brother's conscience. Veracity, therefore, not mere accuracy; to convey truth, not merely to say it, is the point of duty in dispute: and the only difficulty in the mind of an honest man arises from the doubt, whether more than veracity, that is, the truth and nothing but the truth—is not demanded of him by the law of conscience; whether it does not exact simplicity; that is, the truth only, and the whole truth. If we can solve this difficulty, if we can determine the conditions under which the law of universal reason commands the communication of the truth independently of consequences, we shall then be enabled to judge whether there is any such probability of evil consequences from such communication, as can justify the assertion of its occasional criminality, as can perplex us in the conception, or disturb us in the performance, of our duty.

The conscience, or effective reason, commands the design of conveying an adequate notion of the thing spoken of, when this is practicable: but at all events a right notion, or none at all. A schoolmaster is under the necessity of teaching a certain rule in simple arithmetic empirically,—(do so and so, and the sum will always prove true);—the necessary truth of the rule—that is, that the rule having been adhered to, the sum must always prove true—requiring a knowledge of the higher mathematics for its demonstration. He, however, conveys a right notion, though he can not convey the adequate one.

* Eccles. viii. 15; ix. 2, 5.—Ed.
ESSAY VI.

General knowledge and ready talent may be of very great benefit, but they may likewise be of very great disservice to the possessor. They are highly advantageous to the man of sound judgment, and dexterous in applying them; but they injure your fluent holder-forth on all subjects in all companies. It is necessary to know the measures of the time and occasion: for this is the very boundary of wisdom—(that by which it is defined, and distinguished from mere ability). But he, who without regard to the unfitness of the time and the audience, will soar in the high region of his fancies with his garland and singing robes about him, will not acquire the credit of seriousness amidst frivolity, but will be condemned for his silliness, as the greatest idler of the company, because the most unseasonable.

The moral law, it has been shown, permits an inadequate communication of unsophisticated truth, on the condition that it alone is practicable, and binds us to silence when neither an adequate, nor even a right, exposition of the truth is in our power. We must first inquire then,—what is necessary to constitute, and what may allowably accompany, a right though inadequate notion,—and, secondly, what are the circumstances, from which we may deduce the impracticability of conveying even a right notion; the presence or absence of which circumstances it therefore becomes our duty to ascertain. In answer to the first question, the conscience demands: 1. That it should be the wish and design of the mind to convey the truth only; that if in addition to the negative loss implied in its inadequateness, the notion communicated should lead to any positive error, the cause should lie in

* Edit. Gaisford.—Ed.
the fault or defect of the recipient, not of the communicator, whose paramount duty, whose inalienable right, it is to preserve his own integrity,* the integral character of his own moral being. Self-respect; the reverence which he owes to the presence of humanity in the person of his neighbor; the reverential upholding of the faith of man in man; gratitude for the particular act of confidence; and religious awe for the divine purposes in the gift of language; are duties too sacred and important to be sacrificed to the guesses of an individual, concerning the advantages to be gained by the breach of them. 2. It is further required, that the supposed error shall not be such as will pervert or materially vitiate the imperfect truth, in communicating which we had unwillingly, though not perhaps unwittingly, occasioned it. A barbarian so instructed in the power and intelligence of the infinite Being as to be left wholly ignorant of his moral attributes, would have acquired none but erroneous notions even of the former. At the very best, he would gain only a theory to satisfy his curiosity with; but more probably, would deduce the belief of a Moloch or a Baal. For the idea of an irresistible, invisible Being, naturally produces terror in the mind of uninstructed and unprotected man, and with terror there will be associated whatever has been accustomed to excite it, anger, vengeance, &c.; as is proved by

* The best and most forcible sense of a word is often that which is contained in its etymology. The author of the poems, the Synagogue, frequently affixed to Herbert's Temple, gives the original purport of the word "integrity," in the following lines of the fourth stanza of the eighth poem:*

Next to sincerity, remember still,
Thou must resolve upon integrity.
God will have all thou hast, thy mind, thy will,
Thy thoughts, thy words, thy works.—

And again, after some verses on constancy and humility, the poem concludes with—

He that desires to see
The face of God, in his religion must
Sincere, entire, constant, and humble be.

Having mentioned the name of Herbert, that model of a man, a gentleman, and a clergyman, let me add, that the quaintness of some of his thoughts, not of his diction, than which nothing can be more pure, manly, and unaffected, has blinded modern readers to the great general merit of his poems, which are for the most part exquisite in their kind.
the mythology of all barbarous nations. This must be the case with all organized truths; the component parts derive their significance from the idea of the whole. Bolingbroke removed love, justice, and choice, from power and intelligence, and yet pretended to have left unimpaired the conviction of a Deity. He might as consistently have paralyzed the optic nerve, and then excused himself by affirming, that he had, however, not touched the eye.

The third condition of a right though inadequate notion is, that the error occasioned be greatly outweighed by the importance of the truth communicated. The rustic would have little reason to thank the philosopher, who should give him true conceptions of the folly of believing in ghosts, omens, dreams, &c. at the price of abandoning his faith in divine providence, and in the continued existence of his fellow-creatures after their death. The teeth of the old serpent planted by the Cadmuses of French literature, under Lewis XV., produced a plenteous crop of philosophers and truth-trumpeters of this kind, in the reign of his successor. They taught many truths, historical, political, physiological, and ecclesiastical, and diffused their notions so widely, that the very ladies and hair-dressers of Paris became fluent encyclopedists: and the sole price which their scholars paid for these treasures of new information, was to believe Christianity an imposture, the Scriptures a forgery, the worship, if not the belief, of God superstition, hell a fable, heaven a dream, our life without providence, and our death without hope. They became as gods as soon as the fruit of this Upas tree of knowledge and liberty had opened their eyes to perceive that they were no more than beasts—somewhat more cunning, perhaps, and abundantly more mischievous. What can be conceived more natural than the result,—that self-acknowledged beasts should first act, and next suffer themselves to be treated, as beasts. We judge by comparison. To exclude the great is to magnify the little. The disbelief of essential wisdom and goodness, necessarily prepares the imagination for the supremacy of cunning with malignity. Folly and vice have their appropriate religions, as well as virtue and true knowledge: and in some way or other fools will dance round the golden calf, and wicked men beat their timbrels and kettle-drums to,—

—Moloch, horrid king, besmeared with blood
Of human sacrifice and parents' tears.
My feelings have led me on, and in my illustration I had almost lost from my view the subject to be illustrated. One condition yet remains: that the error foreseen shall not be of a kind to prevent or impede the after acquirement of that knowledge which will remove it. Observe, how graciously nature instructs her human children. She can not give us the knowledge derived from sight without occasioning us at first to mistake images of reflection for substances. But the very consequences of the delusion lead inevitably to its detection; and out of the ashes of the error rises a new flower of knowledge. We not only see, but are enabled to discover by what means we see. So, too, we are under the necessity, in given circumstances, of mistaking a square for a round object: but ere the mistake can have any practical consequences, it is not only removed, but in its removal gives us the symbol of a new fact, that of distance. In a similar train of thought, though more fancifully, I might have elucidated the preceding condition, and have referred our hurrying enlighteners and revolutionary amputators to the gentleness of nature, in the oak and the beech, the dry foliage of which she pushes off only by the propulsion of the new buds, that supply its place. My friends! a clothing even of withered leaves is better than bareness.

Having thus determined the nature and conditions of a right notion, it remains to consider the circumstances which tend to render the communication of it impracticable, and oblige us of course, to abstain from the attempt—oblige us not to convey falsehood under the pretext of saying truth. These circumstances, it is plain, must consist either in natural or moral impediments. The former, including the obvious gradations of constitutional insensibility and derangement, preclude all temptation to misconduct, as well as all probability of ill-consequences from accidental oversight, on the part of the communicator. Far otherwise is it with the impediments from moral causes. These demand all the attention and forecast of the genuine lovers of truth in the matter, the manner, and the time of their communications public and private; and these are the ordinary materials of the vain and the factious, determine them in the choice of their audiences and of their arguments, and to each argument give powers not its own. They are distinguishable into two sources, the streams from which, however, most often become confluent, namely, hindrances
From ignorance,—(I here use the word in relation to the habits of reasoning as well as to the previous knowledge requisite for the due comprehension of the subject,)—and hindrances from predominant passions.*

From both these the law of conscience commands us to abstain, because such being the ignorance and such the passions of the supposed auditors, we ought to deduce the impracticability of conveying not only adequate but even right notions of our own convictions: much less does it permit us to avail ourselves of the causes of this impracticability in order to procure nominal proselytes, each of whom will have a different, and all a false, conception of those notions that were to be conveyed for their truth's sake alone. Whatever is, or but for some defect in our moral character would have been, foreseen as preventing the conveyance of our thoughts, makes the attempt an act of self-contradiction: and whether the faulty cause exist in our choice of unfit words or our choice of unfit auditors, the result is the same and so is the guilt. We have voluntarily communicated falsehood.

Thus, without reference to consequences,—if only one short digression be excepted—from the sole principle of self-consistence or moral integrity, we have evolved the clue of right reason, which we are bound to follow in the communication of truth. Now then let me appeal to the judgment and experience of the reader, whether he who most faithfully adheres to the letter of the law of conscience will not likewise act in strictest correspondence to the maxims of prudence and sound policy. I am at least unable to recollect a single instance, either in history or in my personal experience, of a preponderance of injurious consequences from the publication of any truth, under the observance of the moral conditions above stated: much less can I even imagine any case, in which truth, as truth, can be pernicious. But if the assertor of the indifferency of truth and falsehood in their own natures, attempt to justify his position by confining the word truth, in the first instance, to the correspondence of given words to given facts, without reference to the total impression left by such words,—what is this more than to assert, that articulated sounds are things of moral indifferency;—and that we may relate a fact accurately, and nevertheless deceive grossly and wickedly? Blifil related accurately Tom Jones's riotous joy

* See Lay Sermon addressed to the higher and middle classes. VI.
during his benefactor's illness, only omitting that this joy was occasioned by the physician's having pronounced him out of danger. Blifil was not the less a liar for being an accurate matter-of-fact liar. Tell-truths in the service of falsehood we find everywhere, of various names and various occupations, from the elderly young women that discuss the love affairs of their friends and acquaintances at the village tea-tables, to the anonymous calumniators of literary merit in reviews, and the more daring malignants, who dole out discontent, innovation and panic, in political journals: and a most pernicious race of liars they are! But who ever doubted it?—Why should our moral feelings be shocked, and the holiest words with all their venerable associations be profaned, in order to bring forth a truism! But thus it is for the most part with the venders of startling paradoxes. In the sense in which they are to gain for their author the character of a bold and original thinker, they are false even to absurdity; and the sense in which they are true and harmless, conveys so mere a truism, that it even borders on nonsense. How often have we heard—"The rights of man—hurra!—The sovereignty of the people—hurra!"—roared out by men who, if called upon in another place and before another audience, to explain themselves, would give to the words a meaning, in which the most monarchical of their political opponents would admit them to be true, but which would contain nothing new, or strange, or stimulant, nothing to flatter the pride, or kindle the passions, of the populace!
ESSAY VII.


RUDOLPHI LANGII, Epist. ad amicum quemdam Italicum, in qua linguae patris et hodiernae usum defendit et eruditis commendat.

Nec me fallit, ut in corporibus hominum sic in animis multiplici passione affectis, medicamenta verborum multis ineffecticia visum iri. Sed nec illud quoque me praeteritar, ut invisibiles animorum morbos, sic invisibilitia esse remedia. Falsis opinionibus circumventi veris sententiae liberandi sunt, ut qui audiendo cequier audiendo consurgant.

PETRARCA. Prefat. in lib. de remediutriusque fortunae, sub fin.

But how are we to guard against the herd of promiscuous readers? Can we bid our books be silent in the presence of the unworthy? If we employ what are called the dead languages, our own genius, alas! becomes flat and dead: and if we embody our thoughts in the words native to them or in which they were conceived, we divulge the secrets of Minerva to the ridicule of blockheads, and expose our Diana to the Aetæons of a sensual age. I reply: that in order to avoid inconveniences of this kind, we need write neither in Greek nor in Latin. It will be enough, if we abstain from appealing to the bad passions and low appetites, and confine ourselves to a strictly consequent method of reasoning.

To have written innocently, and for wise purposes, is all that can be required of us: the event lies with the reader. I purchased lately Cicero's work, De Officiis, which I had always considered as almost worthy of a Christian. To my surprise it had become a most flagrant libel. Nay! but
how?—Some one, I know not who, out of the fruitfulness of his own malignity, had filled all the margins and other blank spaces with annotations—a true superabundancy of examples, that is, of false and slanderous tales! In like manner, the slave of impure desires will turn the pages of Cato, not to say, Scripture itself, into occasions and excitements of wanton imaginations. There is no wind but fans a volcano, no work but feeds a combustible mind.

I am well aware, that words will appear to many as inefficacious medicines when administered to minds agitated with manifold passions, as when they are muttered by way of charm over bodily ailments. But neither does it escape me, on the other hand, that as the diseases of the mind are invisible, invisible must the remedies likewise be. Those who have been entrapped by false opinions are to be liberated by convincing truths: that thus having imbibed the poison through the ear they may receive the antidote by the same channel.

That our elder writers to Jeremy Taylor inclusively quoted to excess, it would be the very blindness of partiality to deny. More than one might be mentioned, whose works are well characterized in the words of Milton, as a paroxysm of citations, pampered metaphors, and apophenia pedantry. On the other hand, it seems to me that we now avoid quotations with an anxiety that offends in the contrary extreme. Yet it is the beauty and independent worth of the citations far more than their appropriateness which have made Johnson's Dictionary popular even as a reading book—and the mottos with the translations of them are known to add considerably to the value of the Spectator. With this conviction I have taken more than common pains in the selection of the mottos for The Friend: and of two mottos equally appropriate prefer always that from the book which is least likely to have come into my readers' hands. For I often please myself with the fancy, now that I may have saved from oblivion the only striking passage in a whole volume, and now that I may have attracted notice to a writer undeservedly forgotten. If this should be attributed to a silly ambition in the display of various reading, I can do no more than deny any consciousness of having been so actuated: and for the rest, I must console myself by the reflection, that if it be one of the most foolish, it is at the same time one of the most harmless, of human vanities.

The passages prefixed lead at once to the question, which will probably have more than once occurred to the reflecting reader of the preceding essay. How will these rules apply to the most important mode of communication? to that, in which one man
may utter his thoughts to myriads of men at the same time, and
to myriads of myriads at various times and through successions
of generations? How do they apply to authors, whose foreknowl-
edge assuredly does not inform them who, or how many, or of
what description, their readers will be? How do these rules
apply to books, which once published, are as likely to fall in the
way of the incompetent as of the judicious, and will be fortunate
indeed if they are not many times looked at through the thick
mists of ignorance, or amid the glare of prejudice and passion?
— I answer in the first place, that this is not universally true. The
readers are not seldom picked and chosen. Relations of certain
pretended miracles performed a few years ago, at Holywell, in
consequence of prayers to the Virgin Mary, on female servants,
and these relations moralized by the old Roman Catholic argu-
ments without the old Protestant answers, have to my knowledge
been sold by travelling pedlers in villages and farm-houses, not
only in a form which placed them within the reach of the narrow-
est means, but sold at a price less than their prime cost, and doubt-
less, thrown in occasionally as the make-weight in a bargain of
pins and stay-tape. Shall I be told, that the publishers and re-
verend authorizers of these base and vulgar delusions had exerted
no choice as to the purchasers and readers? But waiving this,
or rather having first pointed it out, as an important exception, I
further reply,—that if the author have clearly and rightly estab-
lished in his own mind the class of readers, to which he means to
address his communications; and if both in this choice, and in
the particulars of the manner and matter of his work, he con-
scientiously observe all the conditions which reason and con-
science have been shown to dictate, in relation to those for whom
the work was designed; he will, in most instances, have effected
his design and realized the desired circumscription. The posthu-
mous work of Spinoza—(*Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata*)
—may, indeed, accidentally fall into the hands of an incompetent
reader. But (not to mention, that it is written in a dead lan-
guage), it will be entirely harmless, because it must needs be ut-
terly unintelligible. I venture to assert, that the whole first book,
*De Deo*, might be read in a literal English translation to any
congregation in the kingdom, and that no individual who had not
been habituated to the strictest and most laborious processes of
reasoning, would even suspect its orthodoxy or piety, however
heavily the few who listened might complain of its obscurity and want of interest.

This, it may be objected, is an extreme case. But it is not so for the present purpose. I am speaking of the probability of injurious consequences from the communication of truth. This I have denied, if the right means have been adopted, and the necessary conditions adhered to, for its actual communication. Now the truths—that is, the positions believed by the author to be truths—conveyed in a book are either evident of themselves, or such as require a train of deductions in proof: and the latter will be either such truths as are authorized and generally received; or such as are in opposition to received and authorized opinions; or lastly, positions presented as truths for the appropriate test of examination, and still under trial, adhuc in lite. Of this latter class I affirm, that in no one of the three sorts can an instance be brought of a preponderance of ill-consequences, or even of an equilibrium of advantage and injury from a work, in which the understanding alone has been appealed to, by results fairly deduced from just premises, in terms strictly appropriate. Alas! legitimate reasoning is impossible without severe thinking, and thinking is neither an easy nor an amusing employment. The reader, who would follow a close reasoner to the summit and absolute principle of any one important subject, has chosen a chamois-hunter for his guide. Our guide will, indeed, take us the shortest way, will save us many a wearisome and perilous wandering, and warn us of many a mock road that had formerly led himself to the brink of chasms and precipices, or at best in an idle circle to the spot from which he started. But he can not carry us on his shoulders: we must strain our own sinews, as he has strained his; and make firm footing on the smooth rock for ourselves, by the blood of toil from our own feet. Examine the journals of our humane and zealous missionaries in Hindostan. How often and how feelingly do they describe the difficulty of making the simplest chain of reasoning intelligible to the ordinary natives: the rapid exhaustion of their whole power of attention, and with what pain and distressful effort it is exerted, while it lasts. Yet it is amongst individuals of this class, that the hideous practices of self-torture chiefly, indeed almost exclusively, prevail. O! if folly were no easier than wisdom, it being often so very much more grievous, how certainly might not these mis-
erable men be converted to Christianity? But alas! to swing by hooks passed through the back, or to walk on shoes with nails of iron pointed upward on the soles, all this is so much less difficult, demands so very inferior an exertion of the will than to think, and by thought to gain knowledge and tranquillity!

It is not true, that ignorant persons have no notion of the advantages of truth and knowledge. They see and confess those advantages in the conduct, the immunities, and the superior powers of the possessors. Were these attainable by pilgrimages the most toilsome, or penances the most painful, we should assuredly have as many pilgrims and as many self-tormentors in the service of true religion and virtue, as now exist under the tyranny of Papal or Brahman superstition. This inefficacy of legitimate reason, from the want of fit objects,—this its relative weakness, and how narrow at all times its immediate sphere of action must be,—is proved to us by the impostors of all professions. What, I pray, is their fortress, the rock which is both their quarry and their foundation, from which and on which they are built?—The desire of arriving at the end without the effort of thought and will, which are the appointed means. Let us look backward three or four centuries. Then, as now, the great mass of mankind were governed by the three main wishes, the wish for vigor of body, including the absence of painful feelings;—for wealth, or the power of procuring the external conditions of bodily enjoyment,—these during life; and security from pain and continuance of happiness after death. Then, as now, men were desirous to attain them by some easier means than those of temperance, industry, and strict justice. They gladly therefore applied to the priest, who could insure them happiness hereafter without the performance of their duties here; to the lawyer who could make money a substitute for a right cause; to the physician, whose medicines promised to take the sting out of the tail of their sensual indulgences, and let them fondle and play with vice, as with a charmed serpent; to the alchemist, whose gold-tincture would enrich them without toil or economy; and to the astrologer, from whom they could purchase foresight without knowledge or reflection. The established professions were, without exception, no other than licensed modes of witchcraft. The wizards, who would now find their due reward in Bridewell, and their appropriate honors in the pillory, sat then on episcopal
thrones, candidates for saintship, and already canonized in the belief of their deluded contemporaries; while the one or two real teachers and discoverers of truth were exposed to the hazard of fire and fagot,—a dungeon the best shrine that was vouchsafed to a Roger Bacon* and a Galileo!

Pray, why is it, that people say that men are not such fools now-a-days as they were in the days of yore? I would fain know, whether you would have us understand by this same saying, as indeed you logically may, that formerly, men were fools, and in this generation are grown wise? How many and what dispositions made them fools? How many and what dispositions were wanting to make 'em wise? Why were those fools? How should these be wise? Pray, how came you to know that men were formerly fools? How did you find that they are now wise? Who made them fools? Who in Heaven's name made us wise? Who d'ye think are most, those that loved mankind foolish, or those that love it wise? How long has it been wise? How long otherwise? Whence proceeded the foregoing folly? Whence the following wisdom? Why did the old folly end now and no later? Why did the modern wisdom begin now and no sooner? What were we the worse for the former folly? What the better for the succeeding wisdom? How should the ancient folly have come to nothing? How should this same new wisdom be started up and established? Now answer me, an't please you!

Monsters and madmen canonized and Galileo blind in a dungeon!† It is not so in our times. Heaven be praised, that in this respect, at least, we are, if not better, yet better off, than our

* "It is for his country, not his order, to glory in the man whom that order condemned to imprisonment, not for his supposed skill in magic, but for those opinions which he derived from studying the Scriptures, wherein he was versed beyond any other person of his age."

SOUTHEY'S Colloquies, viii. *

And see the note there.—Ed.

† This is not strictly accurate. Galileo was sentenced by the Inquisition at Rome, on the 22d of June, 1633; and, although his right eye had been formerly affected, he did not become blind till the end of 1637. His confinement, likewise, in the proper prison of the Inquisition, was merely nominal, although the restrictions under which he was kept to the end of his life, were of the most distressing and injurious description.—Ed.
forefathers. But to what, and to whom (under Providence) do we owe the improvement? To any radical change in the moral affections of mankind in general? Perhaps the great majority of men are now fully conscious that they are born with the godlike faculty of reason, and that it is the business of life to develop and apply it?—The Jacob's ladder of truth, let down from heaven, with all its numerous rounds, is now the common highway, on which we are content to toil upward to the objects of our desires?—We are ashamed of expecting the end without the means?—In order to answer these questions in the affirmative, I must have forgotten the animal magnetists;* the proselytes of Brothers, and of Joanna Southcote; and some thousand fanatics less original in their creeds, but not a whit more rational in their expectations; I must forget the infamous empirics, whose advertisements pollute and disgrace all our newspapers, and almost paper the walls of our cities; and the vending of whose poisons and poisonous drams—with shame and anguish be it spoken—supports a shop in every market-town! I must forget that other reproach of the nation, that mother-vice, the lottery! I must forget, that a numerous class plead prudence for keeping their fellow-men ignorant and incapable of intellectual enjoyments, and the revenue for upholding such temptations as men so ignorant will not withstand,—yes! that even senators and officers of state put forth the revenue as a sufficient reason for upholding, at every fiftieth door throughout the kingdom, temptations to the most pernicious vices, which fill the land with mourning, and fit the laboring classes for sedition and religious fanaticism! Above all I must forget the first years of the French revolution, and the millions throughout Europe who confidently expected the best and choicest results of knowledge and virtue, namely, liberty and universal peace, from the votes of a tumultuous assembly—that is, from the mechanical agitation of the air in a large room at Paris—and this too in the most light, unthinking, sensual, and profligate, of the European nations,—a nation, the very phrases of whose language are so composed, that they can scarcely speak without lying!—No! Let us not deceive ourselves. Like the man who used to pull off his hat with great demonstration of respect whenever he spoke of himself, we are

* Recanted since 1817. After subtracting all exaggerated or doubtful testimonies, the undeniable facts are as important as they are surprising.
fond of styling our own the enlightened age: though as Jortin, I think, has wittily remarked, the golden age would be more appropriate. But in spite of our great scientific discoveries, for which praise be given to whom the praise is due, and in spite of that general indifference to all the truths and all the principles of truth, that belong to our permanent being, and therefore do not lie within the sphere of our senses,—that same indifference which makes toleration so easy a virtue with us, and constitutes nine tenths of our pretended illumination,—it still remains the character of the mass of mankind to seek for the attainment of their necessary ends by any means rather than the appointed ones; and for this cause only, that the latter imply the exertion of the reason and the will. But of all things this demands the longest apprenticeship, even an apprenticeship from infancy; which is generally neglected, because an excellence, that may and should belong to all men, is expected to come to every man of its own accord.

To whom then do we owe our meliorated condition?—To the successive few in every age,—more indeed in one generation than in another, but relatively to the mass of mankind always few,—who by the intensity and permanence of their action have compensated for the limited sphere, within which it is at any one time intelligible; and whose good deeds posterity reverences in their results; though the mode, in which we repair the inevitable waste of time, and the style of our additions, too generally furnish a sad proof, how little we understand the principles. I appeal to the histories of the Jewish, the Grecian, and the Roman republics, to the records of the Christian Church, to the history of Europe from the treaty of Westphalia, 1648. What do they contain but accounts of noble structures raised by the wisdom of the few, and gradually undermined by the ignorance and profligacy of the many? If therefore the deficiency of good, which everywhere surrounds us, originate in the general unfitness and aversion of men to the process of thought, that is, to continuous reasoning, it must surely be absurd to apprehend a preponderance of evil from works which can not act at all except as far as they call the reasoning faculties into full co-exertion with them.

Still, however, there are truths so self-evident, or so immediately and palpably deduced from those that are, or are acknowledged for such, that they are at once intelligible to all men,
who possess the common advantages of the social state; although by sophistry, by evil habits, by the neglect, false persuasions, and impostures of an anti-Christian priesthood joined in one conspiracy with the violence of tyrannical governors, the understandings of men may become so darkened and their consciences so lethargic, that a necessity will arise for the republication of these truths, and this too with a voice of loud alarm, and impassioned warning. Such were the doctrines proclaimed by the first Christians to the Pagan world; such were the lightnings flashed by Wickliff, Huss, Luther, Calvin, Zuinglius, Latimer, and others, across the Papal darkness; and such in our own times the agitating truths, with which Thomas Clarkson, and his excellent confederates, the Quakers, fought and conquered the legalized banditti of men-stealers, the numerous and powerful perpetrators and advocates of rapine, murder, and (of blacker guilt than either) slavery. Truths of this kind being indispensable to man, considered as a moral being, are above all expediency, all accidental consequences: for as sure as God is holy, and man immortal, there can be no evil so great as the ignorance or disregard of them. It is the very madness of mock prudence to oppose the removal of a poisoned dish on account of the pleasant sauces or nutritious viands which would be lost with it! The dish contains destruction to that, for which alone we ought to wish the palate to be gratified, or the body to be nourished.

The sole condition, therefore, imposed on us by the law of conscience in these cases is, that we employ no unworthy and heterogeneous means to realize the necessary end,—that we intrust the event wholly to the full and adequate promulgation of the truth, and to those generous affections which the constitution of our moral nature has linked to the full perception of it. Yet evil may, nay it will, be occasioned. Weak men may take offence, and wicked men avail themselves of it; though we must not attribute to the promulgation, or to the truth promulgated, all the evil, of which wicked men—predetermined, like the wolf in the fable, to create some occasion—may choose to make it the pretext. But that there ever was, or ever can be, a preponderance of evil, I defy either the historian to instance, or the philosopher to prove. "Let it fly away, all that chaff of light faith that can fly off at any breath of temptation; the cleaner will the true grain be stored up in the granary of the Lord,"—we are entitled
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to say with Tertullian: and to exclaim with heroic Luther,—
"Scandal and offence! Talk not to me of scandal and offence. Need breaks through stone walls, and recks not of scandal. It is my duty to spare weak consciences as far as it may be done without hazard of my soul. Where not, I must take counsel for my soul, though half or the whole world should be scandalized thereby."

Luther felt and preached and wrote and acted, as beseemed a Luther to feel and utter and act. The truths, which had been outraged, he re-proclaimed in the spirit of outraged truth, at the behest of his conscience and in the service of the God of truth. He did his duty, come good, come evil! and made no question, on which side the preponderance would be. In the one scale there was gold, and impressed thereon the image and superscription of the universal Sovereign. In all the wide and ever-widening commerce of mind with mind throughout the world, it is treason to refuse it. Can this have a counter-weight? The other scale indeed might have seemed full up to the very balance-yard; but of what worth and substance were its contents? Were they capable of being counted or weighed against the former? The conscience, indeed, is already violated when to moral good or evil we oppose things possessing no moral interest. Even if the conscience dared waive this her preventive veto, yet before we could consider the twofold results in the relation of loss and gain, it must be known whether their kind is the same or equivalent. They must first be valued, and then they may be weighed or counted, if they are worth it. But in the particular case at present before us, the loss is contingent and alien; the gain essential and the tree's own natural produce. The gain is permanent, and spreads through all times and places; the loss but temporary, and owing its very being to vice or ignorance, vanishes at the approach of knowledge and moral improvement. The gain reaches all good men, belongs to all that love light and de-

* Avolent, quantum volent, palea loves fidei quocunque afflatu tentationum / eo purior massa frumenti in horrea Domini reponetur. De Præscript. advers. Hæretic. I. c. 3.—Ed.

† Aergerniss hin, Aergerniss her! Noth bricht Eisen, und hat kein Aergerniss. Ich soll der schwachen Gewissen schonen so fern es ohne Gefahr meiner Seelen geschehen mag. Wo nicht, so soll ich meiner Seelen raten, es aergere sich daran die ganze oder halbe Welt.
sire an increase of light: to all and of all times, who thank Heaven for the gracious dawn, and expect the noon-day; who welcome the first gleams of spring, and sow their fields in confident faith of the ripening summer and the rewarding harvest-tide! But the loss is confined to the unenlightened and the prejudiced—say rather, to the weak and the prejudiced of a single generation. The prejudices of one age are condemned even by the prejudiced of the succeeding ages: for endless are the modes of folly, and the fool joins with the wise in passing sentence on all modes but his own. Who cried out with greater horror against the murderers of the Prophets, than those who likewise cried out, Crucify him! Crucify him!—Prophet and Saviour, and Lord of life, Crucify him! Crucify him!—The truth-haters of every future generation will call the truth-haters of the preceding ages by their true names: for even these the stream of time carries onward. In fine, truth considered in itself and in the effects natural to it, may be conceived as a gentle spring or water-source, warm from the genial earth, and breathing up into the snow drift that is piled over and around its outlet. It turns the obstacle into its own form and character, and as it makes its way increases its stream. And should it be arrested in its course by a chilling season, it suffers delay, not loss, and waits only for a change in the wind to awaken and again roll onwards:

\[ I \text{ semplici pastori} \]
\[ Sui Vesolo nevoso \]
\[ Fatti curvi e canuti, \]
\[ D' alto stupor son muti, \]
\[ Mirando al fonte ombroso \]
\[ Il Po con pochi umori; \]
\[ Poscia udendo gli onori \]
\[ Dell' urna angusta e stretta, \]
\[ Che' l Adda, che' l Tesino \]
\[ Soverchia in suo cammino, \]
\[ Che ampio al mar 's affretta, \]
\[ Che si spuma, e si suona, \]
\[ Che gli si da corona! * \]

* Chiabrera Rime, xxviii. “But falsehood,” continues Mr. C., “is fire in stubble; it likewise turns all the light stuffs around it into its own substance for a moment, one crackling blazing moment,—and then dies; and all its converts are scattered in the wind, without place or evidence of their existence, as viewless as the wind which scatters them.”
ESSAY IX.

'The simple shepherds grown bent and hoary-headed on the snowy Vesolo, are mute with deep astonishment, gazing in the overshadowed fountain on the Po with his scanty waters; then hearing of the honors of his confined and narrow urn, how he receives as a sovereign the Adda and the Tesino in his course, how ample he hastens on to the sea, how he foams, how mighty his voice, and that to him the crown is assigned.'

ESSAY IX.

Great men have liv'd among us, heads that plann'd
And tongues that utter'd wisdom—better none.

Even so doth Heaven protect us! Wordsworth.

In the preceding essay I have explained the good, that is, the natural consequences of the promulgation to all of truths which all are bound to know and to make known. The evils occasioned by it, with few and rare exceptions, have their origin in the attempts to suppress or pervert it; in the fury and violence of posture attacked or undermined in her strongholds, or in the extravagances of ignorance and credulity roused from their lethargy, and angry at the medicinal disturbance—awaking, not yet broad awake, and thus blending the monsters of uneasy dreams with the real objects, on which the drowsy eye had alternately half-opened and closed, again half-opened and again closed. This re-action of deceit and superstition, with all the trouble and tumult incident, I would compare to a fire which bursts forth from some stifled and fermenting mass on the first admission of light and air. It roars and blazes, and converts the already spoilt or damaged stuff, with all the straw and straw-like matter near it, first into flame, and the next moment into ashes. The fire dies away, the ashes are scattered on all the winds, and what began in worthlessness ends in nothingness. Such are the evil, that is, the casual consequences of the same promulgation.

It argues a narrow or corrupt nature to lose sight of the general and lasting consequences of rare and virtuous energy, in the
brief accidents which accompanied its first movements—to set lightly by the emancipation of the human reason from a legion of devils, in our complaints and lamentations over the loss of a herd of swine! The Cranmers, Hampdens, and Sidneys,—the counsellors of our Elizabeth, and the friends of our other great deliverer, the third William,—is it in vain that these have been our countrymen? Are we not the heirs of their good deeds? And what are noble deeds but noble truths realized? As Protestants, as Englishmen, as the inheritors of so ample an estate of might and right, an estate so strongly fenced, so richly planted, by the sinewy arms and dauntless hearts of our forefathers, we of all others have good cause to trust in the truth, yea, to follow its pillar of fire through the darkness and the desert, even though its light should but suffice to make us certain of its own presence. If there be elsewhere men jealous of the light, who prophesy an excess of evil over good from its manifestation, we are entitled to ask them, on what experience they ground their bodings? Our own country bears no traces, our own history contains no records to justify them. From the great æras of national illumination we date the commencement of our main national advantages. The tangle of delusions which stifled and distorted the growing tree, have been torn away; the parasite weeds, that fed on its very roots, have been plucked up with a salutary violence. To us there remain only quiet duties, the constant care, the gradual improvement, the cautious, unhazardous labors of the industrious though contented gardener—to prune, to engraft, and one by one to remove from its leaves and fresh shoots the slug and the caterpillar. But far be it from us to undervalue with light and senseless detraction the conscientious hardihood of our predecessors; or even to condemn in them that vehemence, to which the blessings it won for us leave us now neither temptation nor pretext. That the very terms, with which the bigot or the hireling would blacken the first publishers of political and religious truth, are, and deserve to be, hateful to us, we owe to the effects of its publication. We ante-date the feelings in order to criminate the authors of our tranquillity, opulence, and security. But let us be aware. Effects will not, indeed, immediately disappear with their causes; but neither can they long continue without them. If by the reception of truth in the spirit of truth, we became what we are; only by the retention of it in the same spirit, can we remain what
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we are. The narrow seas that form our boundaries,—what were they in times of old? The convenient highway for Danish and Norman pirates. What are they now? Still but "a span of waters." Yet they roll at the base of the isle Ararat, on which the ark of the hope of Europe and of civilization rested!

Even so doth God protect us, if we be
Virtuous and wise. Winds blow and waters roll,
Strength to the brave, and power and deity:
Yet, in themselves are nothing! One decree
Spake laws to them, and said that by the soul
Only the nations shall be great and free! Wordsworth.

GRESSAY X.

I deny not but that it is of greatest concernment in the church and commonwealth to have a vigilant eye how books demean themselves as well as men; and thereafter to confine, imprison, and do sharpest justice on them as malefactors. For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as lively and as vigorously productive as those fabulous dragon's teeth: and being sown up and down may chance to spring up armed men. And yet on the other hand, unless wariness be used, as good almost kill a man as kill a good book. Who kills a man, kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were in the eye. Many a man lives a burthen to the earth; but a good book is the precious life-blood of a master-spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life.

Milton's Speech for the liberty of unlicensed printing.

Thus far then I have been conducting a cause between an individual and his own mind. Proceeding on the conviction, that to man is intrusted the nature, not the result, of his actions, I have presupposed no calculations; I have presumed no foresight. —Introduce no contradiction into thy own consciousness. Acting, or abstaining from action, delivering or withholding thy thoughts, whatsoever thou doest, do it in singleness of heart. In all things, therefore, let thy means correspond to thy purpose, and let the purpose be one with the purport.—To this principle I have
referred the supposed individual, and from this principle solely I have deduced each particular of his conduct. As far, therefore, as the court of conscience extends,—and in this court alone I have been pleading hitherto—I have won the cause. It has been decided, that there is no just ground for apprehending mischief from truth communicated conscientiously,—that is, with a strict observance of all the conditions required by the conscience;—that what is not so communicated, is falsehood, and that to the falsehood, not to the truth, must the ill consequences be attributed.

Another and altogether different cause remains now to be pleaded; a different cause, and in a different court. The parties concerned are no longer the well-meaning individual and his conscience, but the citizen and the state—the citizen, who may be a fanatic as probably as a philosopher, and the state, which concerns itself with the conscience only as far as it appears in the action, or still more accurately, in the fact; and which must determine the nature of the fact not merely by a rule of right formed from the modification of particular by general consequences,—not merely by a principle of compromise, that reduces the freedom of each citizen to the common measure in which it becomes compatible with the freedom of all; but likewise by the relation which the facts bear to its—the state's—own instinctive principle of self-preservation. For every depository of the supreme power must presume itself rightful: and as the source of law not legally to be endangered. A form of government may indeed, in reality, be most pernicious to the governed, and the highest moral honor may await the patriot who risk his life in order by its subversion to introduce a better and juster constitution; but it would be absurd to blame the law by which his life is declared forfeit. It were to expect, that by an involved contradiction the law should allow itself not to be law, by allowing the state, of which it is a part, not to be a state. For, as Hooker has well observed, the law of men's actions is one, if they be respected only as men; and another, when they are considered as parts of a body politic.*

But though every government subsisting in law,—for pure lawless despotism grounding itself wholly on terror precludes all consideration of duty—though every government subsisting in law must, and ought to, regard itself as the life of the body politic, of

* Eccl. Pol. I. xvi. 6.—Ed.
which it is the head, and consequently must punish every attempt against itself as an act of assault or murder, that is, sedition or treason; yet still it ought so to secure the life as not to prevent the conditions of its growth, and of that adaptation to circumstances, without which its very life becomes insecure. In the application, therefore, of these principles to the public communication of opinions by the most efficient mean,—we have to decide, whether consistently with them there should be any liberty of the press; and if this be answered in the affirmative, what shall be declared abuses of that liberty, and made punishable as such; and in what way the general law shall be applied to each particular case.

First, then, ought there to be any liberty of the press? I do not here mean, whether it should be permitted to print books at all;—for this essay has little chance of being read in Turkey, and in any other part of Europe it can not be supposed questionable—but whether by the appointment of a censorship the government should take upon itself the responsibility of each particular publication. In governments purely monarchical,—that is, oligarchies under one head—the balance of advantage and disadvantage from this monopoly of the press will undoubtedly be affected by the general state of information; though after reading Milton's 'Speech for the liberty of unlicensed printing' we shall probably be inclined to believe, that the best argument in favor of licensing under any constitution is that, which supposing the ruler to have a different interest from that of his country, and even from himself as a reasonable and moral creature, grounds itself on the incompatibility of knowledge with folly, oppression, and degradation. What our prophetic Harrington said of religious, applies equally to literary, toleration:—"If it be said that in France there is liberty of conscience in part, it is also plain that while the hierarchy is standing, this liberty is falling, and that if ever it comes to pull down the hierarchy, it pulls down that monarchy also: wherefore the monarchy or hierarchy will be

* Il y a un voile qui doit toujours couvrir tout ce que l'on peut dire et tout ce qu'on peut croire du droit des peuples et de celui des princes, qui ne s'accordent jamais si bien ensemble que dans le silence.
  Mém. du Card. de Retz.

How severe a satire where it can be justly applied! how false and calumnious if meant as a general maxim!
beforehand with it, if they see their true interest.”*—On the other hand, there is no slight danger from general ignorance: and the only choice, which Providence has graciously left to a vicious government, is either to fall by the people, if they are suffered to become enlightened, or with them, if they are kept enslaved and ignorant.

The nature of our constitution, since the Revolution, the state of our literature and the wide diffusion, if not of intellectual, yet of literary, power, and the almost universal interest in the productions of literature, have set the question at rest relatively to the British press. However great the advantages of previous examination might be under other circumstances, in this country it would be both impracticable and inefficient. I need only suggest in broken sentences—the prodigious number of licensers that would be requisite—the variety of their attainments, and—inasmuch as the scheme must be made consistent with our religious freedom—the ludicrous variety of their principles and creeds—their number being so great, and each appointed censor being himself a man of letters, quis custodiet ipsos custodes? If these numerous licensers hold their offices for life, and independently of the ministry pro tempore, a new, heterogeneous, and alarming power is introduced, which can never be assimilated to the constitutional powers already existing:—if they are removable at pleasure, that which is heretical and seditious in 1809, may become orthodox and loyal in 1810;—and what man, whose attainments and moral respectability gave him even an endurable claim to this awful trust, would accept a situation at once so invidious and so precarious? And what institution can retain any useful influence in so free a nation when its abuses have made it contemptible? Lastly, and which of itself would suffice to justify the rejection of such a plan—unless all proportion between crime and punishment were abandoned, what penalties could the law attach to the assumption of a liberty, which it had denied, more severe than those which it now attaches to the abuse of the liberty, which it grants? In all those instances at least, which it would be most the inclination—perhaps the duty—of the state to prevent, namely, in seditious and incendiary publications,—(whether actually such, or only such as the existing government chose so to denominate, makes no difference in the argument).

* Syst. of Politics, vi. 10.—Ed.
the publisher, who hazards the punishment now assigned to seditious publications, would assuredly hazard the penalties of unlicensed ones, especially as the very practice of licensing would naturally diminish the attention to the contents of the works published, the chance of impunity therefore be so much greater, and the artifice of prefixing an unauthorized license so likely to escape detection. It is a fact, that in many of the former German states in which literature flourished, notwithstanding the establishment of censors or licensers, three fourths of the books printed were unlicensed—even those, the contents of which were unobjectionable, and where the sole motive for evading the law, must have been either the pride and delicacy of the author, or the indolence of the bookseller. So difficult was the detection, so various the means of evasion, and worse than all, from the nature of the law and the affront it offers to the pride of human nature, such was the merit attached to the breach of it—a merit commencing perhaps with Luther's Bible, and other prohibited works of similar great minds, published with no dissimilar purpose, and thence by many an intermediate link of association finally connected with books, of the very titles of which a good man would wish to remain ignorant. The interdictory catalogues of the Roman hierarchy always present to my fancy the muster-rolls of the two hostile armies of Michael and of Satan printed promiscuously, or extracted at haphazard, save only that the extracts from the former appear somewhat the more numerous. And yet even in Naples, and in Rome itself, whatever difficulty occurs in procuring any article catalogued in these formidable folios, must arise either from the scarcity of the work itself, or the absence of all interest in it. Assuredly there is no difficulty in obtaining from the most respectable booksellers the vilest provocatives to the basest crimes, though intermixed with gross lampoons on the heads of the church, the religious orders, and on religion itself. The stranger is invited into an inner room, and the proscribed wares presented to him with most significant looks and gestures, implying the hazard, and the necessity of secrecy. A creditable English bookseller would deem himself insulted, if such works were even inquired after at his shop. It is a well-known fact, that with the mournful exception indeed of political provocatives, and the titillations of vulgar envy provided by our anonymous critics, the loathsome articles are among us vended and offered...
for sale almost exclusively by foreigners. Such are the salutary
effects of a free press, and the generous habit of action imbibed
from the blessed air of law and liberty, even by men who neither
understand the principle, nor feel the sentiment, of the dignified
purity, to which they yield obeisance from the instinct of charac-
ter. As there is a national guilt which can be charged but
gently on each individual, so are there national virtues, which
can as little be imputed to the individuals,—nowhere, however,
but in countries where liberty is the presiding influence, the uni-
versal medium and menstruum of all other excellence, moral
and intellectual. Admirably doth the admirable Petrarch ad-
monish us:—

*Nec sibi vero quisquam falsos persuadeat, eos qui pro libertate
excubant, atque hactenus deserta reipublicae partes suscipiunt,
alienum agere negotium; suum agunt. In hac una reposita
sibi omnia norint omnes, securitatem mercator, gloriem miles,
utilitatem agricola. Postremo, in eadem religiosis cerimonias,
ottium studiosi, requiem senes, rudimenta disciplinarum puere,
nuptias puelle, pudicitiam matronae, gaudium omnes invent.
* * * * Huic uni relicue, cedante cura! Si hanc omititis,
in quantalibet occupatione nihil agitis: si huic incumbitis, etsi
nihil agere videmini, cumulate tamen et civium et virorum im-
plevistis officia.*

Nor let any one falsely persuade himself, that those who keep
watch and ward for liberty, are meddling with things that do
not concern them, instead of minding their own business. For
all men should know, that all blessings are stored and protected
in this one, as in a common repository. Here is the tradesman's
security, the soldier's honor, the agriculturist's profit. Lastly, in
this one good of liberty the religious will find the permission of
their rites and forms of worship, the students their learned leisure,
the aged their repose, boys the rudiments of the several branches
of their education, maidens their chaste nuptials, matrons their
womanly honor and the dignity of their modesty, fathers of fami-
lies the dues of natural affection and the sacred privileges of their
ancient home, every one their hope and their joy. To this one

* Petrarch. Epist. 45, ad Nicolaum tribunum urbis alae novissimum et
ad populum Romanum. The translation contains elusives referring to ex-
pressions, which in the second edition, were inserted in the Latin quotation
by Mr. C. himself.—Ed.
solicitude, therefore, let all other cares yield the priority. If you omit this, be occupied as much and sedulously as you may, you are doing nothing: If you apply your heart and strength to this, though you seem to be doing nothing, you will, nevertheless, have been fulfilling the duties of citizens and of men, yea, in a measure pressed down and running over.

I quote Petrarch often in the hope of drawing the attention of scholars to his inestimable Latin writings. Let me add, in the wish likewise of recommending to the London publishers a translation of select passages from his treatises and letters. If I except the German writings and original letters of the heroic Luther, I do not remember a work from which so delightful and instructive a volume might be compiled.

To give the true bent to the above extract, it is necessary to bear in mind, that he who keeps watch and ward for freedom, has to guard against two enemies, the despotism of the few and the despotism of the many—but especially in the present day against the sycophants of the populace.

License they mean, when they cry liberty!
For who loves that, must first be wise and good.

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ESSAY XI.

Nemo vero fallatur, quasi minora sint animorum contagia quam corporum. Majora sunt; gravius ledunt; altius descendunt, serpuntque latenter.

PETRARCH. De Vit. Solit. L. 1. tract. 3. c. 4.

And let no man be deceived as if the contagions of the soul were less than those of the body. They are yet greater; they convey more direful diseases; they sink deeper, and creep on more unsuspectedly.

We have abundant reason then to infer, that the law of England has done well and concluded wisely in proceeding on the principle so clearly worded by Milton: "that a book should be as freely admitted into the world as any other birth; and if it prove a monster, who denies but that it may justly be burnt or sunk into the sea?" We have reason then, I repeat, to rest satisfied with our laws, which no more prevent a book from coming into the world unlicensed, lest it should prove a libel, than a traveller from passing unquestioned through our turnpike-gates, because it is possible he may be a highwayman. Innocence is
presumed in both cases. The publication is a part of the offence, and its necessary condition. Words are moral acts, and words deliberately made public the law considers in the same light as any other cognizable overt act.

Here, however, a difficulty presents itself. Theft, robbery, murder, and the like, are easily defined: the degrees and circumstances likewise of these and similar actions are definite, and constitute specific offences, described and punishable each under its own name. We have only to prove the fact and identify the offender. The intention too, in the great majority of cases, is so clearly implied in the action, that the law can safely adopt it as its universal maxim, that the proof of the malice is included in the proof of the fact; especially as the few occasional exceptions have their remedy provided in the prerogative of pardon intrusted to the supreme magistrate. But in the case of libel, the degree makes the kind, the circumstances constitute the criminality; and both degrees and circumstances, like the ascending shades of color or the shooting hues of a dove's neck, die away into each other, incapable of definition or outline. The eye of the understanding, indeed, sees the determinate difference in each individual case, but language is most often inadequate to express what the eye perceives, much less can a general statute anticipate and pre-define it. Again: in other overt acts a charge disproved leaves the accused either guilty of a different fault, or at best simply blameless. A man having killed a fellow-citizen is acquitted of murder;—the act was manslaughter only, or it was justifiable homicide. But when we reverse the iniquitous sentence passed on Algernon Sidney, during our perusal of his work on government; at the moment we deny it to have been a traitorous libel, our beating hearts declare it to have been a benefaction to our country, and under the circumstances of those times the performance of an heroic duty. From this cause, therefore, as well as from a libel's being a thing made up of degrees and circumstances,—and these too, discriminating offence from merit by such dim and ambulant boundaries,—the intention of the agent, wherever it can be independently or inclusively ascertained, must be allowed a great share in determining the character of the action, unless the law is not only to be divorced from moral justice, but to wage open hostility against it.*

* According to the old adage: you are not hanged for stealing a horse,
Add too, that laws in doubtful points are to be interpreted according to the design of the legislator, where this can be certainly inferred. But the laws of England, which owe their own present supremacy and absoluteness to the good sense and generous dispositions diffused by the press more, far more, than to any other single cause, must needs be presumed favorable to its general influence. Even in the penalties attached to its abuse, we must suppose the legislature to have been actuated by the desire of preserving its essential privileges. The press is indifferently the passive instrument of evil and of good: nay, there is some good even in its evil. "Good and evil we know," says Milton, in the Speech from which I have selected the motto of the preceding essay, "in the field of this world, grow up together almost inseparably: and the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with the knowledge of evil, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be discerned, that those confused seeds which were imposed on Psyche as an incessant labor to cull out and sort asunder, were not more intermixed."—"As, therefore, the state of man now is, what wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear, without the knowledge of evil? He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true way-faring Christian. I can not praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary."—"That virtue, therefore, which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evil, and knows not the utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank virtue, not a pure."—"Since, therefore, the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely and with less danger scout into the regions of sin and falsity, than by reading all manner of tractates, and hearing all manner of reason?"—Again—but, indeed the whole treatise is one strain of moral wisdom and political prudence:—"Why should we then affect a rigor contrary to the manner of God and of nature, by abridging or scanting those means, which books, freely permitted, are both to the trial of virtue and the but that horses may not be stolen. To what extent this is true, I shall have occasion to examine hereafter.
exercise of truth? It would be better done to learn, that the law must needs be frivolous, which goes to restrain things uncertainly, and yet equally, working to good and to evil. And were I the chooser, a dram of well-doing should be preferred before many times as much the forcible hindrance of evil-doing. For God, sure, esteems the growth and completion of one virtuous person, more than the restraint of ten vicious."

The evidence of history is strong in favor of the same principles, even in respect of their expediency. The average result of the press from Henry VIII. to Charles I. was such a diffusion of religious light as first redeemed and afterwards saved this nation from the spiritual and moral death of Popery; and in the following period it is to the press that we owe the gradual ascendency of those wise political maxims, which casting philosophic truth in the moulds of national laws, customs, and existing orders of society, subverted the tyranny without suspending the government, and at length completed the mild and salutary revolution by the establishment of the house of Brunswick. To what must we attribute this vast over-balance of good in the general effects of the press, but to the over-balance of virtuous intention in those who employed the press? The law, therefore, will not refuse to manifest good intention a certain weight even in cases of apparent error, lest it should discourage and scare away those, to whose efforts we owe the comparative infrequency and weakness of error on the whole. The law may, however, nay, it must demand, that the external proofs of the author's honest intentions should be supported by the general style and matter of his work, and by the circumstances and mode of its publication. A passage, which in a grave and regular disquisition would be blameless, might become highly libellous and justly punishable if it were applied to present measures or persons for immediate purposes, in a cheap and popular tract. I have seldom felt greater indignation than at finding in a large manufactory a sixpenny pamphlet, containing a selection of inflammatory paragraphs from the prose writings of Milton, without a hint given of the time, occasion, state of government, and other circumstances under which they were written—not a hint, that the freedom which we now enjoy, exceeds all that Milton dared hope for, or deemed practicable; and that his political creed sternly excluded the populace, and indeed the majority of
ESSAY XI.

the population, from all pretensions to political power. If the manifest bad intention would constitute this publication a seditious libel, a good intention equally manifest can not justly be denied its share of influence in producing a contrary verdict.

Here then is the difficulty. From the very nature of a libel it is impossible so to define it, but that the most meritorious works will be found included in the description. Not from any defect or undue severity in the particular law, but from the very nature of the offence to be guarded against, a work recommending reform by the only rational mode of recommendation, that is, the detection and exposure of corruption, abuse, or incapacity, might, though it should breathe the best and most unadulterated English feelings, be brought within the definition of libel equally with the vilest incendiary pamphlet, that ever aimed at leading and misleading the multitude. Not a paragraph in the Morning Post during the Peace of Amiens, (or rather the experimental truce so called,)—though to the immortal honor of the then editor, that newspaper was the chief secondary means of producing the unexampled national unanimity, with which the war recommenced and has since been continued,—not a paragraph warning the nation, as need was and most imperious duty commanded, of the perilous designs and unsleeping ambition of our neighbor, the mimic and caricaturist of Charlemagne, but was a punishable libel. The law of libel is a vast aviary, which encages the awakening cock and the geese whose alarum preserved the Capitol, no less than the babbling magpie and ominous screech-owl. And yet will we avoid this seeming injustice, we throw down all fence and bulwark of public decency and public opinion; political calumny will soon join hands with private slander; and every principle, every feeling, that binds the citizen to his country and the spirit to its Creator, will be undermined—not by reasoning, for from that there is no danger; but—by the mere habit of hearing them reviled and scoffed at with impunity. Were we to contemplate the evils of a rank and unweeded press only in its effect on the manners of a people, and on the general tone of thought and conversation, the greater the love which we bore to literature and to all the means and instruments of human improvement, the greater would be the earnestness with which we should solicit the interference of law: the more anxiously should we wish for some Ithuriel spear, that might remove from
the ear of the public, and expose in their own fiendish shape those reptiles, which inspiring venom and forging illusions as they list,

thence raise

At least distempered, discontented thoughts,
Vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires.

PARADISE LOST.

ESSAY XII.

Quomodo autem id futurum sit, ne quis incredibile arbitretur, ostendam. Imprinim multiplicabitur regnum, et summa rerum potestas per plurimos dissipata et concisa minuetur. Tune discordia civiles in perpetuum serentur, nec ulla requies bellis exitialibus erit, donec reges decem pariter existant qui orbem terre, non ad regendum, sed ad consumendum, partiantur. Hi exercitiibus in immensum coactis, et agrorum cultibus destitutis, quod primum pertainit et cladis, dispersent omnia, et comminuent, et vorabunt. Tum reperite adversus eos hostis potentissimus ab extremis pugna septentrionalis orietur, qui tribus ex eo numero deletis qui tunc Asiam obtinet, assumetur in societatem a ceteris, ac princeps omnium constituetur. Hic insustentabili dominatione vexabit orbem; divina et humana miscabit; infienda dicta et execrabilia molietur; nova consilia in pectora suo volubilis, ut proprium sibi constitutum imperium; leges commutabit, suas sanctas; contaminabit, diripiet, spoliant, occidet. Denique immutato nomine, atque imperii sede translata, confusio et perturbation humani generis consequetur. Tum verum detestabile, atque abominandum tempus existet, quo nulli hominum sit vita jucunda.

LACTANTIUS de Vita Beatâ, Lib. vii. c. 16.

But lest this should be deemed incredible, I will show the manner in which it is to take place. First, there will be a multiplication of independent sovereignties, and the supreme magistracy of the empire, scattered and cut up into fragments, will be enfeebled in the exercise of power by law and authority. Then will be sown the seeds of civil discords, nor will there be any rest or pause to wasteful and ruinous wars; while the soldiery kept together in immense standing armies, the kings will crush and lay waste at their will;—until at length there will rise up against them a most puissant military chieftain of low birth, who will have conceded to him a fellowship with the other sovereigns of the earth, and will finally be constituted the head of all. This man will harass the civilized world with an insupportable despôtism, he will confound and commix all things spiritual and temporal. He will form plans and preparations of the most execrable and sacrilegious nature. He will be forever restlessly turning over new
schemes in his imagination, in order that he may fix the imperial power over all in his own name and possession. He will change the former laws, he will sanction a code of his own, he will contaminate, pillage, lay waste and massacre. At length, when he has succeeded in the change of names and titles, and in the transfer of the seat of empire, there will follow a confusion and perturbation of the human race; then will there be for a while an era of horror and abomination, during which no man will enjoy his life in quietness.*

I interpose this essay as a historical comment on the words "mimic and caricaturist of Charlemagne," as applied to the despot, whom since the time that the words were first printed, we have, thank Heaven! succeeded in encaging. The motto contains one of the most striking instances of an uninspired prophecy fulfilled even in many of its minutiae, that I recollect ever to have met with: and it is hoped, that as a curiosity it will reconcile my readers to its unusual length. But though my chief motive was that of relieving, by the variety of an historical parallel, the series of argument on this most important of all subjects, the communicability of truth, yet the essay is far from being a digression. Having given utterance to quicquid in rem tam maleficam indignatiodolorqucdiclarent, concerning the mischiefs of a lawless press, I held it an act of justice to give a portrait no less lively of the excess to which the remorseless ambition of a government might go in accumulating its oppressions in the one instance before the discovery of printing, and in the other during the suppression of its freedom.

I have translated the following from a voluminous German work, Michael Ignaz Schmidt's History of the Germans, from Charles the Great to Conrade I.; in which this extract forms the conclusion of the second chapter of the third book. The late tyrant's close imitation of Charlemagne was sufficiently evidenced by his assumption of the iron crown of Italy, by his imperial coronation with the presence and authority of the Holy Father; by his imperial robe embroidered with bees in order to mark him as a successor of Pepin, and even by his ostentatious revocation of Charlemagne's grants to the Bishop of Rome. But that the differences might be felt likewise, I have prefaced the translation with the few following observations.

* This translation has expressions referring to some words inserted by the author in the Latin quotation in the previous editions.—Ed.
Let it be remembered then, that Charlemagne, for the greater part, created for himself the means of which he availed himself; that his very education was his own work, and that unlike Peter the Great, he could find no assistants out of his own realm; that the unconquerable courage and heroic dispositions of the nations he conquered, supplied a proof positive of real superiority, indeed the sole positive proof of intellectual power, in a warrior: for how can we measure force but by the resistance to it? But all was prepared for Bonaparte; Europe weakened in the very heart of all human strength, namely, in moral and religious principle, and at the same time accidentally destitute of any one great or commanding mind: the French people, on the other hand, still restless from revolutionary fanaticism; their civic enthusiasm already passed into military passion and the ambition of conquest; and alike by disgust, terror, and characteristic unfitness for freedom, ripe for the reception of a despotism. Add too, that the main obstacles to an unlimited system of conquest, and the pursuit of universal monarchy had been cleared away for him by his pioneers the Jacobins, namely, the influence of the great landholders, of the privileged and of the commercial classes. Even the naval successes of Great Britain, by destroying the trade, rendering useless the colonies, and almost annihilating the navy of France, were in some respects subservient to his designs by concentrating the powers of the French empire in its armies, and supplying them out of the wrecks of all other employments, save that of agriculture. France had already approximated to the formidable state so prophetically described by Sir James Steuart, in his Political Economy, in which the population should consist chiefly of soldiers and peasantry: at least the interests of no other classes were regarded. The great merit of Bonaparte has been that of a skilful steersman, who with his boat in the most violent storm still keeps himself on the summit of the waves, which not he, but the winds had raised. I will now proceed to my translation.

"That Charles was a hero, his exploits bear evidence. The subjugation of the Lombards, protected as they were by the Alps, by fortresses and fortified towns, by numerous armies, and by a great name; of the Saxons, secured by their savage resoluteness, by an untamable love of freedom, by their desert plains and enormous forests, and by their own poverty; the humbling of the
ESSAY XII.

Dukes of Bavaria, Aquitania, Bretagne, and Gascony; proud of their ancestry as well as of their ample domains; the almost entire extirpation of the Avars, so long the terror of Europe; are assuredly works which demanded a courage and a firmness of mind such as Charles only possessed.

"How great his reputation was, and this too beyond the limits of Europe, is proved by the embassies sent to him out of Persia, Palestine, Mauritania, and even from the Khalifs of Bagdad. If at the present day an embassy from the Black or Caspian Sea comes to a prince on the Baltic, it is not to be wondered at, since such are now the political relations of the four quarters of the world, that a blow which is given to any one of them is felt more or less by all the others. Whereas in the time of Charlemagne, the inhabitants in one of the known parts of the world scarcely knew what was going on in the rest. Nothing but the extraordinary, all-piercing report of Charles's exploits could bring this to pass. His greatness, which set the world in astonishment, was likewise, without doubt, that which begot in the Pope and the Romans the first idea of the re-establishment of their empire.

"It is true, that a number of things united to make Charles a great man—favorable circumstances of time, a nation already disciplined to warlike habits, a long life, and the consequent acquisition of experience, such as no one possessed in his whole realm. Still, however, the principal means of his greatness Charles found in himself. His great mind was capable of extending its attention to the greatest multiplicity of affairs. In the middle of Saxony he thought on Italy and Spain, and at Rome he made provisions for Saxony, Bavaria, and Pannonia. He gave audience to the ambassadors of the Greek emperor and other potentates, and himself audited the accounts of his own farms, where every thing was entered even to the number of the eggs. Busy as his mind was, his body was not less in one continued state of motion. Charles would see into every thing himself, and do every thing himself, as far as his powers extended and even this it was, too, which gave to his undertakings such force and energy.

"But with all this the government of Charles was the government of a conqueror, that is splendid abroad and fearfully oppressive at home. What a grievance must it not have been for the people, that Charles for forty years together dragged them now
to the Elbe, then to the Ebro, after this to the Po, and from thence back again to the Elbe, and this not to check an invading enemy, but to make conquests which little profited the French nation! This must prove too much, at length, for a hired soldier: how much more for conscripts, who did not live only to fight, but who were fathers of families, citizens, and proprietors? But above all, it is to be wondered at, that a nation, like the French, should suffer themselves to be used as Charles used them. But the people no longer possessed any considerable share of influence. All depended on the great chieftains, who gave their willing suffrage for endless wars, by which they were always sure to win. They found the best opportunity, under such circumstances, to make themselves great and mighty at the expense of the freemen resident within the circle of their baronial courts; and when conquests were made, it was far more for their advantage than that of the monarchy. In the conquered provinces there was a necessity for dukes, vassal kings, and different high offices: all this fell to their share.

"I would not say this if we did not possess incontrovertible original documents of those times, which prove clearly to us that Charles's government was an unhappy one for the people, and that this great man, by his actions, labored to the direct subversion of his first principles. It was his first pretext to establish a greater equality among the members of his vast community, and to make all free and equal subjects under a common sovereign. And, from the necessity occasioned by continual war, the exact contrary took place. Nothing gives us a better notion of the interior state of the French monarchy, than the third capitular of the year 811.* All is full of complaint, the bishops and earls clamoring against the freeholders, and these in their turn against the bishops and earls. And, in truth, the freeholders had no small reason to be discontented and to resist, as far as they dared, even the imperial levies. A dependant must be content to follow his lord without further questioning: for he was paid for it. But a free citizen, who lived wholly on his own property, might reasonably object to suffer himself to be dragged about in all quarters of the world, at the fancies of his lord: especially as there was so much injustice intermixed. Those who gave up

* Compare with this the four or five quarto volumes of the French Conscription Code.
their properties entirely, or in part, of their own accord, were left undisturbed at home, while those, who refused to do this, were forced so often into service, that at length, becoming impoverished, they were compelled by want to give up, or dispose of, their free tenures to the bishops or earls.*

“It almost surpasses belief to what a height, at length, the aversion to war rose in the French nation, from the multitude of the campaigns, and the grievances connected with them. The national vanity was now satiated by the frequency of victories: and the plunder which fell to the lot of individuals, made but a poor compensation for the losses and burthens sustained by their families at home. Some, in order to become exempt from military service, sought for menial employments in the establishments of the bishops, abbots, abbesses, and earls. Others made over their free property to become tenants at will of such lords, as: from their age or other circumstances, they thought would be called to no further military services. Others even privately took away the life of their mothers, aunts, or other of their relatives, in order that no family residents might remain through whom their names might be known, and themselves traced; others voluntarily made slaves of themselves, in order thus to render themselves incapable of the military rank.”

When this extract was first published, namely, September 7, 1809, I prefixed the following sentence: “This passage contains so much matter for political anticipation and well-grounded hope, that I feel no apprehension of the reader’s being dissatisfied with its length.” I trust, that I may now derive the same confidence from his genial exultation, as a Christian, and from his honest pride as a Briton, in the retrospect of its completion. In this belief I venture to conclude the essay with the following extract from a “Comparison of the French republic, under Bonaparte, with the Roman empire under the first Caesars,” published by me in the Morning Post, 21st September, 1802.

If, then, there be no counterpoise of dissimilar circumstances, the prospect is gloomy indeed. The commencement of the public slavery in Rome, was in the most splendid era of human genius. Any unusually flourishing period of the arts and sci-

* It would require no great ingenuity to discover parallels, or at least equivalent hardships to these, in the treatment of, and regulations concerning, the reluctant conscripts.
ences in any country, is, even to this day, called the Augustan age of that country. The Roman poets, the Roman historians, the Roman orators, rivalled those of Greece; in military tactics, in machinery, in all the conveniences of private life, the Romans greatly surpassed the Greeks. With few exceptions, all the emperors, even the worst of them, were, like Bonaparte,* the liberal encouragers of all great public works, and of every species of public merit not connected with the assertion of political freedom:

—— O juvenes, circumplicit atque agitat vos,
Materiamque sibi Duci indulgentia quaerit.†

It is even so, at this present moment, in France. Yet, both in France and in Rome, we have learned, that the most abject dispositions to slavery rapidly trod on the heels of the most outrageous fanaticism for an almost anarchical liberty. Ruere in servitium consules, patres, eques: quanto quis illustrior, tanto magis falsi ac festinantes.‡ Peace and the coadunation of all the civilized provinces of the earth were the grand and plausible pretexts of Roman despotism: the degeneracy of the human species itself, in all the nations so blended, was the melancholy effect. To-morrow, therefore, we shall endeavor to detect all those points and circumstances of dissimilarity, which, though

* Imitators succeed better in copying the vices than the excellences of their archetypes. Where shall we find in the First Consul of France a counterpart to the generous and dreadless clemency of the first Cæsar! Acribe loquentibus satia habuit pro concione denunciare, ne perseverarent. Aulique Cæcinae criminosissimo libro, et Pitholai carminibus malamentia similis laceratam existimationem suam civili animo tuit.—(Sueton. I. 75.—Ed.)

It deserves translation for English readers. "To those who spoke bitterly against him, he held it sufficient to signify publicly, that they should not persevere in the use of such language. His character had been mangled in a most libellous work of Aulus Cæcina, and he had been grossly lampooned in some verses by Pitholauus; but he bore both with the temper of a good citizen."

For this part of the First Consul's character, if common report speaks the truth, we must seek a parallel in the dispositions of the third Cæsar, who dreaded the pen of a paragraph writer, hinting aught against his morals and measures, with as great anxiety, and with as vindictive feelings, as if it had been the dagger of an assassin lifted up against his life. From the third Cæsar, too, he adopted the abrogation of all popular elections.

† Juvenal. Sat. vii. 20.—Ed.
‡ Tacit. Ann. i. 7.—Ed.
they can not impeach the rectitude of the parallel, for the present, may yet render it probable, that as the same constitution of government has been built up in France with incomparably greater rapidity, so it may have an incomparably shorter duration. We are not conscious of any feelings of bitterness towards the First Consul; or, if any, only that venial prejudice, which naturally results from the having hoped proudly of an individual, and the having been miserably disappointed. But we will not voluntarily cease to think freely and speak openly. We owe grateful hearts, and uplifted hands of thanksgiving to the Divine Providence, that there is yet one European country—and that country our own—in which the actions of public men may be boldly analyzed, and the result publicly stated. And let the Chief Consul, who professes in all things to follow his fate, learn to submit to it, if he finds that it is still his fate to struggle with the spirit of English freedom, and the virtues which are the offspring of that spirit;—if he finds, that the genius of Great Britain, which blew up his Egyptian navy into the air, and blighted his Syrian laurels, still follows him with a calm and dreadful eye; and in peace, equally as in war, still watches for that liberty, in which alone the genius of our isle lives, and moves, and has its being; and which being lost, all our commercial and naval greatness would instantly languish, like a flower, the root of which had been silently eaten away by a worm; and without which, in any country, the public festivals, and pompous merriments of a nation present no other spectacle to the eye of reason, than a mob of maniacs dancing in their fetters.
ESSAY XIII.

Must there be still some discord mix'd among
The harmony of men, whose mood accords
Best with contention tun'd to notes of wrong!
That when war fails, peace must make war with words,
With words unto destruction arm'd more strong
Than ever were our foreign foemen's swords;
Making as deep, tho' not yet bleeding wounds?
What war left scarless, calumny confounds.

Truth lies entrapp'd where cunning finds no bar:
Since no proportion can there be betwixt:
Our actions which in endless motions are,
And ordinances which are always fixt.
Ten thousand laws more can not reach so far,
But malice goes beyond, or lives commixt
So close with goodness, that it ever will
Corrupt, disguise, or counterfeit it still.

And therefore would our glorious Alfred, who
Join'd with the king's the good man's majesty,
Not leave law's labyrinth without a clue—
Gave to deep skill its just authority;

But the last judgment—this his jury's plan—
Left to the natural sense of work-day man.*

I recur to the dilemma stated in the eighth essay. How shall we solve this problem? Its solution is to be found in that spirit which, like the universal menstruum sought for by the old alchemists, can blend and harmonize the most discordant elements;—it is to be found in the spirit of a rational freedom diffused and become national, in the consequent influence and control of public opinion, and in its most precious organ, the jury. It

* Daniel. Epistle to Sir Thomas Egerton. The lines in italics are substituted by the author for the original; and there are a few other verbal alterations.—Ed.
is to be found, wherever juries are sufficiently enlightened to perceive the difference, and to comprehend the origin and necessity of the difference, between libels and other criminal overt-acts, and are sufficiently independent to act upon the conviction, that in a charge of libel, the degree, the circumstances, and the intention, constitute—not merely modify—the offence, give it its being, and determine its legal name. The words maliciously and advisedly, must here have a force of their own, and a proof of their own. They will consequently consider the law as a blank, power provided for the punishment of the offender, not as a light by which they are to determine and discriminate the offence. The understanding and conscience of the jury are the judges in toto: the law a blank congé d'élire. The law is the clay, and those the potter's wheel. Shame fall on that man, who shall labor to confound what reason and nature have put asunder, and who at once, as far as in him lies, would render the press ineffectual and the law odious: who would lock up the main river, the Thames, of our intellectual commerce; would throw a bar across the stream, that must render its navigation dangerous or partial, using as his materials the very banks, which were intended to deepen its channel and guard against its inundations! Shame fall on him, and a participation of the infamy of those, who misled an English jury to the murder of Algernon Sidney.

But though the virtuous intention of the writer must be allowed a certain influence in facilitating his acquittal; the degree of his moral guilt is not the true index or mete-ward of his condemnation. For juries do not sit in a court of conscience, but of law; they are not the representatives of religion, but the guardians of external tranquillity. The leading principle, the pole-star, of the judgment in its decision concerning the libellous nature of a published writing, is its more or less remote connection with after overt-acts, as the cause or occasion of the same. Thus the publication of actual facts may be, and most often will be, criminal and libellous, when directed against private characters: not only because the charge will reach the minds of many who cannot be competent judges of the truth or falsehood of facts to which themselves were not witnesses, against a man whom they do not know, or at best know imperfectly; but because such a publication is of itself a very serious overt-act, by which the author without authority and without trial, has inflicted punishment on a fellow-
subject, himself being witness and jury, judge and executioner. Of such publications there can be no legal justification, though the wrong may be palliated by the circumstance that the injurious charges are not only true, but wholly out of the reach of the law. But in libels on the government there are two things to be balanced against each other: first, the incomparably greater mischief of the overt-acts, if we suppose them actually occasioned by the libel—(as for instance, the subversion of government and property, if the principles taught by Thomas Paine had been realized, or if even an attempt had been made to realize them, by the many thousands of his readers); and second, the very great improbability that such effects will be produced by such writings. Government concerns all generally, and no one in particular. The facts are commonly as well known to the readers, as to the writer: and falsehood therefore easily detected. It is proved, likewise, by experience, that the frequency of open political discussion, with all its blamable indiscretions, indisposes a nation to overt-acts of practical sedition or conspiracy. They talk ill, said Charles V. of his Belgian provinces, but they suffer so much the better for it. His successor thought differently: he determined to be master of their words and opinions, as well as of their actions, and in consequence lost one half of those provinces, and retained the other half at an expense of strength and treasure greater than the original worth of the whole. An enlightened jury, therefore, will require proofs of more than ordinary malignity of intention, as furnished by the style, price, mode of circulation, and so forth; or of punishable indiscretion arising out of the state of the times, as of dearth, for instance, or of whatever other calamity is likely to render the lower classes turbulent, and apt to be alienated from the government of their country. For the absence of a right disposition of mind must be considered both in law and in morals, as nearly equivalent to the presence of a wrong disposition. Under such circumstances the legal paradox that a libel may be the more a libel for being true, becomes strictly just, and as such ought to be acted upon.

Concerning the right of punishing by law the authors of heretical or deistical writings, I reserve my remarks for a future essay, in which I hope to state the grounds and limits of toleration more accurately than they seem to me to have been hitherto traced. There is one maxim, however, which I am tempted to seize as it
passes across me. If I may trust my own memory, it is indeed a very old truth: and yet if the fashion of acting in apparent ignorance thereof be any presumption of its novelty, it ought to be new, or at least have become so by courtesy of oblivion. It is this: that as far as human practice can realize the sharp limits and exclusive proprieties of science, law and religion should be kept distinct. There is, in strictness, no proper opposition but between the two polar forces of one and the same power.* If I say then, that law and religion are natural opposites, and that the latter is the requisite counterpoise of the former, let it not be interpreted, as if I had declared them to be contraries. The law has rightfully invested the creditor with the power of arresting and imprisoning an insolvent debtor, the farmer with the power of transporting, mediatly at least, the pillagers of his hedges and copes; but the law does not compel him to exercise that power, while it will often happen that religion commands him to forego it. Nay, so well was this understood by our grandfathers, that a man who squares his conscience by the law was a common paraphrase or synonyme of a wretch without any conscience at all. We have all of us learnt from history, that there was a long and dark period, during which the powers and the aims of law were usurped in the name of religion by the clergy and the courts spiritual: and we all know the result. Law and

* Every power in nature and in spirit must evolve an opposite as the sole means and condition of its manifestation: and all opposition is a tendency to re-union. This is the universal law of polarity or essential dualism, first promulgated by Heraclitus, 2000 years afterwards re-published, and made the foundation both of logic, of physics, and of metaphysics by Giordano Bruno. The principle may be thus expressed. The identity of thesis and antithesis is the substance of all being; their opposition the condition of all existence or being manifested; and every thing or phenomenon is the exponent of a synthesis as long as the opposite energies are retained in that synthesis. Thus water is neither oxygen nor hydrogen, nor yet is it a commixture of both; but the synthesis or indifference of the two: and as long as the copula endures, by which it becomes water, or rather which alone is water, it is not less a simple body than either of the imaginary elements, improperly called its ingredients or components. It is the object of the mechanical atomistic philosophy to confound synthesis with synartesis, or rather with mere juxtaposition of corpuscles separated by invisible interspaces. I find it difficult to determine, whether this theory contradicts the reason or the senses most: for it is alike inconceivable and unimagi-
religion thus interpenetrating, neutralized each other; and the baleful product, or *tertium aliquid*, of this union retarded the civilization of Europe for centuries. Law splintered into the minutiae of religion, the awful function and prerogative of which it is to take account of every *idle word*, became a busy and inquisitorial tyranny: and religion substituting legal terrors for the ennobling influences of conscience remained religion in name only.

The present age appears to me approaching fast to a similar usurpation of the functions of religion by law: and if it were required, I should not want strong presumptive proofs in favor of this opinion, whether I sought for them in the charges from the bench concerning wrongs, to which religion denounces the fearful penalties of guilt, but for which the law of the land assigns damages only: or in sundry statutes—and all praise to the late Mr. Wyndham, *Romanorum ultimo*—in a still greater number of attempts towards new statutes, the authors of which displayed the most pitiable ignorance, not merely of the distinction between perfect, and imperfect obligations, but even of that still more sacred distinction between things and persons. What the son of Sirach advises concerning the soul, every senator should apply to his legislative capacity:—reverence it in meekness, knowing how feeble and how mighty a thing it is!*

From this hint concerning toleration, we may pass by an easy transition to the, perhaps, still more interesting subject of toleration. And here I fully coincide with Frederic H. Jacobi, that the only true spirit of toleration consists in our conscientious toleration of each other's intolerance. Whatever pretends to be more than this, is either the unthinking cant of fashion, or the soul-palsying narcotic of moral and religious indifference. All of us without exception, in the same mode though not in the same degree, are necessarily subjected to the risk of mistaking positive opinions for certainty and clear insight. From this yoke we can not free ourselves; but by ceasing to be men; and this too not in order to transcend, but to sink below, our human nature. For if in one point of view it be the mulet of our fall, and of the corruption of our will; it is equally true, that contemplated from another point, it is the price and consequence of our progressiveness. To him who is compelled to pace to and fro within

* The reference, probably, is to Ecclus. x. 28. *My son, glorify thy soul in meekness, and give it honor according to the dignity thereof.*—Ed.
the high walls and in the narrow court-yard of a prison, all objects may appear clear and distinct. It is the traveller journeying onward full of heart and hope, with an ever-varying horizon on the boundless plain, who is liable to mistake clouds for mountains, and the mirage of drouth for an expanse of refreshing waters.

But notwithstanding this deep conviction of our general fallibility, and the most vivid recollection of my own, I dare avow with the German philosopher, that as far as opinions, and not motives, principles, and not men,—are concerned; I neither am tolerant, nor wish to be regarded as such. According to my judgment, it is mere ostentation, or a poor trick that hypocrisy plays with the cards of nonsense, when a man makes protestation of being perfectly tolerant in respect of all principles, opinions, and persuasions, those alone excepted which render the holders intolerant. For he either means to say by this, that he is utterly indifferent towards all truth, and finds nothing so insufferable as the persuasion of there being any such mighty value or importance attached to the possession of the truth as should give a marked preference to any one conviction above any other; or else he means nothing, and amuses himself with articulating the pulses of the air instead of inhaling it in the more healthful and profitable exercise of yawning. That which doth not withstand, hath itself no standing place. To fill a station is to exclude or repel others,—and this is not less the definition of moral, than of material solidity. We live by continued acts of defence, that involve a sort of offensive warfare. But a man's principles, on which he grounds his hope and his faith, are the life of his life. We live by faith, says the philosophic Apostle; and faith without principles is but a flattering phrase for wilful positiveness, or fanatical bodily sensation. Well, and of good right therefore, do we maintain with more zeal, than we should defend body or estate, a deep and inward conviction, which is as the moon to us; and like the moon with all its massy shadows and deceptive gleams, it yet lights us on our way, poor travellers as we are, and benighted pilgrims. With all its spots and changes and temporary eclipses, with all its vain halos and bedimming vapors, it yet reflects the light that is to rise on us, which even now is rising, though intercepted from our immediate view by the mountains that inclose and frown over the vale of our mortal life.
This again is the mystery and the dignity of our human nature, that we can not give up our reason, without giving up at the same time our individual personality. For that must appear to each man to be his reason which produces in him the highest sense of certainty; and yet it is not reason, except so far as it is of universal validity and obligatory on all mankind. There is a one heart for the whole mighty mass of humanity, and every pulse in each particular vessel strives to beat in concert with it. He who asserts that truth is of no importance except in the signification of sincerity, confounds sense with madness, and the word of God with a dream. If the power of reasoning be the gift of the supreme Reason, that we be sedulous, yea, and militant in the endeavor to reason aright, is his implied command. But what is of permanent and essential interest to one man must needs be so to all, in proportion to the means and opportunities of each. Woe to him by whom these are neglected, and double woe to him by whom they are withholden; for he robs at once himself and his neighbor. That man's soul is not dear to himself, to whom the souls of his brethren are not dear. As far as they can be influenced by him, they are parts and properties of his own soul, their faith his faith, their errors his burthen, their righteousness and bliss his righteousness and his reward—and of their guilt and misery his own will be the echo. As much as I love my fellow-men, so much and no more will I be intolerant of their heresies and unbelief—and I will honor and hold forth the right hand of fellowship to every individual who is equally intolerant of that which he conceives such in me. We will both exclaim—' I know not what antidotes among the complex views, impulses and circumstances, that form your moral being, God's gracious providence may have vouchsafed to you against the serpent fang of this error,—but it is a viper, and its poison deadly, although through higher influences some men may take the reptile to their bosom, and remain unstung.'

In one of those poisonous journals, which deal out profaneness, hate, fury, and sedition through the land, I read the following paragraph. "The Brahmin believes that every man will be saved in his own persuasion, and that all religions are equally pleasing to the God of all. The Christian confines salvation to the believer in his own Vedas and Shasters. Which is the more humane and philosophic creed of the two?" Let question an-
swear question. Self-complacent scoffer! Whom meanest thou by God? The God of truth?—and can He be pleased with falsehood, and the debasement or utter suspension of the reason which he gave to man that he might receive from him the sacrifice of truth? Or the God of love and mercy?—and can He be pleased with the blood of thousands poured out under the wheels of Juggernaut, or with the shrieks of children offered up as fire offerings to Baal or to Moloch? Or dost thou mean the God of holiness and infinite purity?—and can He be pleased with abominations unutterable and more than brutal defilements,— and equally pleased too as with that religion, which commands us that we have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness but to reprove them;—with that religion, which strikes the fear of the Most High so deeply, and the sense of the exceeding sinfulness of sin so inwardly, that the believer anxiously inquires: Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?—and which makes answer to him,— He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?* But I check myself. It is at once folly and profanation of truth, to reason with the man who can place before his eyes a minister of the Gospel directing the eye of the widow from the corpse of her husband upward to his and her Redeemer,—(the God of the living and not of the dead)—and then the remorseless Brahmin goading on the disconsolate victim to the flames of her husband’s funeral pile, abandoned by, and abandoning, the helpless pledges of their love,— and yet dare ask, which is the more humane and philosophic creed of the two?—No! No! when such opinions are in question I neither am, nor will be, nor wish to be regarded as, tolerant.

* Micah vi. 7, 8.—Ed.
ESSAY XIV.

Knowing the heart of man is set to be
The centre of this world, about the which
These revolutions of disturbances
Still roll; where all the aspects of misery
Predominate; whose strong effects are such,
As he must bear, being powerless to redress:
And that unless above himself he can
Erect himself, how poor a thing is man! Daniel.

I have thus endeavored, with an anxiety which may perhaps have misled me into prolixity, to detail and ground the conditions under which the communication of truth is commanded or forbidden to us as individuals, by our conscience; and those too, under which it is permissible by the law which controls our conduct as members of the state. But is the subject of sufficient importance to deserve so minute an examination? O that my readers would look round the world, as it now is, and make to themselves a faithful catalogue of its many miseries! From what do these proceed, and on what do they depend for their continuance? Assuredly, for the greater part, on the actions of men, and those again on the want of a vital principle of action. We live by faith. The essence of virtue consists in the principle. And the reality of this, as well as its importance, is believed by all men in fact, few as there may be who bring the truth forward into the light of distinct consciousness. Yet all men feel, and at times acknowledge to themselves, the true cause of their misery. There is no man so base, but that at some time or other, and in some way or other, he admits that he is not what he ought to be, though by a curious art of self-delusion, by an effort to keep at peace with himself as long and as much as possible, he will throw off the blame from the amenable part of his na-

* Epistle to the Countess of Cumberland.—Ed.*
ture, his moral principle, to that which is independent of his will, namely, the degree of his intellectual faculties. Hence, for once that a man exclaims, how dishonest I am! on what base and unworthy motives I act! we may hear a hundred times, what a fool I am! curse on my folly! and the like.*

Yet even this implies an obscure sentiment, that with clearer conceptions in the understanding, the principle of action would become purer in the will. Thanks to the image of our Maker not wholly obliterated from any human soul, we dare not purchase an exemption from guilt by an excuse, which would place our melioration out of our own power. Thus the very man, who will abuse himself for a fool but not for a villain, would rather, spite of the usual professions to the contrary, be condemned as a rogue by other men, than be acquitted as a blockhead. But be this as it may, in and out of himself, however, he sees plainly the true cause of our common complaints. Doubtless, there seem many physical causes of distress, of disease, of poverty and of desolation—tempests, earthquakes, volcanos, wild or venomous animals, barren soils, uncertain or tyrannous climates, pestilential swamps, and death in the very air we breathe. Yet when do we hear the general wretchedness of mankind attributed to these? Even in the most awful of the Icelandic and Sicilian eruptions, when the earth has opened and sent forth vast rivers of fire, and the smoke and vapor have dimmed the light of heaven for months, how small has been the comparative injury to the human race;—and how much even of this injury might be fairly attributed to combined imprudence and superstition! Natural calamities that do indeed spread devastation wide (for instance, the marsh fever), are almost without exception, voices of nature in her all-intelligible language—do this! or cease to do that! By the mere absence of one superstition, and of the sloth engendered by it, the plague would probably cease to exist throughout Asia and Africa. Pronounce meditatively the name of Jenner, and ask what might we not hope, what need we deem unattainable, if all the time, the effort, the skill, which we waste in making

* I do not consider as exceptions the thousands that abuse themselves by rote with lip-penitence, or the wild ravings of fanaticism; for these persons at the very time they speak so vehemently of the wickedness and rotteness of their hearts, are then commonly the warmest in their own good opinion, covered round and comfortable in the wrap-rascal of self-hypocrisy.
ourselves miserable through vice, and vicious through misery, were embodied and marshalled to a systematic war against the existing evils of nature! No, It is a wicked world! This is so generally the solution, that this very wickedness is assigned by selfish men, as their excuse for doing nothing to render it better, and for opposing those who would make the attempt. What have not Clarkson, Granville Sharp, Wilberforce, and the Society of the Friends, effected for the honor, and if we believe in a retributive Providence, for the continuance of the prosperity of the English nation, imperfectly as the intellectual and moral faculties of the people at large are developed at present! What may not be effected, if the recent discovery of the means of educating nations (freed, however, from the vile sophistications and mutilations of ignorant mountebanks) shall have been applied to its full extent! Would I frame to myself the most inspiring representation of future bliss, which my mind is capable of comprehending, it would be embodied to me in the idea of Bell receiving, at some distant period, the appropriate reward of his earthly labors, when thousands and ten thousands of glorified spirits, whose reason and conscience had, through his efforts, been unfolded, shall sing the song of their own redemption, and pouring forth praises to God and to their Saviour, shall repeat his new name in heaven, give thanks for his earthly virtues, as the chosen instruments of divine mercy to themselves, and not seldom perhaps turn their eyes toward him, as from the sun to its image in the fountain, with secondary gratitude and the permitted utterance of a human love! Were but a hundred men to combine a deep conviction that virtuous habits may be formed by the very means by which knowledge is communicated, that men may be made better, not only in consequence, but by the mode, and in the process, of instruction;—were but a hundred men to combine that clear conviction of this, which I myself at this moment feel, even as I feel the certainty of my being, with the perseverance of a Clarkson or a Bell, the promises of ancient prophecy would disclose themselves to our faith, even as when a noble castle hidden from us by an intervening mist, discovers itself by its reflection in the tranquil lake, on the opposite shore of which we stand gazing.* What an awful duty, what a nurse of all other, the fairest vir-

* This is, I fear, too complex, too accidental an image to be conveyed by words to those, who have not seen it themselves in nature. 1880.
tues, does not hope become! We are bad ourselves, because we despair of the goodness of others.

If then it be a truth, attested alike by common feeling and common sense, that the greater part of human misery depends directly on human vices, and the remainder indirectly, by what means can we act on men so as to remove or preclude these vices, and purify their principle of moral election? The question is not by what means each man is to alter his own character—in order to this, all the means prescribed and all the aidances given by religion, may be necessary for him. Vain, of themselves, may be

—— the sayings of the wise
In ancient and in modern books enrolled

* * *

Unless he feel within
Some source of consolation from above,
Secret refreshings, that repair his strength
And fainting spirits uphold.*

This is not the question. Virtue would not be virtue, could it be given by one fellow-creature to another. To make use of all the means and appliances in our power to the actual attainment of rectitude, is the abstract of the duty which we owe to ourselves: to supply those means as far as we can, comprises our duty to others. The question then is, what are these means? Can they be any other than the communication of knowledge, and the removal of those evils and impediments which prevent its reception? It may not be in our power to combine both, but it is in the power of every man to contribute to the former, who is sufficiently informed to feel that it is his duty. If it be said, that we should endeavor not so much to remove ignorance, as to make the ignorant religious;—religion herself, through her sacred oracles, answers for me, that all effective faith pre-supposes knowledge and individual conviction. If the mere acquiescence in truth, uncomprehended and unfathomed, were sufficient, few indeed would be the vicious and the miserable, in this country at least, where speculative infidelity is, God be praised! confined to a small number. Like bodily deformity, there is one instance here and another there; but three in one place are already an undue proportion. It is highly worthy of observation, that the

* Samson Agonistes.
inspired writings received by Christians are distinguishable from all other books pretending to inspiration, from the scriptures of the Brahmins, and even from the Koran, in their strong and frequent recommendations of truth. I do not here mean veracity, which can not but be enforced in every code which appeals to the religious principle of man; but knowledge. This is not only extolled as the crown and honor of a man, but to seek after it is again and again commanded us as one of our most sacred duties. Yea, the very perfection and final bliss of the glorified spirit is represented by the Apostle as a plain aspect, or intuitive beholding, of truth in its eternal and immutable source. Not that knowledge can of itself do all! The light of religion is not that of the moon, light without heat; but neither is its warmth that of the stove, warmth without light. Religion is the sun, the warmth of which indeed swells, and stirs, and actuates the life of nature, but who at the same time beholds all the growth of life with a master-eye, makes all objects glorious on which he looks, and by that glory visible to all others.

But though knowledge be not the only, yet that it is an indispensable and most effectual agent in the direction of our actions, one consideration will convince us. It is an undoubted fact of human nature, that the sense of impossibility quenches all will. Sense of utter inaptitude does the same. The man shuns the beautiful flame, which is eagerly grasped at by the infant. The sense of a disproportion of certain after-harm to present gratification, produces effects almost equally uniform: though almost perishing with thirst, we should dash to the earth a goblet of wine in which we had seen a poison infused, though the poison were without taste or odor, or even added to the pleasures of both. Are not all our vices equally inapt to the universal end of human actions, the satisfaction of the agent? Are not their pleasures equally disproportionate to the after-harm? Yet many a maiden, who will not grasp at the fire, will yet purchase a wreath of diamonds at the price of her health, her honor, nay, —and she herself knows it at the moment of her choice,—at the sacrifice of her peace and happiness. The sot would reject the poisoned cup, yet the trembling hand with which he raises his daily or hourly draught to his lips, has not left him ignorant that this too is altogether a poison. I know it will be objected, that the consequences foreseen are less immediate; that they are dif-
fused over a larger space of time; and that the slave of vice hopes where no hope is. This, however, only removes the question one step further: for why should the distance or diffusion of known consequences produce so great a difference? Why are men the dupes of the present moment? Evidently because the conceptions are indistinct in the one case, and vivid in the other; because all confused conceptions render us restless; and because restlessness can drive us to vices that promise no enjoyment, no not even the cessation of that restlessness. This is indeed the dread punishment attached by nature to habitual vice, that its impulses wax as its motives wane. No object, not even the light of a solitary taper in the far distance, tempts the benighted mind from before; but its own restlessness dogs it from behind, as with the iron goad of destiny. What then is or can be the preventive, the remedy, the counteraction, but the habituation of the intellect to clear, distinct, and adequate conceptions concerning all things that are the possible object of clear conception, and thus to reserve the deep feelings which belong, as by a natural right, to those obscure ideas* that are necessary to the moral perfection of the human being, notwithstanding, yea, even in consequence, of their obscurity—to reserve these feelings, I repeat, for objects, which their very sublimity renders indefinite, no less than their indefiniteness renders them sublime,—namely, to the ideas of being, form, life, the reason, the law of conscience, freedom, immortality, God! To connect with the objects of our senses the obscure notions and consequent vivid feelings, which are due only to immaterial and permanent things, is profanation relatively to the heart, and superstition in the understanding. It is in this sense, that the philosophic Apostle calls covetousness idolatry. Could we emancipate ourselves from the dimming influences of custom, and the transforming witchcraft of early

* I have not expressed myself as clearly as I could wish. But the truth of the assertion, that deep feeling has a tendency to combine with obscure ideas, in preference to distinct and clear notions, may be proved by the history of fanatics and fanaticism in all ages and countries. The odium theologicum is even proverbial: and it is the common complaint of philosophers and philosophic historians, that the passions of the disputants are commonly violent in proportion to the subtlety and obscurity of the questions in dispute. Nor is this fact confined to professional theologians: for whole nations have displayed the same agitations, and have sacrificed national policy to the more powerful interest of a controverted obscurity.
associations, we should see as numerous tribes of *fetisch*-worshipers in the streets of London and Paris, as we hear of on the coasts of Africa.

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**ESSAY XV.**

A palace when 'tis that which it should be
Leaves growing, and stands such, or else decays;
With him who dwells there, 'tis not so: for he
Should still urge upward, and his fortune raise.

*Our bodies had their* morning, *have their* noon,
*And shall not better—the next change is night;*
*But their* far larger guest, *t' whom sun and moon*
*Are sparks and short-lived, claims another right.*

The noble soul by age grows lustier,
Her appetite and her digestion mend;
We must not starve nor hope to pamper her
With woman's milk and pap unto the end.

Provide you manlier diet!  

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I AM fully aware, that what I am writing and have written (in these latter essays at least) will expose me to the censure of some, as bewildering myself and readers with metaphysics; to the ridicule of others as a school-boy declaimer on old and worn-out truisms or exploded fancies; and to the objection of most as obscure. The last real or supposed defect has already received an answer both in the preceding essays, and in the appendix to my first Lay-Sermon, entitled The Statesman's Manual. Of the former two, I shall take the present opportunity of declaring my sentiments; especially as I have already received a hint that my idol, Milton, has represented metaphysics as the subject which the bad spirits in hell delight in discussing. And truly, if I had exerted my subtlety and invention in persuading myself and others that we are but living machines, and that, as one of the late followers of Hobbes and Hartley has expressed the system, the as-

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* Letter to Sir Henry Goodere. The words in italics are substituted for the original.—Ed.
sassin and his dagger are equally fit objects of moral esteem and abhorrence; or if with a writer of wider influence and higher authority, I had reduced all virtue to a selfish prudence eked out by superstition,*—for, assuredly, a creed which takes its central point in conscious selfishness, whatever be the forms or names that act on the selfish passion, a ghost or a constable, can have but a distant relationship to that religion, which places its essence in our loving our neighbor as ourselves, and God above all,—I know not, by what arguments I could repel the sarcasm. But what are my metaphysics?—Merely the referring of the mind to its own consciousness for truths indispensable to its own happiness! To what purpose do I, or am I about to, employ them? To perplex our clearest notions and living moral instincts? To deaden the feelings of will and free power, to extinguish the light of love and of conscience, to make myself and others worthless, soulless, God-less? No! to expose the folly and the legerdemain of those who have thus abused the blessed machine of language; to support all old and venerable truths; and by them to support, to kindle, to project the spirit; to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings, with their vital warmth, actualize our reason:—these are my objects, these are my subjects; and are these the metaphysics which the bad spirits in hell delight in?

But how shall I avert the scorn of those critics who laugh at the oldness of my topics, evil and good, necessity and arbitrament, immortality and the ultimate aim? By what shall I regain their favor? My themes must be new, a French constitution; a balloon; a change of ministry; a fresh batch of kings on the Continent, or of peers in our happier island; or who had the best of it of two parliamentary gladiators, and whose speech, on the subject of Europe bleeding at a thousand wounds, or our own country struggling for herself and all human nature, was cheered.

* "And from this account of obligation it follows, that we are obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by; for nothing else can be a violent motive to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other, depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of God."—Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, B. II. c. 2, et passim.—Ed.
by the greatest number of "laughs," "loudest laughs," and "very loud laughs:"—(which, carefully marked by italics, form most conspicuous and strange parentheses in the newspaper reports.)

Or if I must be philosophical, the last chemical discoveries,—provided I do not trouble my reader with the principle which gives them their highest interest, and the character of intellectual grandeur to the discoverer; or the last shower of stones, and that they were supposed, by certain philosophers, to have been projected from some volcano in the moon,—care being taken not to add any of the cramp reasons for this opinion! Something new, however, it must be, quite new and quite out of themselves! for whatever is within them, whatever is deep within them, must be as old as the first dawn of human reason. But to find no contradiction in the union of old and new, to contemplate the Ancient of days with feelings as fresh, as if they then sprang forth at his own fiat—this characterizes the minds that feel the riddle of the world, and may help to unravel it! To carry on the feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood, to combine the child's sense of wonder and novelty with the appearances which every day for perhaps forty years has rendered familiar,

With sun and moon and stars throughout the year,
And man and woman——

this is the character and privilege of genius, and one of the marks which distinguish genius from talent. And so to represent familiar objects as to awaken the minds of others to a like freshness of sensation concerning them—that constant accompaniment of mental, no less than of bodily, health—to the same modest questioning of a self-discovered and intelligent ignorance, which, like the deep and massy foundations of a Roman bridge, forms half of the whole structure—(prudens interrogatio dimidium scientiae, says Lord Bacon)—this is the prime merit of genius, and its most unequivocal mode of manifestation. Who has not, a thousand times, seen it snow upon water? Who has not seen it with a new feeling, since he has read Burns's comparison of sensual pleasure,

To snow that falls upon a river,
A moment white—then gone forever!*

* Tam O'Shanter.—Ed.
In philosophy equally, as in poetry, genius produces the strongest impressions of novelty, while it rescues the stalest and most admitted truths from the impotence caused by the very circumstance of their universal admission. Extremes meet;—a proverb, by the by, to collect and explain all the instances and exemplifications of which, would constitute and exhaust all philosophy. Truths, of all others the most awful and mysterious, yet being at the same time of universal interest, are too often considered as so true that they lose all the powers of truth, and lie bed-ridden in the dormitory of the soul, side by side with the most despised and exploded errors.

But as the class of critics, whose contempt I have anticipated, commonly consider themselves as men of the world, instead of hazarding additional sneers by appealing to the authorities of recluse philosophers,—for such, in spite of all history, the men who have distinguished themselves by profound thought, are generally deemed, from Plato and Aristotle to Cicero, and from Bacon to Berkeley—I will refer them to the darling of the polished court of Augustus, to the man, whose works have been in all ages deemed the models of good sense, and are still the pocket companion of those who pride themselves on uniting the scholar with the gentleman. This accomplished man of the world has given us an account of the subjects of conversation between himself and the illustrious statesmen who governed, and the brightest luminaries who then adorned, the empire of the civilized world:

Sermo oritur non de villis domibus alienis,
Nec male, necne, lepus saltet. Sed quod magis ad nos
Pertinet, et nescire malum est, agitamus: utrumque
Divitiis homines, an sint virtute beati?
Quidae ad amicitiae, usus rectunne, trahat nos;
Et quae sit natura boni, summumque quid ejus.—Hor.*

Berkeley indeed asserts, and is supported in his assertion by Lord Bacon and Sir Walter Raleigh, that without an habitual in-

* Serm. II. vi. 71. Conversation arises not concerning the country seats or families of strangers, nor whether the dancing hare performed well or ill. But we discuss what more nearly concerns us, and which it is an evil not to know: whether men are made happy by riches or by virtue: whether interest or a love of virtue should lead us to friendship; and in what consists the nature of good, and what is the ultimate or supreme good—the summum bonum.
terest in these subjects, a man may be a dexterous intriguer, but never can be a statesman. Would to Heaven that the verdict to be passed on my labors depended on those who least needed them! The water-lily in the midst of waters lifts up its broad leaves, and expands its petals at the first pattering of the shower, and rejoices in the rain with a quicker sympathy, than the parched shrub in the sandy desert.

God created man in his own image. To be the image of his own eternity created he man! Of eternity and self-existence what other likeness is possible, but immortality and moral self-determination? In addition to sensation, perception, and practical judgment—instinctive or acquirable—concerning the notices furnished by the organs of perception, all which in kind at least, the dog possesses in common with his master; in addition to these, God gave us reason, and with reason he gave us reflective self-consciousness; gave us principles, distinguished from the maxims and generalizations of outward experience by their abso-lute and essential universality and necessity; and above all, by superadding to reason the mysterious faculty of free-will and consequent personal amenability, he gave us conscience—that law of conscience, which in the power, and as the indwelling word, of a holy and omnipotent legislator commands us—from among the numerous ideas mathematical and philosophical, which the reason by the necessity of its own excellence creates for itself,—unconditionally commands us to attribute reality, and actual existence, to those ideas and to those only, without which the conscience itself would be baseless and contradictory, to the ideas of soul, of free-will, of immortality, and of God. To God, as the reality of the conscience and the source of all obligation; to free-will, as the power of the human being to maintain the obedience which God through the conscience has commanded, against all the might of nature; and to the immortality of the soul, as a state in which the weal and woe of man shall be proportioned to his moral worth. With this faith all nature,

—all the mighty world
Of eye and ear——*

presents itself to us, now as the aggregated material of duty, and now as a vision of the Most High revealing to us the mode, and

* Wordsworth. Lines near Tintern Abbey.—Ed.
time, and particular instance of applying and realizing that universal rule, pre-established in the heart of our reason.

"The displeasure of some readers," to use Berkeley's words, "may, perhaps, be incurred by my having surprised them into certain reflections and inquiries, for which they have no curiosity. But perhaps some others may be pleased to find themselves carried into ancient times, even though they should consider the hoary maxims, defended in these essays, barely as hints to awaken and exercise the inquisitive reader, on points not beneath the attention of the ablest men. Those great men, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, men the most consummate in politics, who founded states, or instructed princes, or wrote most accurately on public government, were at the same time the most acute at all abstracted and sublime speculations; —the clearest light being ever necessary to guide the most important actions. And whatever the world may opine, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the sumnum bonum, may possibly make a thriving earth-worm, but will most indubitably make a blundering patriot and a sorry statesman."

**ESSAY XVI.**

_Blind is that soul which from this truth can swerve,
No state stands sure, but on the grounds of right,
Of virtue, knowledge; judgment to preserve,
And all the pow'rs of learning requisite:
Though other shifts a present turn may serve,
Yet in the trial they will weigh too light._

_DANIEL.†_

**I earnestly entreat the reader not to be dissatisfied either with himself or with the author, if he should not at once understand every part of the preceding essay; but rather to consider it as a mere annunciation of a magnificent theme, the different parts of which are to be demonstrated and developed, explained, illustrated, and exemplified in the progress of the work.**

*Siris, 350. The words in italics are substituted for the original._—Ed.
† _Musophilus_. The line in italics is substituted.—Ed.
wise entreat him to peruse with attention and with candor, the
weighty extract from the judicious Hooker, prefixed as the motto
to a following essay.* In works of reasoning, as distinguished
from narrations of events or statements of facts; but more par-
ticularly in works, the object of which is to make us better ac-
quainted with our own nature, a writer whose meaning is every-
where comprehended as quickly as his sentences can be read, may
indeed have produced an amusing composition, nay, by awaken-
ing and re-enlivening our recollections, a useful one; but most as-
suredly he will not have added either to the stock of our knowl-
edge, or to the vigor of our intellect. For how can we gather
strength, but by exercise? How can a truth, new to us, be made
our own without examination and self-questioning — any new
truth, I mean, that relates to the properties of the mind, and its
various faculties and affections? But whatever demands effort,
requires time. Ignorance seldom vaults into knowledge, but
passes into it through an intermediate state of obscurity, even as
night into day through twilight. All speculative truths begin
with a postulate, even the truths of geometry. They all suppose
an act of the will; for in the moral being lies the source of the
intellectual. The first step to knowledge, or rather the previous
condition of all insight into truth, is to dare commune with our
very and permanent self. It is Warburton's remark, not the
Friend's, that of all literary exercitations, whether designed for
the use or entertainment of the world, there are none of so much
importance, or so immediately our concern, as those which let us
into the knowledge of our own nature. Others may exercise the
understanding or amuse the imagination; but these only can im-
prove the heart and form the human mind to wisdom.

The recluse hermit oft times more doth know
Of the world's inmost wheels, than worldlings can.
As man is of the world, the heart of man
Is an epitome of God's great book
Of creatures, and men need no farther look. DONNE.†

The higher a man's station, the more arduous and full of peril
his duties, the more comprehensive should his foresight be, the
more rooted his tranquillity concerning life and death. But these

Pol. I. c. I. 2.—Ed.
† Eclogue. The words in italics are substituted.—Ed.
are gifts which no experience can bestow, but the experience from within: and there is a nobleness of the whole personal being, to which the contemplation of all events and phenomenon in the light of the three master ideas, announced in the foregoing pages, can alone elevate the spirit. *Anima sapiens,* says Giordano Bruno,—and let the sublime piety of the passage excuse some intermixture of error, or rather let the words, as they well may, be interpreted in a safe sense—*anima sapiens non timet mortem, immo interdum illam ultra appetit, illi ultra occurrit. Manet quippe substantiam omnem pro duratione eternitas, pro loco immensitas, pro actu omniformitas. *Non levemigitur ac futilem, atqui gravissimam perfectoque homine dignissimam contemplationis partem perseguimur, ubi divinitatis, naturaeque splendorem, fusionem, et communicacionem, non in cibo, potu, et ignobilire quodam materia cum attonitorum seculo perquirimus; sed in augusta Omnipotentis regia, immenso ætheris spatio, in infinita naturæ gemina omnis fientis et omnia facientis potentia, unde tot astrorum, mundorum, inquam, et numinum, uni altissimo concincentium atque saltantium absque numero atque fine juxta propositos ubique fines atque ordinem contemplamur. Sic ex visibilium æterno, immenso et innumerabili effectu sempiterna immensa illa majestas atque bonitas intellecta conspicitur, proque sua dignitate innumerabilia deorum (mundorum dico) adsistentia, concincentia, et gloria ipsius enarratione, immo ad oculos expressa concione glorificatur. Cui immenso mensum non quadrabit domicilium atque templum;—ad cujus majestatis plenitudinem agnoscendam atque percolandum, innumerabilia ministrorum nullus esset ordo. Era igitur ad omniformis Dei omniformem imaginem conjectemus oculos, vivum et magnum illius admirabrum simulacrum!— Hinc miraculum magnum a Trismegisto appellabatur homo, qui in Deum transeat quasi ipse sit Deus, qui conatur omnia fieri sicut Deus est omnia; ad objectum sine fine, ubique tamen finiendo, contendit, sicut infinitus est Deus, immensus, ubique totus.*

* De monade, &c. A wise spirit does not fear death, nay, sometimes—as in cases of voluntary martyrdom—seeks and goes forth to meet it, of its own accord. For there awaits all actual beings, for duration eternity, for place immensity, for action omniformity. We pursue, therefore, a species of contemplation not light or futile, but the weightiest and most worthy of
If this be regarded as the fancies of an enthusiast, by such as deem themselves most free,
When they within this gross and visible sphere
Chain down the winged soul, scoffing ascent,
Proud in their meanness, ———*

by such as pronounce every man out of his senses who has not lost his reason; even such men may find some weight in the

an accomplished man, while we examine and seek for the splendor, the interfusion, and communication of the Divinity and of nature, not in meats or drink, or any yet ignoble matter, with the race of the thunder-stricken; but in the august palace of the Omnipotent, in the illimitable ethereal space, in the infinite power, that creates all things, and is the abiding being of all things.

There we may contemplate the host of stars, of worlds, and their guardian deities, numbers without number, each in its appointed sphere, singing together, and dancing in adoration of the One Most High. Thus from the perpetual, immense, and innumerable goings on of the visible world, that sempiternal and absolutely infinite Majesty is intellectually beheld, and is glorified according to his glory, by the attendance and choral symphonies of innumerable gods, who utter forth the glory of their ineffable Creator in the expressive language of vision! To him illimitable, a limited temple will not correspond—to the acknowledgment and due worship of the plenitude of his majesty there would be no proportion in any innumerable army of ministrant spirits. Let us then cast our eyes upon the omniform image of the attributes of the all-creating Supreme, nor admit any representation of his excellency but the living universe, which he has created! Thence was man entitled by Trismegistus, the great miracle, inasmuch as he has been made capable of entering into union with God, as if he were himself a divine nature; tries to become all things, even as in God all things are; and in limitless progression of limited states of being, urges onward to the ultimate aim, even as God is simultaneously infinite, and everywhere all!

Giordano Bruno, the friend of Sir Philip Sidney and Fulk Greville, was burnt under pretence of atheism, at Rome, on the 17th of February, 1599–1600 (Scioppio ends his narrative in these words: *Sic ustitatus misere perit, renunciaturus, credo, in reliquis illis, quos finxit, mundis, quonam pacto homines blasphem et impii a Romanis tractari solent. His itaque modus in Roma est, quo contra homines impios et monstra huysmodi procedi a nobis sole.*—Ed.) His works are perhaps the scarcest books ever printed. They are singularly interesting as portraits of a vigorous mind struggling after truth, amid many prejudices, which from the state of the Roman Church, in which he was born, have a claim to much indulgence. One of them (entitled Ember Week) is curious for its lively accounts of the rude state of London, at that time, both as to the streets and the manners of the citizens.

* Poetical Works, VII. p. 88.—Ed.
historical fact that from persons, who had previously strengthened their intellects and feelings by the contemplation of principles—principles, the actions correspondent to which involve one half of their consequences, by their ennobling influence on the agent's own soul, and have omnipotence, as the pledge for the remainder—we have derived the surest and most general maxims of prudence. Of high value are they all. Yet there is one among them worth all the rest, which in the fullest and primary sense of the word is, indeed, the maxim, that is, maximum, of human prudence; and of which history itself, in all that makes it most worth studying, is one continued comment and exemplification. It is this: that there is a wisdom higher than prudence, to which prudence stands in the same relation as the mason and carpenter to the genial and scientific architect; and it is from the habits of thinking and feeling, which in this wisdom had their first formation, that our Nelsons and Wellingtons inherit that glorious hardihood, which completes the undertaking, ere the contemptuous calculator, who has left nothing omitted in his scheme of probabilities, except the might of the human mind, has finished his pretended proof of its impossibility. You look to facts, and profess to take experience for your guide. Well! I too appeal to experience: and let facts be the ordeal of my position! Therefore, although I have in this and the preceding essays quoted more frequently and copiously than I shall permit myself to do in future, I owe it to the cause I am pleading not to deny myself the gratification of supporting this connection of practical heroism with previous habits of philosophic thought, by a singularly ap-

(Le cena de le ceneri. See particularly the second dialogue.—Ed.) The most industrious historians of speculative philosophy, have not been able to procure more than a few of his works. Accidentally I have been more fortunate in this respect, than those who have written hitherto on the unhappy philosopher of Nola; as out of eleven works, the titles of which are preserved to us, I have had an opportunity of perusing six. I was told, when in Germany, that there is a complete collection of them in the royal library at Copenhagen. If so, it is unique.

(Wagner has collected and published seven of the Italian works of Bruno: Leipzig, 1830. These are, Il Candelajo; Le cena de le ceneri; De la causa, principio et uno; De l'infinito, universo e mondi; Spaccio de la bestia triante; Cabala del caballo Pegaseo; and De gli eroici furori. Two others are mentioned by Bruno, himself in the Cena, &c.; namely, L'area di Not and Purgatorio dell' inferno. Wagner could not discover these. The titles of twenty-three works in Latin are given by Wagner.—Ed.)
propriate passage from an author whose works can be called rare only from their being, I fear, rarely read, however commonly talked of. It is the instance of Xenophon, as stated by Lord Bacon, who would himself furnish an equal instance, if there could be found an equal commentator.

"It is of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from Socrates' school into Asia, in the expedition of Cyrus the younger, against King Artaxerxes. This Xenophon, at that time, was very young, and never had seen the wars before; neither had any command in the army, but only followed the war as a volunteer, for the love and conversation of Proxenus, his friend. He was present when Falinus came in message from the great King to the Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they, a handful of men, left to themselves in the midst of the King's territories, cut off from their country by many navigable rivers, and many hundred miles. The message imported, that they should deliver up their arms and submit themselves to the King's mercy. To which message, before answer was made, divers of the army conferred familiarly with Falinus, and amongst the rest Xenophon happened to say: 'Why, Falinus! we have now but these two things left, our arms and our virtue; and if we yield up our arms, how shall we make use of our virtue?' Whereeto Falinus, smiling on him, said, 'If I be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an Athenian, and I believe you study philosophy, and it is pretty that you say; but you are much abused, if you think your virtue can withstand the King's power.' Here was the scorn: the wonder followed;--which was, that this young scholar or philosopher, after all the captains were murdered in parley, by treason, conducted those ten thousand foot through the heart of all the King's high countries from Babylon to Gracia, in safety, in despite of all the King's forces, to the astonishment of the world, and the encouragement of the Grecians, in time succeeding, to make invasion upon the kings of Persia; as was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, attempted by Agesilaua the Spartan, and achieved by Alexander the Macedonian, all upon the ground of the act of that young scholar."

Often have I reflected with awe on the great and disproportionate power, which an individual of no extraordinary talents or attainments may exert, by merely throwing off all restraint of

* Advancement of Learning. B. I.—Ed.
conscience. What then must not be the power, where an individual, of consummate wickedness, can organize into the unity and rapidity of an individual will all the natural and artificial forces of a populous and wicked nation? And could we bring within the field of imagination, the devastation effected in the moral world, by the violent removal of old customs, familiar sympathies, willing reverences, and habits of subordination almost naturalized into instinct; of the mild influences of reputation, and the other ordinary props and aids of our infirm virtue, or at least, if virtue be too high a name, of our well-doing; and above all, if we could give form and body to all the effects produced on the principles and dispositions of nations by the infectious feelings of insecurity, and the soul-sickening sense of unsteadiness in the whole edifice of civil society; the horrors of battle, though the miseries of a whole war were brought together before our eyes in one disastrous field, would present but a tame tragedy in comparison. Nay it would even present a sight of comfort and of elevation, if this field of carnage were the sign and result of a national resolve, of a general will, so to die, that neither deluge nor fire should take away the name of country from their graves, rather than to tread the same clods of earth, no longer a country, and themselves alive in nature, but dead in infamy. What is Greece at this present moment? It is the country of the heroes from Codrus to Philopomen; and so it would be, though all the sands of Africa should cover its cornfields and olive-gardens, and not a flower were left on Hymettus for a bee to murmur in.

If then the power with which wickedness can invest the human being be thus tremendous, greatly does it behoove us to inquire into its source and causes. So doing we shall quickly discover that it is not vice, as vice, which is thus mighty; but systematic vice. Vice self-consistent and entire; crime corresponding to crime; villany entrenched and barricadoed by villany; this is the condition and main constituent of its power. The abandonment of all principle of right enables the soul to choose and act upon a principle of wrong, and to subordinate to this one principle all the various vices of human nature. For it is a mournful truth, that as devastation is incomparably an easier work than production, so may all its means and instruments be more easily arranged into a scheme and system: even as in a
siege every building and garden, which the faithful governor must destroy, as impeding the defensive means of the garrison, or furnishing means of offence to the besieger, occasions a wound in feelings which virtue herself has fostered: and virtue, because it is virtue, loses perforce part of her energy in the reluctance with which she proceeds to a business so repugnant to her wishes, as a choice of evils. But he, who has once said with his whole heart, Evil, be thou my good! has removed a world of obstacles by the very decision, that he will have no obstacles but those of force and brute matter. The road of justice

Curves round the corn-field and the hill of vines,
Honoring the holy bounds of property;—

but the path of the lightning is straight; and straight the fearful path

Of the cannon-ball. Direct it flies and rapid,
Shatt'ring that it may reach, and shatt'ring what it reaches.†

Happily for mankind, however, the obstacles which a consistently evil mind no longer finds in itself, it finds in its own unsuitability to human nature. A limit is fixed to its power: but within that limit, both as to the extent and duration of its influence, there is little hope of checking its career, if giant and united vices are opposed only by mixed and scattered virtues; and those too, probably, from the want of some combining principle, which assigns to each its due place and rank, at civil war with themselves, or at best perplexing and counteracting each other. In our late agony of glory and of peril, did we not too often hear even good men declaiming on the horrors and crimes of war, and softening or staggering the minds of their brethren by details of individual wretchedness? Thus under pretence of avoiding blood, they were withdrawing the will from the defence of the very source of those blessings without which the blood would flow idly in our veins! Thus lest a few should fall on the bulwarks in glory, they were preparing us to give up the whole state to baseness, and the children of free ancestors to become slaves, and the fathers of slaves!

Machiavelli has well observed, Sono di tre generazioni cervelli: l'uno intende per se; l'altro intende quanto da altri gli è

* Poetical Works, VII. p. 480.—Ed.
† Ibid. p. 480.—Ed.
mostro; e il terzo non intende nè per se stesso, nè per dimostrazione di altri.* "There are brains of three races. The one understands of itself; the second understands as much as is shown it by others; the third neither understands of itself nor what is shown it by others."† I should have no hesitation in placing that man in the third class of brains, for whom the history of the last twenty years has not supplied a copious comment on the preceding text. The widest maxims of prudence are like arms without hearts, disjoined from those feelings which flow forth from principle as from a fountain. So little are even the genuine maxims of expedience likely to be perceived or acted upon by those who have been habituated to admit nothing higher than expedience, that I dare hazard the assertion, that in the whole chapter of contents of European ruin, every article might be unanswerably deduced from the neglect of some maxim which has been repeatedly laid down, demonstrated, and enforced with a host of illustrations, in some one or other of the works of Machiavelli, Bacon, or Harrington. Indeed I can remember no one event of importance which was not distinctly foretold, and this not by a lucky prize drawn among a thousand blanks out of the lottery wheel of conjecture, but legitimately deduced as certain consequences from established premises. It would be a melancholy, but a very profitable employment, for some vigorous mind, intimately acquainted with the recent history of Europe, to collect the weightiest aphorisms of Machiavelli alone, and illustrating by appropriate facts the breach or observation of each, to render less mysterious the present triumph of lawless violence. The apt motto to such a work would be,—The children of darkness are wiser in their generation than the children of light.

So grievously, indeed, have men been deceived by the showy theories of unlearned mock thinkers, that there seems a tendency in the public mind to shun all thought, and to expect help from

* Il Principe, c. xxii.—Ed.
† Op. et Dies. 293, &c.
any quarter rather than from seriousness and reflection; as if some invisible power would think for us, when we gave up the pretence of thinking for ourselves. But in the first place, did those, who opposed the theories of innovators, conduct their untheoretic opposition with more wisdom, or to a happier result? And secondly, are societies now constructed on principles so few and so simple, that we could, if even we wished it, act as it were by instinct, like our distant forefathers in the infancy of states? Doubtless, to act is nobler than to think; but as the old man doth not become a child by means of his second childishness, as little can a nation exempt itself from the necessity of thinking which has once learnt to think. Miserable was the delusion of the late mad realizer of mad dreams, in his belief that he should ultimately succeed in transforming the nations of Europe into the unreasoning hordes of a Babylonian or Tartar empire, or even in reducing the age to the simplicity—so desirable for tyrants—of those times, when the sword and the plough were the sole implements of human skill. Those are epochs in the history of a people, which, having been, can never more recur. Extirpate all civilization and all its arts by the sword, trample down all ancient institutions, rights, distinctions, and privileges, drag us backward to our old barbarism, as beasts to the den of Cacus—deem you that thus you could recreate the unexamining and boisterous youth of the world, when the sole questions were—“What is to be conquered? and who is the most famous leader?”

In an age in which artificial knowledge is received almost at the birth, intellect and thought alone can be our upholder and judge. Let the importance of this truth procure pardon for its repetition. Only by means of seriousness, and meditation, and the free infliction of censure in the spirit of love, can the true philanthropist of the present time, curb in himself and his contemporaries; only by these can he aid in preventing the evils which threaten us, not from the terrors of an enemy so much as from our own fear of, and aversion to, the toils of reflection. For all must now be taught in sport—science, morality, yea, religion itself. And yet few now sport from the actual impulse of a believing fancy and in a happy delusion. Of the most influential class, at least, of our literary guides—the anonymous authors of our periodical publications—the most part assume this character from cowardice or malice, till having begun with studied igno-
rance and a premeditated levity, they at length realize the lie, and end indeed in a pitiable destitution of all intellectual power.

To many I shall appear to speak insolently, because the public,—(for that is the phrase which has succeeded to The Town, of the wits of the reign of Charles II.)—the public is at present accustomed to find itself appealed to as the infallible judge, and each reader complimented with excellencies, which, if he really possessed, to what purpose is he a reader, unless, perhaps, to remind himself of his own superiority! I confess that I think very differently. I have not a deeper conviction on earth, than that the principles of taste, morals, and religion, which are taught in the commonest books of recent composition, are false, injurious, and debasing. If these sentiments should be just, the consequences must be so important, that every well-educated man, who professes them in sincerity, deserves a patient hearing. He may fairly appeal even to those whose persuasions are most opposed to his own, in the words of the philosopher of Nola:—

Ad isthec quae vos, qualia acunque primo videantur aspectu, attendite, ut qui vobis forsan insanire videar, saltem quibus insaniam rationibus cognoscatis. What I feel deeply, freely will I utter. Truth is not detraction; and assuredly we do not hate him to whom we tell the truth. But with whomsoever we play the deceiver and flatterer, him at the bottom we despise. We are, indeed, under a necessity to conceive a vileness in him, in order to diminish the sense of the wrong we have committed, by the worthlessness of the object.

Through no excess of confidence in the strength of my talents, but with the deepest assurance of the justice of my cause, I bid defiance to all the flatterers of the folly, and foolish self-opinion of the half-instructed many;—to all who fill the air with festal explosions and false fires sent up against the lightnings of heaven, in order that the people may neither distinguish the warning flash nor hear the threatening thunder! How recently did we stand alone in the world? And though the one storm has blown over, another may even now be gathering: or haply the hollow murmur of the earthquake within the bowels of our own commonweal may strike a direr terror than ever did the tempest of foreign warfare. Therefore, though the first quatrain is no longer applicable, yet the moral truth and the sublime exhortation of the following sonnet can never be superannuated. With
it I conclude this essay, thanking God that I have communed with, honored, and loved its wise and high-minded author. To know that such men are among us, is of itself an antidote against despondence——

Another year!—another deadly blow!
Another mighty empire overthrown!
And we are left, or shall be left, alone;
The last that dares to struggle with the foe.
'Tis well! from this day forward we shall know
That in ourselves our safety must be sought;
That by our own right hands it must be wrought;
That we must stand unpropt or be laid low.
O dastard! whom such foretaste doth not cheer!
We shall exult, if they, who rule the land,
Be men who hold its many blessings dear,
Wise, upright, valiant; not a venal band,
Who are to judge of danger which they fear,
And honor, which they do not understand. \(\text{Wordsworth}\).
THE LANDING-PLACE:

OR ESSAYS INTERPOSED FOR AMUSEMENT, RETROSPECT, AND PREPARATION.

MISCELLANY THE FIRST.

Etiam a Musis si quando animum paulisper abducamus, apud Musas nihilominus seriamur: at reclices quidem, at otiosas, at de his et illis inter se libere colloquentes.
THE LANDING-PLACE.

ESSAY I.

O blessed letters! that combine in one
All ages past, and make one live with all:
By you we do confer with who are gone,
And the dead-living unto council call!
By you the unborn shall have communion
Of what we feel and what doth us befall.

Since writings are the veins, the arteries,
And undecaying life-strings of those hearts,
That still shall pant and still shall exercise
Their mightiest powers when nature none imparts:
And the strong constitution of their praise
Wear out the infection of distemper'd days.

DANIEL'S MUSOPHILUS.

The intelligence, which produces or controls human actions and occurrences, is often represented by the Mystics under the name and notion of the supreme harmonist. I do not myself approve of these metaphors: they seem to imply a restlessness to understand that which is not among the appointed objects of our comprehension or discursive faculty. But certainly there is one excellence in good music, to which, without mysticism, we may find or make an analogy in the records of history. I allude to that sense of recognition, which accompanies our sense of novelty in the most original passages of a great composer. If we listen to a symphony of Cimarosa, the present strain still seems not only to recall, but almost to renew, some past movement, another and yet the same! Each present movement bringing back as it were, and embodying the spirit of some melody that had gone before, anticipates and seems trying to overtake something that is to come: and the musician has reached the summit of his art.
when having thus modified the present by the past, he at the same time weds the past in the present to some prepared and corresponsive future. The auditor's thoughts and feelings move under the same influence: retrospection blends with anticipation, and hope and memory, a female Janus, become one power with a double aspect. A similar effect the reader may produce for himself in the pages of history, if he will be content to substitute an intellectual complacency for pleasurable sensation. The events and characters of one age, like the strains in music, recall those of another, and the variety by which each is individualized, not only gives a charm and poignancy to the resemblance, but likewise renders the whole more intelligible. Meantime ample room is afforded for the exercise both of the judgment and the fancy, in distinguishing cases of real resemblance from those of intentional imitation, the analogies of nature, revolving upon herself, from the masquerade figures of cunning and vanity.

It is not from identity of opinions, or from similarity of events and outward actions, that a real resemblance in the radical character can be deduced. On the contrary, men of great and stirring powers, who are destined to mould the age in which they are born, must first mould themselves upon it. Mohammed born twelve centuries later, and in the heart of Europe, would not have been a false prophet; nor would a false prophet of the present generation have been a Mohammed in the seventh century. I have myself, therefore, derived the deepest interest from the comparison of men, whose characters at first view appear widely dissimilar, who yet have produced similar effects on their different ages, and this by the exertion of powers which on examination will be found far more alike, than the altered drapery and costume would have led us to suspect. Of the heirs of fame few are more respected by me, though for very different qualities, than Erasmus and Luther; scarcely any one has a larger share of my aversion than Voltaire; and even of the better-hearted Rousseau I was never more than a very lukewarm admirer. I should perhaps too rudely affront the general opinion, if I avowed my whole creed concerning the proportions of real talent between the two purifiers of revealed religion, now neglected as obsolete, and the two modern conspirators against its authority, who are still the Alpha and Omega of continental genius. Yet when I abstract the questions of evil and good, and measure only the effects pro-
duced and the mode of producing them, I have repeatedly found the names of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Robespierre, recall in a similar cluster and connection those of Erasmus, Luther, and Muncer.

Those who are familiar with the works of Erasmus, and who know the influence of his wit, as the pioneer of the Reformation; and who likewise know, that by his wit, added to the vast variety of knowledge communicated in his works, he had won over by anticipation so large a part of the polite and lettered world to the Protestant party; will be at no loss in discovering the intended counterpart in the life and writings of the veteran Frenchman. They will see, indeed, that the knowledge of the one was solid through its whole extent, and that of the other extensive at a cheap rate, by its superficiality; that the wit of the one is always bottomed on sound sense, peoples and enriches the mind of the reader with an endless variety of distinct images and living interests; and that his broadest laughter is everywhere translatable into grave and weighty truth: while the wit of the Frenchman, without imagery, without character, and without that pathos which gives the magic charm to genuine humor, consists, when it is most perfect, in happy turns of phrase, but far too often in fantastic incidents, outrages of the pure imagination, and the poor low trick of combining the ridiculous with the venerable, where he, who does not laugh, abhors. Neither will they have forgotten that the object of the one was to drive the thieves and mummers out of the temple, while the other was propelling a worse banditti, first to profane and pillage, and ultimately to raze it. Yet not the less will they perceive, that the effects remain parallel, the circumstances analogous, and the instruments the same. In each case the effects extended over Europe, were attested and augmented by the praise and patronage of thrones and dignities, and are not to be explained but by extraordinary industry and a life of literature; in both instances the circumstances were supplied by an age of hopes and promises—the age of Erasmus restless from the first vernal influences of real knowledge, that of Voltaire from the hectic of imagined superiority. In the voluminous works of both, the instruments employed are chiefly those of wit and amusing erudition, and alike in both the errors and evils, real or imputed, in religion and politics are the objects of the battery. And here we must stop. The two men were es-
sentially different. Exchange mutually their dates and spheres of action, yet Voltaire, had he been ten-fold a Voltaire, could not have made up an Erasmus; and Erasmus must have emptied himself of half his greatness and all his goodness, to have become a Voltaire.

Shall I succeed better or worse with the next pair, in this our new dance of death, or rather of the shadows which I have brought forth—two by two—from the historic ark? In our first couple I have at least secured an honorable retreat, and though I failed as to the agents, I have maintained a fair analogy in the actions and the objects. But the heroic Luther, a giant awaking in his strength, and the crazy Rousseau, the dreamer of love-sick tales, and the spinner of speculative cobwebs; shy of light as the mole, but as quick-eared too for every whisper of the public opinion; the teacher of stoic pride in his principles, yet the victim of morbid vanity in his feelings and conduct! From what point of likeness can we commence the comparison between a Luther and a Rousseau? And truly had I been seeking for characters that, taken as they really existed, closely resemble each other, and this, too, to our first apprehensions, and according to the common rules of biographical comparison, I could scarcely have made a more unlucky choice: unless I had desired that my parallel of the German son of thunder and the visionary of Geneva, should sit on the same bench with honest Fluellen's of Alexander the Great and Harry of Monmouth. Still, however, the same analogy would hold as in my former instance: the effect produced on their several ages by Luther and Rousseau, were commensurate with each other, and were produced in both cases by what their contemporaries felt as serious and vehement eloquence, and an elevated tone of moral feeling: and Luther, not less than Rousseau, was actuated by an almost superstitious hatred of superstition, and a turbulent prejudice against prejudices. In the relation too which their writings severally bore to those of Erasmus and Voltaire, and the way in which the latter co-operated with them to the same general end, each finding its own class of admirers and proselytes, the parallel is complete.

I can not, however, rest here. Spite of the apparent incongruities, I am disposed to plead for a resemblance in the men themselves, for that similarity in their radical natures, which I abandoned all pretence and desire of showing in the instances of Vol-
taire and Erasmus. But then my readers must think of Luther not as he really was, but as he might have been, if he had been born in the age and under the circumstances of the Swiss philosopher. For this purpose I must strip him of many advantages which he derived from his own times, and must contemplate him in his natural weaknesses as well as in his original strength. Each referred all things to his own ideal. The ideal was indeed widely different in the one and in the other: and this was not the least of Luther's many advantages, or, to use a favorite phrase of his own, not one of his least favors of preventing grace. Happily for him he had derived his standard from a common measure already received by the good and wise; I mean the inspired writings, the study of which Erasmus had previously restored among the learned. To know that we are in sympathy with others, moderates our feelings as well as strengthens our convictions: and for the mind, which opposes itself to the faith of the multitude, it is more especially desirable, that there should exist an object out of itself, on which it may fix its attention, and thus balance its own energies.

Rousseau, on the contrary, in the inauspicious spirit of his age and birth-place,* had slipped the cable of his faith, and steered by the compass of unaided reason, ignorant of the hidden currents that were bearing him out of his course, and too proud to consult the faithful charts prized and held sacred by his forefathers. But the strange influences of his bodily temperament on his understanding; his constitutional melancholy pampered into a morbid excess by solitude; his wild dreams of suspicion; his hypochondriacal fancies of hosts of conspirators all leagued against him and his cause, and headed by some arch-enemy, to whose machinations he attributed every trifling mishap—all as much the creatures of his imagination, as if instead of men he had conceived them to be infernal spirits and beings preternatural—these, or at least the predisposition to them, existed in the ground-work of his nature: they were parts of Rousseau himself. And what corres-

* Infidelity was so common in Geneva about that time, that Voltaire in one of his letters exults, that in this, Calvin's own city, some half-dozen only of the most ignorant believed in Christianity under any form. This was, no doubt, one of Voltaire's usual lies of exaggeration: it is not, however, to be denied, that here, and throughout Switzerland, he and the dark master in whose service he employed himself, had ample grounds of triumph.
ponding in kind to these, not to speak of degree, can we detect in
the character of his supposed parallel? This difficulty will sug-
gest itself at the first thought, to those who derive all their
knowledge of Luther from the meagre biography met with in the
Lives of eminent Reformers, or even from the ecclesiastical his-
tories of Mosheim or Milner: for a life of Luther, in extent and
style of execution proportioned to the grandeur and interest of the
subject, a life of the man Luther, as well as of Luther the theo-
logian, is still a desideratum in English literature, though perhaps
there is no subject for which so many unused materials are ex-
tant, both printed and in manuscript.*

ESSAY II.

Is it, I ask, most important to the best interests of mankind, temporal as
well as spiritual, that certain works, the names and number of which are
fixed and unalterable, should be distinguished from all other works, not in
degree only but even in kind † And that these, collectively, should form
THE Book, to which in all the concerns of faith and morality the last re-
course is to be had, and from the admitted decisions of which no man dare

* The affectionate respect in which I hold the name of Dr. Jortin—one
of the many illustrious nurslings of the college to which I deem it no small
honor to have belonged—Jesus, Cambridge—renders it painful to me to as-
sert, that the above remark holds almost equally true of a life of Erasmus.
But every scholar well read in the writings of Erasmus and his illustrious
contemporaries, must have discovered, that Jortin had neither collected
sufficient, nor the best, materials for his work: and—perhaps from that
very cause—he grew weary of his task, before he had made a full use of
the scanty materials which he had collected.

† This is one of the hinges on which the gate of egress from the spiritual
Rome turns. Historically, the affirmative to the question has been the con-
stant and close companion of Protestantism:—but whether it be likewise
its indispensable support, remains yet to be discussed, at the tribunal of
sound philosophy. Hitherto both the ay and the no have been, as it ap-
ppears to me, but very weakly and superficially argued. But I confess that
Chillingworth makes me half a Roman Catholic on this point; lest in ac-
ceding to the grounds of his arguments against the Romanists, I should be-
come less than half a Christian, and lose the substantive in my earnestness
to tear off its parasitical and suffocating epithet:—that is, cease to be a
Catholic in aversion to the Papal bull of Roman Catholic. 1830.
appeal!—If the mere existence of a book so called and characterized be, as the Koran itself suffices to evince, a mighty bond of union, among nations whom all other causes tend to separate; if moreover the book revered by us and our forefathers has been the foster-nurse of learning in the darkest, and of civilization in the rudest, times; and lastly, if this so vast and wide a blessing is not to be founded in a delusion, and doomed therefore to the impermanence and scorn in which sooner or later all delusions must end; how, I pray you, is it conceivable that this should be brought about and secured, otherwise than by God's special vouchsafement to this one book, exclusively, of that divine mean, that uniform and perfect middle way, which in all points is at safe and equal distance from all errors whether of excess or defect! But again, if this be true—and what Protestant Christian worthy of his baptismal dedication will deny its truth!—if in the one book we are entitled, or even permitted, to expect the golden mean throughout;—surely we ought not to be hard and over-stern in our censures of the mistakes and infirmities of those, who pretending to no warrant of extraordinary inspiration have yet been raised up by God's providence to be of highest power and eminence in the reformation of his Church. Far rather does it behove us to consider, in how many instances the peccant humor native to the man had been wrought upon by the faithful study of that only faultless model, and corrected into an unsinning, or at least a venial, predominance in the writer or preacher. Yea, that not seldom the infirmity of a zealous soldier in the warfare of Christ has been made the very mould and ground-work of that man's peculiar gifts and virtues. Grateful too we should be, that the very faults of famous men have been fitted to the age, on which they were to act: and that thus the folly of man has proved the wisdom of God, and been made the instrument of his mercy to mankind.

WHOEVER has sojourned in Eisenach, will assuredly have visited the Warteburg, interesting by so many historical associations, which stands on a high rock, about two miles to the south from the city gate. To this castle Luther was taken on his return from the imperial Diet, where Charles V. had pronounced the ban upon him, and limited his safe convoy to one and twenty days. On the last but one of these days, as he was on his way to Waltershausen, a town in the duchy of Saxe Gotha, a few leagues to the south-east of Eisenach; he was stopped in a hollow behind the castle Altenstein, and carried to the Warteburg. The Elector of Saxony, who could not have refused to deliver up Luther, as one put in the ban by the Emperor and the Diet, had ordered John of Berleptsch, the governor of the Warteburg, and Burckhardt von Hundt, the governor of Altenstein, to take Luther to one or the other of these castles, without acquainting him which; in order that he might be able, with safe conscience, to
declare, that he did not know where Luther was. Accordingly
they took him to the Warteburg, under the name of the Cheva-
lier (Ritter) George.

To this friendly imprisonment the Reformation owes many of
Luther's most important labors. In this place he wrote his works
against auricular confession, against Jacob Latronum, the tract
on the abuses of masses, that against clerical and monastic vows,
composed his exposition of the 22, 27, and 68 Psalms, finished
his declaration of the Magnificat, began to write his Church
homilies, and translated the New Testament. Here too, and
during this time, he is said to have hurled his inkstand at the
devil, the black spot from which yet remains on the stone wall
of the room he studied in; which, surely, no one will have vis-
ited the Warteburg without having had pointed out to him by
the good Catholic who is, or at least some few years ago was,
the warden of the castle. He must have been either a very su-
percilious or a very incurious traveller if he did not, for the grati-
fication of his guide at least, inform himself by means of his pen-
knife, that the said marvellous blot bids defiance to all the toils
of the scrubbing brush, and is to remain a sign forever; and with
this advantage over most of its kindred, that being capable of a
double interpretation, it is equally flattering to the Protestant
and the Papist, and is regarded by the wonder-loving zealots of
both parties, with equal faith.

Whether the great man ever did throw his inkstand at his
Satanic Majesty, whether he ever boasted of the exploit, and him-
self declared the dark blotch on his study wall in the Warteburg,
to be the result and relict of this author-like hand-grenado,—
(happily for mankind he used his inkstand at other times to bet-
ter purpose, and with more effective hostility against the arch-
fiend)—I leave to my reader's own judgment; on condition, how-
ever, that he has previously perused Luther's Table Talk, and
other writings of the same stamp, of some of his most illustrious
contemporaries, which contain facts still more strange and whim-
sical, related by themselves and of themselves, and accompanied
with solemn protestations of the truth of their statements. Lu-
ther's Table Talk, which to a truly philosophic mind, will not be
less interesting than Rousseau's Confessions, I have not myself
the means of consulting at present, and can not therefore say,
whether this ink-pot adventure is, or is not, told or referred to, in
but many considerations incline me to give credit to the story.

Luther's unremitting literary labor and his sedentary mode of life, during his confinement in the Warteburg, where he was treated with the greatest kindness, and enjoyed every liberty consistent with his own safety, had begun to undermine his former unusually strong health. He suffered many and most distressing effects of indigestion and a deranged state of the digestive organs. Melanthon, whom he had desired to consult the physicians at Erfurth, sent him some de-obstruent medicines, and the advice to take regular and severe exercise. At first he followed the advice, sate and labored less, and spent whole days in the chase; but like the younger Pliny, he strove in vain to form a taste for this favorite amusement of the gods of the earth, as appears from a passage in his letter to George Spalatin, which I translate for an additional reason;—to prove to the admirers of Rousseau, who perhaps will not be less affronted by this biographical parallel, than the zealous Lutherians will be offended, that if my comparison should turn out groundless on the whole, the failure will not have arisen either from the want of sensibility in our great re-former, or of angry aversion to those in high places, whom he regarded as the oppressors of their rightful equals. "I have been," he writes, "employed for two days in the sports of the field, and was willing myself to taste this bitter-sweet amusement of the great heroes: we have caught two hares, and one brace of poor little partridges. An employment this which does not ill suit quiet leisurely folks: for even in the midst of the ferrets and dogs, I have had theological fancies. But as much pleasure as the general appearance of the scene and the mere looking-on occasioned me, even so much it pitted me to think of the mystery and emblem which lies beneath it. For what does this symbol signify, but that the devil, through his godless huntsmen and dogs, the bishops and theologians to wit, doth privily chase and catch the innocent poor little beasts? Ah! the simple and credulous souls came thereby far too plain before my eyes. Thereto comes a yet more frightful mystery: as at my earnest entreaty we had saved alive one poor little hare, and I had concealed it in the sleeve of my great coat, and had strolled off a short distance from it, the dogs in the mean time found the poor

* It is not.—Ed.
hare. Such, too, is the fury of the Pope with Satan, that he destroys even the souls that had been saved, and troubles himself little about my pains and entreaties. Of such hunting then I have had enough." In another passage he tells his correspondent, "You know it is hard to be a prince, and not in some degree a robber, and the greater a prince the more a robber." Of our Henry VIII. he says, "I must answer the grim lion that passes himself off for king of England. The ignorance in the book is such as one naturally expects from a king; but the bitterness and impudent falsehood is quite leonine." And in his circular letter to the princes, on occasion of the peasants' war, he uses a language so inflammatory, and holds forth a doctrine which borders so near on the holy right of insurrection, that it may as well remain untranslated.

Had Luther been himself a prince he could not have desired better treatment than he received during his eight months' stay in the Warteburg; and in consequence of a more luxurious diet than he had been accustomed to, he was plagued with temptations both from the flesh and the devil. It is evident from his letters* that he suffered under great irritability of his nervous system, the common effect of deranged digestion in men of sedentary habits, who are at the same time intense thinkers; and this irritability added to, and revivifying, the impressions made upon him in early life, and fostered by the theological systems of his manhood, is abundantly sufficient to explain all his apparitions and all his nightly combats with evil spirits. I see nothing improbable in the supposition, that in one of those unconscious half sleeps, or rather those rapid alternations of the sleeping with the half-waking state, which is the true witching time,

the fruitful matrix of ghosts—I see nothing improbable, that in some one of those momentary slumbers, into which the suspens-

* I can scarcely conceive a more delightful volume than might be made from Luther's letters, especially from those that were written from the Warteburg, if they were translated in the simple, sinewy, idiomatic, hearty, mother-tongue of the original. A difficult task I admit—and scarcely possible for any man, however great his talents in other respects, whose favorite reading has not lain among the English writers from Edward VI. to Charles I.
sion of all thought in the perplexity of intense thinking so often
passes, Luther should have had a full view of the room in which
he was sitting, of his writing-table and all the implements of
study, as they really existed, and at the same time a brain-image
of the devil, vivid enough to have acquired apparent outness,
and a distance regulated by the proportion of its distinctness to
that of the objects really impressed on the outward senses.

If this Christian Hercules, this heroic cleanser of the Augean
stable of apostasy, had been born and educated in the present or
the preceding generation, he would, doubtless, have held him-
self for a man of genius and original power. But with this faith
alone, he would scarcely have removed the mountains which he
did remove. The darkness and superstition of the age, which
required such a reformer, had moulded his mind for the reception
of impressions concerning himself, better suited to inspire the
strength and enthusiasm necessary for the task of reformation,
impressions more in sympathy with the spirits whom he was to
influence. He deemed himself gifted with supernatural influxes,
an especial servant of heaven, a chosen warrior, fighting as the
general of a small but faithful troop, against an army of evil
beings, headed by the prince of the air. These were no meta-
phorical beings in his apprehension. He was a poet indeed, as
great a poet as ever lived in any age or country; but his poetic
images were so vivid, that they mastered the poet's own mind!
He was possessed with them, as with substances distinct from
himself: Luther did not write, he acted poems. The Bible was
a spiritual, indeed, but not a figurative armory in his belief: it
was the magazine of his warlike stores, and from thence he was
to arm himself, and supply both shield and sword, and javelin,
to the elect. Methinks I see him sitting, the heroic student, in
his chamber in the Warteburg, with his midnight lamp before
him, seen by the late traveller in the distant plain of Bischofs-
roda, as a star on the mountain! Below it lies the Hebrew
Bible open, on which he gazes, his brow pressing on his palm,
brooding over some obscure text, which he desires to make plain
to the simple boor and to the humble artisan, and to transfer its
whole force into their own natural and living tongue. And he
himself does not understand it! Thick darkness lies on the ori-
ginal text: he counts the letters, he calls up the roots of each
separate word, and questions them as the familiar spirits of an
oracle. In vain; thick darkness continues to cover it; not a ray of meaning dawns through it. With sullen and angry hope he reaches for the Vulgate, his old and sworn enemy, the treacherous confederate of the Roman anti-Christ, which he so gladly, when he can, rebukes for idolatrous falsehoods, that had dared place within the sanctuary itself their shrines, abominations!

Now—O thought of humiliation—he must entreat its aid. See! there has the sly spirit of apostasy worked-in a phrase, which favors the doctrine of purgatory, the intercession of saints, or the efficacy of prayers for the dead; and what is worst of all, the interpretation is plausible. The original Hebrew might be forced into this meaning: and no other meaning seems to lie in it, none to hover above it in the heights of allegory, none to lurk beneath it even in the depths of cabala! This is the work of the tempter; it is a cloud of darkness conjured up between the truth of the sacred letters and the eyes of his understanding, by the malice of the evil one, and for a trial of his faith! Must he then at length confess, must he subscribe the name of Luther to an exposition which consecrates a weapon for the hand of the idolatrous hierarchy? Never! never!

There still remains one auxiliary in reserve, the translation of the Seventy. The Alexandrine Greeks, anterior to the Church itself, could intend no support to its corruptions—the Septuagint will have profaned the altar of truth with no incense for the nostrils of the universal bishop to snuff up. And here again his hopes are baffled! Exactly at this perplexed passage had the Greek translator given his understanding a holiday, and made his pen supply its place. O honored Luther! as easily mightest thou convert the whole city of Rome, with the Pope and the conclave of cardinals inclusively, as strike a spark of light from the words, and nothing but words, of the Alexandrine version. Disappointed, despondent, enraged, ceasing to think, yet continuing his brain on the stretch in solicitation of a thought; and gradually giving himself up to angry fancies, to recollections of past persecutions, to uneasy fears and inward defiances and floating images of the evil being, their supposed personal author; he sinks without perceiving it, into a trance of slumber; during which his brain retains its waking energies, excepting that what
ESSAY II.

would have been mere thoughts before, now—the action and counterweight of his senses and of their impressions being withdrawn—shape and condense themselves into things, into realities. Repeatedly half-wakening, and his eyelids as often reclosing, the objects which really surround him form the place and scenery of his dream. All at once he sees the arch-fiend coming forth on the wall of the room, from the very spot, perhaps, on which his eyes had been fixed vacantly during the perplexed moments of his former meditation: the inkstand which he had at the same time been using, becomes associated with it: and in that struggle of rage, which in these distempered dreams almost constantly precedes the helpless terror by the pain of which we are finally awakened, he imagines that he hurls it at the intruder, or not improbably in the first instant of awakening, while yet both his imagination and his eyes are possessed by the dream, he actually hurls it. Some weeks after, perhaps, during which interval he had often mused on the incident, undetermined whether to deem it a visitation of Satan to him in the body or out of the body, he discovers for the first time the dark spot on his wall, and receives it as a sign and pledge vouchsafed to him of the event having actually taken place.

Such was Luther under the influences of the age and country in and for which he was born. Conceive him a citizen of Geneva, and a contemporary of Voltaire: suppose the French language his mother-tongue, and the political and moral philosophy of English free-thinkers re-modelled by Parisian fort esprits, to have been the objects of his study;—conceive this change of circumstances, and Luther will no longer dream of fiends or of anti-Christ—but will he have no dreams in their place? His melancholy will have changed its drapery; but will it find no new costume wherewith to clothe itself? His impetuous temperament, his deep working mind, his busy and vivid imaginations—would they not have been a trouble to him in a world, where nothing was to be altered, where nothing was to obey his power, to cease to be that which it had been, in order to realize his pre-conceptions of what it ought to be? His sensibility, which found objects for itself, and shadows of human suffering in the harmless brute, and even in the flowers which he trod upon—might it not naturally, in an unspiritualized age, have wept, and trembled, and dissolved, over scenes of earthly passion, and the struggles of
love with duty? His pity, that so easily passed into rage, would it not have found in the inequalities of mankind, in the oppressions of governments and the miseries of the governed, an entire instead of a divided object? And might not a perfect constitution, a government of pure reason, a renovation of the social contract, have easily supplied the place of the reign of Christ in the new Jerusalem, of the restoration of the visible Church, and the union of all men by one faith in one charity? Henceforward then, we will conceive his reason employed in building up anew the edifice of earthly society, and his imagination as pledging itself for the possible realization of the structure. We will lose the great reformer, who was born in an age which needed him, in the philosopher of Geneva, who was doomed to misapply his energies to materials the properties of which he misunderstood, and happy only that he did not live to witness the direful effects of his own system.

ESSAY III.

Pectora cui credam? quis me lenire docebit
Mordaces curas, quis longas fallere noctes,
Ex quo numma dies tulerit Damona sub umbras?

Omnia paulatim consumit longior atas,
Vivendoque simul morimur, rapimurque manendo.

Ita tamen, lacrymae! purum colis athera, Damon!
Nec mihi conveniunt lacrymae. Non omnia terras
Obruta! vivit amor, vivit dolor! ora negatur
Dulcia conspicere: flere et reminisce relic tum est.

MILTON: PETRARCH: MILTON.

The two following essays I devote to elucidation, the first of the theory of Luther's apparitions stated perhaps too briefly in the preceding essay; the second for the purpose of removing the only obstacle, which I can discover in the next section of The Friend, to the reader's ready comprehension of the principles, on which the arguments are grounded. First, I will endeavor to make my ghost theory more clear to those of my readers, who are fortunate
enough to find it obscure in consequence of their own good health and unshattered nerves. The window of my library at Keswick is opposite to the fire-place, and looks out on the very large garden that occupies the whole slope of the hill on which the house stands. Consequently, the rays of light transmitted through the glass, that is, the rays from the garden, the opposite mountains, and the bridge, river, lake, and vale interjacent, and the rays reflected from it, of the fire-place, &c., enter the eye at the same moment. At the coming on of evening, it was my frequent amusement to watch the image or reflection of the fire, that seemed burning in the bushes or between the trees in different parts of the garden or the fields beyond it, according as there was more or less light; and which still arranged itself among the real objects of vision, with a distance and magnitude proportioned to its greater or lesser faintness. For still as the darkness increased, the image of the fire lessened and grew nearer and more distinct; till the twilight had deepened into perfect night, when all outward objects being excluded, the window became a perfect looking-glass: save only that my books on the side shelves of the room were lettered, as it were, on their backs with stars, more or fewer as the sky was less or more clouded, the rays of the stars being at that time the only ones transmitted. Now substitute the phantom from Luther's brain for the images of reflected light, the fire for instance, and the forms of his room and its furniture for the transmitted rays, and you have a fair resemblance of an apparition, and a just conception of the manner in which it is seen together with real objects. I have long wished to devote an entire work to the subject of dreams, visions, ghosts, and witchcraft, in which I might first give, and then endeavor to explain, the most interesting and best attested fact of each, which has come within my knowledge, either from books or from personal testimony. I might then explain in a more satisfactory way the mode in which our thoughts, in states of morbid slumber, become at times perfectly dramatic,—for in certain sorts of dreams the dullest weight becomes a Shakspeare,—and by what law the form of the vision appears to talk to us its own thoughts in a voice as audible as the shape is visible; and this too oftentimes in connected trains, and not seldom even with a concentration of power which may easily impose on the soundest judgments, uninstructed in the optics and acoustics of the inner sense, for reve-
lations and gifts of prescience. In aid of the present case, I will only remark, that it would appear incredible to persons not accustomed to these subtle notices of self-observation, what small and remote resemblances, what mere hints of likeness from some real external object, especially if the shape be aided by color, will suffice to make a vivid thought consubstantiate with the real object, and derive from it an outward perceptibility. Even when we are broad awake, if we are in anxious expectation, how often will not the most confused sounds of nature be heard by us as articulate sounds? For instance, the babbling of a brook will appear for a moment the voice of a friend, for whom we are waiting, calling out our own names. A short meditation, therefore, on the great law of the imagination, that a likeness in part tends to become a likeness of the whole, will make it not only conceivable but probable, that the inkstand itself, and the dark-colored stone on the wall, which Luther perhaps had never till then noticed, might have a considerable influence in the production of the fiend, and of the hostile act by which his obtrusive visit was repelled.

A lady once asked me if I believed in ghosts and apparitions. I answered with truth and simplicity: No, madam! I have seen far too many myself. I have indeed a whole memorandum-book filled with records of these phænomena, many of them interesting as facts and data for psychology, and affording some valuable materials for a theory of perception, and its dependence on the memory and imagination. In omnem actum perceptionis imaginatio insuit efficienter, says Wolfe. But he* is no more, who would have realized this idea; who had already established the foundations and the law of the theory; and for whom I had so often found a pleasure and a comfort, even during the wretched and restless nights of sickness, in watching and instantly recording these experiences of the world within us, of the gemina natura, qua fit et facit, et creat et creatur! He is gone, my friend; my munificent co-patron, and not less the benefactor of my intellect!—He who, beyond all other men known to me, added a fine and ever-wakeful sense of beauty to the most patient accuracy in experimental philosophy and the profounder researches of metaphysical science; he who united all the play and spring of fancy with the subtlest discrimination and an inexorable judg-

* Thomas Wedgwood.
ment; and who controlled an almost painful exquisiteness of taste by a warmth of heart, which in the practical relations of life made allowances for faults as quickly as the moral taste detected them; a warmth of heart, which was indeed noble and pre-eminent, for alas! the genial feelings of health contributed no spark toward it. Of these qualities I may speak, for they belonged to all mankind.—The higher virtues, that were blessings to his friends, and the still higher that resided in and for his own soul, are themes for the energies of solitude, for the awfulness of prayer!—virtues exercised in the barrenness and desolation of his animal being; while he thirsted with the full stream at his lips, and yet with unwearied goodness poured out to all around him, like the master of a feast among his kindred in the day of his own gladness! Were it but for the remembrance of him alone and of his lot here below, the disbelief of a future state would sadden the earth around me, and blight the very grass in the field.

ESSAY IV.

It is difficult, excellent friend! to make any comprehensive truth completely intelligible, unless we avail ourselves of an example. Otherwise we may, as in a dream, seem to know all, and then, as it were awaking, find that we know nothing.

Among my earliest impressions I still distinctly remember that of my first entrance into the mansion of a neighboring baronet, awfully known to me by the name of the great house,* its exterior having been long connected in my childish imagination with the feelings and fancies stirred up in me by the perusal of the Arabian Nights' Entertainments.† Beyond all other objects,

* Escot, near Ottery St. Mary, Devon, then the seat of Sir George Young, and since burnt down, in 1808.—Ed.
† As I had read one volume of these tales over and over again before my fifth birth-day, it may be readily conjectured of what sort these fancies
I was most struck with the magnificent staircase, relieved at well-proportioned intervals by spacious landing-places, this adorned with grand or showy plants, the next looking out on an extensive prospect through the stately window, with its side-panes of rich blues and saturated amber or orange tints: while from the last and highest the eye commanded the whole spiral ascent with the marble pavement of the great hall, from which it seemed to spring up as if it merely used the ground on which it rested. My readers will find no difficulty in translating these forms of the outward senses into their intellectual analogies, so as to understand the purport of The Friend’s landing-places, and the objects I proposed to myself, in the small groups of essays interposed under this title between the main divisions of the work.

My best powers would have sunk within me, had I not soothed my solitary toils with the anticipation of many readers—(whether during my life, or when my grave shall have shamed my detractors into a sympathy with its own silence, formed no part in this self-flattery—) who would submit to any reasonable trouble rather than read, ‘as in a dream seeming to know all, to find on awaking that they know nothing.’ Having, therefore, in the three preceding essays selected from my conservatory a few plants, of somewhat gayer petals and a livelier green, though like the geranium tribe of a sober character in the whole physiognomy and odor, I shall first devote a few sentences to a catalogue of my introductory lucubrations, and the remainder of the essay to the prospect, as far as it can be seen distinctly from our present site. Within a short distance, several ways meet: and at that point only does it appear to me that the reader will be in danger of mistaking the road. Dropping the metaphor, I would say that there is one term, reason, the meaning of which has become unsettled. To different persons it conveys a different notion, and not seldom to the same person at different times; while the force, and to a certain extent, the intelligibility of the follow-
ing sections depend on its being interpreted in one sense exclusively.

Essays I. to IV. inclusively convey the design and contents of the work; my judgment respecting the style, and my defence of myself from the charges of arrogance and presumption. Say rather, that such are the personal threads of the discourse: for it will not have escaped the reader's observation, that even in these prefatory pages principles and truths of general interest form the true contents, and that amid all the usual compliments and courtesies of a first presentation to the reader's acquaintance the substantial object is still to assert the practicability, without disguising the difficulties, of improving the morals of mankind by a direct appeal to their understandings; to show the distinction between attention and thought, and the necessity of the former as a habit or discipline without which the very word, thinking, must remain a thoughtless substitute for dreaming with our eyes open; and lastly, the tendency of a certain fashionable style with all its accommodations to paralyze the very faculties of manly intellect by a series of petty stimulants. After this preparation, I proceed at once to lay the foundations common to the whole work by an inquiry into the duty of communicating truth, and the conditions under which it may be communicated with safety, from essay V. to XVI. inclusively. Each essay will, I believe, be found complete in itself, yet an organic part of the whole considered as one disquisition. First, the inexpediency of pious frauds is proved from history, the shameless assertion of the indifference of truth and falsehood exposed to its deserved infamy, and an answer given to the objection derived from the impossibility of conveying an adequate notion of the truths, we may attempt to communicate. The conditions are then detailed, under which, right though inadequate notions may be taught without danger, and proofs given, both from facts and from reason, that he, who fulfils the conditions required by conscience, takes the surest way of answering the purposes of prudence. This is, indeed, the main characteristic of the moral system taught by The Friend throughout, that the distinct foresight of consequences belongs exclusively to the infinite Wisdom which is one with that Almighty Will, on which all consequences depend; but that for man—to obey the simple unconditional commandment of eschewing every act that implies a self-contradiction, or, in other words, to produce and
maintain the greatest possible harmony in the component impulses and faculties of his nature, involves the effects of prudence. It is, as it were, prudence in short-hand or cipher. A pure conscience, that inward something, that θέση αἰσθησιος, which being absolutely unique no man can describe, because every man is bound to know, and even in the eye of the law is held to be a person no longer than he may be supposed to know it—the conscience, I say, bears the same relation to God, as an accurate time-piece bears to the sun. The time-piece merely indicates the relative path of the sun, yet we can regulate our plans and proceedings by it with the same confidence as if it was itself the efficient cause of light, heat, and the revolving seasons: on the self-evident axiom, that in whatever sense two things—for instance, A. and C. D. E., are both equal to a third thing, B., they are in the same sense equal to each other. Cunning is circuitous folly. In plain English, to act the knave is but a round-about way of playing the fool; and the man, who will not permit himself to call an action by its proper name without a previous calculation of all its probable consequences, may be indeed only a coxcomb, who is looking at his fingers through an opera-glass; but he runs no small risk of becoming a knave. The chances are against him. Though he should begin by calculating the consequences with regard to others, yet by the mere habit of never contemplating an action in its own proportions and immediate relations to his moral being, it is scarcely possible but that he must end in selfishness: for the 'you,' and the 'they' will stand on different occasions for a thousand different persons, while the 'I' is one only, and recurs in every calculation. Or grant that the principle of expediency should prompt to the same outward deeds as are commanded by the law of reason; yet the doer himself is debased. But if it be replied, that the reaction on the agent's own mind is to form a part of the calculation, then it is a rule that destroys itself in the very propounding, as will be more fully demonstrated in the second or ethical division of The Friend, when I shall have detected and exposed the equivocque between an action and a series of motions, by which the determinations of the will are to be realized in the world of the senses. What modification of the latter corresponds to the former, and is entitled to be called by the same name, will often depend on time, place, persons and circumstances, the consideration of which re-
quires an exertion of the judgment; but the action itself remains
the same, and like all other ideas pre-exists in the reason, or, in
the more expressive and perhaps more precise and philosophical
language of St. Paul, in the spirit, unalterable because uncondi-
tional, or with no other than that most awful condition, as sure
as God liveth, it is so!

These remarks are inserted in this place, because the principle
admits of easiest illustration in the instance of veracity and the
actions connected with the same, and may then be intelligibly ap-
plied to other departments of morality, all of which Woollston
indeed considers as only so many different forms of truth and false-
hood. So far I treated of oral communication of the truth. The
applicability of the same principle is then tried and affirmed in
publications by the press, first as between the individual and his
own conscience, and then between the publisher and the state:
and under this head I have considered at large the questions of a
free press and the law of libel, the anomalies and peculiar diffi-
culties of the latter, and the only possible solution compatible
with the continuance of the former: a solution rising out of and
justified by the necessarily anomalous and unique nature of the
law itself. I confess that I look back on this discussion concern-
ing the press and its limits with a satisfaction unusual to me in
the review of my own labors: and if the date of their first publi-
cation (September, 1809) be remembered, it will not perhaps be
denied on an impartial comparison, that I have treated this most
important subject, so especially interesting in the present time,
more fully and more systematically than it had up to that time
been. Interim tum recti conscientia, tum illo me consolor, quod
optimis quibusque certe non improbamur, fortassis omnibus
placituri, simul atque livor ab obitu conquireverit.

Lastly, the subject is concluded even as it commenced, and as
beseemed a disquisition placed as the steps and vestibule of the
whole work, with an enforcement of the absolute necessity of
principles grounded in reason as the basis or rather as the living
root of all genuine expedience. Where these are despised or at
best regarded as aliens from the actual business of life, and con-
signed to the ideal world of speculative philosophy and Utopian
politics, instead of state wisdom we shall have state-craft, and for
the talent of the governor the cleverness of an embarrassed spend-
thrift—which consists in tricks to shift off difficulties and dan-
gers when they are close upon us, and to keep them at arm's length— not in solid and grounded courses to preclude or subdue them. We must content ourselves with expedient-makers—with fire-engines against fires, life-boats against inundations; but no houses built fire-proof, no dams that rise above the water-mark.

The reader will have observed that already has the term, reason been frequently contradistinguished from the understanding and the judgment. If I could succeed in fully explaining the sense in which the word reason is employed by me, and in satisfying the reader's mind concerning the grounds and importance of the distinction, I should feel little or no apprehension concerning the intelligibility of these essays from first to last. The following section is in part founded on this distinction: the which remaining obscure, all else will be so as a system, however clear the component paragraphs may be, taken separately. In the appendix* to my first Lay Sermon, I have, indeed, treated the question at considerable length, but chiefly in relation to the heights of theology and metaphysics. In the next number I attempt to explain myself more popularly, and trust that with no great expenditure of attention the reader will satisfy his mind, that our remote ancestors spoke as men acquainted with the constituent parts of their own moral and intellectual being, when they described one man as "being out of his senses," another as "out of his wits," or "deranged in his understanding," and a third as having "lost his reason." Observe, the understanding may be deranged, weakened, or perverted; but the reason is either lost or not lost, that is, wholly present or wholly absent.
ESSAY V.

Man may rather be defined a religious than a rational creature, in regard that in other creatures there may be something of reason, but there is nothing of religion.

Harrington.

If the reader will substitute the word "understanding" for "reason," and the word "reason" for "religion," Harrington has here completely expressed the truth for which I am contending. Man may rather be defined a rational than an intelligent creature, in regard that in other creatures there may be something of understanding, but there is nothing of reason. But that this was Harrington's meaning is evident. Otherwise, instead of comparing two faculties with each other, he would contrast a faculty with one of its own objects, which would involve the same absurdity as if he had said, that man might rather be defined an astronomical than a seeing animal, because other animals possessed the sense of sight, but were incapable of beholding the satellites of Saturn, or the nebulae of fixed stars. If further confirmation be necessary, it may be supplied by the following reflections, the leading thought of which I remember to have read in the works of a continental philosopher. It should seem easy to give the definite distinction of the reason from the understanding, because we constantly imply it when we speak of the difference between ourselves and the brute creation. No one, except as a figure of speech, ever speaks of an animal reason;

* I have this moment looked over a translation of Blumenbach's Physiology, by Dr. Elliotson, which forms a glaring exception, p. 45. I do not know Dr. Elliotson, but I do know Professor Blumenbach, and was an assiduous attendant on the lectures, of which this classical work was the text-book; and I know that that good and great man would start back with surprise and indignation at the gross materialism mortised on to his work: the more so because during the whole period, in which the identification of man with the brute in kind was the fashion of naturalists, Blumenbach
but that many animals possess a share of understanding, perfectly distinguishable from mere instinct, we all allow. Few persons have a favorite dog without making instances of its intelligence an occasional topic of conversation. They call for our admiration of the individual animal, and not with exclusive reference to the wisdom in nature, as in the case of the στρογγυλον, or maternal instinct of beasts; or of the hexagonal cells of the bees, and the wonderful coincidence of this form with the geometrical demonstration of the largest possible number of rooms in a given space. Likewise, we distinguish various degrees of understanding there, and even discover from inductions supplied by the zoologists, that the understanding appears, as a general rule, in an inverse proportion to the instinct. We hear little or nothing of the instincts of the "half-reasoning elephant," and as little of the understanding of caterpillars and butterflies.* But reason is wholly denied, equally to the highest as to the lowest of the brutes; otherwise it must be wholly attributed to them, and with it therefore self-consciousness, and personality, or moral being.

I should have no objection to define reason with Jacobi,† and with his friend Hemsterhuis, as an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the universal, the eternal, and the necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phænomena. But then it must be added, that it is an organ identical with its appropriate objects. Thus, God, the soul, eternal truth, &c., are remained ardent and instant in controverting the opinion, and exposing its fallacy and falsehood, both as a man of sense and as a naturalist. I may truly say, that it was uppermost in his heart and foremost in his speech. Therefore, and from no hostile feeling to Dr. Elliotson (whom I hear spoken of with great regard and respect, and to whom I myself give credit for his manly openness in the avowal of his opinions), I have felt the present animadversion a duty of justice as well as gratitude. April 8, 1817.

* Note, that though "reasoning" does not in our language, in the lax use of words natural in conversation or popular writings, imply scientific conclusion, yet the phrase "half-reasoning" is evidently used by Pope as a poetic hyperbole.

† Von den Göttlichen Dingen, Beilage A. Jacobi, in this passage, speaks of reason in man as being recipient rather than originant, and of this as the true Platonic doctrine. The affirmation of identity rather than pre-conformity between the finite and infinite Reason, by Coleridge, in this passage, is more than Jacobi is ready to affirm, as Coleridge evidently means to indicate by his criticism. A better statement of the doctrine may be found in an extract from John Smith, I. p. 264, note.—Am. Ed.
the objects of reason; but they are themselves reason. We name God the Supreme Reason; and Milton says,—

—whence the soul

Reason receives, and reason is her being.*

Whatever is conscious self-knowledge is reason: and in this sense it may be safely defined the organ of the supersensuous; even as the understanding wherever it does not possess or use the reason, as its inward eye, may be defined the conception of the sensuous, or the faculty by which we generalize and arrange the phenomena of perception; that faculty, the functions of which contain the rules and constitute the possibility of outward experience. In short, the understanding supposes something that is understood. This may be merely its own acts or forms, that is, formal logic; but real objects, the materials of substantial knowledge, must be furnished, I might safely say revealed, to it by organs of sense. The understanding of the higher brutes has only organs of outward sense, and consequently material objects only; but man's understanding has likewise an organ of inward sense, and therefore the power of acquainting itself with invisible realities or spiritual objects. This organ is his reason.

Again, the understanding and experience may exist† without reason. But reason can not exist without understanding; nor does it or can it manifest itself but in and through the understanding, which in our elder writers is often called discourse, or the discursive faculty, as by Hooker, Lord Bacon, and Hobbes: and an understanding enlightened by reason Shakspeare gives as the contradistinguishing character of man, under the name 'dis
course of reason.' In short, the human understanding possesses two distinct organs, the outward sense, and the mind's eye, which is reason: wherever we use that phrase, the 'mind's eye,' in its proper sense, and not as a mere synonyme of the memory or the

* P. L. v. 486.—Ed.

† Of this no one would feel inclined to doubt, who had seen the poodle dog, whom the celebrated BLUMENBACH,—a name so dear to science, as a physiological and comparative anatomist, and not less dear as a man to all Englishmen who have ever resided at Göttingen in the course of their education,—trained up, not only to hatch the eggs of the hen with all the mother's care and patience, but to attend the chickens afterwards, and find the food for them. I have myself known a Newfoundland dog, who watched and guarded a family of young children with all the intelligence of a nurse, during their walks.

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fancy. In this way we reconcile the promise of revelation that the blessed will see God, with the declaration of St. John, No man hath seen God at any time.*

I will add one other illustration to prevent any misconception, as if I were dividing the human soul into different essences, or ideal persons. In this piece of steel I acknowledge the properties of hardness, brittleness, high polish, and the capability of forming a mirror. I find all these likewise in the plate glass of a friend's carriage; but in addition to all these I find the quality of transparency, or the power of transmitting, as well as of reflecting, the rays of light. The application is obvious.

If the reader therefore will take the trouble of bearing in mind these and the following explanations, he will have removed beforehand every possible difficulty from The Friend's political section. For there is another use of the word, reason, arising out of the former indeed, but less definite, and more exposed to misconception. In this latter use it means the understanding considered as using the reason, so far as by the organ of reason only we possess the ideas of the necessary and the universal; and this is the more common use of the word, when it is applied with any attempt at clear and distinct conceptions. In this narrower and derivative sense the best definition of reason, which I can give, will be found in the third member of the following sentence, in which the understanding is described in its three-fold operation, and from each receives an appropriate name. The sense,—vis sensitiva vel intuitiva—perceives: vis regulatrix—the understanding, in its own peculiar operation—conceives: vis rationalis—the reason or rationalized understanding—comprehends. The first is impressed through the organs of sense; the second combines these multifarious impressions into individual notions, and by reducing these notions to rules, according to the analogy of all its former notices, constitutes experience: the third subordinates both of them, the notions, namely, and the rules of experience, to absolute principles or necessary laws: and thus concerning objects, which our experience has proved to have real existence, it demonstrates, moreover, in what way they are possible, and in doing this constitutes science. Reason therefore, in this secondary sense, and used, not as a spiritual organ, but as a

* 1 Ep. iv. 12.—Ed.
faculty, namely, the understanding or soul enlightened by that organ,—reason, I say, or the scientific faculty, is the intellection of the possibility or essential properties of things by means of the laws that constitute them. Thus the rational idea of a circle is that of a figure constituted by the circumvolution of a straight line with its one end fixed.

Every man must feel, that though he may not be exerting different faculties, he is exerting his faculties in a different way, when in one instance he begins with some one self-evident truth,—that the radii of a circle, for instance, are all equal,—and in consequence of this being true sees at once, without any actual experience, that some other thing must be true likewise, and that, this being true, some third thing must be equally true, and so on till he comes, we will say, to the properties of the lever, considered as the spoke of a circle; which is capable of having all its marvellous powers demonstrated even to a savage who had never seen a lever, and without supposing any other previous knowledge in his mind, but this one, that there is a conceivable figure, all possible lines from the middle to the circumference of which are of the same length; or when, in another instance, he brings together the facts of experience, each of which has its own separate value, neither increased nor diminished by the truth of any other fact which may have preceded it; and making these several facts bear upon some particular project, and finding some in favor of it, and some against it, determines for or against the project, according as one or the other class of facts preponderate: as, for example, whether it would be better to plant a particular spot of ground with larch, or with Scotch fir, or with oak in preference to either. Surely every man will acknowledge, that his mind was very differently employed in the first case from what it was in the second; and all men have agreed to call the results of the first class the truths of science, such as not only are true, but which it is impossible to conceive otherwise: while the results of the second class are called facts, or things of experience: and as to these latter we must often content ourselves with the greater probability, that they are so or so, rather than otherwise—nay, even when we have no doubt that they are so in the particular case, we never presume to assert that they must continue so always, and under all circumstances. On the contrary, our conclusions depend altogether on contingent circumstances.
Now when the mind is employed, as in the case first mentioned, I call it reasoning, or the use of the pure reason; but, in the second case, the understanding or prudence.

This reason applied to the motives of our conduct, and combined with the sense of our moral responsibility, is the conditional cause of conscience, which is a spiritual sense or testifying state of the coincidence or discordance of the free will with the reason. But as the reasoning consists wholly in a man's power of seeing, whether any two conceptions which happen to be in his mind, are, or are not in contradiction to each other, it follows of necessity, not only that all men have reason, but that every man has it in the same degree. For reasoning, or reason, in this its secondary sense, does not consist in the conceptions themselves or in their clearness, but simply, when they are in the mind, in seeing whether they contradict each other or no.

And again, as in the determinations of conscience the only knowledge required is that of my own intention—whether in doing such a thing, instead of leaving it undone, I did what I should think right if any other person had done it; it follows that in the mere question of guilt or innocence, all men have not only reason equally, but likewise all the materials on which the reason, considered as conscience, is to work. But when we pass out of ourselves, and speak, not exclusively of the agent as meaning well or ill, but of the action in its consequences, then of course experience is required, judgment in making use of it, and all those other qualities of the mind which are so differently dispensed to different persons, both by nature and education. And though the reason itself is the same in all men, yet the means of exercising it, and the materials,—that is, the facts and conceptions—on which it is exercised, being possessed in very different degrees by different persons, the practical result is, of course, equally different—and the whole ground-work of Rousseau's philosophy ends in a mere nothingism.—Even in that branch of knowledge, where the conceptions, on the congruity of which with each other, the reason is to decide, are all possessed alike by all men, namely in geometry;—for all men in their senses possess all the component images, namely simple curves and straight lines; yet the power of attention required for the perception of linked truths, even of such truths, is so very different in A and in B, that Sir Isaac Newton professed that it was in this power only that he was
superior to ordinary men. In short, the sophism is as gross as if I should say,—the souls of all men have the faculty of sight in an equal degree—forgetting to add, that this faculty can not be exercised without eyes, and that some men are blind and others short-sighted,—and should then take advantage of this my omission to conclude against the use or necessity of spectacles, and microscopes,—or of choosing the sharpest-sighted men for our guides.

Having exposed this gross sophism, I must warn against an opposite error—namely, that if reason, as distinguished from prudence, consists merely in knowing that black can not be white— or when a man has a clear conception of an inclosed figure, and another equally clear conception of a straight line, his reason teaches him that these two conceptions are incompatible in the same object, that is, that two straight lines can not include a space— the reason must therefore be a very insignificant faculty. For a moment's steady self-reflection will show us, that in the simple determination 'black is not white'—or, 'that two straight lines can not include a space'—all the powers are implied, that distinguish man from animals;—first, the power of reflection—2d, of comparison—3d, and therefore of suspension of the mind—4th, therefore of a controlling will, and the power of acting from notions, instead of mere images exciting appetites; from motives, and not from mere dark instincts. Was it an insignificant thing to weigh the planets, to determine all their courses, and prophesy every possible relation of the heavens a thousand years hence? Yet all this mighty chain of science is nothing but a linking together of truths of the same kind, as, the whole is greater than its part;—or, if A and B = C, then A = B: or 3 + 4 = 7, therefore 7 + 5 = 12, and so forth. X is to be found either in A or B, or C or D: it is not found in A, B, or C; therefore it is to be found in D. What can be simpler? Apply this to a brute animal. A dog misses his master where four roads meet;—he has come up one, smells to two of the others, and then with his head aloft darts forward to the fourth road without any examination. If this were done by a conclusion, the dog would have reason;—how comes it then, that he never shows it in his ordinary habits? Why does this story excite either wonder or incredulity?—If the story be a fact, and not a fiction, I should say—the breeze brought his master's scent down
the fourth road to the dog's nose, and that therefore he did not put it down to the road, as in the two former instances. So awful and almost miraculous does the simple act of concluding, that 'take three from four, there remains one,' appear to us, when attributed to one of the most sagacious of all brute animals.
THE FRIEND.

SECTION THE FIRST.

ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE.

_Hoc potissimum pacto felicem ac magnum regem se fore judicantis, non si quam plurimis sed si quam optimis imperet. Proinde parum esse putat justis præsidiiis regnum suum muniisse, nisi idem viris eruditione juxta ac vita integritate præcellentibus dilet atque honestet. Nimium intelligit hæc demum esse vera regni decora, has veras opes._

ERASMUS: _EPIST. AD EPISC. PARIS._
THE FRIEND.

ESSAY I.

While the mere practical statesman too often rather plots against mankind, than consults their interest, crafty, not wise; the mere theorists, on the other hand, imagine that they are employed in a glorious work, and believe themselves at the very summit of earthly wisdom, when they are able, in set and varied language, to extol that human nature, which exists nowhere, except indeed in their own fancy, and to accuse and vilify our nature as it really is. Hence it has happened, that these men have never conceived a practicable scheme of civil policy, but, at best, such forms of government only, as might have been instituted in Utopia, or during the golden age of the poets: that is to say, forms of government excellently adapted for those who need no government at all. But I am
fully persuaded, that experience has already brought to light all conceivable sorts of political institutions under which human society can be maintained in concord, and likewise the chief means of directing the multitude, or retaining them within given boundaries: so that I can hardly believe, that on this subject the deepest research would arrive at any result, not abhorrent from experience and practice, which has not been already tried and proved.

When, therefore, I applied my thoughts to the study of political philosophy, I proposed to myself nothing original or strange as the fruits of my reflections; but simply to demonstrate from plain and undoubted principles, or to deduce from the very condition and necessities of human nature, those plans and maxims which square the best with practice. And that in all things which relate to this province, I might conduct my investigations with the same freedom of intellect with which we proceed in questions of pure science, I sedulously disciplined my mind neither to laugh at, nor bewail, nor detest, the actions of men; but to understand them. For to the safety of the state it is not of necessary importance what motives induce men to administer public affairs rightly, provided only that public affairs be rightly administered.* For moral strength, or freedom from the selfish passions, is the virtue of individuals; but security is the virtue of a state.

ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

All the different philosophical systems of political justice, all the theories on the rightful origin of government, are reducible in the end to three classes, correspondent to the three different points of view, in which the human being itself may be contemplated. The first denies all truth and distinct meaning to the words, right and duty; and affirming that the human mind consists of nothing but the manifold modifications of passive sensation, considers men as the highest sort of animals indeed, but at the same time the most wretched; inasmuch as their defenceless nature forces them into society: while such is the multiplicity of wants engendered by the social state, that the wishes of one are sure to be in contradiction to those of some other. The assertors of this system consequently ascribe the origin and continuance of government to fear, or the power of the stronger, aided by the force of custom. This is the system of Hobbes. Its statement is its confutation. It is, indeed, in the literal sense

* I regret, that I should have given, by thus selecting it for my motto, an implied consent to this very plausible, but false and dangerous position. 1830.
of the word, preposterous: for fear presupposes conquest, and conquest a previous union and agreement between the conquerors. A vast empire may perhaps be governed by fear; at least the supposition is not absolutely inconceivable, under circumstances which prevent the consciousness of a common strength. A million of men united by mutual confidence and free intercourse of thoughts form one power, and this is as much a real thing as a steam-engine; but a million of insulated individuals is only an abstraction of the mind, and but one told so many times over without addition, as an idiot would tell the clock at noon—one, one, one. But when, in the first instances, the descendants of one family joined together to attack those of another family, it is impossible that their chief or leader should have appeared to them stronger than all the rest together; they must therefore have chosen him, and this as for particular purposes, so doubtless under particular conditions, expressed or understood. Such we know to be the case with the North American tribes at present; such, we are informed by history, was the case with our own remote ancestors. Therefore, even on the system of those who, in contempt of the oldest and most authentic records, consider the savage as the first and natural state of man, government must have originated in choice and an agreement. The apparent exceptions in Africa and Asia are, if possible, still more subversive of this system: for they will be found to have originated in religious imposture, and the first chiefs to have secured a willing and enthusiastic obedience to themselves as delegates of the Deity.

But the whole theory is baseless. We are told by history, we learn from our experience, we know from our own hearts, that fear, of itself, is utterly incapable of producing any regular, continuous, and calculable effect, even on an individual; and that the fear, which does act systematically upon the mind, always presupposes a sense of duty, as its cause. The most cowardly of the European nations, the Neapolitans and Sicilians, those among whom the fear of death exercises the most tyrannous influence relatively to their own persons, are the very men who least fear to take away the life of a fellow-citizen by poison or assassination; while in Great Britain, a tyrant, who has abused the power, which a vast property has given him, to oppress a whole neighborhood, can walk in safety unarmed and unattended,
amid a hundred men, each of whom feels his heart burn with rage and indignation at the sight of him. It was this man who broke my father's heart; or, it is through him that my children are clad in rags, and cry for the food which I am no longer able to provide for them. And yet they dare not touch a hair of his head! Whence does this arise? Is it from a cowardice of sensibility that makes the injured man shudder at the thought of shedding blood? Or from a cowardice of selfishness which makes him afraid of hazarding his own life? Neither the one nor the other! The field of Waterloo, as the most recent of a hundred equal proofs, has borne witness that,—

——bring a Briton frae his hill,
Say, such is royal George's will,
An' there's the foe,
He has nae thought but how to kill
Twa at a blow.
Nae cauld, faint-hearted doubtfuls tease him;
Death comes, wi' fearlesse eye he sees him;
Wi' bluidy hand, a welcome gies him;
And when he fa's,
His latest draught o' breathin' leaves him
In faint huzzas.*

Whence then arises the difference of feeling in the former case? To what does the oppressor owe his safety? To the spirit-quelling thought;—the laws of God and of my country have made his life sacred! I dare not touch a hair of his head!—'Tis conscience that makes cowards of us all,—but oh! it is conscience too which makes heroes of us all.

* Burns.—Ed.
Le plus fort n'est jamais assez fort pour être toujours le maître, s'il ne transforme sa force en droit et l'obéissance en devoir.

Rousseau.

Viribus parantur provinicia, jure retinentur. Igitur breve id gaudium, quippe Germani victi magis, quam domiti.

Florus, iv. 12.*

The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms his power into right, and obedience into duty.

Provinces are taken by force, but they are kept by right. This exultation therefore was of brief continuance, inasmuch as the Germans had been overcome, but not subdued.

A truly great man,† the best and greatest public character that I had ever the opportunity of making myself acquainted with,—on assuming the command of a man of war, found a mutinous crew, more than one half of them uneducated Irishmen, and of the remainder no small portion had become sailors by compromise of punishment. What terror could effect by severity and frequency of acts of discipline, had been already effected. And what was this effect? Something like that of a polar winter on a flask of brandy. The furious spirit centered itself with tenfold strength at the heart; open violence was changed into secret plots and conspiracies; and the consequent orderliness of the crew, as far as they were orderly, was but the brooding of a tempest. The new commander instantly commenced a system of discipline as near as possible to that of ordinary law;—as much as possible, he avoided, in his own person, the appearance of any will or arbitrary power to vary, or to remit, punishment. The rules to be observed were affixed to a conspicuous part of the ship, with the particular penalties for the breach of each particular rule; and care was taken that every individual of the ship should know and understand this code. With a single exception in the case of mutinous behavior, a space of twenty-four hours

* Slightly altered.—Ed.
† Sir Alexander Ball.—Ed.
was appointed between the first charge and the second hearing of the cause, at which time the accused person was permitted and required to bring forward whatever he thought conducive to his defence or palliation. If, as was commonly the case—for the officers well knew that the commander would seriously resent in them all caprice of will, and by no means permit to others what he denied to himself,—no answer could be returned to the three questions—Did you not commit the act? Did you not know that it was in contempt of such a rule, and in defiance of such a punishment? And was it not wholly in your own power to have obeyed the one and avoided the other?—the sentence was then passed with the greatest solemnity, and another, but shorter, space of time was again interposed between it and its actual execution. During this space the feelings of the commander, as a man, were so well blended with his inflexibility, as the organ of the law; and how much he suffered previously to and during the execution of the sentence was so well known to the crew, that it became a common saying with them when a sailor was about to be punished, the captain takes it more to heart than the fellow himself. But whenever the commander perceived any trait of pride in the offender, or the germs of any noble feeling, he lost no opportunity of saying, "It is not the pain that you are about to suffer which grieves me! You are none of you, I trust, such cowards as to turn faint-hearted at the thought of that! but that, being a man, and one who is to fight for his king and country, you should have made it necessary to treat you as a vicious beast,—it is this that grieves me."

I have been assured, both by a gentleman who was a lieutenant on board that ship at the time when the heroism of its captain, aided by his characteristic calmness and foresight, greatly influenced the decision of the most glorious battle recorded in the annals of our naval history; and very recently by a gray-headed sailor, who did not even know my name, or could have suspected that I was previously acquainted with the circumstances—I have been assured, I say, that the success of this plan was such as astonished the oldest officers, and convinced the most incredulous. Ruffians, who, like the old Buccaneers, had been used to inflict torture on themselves for sport, or in order to harden themselves beforehand, were tamed and overpowered, how or why they themselves knew not. From the fiercest spirits were heard the
most earnest entreaties for the forgiveness of their commander: not before the punishment, for it was too well known that then they would have been to no purpose, but days after it, when the bodily pain was remembered but as a dream. An invisible power it was, that quelled them, a power, which was therefore irresistible, because it took away the very will of resisting. It was the awful power of law, acting on natures pre-configured to its influences. A faculty was appealed to in the offender's own being: a faculty and a presence, of which he had not been previously made aware,—but it answered to the appeal; its real existence therefore could not be doubted, or its reply rendered inaudible; and the very struggle of the wilder passions to keep uppermost counteracted their own purpose, by wasting in internal contest that energy which before had acted in its entireness on external resistance or provocation. Strength may be met with strength; the power of inflicting pain may be baffled by the pride of endurance; the eye of rage may be answered by the stare of defiance, or the downcast look of dark and revengeful resolve; and with all this there is an outward and determined object to which the mind can attach its passions and purposes, and bury its own disquietudes in the full occupation of the senses. But who dares struggle with an invisible combatant,—with an enemy which exists and makes us know its existence—but where it is, we ask in vain?—No space contains it—time promises no control over it—it has no ear for my threats—it has no substance, that my hands can grasp, or my weapons find vulnerable—it commands and can not be commanded—it acts and is insusceptible of my reaction—the more I strive to subdue it, the more am I compelled to think of it—and the more I think of it, the more do I find it to possess a reality out of myself, and not to be a phantom of my own imagination; that all, but the most abandoned men, acknowledge its authority, and that the whole strength and majesty of my country are pledged to support it; and yet that for me its power is the same with that of my own permanent self, and that all the choice, which is permitted to me, consists in having it for my guardian angel or my avenging fiend! This is the spirit of law! the lute of Amphiön, the harp of Orpheus! This is the true necessity, which compels man into the social state, now and always, by a still-beginning, never-ceasing, force of moral cohesion.
Thus is man to be governed, and thus only can he be governed. For from his creation the objects of his senses were to become his subjects, and the task allotted to him was to subdue the visible world within the sphere of action circumscribed by those senses, as far as they could act in concert. What the eye beholds, the hand strives to reach; what it reaches, it conquers, and makes the instrument of further conquest. We can be subdued by that alone which is analogous in kind to that by which we subdue: therefore by the invisible powers of our nature, whose immediate presence is disclosed to our inner sense, and only as the symbols and language of which all shapes and modifications of matter become formidable to us.

A machine continues to move by the force which first set it in motion. If only the smallest number in any state, properly so called, hold together through the influence of any fear that does not itself pre-suppose the sense of duty, it is evident that the state itself could not have commenced through animal fear. We hear, indeed, of conquests; but how does history represent these? Almost without exception as the substitution of one set of governors for another: and so far is the conqueror from relying on fear alone to secure the obedience of the conquered, that his first step is to demand an oath of fealty from them, by which he would impose upon them the belief, that they become subjects; for who would think of administering an oath to a gang of slaves? But what can make the difference between slave and subject, if not the existence of an implied contract in the one case, and not in the other? And to what purpose would a contract serve, if, however it might be entered into through fear, it were deemed binding only in consequence of fear? To repeat my former illustration—where fear alone is relied on, as in a slave ship, the chains that bind the poor victims must be material chains: for these only can act upon feelings which have their source wholly in the material organization. Hobbes has said, that laws without the sword are but bits of parchment. How far this is true, every honest man's heart will best tell him, if he will content himself with asking his own heart, and not falsify the answer by his notions concerning the hearts of other men. But were it true, still the fair answer would be—Well! but without the laws the sword is but a piece of iron. The wretched tyrant, who disgraces the present age and human nature itself, had exhausted
the whole magazine of animal terror, in order to consolidate his truly Satanic government. But look at the new French catechism, and in it read the misgivings of his mind, as to the sufficiency of terror alone! The system, which I have been confuting, is indeed so inconsistent with the facts revealed to us by our own mind, and so utterly unsupported by any facts of history, that I should be censurable in wasting my own time and my reader's patience by the exposure of its falsehood, but that the arguments adduced have a value of themselves independently of their present application. Else it would have been an ample and satisfactory reply to an assertor of this bestial theory—Government is a thing which relates to men, and what you say applies only to beasts.

Before I proceed to the second of these systems, let me remove a possible misunderstanding that may have arisen from the use of the word contract: as if I had asserted, that the whole duty of obedience to governors is derived from, and dependent on, the fact of an original contract. I freely admit, that to make this the cause and origin of political obligation, is not only a dangerous but an absurd theory; for what could give moral force to the contract? The same sense of duty which binds us to keep it, must have pre-existed as impelling us to make it. For what man in his senses would regard the faithful observation of a contract entered into to plunder a neighbor's house, but as a treble crime? First the act, which is a crime of itself; secondly, the entering into a contract which it is a crime to observe, and yet a weakening of one of the main pillars of human confidence not to observe, and thus voluntarily placing ourselves under the necessity of choosing between two evils;—and thirdly, the crime of choosing the greater of the two evils, by the unlawful observance of an unlawful promise. But in my sense, the word contract is merely synonymous with the sense of duty acting in a specific direction, that is, determining our moral relations, as members of a body politic. If I have referred to a supposed origin of government, it has been in courtesy to a common notion: for I myself regard the supposition as no more than a means of simplifying to our apprehension the ever-continuing causes of social union, even as the conversation of the world may be represented as an act of continued creation. For, what if an original contract had really been entered into, and formally recorded?
Still it could do no more than bind the contracting parties to act for the general good in the best manner, that the existing relations among themselves (state of property, religion, and so forth), on the one hand, and the external circumstances on the other (ambitious or barbarous neighbors, and the like), required or permitted. In after-times it could be appealed to only for the general principle, and no more, than the ideal contract, could it affect a question of ways and means. As each particular age brings with it its own exigencies, so must it rely on its own prudence for the specific measures by which they are to be encountered.

Nevertheless, it assuredly can not be denied, that an original,—more accurately, an ever-originating,—contract is a very natural and significant mode of expressing the reciprocal duties of subject and sovereign. We need only consider the utility of a real and formal state contract,—the Bill of Rights for instance,—as a sort of est demonstratum in politics; and the contempt lavished on this notion, though sufficiently compatible with the tenets of a Hume, will seem strange to us in the writings of a Protestant clergyman,* who surely owed some respect to a mode of thinking which God himself had authorized by his own example, in the establishment of the Jewish constitution. In this instance there was no necessity for deducing the will of God from the tendency of the laws to the general happiness: his will was expressly declared. Nevertheless, it seemed good to the divine wisdom, that there should be a covenant, an original contract, between himself as sovereign, and the Hebrew nation as subjects. This I admit was a written and formal contract; but the relations of mankind, as members of a body spiritual, or religious commonwealth, to the Saviour, as its head or regent;—is not this, too, styled a covenant, though it would be absurd to ask for the material instrument that contained it, or the time when it was signed or voted by the members of the church collectively.†

* See Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy. B. vi. c. 3.—Ed.
† It is perhaps to be regretted, that the words, Old and New Testament,—they having lost the sense intended by the translators of the Bible,—have not been changed into the Old and New Covenant. We can not too carefully keep in sight a notion, which appeared to the Primitive Church the fittest and most scriptural mode of representing the sum of the contents of the sacred writings.
ESSAY III.

With this explanation, the assertion of an original or a perpetual contract is rescued from all rational objection; and however speciously it may be urged, that history can scarcely produce a single example of a state dating its primary establishment from a free and mutual covenant, the answer is ready: if there be any difference between a government and a band of robbers, an act of consent must be supposed on the part of the people governed.

ESSAY III.

Human institutions cannot be wholly constructed on principles of science, which is proper to immutable objects. In the government of the visible world the Supreme Wisdom itself submits to be the author of the better; not of the best, but of the best possible in the subsisting relations. Much more must all human legislators give way to many evils rather than encourage the discontent that would lead to worse remedies. If it is not in the power of man to construct even the arch of a bridge that shall exactly correspond in its strength to the calculations of geometry, how much less can human science construct a constitution except by rendering itself flexible to experience and expediency: where so many things must fall out accidentally, and come not into any compliance with the preconceived ends: but men are forced to comply subsequently, and to strike in with things as they fall out, by after applications of them to their purposes, or by framing their purposes to them.

The second system corresponds to the second point of view under which the human being may be considered, namely, as an animal gifted with understanding, or the faculty of suiting measures to circumstances. According to this theory, every institution of national origin needs no other justification than a proof, that under the particular circumstances it is expedient. Having in my former essays expressed myself,—so at least I am conscious I shall have appeared to do to many persons;—with comparative slight of the understanding considered as the sole guide of human conduct, and even with something like contempt and reprobation of the maxims of expediency, when represented as the only steady light of the conscience, and the absolute foundation of all morality; I shall perhaps seem guilty of an inconsistency, in declaring myself an adherent of this second system, a zealous advocate for
deriving the various forms and modes of government from human prudence, and of deeming that to be just which experience has proved to be expedient. From this charge of inconsistency* I shall best exculpate myself by the full statement of the third system, and by the exposition of its grounds and consequences.

* Distinct notions do not suppose different things. When I make a three-fold distinction in human nature, I am fully aware, that it is a distinction, not a division, and that in every act of mind the man unites the properties of sense, understanding, and reason. Nevertheless it is of great practical importance, that these distinctions should be made and understood, the ignorance or perversion of them being alike injurious; as the first French constitution has most lamentably proved. It was the fashion in the profligate times of Charles II. to laugh at the Presbyterians, for distinguishing between the person and the king; while in fact they were ridiculing the most venerable maxims of English law;—the king never dies—the king can do no wrong.—and subverting the principles of genuine loyalty, in order to prepare the minds of the people for despotism.

Under the term "sense," I comprise whatever is passive in our being, without any reference to the question of materialism or immaterialism; all that man is in common with animals, in kind at least—his sensations, and impressions, whether of his outward senses, or the inner sense of imagination. This, in the language of the schools, was called the vis receptiva, or recipient property of the soul, from the original constitution of which we perceive and imagine all things under the forms of space and time. By the "understanding," I mean the faculty of thinking and forming judgments on the notices furnished by the sense, according to certain rules existing in itself, which rules constitute its distinct nature. By the pure "reason," I mean the power by which we become possessed of principles,—the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes, and of ideas, not images—as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in mathematics;* and of justice, holiness, free-will, and the like, in morals. Hence in works of pure science the definitions of necessity precede the reasoning, in other works they more aptly form the conclusion.

To many of my readers it will, I trust, be some recommendation of these distinctions, that they are more than once expressed, and everywhere supposed, in the writings of St. Paul. I have no hesitation in undertaking to prove, that every heresy which has disquieted the Christian Church, from Tritheism to Socinianism, has originated in and supported itself by arguments rendered plausible only by the confusion of these faculties, and thus demanding for the objects of one, a sort of evidence appropriated to those of another faculty.—These disquisitions have the misfortune of being in ill-report, as dry and unsatisfactory; but I hope, in the course of the work, to gain them a better character—and if elucidations of their practical impor-

* In the severity of logic, the geometrical point, line, surface, circle, and so forth, are theorems, not ideas.
ESSAY III.

The third and last system, then, denies all rightful origin to government, except as far as it is derivable from principles contained in the reason of man, and judges all the relations of man in society by the laws of moral necessity, according to ideas. I here use the word in its highest and primitive sense, and as nearly synonymous with the modern word ideal,—according to archetypal ideas co-essential with the reason, the consciousness of these ideas being indeed the sign and necessary product of the full development of the reason. The following then is the fundamental principle of this theory: Nothing is to be deemed rightful in civil society, or to be tolerated as such, but what is capable of being demonstrated out of the original laws of the pure reason. Of course, as there is but one system of geometry, so according to this theory there can be but one constitution and one system of legislation, and this consists in the freedom, which is the common right of all men, under the control of that moral necessity, which is the common duty of all men. Whatever is not everywhere necessary, is nowhere right. On this assumption the whole theory is built. To state it nakedly is to confute it satisfactorily. So at least it should seem. But in how winning and specious a manner this system may be represented even to minds of the loftiest order, if undisciplined and unhumbled by practical experience, has been proved by the general impassioned admiration and momentous effects of Rousseau's *Du Contrat Social*, and the writings of the French economists, or, as they more appropriately entitled themselves, physiocratic philosophers: and in how tempting and dangerous a manner it may be represented to the populace, has been made too evident in our own country by the temporary effects of Paine's *Rights of Man*. Relatively, however, to this latter work it should be observed, that it is not a legitimate offspring of any one theory, but a confusion of the immortality of the first system with the misapplied universal principles of the
last: and in this union, or rather lawless alternation, consists the essence of Jacobinism, as far as Jacobinism is any thing but a term of abuse, or has any meaning of its own distinct from democracy and sedition.

A constitution equally suited to China and America, or to Russia and Great Britain, must surely be equally unfit for both, and deserve as little respect in political, as a quack's panacea in medical, practice. Yet there are three weighty motives for a distinct exposition of this theory,* and of the ground on which its pretensions are bottomed: and I dare affirm, that for the same reasons there are few subjects which in the present state of the world have a fairer claim to the attention of every serious Englishman, who is likely, directly or indirectly, as partisan or as opponent, to interest himself in schemes of reform.

The first motive is derived from the propensity of mankind to mistake the abhorrence occasioned by the unhappy effects or accompaniments of a particular system for an insight into the falsehood of its principles. And it is the latter only, a clear insight, not any vehement emotion, that can secure its permanent rejection. For by a wise ordinance of nature our feelings have no abiding-place in our memory; nay, the more vivid they are in the moment of their existence, the more dim and difficult to be remembered do they make the thoughts which accompanied them. Those of my readers, who at any time of their life have been in the habit of reading novels, may easily convince themselves of this truth, by comparing their recollections of those stories which most excited their curiosity, and even painfully affected their feelings, with their recollections of the calm and meditative pathos of Shakspeare and Milton. Hence it is that human experience, like the stern lights of a ship at sea, illumines only the path which we have passed over. The horrors of the Peasants' War in Germany, and the direful effects of the Anabaptist tenets, which were only nominally different from those of

* As metaphysics are the science which determines what can, and what can not, be known of being and the laws of being, à priori,—that is, from those necessities of the mind or forms of thinking, which, though first revealed to us by experience, must yet have pre-existed in order to make experience itself possible, even as the eye must exist previously to any particular act of seeing, though by sight only can we know that we have eyes—so might the philosophy of Rousseau and his followers not inapty be entitled, metapolitics, and the doctors of this school metapoliticians.
Jacobinism by the substitution of religious for philosophical jargon, struck all Europe for a time with affright. Yet little more than a century was sufficient to obliterate all effective memory of those events: the same principles budded forth anew, and produced the same fruits from the imprisonment of Charles I. to the restoration of his son. In the succeeding generations, to the follies and vices of the European courts, and to the oppressive privileges of the nobility, were again transferred those feelings of disgust and hatred, which for a brief while the multitude had attached to the crimes and extravagances of political and religious fanaticism: and the same principles, aided by circumstances and dressed out in the ostentatious garb of a fashionable philosophy, once more rose triumphant, and effected the French revolution. That man has reflected little on human nature who does not perceive that the detestable maxims and correspondent crimes of the existing French despotism, have already dimmed the recollections of the democratic phrenzy in the minds of men; by little and little, have drawn off to other objects the electric force of the feelings, which had massed and upheld those recollections; and that a favorable concurrence of occasions is alone wanting to awaken the thunder and precipitate the lightning from the opposite quarter of the political heaven. The true origin of human events is so little susceptible of that kind of evidence which can compel our belief even against our will; and so many are the disturbing forces which modify the motion given by the first projection; and every age has, or imagines it has, its own circumstances which render past experience no longer applicable to the present case; that there will never be wanting answers and explanations, and specious flatteries of hope. I well remember, that when the examples of former Jacobins, Julius Cæsar, Cromwell, &c. were adduced in France and England at the commencement of the French Consulate, it was ridiculed as pedantry and pedants' ignorance, to fear a repetition of such usurpation at the close of the enlightened eighteenth century. Those who possess the Moniteurs of that date will find set proofs, that such results were little less than impossible, and that it was an insult to so philosophical an age, and so enlightened a nation, to dare direct the public eye towards them as lights of admonition and warning.

It is a common weakness with official statesmen, and with
those who deem themselves honored by their acquaintance, to attribute great national events to the influence of particular persons, to the errors of one man and to the intrigues of another, to any possible spark of a particular occasion, rather than to the true cause, the predominant state of public opinion. I have known men who, with most significant nods, and the civil contempt of pitying half-smiles, have declared the natural explanation of the French revolution, to be the mere fancies of garretiers, and then, with the solemnity of cabinet ministers, have proceeded to explain the whole by anecdotes. It is so stimulant to the pride of a vulgar mind, to be persuaded that it knows what few others know, and that it is the important depository of a sort of state secret, by communicating which it confers an obligation on others! But I have likewise met with men of intelligence, who at the commencement of the revolution were travelling on foot through the French provinces, and they bear witness, that in the remotest villages every tongue was employed in echoing and enforcing the doctrines of the Parisian journalists; that the public highways were crowded with enthusiasts, some shouting the watchwords of the revolution, others disputing on the most abstract principles of the universal constitution, which they fully believed, that all the nations of the earth were shortly to adopt; the most ignorant among them confident of his fitness for the highest duties of a legislator; and all prepared to shed their blood in the defence of the inalienable sovereignty of the self-governed people. The more abstract the notions were, with the closer affinity did they combine with the most fervent feelings, and all the immediate impulses to action. The Lord Chancellor Bacon lived in an age of court intrigues, and was familiarly acquainted with all the secrets of personal influence. He, if any man, was qualified to take the gauge and measurement of their comparative power; and he has told us, that there is one, and but one infallible source of political prophecy, the knowledge of the predominant opinions and the speculative principles of men in general, between the age of twenty and thirty. Sir Philip Sidney,—the favorite of Queen Elizabeth, the paramount gentleman of Europe, the nephew, and—as far as a good man could be—the confidant of the intriguing and dark-minded Earl of Leicester,—was so deeply convinced that the principles diffused through the majority of a nation are the true oracles from whence statesmen are to
learn wisdom, and that when the people speak loudly it is from their being strongly possessed either by the godhead or the daemon, that in the revolution of the Netherlands he considered the universal adoption of one set of principles, as a proof of the divine presence. 'If Her Majesty,' says he, 'were the fountain, I would fear, considering what I daily find, that we should wax dry. But she is but a means which God useth.' But if my readers wish to see the question of the efficacy of principles and popular opinions for evil and for good proved and illustrated with an eloquence worthy of the subject, I can refer them with the hardest anticipation of their thanks to the late work concerning the relations of Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal, by my honored friend, William Wordsworth, *quem quoties lego, non verba mihi videor audire, sed tonitrua.*

I consider this reference to, and strong recommendation of, the work above mentioned, not as a voluntary tribute of admiration, but as an act of mere justice both to myself and to the readers of The Friend. My own heart bears me witness, that I am actuated by the deepest sense of the truth of the principles, which it has been and still more will be my endeavor to enforce, and of their paramount importance to the well-being of society at the present juncture: and that the duty of making the attempt, and the hope of not wholly failing in it, are, far more than the wish for the doubtful good of literary reputation, or any yet meaner object, my great and ruling motives. Mr. Wordsworth I deem a fellow-laborer in the same vineyard, actuated by the same motives and teaching the same principles, but with far greater powers of mind, and an eloquence more adequate to the importance and majesty of the cause. I am strengthened too by the knowledge, that I am not unauthorized by the sympatny of many wise and good men, and men acknowledged as such by the public, in my admiration of his pamphlet.—*Neque enim debet operibus ejus obesse, quod vivit. An si inter eos, quos numquam vidimus, foruisset, non solum libros ejus, verum etiam imagines conquereremus, ejusdem nunc honor præsentis, et gratia quasi satietate languescet? At hoc pravum, malignumque est, non admirari hominem admiratione dignissimum, quia videre, alloqui, audire, complecti, nec laudare tantum, verum etiam amare, contingit.* Præx. Epis. Lib. I. 16.

It is hardly possible for a man of ingenuous mind to act under the fear that he shall be suspected by honest men of the vileness of praising a work to the public, merely because he happens to be personally acquainted with the author. That this is so commonly done in reviews, furnishes only an additional proof of the morbid hardness produced in the moral sense by the habit of writing anonymous criticisms, especially under the further disguise of a pretended board or association of critics, each man expressing himself, to use the words of Andrew Marvel, as a synodal *individuum*. With regard, however, to the probability of being warped by partiality, I can only...
That erroneous political notions—they having become general and a part of the popular creed—have practical consequences, and these, of course, of a most fearful nature, is a truth as certain as historic evidence can make it: and that when the feelings excited by these calamities have passed away, and the interest in them has been displaced by more recent events, the same errors are likely to be started afresh, pregnant with the same calamities, is an evil rooted in human nature in the present state of general information, for which we have hitherto found no adequate remedy. It may, perhaps, in the scheme of Providence, be proper and conducive to its ends, that no adequate remedy should exist: for the folly of men is the wisdom of God. But if there be any means, if not of preventing, yet of palliating, the disease, and, in the more favored nations, of checking its progress at the first symptoms; and if these means are to be at all compatible with the civil and intellectual freedom of mankind; they are to be found only in an intelligible and thorough exposure of the error, and, through that discovery, of the source, from which it derives its speciousness and powers of influence on the human mind. This therefore is my first motive for undertaking the disquisition.

The second is, that though the French code of revolutionary principles is now generally rejected as a system, yet everywhere in the speeches and writings of the English reformers, nay, not seldom in those of their opponents, I find certain maxims asserted saying that I judge of all works indifferently by certain fixed rules previously formed in my mind with all the power and vigilance of my judgment; and that I should certainly of the two apply them with greater rigor to the production of a friend than to that of a person indifferent to me. But wherever I find in any work all the conditions of excellence in its kind, it is not the accident of the author's being my contemporary or even my friend, or the sneers of bad-hearted men, that shall prevent me from speaking of it, as in my inmost convictions I deem it deserves.

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Though it be now the fashion to commend,
As men of strong minds, those alone who can
Censure with judgment, no such piece of man
Makes up my spirit: where desert does live,
There will I plant my wonder, and there give
My best endeavors to build up his glory,
That truly merits!

*Recommendatory Verses to one of the old plays.*
or appealed to, which are not tenable, except as constituent parts of that system. Many of the most specious arguments in proof of the imperfection and injustice of the present constitution of our legislature will be found, on closer examination, to presuppose the truth of certain principles, from which the adducers of these arguments loudly profess their dissent. But in political changes no permanence can be hoped for in the edifice, without consistency in the foundation.

The third motive is, that by detecting the true source of the influence of these principles, we shall at the same time discover their natural place and object; and that in themselves they are not only truths, but most important and sublime truths; and that their falsehood and their danger consist altogether in their misapplication. Thus the dignity of human nature will be secured, and at the same time a lesson of humility taught to each individual, when we are made to see that the universal necessary laws, and pure ideas of reason, were given us, not for the purpose of flattering our pride, and enabling us to become national legislators; but that, by an energy of continued self-conquest, we might establish a free and yet absolute government in our own spirits.

ESSAY IV.

Albeit therefore, much of that we are to speak in this present cause, may seem to a number perhaps tedious, perhaps obscure, dark, and intricate (for many talk of the truth, which never sounded the depth from whence it springeth: and therefore, when they are led thereunto, they are soon weary, as men drawn from those beaten paths, wherewith they have been inured); yet this may not so far prevail, as to cut off that which the matter itself requireth, howsoever the nice humor of some be therewith pleased or no. They unto whom we shall seem tedious, are in no wise injured by us, because it is in their own hands to spare that labor which they are not willing to endure. And if any complain of obscurity, they must consider, that in these matters it cometh no otherwise to pass, than in sundry the works both of art, and also of nature, where that which hath greatest force in the very things we see, is, notwithstanding, itself oftentimes not seen. The stateliness of houses, the goodliness of trees, when we behold them, delighteth the eye: but that foundation which beareth up the one, that root which ministereth unto the other nourishment and life, is in the bosom of
the earth concealed; and if there be at any time occasion to search into it, such labor is then more necessary than pleasant, both to them which undertake it and for the lookers-on. In like manner, the use and benefit of good laws, all that live under them, may enjoy with delight and comfort, albeit the grounds and first original causes from whence they have sprung, be unknown, as to the greatest part of men they are. But when they who withdraw their obedience, pretend that the laws which they should obey are corrupt and vicious; for better examination of their quality, it behooveth the very foundation and root, the highest well-spring and fountain of them to be discovered. Which, because we are not oftentimes accustomed to do, when we do it, the pains we take are more needful a great deal than acceptable, and the matters which we handle, seem by reason of newness (till the mind grow better acquainted with them), dark, intricate, and unfamiliar. For as much help whereof, as may be in this case, I have endeavored throughout the body of this whole discourse, that every former part might givestrength unto all that follow, and every latter bringsome light unto all before: so that if the judgments of men do but hold themselves in suspense, as touching these first more general meditations, till in order they have perused the rest that ensue; what may seem dark at the first, will afterwards be found more plain, even as the latter particular decisions will appear, I doubt not, more strong when the other have been read before.

Hooker.*

ON THE GROUNDS OF GOVERNMENT AS LAID EXCLUSIVELY IN THE PURE REASON; OR A STATEMENT AND CRITIQUE OF THE THIRD SYSTEM OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY,—THE THEORY OF ROUSSEAU AND THE FRENCH ECONOMISTS.

I PROCEED to my promise of developing from its embryo principles the tree of French liberty, of which the declaration of the rights of man, and the constitution of 1791 were the leaves, and the succeeding and present state of France the fruits. Let me not be blamed, if, in the interposed essays, introductory to this section, I have connected this system, though only in imagination, though only as a possible case, with a name so deservedly reverenced as that of Luther. It is some excuse, that to interweave with the reader's recollections a certain life and dramatic interest, during the perusal of the abstract* reasonings that are to fol-

* Eccl. Pol. B. I. c. 1, 2.—Ed.

† I have been charged in The Friend with a novel and perplexing use of the word abstract, both as verb and noun. Novel it certainly is not; it being authorized by Lord Bacon, Des Cartes, and others. The fact is this: I take the word in its proper meaning, as abstraho, I draw from. The image, by which I represent to myself an oak-tree, is no fac simile or ade-
low, is the only means I possess of bribing his attention. We have, most of us, at some period or other of our lives, been amused with dialogues of the dead. Who is there, that wishing to form a probable opinion on the grounds of hope and fear for an injured people warring against mighty armies, would not be pleased with a spirited fiction, which brought before him an old Numantian discoursing on that subject in Elysium, with a newly-arrived spirit from the streets of Saragoza or the walls of Gerona?

But I have a better reason. I wished to give every fair advantage to the opinions, which I deemed it of importance to confute. It is bad policy to represent a political system as having no charm but for robbers and assassins, and no natural origin but in the brains of fools or madmen, when experience has proved, that the great danger of the system consists in the peculiar fascination it is calculated to exert on noble and imaginative spirits; on all those who, in the amiable intoxication of youthful benevolence, are apt to mistake their own best virtues and choicest powers for the average qualities and attributes of the human character. The very minds, which a good man would most wish to preserve or disentangle from the snare, are by these angry misrepresentations rather lured into it. Is it wonderful that a man should reject the arguments unheard, when his own heart proves the falsehood of the assumptions by which they are prefaced; or that he should retaliate on the aggressors their own evil thoughts? I am well aware, that the provocation was great, the temptation almost inevitable; yet still I can not repel the conviction from my mind, that in part to this error, and in part to a certain inconsistency in his own fundamental principles, we are to attribute the small number of converts made by Burke

quote icon of the tree, but is abstracted from it by my eye. Now this appears to me a more natural as well as more grammatical and philosophical use of the word, than that elliptic construction, by which an accusative noun, and the preposition following it are to be understood, namely, I draw (my attention from) the, &c. Thus:—I give the outline of a flower on a slate with a slate pencil.—Now, I would say, I abstract the shape from the flower, or of the flower. But the objector would express the same thing by saying, I abstract the color, &c. (that is, my attention from the color, &c.)

Perhaps the latter might be better in familiar writing; but I continue to prefer the former on subjects that require precision. 1830.
during his life-time. Let me not be misunderstood. I do not mean, that this great man supported different principles at different æras of his political life. On the contrary, no man was ever more like himself. From his first published speech on the American colonies to his last posthumous tracts, we see the same man, the same doctrines, the same uniform wisdom of practical counsels, the same reasoning and the same prejudices against all abstract grounds, against all deduction of practice from theory. The inconsistency to which I allude, is of a different kind: it is the want of congruity in the principles appealed to in different parts of the same work; it is an apparent versatility of the principle with the occasion. If his opponents are theorists, then every thing is to be founded on prudence, on mere calculations of expediency; and every man is represented as acting according to the state of his own immediate self-interest. Are his opponents calculators? Then calculation itself is represented as a sort of crime. God has given us feelings, and we are to obey them;—and the most absurd prejudices become venerable, to which these feelings have given consecration. I have not forgotten, that Burke himself defended these half-contradictions, on the pretext of balancing the too much on the one side by a too much on the other. But never can I believe but that the straight line must needs be the nearest; and that where there is the most, and the most unalloyed truth, there will be the greatest and most permanent power of persuasion. But the fact was, that Burke in his public character found himself, as it were, in a Noah's ark, with a very few men, and a great many beasts. He felt how much his immediate power was lessened by the very circumstance of his measureless superiority to those about him: he acted, therefore, under a perpetual system of compromise—a compromise of greatness with meanness; a compromise of comprehension with narrowness; a compromise of the philosopher,—who, armed with the twofold knowledge of history and the laws of spirit, looked, as with a telescope, far around and into the remote distance,—with the mere men of business, or with yet coarser intellects, who handled a truth, which they were required to receive, as they would handle an ox, which they were desired to purchase. But why need I repeat what has been already said in so happy a manner by Goldsmith of this great man:
Who too deep for his hearers, still went on refining,  
And thought of convincing, while they thought of dining.*

And if in consequence it was his fate to "cut blocks with a razor," I may be permitted to add, that in respect of truth, though not of genius, the weapon was injured by the misapplication.

For myself, however, I act and will continue to act under the belief, that the whole truth is the best antidote to falsehoods, which are dangerous chiefly because they are half-truths: and that an erroneous system is best confuted, not by an abuse of theory in general, nor by an absurd opposition of theory to practice, but by a detection of the errors in the particular theory. For the meanest of men has his theory, and to think at all is to theorize. With these convictions I proceed immediately to the system of the economists, and to the principles on which it is constructed, and from which it must derive all its strength.

The system commences with an undeniable truth, and an important deduction therefrom equally undeniable. All voluntary actions, say they, having for their objects, good or evil, are moral actions. But all morality is grounded in the reason. Every man is born with the faculty of reason: and whatever is without it, be the shape what it may, is not a man or person, but a thing. Hence the sacred principle, recognized by all laws, human and divine, the principle indeed, which is the ground-work of all law and justice, that a person can never become a thing, nor be treated as such without wrong. But the distinction between person and thing consists herein, that the latter may rightfully be used, altogether and merely, as a mean; but the former must always be included in the end, and form a part of the final cause. We plant the tree and we cut it down, we breed the sheep and we kill it, wholly as means to our own ends. The wood-cutter and the hind are likewise employed as means, but on an agreement of reciprocal advantage, which includes them as well as their employer in the end. Again: as the faculty of reason implies free-agency, morality,—that is, the dictate of reason,—gives to every rational being the right of acting as a free agent, and of finally determining his conduct by his own will, according to his own conscience: and this right is inalienable except by guilt, which is an act of self-forfeiture, and the conse-

* Retaliation.—Ed.
quences therefore to be considered as the criminal's own moral election. In respect of their reason* all men are equal. The measure of the understanding and of all other faculties of man, is different in different persons: but reason is not susceptible of degree. For since it merely decides whether any given thought or action is or is not in contradiction with the rest, there can be no reason better, or more reason, than another.

Reason! best and holiest gift of God and bond of union with the giver;—the high title by which the majesty of man claims precedence above all other living creatures;—mysterious faculty, the mother of conscience, of language, of tears, and of smiles;—calm and incorruptible legislator of the soul, without whom all its other powers would 'meet in mere oppugnacy;’—sole principle of permanence amid endless change,—in a world of discordant appetites and imagined self-interests the one only common measure, which taken away,—

* This position has been already explained, and the sophistry grounded on it detected and exposed, in Essay V. of the First Landing-Place. II. pp. 148–150.
measure of his free agency? Man must be free; or to what purpose was he made a spirit of reason, and not a machine of instinct? Man must obey; or wherefore has he a conscience? The powers, which create this difficulty, contain its solution likewise: for their service is perfect freedom. And whatever law or system of law compels any other service, disennobles our nature, leagues itself with the animal against the god-like, kills in us the very principle of joyous well-doing, and fights against humanity.

By the application of these principles to the social state there arises the following system, which, as far as its first grounds are concerned, is developed the most fully by J. J. Rousseau in his work Du Contrat Social. If then no individual possesses the right of prescribing any thing to another individual, the rule of which is not contained in their common reason, society, which is but an aggregate of individuals, can communicate this right to no one. It can not possibly make that rightful which the higher and inviolable law of human nature declares contradictory and unjust. But concerning right and wrong, the reason of each and every man is the competent judge: for how else could he be an amenable being, or the proper subject of any law? This reason, therefore, in any one man, can not even in the social state be rightfully subjugated to the reason of any other. Neither an individual, nor yet the whole multitude which constitutes the state, can possess the right of compelling him to do any thing, of which it can not be demonstrated that his own reason must join in prescribing it. If therefore society is to be under a rightful constitution of government, and one that can impose on rational beings a true and moral obligation to obey it, it must be framed on such principles that every individual follows his own reason while he obeys the laws of the constitution, and performs the will of the state while he follows the dictates of his own reason. This is expressly asserted by Rousseau, who states the problem of a perfect constitution of government in the following words: trouver une forme d'association—par laquelle chacun s'unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui même, et reste aussi libre qu'auvant,—that is, to find a form of society according to which each one uniting himself with the whole shall yet obey himself only and remain as free as before. This right of the individual to retain his whole natural independence, even in the social state,
is absolutely inalienable. He can not possibly concede or compromise it: for this very right is one of his most sacred duties. He would sin against himself, and commit high treason against the reason which the Almighty Creator has given him, if he dared abandon its exclusive right to govern his actions.

Laws obligatory on the conscience, can only therefore proceed from that reason which remains always one and the same, whether it speaks through this or that person: like the voice of an external ventriloquist, it is indifferent from whose lips it appears to come, if only it be audible. The individuals indeed are subject to errors and passions, and each man has his own defects. But when men are assembled in person or by real representatives, the actions and reactions of individual self-love balance each other; errors are neutralized by opposite errors; and the winds rushing from all quarters at once with equal force, produce for the time a deep calm, during which the general will arising from the general reason displays itself. 'It is fittest,' says Burke himself, * that sovereign authority should be exercised where it is most likely to be attended with the most effectual correctives. These correctives are furnished by the nature and course of parliamentary proceedings, and by the infinitely diversified characters which compose the two Houses. The fulness, the freedom, and publicity of discussion, leave it easy to distinguish what are acts of power, and what the determinations of equity and reason. There prejudice corrects prejudice, and the different asperities of party zeal mitigate and neutralize each other.'

This, however, as my readers will have already detected, is no longer a demonstrable deduction from reason. It is a mere probability, against which other probabilities may be weighed: as the lust of authority, the contagious nature of enthusiasm, and other of the acute or chronic diseases of deliberative assemblies. But which of these results is the more probable, the correction or the contagion of evil, must depend on circumstances and grounds of expediency: and thus we already find ourselves beyond the magic circle of the pure reason, and within the sphere of the understanding and the prudence. Of this important fact Rousseau was by no means unaware in his theory, though with gross inconsistency he takes no notice of it in his application of the the-

* Note on his motion relative to the Speech from the Throne, vol. ii. p. 647, 4to Edit.
ory to practice. He admits the possibility, he is compelled by history to allow even the probability, that the most numerous popular assemblies, nay even whole nations, may at times be hurried away by the same passions, and under the dominion of a common error. This will of all is then of no more value, than the humors of any one individual: and must therefore be sacredly distinguished from the pure will which flows from universal reason. To this point then I entreat the reader's particular attention: for in this distinction, established by Rousseau himself, between the volonté de tous and the volonté générale,—that is, between the collective will, and a casual overbalance of wills—the falsehood or nothingness of the whole system becomes manifest. For hence it follows, as an inevitable consequence, that all which is said in the Contrat Social of that sovereign will, to which the right of universal legislation appertains, applies to no one human being, to no society or assemblage of human beings, and least of all to the mixed multitude that makes up the people: but entirely and exclusively to reason itself, which, it is true, dwells in every man potentially, but actually and in perfect purity is found in no man and in no body of men. This distinction the latter disciples of Rousseau chose completely to forget, and,—a far more melancholy case—the constituent legislators of France forgot it likewise. With a wretched parrotry they wrote and harangued without ceasing of the volonté générale—the inalienable sovereignty of the people: and by these high-sounding phrases led on the vain, ignorant, and intoxicated populace to wild excesses and wilder expectations, which entailing on them the bitterness of disappointment cleared the way for military despotism, for the Satanic government of horror under the Jacobins, and of terror under the Corsican.

Luther lived long enough to see the consequences of the doctrines into which indignant pity and abstract principles of right had hurried him—to see, to retract and to oppose them. If the same had been the lot of Rousseau, I doubt not, that his conduct would have been the same. In his whole system there is beyond controversy much that is true and well reasoned, if only its application be not extended farther than the nature of the case permits. But then we shall find that little or nothing is won by it for the institutions of society; and least of all for the constitution of governments, the theory of which it was his wish to ground
on it. Apply his principles to any case, in which the sacred and inviolable laws of morality are immediately interested, all becomes just and pertinent. No power on earth can oblige me to act against my conscience. No magistrate, no monarch, no legislature, can without tyranny compel me to do any thing which the acknowledged laws of God have forbidden me to do. So act that thou mayest be able, without involving any contradiction, to will that the maxim of thy conduct should be the law of all intelligent beings—is the one universal and sufficient principle and guide of morality.* And why? Because the object of morality is not the outward act, but the internal maxim of our actions: And so far it is infallible. But with what show of reason can we pretend, from a principle by which we are to determine the purity of our motives, to deduce the form and matter of a rightful government, the main office of which is to regulate the outward actions of particular bodies of men, according to their particular circumstances? Can we hope better of constitutions framed by ourselves, than of that which was given by Almighty Wisdom itself? The laws of the Hebrew commonwealth, which flowed from the pure reason, remain and are immutable; but the regulations dictated by prudence, though by the divine prudence, and though given in thunder from the mount, have passed away; and while they lasted, were binding only for that one state, the particular circumstances of which rendered them expedient.

Rousseau indeed asserts, that there is an inalienable sovereignty inherent in every human being possessed of reason: and from this the framers of the constitution of 1791 deduce, that the people itself is its own sole rightful legislator, and at most dare only recede so far from its right as to delegate to chosen deputies the power of representing and declaring the general will. But this is wholly without proof; for it has already been fully shown, that according to the principle out of which this consequence is attempted to be drawn, it is not the actual man, but the abstract reason alone, that is the sovereign and rightful lawgiver. The confusion of two things so different is so gross an error, that the Constituent Assembly could scarcely proceed a step in their declaration of rights, without some glaring inconsistency. Children are excluded from all political power;—are they not human

* Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 46, 47. Leipsie, 1838. Am. Ed.
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beings in whom the faculty of reason resides? Yes! but in
them the faculty is not yet adequately developed. But are not
gross ignorance, inveterate superstition, and the habitual tyranny
of passion and sensuality, equally preventives of the development,
equally impediments to the rightful exercise, of the reason, as
childhood and early youth? Who would not rely on the judg-
ment of a well-educated English lad, bred in a virtuous and en-
lightened family, in preference to that of a brutal Russian, who
believes that he can scourge his wooden idol into good-humor,
or attributes to himself the merit of perpetual prayer, when he
has fastened the petitions, which his priest has written for him,
on the wings of a windmill?—Again: women are likewise ex-
cluded—a full half, and that assuredly the most innocent, the
most amiable half, of the whole human race, is excluded, and
this too by a constitution which boasts to have no other foun-
dations but those of universal reason! Is reason then an affair
of sex? No! But women are commonly in a state of depen-
dence, and are not likely to exercise their reason with freedom.
Well! and does not this ground of exclusion apply with equal
or greater force to the poor, to the infirm, to men in embarrassed
circumstances, to all in short whose maintenance, be it scanty
or be it ample, depends on the will of others? How far are we
to go? Where must we stop? What classes should we admit?
Whom must we disfranchise? The objects concerning whom
we are to determine these questions, are all human beings, and
differenced from each other by degrees only, these degrees, too,
oftentimes changing. Yet the principle on which the whole sys-
tem rests is, that reason is not susceptible of degree. Nothing,
therefore, which subsists wholly in degrees, the changes of which
do not obey any necessary law, can be subjects of pure science,
or determinable by mere reason. For these things we must rely
on our understandings, enlightened by past experience and im-
mediate observation, and determining our choice by comparisons
of expediency.

It is therefore altogether a mistaken notion, that the theory
which would deduce the social rights of man, and the sole right-
ful form of government from principles of reason, involves a ne-
cessary preference of the democratic, or even the representative,
constitutions. Accordingly, several of the French economists,
although devotees of Rousseau and the physiocratic system, and
assuredly not the least respectable of their party either in morals or in intellect,—and these, too, men who lived and wrote under the limited monarchy of France, and who were therefore well acquainted with the evils connected with that system,—did yet declare themselves for a pure monarchy in preference to the aristocratic, the popular, or the mixed form. These men argued, that no other laws being allowable but those which are demonstrably just, and founded in the simplest ideas of reason, and of which every man's reason is the competent judge, it is indifferent whether one man, or one or more assemblies of men, give form and publicity to them. For being matters of pure and simple science, they require no experience in order to see their truth; and among an enlightened people, by whom this system had been once solemnly adopted, no sovereign would dare to make other laws than those of reason. They further contend, that if the people were not enlightened, a purely popular government could not co-exist with this system of absolute justice: and if it were adequately enlightened, the influence of public opinion would supply the place of formal representation, while the form of the government would be in harmony with the unity and simplicity of its principles. This they entitled le despotisme légal sous l'empire de l'évidence. The best statement of the theory thus modified, may be found in Mercier de la Rivière, l'ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques. From the proofs adduced in the preceding paragraph, to which many others might be added, I have no hesitation in affirming that this latter party are the more consistent reasoners.

It is worthy of remark, that the influence of these writings contributed greatly, not indeed to raise the present emperor, but certainly to reconcile a numerous class of politicians to his unlimited authority: and as far as his lawless passion for war and conquest allows him to govern according to any principles, he favors those of the physiocratic philosophers. His early education must have given him a predilection for a theory conducted throughout with mathematical precision; its very simplicity promised the readiest and most commodious machine for despotism, for it moulds a nation into as calculable a power as an army; while the stern and seeming greatness of the whole, and its mock elevation above human feelings, flattered his pride, hardened his conscience, and aided the efforts of self-delusion. Reason is the
sole sovereign, the only rightful legislator: but reason to act on
man must be impersonated. The Providence which had so mar-
vellously raised and supported him, had marked him out for the
representative of reason, and had armed him with irresistible
force, in order to realize its laws. In him, therefore, might be-
comes right, and his cause and that of destiny (or, as he now
chooses to word it, exchanging blind nonsense for staring blas-
phemy), his cause and the cause of God are one and the same.
Excellent postulate for a choleric and self-willed tyrant! What
avails the impoverishment of a few thousand merchants and
manufacturers? What even the general wretchedness of mil-
ions of perishable men, for a short generation? Should these
stand in the way of the chosen conqueror, the innovator mundi,
et stupor saeculorum, or prevent a constitution of things, which
erected on intellectual and perfect foundations growth not old,
but like the eternal justice, of which it is the living image,

---may despise

The strokes of fate, and see the world's last hour?

For justice, austere, unrelenting justice, is everywhere holden
up as the one thing needful; and the only duty of the citizen, in
fulfilling which he obeys all the laws, is not to encroach on
another's sphere of action. The greatest possible happiness of a
people is not, according to this system, the object of a governor;
but to preserve the freedom of all, by coercing within the requi-
site bounds the freedom of each. Whatever a government does
more than this, comes of evil: and its best employment is the re-
peal of laws and regulations, not the establishment of them.
Each man is the best judge of his own happiness, and to himself
must it therefore be intrusted. Remove all the interferences of
positive statutes, all monopoly, all bounties, all prohibitions, and
all encouragements of importation and exportation, of particular
growth and particular manufactures: let the revenues of the
state be taken at once from the produce of soil; and all things will
then find their level, all irregularities will correct each other,
and an indestructible cycle of harmonious motions take place in
the moral equally as in the natural world. The business of the
governor is to watch incessantly, that the state shall remain com-
posed of individuals, acting as individuals, by which alone the
freedom of all can be secured. Its duty is to take care that itself
remain the sole collective power, and that all the citizens should enjoy the same rights, and without distinction be subject to the same duties.

Splendid promises! Can any thing appear more equitable than the last proposition, the equality of rights and duties? Can any thing be conceived more simple in the idea? But the execution—! Let the four or five quarto volumes of the Conscript Code be the comment! But as briefly as possible I shall prove, that this system, as an exclusive total, is under any form impracticable; and that if it were realized, and as far as it were realized, it would necessarily lead to general barbarism and the most grinding oppression; and that the final result of a general attempt to introduce it, must be a military despotism inconsistent with the peace and safety of mankind. That reason should be our guide and governor is an undeniable truth, and all our notion of right and wrong is built thereon: for reason is one of the two fountain-heads in which the whole moral nature of man originated and subsists. From reason alone can we derive the principles which our understandings are to apply, the ideal to which by means of our understandings we should endeavor to approximate. This, however, gives no proof that reason alone ought to govern and direct human beings, either as individuals or as states. It ought not to do this, because it can not. The laws of reason are unable to satisfy the first conditions of human society. We will admit that the shortest code of the law is the best, and that the citizen finds himself most at ease where the government least intermeddles with his affairs, and confines its efforts to the preservation of public tranquillity; we will suffer this to pass at present undisputed, though the examples of England, and before the late events, of Holland and Switzerland,—surely the three happiest nations of the world—to which perhaps we might add the major part of the former German free towns, furnish stubborn facts in presumption of the contrary,—yet still the proof is wanting that the first and most general applications and exertions of the power of man can be definitely regulated by reason unaided by the positive and conventional laws in the formation of which the understanding must be our guide, and which become just because they happen to be expedient.

The chief object for which men first formed themselves into a state was not the protection of their lives, but of their property.
ESSAY IV.

Where the nature of the soil and climate precludes all property but personal, and permits that only in its simplest forms, as in Greenland, men remain in the domestic state and form neighborhoods, but not governments. And in North America the chiefs appear to exercise government in those tribes only which possess individual landed property. Among the rest the chief is their general; but government is exercised only in families by the fathers of families. But where individual landed property exists, there must be inequality of property: the nature of the earth and the nature of the mind unite to make the contrary impossible. But to suppose the land the property of the state, and the labor and the produce to be equally divided among all the members of the state, involves more than one contradiction: for it could not subsist without gross injustice, except where the reason of all and of each was absolute master of the selfish passions of sloth, envy, and the like; and yet the same state would preclude the greater part of the means by which the reason of man is developed. In whatever state of society you would place it, from the most savage to the most refined, it would be found equally unjust and impossible; and were there a race of men, a country, and a climate, that permitted such an order of things, the same causes would render all government superfluous.

To property, therefore, and to its inequalities all human laws directly or indirectly relate, which would not be equally laws in the state of nature. Now it is impossible to deduce the right of property* from pure reason. The utmost which reason could give would be a property in the forms of things, as far as the forms were produced by individual power. In the matter it could give no property. We regard angels and glorified spirits as beings of pure reason: and who ever thought of property in heaven? Even the simplest and most moral form of it, namely, marriage (we know from the highest authority), is excluded from the state of pure reason. Rousseau himself expressly admits that property can not be deduced from the laws of reason and nature; and he ought therefore to have admitted at the same time that his whole theory was a thing of air. In the most respectable point of view

* I mean, practically and with the inequalities inseparable from the actual existence of property. Abstractedly, the right to property is deducible from the free-agency of man. If to act freely be a right, a sphere of action must be so too.
he could regard his system as analogous to geometry. If indeed it be purely scientific, how could it be otherwise? Geometry holds forth an ideal which can never be fully realized in nature, even because it is nature; because bodies are more than extension, and to pure extension of space only the mathematical theorems wholly correspond. In the same manner the moral laws of the intellectual world, as far as they are deducible from pure intellect, are never perfectly applicable to our mixed and sensitive nature, because man is something besides reason; because his reason never acts by itself, but must clothe itself in the substance of individual understanding and specific inclination, in order to become a reality and an object of consciousness and experience. It will be seen hereafter that together with this, the key-stone of the arch, the greater part and the most specious of the popular arguments in favor of universal suffrage fall in and are crushed. I will mention one only at present. Major Cartwright,—in his deduction of the rights of the subject from principles "not susceptible of proof, being self-evident, if one of which be violated all are shaken,"—affirms (Principle 98th; though the greater part indeed are moral aphorisms or blank assertions, not scientific principles) "that a power which ought never to be used ought never to exist." Again he affirms that "laws to bind all must be assented to by all, and consequently every man, even the poorest, has an equal right to suffrage;" and this for an additional reason, because "all without exception are capable of feeling happiness or misery, accordingly as they are well or ill governed." But are they not then capable of feeling happiness or misery accordingly as they do or do not possess the means of a comfortable subsistence? and who is the judge, what is a comfortable subsistence, but the man himself? Might not then, on the same or equivalent principles, a leveller construct a right to equal property? The inhabitants of this country without property form, doubtless, a great majority; each of these has a right to a suffrage, and the richest man to no more; and the object of this suffrage is, that each individual may secure himself a true efficient representative of his will. Here then is a legal power of abolishing or equalizing property: and according to Major C. himself, a power which ought never to be used ought not to exist.

Therefore, unless he carries his system to the whole length of common labor and common possession, a right to universal suf-
frage can not exist; but if not to universal suffrage, there can exist no natural right to suffrage at all. In whatever way he would obviate this objection, he must admit expedience founded on experience and particular circumstances, which will vary in every different nation, and in the same nation at different times, as the maxim of all legislation and the ground of all legislative power. For his universal principles, as far as they are principles and universal, necessarily suppose uniform and perfect subjects, which are to be found in the ideas of pure geometry and, I trust, in the realities of heaven, but never, never, in creatures of flesh and blood.

ESSAY V.

ON THE ERRORS OF PARTY SPIRIT: OR, EXTREMES MEET.

And it was no wonder if some good and innocent men, especially such as he (Lightfoot) who was generally more concerned about what was done in Judea many centuries ago, than what was transacted in his own time in his own country—it is no wonder if some such were for a while borne away to the approval of opinions which they, after more sedate reflection, disowned. Yet his innocency from any self-interest or design, together with his learning, secured him from the extravagances of demagogues, the people's oracles.—Lightfoot's Works, Publisher's Preface to the Reader.

I have never seen Major Cartwright, much less enjoy the honor of his acquaintance; but I know enough of his character, from the testimony of others and from his own writings, to respect his talents, and revere the purity of his motives. I am fully persuaded that there are few better men, few more fervent or disinterested adherents of their country or the laws of their country, of whatsoever things are lovely, of whatsoever things are honorable. It would give me great pain should I be supposed to have introduced, disrespectfully, a name, which from my early youth I never heard mentioned without a feeling of affectionate admiration. I have indeed quoted from this venerable patriot, as from the most respectable English advocate for the theory, which derives the rights of government, and the duties of obedience to it, exclusively from principles of pure
reason. It was of consequence to my cause that I should not be thought to have been waging war against a straw image of my own setting up, or even against a foreign idol that had neither worshipers nor advocates in our own country; and it was not less my object to keep my discussion aloof from those passions, which more unpopular names might have excited. I therefore introduced the name of Cartwright, as I had previously done that of Luther, in order to give every fair advantage to a theory, which I thought it of importance to confute; and as an instance that though the system might be made tempting to the vulgar, yet that, taken unmixed and entire, it was chiefly fascinating for lofty and imaginative spirits, who mistook their own virtues and powers for the average character of men in general.

Neither by fair statements nor by fair reasoning should I ever give offence to Major Cartwright himself, nor to his judicious friends. If I am in danger of offending them, it must arise from one or other of two causes; either that I have falsely represented his principles, or his motives and the tendency of his writings. In the book from which I quoted, "The People's Barrier against undue Influence" (the only one of Major Cartwright's which I possess), I am conscious that there are six foundations stated of constitutional government. Therefore, it may be urged, the author can not be justly classed with those who deduce our social rights and correlative duties exclusively from principles of pure reason, or unavoidable conclusions from such. My answer is ready. Of these six foundations three are but different words for one and the same, namely, the law of reason, the law of God, and first principles: and the three that remain can not be taken as indifferent, inasmuch as they are afterwards affirmed to be of no validity except as far as they are evidently deduced from the former; that is, from the principles implanted by God in the universal reason of man. These three latter foundations are, the general customs of the realm, particular customs, and acts of Parliament. It might be supposed that the author had not used his terms in the precise and single sense in which they are defined in my former essay; and that self-evident principles may be meant to include the dictates of manifest expedience, the inductions of the understanding as well as the precepts of the pure reason. But no; Major Cartwright has guarded against the possibility of this interpretation, and has expressed himself
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as decisively, and with as much warmth, against founding governments on grounds of expediency, as I have done against founding morality on the same. Euclid himself could not have defined his words more sternly within the limits of pure science; for instance, see the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th primary rules:—'A principle is a manifest and simple proposition comprehending a certain truth. Principles are the proof of every thing: but are not susceptible of external proof, being self-evident. If one principle be violated, all are shaken. Against him, who denies principles, all dispute is useless, and reason unintelligible, or disallowed, so far as he denies them. The laws of nature are immutable.'—Neither could Rousseau himself, nor his predecessors, the Fifth-monarchy men, have more nakedly or emphatically identified the foundations of government in the concrete with those of religion and morality in the abstract: see Major Cartwright's primary rules from 31 to 39, and from 44 to 83. In these it is affirmed;—that the legislative rights of every citizen are inherent in his nature; that, being natural rights, they must be equal in all men; that a natural right is that right which a citizen claims as being a man, and that it hath no other foundation but his personality or reason; that property can neither increase nor modify any legislative right; that every one man shall have one vote however poor, and for any one man, however rich, to have more than one vote, is against natural justice, and an evil measure; that it is better for a nation to endure all adversities, than to assent to one evil measure; that to be free is to be governed by laws, to which we have ourselves assented, either in person or by representative, for whose election we have actually voted: that all not having a right of suffrage are slaves, and that a vast majority of the people of Great Britain are slaves! To prove the total coincidence of Major Cartwright's theory with that which I have stated, and I trust confuted, in the preceding essay, it only remains for me to prove, that the former, equally with the latter, confounds the sufficiency of the conscience to make every person a moral and amenable being, with the sufficiency of judgment and experience requisite to the exercise of political right. A single quotation will place this out of all doubt, which from its length I shall insert in a note.*

* 'But the equality' (observe, that Major Cartwright is here speaking of the natural right to universal suffrage, and consequently of the univer-
Great stress, indeed, is laid on the authority of our ancient laws, both in this and the other works of our patriotic author; and whatever his system may be, it is impossible not to feel, that the author himself possesses the heart of a genuine Englishman. But still his system can neither be changed nor modified by these appeals: for among the primary maxims, which form the groundwork of it, we are informed not only that law in the abstract is the perfection of reason; but that the law of God and the law of the land are all one! What! The statutes against witches; or those against papists, the abolition of which gave rise to the infamous riots in 1780! Or, in the author's own opinion, the statutes of disfranchisement and for making Parliaments septennial right of eligibility, as well as of election, independently of character or property)—'the equality and dignity of human nature in all men, whether rich or poor, is placed in the highest point of view by St. Paul, when he reprehends the Corinthian believers for their litigations one with another, in the courts of law where unbelievers presided; and as an argument of the competency of all men to judge for themselves, he alludes to that elevation in the kingdom of heaven which is promised to every man who shall be virtuous, or in the language of that time, a saint. Do ye not know, says he, that the saints shall judge the world? And if the world shall be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters? Know ye not that ye shall judge the angels? How much more things that pertain to this life? If after such authorities, such manifestations of truth as these, any Christian through those prejudices, which are the effects of long habits of injustice and oppression, and teach us to despise the poor, shall still think it right to exclude that part of the commonalty, consisting of tradesmen, artificers, and laborers, or any of them from voting in elections of members to serve in Parliament, I must sincerely lament such a persuasion as a misfortune both to himself and his country. And if any man,—not having given himself the trouble to consider whether or not the Scripture be an authority, but who, nevertheless, is a friend to the rights of mankind—upon grounds of mere prudence, policy, or expediency, shall think it advisable to go against the whole current of our constitutional and law maxims, by which it is self-evident that every man, as being a man, is created free, born to freedom, and, without it, a thing, a slave, a beast; and shall contend for drawing a line of exclusion at freeholders of forty pounds a year, or forty shillings a year, or householders, or pot-boilers, so that all who are below that line shall not have a vote in the election of a legislative guardian,—which is taking from a citizen the power even of self-preservation,—such a man, I venture to say, is bolder than he who wrestled with the angel; for he wrestles with God himself, who established those principles in the eternal laws of nature, never to be violated by any of his creatures.' Pp. 28, 24.
nial!—Nay! but (Principle 28) an unjust law is no law: and (P. 22) against the law of reason neither prescription, statute, nor custom, may prevail; and if any such be brought against it, they be not prescriptions, statutes, nor customs, but things void: and (P. 29) what the Parliament doth shall be holden for naught whensoever it shall enact that which is contrary to a natural right! I dare not suspect a grave writer of such egregious trifling, as to mean no more by these assertions, than that what is wrong is not right; and if more than this be meant, it must be that the subject is not bound to obey any act of Parliament, which according to his conviction entrenches on a principle of natural right; which natural rights are, as we have seen, not confined to the man in his individual capacity, but are made to confer universal legislative privileges on every subject of every state, and of the extent of which every man is competent to judge, who is competent to be the object of law at all, that is, every man who has not lost his reason.

In the statement of his principles, therefore, I have not misrepresented Major Cartwright. Have I then endeavored to connect public odium with his name, by arraigning his motives, or the tendency of his writings? The tendency of his writings in my inmost conscience I believe to be perfectly harmless, and I dare cite them in confirmation of the opinions which it was the object of my introductory essays to establish, and as an additional proof, that no good man communicating what he believes to be the truth for the sake of truth, and according to the rules of conscience, will be found to have acted injuriously to the peace or interests of society. The venerable state-moralist,—for this is his true character, and in this title is conveyed the whole error of his system,—is incapable of aiding his arguments by the poignant condiment of personal slander, incapable of appealing to the envy of the multitude by bitter declamation against the follies and oppressions of the higher classes. He would shrink with horror from the thought of adding a false and unnatural influence to the cause of truth and justice, by details of present calamity or immediate suffering, fitted to excite the fury of the multitude, or by promises of turning the current of the public revenue into the channels* of

* I must remind the reader, that this essay was written in October, 1809. If Major Cartwright has ever since acted in a different spirit, and tampered personally with the distresses, and consequent irritability of the
individual distress and poverty, so as to bribe the populace by selfish hopes. It does not belong to men of his character to delude the uninstructed into the belief that their shortest way of obtaining the good things of this life, is to commence busy politicians, instead of remaining industrious laborers. He knows, and acts on the knowledge, that it is the duty of the enlightened philanthropist to plead for the poor and ignorant, not to them.

No.—From works written and published under the control of austere principles, and at the impulse of a lofty and generous enthusiasm,—from works rendered attractive only by the fervor of sincerity, and imposing only by the majesty of plain dealing, no danger will be apprehended by a wise man, no offence received by a good man. I could almost venture to warrant our patriot's publications innocuous, from the single circumstance of their perfect freedom from personal themes in this age of personality, this age of literary and political gossiping, when the meanest insects are worshiped with a sort of Egyptian superstition, if only the brainless head be atoned for by the sting of personal malignity in the tail; when the most vapid satires have become the objects of a keen public interest purely from the number of contemporary characters named in the patch-work notes,—which possess, however, the comparative merit of being more poetical than the text,—and because, to increase the stimulus, the author has sagaciously left his own name for whispers and conjectures!—In an age, when even sermons are published with a double appendix stuffed with names—in a generation so transformed from the characteristic reserve of Britons, that from the ephemeral sheet of a London newspaper to the everlasting Scotch professorial quarto, almost every publication exhibits or flatters the epidemic distemper; that the very last year's rebuses in the Lady's Diary, are answered in a serious elegy 'On my father's death,' with the name and habitat of the elegiac Oedipus subscribed;—and other ingenious solutions are likewise given to the said rebuses—not, as heretofore, by Crito, Philander, A B, X Y, &c., but by fifty or sixty plain English surnames at full length, with their several places of abode! In an age, when a bashful ignorant, the inconsistency is his, not mine. If what I then believed and avowed should now appear a severe satire in the shape of a false prophecy, any shame I might feel for my lack of penetration would be lost in the sincerity of my regret.—1818.
Philalethes or Phileleutheros is as rare on the title-pages and among the signatures of our magazines, as a real name used to be in the days of our shy and notice-shunning grandfathers! When—more exquisite than all—I see an epic poem—spirits of Maro and Mæonides, make ready to welcome your new compere!—advertised with the special recommendation, that the said epic poem contains more than a hundred names of living persons! No—if works as abhorrent, as those of Major Cartwright, from all unworthy provocatives to vanity, envy, and the selfish passions, could acquire a sufficient influence on the public mind to be mischievous, the plans proposed in his pamphlets would cease to be altogether visionary: though even then they could not ground their claims to actual adoption on self-evident principles of pure reason, but on the happy accident of the virtue and good sense of that public, for whose suffrages they were presented. Indeed with Major Cartwright's plans I have no present concern; but with the principles, on which he grounds the obligations to adopt them.

But I must not sacrifice truth to my reverence for individual purity of intention. The tendency of one good man's writings is altogether a different thing from the tendency of the system itself, when seasoned and served up for the unreasoning multitude, as it has been by men whose names I would not honor by writing them in the same sentence with Major Cartwright's. For this system has two sides, and holds out very different attractions to its admirers who advance towards it from different points of the compass. It possesses qualities, that can scarcely fail of winning over to its banners a numerous host of shallow heads and restless tempers, men who, without learning,—or, as one of my friends has forcibly expressed it, strong book-mindedness,—live as alms-folks on the opinions of their contemporaries, and who,—well pleased to exchange the humility of regret for the self-complacent feelings of contempt,—reconcile themselves to the sans culotteerie of their ignorance, by scoffing at the useless fox-brush of pedantry.* The attachment of this numerous class is owing neither to

*He (Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk) knowing that learning hath no enemy but ignorance, did suspect always the want of it in those men who derided the habit of it in others: like the fox in the fable, who, being without a tail, would persuade others to cut off theirs as a burthen. But he liked well the philosopher's division of men into three ranks—some who

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the solidity and depth of foundation in this theory, nor to the strict coherence of its arguments; and still less to any genuine reverence for humanity in the abstract. The physiocratic system promises to deduce all things, and everything relative to law and government, with mathematical exactness and certainty, from a few individual and self-evident principles. But who so dull, as not to be capable of apprehending a simple self-evident principle, and of following a short demonstration? By this system, 'the system' as its admirers were wont to call it, even as they named the writer who first applied it in systematic detail to the whole constitution and administration of civil policy,—Du Quesnoy—le docteur, or 'the teacher;'—by this system the observation of times, places, relative bearings, history, national customs and character, is rendered superfluous;—all, in short, which, according to the common notion, makes the attainment of legislative prudence a work of difficulty and long-continued effort, even for the acutest and most comprehensive minds. The cautious balancing of comparative advantages, the painful calculation of forces and counterforces, the preparation of circumstances, the lynx-eyed watching for opportunities, are all superseded; and by the magic oracles of certain axioms and definitions it is revealed how the world with all its concerns should be mechanized, and then let go on of itself. All the positive institutions and regulations, which the prudence of our ancestors had provided, are declared to be erroneous or interested perversions of the natural relations of man; and the whole is delivered over to the faculty, which all men possess equally, namely, the common sense or universal reason. The science of politics, it is said, is but the application of the common sense, which every man possesses, to a subject in which every man is concerned. To be a musician, an orator, a painter, a poet, an architect, or even to be a good mechanist, presupposes genius; to be an excellent artisan or mechanic, requires more than an average degree of talent; but to be a legislator requires nothing but common sense. The commonest human intellect, therefore, suffices for a perfect

knew good and were willing to teach others; these he said were like gods among men—others who though they knew not much, yet were willing to learn; these he said were like men among beasts—and some who knew not good and yet despised such as should teach them; these he esteemed as beasts among men.—Lloyd's State Worthies, p. 88.
insight into the whole science of civil polity, and qualifies the
possessor to sit in judgment on the constitution and administra-
tion of his own country, and of all other nations. This must
needs be agreeable tidings to the great mass of mankind. There
is no subject, which men in general like better to harangue on
than politics; none, the deciding on which more flatters the
sense of self-importance. For as to what Johnson calls 'plebeian
envy,'* I do not believe that the mass of men are justly charge-
able with it in their political feelings; not only because envy is
seldom excited except by definite and individual objects, but still
more because it is a painful passion, and not likely to co-exist
with the high delight and self-complacency with which the ha-
rangues on states and statesmen, princes and generals, are made
and listened to in ale-house circles or promiscuous public meet-
ings. A certain portion of this is not merely desirable, but ne-
necessary in a free country. Heaven forbid that the most ignorant
of my countrymen should be deprived of a subject so well fitted to

An hour's importance to the poor man's heart!†

But a system which not only flatters the pride and vanity of men,
but which in so plausible and intelligible a manner persuades
them, not that this is wrong and that ought to have been man-
aged otherwise; or that Mr. X. is worth a hundred of Mr. Y. as
a minister or Parliament man; but that all is wrong and mis-
taken,—nay, almost unjust and wicked,—and that every man is
competent, and in contempt of all rank and property, on the
mere title of his personality, possesses the right, and is under the
most solemn moral obligation, to give a helping hand toward
overthrowing all;—this confusion of political with religious
claims, this transfer of the rights of religion disjoined from the
austere duties of self-denial, with which religious rights exercised
in their proper sphere can not fail to be accompanied; and not
only disjoined from self-restraint, but united with the indulgence
of those passions,—self-will, love of power,—which it is the prin-
cipal aim and hardest task of religion to correct and restrain;—

* I now more than fear that Dr. Johnson was in the right: and that I
must recant my opinion with 'Coleridge! thy wish was father to that
thought, not a clearer insight into the nature of man, not a wider expe-
rience of men.'—October 20th, 1818.

† Deserted Village.—Ed.
this, I say, is altogether different from the village politics of yore, and may be pronounced alarming and of dangerous tendency by the boldest advocates of reform not less consistently, than by the most timid eschewers of popular disturbance.

Still, however, the system had its golden side for the noblest minds: and I should act the part of a coward, if I disguised my convictions, that the errors of the aristocratic party were full as gross, and far less excusable. Instead of contenting themselves with opposing the real blessings of English law to the splendid promises of untried theory, too large a part of those, who called themselves anti-Jacobins, did all in their power to suspend those blessings; and thus furnished new arguments to the advocates of innovation, when they should have been answering the old ones. The most prudent, as well as the most honest, mode of defending the existing arrangements would have been, to have candidly admitted what could not with truth be denied, and then to have shown that, though the things complained of were evils, they were necessary evils; or if they were removable, yet that the consequences of the heroic medicines recommended by the revolutionists would be far more dreadful than the disease. Now either the one or the other point, by the double aid of history and a sound philosophy, they might have established with a certainty little short of demonstration, and with such colors and illustrations as would have taken strong hold of the very feelings which had attached to the democratic system all the good and valuable men of the party. But instead of this they precluded the possibility of being listened to even by the gentlest and most ingenuous among the friends of the French revolution, by denying or attempting to palliate facts, which were equally notorious and unjustifiable, and by supplying the lack of brain by an overflow of gall. While they lamented with tragic outcries the injured monarch and the exiled noble, they displayed the most disgusting insensibility to the privations, sufferings, and manifold oppressions of the great mass of the continental population, and a blindness or callousness still more offensive to the crimes and unutterable abominations of their oppressors. * Not only was the

* I do not mean the sovereigns, but the old nobility of both Germany and France. The extravagantly false and flattering picture, which Burke gave of the French nobility and hierarchy, has always appeared to me the greatest defect of his, in so many respects, invaluable work.
Bastile justified, but the Spanish Inquisition itself;—and this in a pamphlet passionately extolled and industriously circulated by the adherents of the then ministry. Thus, and by their infatuated panegyrics on the former state of France, they played into the hands of their worst and most dangerous antagonists. In confounding the conditions of the English and the French peasantry, and in quoting the authorities of Milton, Sidney, and their immortal comppeers, as applicable to the present times and the existing government, the demagogues appeared to talk only the same language as the anti-Jacobins themselves employed. For if the vilest calumnies of obsolete bigots were applied against these great men by the one party, with equal plausibility might their authorities be adduced, and their arguments for increasing the power of the people be re-applied to the existing government, by the other. If the most disgusting forms of despotism were spoken of by the one in the same respectful language as the executive power of our own country, what wonder if the irritated partisans of the other were able to impose on the populace the converse of the proposition, and to confound the executive branch of the English sovereignty with the despotisms of less happy lands? The first duty of a wise advocate is to convince his opponents, that he understands their arguments and sympathizes with their just feelings. But instead of this, these pretended constitutionalists recurred to the language of insult, and to measures of persecution. In order to oppose Jacobinism they imitated it in its worst features; in personal slander, in illegal violence, and even in the thirst for blood. They justified the corruptions of the state in the same spirit of sophistry, by the same vague arguments of general reason, and the same disregard of ancient ordinances and established opinions, with which the state itself had been attacked by the Jacobins. The wages of state dependence were represented as no less sacred than the property won by industry or derived from a long line of ancestors.

It was, indeed, evident to thinking men, that both parties were playing the same game with different counters. If the Jacobins ran wild with the rights of man, and the abstract sovereignty of the people, their antagonists flew off as extravagantly from the sober good sense of our forefathers, and idolized as mere an abstraction in the rights of sovereigns. Nor was this confined to sovereigns. They defended the exemptions and privileges of all
privileged orders, on the presumption of their inalienable right to them, however inexpedient they might have been found, as universally and abstractly as if these privileges had been decreed by the Supreme Wisdom, instead of being the offspring of chance or violence, or the inventions of human prudence. Thus, while they deemed themselves defending, they were in reality blackening and degrading the uninjurious and useful privileges of our English nobility, which rest on nobler and securer grounds. Thus too, the necessity of compensations for dethroned princes was affirmed as familiarly, as if kingdoms had been private estates: and no more disapprobation was expressed at the transfer of five or ten millions of men from one proprietor to another, than of as many score head of cattle. This most degrading and superannuated superstition, or rather this ghost of a defunct absurdity, raised up by the necromancy of a violent re-action,—such as the extreme of one system is sure to occasion in the adherents of its opposite,—was more than once allowed to regulate our measures in the conduct of a war, on which the integrity of the British empire and the progressive civilization of all mankind depended. I could mention possessions of paramount and indispensable importance to first-rate national interests, the nominal sovereign of which had delivered up all his sea-ports and strongholds to the French, and maintained a French army in his dominions, and had therefore, by the law of nations, made his territories French dependencies—which possessions were not to be touched, though the natural inhabitants were eager to place themselves under our permanent protection—and why?—They were the property of the king of Naples! All the grandeur and majesty of the law of nations, which taught our ancestors to distinguish between a European sovereign and the miserable despots of oriental barbarism, and to consider the former as the representative of the nation which he governed, and as inextricably connected with its fortunes as sovereign, were merged in the basest personality. Instead of the interests of mighty nations, it seemed as if a mere law-suit were carrying on between John Doe and Richard Roe! The happiness of millions was light in the balance, weighed against a theatrical compassion for one individual and his family, who,—I speak from facts that I myself know,—if they feared the French more, hated us worse. Though the restoration of good sense commenced during the interval of the
peace of Amiens, yet it was not till the Spanish insurrection that Englishmen of all parties recurred, in toto, to the old English principles, and spoke of their Hampdens, Sidneys, and Miltons with the old enthusiasm. During the last war, an acquaintance of mine—least of all men a political zealot—had named a vessel which he had just built—The Liberty; and was seriously admonished by his aristocratic friends to change it for some other name. What? replied the owner very innocently—should I call it The Freedom? That (it was replied) would be far better, as people might then think only of freedom of trade; whereas Liberty had a jacobinical sound with it! Alas! (and this is an observation of Denham and of Burke) is there then no medium between an ague-fit and a frenzy-fever?

I have said that to withstand the arguments of the lawless, the anti-Jacobins proposed to suspend the law, and by the interposition of a particular statute to eclipse the blessed light of the universal sun, that spies and informers might tyrannize and escape in the ominous darkness. Oh! if these mistaken men, intoxicated with alarm and bewildered by that panic of property, which they themselves were the chief agents in exciting, had ever lived in a country where there was indeed a general disposition to change and rebellion! Had they ever travelled through Sicily, or through France at the first coming on of the revolution, or even, alas! through too many of the provinces of a sister-land, they could not but have shrunk from their own declarations concerning the state of feeling and opinion at that time predominant throughout Great Britain. There was a time—Heaven grant that that time may have passed by!—when by crossing a narrow strait they might have learned the true symptoms of approaching danger, and have secured themselves from mistaking the meetings and idle rant of such sedition as shrank appalled from the sight of a constable, for the dire murmuring and strange consternation which precedes the storm or earthquake of national discord. Not only in coffee-houses and public theatres, but even at the tables of the wealthy, they would have heard the advocates of existing government defend their cause in the language and with the tone of men, who are conscious that they are in a minority. But in England, when the alarm was at the highest, there was not a city, no, not a town, in which a man suspected of holding democratic principles could move abroad without re-
ceiving some unpleasant proof of the hatred in which his supposed opinions were held by the great majority of the people: and the only instances of popular excess and indignation, were on the side of the government and the established church. But why need I appeal to these invidious facts? Turn over the pages of history, and seek for a single instance of a revolution having been effected without the concurrence of either the nobles, or the ecclesiastics, or the moneyed classes, in any country in which the influences of property had ever been predominant, and where the interests of the proprietors were interlinked! Examine the revolution of the Belgic provinces under Philip II.; the civil wars of France in the preceding generation, the history of the American revolution, or the yet more recent events in Sweden and in Spain; and it will be scarcely possible not to perceive, that in England, from 1791 to the peace of Amiens, there were neither tendencies to confederacy nor actual confederacies, against which the existing laws had not provided both sufficient safeguards and an ample punishment. But alas! the panic of property had been struck in the first instance for party purposes; and when it became general, its propagators caught it themselves, and ended in believing their own lie;—even as the bulls in Borodale are said sometimes to run mad with the echo of their own bellowing. The consequences were most injurious. Our attention was concentrated on a monster which could not survive the convulsions in which it had been brought forth,—even the enlightened Burke himself too often talking and reasoning as if a perpetual and organized anarchy had been a possible thing! Thus while we were warring against French doctrines, we took little heed whether the means by which we attempted to overthrow them were not likely to aid and augment the far more formidable evil of French ambition. Like children, we ran away from the yelping of a cur, and took shelter at the heels of a vicious war-horse.

The conduct of the aristocratic party was equally unwise in private life and to individuals, especially to the young and inexperienced, who were surely to be forgiven for having had their imagination dazzled, and their enthusiasm kindled, by a novelty so specious, that even an old and tried statesman, Mr. Fox, had pronounced it a stupendous monument of human wisdom and human happiness. This was indeed a gross delusion, but assuredly for young men at least, a very venial one. To hope too boldly
of human nature is a fault which all good men have an interest in forgiving. Nor was it less removable than venial, if the party had taken the only way by which the error could be, or even ought to have been removed. Having first sympathized with the warm benevolence and the enthusiasm for liberty, which had consecrated it, they should have then shown the young enthusiasts that liberty was not the only blessing of society; that, though desirable, even for its own sake, it yet derived its main value as the means of calling forth and securing other advantages and excellences, the activities of industry, the security of life and property, the peaceful energies of genius and manifold talent, the development of the moral virtues, and the independence and dignity of the nation in its relations to foreign powers: and that neither these nor liberty itself could subsist in a country so various in its soils, so long inhabited, and so fully peopled as Great Britain, without difference of ranks and without laws which recognized and protected the privileges of each. But instead of thus winning them back from the snare, they too often drove them into it by angry contumelies, which being in contradiction with each other could only excite contempt for those that uttered them. To prove the folly of the opinions, they were represented as the crude fancies of unfledged wit and school-boy statesmen; but when abhorrence was to be expressed, the selfsame unfledged school-boys were invested with all the attributes of brooding conspiracy and hoary-headed treason. Nay, a sentence of absolute reprobation was passed on them; and the speculative error of Jacobinism was equalized to the mysterious sin in Scripture, which in some inexplicable manner excludes not only mercy but even repentance. It became the watch-word of the party, once a Jacobin always a Jacobin. And wherefore?* I will suppose this question asked by an individual, who in his youth or earliest manhood had been enamored of a system, which for him had combined at once the austere beauty of science with all the light and colors of imagination, and with all the warmth of wide religious charity, and who, overlooking its ideal essence, had dreamed of actually building a government on personal and natural rights.

* The passage which follows was first published in the Morning Post, in the year 1800, and contained, if I mistake not, the first philosophical appropriation of a precise import to the word Jacobin, as distinct from republican, democrat, and demagogue. [The article appeared Oct. 21, 1802. S. C.]
alone.—And wherefore? Is Jacobinism an absurdity, and have we no understanding by which to detect it? Is it productive of all misery and all horrors, and have we no natural humanity to make us turn away with indignation and loathing from it? Uproar and confusion, insecurity of person and of property, the tyranny of mobs or the domination of a soldiery; private houses changed to brothels, the ceremony of marriage but an initiation to harlotry, and marriage itself degraded to mere concubinage—these, the wiser advocates of aristocracy have said, and truly said, are the effects of Jacobinism! In private life, an insufferable licentiousness, and abroad an intolerable despotism. Once a Jacobin, always a Jacobin—O wherefore? Is it because the creed which we have stated is dazzling at first sight to the young, the innocent, the disinterested, and to those, who judging of men in general from their own uncorrupted hearts, judge erroneously, and expect unwisely? Is it, because it deceives the mind in its purest and most flexible period? Is it, because it is an error, that every day's experience aids to detect? An error against which all history is full of warning examples? Or is it because the experiment has been tried before our eyes and the error made palpable?

From what source are we to derive this strange phenomenon, that the young and the enthusiastic, who, as our daily experience informs us, are deceived in their religious antipathies, and grow wiser; in their friendships, and grow wiser; in their modes of pleasure, and grow wiser; should, if once deceived in a question of abstract politics, cling to the error forever and ever? And this too, although in addition to the natural growth of judgment and information with increase of years, they live in the age in which the tenets have been acted upon; and though the consequences have been such, that every good man's heart sickens, and his head turns giddy at the retrospect.
ESSAY VI.

Truth I pursued, as fancy sketched the way,
And wiser men than I went worse astray.

I was never myself, at any period of my life, a convert to the Jacobinical system.* From my earliest manhood, it was an axiom in politics with me, that in every country where property prevailed, property must be the grand basis of the government; and that government was the best, in which the power or political influence of the individual was in proportion to his property, provided that the free circulation of property was not impeded by any positive laws or customs, nor the tendency of wealth to accumulate in abiding masses unduly encouraged. I perceived, that if the people at large were neither ignorant nor immoral, there could be no motive for a sudden and violent change of government; and if they were, there could be no hope but of a change for the worse. The temple of despotism, like that of the Mexican God, would be rebuilt with human skulls, and more firmly, though in a different style of architecture.† Thanks to the excellent education which I had received, my reason was too clear not to draw this circle of power round me, and my spirit too honest to attempt to break through it. My feelings, however, and imagination did not remain unkindled in this general conflagration; and I confess I should be more inclined to be ashamed than proud of myself, if they had. I was a sharer in the general vortex, though my little world described the path of its revolution in an orbit of its own. What I dared not expect from constitutions of government and whole nations, I hoped from religion and a small company of chosen individuals. I formed a plan, as harmless as it was extravagant, of trying the experiment of human

* See Essay XVI. of this volume.—Ed.
† To the best of my recollection, these were Mr. Southey's words in the year 1794.
perfectibility on the banks of the Susquehanna; where our little society, in its second generation, was to have combined the innocence of the patriarchal age with the knowledge and genuine refinements of European culture; and where I dreamed that in the sober evening of my life, I should behold the cottages of independence in the undivided dale of industry,—

And oft, soothed sadly by some dirgeful wind,
Muse on the sore ills I had left behind!

Strange fancies, and as vain as strange! yet to the intense interest and impassioned zeal, which called forth and strained every faculty of my intellect for the organization and defence of this scheme, I owe much of whatever I at present possess, my clearest insight into the nature of individual man, and my most comprehensive views of his social relations, of the true uses of trade and commerce, and how far the wealth and relative power of nations promote or impede their welfare and inherent strength. Nor were they less serviceable in securing myself, and perhaps some others, from the pitfalls of sedition: and when we at length alighted on the firm ground of common sense from the gradually exhausted balloon of youthful enthusiasm, though the air-built castles, which we had been pursuing, had vanished with all their pageantry of shifting forms, and glowing colors, we were yet free from the stains and impurities which might have remained upon us, had we been travelling with the crowd of less imaginative malcontents, through the dark lanes and foul by-roads of ordinary fanaticism.

But oh! there were thousands as young and as innocent as myself who, not like me, sheltered in the tranquil nook or inland cove of a particular fancy, were driven along with the general current! Many there were, young men of loftiest minds, yea, the prime stuff out of which manly wisdom and practical greatness are to be formed, who had appropriated their hopes and the ardor of their souls to mankind at large, to the wide expanse of national interests, which then seemed fermenting in the French republic as in the main outlet and chief crater of the revolutionary torrents; and who confidently believed, that these torrents, like the lavas of Vesuvius, were to subside into a soil of inexhaustible fertility on the circumjacent lands, the old divisions and mouldering edifices of which they had covered or swept away—enthusiasts
of kindliest temperament, who to use the words of the poet, having already borrowed the meaning and the metaphor, had approached

the shield

Of human nature from the golden side,
And would have fought even to the death to attest
The quality of the metal which they saw.

My honored friend Mr. Wordsworth has permitted me to give a value and relief to the present essay, by a quotation from one of his unpublished poems, the length of which I regret only from its forbidding me to trespass on his kindness by making it yet longer. I trust there are many of my readers of the same age with myself, who will throw themselves back into the state of thought and feeling in which they were when France was reported to have solemnized her first sacrifice of error and prejudice on the bloodless altar of freedom, by an oath of peace and good-will to all mankind.

Oh! pleasant exercise of hope and joy!
For mighty were the auxiliars, which then stood
Upon our side, we who were strong in love.
Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be young was very heaven;—Oh! times,
In which the meagre stale forbidding ways
Of custom, law, and statute, took at once
The attraction of a country in romance;
When reason seem'd the most to assert her rights,
When most intent on making of herself
A prime enchanter to assist the work,
Which then was going forward in her name.
Not favor'd spots alone, but the whole earth
The beauty wore of promise—that which sets
(To take an image which was felt no doubt
Among the bowers of paradise itself)
The budding rose above the rose, full blown.
What temper at the prospect did not wake
To happiness unthought of? The inert
Were roused, and lively natures rapt away.
They who had fed their childhood upon dreams,
The play-fellows of fancy, who had made
All powers of swiftness, subtlety, and strength
Their ministers, used to stir in lordly wise
Among the grandest objects of the sense,
And deal with whatsoever they found there
As if they had within some lurking right
To wield it;—they too, who of gentle mood
Had watch'd all gentle motions, and to these
Had fitted their own thoughts, schemers more mild
And in the region of their peaceful selves;
Now was it that both found, the meek and lofty
Did both find helpers to their heart's desire
And stuff at hand, plastic as they could wish—
Were call'd upon to exercise their skill
Not in Utopia, subterraneous fields,
Or some secreted island, Heaven knows where,
But in the very world, which is the world
Of all of us, the place where in the end
We find our happiness, or not at all.

The peace of Amiens deserved the name of peace, for it gave us unanimity at home, and reconciled Englishmen with each other. Yet it would be as wild a fancy as any of which I have treated, to expect that the violence of party spirit is never more to return. Sooner or later the same causes, or their equivalents, will call forth the same opposition of opinion, and bring the same passions into play. Ample would be my recompense, could I foresee that this present essay would be the means of preventing discord and unhappiness in a single family; if its words of warning, aided by its tones of sympathy, should arm a single man of genius against the fascinations of his own ideal world, a single philanthropist against the enthusiasm of his own heart. Not less would be my satisfaction, dared I flatter myself that my lucubrations would not be altogether without effect on those who deem themselves men of judgment, faithful to the light of practice, and not to be led astray by the wandering fires of theory;—if I should aid in making these aware, that in recoiling with too incautious an abhorrence from the bugbears of innovation, they may sink all at once into the slough of slavishness and corruption. Let such persons recollect that the charms of hope and novelty furnish some palliation for the idolatry to which they seduce the mind; but that the apotheosis of familiar abuses and of the errors of selfishness is the vilest of superstitions. Let them recollect, too, that nothing can be more incongruous than to combine the pusillanimity, which despairs of human improvement, with the arrogance, supercilious contempt, and boisterous anger, which have no pretensions to pardon, except as the overflowing of ardent anticipation and enthusiastic faith. And finally,
and above all, let it be remembered by both parties, and indeed by controversialists on all subjects, that every speculative error which boasts a multitude of advocates, has its golden as well as its dark side; that there is always some truth connected with it, the exclusive attention to which has misled the understanding, some moral beauty which has given it charms for the heart. Let it be remembered that no assailant of an error can reasonably hope to be listened to by its advocates, who has not proved to them that he has seen the disputed subject in the same point of view, and is capable of contemplating it with the same feelings as themselves; for why should we abandon a cause at the persuasions of one who is ignorant of the reasons which have attached us to it? Let it be remembered, that to write, however ably, merely to convince those who are already convinced, displays but the courage of a boaster; and in any subject to rail against the evil before we have inquired for the good, and to exasperate the passions of those who think with us, by caricaturing the opinions and blackening the motives of our antagonists, is to make the understanding the pander of the passions; and even though we should have defended the right cause, to gain for ourselves ultimately from the good and wise no other praise than the supreme Judge awarded to the friends of Job for their partial and uncharitable defence of his justice: *My wrath is kindled against you, for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right.*

*Job xlii. 7.—Ed.*
ESSAY VII.

ON THE VULGAR ERRORS RESPECTING TAXES AND TAXATION.

"Οπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰς ἐγχέλεως θρώμενοι πέπονθας
Οταν μὲν ἡ λίμνη καταζῇ, λαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲν
Εάν δὲ ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω τὸν βορβοραν κυκώσιν,
Αἰροῦσι καὶ σῦ λαμβάνεις, ἢν τὴν πόλιν ταράττῃς."

It is with you as with those that are hunting for eels. While the pond is clear and settled, they take nothing; but if they stir up the mud high and low, then they bring up the fish:—and you succeed only as far as you can set the state in tumult and confusion.

In a passage in the last essay, I referred to the second part of the "Rights of Man," in which Paine assures his readers that their poverty is the consequence of taxation: that taxes are rendered necessary only by wars and state corruption; that war and corruption are entirely owing to monarchy and aristocracy; that by a revolution and a brotherly alliance with the French republic, our land and sea forces, our revenue officers, and three fourths of our pensioners, placemen, and other functionaries, would be rendered superfluous; and that a small part of the expenses thus saved, would suffice for the maintenance of the poor, the infirm, and the aged, throughout the kingdom. Would to God that this infamous mode of misleading and flattering the lower classes were confined to the writings of Thomas Paine! But how often do we hear, even from the mouths of our parliamentary advocates for popularity, the taxes stated as so much money actually lost to the people; and a nation in debt represented as the same both in kind and consequences, as an individual tradesman on the brink of bankruptcy! It is scarcely possible, that these men should be themselves deceived; that they should be so ignorant of history as not to know that the freest nations, being at the same time

* Aristoph. Equites, v. 864, &c.—Ed.
commercial, have been at all times the most heavily taxed: or so void of common sense as not to see that there is no analogy in the case of a tradesman and his creditors, to a nation indebted to itself. Surely, a much fairer instance would be that of a husband and wife playing cards at the same table against each other, where what the one loses the other gains. Taxes may be indeed, and often are, injurious to a country: at no time, however, from their amount merely, but from the time or injudicious mode in which they are raised. A great statesman, lately deceased, in one of his anti-ministerial harangues against some proposed impost, said,—‘the nation has been already bled in every vein, and is faint with loss of blood.’ This blood, however, was circulating in the mean time through the whole body of the state, and what was received into one chamber of the heart was instantly sent out again at the other portal. Had he wanted a metaphor to convey the possible injuries of taxation, he might have found one less opposite to the fact, in the known disease of aneurism, or relaxation of the coats of particular vessels, by a disproportionate accumulation of blood in them, which sometimes occurs when the circulation has been suddenly and violently changed, and causes helplessness, or even mortal stagnation, though the total quantity of blood remains the same in the system at large.

But a fuller and fairer symbol of taxation, both in its possible good and evil effects, is to be found in the evaporation of waters from the surface of the planet. The sun may draw up the moisture from the river, the morass, and the ocean, to be given back in genial showers to the garden, the pasture, and the corn-field; but it may likewise force away the moisture from the fields of tillage, to drop it on the stagnant pool, the saturated swamp, or the unprofitable sand-waste. The gardens in the south of Europe supply, perhaps, a not less apt illustration of a system of finance judiciously conducted, where the tanks or reservoirs would represent the capital of a nation, and the hundred rills hourly varying their channels and directions under the gardener’s spade, give a pleasing image of the dispersion of that capital through the whole population, by the joint effect of taxation and trade. For taxation itself is a part of commerce, and the government may be fairly considered as a great manufacturing house, carrying on in different places, by means of its partners and over-
seers, the trades of the ship-builder, the clothier, the iron-founder, and the like.

There are so many real evils, so many just causes of complaint in the constitution and administration of governments, our own not excepted, that it becomes the imperious duty of every well-wisher of his country, to prevent, as much as in him lies, the feelings and efforts of his compatriots from losing themselves on a wrong scent. Whether a system of taxation is injurious or beneficial on the whole, is to be known, not by the amount of the sum taken from each individual, but by that which remains behind. A war will doubtless cause a stagnation of certain branches of trade, and severe temporary distress in the places where those branches are carried on; but are not the same effects produced in time of peace by prohibitory edicts and commercial regulations of foreign powers, or by new rivals with superior advantages in other countries, or in different parts of the same? Bristol has, doubtless, been injured by the rapid prosperity of Liverpool and its superior spirit of enterprise; and the vast machines of Lancashire have overwhelmed and rendered hopeless the domestic industry of females in the cottages and small farm-houses of Westmoreland and Cumberland. But if peace has its stagnation as well as war, does not war create or re-enliven numerous branches of industry as well as peace? Is it not a fact, that not only our own military and naval forces, but even a part of those of our enemy are armed and clothed by British manufacturers? It can not be doubted, that the whole of our immense military force is better and more expensively clothed, and both these and our sailors better fed than the same persons would be in their individual capacities: and this forms one of the real expenses of war. Not, I say, that so much more money is raised, but that so much more of the means of comfortable existence are consumed, than would otherwise have been. But does not this, like all other luxury, act as a stimulus on the producing classes, and this in the most useful manner, and on the most important branches of production, on the tiller, on the grazier, the clothier and the maker of arms? Had it been otherwise, is it possible that the receipts from the property tax should have increased, instead of decreased, notwithstanding all the rage of our enemy?

Surely, never from the beginning of the world was such a trib-
ute of admiration paid by one power to another, as Buonaparte within the last few years has paid to the British empire. With all the natural and artificial powers of almost the whole of continental Europe, with all the fences and obstacles of all public and private morality broken down before him, with a mighty empire of fifty millions of men, nearly two thirds of whom speak the same language, and are as it were fused together by the intensest nationality; with this mighty and swarming empire, organized in all its parts of war, and forming one huge camp, and himself combining in his own person the two-fold power of monarch and commander-in-chief;—with all these advantages, with all these stupendous instruments and inexhaustible resources of offence, this mighty being finds himself imprisoned by the enemy whom he most hates, and would fain despise, insulted by every wave that breaks upon his shores, and condemned to behold his vast flotillas as worthless and idle as the sea-weed that rots around their keels! After years of haughty menace and expensive preparations for the invasion of an island, the trees and buildings of which are visible from the roofs of his naval store-houses, he is at length compelled to make open confession, that he possesses one mean only of ruining Great Britain. And what is it? The ruin of his own enslaved subjects. To undermine the resources of one enemy, he reduces the continent of Europe to the wretched state in which it was before the wide diffusions of trade and commerce, deprives its inhabitants of comforts and advantages to which they and their fathers had been for more than a century habituated, and thus destroys, as far as his power extends, a principal source of civilization, the origin of a middle class throughout Christendom; and with it the true balance of society, the parent of international law, the foster-nurse of general humanity, and, to sum up all in one, the main principle of attraction and repulsion, by which the nations were rapidly, though insensibly, drawn together into one system, and by which alone they could combine the manifold blessings of distinct character and national independence, with the needful stimulation and general influences of intercommunity, and be virtually united, without being crushed together by conquest, in order to waste away under the tabes and slow putrefaction of a universal monarchy. This boasted pacificator of the world, this earthly
Providence,* as his Roman Catholic bishops blasphemously call him, professes to entertain no hope of purchasing the destruction of Great Britain at a less price than that of the barbarism of all Europe. By the ordinary war of government against government, fleets against fleets, and armies against armies, he could effect nothing. His fleets might as well have been built at his own expense in our dockyards, as tribute offerings to the masters of the ocean: whilst his army of England lay encamped on his coasts like wolves baying the moon!

Delightful to humane and contemplative minds was the idea of countless individual efforts working together by a common instinct and to a common object, under the protection of an unwritten code of religion, philosophy, and common interest, which made peace and brotherhood co-exist with the most active hostility. Not in the untamed plains of Tartary, but in the very bosom of civilization, and himself indebted to its fostering care for his own education and for all the means of his elevation and power, did this genuine offspring of the old serpent warm himself into the fiend-like resolve of waging war against mankind and the quiet growth of the world's improvement—in an emphatic sense the enemy of the human race. By these means only he deems Great Britain assailable,—a strong presumption, that our prosperity is built on the common interest of mankind;—this he acknowledges to be his only hope—and in this hope he has been utterly baffled.

To what then do we owe our strength and our immunity? To the sovereignty of law,—the incorruptness of its administration,—our national church,—our religious sects,—the purity, or at least the decorum, of private morals, and the independence, activity, and weight, of public opinion?—These and similar advantages are doubtless the materials of the fortress, but what has been the cement? What has bound them together? What has rendered Great Britain, from the Orkneys to the rocks of Scilly, indeed and with more than metaphorical propriety, a body politic,—our

* It has been well remarked, that there is something far more shocking in Buonaparte's pretensions to the gracious attributes of the Supreme Ruler, than in his most remorseless cruelties. There is a sort of wild grandeur, not ungratifying to the imagination, in the answer of Timur Khan to one who remonstrated with him on the inhumanity of his devastations: cur me hominem putas, et non potius irem Dei in terris agentem ob pernicem humani generis? Why do you deem me a man, and not rather the incarnate wrath of God acting on the earth for the ruin of mankind?
ESSAY VII.

roads, rivers, and canals being so truly the veins, arteries, and nerves, of the state, that every pulse in the metropolis produces a correspondent pulsation in the remotest village on its extreme shores? What made the stoppage of the national bank the conversation of a day without causing one irregular throb, or the stagnation of the commercial current, in the minutest vessel? I answer without hesitation, that the cause and mother principle of this unexampled confidence, of this system of credit, which is as much stronger than mere positive possessions, as the soul of man is than his body, or as the force of a mighty mass in free motion, than the pressure of its separate component parts in a state of rest—the main cause of this, I say, has been our national debt. What its injurious effects on the literature, the morals, and religious principles of this country, have been, I shall hereafter develop with the same boldness. But as to our political strength and circumstantial prosperity, it is the national debt which has wedded in indissoluble union all the interests of the state, the landed with the commercial, and the man of independent fortune with the stirring tradesman and reposing annuitant. It is the national debt, which, by the rapid nominal rise in the value of things, has made it impossible for any considerable number of men to retain their own former comforts without joining in the common industry, and adding to the stock of national produce; which thus first necessitates a general activity and then by the immediate and ample credit, which is never wanting to him, who has any object on which his activity can employ itself, gives each man the means not only of preserving but of increasing and multiplying all his former enjoyments, and all the symbols of the rank in which he was born. It is this which has planted the naked hills and inclosed the bleak wastes in the low-lands of Scotland not less than in the wealthier districts of South Britain: it is this, which, leaving all the other causes of patriotism and national fervor undiminished and uninjured, has added to our public duties the same feeling of necessity, the same sense of immediate self-interest, which in other countries actuates the members of a single family in their conduct toward each other.

Somewhat more than a year ago, I happened to be on a visit with a friend, in a small market-town* in the south-west of England, when one of the company turned the conversation to the

*a Nether Stowey.—Ed.
weight of taxes and the consequent hardness of the times. I answered, that if the taxes were a real weight, and that in proportion to their amount, we must have been ruined long ago: for Mr. Hume, who had proceeded, as on a self-evident axiom, on the hypothesis, that the debt of a nation was the same as the debt of an individual, had declared our ruin arithmetically demonstrable, if the national debt increased beyond a certain sum. Since his time it has more than quintupled that sum, and yet—True, answered my friend, but the principle might be right, though he might have been mistaken in the time. But still, I rejoined, if the principle were right, the nearer we came to that given point, and the greater and the more active the pernicious cause became, the more manifest would its effects be. We might not be absolutely ruined, but our embarrassments would increase in some proportion to their cause. Whereas instead of being poorer and poorer, we are richer and richer. Will any man in his senses contend, that the actual labor and produce of the country has not only been decupled within half a century, but increased so prodigiously beyond that decuple as to make six hundred millions a less weight to us than fifty millions were in the days of our grandfathers? But if it really be so, to what can we attribute this stupendous progression of national improvement, but to that system of credit and paper currency, of which the national debt is both the reservoir and the water-works? A constant cause should have constant effects; but if you deem that this is some anomaly, some strange exception to the general rule, explain its mode of operation, make it comprehensible, how a cause acting on a whole nation can produce a regular and rapid increase of prosperity to a certain point, and then all at once pass from an angel of light into a demon of destruction! That an individual house may live more and more luxuriously upon borrowed funds, and that when the suspicions of the creditors are awakened, and their patience exhausted, the luxurious spendthrift may all at once exchange his palace for a prison—this I can understand perfectly: for I understand, whence the luxuries could be produced for the consumption of the individual house, and who the creditors might be, and that it might be both their inclination and their interest to demand the debt, and to punish the insolvent debtor. But who are a nation's creditors? The answer is, every man to every man. Whose possible interest
ESSAY VII.

could it be either to demand the principal, or to refuse his share toward the means of paying the interest? Not the merchant's:—for he would but provoke a crash of bankruptcy, in which his own house would as necessarily be included, as a single card in a house of cards. Not the landholder's;—for in the general destruction of all credit, how could he obtain payment for the produce of his estates? Not to mention the improbability that he would remain the undisturbed possessor in so direful a concussion—not to mention that on him must fall the whole weight of the public necessities—not to mention, that from the merchant's credit depends the ever-increasing value of his land and the readiest means of improving it. Neither could it be the laborer's interest;—for he must be either thrown out of employ, and lie like the fish in the bed of a river from which the water has been diverted, or have the value of his labor reduced to nothing by the irruption of eager competitors. But least of all could it be the wish of the lovers of liberty which must needs perish or be suspended, either by the horrors of anarchy, or by the absolute power, with which the government must be invested, in order to prevent them. In short, with the exception of men desperate from guilt or debt, or mad with the blackest ambition, there is no class or description of men who can have the least interest in producing or permitting a bankruptcy.

If then, neither experience has acquainted us with any national impoverishment or embarrassment from the increase of national debt, nor theory renders such efforts comprehensible;—for the predictions of Hume went on the false assumption, that a part only of the nation was interested in the preservation of the public credit;—on what authority are we to ground our apprehensions? Does history record a single nation, in which relatively to taxation there were no privileged or exempted classes, in which there were no compulsory prices of labor, and in which the interests of all the different classes and all the different districts, were mutually dependent and vitally co-organized, as in Great Britain,—has history, I say, recorded a single instance of such a nation being ruined or dissolved by the weight of taxation? In France there was no public credit, no communion of interests; its unprincipled government and the productive and taxable classes, were as two individuals with separate interests. Its bankruptcy and the consequences of it are sufficiently com-
prehensible. Yet the cahiers, or the instructions and complaints sent to the National Assembly, from the towns and provinces of France, an immense mass of documents indeed, but without examination and patient perusal of which, no man is entitled to write a history of the French revolution,—these proved, beyond contradiction, that the amount of the taxes was one only, and that a subordinate cause, of the revolutionary movement. Indeed, if the amount of the taxes could be disjoined from the mode of raising them, it might be fairly denied to have been a cause at all. Holland was taxed as heavily and as equally as ourselves; but was it by taxation that Holland was reduced to its present miseries?

The mode in which taxes are supposed to act on the marketableness of our manufactures in foreign marts, I shall examine on some future occasion, when I shall endeavor to explain in a more satisfactory way than has been hitherto done, to my apprehension at least, the real mode in which taxes act, and how and why, and to what extent, they affect the wealth, and what is of more consequence, the well-being of a nation. But in the present exigency, when the safety of the nation depends, on the one hand, on the sense which the people at large have of the comparative excellences of the laws and government, and on the firmness and wisdom of the legislators and enlightened classes in detecting, exposing, and removing its many particular abuses and corruptions on the other, right views on this subject of taxation are of such especial importance; and I have besides in my inmost nature such a loathing of factious falsehoods and mob-sycophancy, that is, the flattering of the multitude by informing against their betters;—that I can not but revert to that point of the subject from which I began, namely, that the weight of taxes is to be calculated not by what is paid, but by what is left. What matters it to a man, that he pays six times more taxes than his father did, if, notwithstanding, he with the same portion of exertion enjoys twice the comforts which his father did? Now this I affirm to be the case in general, throughout England, according to all the facts which I have collected during an examination of years, wherever I have travelled, and wherever I have been resident. I do not speak of Ireland, or the Lowlands of Scotland: and if I may trust to what I myself saw and heard there, I must even except the Highlands. In the conversation
which I have spoken of as taking place in the south-west of England, by the assistance of one or other of the company, we went through every family in the town and neighborhood, and my assertion was found completely accurate, though the place had no one advantage over others, and many disadvantages,—that heavy one in particular, the non-residence and frequent change of its rector,—the living being always given to one of the canons of Windsor, and resigned on the acceptance of better preferment. It was even asserted, and not only asserted but proved, by my friend,* who has from his earliest youth devoted a strong original understanding, and a heart warm and benevolent even to enthusiasm, to the service of the poor and the laboring class, that every sober laborer, in that part of England at least, who should not marry till thirty, might, without any hardship or extreme self-denial, commence housekeeping at that age, with from a hundred to a hundred and twenty pounds belonging to him. I have no doubt, that on seeing this essay, my friend will communicate to me the proof in detail. But the price of labor in the south-west of England is full one third less than in the greater number, if not all, of the northern counties. What then is wanting? Not the repeal of taxes, but the increased activity both of the gentry and clergy of the land, in securing the instruction of the lower classes. A system of education is wanting, such a system as that discovered, and to the blessings of thousands realized, by Dr. Bell, which I never am, or can be, weary of praising, while my heart retains any spark of regard for human nature, or of reverence for human virtue;—a system, by which in the very act of receiving knowledge, the best virtues and most useful qualities of the moral character are awakened, developed, and formed into habits. Were there a Bishop of Durham—no matter whether a temporal or a spiritual lord—in every county or half-county, and a clergyman enlightened with the views, and animated with the spirit, of Dr. Bell, in every parish, we might bid defiance to the present weight of taxes, and boldly challenge the whole world to show a peasantry as well fed and clothed as the English, or with equal chances of improving their situation, and of securing an old age of repose and comfort to a life of cheerful industry.

I will add one other anecdote, as it demonstrates incontro-

* Thomas Poole.—Ed.

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tibly the error of the vulgar opinion, that taxes make things really dear, taking in the whole of a man's expenditure. A friend of mine, who has passed some years in America, was questioned by an American tradesman, in one of their cities of the second class, concerning the names and number of our taxes and rates. The answer seemed perfectly to astound him: and he exclaimed, "How is it possible that men can live in such a country? In this land of liberty we never see the face of a tax-gatherer, nor hear of a duty, except in our sea-ports." My friend, who was perfect master of the question, made semblance of turning off the conversation to another subject: and then, without any apparent reference to the former topic, asked the American, for what sum he thought a man could live in such and such a style, with so many servants, in a house of such dimensions and such a situation (still keeping in his mind the situation of a thriving and respectable shopkeeper and householder in different parts of England), first supposing him to reside in Philadelphia or New York, and then in some town of secondary importance. Having received a detailed answer to these questions, he proceeded to convince the American, that notwithstanding all our taxes, a man might live in the same style, but with incomparably greater comforts, on the same income in London as in New York, and on a considerably less income in Exeter or Bristol, than in any American provincial town of the same relative importance. It would be insulting my readers to discuss on how much less a person may vegetate or brutalize in the back settlements of the republic, than he could live as a man, as a rational and social being, in an English village; and it would be wasting time to inform him, that where men are comparatively few, and unoccupied land is in inexhaustible abundance, the laborer and common mechanic must needs receive—not only nominally, but really—higher wages than in a populous and fully occupied country. But that the American laborer is therefore happier, or even in possession of more comforts and conveniences of life than a sober or industrious English laborer or mechanic, remains to be proved. In conducting the comparison, we must not however exclude the operation of moral causes, when these causes are not accidental, but arise out of the nature of the country, and the constitution of the government and society. This being the case, take away from the American's wages all the taxes which his insolence,
sloth, and attachment to spirituous liquors impose on him, and judge of the remainder by his house, his household furniture, and utensils—and if I have not been grievously deceived by those whose veracity and good sense I have found unquestionable in all other respects, the cottage of an honest English husbandman, in the service of an enlightened and liberal farmer, who is paid for his labor at the price usual in Yorkshire or Northumberland, would in the mind of a man in the same rank of life, who had seen a true account of America, make no impressions favorable to emigration. This, however, I confess, is a balance of morals rather than of circumstances: it proves, however, that where foresight and good morals exist, the taxes do not stand in the way of an industrious man's comforts.

Dr. Price almost succeeded in persuading the English nation,—for it is a curious fact, that the fancy of our calamitous situation is a sort of necessary sauce without which our real prosperity would become insipid to us—Dr. Price, I say, alarmed the country with pretended proofs that the island was in a rapid state of depopulation;—that England at the Revolution had been, Heaven knows how much more populous; and that in Queen Elizabeth's time, or about the Reformation, the number of inhabitants in England, might have been greater than even at the Revolution. My old mathematical master, a man of an uncommonly clear head, answered this blundering book of the worthy doctor's, and left not a stone unturned of the pompous cenotaph in which the effigy of the still living and bustling English prosperity lay interred. And yet so much more suitable was the doctor's book to the purposes of faction, and to the November mood of what is called the public, that Mr. Wales's pamphlet, though a master-piece of perspicacity as well as perspicuity, was scarcely heard of. This tendency to political nightmares in our countrymen, reminds me of a superstition, or rather nervous disease, not uncommon in the Highlands of Scotland, in which men, though broad awake, imagine they see themselves lying dead at a small distance from them. The act of Parliament for ascertaining the population of the empire has laid forever this uneasy ghost: and now, forsooth, we are on the brink of ruin from the excess of population, and he who would prevent the poor from rotting away in disease, misery, and wickedness, is an enemy to his country. A lately-deceased miser, of immense wealth, is re-
ported to have been so delighted with this splendid discovery, as to have offered a handsome annuity to the author, in part of payment for this new and welcome piece of heart-armor. This, however, we may deduce from the fact of our increased population, that if clothing and food had actually become dearer in proportion to the means of procuring them, it would be as absurd to ascribe this effect to increased taxation, as to attribute the scantiness of fare, at a public ordinary, to the landlord's bill, when twice the usual number of guests had sat down to the same number of dishes. But the fact is notoriously otherwise, and every man has the means of discovering it in his own house and in that of his neighbors, provided that he makes the proper allowances for the disturbing forces of individual vice and imprudence. If this be the case, I put it to the consciences of our literary demagogues, whether a lie, for the purposes of creating public disunion and dejection, is not as much a lie, as one for the purpose of exciting discord among individuals. I entreat my readers to recollect, that the present question does not concern the effects of taxation on the public independence and on the supposed balance of the three constitutional powers, from which said balance, as well as from the balance of trade, I own, I have never been able to elicit one ray of common sense. That the nature of our constitution has been greatly modified by the funding system, I do not deny;—whether for good or for evil, on the whole, will form part of my essay on the British constitution as it actually exists.

There are many and great public evils, all of which are to be lamented, some of which may, and ought to, be removed, and none of which can consistently with wisdom or honesty be kept concealed from the public. As far as these originate in false principles, or in the contempt or neglect of right ones, and as such belonging to the plan of The Friend, I shall not hesitate to make known my opinions concerning them, with the same fearless simplicity with which I have endeavored to expose the errors of discontent and the artifices of faction. But for the very reason that there are great evils, the more does it behoove us not to open out on a false scent.

I will conclude this essay with the examination of an article in a provincial paper of a recent date, which is now lying before me; the accidental perusal of which occasioned the whole of the preceding remarks. In order to guard against a possible mistake,
I must premise, that I have not the most distant intention of defending the plan or conduct of our late expeditions, and should be grossly calumniated if I were represented as an advocate for carelessness or prodigality in the management of the public purse. The public money may or may not have been culpably wasted. I confine myself entirely to the general falsehood of the principle in the article here cited; for I am convinced, that any hopes of reform originating in such notions, must end in disappointment and public mockery.

"ONLY A FEW MILLIONS!

"We have unfortunately of late been so much accustomed to read of millions being spent in one expedition, and millions being spent in another, that a comparative insignificance is attached to an immense sum of money, by calling it only a few millions. Perhaps some of our readers may have their judgment a little improved by making a few calculations, like those below, on the millions which it has been estimated will be lost to the nation by the late expedition to Holland; and then, perhaps, they will be led to reflect on the many millions which are annually expended in expeditions, which have almost invariably ended in absolute loss.

"In the first place, with less money than it cost the nation to take Walcheren, &c. with the view of taking or destroying the French fleet at Antwerp, consisting of nine sail of the line, we could have completely built and equipped, ready for sea, a fleet of upwards of one hundred sail of the line.

"Or, secondly, a new town could be built in every county of England, and each town consist of upwards of 1000 substantial houses for a less sum.

"Or, thirdly, it would have been enough to give 100l. to 2000 poor families in every county in England and Wales.

"Or, fourthly, it would be more than sufficient to give a handsome marriage portion to 200,000 young women, who probably, if they had even less than 50l. would not long remain unsolicited to enter the happy state.

"Or, fifthly, a much less sum would enable the legislature to establish a life boat in every port in the United Kingdom, and provide for ten or twelve men to be kept in constant attendance on each; and 100,000l. could be funded, the interest of which to be applied in premiums to those who should prove to be particularly active in saving lives from wrecks, &c. and to provide for the widows and children of those men who may accidentally lose their lives in the cause of humanity.

"This interesting appropriation of ten millions sterling, may lead our readers to think of the great good that can be done by only a few millions."

The exposure of this calculation will require but a few sentences. These ten millions were expended, I presume, in arms, artillery, ammunition, clothing, provision, and the like, for about one hundred and twenty thousand British subjects: and I pre-
sume that all these consumables were produced by, and pur-
chased from, other British subjects. Now during the building of
these new towns for a thousand inhabitants each in every county,
or the distribution of the hundred pound bank notes to the two
thousand poor families, were the industrious ship-builders, clothiers,
charcoal-burners, gunpowder-makers, gunsmiths, cutlers, cannon-
founders, tailors, and shoemakers, to be left unemployed and starv-
ing;—or our brave soldiers and sailors to have remained without
food and raiment? And where is the proof, that these ten
millions, which, observe, all remain in the kingdom, do not cir-
culate as beneficially in the one way as they would in the other?
Which is better? To give money to the idle, houses to those
who do not ask for them, and towns to counties which have
already perhaps too many, or to afford opportunity to the indus-
trious to earn their bread, and to the enterprising to better their
circumstances, and perhaps to found new families of independent
proprietors? The only mode, not absolutely absurd, of consider-
ing the subject, would be, not by the calculation of the money ex-
pended, but of the labor of which the money is a symbol. But
then the question would be removed altogether from the expedi-
tion: for assuredly, neither the armies were raised, nor the fleets
built or manned for the sake of conquering the Isle of Walcheren,
nor would a single regiment have been disbanded, nor a single
sloop paid off, though the Isle of Walcheren had never existed.
The whole dispute, therefore, resolves itself into this one ques-
tion: whether our soldiers and sailors would not be better em-
ployed in making canals for instance, or cultivating waste lands,
than in fighting or learning to fight; and the tradesman, in
making gray coats instead of red or blue—and ploughshares
instead of arms. When I reflect on the state of China and the
moral character of the Chinese, I dare not positively affirm that
it would be better. When the fifteen millions, which form our
present population, shall have attained to the same general purity
of morals and shall be capable of being governed by the same
admirable discipline, as the society of the Friends, I doubt not
that we should be all Quakers in this as in the other points of
their moral doctrine. But were this transfer of employment
desirable, is it practicable at present,—is it in our power? These
men know, that it is not. What then does all their reasoning
amount to? Nonsense.
ESSAY VIII.

I have not intentionally either hidden or disguised the truth, like an advocate ashamed of his client, or a bribed accoantant who falsifies the quotient to make the bankrupt's ledgers square with the creditor's inventory. My conscience forbids the use of falsehood and the arts of concealment: and were it otherwise, yet I am persuaded, that a system which has produced and protected so great prosperity, can not stand in need of them. If therefore honesty and the knowledge of the whole truth be the things you aim at, you will find my principles suited to your ends: and as I like not the democratic forms, so am I not fond of any others above the rest. That a succession of wise and godly men may be secured to the nation in the highest power, is that to which I have directed your attention in this essay, which if you will read, perhaps you may see the error of those principles which have led you into errors of practice. I wrote it purposely for the use of the multitude of well-meaning people, that are tempted in these times to usurp authority and meddle with government before they have any call from duty or tolerable understanding of its principles. I never intended it for learned men versed in politics; but for such as will be practitioners before they have been students.

BAXTER'S Holy Commonwealth, or Political Aphorisms.

The metaphysical, or as I have proposed to call them, metaphysical reasoning hitherto discussed, belong to government in the abstract. But there is a second class of reasoners who argue for a change in our government from former usage, and from statutes still in force, or which have been repealed,—so these writers affirm,—either through a corrupt influence, or to ward off temporary hazard or inconvenience. This class, which is rendered illustrious by the names of many intelligent and virtuous patriots, are advocates for reform in the literal sense of the word. They wish to bring back the government of Great Britain to a certain form, which they affirm it to have once possessed; and would melt the bullion anew in order to recast it in the original mould.

The answer to all arguments of this nature is obvious, and to my understanding appears decisive. These reformers assume
the character of legislators or of advisers of the legislature, not that of law judges or of appellants to courts of law. Sundry statutes concerning the rights of electors, we will suppose,—still exist; so likewise do sundry statutes on other subjects,—on witchcraft for instance*—which change of circumstances have rendered obsolete, or increased information shown to be absurd. It is evident, therefore, that the expediency of the regulations prescribed by them, and their suitableness to the existing circumstances of the kingdom, must first be proved; and on this proof must be rested all rational claims for the enforcement of the statutes that have not, no less than for the re-enacting of those that have, been repealed. If the authority of the men who first enacted the laws in question, is to weigh with us, it must be on the presumption that they were wise men. But the wisdom of legislation consists in the adaptation of laws to circumstances. If then it can be proved, that the circumstances, under which those laws were enacted, no longer exist; and that other circumstances altogether different, and in some instances opposite, have taken their place; we have the best grounds for supposing, that if the men were now alive, they would not pass the same statutes. In other words, the spirit of the statute interpreted by the intention of the legislator would annul the letter of it. It is not indeed impossible, that by a rare felicity of accident the same law may apply to two sets of circumstances. But surely the presumption is, that regulations well adapted for the manners, the social distinctions, and the state of property, of opinion, and of external relations of England in the reign of Alfred, or even in that of Edward I., will not be well suited to Great Britain at the close of the reign of George III. For instance: at the time when the greater part of the cottagers and inferior farmers were in a state of villenage, when Sussex alone contained seven thousand, and the Isle of Wight twelve hundred, families of bondsmen, it was the law of the land that every freeman should vote in the assembly of the nation personally or by his representative. An act of Parliament in the year 1660 confirmed what a concurrence of causes had previously effected:—every Englishman is now born free, the laws of the land are the birthright of every native, and with the exception of a few

* Repealed now; but many other equally obsolete acts remain on the statute book, as illustrations of the principle in the text.—Ed.
honorary privileges all classes obey the same laws.* Now, argues one of our political writers, it being made the constitution of the land by our Saxon ancestors, that every freeman should have a vote, and all Englishmen being now born free, therefore, by the constitution of the land, every Englishman has now a right to a vote. How shall we reply to this without breach of that respect, to which the reasoner at least, if not the reasoning, is entitled? If it be the definition of a pun, that it is the confusion of two different meanings under the same or some similar sound, we might almost characterize this argument as being grounded on a grave pun. Our ancestors established the right of voting in a particular class of men, forming at that time the middle rank of society, and known to be all of them, or almost all, legal proprietors—and these were then called the freemen of England: therefore they established it in the lowest classes of society, in those who possess no property, because these two are now called by the same name! Under a similar pretext, grounded on the same precious logic, a Mameluke Bey extorted a large contribution from the Egyptian Jews: "These books, the Pentateuch, are authentic?" "Yes!" "Well, the debt then is acknowledged:—and now the receipt, or the money, or your heads! The Jews borrowed a large treasure from the Egyptians; but you are the Jews, and on you, therefore, I call for the re-payment." Besides, if a law is to be interpreted by the known intention of its makers, the Parliament in 1660, which declared all natives of England freemen, but neither altered nor meant thereby to alter the limitations of the right of election, did to all intents and purposes except that right from the common privileges of Englishmen, as Englishmen.

A moment's reflection may convince us, that every single statute is made under the knowledge of all the other laws, with which it is meant to co-exist, and by which its action is to be

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* The reference is to the abolition of the military tenures at the Restoration. "For at length the military tenures, with all their heavy appendages (having during the usurpation been discontinued) were destroyed at one blow by the statute 12 Car. II. c. 24, which enacts that * * * all sorts of tenures, held by the king or others, be turned into free and common socage; save only tenures in frank-almoign, &c. A statute, which was a greater acquisition to the civil property of this kingdom than even magna charta itself." Blackst. Comm. II. c. 5.—Ed.
modified and determined. In the legislative as in the religious code the text must not be taken without the context. Now, I think, we may safely leave it to the reformers themselves to make choice between the civil and political privileges of Englishmen at present, considered as one sum total, and those of our ancestors in any former period of our history, considered as another, on the old principle, 'take one and leave the other; but whichever you take, take it all or none.' Laws seldom become obsolete as long as they are both useful and practicable; but should there be an exception in any given law, there is no other way of reviving its validity but by convincing the existing legislature of its undiminished practicability and expedition; which in all essential points is the same as the recommending of a new law. And this leads me to the third class of the advocates of reform, those, namely, who leaving ancient statutes to lawyers and historians, and universal principles with the demonstrable deductions from them to the schools of logic, mathematics, theology, and ethics, rest all their measures, which they wish to see adopted, wholly on their expediency. Consequently, they must hold themselves prepared to give such proof, as the nature of comparative expediency admits, and to bring forward such evidence, as experience and the logic of probability can supply, that the plans which they recommend for adoption, are;—first, practicable; secondly, suited to the existing circumstances; and lastly, necessary or at least requisite, and such as will enable the government to accomplish more perfectly the ends for which it was instituted. These are the three indispensable conditions of all prudent change, the credentials, with which wisdom never fails to furnish her public envoys. Whoever brings forward a measure that combines this threefold excellence, whether in the cabinet, the senate, or by means of the press, merits emphatically the title of a patriotic statesman. Neither are they without a fair claim to respectful attention as state-counsellors, who fully aware of these conditions, and with a due sense of the difficulty of fulfilling them, employ their time and talents in making the attempt. An imperfect plan is not necessarily a useless plan: and in a complex enigma the greatest ingenuity is not always shown by him who first gives the complete solution. The dwarf sees farther than the giant, when he has the giant's shoulders to mount on.

Thus, as perspicuously as I could, I have exposed the erro-
neous principles of political philosophy, and pointed out the one only ground on which the constitution of governments can be either condemned or justified by wise men.

If I interpret aright the signs of the times, that branch of politics which relates to the necessity and practicability of infusing new life into our legislature, as the best means of securing talent and wisdom in the cabinet, will shortly occupy the public attention with a paramount interest. I would gladly, therefore, suggest the proper state of feeling, and the right preparatory notions with which this disquisition should be entered upon: and I do not know how I can effect this more naturally, than by relating the facts and circumstances which influenced my own mind. I can scarcely be accused of egotism, as in the communications and conversations which I am about to mention as having occurred to me during my residence abroad, I am no otherwise the hero of the tale, than as being the passive receiver or auditor.

To examine any thing wisely, two conditions are requisite: first, a distinct notion of the desirable ends, in the complete accomplishment of which would consist the perfection of such a thing, or its ideal excellence; and, secondly, a calm and kindly mode of feeling, without which we shall hardly fail either to overlook, or not to make due allowances for, the circumstances which prevent these ends from being all perfectly realized in the particular thing which we are to examine. For instance, we must have a general notion what a man can be and ought to be, before we can fitly proceed to determine on the merits or demerits of any one individual. For the examination of our own government, I prepared my mind, therefore, by a short catechism, which I shall communicate in the next essay, and on which the letter and anecdotes that follow, will, I flatter myself, be found an amusing, if not an instructive, commentary.
ESSAY IX.


Judging that he will have employed the most effectual means of being a happy and powerful king, not by governing the most numerous but the most moral people. He deems it of small sufficiency to have protected the country by fleets and garrison, unless he shall at the same time enrich and illustrate it with men of eminent learning and sanctity. For these verily he conceives to be the true ornaments and wealth of his kingdom,—these its only genuine and imperishable glories.

In what do all states agree? A number of men—exert—powers—in union. Wherein do they differ? First, in the quality and quantity of the powers. One state possesses chemists, mechanists, mechanics of all kinds, men of science; the arts of war and peace; and its citizens naturally strong and of habitual courage. Another state may possess none or a few only of these, or the same more imperfectly. Or of two states possessing the same in equal perfection the one is more populous than the other, as in the instance of France and Switzerland. Secondly, in the more or less perfect union of these powers. Compare Mr. Leckie's valuable and authentic documents respecting the state of Sicily with the preceding essay on taxation. Thirdly, in the greater or less activity of exertion. Think of the papal state and its silent metropolis, and then of the county of Lancaster and the towns of Manchester and Liverpool. What is the condition indispensable to the exertion of powers in union by a number of men? A government. What are the ends of government? They are of two kinds, negative and positive. The negative ends of government are the protection of life, of personal freedom, of property, of reputation, and of religion, from foreign and from domestic attacks. The positive ends are;—
First, to make the means of subsistence more easy to each individual:—Secondly, that in addition to the necessaries of life he should derive from the union and division of labor a share of the comforts and conveniences which humanize and ennoble his nature; and at the same time the power of perfecting himself in his own branch of industry by having those things which he needs provided for him by others among his fellow-citizens; the tools and raw or manufactured materials necessary for his own employment being included. I knew a profound mathematician in Sicily, who had devoted a full third of his life to the discovery of the longitude, and who had convinced not only himself but the principal mathematicians of Messina and Palermo that he had succeeded: but neither throughout Sicily nor Naples could he find a single artist capable of constructing the instrument which he had invented:*—Thirdly, the hope of bettering his own condition and that of his children. The civilized man gives up those stimulants of hope and fear which constitute the chief charm of the savage life: and yet his Maker has distinguished him from the brute that perishes, by making hope an instinct of his nature, and an indispensable condition of his moral and intellectual progression. But a natural instinct constitutes a natural right, as far as its gratification is compatible with the equal rights of others. Hence our ancestors classed those who were bound to the soil (adscriptitiit glebae) and incapable by law of altering their condition from that of their parents, as bondsmen or villeins, however advantageously they might otherwise be situated. Reflect on the direful effects of castes in Hindostan, and then transfer yourself in fancy to an English cottage,—

* The good old man, who is poor, old, and blind, universally esteemed for the innocence and austerity of his life not less than for his learning, and yet universally neglected, except by persons almost as poor as himself, strongly reminded me of a German epigram on Kepler, which may be thus translated:—

No mortal spirit yet had clomb so high
As Kepler—yet his country saw him die
For very want! the minds alone he fed,
And so the bodies left him without bread.

The good old man presented me with the book in which he has described and demonstrated his invention: and I should with great pleasure transmit it to any mathematician who would feel an interest in examining it and communicating his opinion on its merits.
Where o'er the cradled infant bending
Hope has fix'd her wishful gaze,—
and the fond mother dreams of her child's future fortunes.—Who
knows but he may come home a rich merchant, like such a one,
or be a bishop or a judge? The prizes are indeed few and rare,
but still they are possible: and the hope is universal, and per-
haps occasions more happiness than even its fulfilment:—Lastly,
the development of those faculties which are essential to his
human nature by the knowledge of his moral and religious du-
ties, and the increase of his intellectual powers in as great a de-
gree as is compatible with the other ends of social union, and
does not involve a contradiction. The poorest Briton possesses
much and important knowledge, which he would not have had,
if Luther, Calvin, Newton, and their comperees had not existed;
but it is evident that the means of science and learning could
not exist, if all men had a right to be made profound mathematic-
ians or men of extensive erudition. Still instruction is one of
the ends of government; for it is that only which makes the
abandonment of the savage state an absolute duty: and that
constitution is the best, under which the average sum of useful
knowledge is the greatest, and the causes that awaken and en-
courage talent and genius, the most powerful and various.

These were my preparatory notions. The influences under
which I proceeded to re-examine our own constitution, were the
following, which I give, not exactly as they occurred, but in the
order in which they will be illustrative of the different articles of
the preceding paragraph. That we are better and happier than
others is indeed no reason for our not becoming still better;
especially as with states, as well as individuals, not to be pro-
gressive is to be retrograde. Yet the comparison will usefully
temper the desire of improvement with love and a sense of grati-
tude for what we already are.

I. A LETTER RECEIVED, AT MALTA, FROM AN AMERICAN OFFICER OF
HIGH RANK,* WHO HAS SINCE RECEIVED THE THANKS AND REWARDS
OF CONGRESS FOR HIS SERVICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Sir,

GRAND CAIRO, Dec. 13, 1804.

The same reason, which induced me to request letters of in-
troduction to his Britannic Majesty's agents here, suggested the

* Decatur.—Ed.
propriety of showing an English jack at the main top-gallant mast-head, on entering the port of Alexandria on the 26th ult. The signal was recognized; and Mr. B—— was immediately on board.

We found in port, a Turkish Vice Admiral, with a ship of the line, and six frigates; a part of which squadron is stationed there to preserve the tranquillity of the country; with just as much influence as the same number of pelicans would have on the same station.

On entering and passing the streets of Alexandria, I could not but notice the very marked satisfaction, which every expression and every countenance of all denominations of people, Turks and Frenchmen only excepted, manifested under an impression that we were the avant-couriers of an English army. They had conceived this from observing the English jack at our main, taking our flag perhaps for that of a feint, and because as is common enough everywhere, they were ready to believe what they wished. It would have been cruel to have undeceived them: consequently without positively assuming it, we passed in the character of Englishmen among the middle and lower orders of society, and as their allies among those of better information. Wherever we entered or wherever halted, we were surrounded by the wretched inhabitants; and stunned with their benedictions and prayers for blessings on us. "Will the English come? Are they coming? God grant the English may come! we have no commerce—we have no money—we have no bread! When will the English arrive?" My answer was uniformly, Patience! The same tone was heard at Rosetta as among the Alexandrians, indicative of the same dispositions; only it was not so loud, because the inhabitants are less miserable, although without any traits of happiness. On the fourth, we left that village for Cairo, and as well for our security as to facilitate our procurement of accommodations during our voyage, and our stay there, the resident directed his secretary, Capt. V——, to accompany us, and to give us lodgings in his house. We ascended the Nile leisurely, and calling at several villages, we plainly perceived that the national partiality, the strong and open expression of which proclaimed so loudly the feelings of the Egyptians of the sea-coast, was general throughout the country; and the prayers for the return of the English as earnest as universal.
On the morning of the sixth we went on shore at the village of Sabour. The villagers expressed an enthusiastic gladness at seeing red and blue uniforms and round hats;—(the French, I believe, wear three-cornered ones.) Two days before, five hundred Albanian deserters from the Viceroy’s army had pillaged and left this village; at which they had lived at free quarters about four weeks. The famishing inhabitants were now distressed with apprehensions from another quarter. A company of wild Arabs were encamped in sight. They dreaded their ravages and apprized us of danger from them. We were eighteen in the party, well armed; and a pretty brisk fire which we raised among the numerous flocks of pigeons and other small fowl in the environs, must have deterred them from mischief; if, as is most probable, they had meditated any against us. Scarcely, however, were we on board and under weigh, when we saw these mounted marauders of the desert fall furiously upon the herds of camels, buffaloes, and cattle of the village, and drive many of them off wholly unannoyed on the part of the unresisting inhabitants, unless their shrieks could be deemed an annoyance. They afterwards attacked and robbed several unarmed boats, which were a few hours astern of us. The most insensible must surely have been moved by the situation of the peasants of that village. While we were listening to their complaints, they kissed our hands, and with prostrations to the ground, rendered more affecting by the inflamed state of the eyes almost universal among them, and which the new traveller might venially imagine to have been the immediate effect of weeping and anguish, they all implored English succor. Their shrieks at the assault of the wild Arabs seemed to implore the same still more forcibly, while it testified what multiplied reasons they had to implore it. I confess, I felt an almost insurmountable impulse to bring our little party to their relief, and might perhaps have done a rash act, had it not been for the calm and just observation of Captain V—, that “these were common occurrences, and that any relief which we could afford, would not merely be only temporary, but would exasperate the plunderers to still more atrocious outrages after our departure.”

On the morning of the seventh we landed near a village. At our approach the villagers fled: signals of friendship brought some of them to us. When they were told that we were English-
men, they flocked around us with demonstrations of joy, offered their services, and raised loud ejaculations for our establishment in the country. Here we could not procure a pint of milk for our coffee. The inhabitants had been plundered and chased from their habitations by the Albanians and desert Arabs, and it was but the preceding day, they had returned to their naked cottages.

Grand Cairo differs from the places already passed, only as the presence of the tyrant stamps silence on the lips of misery with the seal of terror. Wretchedness here assumes the form of melancholy; but the few whispers that are hazarded, convey the same feelings and the same wishes. And wherein does this misery and consequent spirit of revolution consist? Not in any form of government but in a formless despotism, an anarchy indeed,—for it amounts literally to an annihilation of every thing that can merit the name of government or justify the use of the word even in the laxest sense. Egypt is under the most frightful despotism, yet has no master. The Turkish soldiery, restrained by no discipline, seize every thing by violence, not only all that their necessities dictate, but whatever their caprices suggest. The Mamelukes, who dispute with these the right of domination, procure themselves subsistence by means as lawless though less insupportably oppressive; and the wild Arabs availing themselves of the occasion, plunder the defenceless wherever they find plunder. To finish the whole, the talons of the Viceroy fix on every thing which can be changed into currency, in order to find the means of supporting an ungoverned, disorganized banditti of foreign troops, who receive the harvest of his oppression, desert and betray him. Of all this rapine, robbery, and extortion, the wretched cultivators of the soil are the perpetual victims. A spirit of revolution is the natural consequence.

The reason the inhabitants of this country give for preferring the English to the French, whether true or false, is as natural as it is simple, and as influential as natural. "The English," say they, "pay for every thing,—the French pay nothing, and take every thing." They do not like this kind of deliverers.

Well, thought I, after the perusal of this letter, the slave-trade,—which had not then been abolished,—is a dreadful crime, an English iniquity, and to sanction its continuance under full conviction and parliamentary confession of its injustice and inhu-
manity, is, if possible, still blacker guilt. Would that our disconsents were for a while confined to our moral wants! Whatever may be the defects of our constitution, we have at least an effective government, and that too composed of men who were born with us and are to die among us. We are at least preserved from the incursions of foreign enemies: the intercommunion of interests precludes a civil war, and the volunteer spirit of the nation equally with its laws, gives to the darkest lanes of our crowded metropolis that quiet and security which the remotest villager at the cataracts of the Nile prays for in vain, in his mud hovel!

Not yet enslaved nor wholly vile,
O Albion, O my mother isle!
Thy valleys fair, as Eden's bowers,
Glitter green with sunny showers;
Thy grassy uplands' gentle swells
Echo to the bleat of flocks;—
Those grassy hills, those glitt'ring dells
Proudly ramparted with rocks,—
And ocean 'mid his uproar wild
Speaks safety to his island-child,
Hence for many a fearless age
Has social quiet loved thy shore;
Nor ever proud invader's rage
Or sack'd thy towers or stain'd thy fields with gore.*

II. ANECDOTE OF BONAPARTE.

Bonaparte, during his short stay at Malta, called out the Maltese regiments raised by the Knights, amounting to fifteen hundred of the stoutest young men of the islands. As they were drawn up on the parade, he informed them, in a bombastic harrangue, that he had restored them to liberty; but in proof that his attachment to them was not bounded by this benefaction, he would now give them an opportunity of adding glory to freedom—and concluded by asking who of them would march forward to be his fellow-soldiers on the banks of the Nile, and contribute a flower of Maltese heroism to the immortal wreaths of fame, with which he meant to crown the pyramids of Egypt! Not a man stirred: all gave a silent refusal. They were instantly surrounded by a regiment of French soldiers, marched to the Marino,

* Ode To the Departing Year. Poetical Works, VII. p. 108.—Ed.
forced on board the transports, and threatened with death if any one of them attempted his escape, or should be discovered in any part of the islands of Malta or Goza. At Alexandria they were always put in the front, both to save the French soldiery, and to prevent their running away; and of the whole number, fifty only survived to revisit their native country. From one of these survivors I first learned this fact, which was afterwards confirmed to me by several of his remaining comrades, as well as by the most respectable inhabitants of Valette.

This anecdote recalled to my mind an accidental conversation with an old countryman in a central district of Germany. I purposely omit names, because the day of retribution has come and gone by.* I was looking at a strong fortress in the distance, which formed a highly interesting object in a rich and varied landscape, and asked the old man, who had stopped to gaze at me, its name, adding—How beautiful it looks! "It may be well enough to look at," answered he, "but God keep all Christians from being taken thither!" He then proceeded to gratify the curiosity which he had thus excited, by informing me that the Baron —— had been taken out of his bed at midnight and carried to that fortress—that he was not heard of for nearly two years, when a soldier who had fled over the boundaries sent information to his family of the place and mode of his imprisonment. As I have no design to work on the feelings of my readers, I pass over the shocking detail: had not the language and countenance of my informant precluded such a suspicion, I might have supposed that he had been repeating some tale of horror from a romance of the dark ages. "What was his crime?" I asked.—"The report is," said the old man, "that in his capacity as minister he had remonstrated with the —— concerning the extravagance of his mistress, an outlandish countess; and that she in revenge persuaded the sovereign, that it was the Baron who had communicated to a professor at Göttingen the

* This anecdote refers to the transfer made by the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel of a body of his troops to the service of Great Britain in the first American war:

—— and leauged with these
Each petty German princeling, nurs'd in gore;
Soul-harden'd barterers of human blood——
Death's prime slave-merchants—scorpion whips of fate!

Poetical Works, VII. p. 76.—Ed.
particulars of the infamous sale of some thousands of his subjects as soldiers." On the same day I discovered in the landlord of a small public-house one of the men who had been thus sold. He seemed highly delighted in entertaining an English gentleman, and in once more talking English after a lapse of so many years. He was far from regretting this incident in his life, but his account of the manner in which they were forced away accorded in so many particulars with Schiller's impassioned description of the same or a similar scene, in his tragedy of Cabal and Love, as to leave a perfect conviction on my mind, that the dramatic pathos of that description was not greater than its historic fidelity.

As I was thus reflecting, I glanced my eye on the leading paragraph of a London newspaper, containing much angry declamation, and some bitter truths, respecting our military arrangements. It were in vain, thought I, to deny that the influence of parliamentary interest, which prevents the immense patronage of the crown from becoming a despotic power, is not the most likely to secure the ablest commanders or the fittest persons for the management of our foreign empire. However, thank God! if we fight, we fight for our own king and country: and grievances which may be publicly complained of, there is some chance of seeing remedied.

III. A celebrated professor in a German university, showed me a very pleasing print, entitled, Toleration.—A Roman Catholic priest, a Lutheran divine, a Calvinist minister, a Quaker, a Jew, and a philosopher, were represented sitting round the same table, over which a winged figure hovered in the attitude of protection. "For this harmless print," said my friend, "the artist was imprisoned, and having attempted to escape, was sentenced to draw the boats on the banks of the Danube, with robbers and murderers: and there died in less than two months, from exhaustion and exposure. In your happy country, sir, this print would be considered as a pleasing scene from real life: for in every great town throughout your empire you may meet with the original." "Yes," I replied, "as far as the negative ends of government are concerned, we have no reason to complain. Our government protects us from foreign enemies, and our laws secure our lives, our personal freedom, our property, reputation, and religious rights, from domestic attacks. Our taxes, indeed, are enormous"
—“Oh! talk not of taxes,” said my friend, “till you have resided in a country where the boor disposes of his produce to strangers for a foreign mart, not to bring back to his family the comforts and conveniences of foreign manufactures, but to procure that coin which his lord is to squander away in a distant land. Neither can I with patience hear it said, that your laws act only to the negative ends of government. They have a manifold positive influence, and their incorrupt administration gives a color to all your modes of thinking, and is one of the chief causes of your superior modes of thinking in private as well as public life.”

My limits compel me to strike out the different incidents which I had written as a commentary on the former three of the positive ends of government. To the moral feelings of my readers they might have been serviceable; but for their understandings they are superfluous. It is surely impossible to peruse those ends, and not admit that all three are realized under our government to a degree unexampled in any other old and long peopled country. The defects of our constitution, in which word I include the laws and customs of the land as well as its scheme of legislative and executive power, must exist, therefore, in the fourth, namely, the production of the highest average of general information, of general moral and religious principles, and the excitements and opportunities which it affords to paramount genius and heroic power in a sufficient number of its citizens. These are points in which it would be immorality to rest content with the presumption, however well founded, that we are better

* "The administration of justice throughout the continent is partial, venal, and infamous. I have, in conversation with many sensible men, met with something of content with their governments in all other respects than this; but upon the question of expecting justice to be really and fairly administered, every one confessed there was no such thing to be looked for. The conduct of the judges is profligate and atrocious. Upon almost every cause that comes before them interest is openly made with the judges; and woe betide the man, who, with a cause to support has no means of conciliating favor, either by the beauty of a handsome wife, or by other methods."—This quotation is confined in the original to France under the monarchy; I have extended the application, and adopted the words as comprising the result of my own experience; and I take this opportunity of declaring, that the most important part of Mr. Leckie's statement concerning Sicily, I myself know to be accurate, and am authorized by what I myself saw there, to rely on the whole as a fair and unexaggerated representation.
than others, if we are not what we ought to be ourselves, and are not using the means of improvement. The first question then is, What is the fact? The second upon the supposition of a defect or deficiency in one or all of these points, and that to a degree which may affect our power and prosperity, if not our absolute safety,—are the plans of legislative reform that have hitherto been proposed fit or likely to remove such defect, and supply such deficiency? The third and last question is,—Should there appear reason to deny or doubt this, are there any other means, and what are they? Of these points in the concluding essay of this section.

A French gentleman in the reign of Louis XIV. was comparing the French and English writers with all the boastfulness of national prepossession. "Sir!" replied an Englishman, better versed in the principles of freedom than the canons of criticism, "there are but two subjects worthy the human intellect, politics and religion, our state here and our state hereafter; and on neither of these dare you write." Long may the envied privilege be preserved to my countrymen of writing and talking concerning both! Nevertheless, it behooves us all to consider, that to write or talk concerning any subject, without having previously taken the pains to understand it, is a breach of duty which we owe to ourselves, though it may be no offence against the laws of the land. The privilege of talking and even publishing nonsense, is necessary in a free state; but the more sparingly we make use of it the better.
ESSAY X.

Then we may thank ourselves,
Who spell-bound by the magic name of peace
Dream golden dreams. Go, warlike Briton, go,
For the gray olive-branch change thy green laurels:
Hang up thy rusty helmet, that the bee
May have a hive, or spider find a loom!
Instead of doubling drum and thrilling fife,
Be lull'd in lady's lap with amorous flutes.
But for Napoleon, know, he'll scorn this calm:
The ruddy planet at his birth bore sway;
Sanguine, aust, his humor, and wild fire
His ruling element. Rage, revenge, and cunning
Make up the temper of this captain's valor.

Little prospective wisdom can that man obtain, who hurrying
onward with the current, or rather torrent, of events, feels no interest
in their importance, except as far as his curiosity is excited
by their novelty; and to whom all reflection and retrospect are
wearisome. If ever there were a time when the formation of
just public principles becomes a duty of private morality; when
the principles of morality in general ought to be made to bear on
our public suffrages, and to affect every great national determination;
when, in short, his country should have a place by every
Englishman's fireside; and when the feelings and truths which
give dignity to the fireside and tranquillity to the death-bed,
ought to be present and influential in the cabinet and in the senate—that time is now with us. As an introduction to, and at
the same time as a commentary on, the subject of international
law, I have taken a review of the circumstances that led to the
treaty of Amiens, and the recommencement of the war, more es-
pecially with regard to the occupation of Malta.

In a rich commercial state, a war seldom fails to become unpopular by length of continuance. The first, or revolution war,
which towards its close, had become just and necessary, perhaps
beyond any former example, had yet causes of unpopularity peculiar to itself. Exhaustion is the natural consequence of excessive stimulation, in the feelings of nations equally as in those of individuals. Wearyed out by overwhelming novelties; stunned, as it were, by a series of strange explosions; sick too of hope long delayed; and uncertain as to the real object and motive of the war, from the rapid change and general failure of its ostensible objects and motives: the public mind for many months preceding the signing of the preliminaries had lost all its tone and elasticity. The consciousness of mutual errors and mutual disappointments disposed the great majority of all parties to a spirit of diffidence and toleration, which, amiable as it may be in individuals, in a nation, and above all in an opulent and luxurious nation, is always too nearly akin to apathy and selfish indulgence. An unmanly impatience for peace became only not universal. After as long a resistance as the nature of our constitution and national character permitted, or even endured, the government applied at length the only remedy adequate to the greatness of the evil, a remedy which the magnitude of the evil justified, and which nothing but an evil of that magnitude could justify. At a high price they purchased for us the name of peace at a time when the views of France became daily more and more incompatible with our vital interests. Considering the peace as a mere truce of experiment, wise and temperate men regarded with complacency the treaty of Amiens, for the very reasons that would have insured the condemnation of any other treaty under any other circumstances. Its palpable deficiencies were its antidote; or rather they formed its very essence, and declared at first sight, what alone it was, or was meant to be. Any attempt at that time, and in this treaty, to have secured Italy, Holland, and the German empire, would have been, in the literal sense of the word, preposterous. The nation would have withdrawn all faith in the pacific intentions of the ministers, if the negotiation had been broken off on a plea of this kind: for it had taken for granted the extreme desirableness, nay, the necessity of a peace, and, this once admitted, there would, no doubt, have been an absurdity in continuing the war for objects which the war furnished no means of realizing. If the First Consul had entered into stipulations with us respecting the continent, they would have been observed only as long as his interest from other causes
Even Lord Bacon himself, who in his *Novum Organum* has so incomparably set forth the nature of the difference, and the unfitness of the latter faculty for the objects of the former, does nevertheless in sundry places use the term reason where he means the understanding, and sometimes, though less frequently, understanding for reason.* In consequence of thus confounding the two terms, or rather of wasting both words for the expression of one and the same faculty, he left himself no appropriate term for the other and higher gift of reason, and was thus under the necessity of adopting fantastical and mystical phrases, for example, the dry light (*lumen siccum*), the lucific vision, and the like, meaning thereby nothing more than reason in contradistinction from the understanding. Thus too in the preceding Aphorism, by reason Leighton means the human understanding, the explanation annexed to it being (by a noticeable coincidence) word for word, the very definition which the founder of the Critical Philosophy gives of the understanding—namely, "the faculty judging according to sense."

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**ON THE DIFFERENCE IN KIND OF REASON AND THE UNDERSTANDING.**

SCHEME OF THE ARGUMENT.

On the contrary, Reason is the power of universal and necessary convictions, the source and substance of truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves. Its presence is always marked by the necessity of the position affirmed: this necessity being conditional, when a truth of reason is applied to facts of experience, or to the rules and maxims of the understanding; but absolute, when the subject matter is itself the growth or offspring of reason. Hence arises a distinction in reason itself, derived from the different mode of applying it, and from the objects to which it is directed: accordingly as we consider one and the same gift, now as the ground of formal principles, and now as the origin of ideas. Contemplated distinctively in reference to formal (or abstract) truth, it is the Speculative Reason; but in reference to actual (or moral) truth, as the fountain of ideas and

*See The Friend, II. pp. 146–150; Essays VIII. and IX., II. pp. 437–448.—Ed.*
the light of the conscience, we name it the Practical Reason. Whenever by self-subjection to this universal light, the will of the individual, the particular will, has become a will of reason, the man is regenerate: and reason is then the spirit of the regenerated man, whereby the person is capable of a quickening intercommunion with the Divine Spirit. And herein consists the mystery of Redemption, that this has been rendered possible for us. And so it is written; the first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening Spirit. (1 Cor. xv. 45.) We need only compare the passages in the writings of the Apostles Paul and John, concerning the Spirit and spiritual gifts, with those in the Proverbs and in the Wisdom of Solomon respecting Reason, to be convinced that the terms are synonymous.* In this at once most comprehensive and most appropriate acceptation of the word, Reason is pre-eminently spiritual, and a spirit, even our spirit, through an effluence of the same grace by which we are privileged to say, Our Father!

On the other hand, the judgments of the Understanding are binding only in relation to the objects of our senses, which we reflect under the forms of the understanding. It is, as Leighton rightly defines it, “the faculty judging according to sense.” Hence we add the epithet human without tautology: and speak of the human understanding in disjunction from that of beings higher or lower than man. But there is, in this sense, no human reason. There neither is nor can be but one reason, one and the same; even the light that lighteth every man’s individual understanding (discursus), and thus maketh it a reasonable understanding, discourse of reason—one only, yet manifold: it goeth through all understanding, and remaining in itself regeneratest all other powers. The same writer calls it likewise an influence from the Glory of the Almighty, this being one of the names of the Messiah, as the Logos, or co-eternal Filial Word. And most noticeable for its coincidence is a fragment of Heraclitus, as I have indeed already noticed elsewhere;—“To discourse rationally it behooves us to derive strength from that which is common to all men: for all human understandings are nourished by the one Divine Word.”

Beasts, I have said, partake of understanding. If any man deny this, there is a ready way of settling the question. Let

* See Wisd. of Sol. c. vii. 22, 23, 27.—Ed.
him give a careful perusal to Hübcr's two small volumes on bees and ants (especially the latter), and to Kirby and Spence's Introduction to Entomology: and one or other of two things must follow. He will either change his opinion as irreconcilable with the facts; or he must deny the facts; which yet I can not suppose, inasmuch as the denial would be tantamount to the no less extravagant than uncharitable assertion, that Hübcr, and the several eminent naturalists, French and English, Swiss, German, and Italian, by whom Hübcr's observations and experiments have been repeated and confirmed, have all conspired to impose a series of falsehoods and fairy-tales on the world. I see no way, at least, by which he can get out of this dilemma, but by over-leaping the admitted rules and fences of all legitimate discussion, and either transferring to the word, Understanding, the definition already appropriated to Reason, or defining understanding in genere by the specific and accessional perfections which the human understanding derives from its co-existence with reason and free-will in the same individual person; in plainer words, from its being exercised by a self-conscious and responsible creature. And, after all, the supporter of Harrington's position would have a right to ask him, by what other name he would designate the faculty in the instances referred to? If it be not understanding, what is it?

In no former part of this Volume have I felt the same anxiety to obtain a patient attention. For I do not hesitate to avow, that on my success in establishing the validity and importance of the distinction between Reason and the Understanding, rest my hopes of carrying the Reader along with me through all that is to follow. Let the student but clearly see and comprehend the diversity in the things themselves, and the expediency of a correspondent distinction and appropriation of the words will follow of itself. Turn back for a moment to the Aphorism, and having re-perused the first paragraph of this Comment thereon, regard the two following narratives as the illustration. I do not say proof: for I take these from a multitude of facts equally striking for the one only purpose of placing my meaning out of all doubt.

I. Hübcr put a dozen humble-bees under a bell-glass along with a comb of about ten silken cocoons so unequal in height as not to be capable of standing steadily. To remedy this two or
three of the humble-bees got upon the comb, stretched themselves over its edge, and with their heads downwards fixed their fore-feet on the table on which the comb stood, and so with their hind feet kept the comb from falling. When these were weary others took their places. In this constrained and painful posture, fresh bees relieving their comrades at intervals, and each working in its turn, did these affectionate little insects support the comb for nearly three days: at the end of which they had prepared sufficient wax to build pillars with. But these pillars having accidentally got displaced, the bees had recourse again to the same manœuvre, till Hüber pitying their hard case, &c.

II. "I shall at present describe the operations of a single ant that I observed sufficiently long to satisfy my curiosity.

"One rainy day I observed a laborer digging the ground near the aperture which gave entrance to the ant-hill. It placed in a heap the several fragments it had scraped up, and formed them into small pellets, which it deposited here and there upon the nest. It returned constantly to the same place, and appeared to have a marked design, for it labored with ardor and perseverance. I remarked a slight furrow, excavated in the ground in a straight line, representing the plan of a path or gallery. The laborer, the whole of whose movements fell under my immediate observation, gave it greater depth and breadth, and cleared out its borders: and I saw at length, in which I could not be deceived, that it had the intention of establishing an avenue which was to lead from one of the stories to the underground chambers. This path, which was about two or three inches in length, and formed by a single ant, was opened above and bordered on each side by a buttress of earth; its concavity en forme de goutière was of the most perfect regularity, for the architect had not left an atom too much. The work of this ant was so well followed and understood, that I could almost to a certainty guess its next proceeding, and the very fragment it was about to remove. At the side of the opening where this path terminated, was a second opening to which it was necessary to arrive by some road. The same ant engaged in and executed alone this undertaking. It furrowed out and opened another path, parallel to the first, leaving between each a little wall of three or four lines in height. Those ants who lay the foundation of a wall, chamber, or gallery, from working separately occasion, now and then, a want of
coincidence in the parts of the same or different objects. Such examples are of no unfrequent occurrence, but they by no means embarrass them. What follows proves that the workman, on discovering his error, knew how to rectify it. A wall had been erected with the view of sustaining a vaulted ceiling, still incomplete, that had been projected from the wall of the opposite chamber. The workman who began constructing it, had given it too little elevation to meet the opposite partition upon which it was to rest. Had it been continued on the original plan, it must infallibly have met the wall at about one half of its height, and this it was necessary to avoid. This state of things very forcibly claimed my attention, when one of the ants arriving at the place, and visiting the works, appeared to be struck by the difficulty which presented itself; but this it as soon obviated, by taking down the ceiling and raising the wall upon which it reposed. It then, in my presence, constructed a new ceiling with the fragments of the former one."—Hüber's Natural History of Ants, pp. 38-41.

Now I assert, that the faculty manifested in the acts here narrated does not differ in kind from understanding, and that it does so differ from reason. What I conceive the former to be, physiologically considered, will be shown hereafter. In this place I take the understanding as it exists in men, and in exclusive reference to its intelligential functions; and it is in this sense of the word that I am to prove the necessity of contra-distinguishing it from reason.

Premising then, that two or more subjects having the same essential characters are said to fall under the same general definition, I lay it down, as a self-evident truth—(it is, in fact, an identical proposition)—that whatever subjects fall under one and the same general definition are of one and the same kind: consequently, that which does not fall under this definition, must differ in kind from each and all of those that do. Difference in degree does indeed suppose sameness in kind; and difference in kind precludes distinction from difference of degree. Heterogenea non comparari, ergo nec distinguiri, possunt. The inattention to this rule gives rise to the numerous sophisms comprised by Aristotle under the head of μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, that is, transition into a new kind, or the falsely applying to X what had been truly asserted of A, and might have been true of X, had it differed from
AIDS TO REFLECTION.

A in its degree only. The sophistry consists in the omission to notice what not being noticed will be supposed not to exist; and where the silence respecting the difference in kind is tantamount to an assertion that the difference is merely in degree. But the fraud is especially gross, where the heterogeneous subject, thus clandestinely slipped in, is in its own nature insusceptible of degree: such as, for instance, certainty or circularity, contrasted with strength, or magnitude.

To apply these remarks for our present purpose, we have only to describe Understanding and Reason, each by its characteristic qualities. The comparison will show the difference.

UNDERSTANDING.

1. Understanding is discursive.
2. The Understanding in all its judgments refers to some other faculty as its ultimate authority.
3. Understanding is the faculty of reflection.

REASON.

1. Reason is fixed.
2. The Reason in all its decisions appeals to itself as the ground and substance of their truth. (Heb. vi. 13.)
3. Reason of contemplation.

Reason indeed is much nearer to Sense than to Understanding: for Reason (says our great Hooker) is a direct aspect of truth, an inward beholding, having a similar relation to the intelligible or spiritual, as Sense has to the material or phenomenal.

The result is, that neither falls under the definition of the other. They differ in kind: and had my object been confined to the establishment of this fact, the preceding columns would have superseded all further disquisition. But I have ever in view the especial interest of my youthful readers, whose reflective power is to be cultivated, as well as their particular reflections to be called forth and guided. Now the main chance of their reflecting on religious subjects aright, and of their attaining to the contemplation of spiritual truths at all, rests on their insight into the nature of this disparity still more than on their conviction of its existence. I now, therefore, proceed to a brief analysis of
the Understanding, in elucidation of the definitions already
given.

The Understanding then, considered exclusively as an organ
of human intelligence, is the faculty by which we reflect and gen-
eralize. Take, for instance, any object consisting of many parts,
a house, or a group of houses: and if it be contemplated, as a
whole, that is, as many constituting a one, it forms what, in the
technical language of psychology, is called a total impression.
Among the various component parts of this, we direct our at-
tention especially to such as we recollect to have noticed in other
total impressions. Then, by a voluntary act, we withhold our
attention from all the rest to reflect exclusively on these; and
these we henceforward use as common characters, by virtue of
which the several objects are referred to one and the same sort.*
Thus, the whole process may be reduced to three acts, all de-
pending on and supposing a previous impression on the senses:
first, the appropriation of our attention; second (and in order to
the continuance of the first) abstraction, or the voluntary with-
holding of the attention; and, third, generalization. And these
are the proper functions of the Understanding: and the power
of so doing, is what we mean, when we say we possess under-
standing, or are created with the faculty of understanding.†

* Accordingly as we attend more or less to the differences, the sort be-
comes, of course, more or less comprehensive. Hence there arises for the
systematic naturalist the necessity of subdividing the sorts into orders,
classes, families, &c.: all which, however, resolve themselves for the mere
logician into the conception of genus and species, that is, the comprehending
and the comprehended.

† It is obvious, that the third function includes the act of comparing
one object with another. The act of comparing supposes in the comparing
faculty certain inherent forms, that is, modes of reflecting not referable to
the objects reflected on, but pre-determined by the constitution and mechan-
ism of the understanding itself. And under some one or other of these
forms, the resemblances and differences must be subsumed in order to be
conceivable, and à fortiori therefore in order to be comparable. The senses
do not compare, but merely furnish the materials for comparison.

Were it not so, how could the first comparison have been possible? It
would involve the absurdity of measuring a thing by itself. But if we think
on some one thing, the length of our own foot, or of our hand and arm from
the elbow-joint, it is evident that in order to do this, we must have the con-
ception of measure. Now these antecedent and most general conceptions
are what is meant by the constituent forms of the understanding: we call
them constituent because they are not acquired by the understanding, but
Now when a person speaking to us of any particular object or appearance refers it by means of some common character to a known class (which he does in giving it a name), we say, that we understand him; that is, we understand his words. The name of a thing, in the original sense of the word name (nomen, are implied in its constitution. As rationally might a circle be said to acquire a centre and circumference, as the understanding to acquire these its inherent forms or ways of conceiving. This is what Leibnitz meant, when to the old adage of the Peripatetics, Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu—there is nothing in the understanding not derived from the senses, or—there is nothing conceived that was not previously perceived,—he replied—præter intellectum ipsum, except the misunderstanding itself.

And here let me remark for once and all: whoever would reflect to any purpose—whoever is earnest in his pursuit of self-knowledge, and of one of the principal means to this, an insight into the meaning of the words he uses, and the different meanings properly or improperly conveyed by one and the same word, accordingly as it is used in the schools or the market,—accordingly as the kind or a high degree is intended (for example, heat, weight, and the like, as employed scientifically, compared with the same word used popularly)—whoever, I say, seriously, proposes this as his object, must so far overcome his dislike of pedantry, and his dread of being sneered at as a pedant, as not to quarrel with an uncouth word or phrase, till he is quite sure that some other and more familiar one would not only have expressed the precise meaning with equal clearness, but have been as likely to draw attention to this meaning exclusively. The ordinary language of a philosopher in conversation or popular writings, compared with the language he uses in strict reasoning, is as his watch compared with the chronometer in his observatory. He sets the former by the town-clock, or even, perhaps, by the Dutch clock in his kitchen, not because he believes it right, but because his neighbors and his cook go by it. To afford the reader an opportunity for exercising the forbearance here recommended, I turn back to the phrase, "most general conceptions," and observe, that in strict and severe propriety of language, I should have said generalisic or generisic rather than general, and concipencies or concepitive acts rather than conceptions.

It is an old complaint, that a man of genius no sooner appears, but the host of dunces are up in arms to repel the invading alien. This observation would have made more converts to its truth, I suspect, had it been worded more dispassionately and with a less contemptuous antithesis. For "dunces," let us substitute "the many," or the "οὐγος κόσμος" (this world) of the Apostle, and we shall perhaps find no great difficulty in accounting for the fact. To arrive at the root, indeed, and last ground of the problem, it would be necessary to investigate the nature and effects of the sense of difference on the human mind where it is not holden in check by reason and reflection. We need not go to the savage tribes of North America, or the yet ruder natives of the Indian Isles, to learn how slight a degree of difference will, in
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\( \text{vota intelligible, id quod intelligitur} \), expresses that which is understood in an appearance, that which we place (or make to stand) under it, as the condition of its real existence, and in proof that it is not an accident of the senses, or affection of the individual, not a phantom or apparition, that is, an appearance

uncultivated minds, call up a sense of diversity, and inward perplexity and contradiction, as if the strangers were, and yet were not, of the same kind with themselves. Who has not had occasion to observe the effect which the gesticulations and nasal tones of a Frenchman produce on our own vulgar? Here we may see the origin and primary import of our unkindness. It is a sense of unkind, and not the mere negation but the positive opposite of the sense of kind. Alienation, aggravated now by fear, now by contempt, and not seldom by a mixture of both, aversion, hatred, enmity, are so many successive shapes of its growth and metamorphosis. In application to the present case, it is sufficient to say, that Pindar's remark on sweet music holds equally true of genius: as many as are not delighted by it are disturbed, perplexed, irritated. The beholder either recognizes it as a projected form of his own being, that moves before him with a glory round its head, or recoils from it as from a spectre. But this speculation would lead me too far; I must be content with having referred to it as the ultimate ground of the fact, and pass to the more obvious and proximate causes. And as the first, I would rank the person's not understanding what yet he expects to understand, and as if he had a right to do so. An original mathematical work, or any other that requires peculiar and technical marks and symbols, will excite no uneasy feelings—not in the mind of a competent reader, for he understands it; and not with others, because they neither expect nor are expected to understand it. The second place we may assign to the misunderstanding, which is almost sure to follow in cases where the incompetent person, finding no outward marks (diagrams, arbitrary signs, and the like) to inform him at first sight, that the subject is one which he does not pretend to understand, and to be ignorant of which does not detract from his estimation as a man of abilities generally, will attach some meaning to what he hears or reads; and as he is out of humor with the author, it will most often be such a meaning as he can quarrel with and exhibit in a ridiculous or offensive point of view.

But above all, the whole world almost of minds, as far as we regard intellectual efforts, may be divided into two classes of the busy-indolent and lazy-indolent. To both alike all thinking is painful, and all attempts to rouse them to think, whether in the re-examination of their existing convictions, or for the reception of new light, are irritating. "It may all be very deep and clever; but really one ought to be quite sure of it, before one wrenches one's brain to find out what it is. I take up a book as a companion, with whom I can have an easy cheerful chit-chat on what we both know beforehand, or else matters of fact. In our leisure hours we have a right to relaxation and amusement."

Well! but in their studious hours, when their bow is to be bent, when
which is only an appearance. (See Gen. ii. 19, 20, and in Psalm
xx. 1, and in many other places of the Bible, the identity of no-
men with numen, that is, invisible power and presence, the no-
men substantivum of all real objects, and the ground of their
reality, independently of the affections of sense in the percipient.)
In like manner, in a connected succession of names, as the speaker
passes from one to the other, we say that we understand his dis-
they are apud Musae, or amidst the Muses? Alas! it is just the same.
The same craving for amusement, that is, to be away from the Muses; for
relaxation, that is, the unbending of a bow which in fact had never been
strung! There are two ways of obtaining their applause. The first is:
enable them to reconcile in one and the same occupation the love of sloth
and the hatred of vacancy. Gratify indolence, and yet save them from ennui
—in plain English, from themselves. For, spite of their antipathy to dry
reading, the keeping company with themselves is, after all, the insufferable
annoyance: and the true secret of their dislike to a work of thought and in-
quiry lies in its tendency to make them acquainted with their own perma-
nent being. The other road to their favor is, to introduce to them their
own thoughts and predilections, tricked out in the fine language, in which
it would gratify their vanity to express them in their own conversation, and
with which they can imagine themselves showing off: and this (as has been
elsewhere remarked) is the characteristic difference between the second-rate
writers of the last two or three generations, and the same class under Eliza-
beth and the Stuarts. In the latter we find the most far-fetched and singu-
lar thoughts in the simplest and most native language; in the former, the
most obvious and common-place thoughts in the most far-fetched and motley
language. But lastly, and as the sine qua non of their patronage, a suffi-
cient arc must be left for the reader's mind to oscillate in—freedom of
choice,

To make the shifting cloud be what you please,
save only where the attraction of curiosity determines the line of motion.
The attention must not be fastened down: and this every work of genius,
not simply narrative, must do before it can be justly appreciated.

In former times a popular work meant one that adapted the results of
studious meditation or scientific research to the capacity of the people, pre-
senting in the concrete, by instances and examples, what had been ascer-
tained in the abstract and by discovery of the law. Now, on the other hand,
that is a popular work which gives back to the people their own errors and
prejudices, and flatters the many by creating them under the title of the
public, into a supreme and inappellable tribunal of intellectual excellence.

'P.S. In a continuous work, the frequent insertion and length of notes
would need an apology: in a book like this, of aphorisms and detached
comments, none is necessary, it being understood beforehand that the sauce
and the garnish are to occupy the greater part of the dish.
course, *discurso intellectus, discurus*, his passing from one thing to another. Thus, in all instances, it is words, names, or, if images, yet images used as words or names, that are the only and exclusive subjects of understanding. In no instance do we understand a thing in itself; but only the name to which it is referred. Sometimes indeed, when several classes are recalled conjointly, we identify the words with the object—though by courtesy of idiom rather than in strict propriety of language. Thus we may say that we understand a rainbow, when recalling successively the several names for the several sorts of colors, we know that they are to be applied to one and the same *phænomenon*, at once distinctly and simultaneously; but even in common speech we should not say this of a single color. No one would say he understands red or blue. He sees the color, and had seen it before in a vast number and variety of objects; and he understands the word red, as referring his fancy or memory to this his collective experience.

If this be so, and so it most assuredly is—if the proper functions of the understanding be that of generalizing the notices received from the senses in order to the construction of names: of referring particular notices, that is, impressions or sensations, to their proper names; and, *vice versa*, names to their correspondent class or kind of notices—then it follows of necessity, that the Understanding is truly and accurately defined in the words of Leighton and Kant, a faculty judging according to sense.

Now whether in defining the speculative Reason,—(that is, the reason considered abstractedly as an intellectual power)—we call it "the source of necessary and universal principles, according to which the notices of the senses are either affirmed or denied;" or describe it as "the power by which we are enabled to draw from particular and contingent appearances universal and necessary conclusions:"* it is equally evident that the two definitions

* Take a familiar illustration. My sight and touch convey to me a certain impression, to which my understanding applies its pre-conceptions (*conceptus antecedentes et generalissimi*) of quantity and relation, and thus refers it to the class and name of three-cornered bodies—we will suppose it the iron of a turf-spade. It compares the sides, and finds that any two measured as one are greater than the third; and according to a law of the imagination, there arises a presumption that in all other bodies of the same figure (that is, three-cornered and equilateral) the same proportion exists. After this, the senses have been directed successively to a number of three-
differ in their essential characters, and consequently the subjects differ in kind.

The dependence of the Understanding on the representations of the senses, and its consequent posteriority thereto, as contrasted with the independence and antecedency of Reason, are strikingly cornered bodies of unequal sides—and in these too the same proportion has been found without exception, till at length it becomes a fact of experience, that in all triangles hitherto seen, the two sides together are greater than the third: and there will exist no ground or analogy for anticipating an exception to a rule, generalized from so vast a number of particular instances. So far and no further could the understanding carry us: and as far as this "the faculty, judging according to sense," conducts many of the inferior animals, if not in the same, yet in instances analogous and fully equivalent.

The reason supersedes the whole process, and on the first conception presented by the understanding in consequence of the first sight of a triangular figure, of whatever sort it might chance to be, it affirms with an assurance incapable of future increase, with a perfect certainty, that in all possible triangles any two of the inclosing lines will and must be greater than the third. In short, understanding in its highest form of experience remains commensurate with the experimental notices of the senses from which it is generalized. Reason, on the other hand, either predetermines experience, or avails itself of a past experience to supersede its necessity in all future time; and affirms truths which no sense could perceive, nor experiment verify, nor experience confirm.

Yea, this is the test and character of a truth so affirmed, that in its own proper form it is inconceivable. For to conceive is a function of the understanding, which can be exercised only on subjects subordinate thereto. And yet to the forms of the understanding, all truth must be reduced, that is to be fixed as an object of reflection, and to be rendered expressible. And here we have a second test and sign of a truth so affirmed, that it can come forth out of the moulds of the understanding only in the disguise of two contradictory conceptions, each of which is partially true, and the conjunction of both conceptions becomes the representative or expression (the exponent) of a truth beyond conception and inexpressible. Examples: Before Abraham was, I am.—God is a circle, the centre of which is everywhere, and circumference nowhere. The soul is all in every part.

If this appear extravagant, it is an extravagance which no man can indeed learn from another, but which, (were this possible,) I might have learnt from Plato, Kepler, and Bacon; from Luther, Hooker, Pascal, Leibnitz, and Fenelon. But in this last paragraph I have, I see, unwittingly overstepped my purpose, according to which we were to take reason as a simply intellectual power. Yet even as such, and with all the disadvantage of a technical and arbitrary abstraction, it has been made evident:—1. that there is an intuition or immediate beholding, accompanied by a conviction of the necessity and universality of the truth so beheld, not derived from the senses, which intuition, when it is construed by pure sense, gives birth to the
exemplified in the Ptolemaic system—that truly wonderful product and highest boast of the faculty, judging according to the senses—compared with the Newtonian, as the offspring of a yet higher power, arranging, correcting, and annuling the representations of the senses according to its own inherent laws and constitutive ideas.

science of mathematics, and when applied to objects supersensuous or spiritual is the organ of theology and philosophy:—and 2. that there is likewise a reflective and discursive faculty, or mediate apprehension which, taken by itself and uninfluenced by the former, depends on the senses for the materials on which it is exercised, and is contained within the sphere of the senses. And this faculty it is, which in generalizing the notices of the senses constitutes sensible experience, and gives rise to maxims or rules which may become more and more general, but can never be raised into universal verities, or beget a consciousness of absolute certainty; though they may be sufficient to extinguish all doubt. (Putting revelation out of view, take our first progenitor in the 50th or 100th year of his existence. His experience would probably have freed him from all doubt, as the sun sank in the horizon, that it would re-appear the next morning. But compare this state of assurance with that which the same man would have had of the 47th proposition of Euclid, supposing him like Pythagoras to have discovered the demonstration.) Now is it expedient, I ask, or conformable to the laws and purposes of language, to call two so altogether disparate subjects by one and the same name? Or, having two names in our language, should we call each of the two diverse subjects by both—that is, by either name, as caprice might dictate? If not, then as we have the two words, reason and understanding (as indeed what language of cultivated man has not?)—what should prevent us from appropriating the former to the power distinctive of humanity? We need only place the derivatives from the two terms in opposition (for example, "A and B are both rational beings; but there is no comparison between them in point of intelligence," or "She always concludes rationally, though not a woman of much understanding") to see that we can not reverse the order—that is, call the higher gift understanding, and the lower reason. What should prevent us? I asked. Alas! that which has prevented us—the cause of this confusion in the terms—is only too obvious; namely, inattention to the momentous distinction in the things, and generally, to the duty and habit recommended in the fifth introductory Aphorism of this Volume. But the cause of this, and of all its lamentable effects and subcauses, false doctrine, blindness of heart, and contempt of the word, is best declared by the philosophic Apostle: *they did not like to retain God in their knowledge* (Rom. i. 28), and though they could not extinguish the light that lighteth every man, and which shone in the darkness: yet because the darkness could not comprehend the light, they refused to bear witness of it and worshiped, instead, the shaping mist, which the light had drawn upward from the ground (that is, from the mere animal nature and instinct), and which that light alone had made visible, that is, by superinducing on the animal instinct the principle of self-consciousness.
APHORISM IX.

In wonder all philosophy began; in wonder it ends; and admiration fills up the interspace. But the first wonder is the offspring of ignorance: the last is the parent of adoration. The first is the birth-throe of our knowledge: the last is its euthanasia and apotheosis.

SEQUELÆ: OR THOUGHTS SUGGESTED BY THE PRECEDING APHORISM.

As in respect of the first wonder we are all on the same level, how comes it that the philosophic mind should, in all ages, be the privilege of a few? The most obvious reason is this. The wonder takes place before the period of reflection, and (with the great mass of mankind) long before the individual is capable of directing his attention freely and consciously to the feeling, or even to its exciting causes. Surprise (the form and dress which the wonder of ignorance usually puts on) is worn away, if not precluded, by custom and familiarity. So is it with the objects of the senses, and the ways and fashions of the world around us; even as with the beat of our own hearts, which we notice only in moments of fear and perturbation. But with regard to the concerns of our inward being, there is yet another cause that acts in concert with the power in custom to prevent a fair and equal exertion of reflective thought. The great fundamental truths and doctrines of religion, the existence and attributes of God and the life after death, are in Christian countries taught so early, under such circumstances, and in such close and vital association with whatever makes or marks reality for our infant minds, that the words ever after represent sensations, feelings, vital assurances, sense of reality—rather than thoughts, or any distinct conception. Associated, I had almost said identified, with the parental voice, look, touch, with the living warmth and pressure of the mother, on whose lap the child is first made to kneel, within whose palms its little hands are folded, and the motion of whose eyes its eyes follow and imitate—(yea, what the blue sky is to the mother, the mother's upraised eyes and brow are to the child, the type and symbol of an invisible heaven!)—from within and without these great first truths, these good and gracious tidings, these holy and
humanizing spells, in the preconformity to which our very humanity may be said to consist, are so infused that it were but a tame and inadequate expression to say, we all take them for granted. At a later period, in youth or early manhood, most of us, indeed (in the higher and middle classes at least), read or hear certain proofs of these truths—which we commonly listen to, when we listen at all, with much the same feelings as a popular prince on his coronation day, in the centre of a fond and rejoicing nation, may be supposed to hear the champion’s challenge to all the non-existent, that deny or dispute his rights and royalty. In fact, the order of proof is most often reversed or transposed. As far at least as I dare judge from the goings on in my own mind, when with keen delight I first read the works of Derham, Nieuwentiet, and Lyonet, I should say that the full and life-like conviction of a gracious Creator is the proof (at all events, performs the office and answers all the purposes of a proof) of the wisdom and benevolence in the construction of the creature.

Do I blame this? Do I wish it to be otherwise? God forbid! It is only one of its accidental, but too frequent, consequences, of which I complain, and against which I protest. I regret nothing that tends to make the light become the life of men, even as the life in the eternal Word is their only and single true light. But I do regret, that in after-years—when by occasion of some new dispute on some old heresy, or any other accident, the attention has for the first time been distinctly attracted to the superstructure raised on these fundamental truths, or to truths of later revelation supplemental of these and not less important—all the doubts and difficulties, that can not but arise where the understanding, the mind of the flesh, is made the measure of spiritual things; all the sense of strangeness and seeming contradiction in terms; all the marvel and the mystery, that belong equally to both, are first thought of and applied in objection exclusively to the latter. I would disturb no man’s faith in the great articles of the (falsely so called) religion of nature. But before a man rejects, and calls on other men to reject, the revelations of the Gospel and the religion of all Christendom, I would have him place himself in the state and under all the privations of a Simonides, when in the fortieth day of his meditation the sage and philosophic poet abandoned the problem in despair. Ever and
anon he seemed to have hold of the truth; but when he asked himself what he meant by it, it escaped from him, or resolved itself into meanings, that destroyed each other. I would have the skeptic, while yet a skeptic only, seriously consider whether a doctrine, of the truth of which a Socrates could obtain no other assurance than what he derived from his strong wish that it should be true; and which Plato found a mystery hard to discover, and when discovered, communicable only to the fewest of men; can, consonantly with history or common sense, be classed among the articles, the belief of which is insured to all men by their mere common sense? Whether without gross outrage to fact, they can be said to constitute a religion of nature, or a natural theology antecedent to revelation, or superseding its necessity? Yes! in prevention (for there is little chance, I fear, of a cure) of the pugnacious dogmatism of partial reflection, I would prescribe to every man who feels a commencing alienation from the Catholic faith, and whose studies and attainments authorize him to argue on the subject at all, a patient and thoughtful perusal of the arguments and representations which Bayle supposes to have passed through the mind of Simonides. Or I should be fully satisfied if I could induce these eschewers of mystery to give a patient, manly, and impartial perusal to the single treatise of Pomponatus, De Fato.*

When they have fairly and satisfactorily overthrown the objections and cleared away the difficulties urged by this sharp-witted Italian against the doctrines which they profess to retain, then let them commence their attack on those which they reject. As far as the supposed irrationality of the latter is the ground of argument, I am much deceived if, on reviewing their forces, they would not find the ranks woefully thinned by the success of their own fire in the preceding engagement—unless, indeed, by pure heat of controversy, and to storm the lines of their antagonists, they can bring to life again the arguments which they had themselves killed off in the defence of their own positions. In vain

* The philosopher, whom the Inquisition would have burnt alive as an atheist, had not Leo X. and Cardinal Bembo decided that the work might be formidable to those semi-pagan Christians who regarded revelation as a mere make-weight to their boasted religion of nature; but contained nothing dangerous to the Catholic Church or offensive to a true believer. (He was born at Mantua in 1462 and died in 1525.—Ed.)
shall we seek for any other mode of meeting the broad facts of
the scientific Epicurean, or the requisitions and queries of the all-
analyzing Pyrrhonist, than by challenging the tribunal to which
they appeal, as incompetent to try the question. In order to
nonsuit the plaintiff, we must remove the cause from the faculty,
that judges according to sense, and whose judgments, therefore,
are valid only on objects of sense, to the superior courts of con-
science and intuitive reason. The words I speak unto you, are
Spirit, and such only are life, that is, have an inward and ac-
tual power abiding in them.

But the same truth is at once shield and bow. The shaft of
Atheism glances aside from it to strike and pierce the breast-plate
of the heretic. Well for the latter, if, plucking the weapon from
the wound, he recognizes an arrow from his own quiver, and aban-
dons a cause that connects him with such confederates! An in-
sight into the proper functions and subaltern rank of the under-
standing may not, indeed, disarm the Psilanthropist of his meta-
phorical glosses, or of his versions fresh from the forge, with no
other stamp than the private mark of the individual manufac-
turer; but it will deprive him of the only rational pretext for
having recourse to tools so liable to abuse, and of such perilous
example.

COMMENT.

Since the preceding pages were composed, and during an in-
terim of depression and disqualification, I heard with a delight
and an interest which I might without hyperbole call medicinal,
that the contradistinction of the understanding from reason,—for
which during twenty years I have been contending, casting my
bread upon the waters with a perseverance which in the existing
state of the public taste, nothing but the deepest conviction of
its importance could have inspired—has been lately sanctioned by
the present distinguished Professor of Anatomy, in the course of
lectures given by him at the Royal College of Surgeons, on the
zoological part of natural history; and, if I am rightly informed,
in one of the eloquent and impressive introductory discourses.*
In explaining the nature of Instinct, as deduced from the actions

* The allusion is to Mr. Green; and the passage to which the Author re-
fers, will be found in an Appendix, reprinted from the "Vital Dynamics."
—Ed.
and tendencies of animals successively presented to the observation of the comparative physiologist in the ascending scale of organic life—or rather, I should have said, in an attempt to determine that precise import of the term, which is required by the facts*—the Professor explained the nature of what I have elsewhere called the adaptive power, that is, the faculty of adapting means to a proximate end. I mean here a relative end—that which relatively to one thing is an end, though relatively to some other it is in itself a mean. It is to be regretted that we have no single word to express those ends, that are not the end: for the distinction between those and an end in the proper sense of the term, is an important one. The Professor, I say, not only explained, first, the nature of the adaptive power in genere, and, secondly, the distinct character of the same power as it exists specifically and exclusively in the human being, and acquires the name of understanding; but he did it in a way which gave the whole sum and substance of my convictions, of all I had so long wished, and so often, but with such imperfect success, attempted to convey, free from all semblance of paradoxy, and from all occasion of offence—omnem offendiculi ansam præcidens.† It is,

* The word, Instinct, brings together a number of facts into one class by the assertion of a common ground, the nature of which ground it determines negatively only,—that is, the word does not explain what this common ground is; but simply indicates that there is such a ground, and that it is different in kind from that in which the responsible and consciously voluntary actions of men originate. Thus, in its true and primary import, Instinct stands in antithesis to Reason; and the perplexity and contradictory statements into which so many meritorious naturalists and popular writers on natural history (Priscilla Wakefield, Kirby, Spence, Hübcr, and even Reimarus) have fallen on this subject, arise wholly from their taking the word in opposition to Understanding. I notice this, because I would not lose any opportunity of impressing on the mind of my youthful readers the important truth that language, as the embodied and articulated spirit of the race, as the growth and emanation of a people, and not the work of any individual wit or will, is often inadequate, sometimes deficient, but never false or delusive. We have only to master the true origin and original import of any native and abiding word, to find in it, if not the solution of the facts expressed by it, yet a finger-mark pointing to the road on which this solution is to be sought.

† Neque quicquam addubito, quin ea candidis omnibus faciat satis. Quid autem facias si quis ob ingenti pertinaciam sibi satisficeri non sit vel stupidores sint quam ut satisfactionem intelligent? Nam quemadmodum Simonides dixit, Thessalos hebetiores esse quam ut possint a se decipi, ita quor-
indeed, for the fragmentary reader only that I have any scruple. In those who have had the patience to accompany me so far on the up-hill road to manly principles, I can have no reason to guard against that disposition to hasty offence from anticipation of consequences—that faithless and loveless spirit of fear which plunged Galileo into a prison;*—a spirit most unworthy of an educated man, who ought to have learnt that the mistakes of scientific men have never injured Christianity, while every new truth discovered by them has either added to its evidence, or prepared the mind for its reception.

ON INSTINCT IN CONNECTION WITH THE UNDERSTANDING.

It is evident, that the definition of a genus or class is an adequate definition only of the lowest species of that genus: for each higher species is distinguished from the lower by some additional character, while the general definition includes only the characters common to all the species. Consequently it describes the lowest only. Now I distinguish a genus or kind of powers under

* And which (I may add) in a more enlightened age, and in a Protestant country, impelled more than one German University to anathematize Fr. Hoffman’s discovery of carbonic acid gas, and of its effects on animal life, as hostile to religion, and tending to atheism! Three or four students at the University of Jena, in the attempt to raise a spirit for the discovery of a supposed hidden treasure, were strangled or poisoned by the fumes of the charcoal they had been burning in a close garden-house of a vineyard near Jena, while employed in their magic fumigations and charms. One only was restored to life: and from his account of the noises and spectres (in his ears and eyes) as he was losing his senses, it was taken for granted that the bad spirit had destroyed them. Frederick Hoffman admitted that it was a very bad spirit who had tempted them, the spirit of avarice and folly; and that a very noxious spirit (gas, or Geist) was the immediate cause of their death. But he contended that this latter spirit was the spirit of charcoal, which would have produced the same effect, had the young men been chanting psalms instead of incantations: and acquitted the Devil of all direct concern in the business. The theological faculty took the alarm: even physicians pretended to be horror-stricken at Hoffman's audacity. The controversy and its appendages embittered several years of this great and good man's life.
the name of adaptive power, and give as its generic definition—
the power of selecting and adapting means to proximate ends; 
and as an instance of the lowest species of this genus, I take the 
stomach of a caterpillar. I ask myself, under what words I can 
generalize the action of this organ; and I see, that it selects and 
adapts the appropriate means (that is, the assimilable part of the 
vegetable congesta) to the proximate end, that is, the growth or 
reproduction of the insect's body. This we call Vital Power, or 
vita proprio of the stomach; and this being the lowest species, 
its definition is the same with the definition of the kind.

Well! from the power of the stomach I pass to the power 
exerted by the whole animal. I trace it wandering from spot to 
spot, and plant to plant, till it finds the appropriate vegetable; 
and again on this chosen vegetable, I mark it seeking out and 
fixing on the part of the plant, bark, leaf, or petal, suited to its 
nourishment: or (should the animal have assumed the butterfly 
form), to the deposition of its eggs, and the sustentation of the 
future larva. Here I see a power of selecting and adapting 
means to proximate ends according to circumstances: and this 
higher species of adaptive power we call Instinct.

Lastly, I reflect on the facts narrated and described in the pre-
ceding extracts from Hübér, and see a power of selecting and 
adapting the proper means to the proximate ends, according to 
varying circumstances. And what shall we call this yet higher 
species? We name the former, Instinct: we must call this In-
stinctive Intelligence.

Here then we have three powers of the same kind; life, in-
stant, and instinctive intelligence: the essential characters that 
define the genus existing equally in all three. But in addition 
to these, I find one other character common to the highest and 
lowest: namely, that the purposes are all manifestly predetermined 
by the peculiar organization of the animals; and though 
it may not be possible to discover any such immediate depend-
ency in all the actions, yet the actions being determined by the 
purposes, the result is equivalent: and both the actions and the 
purposes are all in a necessitated reference to the preservation 
and continuance of the particular animal or the progeny. There 
is selection, but not choice; volition rather than will. The pos-
sible knowledge of a thing, or the desire to have that thing repre-
sentable by a distinct correspondent thought, does not, in the ani-
mal, suffice to render the thing an object, or the ground of a purpose. I select and adapt the proper means to the separation of a stone from a rock, which I neither can, nor desire to use for food, shelter, or ornament: because, perhaps, I wish to measure the angles of its primary crystals, or, perhaps, for no better reason than the apparent difficulty of loosening the stone—sit pro ratione voluntas—and thus make a motive out of the absence of all motive, and a reason out of the arbitrary will to act without any reason.

Now what is the conclusion from these premisses? Evidently this: that if I suppose the adaptive power in its highest species, or form of instinctive intelligence, to co-exist with reason, free-will, and self-consciousness, it instantly becomes Understanding: in other words, that understanding differs indeed from the noblest form of instinct, but not in itself or in its own essential properties, but in consequence of its co-existence with far higher powers of a diverse kind in one and the same subject. Instinct in a rational, responsible, and self-conscious animal, is Understanding.

Such I apprehend to be the true view and exposition of Instinct; and in confirmation of its truth, I would merely request my readers, from the numerous well-authenticated instances on record, to recall some one of the extraordinary actions of dogs for the preservation of their masters' lives, and even for the avenging of their deaths. In these instances we have the third species of the adaptive power in connection with an apparently moral end—with an end in the proper sense of the word. Here the adaptive power co-exists with a purpose apparently voluntary, and the action seems neither pre-determined by the organization of the animal, nor in any direct reference to his own preservation, nor to the continuance of his race. It is united with an imposing semblance of gratitude, fidelity, and disinterested love. We not only value the faithful brute; we attribute worth to him. This, I admit, is a problem, of which I have no solution to offer. One of the wisest of uninspired men has not hesitated to declare the dog a great mystery, on account of this dawning of a moral nature, unaccompanied by any the least evidence of reason, in whichever of the two senses we interpret the word—whether as the practical reason, that is, the power of proposing an ultimate end, the determinability of the will by ideas; or as the sciential reason, that is, the faculty of concluding universal and necessary
truths from particular and contingent appearances. But in a question respecting the possession of reason, the absence of all proof is tantamount to a proof of the contrary. It is, however, by no means equally clear to me, that the dog may not possess an analogon of words, which I have elsewhere shown to be the proper objects of the "faculty, judging according to sense."

But to return to my purpose: I entreat the Reader to reflect on any one fact of this kind, whether occurring in his own experience, or selected from the numerous anecdotes of the Dog preserved in the writings of zoologists. I will then confidently appeal to him, whether it is in his power not to consider the faculty displayed in these actions as the same in kind with the understanding, however inferior in degree. Or should he even in these instances prefer calling it instinct, and this in contra-distinction from understanding, I call on him to point out the boundary between the two, the chasm or partition-wall that divides or separates the one from the other. If he can, he will have done what none before him have been able to do, though many and eminent men have tried hard for it: and my recantation shall be among the first trophies of his success. If he can not, I must infer that he is controlled by his dread of the consequences, by an apprehension of some injury resulting to religion or morality from this opinion; and I shall console myself with the hope, that in the sequel of this Work he will find proofs of the directly contrary tendency. Not only is this view of the Understanding, as differing in degree from Instinct, and in kind from Reason, innocent in its possible influences on the religious character, but it is an indispensable preliminary to the removal of the most formidable obstacles to an intelligent belief of the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel, of the characteristic articles of the Christian Faith, with which the advocates of the truth in Christ have to contend;—the evil heart of unbelief alone excepted.

REFLECTIONS INTRODUCTORY TO APHORISM X.

The most momentous question a man can ask is, Have I a Saviour? And yet as far as the individual querist is concerned, it is premature and to no purpose, unless another question has been previously put and answered, (alas! too generally put after the wounded conscience has already given the answer!)
namely, Have I any need of a Saviour? For him who needs none, (O bitter irony of the evil Spirit, whose whispers the proud soul takes for its own thoughts, and knows not how the tempter is scoffing the while!) there is none, as long as he feels no need. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible to have answered this question in the affirmative, and not ask—first, in what the necessity consists—secondly, whence it proceeded—and, thirdly, how far the answer to this second question is or is not contained in the answer to the first. I entreat the intelligent Reader, who has taken me as his temporary guide on the straight, but yet, from the number of cross roads, difficult way of religious inquiry, to halt a moment, and consider the main points which, in this last division of my Work, have been already offered for his reflection. I have attempted, then, to fix the proper meaning of the words, Nature and Spirit, the one being the antithesis to the other: so that the most general and negative definition of nature is, whatever is not spirit; and vice versa of spirit, that which is not comprehended in nature; or in the language of our elder divines, that which transcends nature. But Nature is the term in which we comprehend all things that are representable in the forms of time and space, and subjected to the relations of cause and effect: and the cause of the existence of which, therefore, is to be sought for perpetually in something antecedent. The word itself expresses this in the strongest manner possible: Nature, that which is about to be born, that which is always becoming. It follows, therefore, that whatever originates its own acts, or in any sense contains in itself the cause of its own state, must be spiritual, and consequently supernatural; yet not on that account necessarily miraculous. And such must the responsible Will in us be, if it be at all.

A prior step has been to remove all misconceptions from the subject; to show the reasonableness of a belief in the reality and real influence of a universal and divine Spirit; the compatibility and possible communion of such a spirit with the spiritual in principle; and the analogy offered by the most undeniable truths of natural philosophy.*

* It has in its consequences proved no trifling evil to the Christian world, that Aristotle's definitions of Nature are all grounded on the petty and rather rhetorical than philosophical antithesis of nature to art—a conception inadequate to the demands even of his philosophy. Hence in the prog-
These views of the Spirit, and of the Will as spiritual, form the ground-work of my scheme. Among the numerous corollaries or appendants, the first that presented itself respects the question;—whether there is any faculty in man by which a knowledge of spiritual truths, or of any truths not abstracted from nature, is rendered possible;—and an answer is attempted in the comment on Aphorism VIII. And here I beg leave to remark, that in this comment the only novelty, and if there be merit, the only merit is—that there being two very different meanings, and two different words, I have here and in former works appropriated one meaning to one of the words, and the other to the other—instead of using the words indifferently and by hap-hazard: a confusion, the ill effects of which in this instance are so great and of such frequent occurrence in the works of our ablest philosophers and divines, that I should select it before all others in proof of Hobbes' maxim: that it is a short downhill passage from errors in words or errors in things. The difference of the Reason from the Understanding, and the imperfection and limited sphere of the latter, have been asserted by many both before and since Lord Bacon;* but still the habit of using reason and understanding as syno-

* Take one passage among many from the Posthumous Tracts (1660) of John Smith, not the least star in that bright constellation of Cambridge men, the contemporaries of Jeremy Taylor. "While we reflect on our own idea of Reason, we know that our souls are not it, but only partake of it: and that we have it καρὰ μὲθέσιν and not κατ’ οἰκονύμ. Neither can it be called a faculty, but far rather a light, which we enjoy, but the source of which is not in ourselves, nor rightly by any individual to be denominated mine." This pure intelligence ne then proceeds to contrast with the discursive faculty, that is, the Understanding. (See the notes on this remarkable writer in the Author's "Literary Remains." V. p. 266.—Ed.)

Also see Cudworth's Immutable Morality, book iv. chap. 4, et passim.—Am. Ed.
nymes acted as a disturbing force. Some it led into mysticism, others it set on explaining away a clear difference in kind into a mere superiority in degree: and it partially eclipsed the truth for all.

In close connection with this, and therefore forming the comment on the Aphorism next following, is the subject of the legitimate exercise of the Understanding, and its limitation to objects of sense; with the errors both of unbelief and of misbelief, which result from its extension beyond the sphere of possible experience. Wherever the forms of reasoning appropriate only to the natural world are applied to spiritual realities, it may be truly said, that the more strictly logical the reasoning is in all its parts, the more irrational it is as a whole.

To the Reader thus armed and prepared, I now venture to present the so-called mysteries of Faith, that is, the peculiar tenets and especial constituents of Christianity, or religion in spirit and in truth. In right order I must have commenced with the articles of the Trinity and Apostasy, including the question respecting the origin of Evil, and the Incarnation of the Word. And could I have followed this order, some difficulties that now press on me would have been obviated. But the limits of the present Volume render it alike impracticable and inexpedient; for the necessity of my argument would have called forth certain hard though most true sayings, respecting the hollowness and tricksy sophistry of the so-called "natural theology," "religion of nature," "light of nature," and the like, which a brief exposition could not save from innocent misconceptions, much less protect against plausible misinterpretation. And yet both reason and experience have convinced me, that in the greater number of our Alogi, who feed on the husks of Christianity, the disbelief of the Trinity, the divinity of Christ included, has its origin and support in the assumed self-evidence of this natural theology, and in their ignorance of the insurmountable difficulties which on the same mode of reasoning press upon the fundamental articles of their own remnant of a creed. But arguments, which would prove the falsehood of a known truth, must themselves be false, and can prove the falsehood of no other position in eodem genere.

This hint I have thrown out as a spark that may perhaps fall where it will kindle. And, worthily might the wisest of men make inquisition into the three momentous points here spoken
of, for the purposes of speculative insight, and for the formation of enlarged and systematic views of the destination of Man, and the dispensation of God. But the practical Inquirer—(I speak not of those who inquire for the gratification of curiosity, and still less of those who labor as students only to shine as disputants; but of one, who seeks the truth, because he feels the want of it),—the practical inquirer, I say, hath already placed his foot on the rock, if he have satisfied himself that whoever needs not a Redeemer is more than human. Remove from him the difficulties and objections that oppose or perplex his belief of a crucified Saviour; convince him of the reality of sin, which is impossible without a knowledge of its true nature and inevitable consequences; and then satisfy him as to the fact historically, and as to the truth spiritually, of a redemption therefrom by Christ; do this for him, and there is little fear that he will permit either logical quirks or metaphysical puzzles to contravene the plain dictate of his common sense, that the sinless One who redeemed mankind from sin, must have been more than man; and that He who brought light and immortality into the world, could not in his own nature have been an inheritor of death and darkness. It is morally impossible that a man with these convictions should suffer the objection of incomprehensibility, and this on a subject of faith, to overbalance the manifest absurdity and contradiction in the notion of a Mediator between God and the human race, at the same infinite distance from God as the race for whom he mediates.

The origin of Evil, meanwhile, is a question interesting only to the metaphysician, and in a system of moral and religious philosophy. The man of sober mind who seeks for truths that possess a moral and practical interest, is content to be certain, first, that evil must have had a beginning, since otherwise it must either be God, or a co-eternal and co-equal rival of God; both impious notions, and the latter foolish to boot:—secondly, that it could not originate in God; for if so, it would be at once evil and not evil, or God would be at once God, that is, infinite goodness, and not God—both alike impossible positions. Instead, therefore, of troubling himself with this barren controversy, he more profitably turns his inquiries to that evil which most concerns himself, and of which he may find the origin.

The entire scheme of necessary Faith may be reduced to two
heads; first, the object and occasion, and secondly, the fact and effect,—of our redemption by Christ: and to this view does the order of the following Comments correspond. I have begun with Original Sin, and proceeded in the following Aphorism to the doctrine of Redemption. The Comments on the remaining Aphorisms are all subsidiary to these, or written in the hope of making the minor tenets of general belief be believed in a spirit worthy of these. They are, in short, intended to supply a febrifuge against anguish scruples and horrors, the hectic of the soul;—and, in Milton's words, "for servile and thrall-like fear, to substitute that adoptive and cheerful boldness, which our new alliance with God requires of us as Christians." Not the origin of evil, not the chronology of sin, or the chronicles of the original sinner; but sin originant, underived from without, and no passive link in the adamantine chain of effects, each of which is in its turn an instrument of causation, but no one of them a cause;—not with sin inflicted, which would be a calamity;—not with sin (that is, an evil tendency) implanted, for which let the planter be responsible;—but I begin with original sin. And for this purpose I have selected the Aphorism from the ablest and most formidable antagonist of this doctrine, Bishop Jeremy Taylor, and from the most eloquent work of this most eloquent of divines.* Had I said, of men, Cicero would forgive me, and Demosthenes nod assent!†

* See the notes on J. Taylor, *Lit. Rem.* V. p. 194–218.—Ed.
† It does not appear that the Church of England demands the literal understanding of the document contained in the second (from verse 8) and third chapters of Genesis as a point of faith, or regards a different interpretation as affecting the orthodoxy of the interpreter.* divines of the most unimpeachable orthodoxy and the most averse to the allegorizing of Scripture history in general, having from the earliest ages of the Christian Church adopted or permitted it in this instance. And indeed no unprejudiced man can pretend to doubt, that if in any other work of Eastern origin he met with trees of life and of knowledge; or talking and conversable snakes:

\[ \text{In quo rei signum serpentem serpere fuisse;} \]
he would want no other proofs that it was an allegory he was reading, and intended to be understood as such. Nor, if we suppose him conversant with Oriental works of any thing like the same antiquity, could it surprise him to find events of true history in connection with, or historical person-

* See Bp. Horsley's Sermon xvi. 2 Peter i. 20, 21.—Ed.
The question is not whether there be any such thing as original Sin: for it is certain, and confessed on all hands almost. For my part I can not but confess that to be, which I feel and groan under, and by which all the world is miserable.

ages among the actors and interlocutors of the parable. In the temple-language of Egypt the serpent was the symbol of the understanding in its twofold function, namely, as the faculty of means to proximate or medial ends, analogous to the instinct of the more intelligent animals, ant, bee, beaver, and the like, and opposed to practical reason, as the determinant of the ultimate end; and again, as the discursive and logical faculty possessed individually by each individual—the λόγος ἐν ἐκάστῳ, in distinction from the νοῦς, that is, intuitive reason, the source of ideas and absolute truths, and the principle of the necessary and the universal in our affirmations and conclusions. Without or in contravention to the reason—that is, the spiritual mind of St. Paul, and the light that lighteth every man of St. John)—this understanding (φρόνημα σαρκός, or carnal mind) becomes the sophistic principle, the wily tempter to evil by counterfeit good; the pandar and advocate of the passions and appetites: ever in league with, and always first applying to, the desire, as the inferior nature in man, the woman in our humanity; and through the desire prevailing on the will (the manhood, virtue) against the command of the universal reason, and against the light of reason in the will itself. This essential inherence of an intellectual principle (φόρ νοέρόν) in the will (ἀρχή θελητική), or rather the Will itself thus considered, the Greeks expressed by an appropriate word, βουλή. This, but little differing from Origen's interpretation or hypothesis, is supported and confirmed by the very old tradition of the homo androgynus, that is, that the original man, the individual first created, was bisexual;—a chimæra, of which, and of many other mythological traditions, the most probable explanation is, that they were originally symbolical glyphs or sculptures, and afterwards translated into words, yet literally, that is, into the common names of the several figures and images composing the symbol; while the symbolic meaning was left to be deciphered as before, and sacred to the initiate. As to the abstruseness and subtlety of the conceptions, this is so far from being an objection to this oldest gloss on this venerable relic of Semitic, not impossibly ante-diluvian, philosophy, that to those who have carried their researches farthest back into Greek, Egyptian, Persian, and Indian antiquity, it will seem a strong confirmation. Or if I chose to address the skeptic in the language of the day, I might remind him that as alchemy went before chemistry, and astrology before astronomy, so in all countries of civilized men have metaphysics outrun common sense. Fortunately for us that they have so! For from all we know
Adam turned his back upon the sun, and dwelt in the dark and the shadow. He sinned, and fell into God’s displeasure, and was made naked of all his supernatural endowments, was ashamed and sentenced to death, and deprived of the means of long life, and of the sacrament and instrument of immortality, I mean the

of the unmetaphysical tribes of New Holland and elsewhere, a common sense not preceded by metaphysics is no very enviable possession. O be not cheated, my youthful Reader, by this shallow prate! The creed of true common sense is composed of the results of scientific meditation, observation, and experiment, as far as they are generally intelligible. It differs therefore in different countries, and in every different age of the same country. The common sense of a people is the movable index of its average judgment and information. Without metaphysics science could have had no language, and common sense no materials.

But to return to my subject. It can not be denied, that the Mosaic narrative thus interpreted gives a just and faithful exposition of the birth and parentage and successive moments of phenomenal sin (peccatum phænomenon; crimen primarium et commune), that is, of sin as it reveals itself in time, and is an immediate object of consciousness. And in this sense most truly does the Apostle assert, that in Adam we all fell. The first human sinner is the adequate representative of all his successors. And with no less truth may it be said, that it is the same Adam that falls in every man, and from the same reluctance to abandon the too ‘dear and undivorceable Eve: and the same Eve tempted by the same serpentine and perverted understanding, which, framed originally to be the interpreter of the reason and the ministering angel of the spirit, is henceforth sentenced and bound over to the service of the animal nature, its needs and its cravings, dependent on the senses for all its materials, with the world of sense for its appointed sphere: Upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life. I have shown elsewhere, that as the instinct of the mere intelligence differs in degree not in kind, and circumstantially, not essentially, from the vis vitae, or vital power in the assimilative and digestive functions of the stomach and other organs of nutrition, even so the Understanding in itself, and distinct from the Reason and Conscience, differs in degree only from the instinct in the animal. It is still but a beast of the field, though more subtle than any beast of the field, and therefore in its corruption and perversion cursed above any;—a pregnant word! of which if the Reader wants an exposition or paraphrase, he may find one more than two thousand years old among the fragments of the poet Menander. This is the understanding which in its every thought is to be brought under obedience to faith; which it can scarcely fail to be, if only it be first subjected to the reason, of which spiritual faith is even the blossoming and the fructifying process. For it is indifferent whether I say that Faith is the interpenetration of the Reason and the Will, or that it is at once the assurance and the commencement of the approaching union between the reason and
tree of life.* He then fell under the evils of a sickly body, and
a passionate, ignorant, and uninstructed soul. His sin made
him sickly, his sickness made him peevish: his sin left him igno-
rant, his ignorance made him foolish and unreasonable. His sin
left him to his nature: and by his nature, whoever was to be
born at all, was to be born a child, and to do before he could un-
derstand, and to be bred under laws to which he was always
bound, but which could not always be exacted; and he was to
choose when he could not reason, and had passions most strong
the intelligible realities, the living and substantial truths, that are even in
this life its most proper objects.

I have thus put the Reader in possession of my own opinions respecting
the narrative in Gen. ii. and iii. *Εστιν οὖν ὁ χείρ του θεοῦ θεοῦ, νεωτὸς,
μόθος, ἀλθεότατον καὶ ἀρχαιότατον φιλοσόφημα, θεόσθει μὲν αἰζναμα, σύ-
νετοίς τε φωνῶν ἐστὶν ὅτα πᾶν ἡμώνες χατίσει. Or I might ask with August-
tine, why not both! Why not at once symbol and history! Or rather
how should it be otherwise? Must not of necessity the first man be a sym-
bol of mankind in the fullest force of the word symbol, rightly defined;—a
sign included in the idea which it represents;—that is, an actual part chosen
to represent the whole, as a lip with a chin prominent is a symbol of man;
or a lower form or species of a higher in the same kind; thus magnetism is
the symbol of vegetation, and of the vegetative and reproductive power in
animals; the instinct of the ant-tribe or the bee is a symbol of the human
understanding. And this definition of the word is of great practical im-
portance, inasmuch as the symbolical is hereby distinguished toto genere from
the allegoric and metaphorical. But, perhaps, parables, allegories, and
allegorical or typical applications, are incompatible with inspired Scrip-
ture! The writings of St. Paul are sufficient proof of the contrary. Yet I
readily acknowledge that allegorical applications are one thing, and alle-
gorical interpretation another: and that where there is no ground for sup-
posing such a sense to have entered into the intent and purpose of the sacred
penman, they are not to be commended. So far indeed am I from enter-
taining any predilection for them, or any favorable opinion of the Rabbinic-
ical commentators and traditionists, from whom the fashion was derived, that
in carrying it as far as our own Church has carried it, I follow her judg-
ment, not my own. Indeed I know but one other part of the Scriptures not
universally held to be parabolical, which, not without the sanction of great
authorities. I am disposed to regard as an apologue or parable, namely, the
book of Jonah; the reasons for believing the Jewish Nation collectively to
be therein impersonated seeming to me unanswerable. And it is my delib-
erate and conscientious conviction, that the proofs of such interpretation
having been the intention of the inspired writer or compiler of the book of
Genesis lie on the face of the narrative itself.

* Rom. v. 14.—Who were they who had not sinned after the similitude
of Adam's transgression; and over whom notwithstanding, death reigned?
when he had his understanding most weak; and the more need he had of a curb, the less strength he had to use it! And this being the case of all the world, what was every man's evil became all men's greater evil; and though alone it was very bad, yet when they came together it was made much worse. Like ships in a storm, every one alone hath enough to do to outride it; but when they meet, besides the evils of the storm, they find the intolerable calamity of their mutual concussion; and every ship that is ready to be oppressed with the tempest, is a worse tempest to every vessel against which it is violently dashed. So it is in mankind. Every man hath evil enough of his own, and it is hard for a man to live up to the rule of his own reason and conscience. But when he hath parents and children, friends and enemies, buyers and sellers, lawyers and clients, a family and a neighborhood—then it is that every man dashes against another, and one relation requires what another denies; and when one speaks another will contradict him; and that which is well spoken is sometimes innocently mistaken; and that upon a good cause produces an evil effect; and by these, and ten thousand other concurrent causes, man is made more than most miserable*

COMMENT.

The first question we should put to ourselves, when we have to read a passage that perplexes us in a work of authority, is: What does the writer mean by all this? And the second question should be, What does he intend by all this? In the passage before us, Taylor's meaning is not quite clear. A sin is an evil which has its ground or origin in the agent, and not in the compulsion of circumstances. Circumstances are compulsory from the absence of a power to resist or control them: and if this absence likewise be the effect of circumstance (that is, if it have been neither directly nor indirectly caused by the agent himself), the evil derives from the circumstances; and therefore (in the Apostle's sense of the word, sin, when he speaks of the exceeding sinfulness of sin) such evil is not sin; and the person who suffers it, or who is the compelled instrument of its infliction on others, may feel regret, but can not feel remorse. So likewise of the word origin, original, or originant. The Reader can not too early

* Deus Justificatus, with some slight omissions and alterations.—Ed.
be warned that it is not applicable, and, without abuse of language, can never be applied, to a mere link in a chain of effects, where each, indeed, stands in the relation of a cause to those that follow, but is at the same time the effect of all that precede. For in these cases a cause amounts to little more than an antecedent. At the utmost it means only a conductor of the causative influence; and the old axiom, causa causa causa causa causati, applies with a never-ending regress to each several link, up the whole chain of nature. But this is Nature: and no natural thing or act can be called originant,* or be truly said to have an origin† in any other. The moment we assume an origin in na-

* * * wherein they are not guilty,

Since Nature can not choose his origin.

Hamlet, Act I. sc. iv.—Am. Ed.

† This sense of the word is implied even in its metaphorical or figurative use. Thus we may say of a river that it originates in such or such a fountain; but the water of a canal is derived from such or such a river. The power which we call Nature, may be thus defined: a power subject to the law of continuity (lex continui; nam in natura non datur saltus) which law the human understanding, by a necessity arising out of its own constitution, can conceive only under the form of cause and effect. That this form or law of cause and effect is, relatively to the world without, or to things as they subsist independently of our perceptions, only a form or mode of thinking; that it is a law inherent in the understanding itself just as the symmetry of the miscellaneous objects seen by the kaleidoscope inheres in, or results from, the mechanism of the kaleidoscope itself—this becomes evident as soon as we attempt to apply the preconception directly to any operation of nature. For in this case we are forced to represent the cause as being at the same instant the effect, and vice versa the effect as being the cause—a relation which we seek to express by the terms action and re-action; but for which the term reciprocal action, or the law of reciprocity (Wechselwirkung), would be both more accurate and more expressive.

These are truths which can scarcely be too frequently impressed on the mind that is in earnest in the wish to reflect aright. Nature is a line in constant and continuous evolution. Its beginning is lost in the supernatural: and for our understanding therefore it must appear as a continuous line without beginning or end. But where there is no discontinuity there can be no origination, and every appearance of origination in nature is but a shadow of our own casting. It is a reflection from our own will or spirit. Herein, indeed, the will consists. This is the essential character by which Will is opposed to Nature, as spirit, and raised above nature as self-determining spirit—this namely, that it is a power of originating an act or state.

A young friend, or as he was pleased to describe himself, a pupil of mine,
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ture, a true beginning, an actual first—that moment we rise above nature, and are compelled to assume a supernatural power. (Gen. i. 1.)

It will be an equal convenience to myself and to my Reader, to let it be agreed between us, that we will generalize the word who is beginning to learn to think, asked me to explain by an instance what is meant by "originating an act or state." My answer was—This morning I awoke with a dull pain, which I knew from experience the getting up would remove: and yet by adding to the drowsiness and by weakening or depressing the volition (voluntas sensorialis seu mechanica), the very pain seemed to hold me back, to fix me, as it were, to the bed. After a peevish ineffectual quarrel with this painful disinclination, I said to myself: Let me count twenty, and the moment I come to nineteen I will leap out of bed. So said, and so done. Now should you ever find yourself in the same or in a similar state, and should attend to the goings-on within you, you will learn what I mean by originating an act. At the same time you will see that it belongs exclusively to the will (arbítrium); that there is nothing analogous to it in outward experiences; and that I had, therefore, no way of explaining it but by referring you to an act of your own, and to the peculiar self-consciousness preceding and accompanying it. As we know what life is by being, so we know what will is by acting. That in willing, replied my friend, we appear to ourselves to constitute an actual beginning, and that this seems unique, and without any example in our sensible experience, or in the phænomena of nature, is an undeniable fact. But may it not be an illusion arising from our ignorance of the antecedent causes? You may suppose this, I rejoined:—that the soul of every man should impose a lie on itself; and that this lie, and the acting on the faith of its being the most important of all truths, and the most real of all realities, should form the main contra-distinctive character of humanity, and the only basis of that distinction between things and persons on which our whole moral and criminal law is grounded;—you may suppose this;—I can not, as I could in the case of an arithmetical or geometrical proposition, render it impossible for you to suppose it. Whether you can reconcile such a supposition with the belief of an all-wise Creator, is another question. But, taken singly, it is doubtless in your power to suppose this. Were it not, the belief of the contrary would be no subject of a command, no part of a moral or religious duty. You would not, however, suppose it without a reason. But all the pretexts that ever have been or ever can be offered for this supposition, are built on certain notions of the understanding that have been generalized from conceptions; which conceptions, again, are themselves generalized or abstracted from objects of sense. Neither the one nor the other, therefore, have any force except in application to objects of sense, and within the sphere of sensible experience. What but absurdity can follow, if you decide on spirit by the laws of matter;—if you judge that, which if it be at all must be supersensual, by that faculty of your mind, the very definition of which is "the faculty judging according to sense?"
circumstance, so as to understand by it, as often as it occurs in this Comment, all and everything not connected with the Will, past or present, of a free agent. Even though it were the blood in the chambers of his heart, or his own inmost sensations, we will regard them as circumstantial, extrinsic, or from without.

In this sense of the word, original, and in the sense before given of sin, it is evident that the phrase, Original Sin, is a pleonasm, the epithet not adding to the thought, but only enforcing it. For if it be sin, it must be original; and a state or act, that has not its origin in the will, may be calamity, deformity, disease, or mischief; but a sin it can not be. It is not enough that the act appears voluntary, or that it is intentional; or that it has the most hateful passions or debasing appetite for its proximate cause.

These then are unworthy the name of reasons: they are only pretexts. But without reason to contradict your own consciousness in defiance of your own conscience, is contrary to reason. Such and such writers, you say, have made a great sensation. If so, I am sorry for it; but the fact I take to be this. From a variety of causes the more austere sciences have fallen into discredit, and impostors have taken advantage of the general ignorance to give a sort of mysterious and terrific importance to a parcel of trashy sophistry, the authors of which would not have employed themselves more irrationally in submitting the works of Raffaello or Titian to canons of criticism deduced from the sense of smell. Nay, less so. For here the objects and the organs are disparate: while in the other case they are absolutely diverse. I conclude this note by reminding the Reader, that my first object is to make myself understood. When he is in full possession of my meaning, then let him consider whether it deserves to be received as the truth. Had it been my immediate purpose to make him believe me as well as understand me, I should have thought it necessary to warn him that a finite will does indeed originate an act, and may originate a state of being; but yet only in and for the agent himself. A finite will constitutes a true beginning; but with regard to the series of motions and changes by which the free act is manifested and made effectual, the finite will gives a beginning only by coincidence with that Absolute Will, which is at the same time Infinite Power. Such is the language of religion, and of philosophy too in the last instance. But I express the same truth in ordinary language when I say, that a finite will or the will of a finite free agent, acts outwardly by confluence with the laws of nature.

(The student will find the fullest development that has yet been made of this most fundamental and most important distinction between Nature and Spirit, or Will, in Kant's Kritik der practischen Vernunft, and in Jacobi's Von göttlichen Dingen, pp. 388-428, vol. iii. Leipsic, 1818. See also Fichte's Bestimmung des Menschen, p. 266, et seq. for many forcible statements respecting the Will as originant in its essence.—Am. Ed.)
and accompaniment. All these may be found in a madhouse, where neither law nor humanity permits us to condemn the actor of sin. The reason of law declares the maniac not a free-agent; and the verdict follows of course—Not guilty. Now mania, as distinguished from idiocy, frenzy, delirium, hypochondria, and de
dangement (the last term used specifically to express a suspen
sion or disordered state of the understanding or adaptive power), is the occultation or eclipse of reason, as the power of ultimate ends. The maniac, it is well known, is often found clever and inventive in the selection and adaptation of means to his ends; but his ends are madness. He has lost his reason. For though reason in finite beings, is not the will—or how could the will be opposed to the reason?—yet it is the condition, the sine qua non of a free will.

We will now return to the extract from Taylor on a theme of deep interest in itself, and trebly important from its bearings. For without just and distinct views respecting the Article of Original Sin, it is impossible to understand aright any one of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity. Now my first complaint is, that the eloquent Bishop, while he admits the fact as established beyond controversy by universal experience, yet leaves us wholly in the dark as to the main point, supplies us with no answer to the principal question—why he names it Original Sin? It can not be said, We know what the Bishop means, and what matters the name?—for the nature of the fact, and in what light it should be regarded by us, depends on the nature of our answer to the question, whether Original Sin is or is not the right and proper designation. I can imagine the same quantum of suffer
ings, and yet if I had reason to regard them as symptoms of a commencing change, as pains of growth, the temporary deformity and misproportions of immaturity, or (as in the final sloughing of the caterpillar) the throes and struggles of the waxing or evolv
ing Psyche, I should think it no Stoical flight to doubt, how far I was authorized to declare the circumstance an evil at all. Most assuredly I would not express or describe the fact as an evil hav
ing an origin in the sufferers themselves, or as sin.

Let us, however, waive this objection. Let it be supposed that the Bishop uses the word in a different and more compre
hensive sense, and that by sin he understands evil of all kind connected with or resulting from actions—though I do not see
how we can represent the properties even of inanimate bodies (of poisonous substances for instance) except as acts resulting from the constitution of such bodies. Or if this sense, though not unknown to the mystic divines, should be too comprehensive and remote, I will suppose the Bishop to comprise under the term Sin, the evil accompanying or consequent on human actions and purposes:—though here, too, I have a right to be informed, for what reason and on what grounds sin is thus limited to human agency? And truly, I should be at no loss to assign the reason. But then this reason would instantly bring me back to my first definition; and any other reason, than that the human agent is endowed with reason, and with a will which can place itself either in subjection or in opposition to his reason—in other words, that man is alone of all known animals a responsible creature—I neither know nor can imagine.

Thus, then, the sense which Taylor—and with him the antagonists generally of this Article as propounded by the first Reformers—attaches to the words, Original Sin, needs only be carried on into its next consequence, and it will be found to imply the sense which I have given—namely, that sin is evil having an origin. But inasmuch as it is evil, in God it can not originate: and yet in some Spirit (that is, in some supernatural power) it must. For in nature there is no origin. Sin therefore is spiritual evil: but the spiritual in man is the will. Now when we do not refer to any particular sins, but to that state and constitution of the will, which is the ground, condition, and common cause of all sins; and when we would further express the truth, that this corrupt nature of the will must in some sense or other be considered as its own act, that the corruption must have been self-originated;—in this case and for this purpose we may, with no less propriety than force, entitle this dire spiritual evil and source of all evil, which is absolutely such, Original Sin. I have said, the corrupt nature of the will. I might add, that the admission of a nature into a spiritual essence by its own act is a corruption.

Such, I repeat, would be the inevitable conclusion, if Taylor's sense of the term were carried on into its immediate consequences. But the whole of his most eloquent Treatise makes it certain that Taylor did not carry it on: and consequently Original Sin, according to his conception, is a calamity, which being common to all men must be supposed to result from their com-
Can we wonder, then, that a mind, a heart, like Taylor's, should reject, that he should strain his faculties to explain away the belief that this calamity, so dire in itself, should appear to the All-merciful God a rightful cause and motive for inflicting on the wretched sufferers a calamity infinitely more tremendous;—nay, that it should be incompatible with Divine Justice not to punish it by everlasting torment? Or need we be surprised if he found nothing that could reconcile his mind to such a belief, in the circumstance that the acts now consequent on this calamity, and either directly or indirectly effects of the same, were, five or six thousand years ago in the instance of a certain individual and his accomplice, anterior to the calamity, and the cause or occasion of the same;—that what in all other men is disease, in these two persons was guilt;—that what in us is hereditary, and consequently nature, in them was original, and consequently sin? Lastly, might it not be presumed, that so enlightened, and at the same time so affectionate, a divine would even fervently disclaim and reject the pretended justifications of God grounded on flimsy analogies drawn from the imperfections of human ordinances and human justice-courts—some of very doubtful character even as human institutes, and all of them just only as far as they are necessary; and rendered necessary chiefly by the weakness and wickedness, the limited powers and corrupt passions, of mankind? The more confidently might this be presumed of so acute and practised a logician, as Taylor, in addition to his other extraordinary gifts, is known to have been, when it is demonstrable that the most current of these justifications rests on a palpable equivocation: namely, the gross misuse of the word Right.* An instance will explain my meaning. In as far as,

* It may conduce to the readier comprehension of this point if I say, that the equivoque consists in confounding the almost technical sense of the noun substantive, right (a sense most often determined by the genitive case following, as the right of property, the right of husbands to chastise their wives, and so forth) with the popular sense of the adjective, right: though this likewise has, if not a double sense, yet a double application;—the first, when it is used to express the fitness of a mean to a relative end; for example, "the right way to obtain the right distance at which a picture should be examined," and the like; and the other, when it expresses a perfect conformity and commensurateness with the immutable idea of equity, or per-
from the known frequency of dishonest or mischievous persons, it
may have been found necessary, in so far is the law justifiable in
giving landowners the right of proceeding against a neighbor or
fellow-citizen for even a slight trespass on that which the law
has made their property: nay, of proceeding in sundry instances
criminally and even capitally. But surely, either there is no re-
ligion in the world, and nothing obligatory in the precepts of the
Gospel, or there are occasions in which it would be very wrong
in the proprietor to exercise the right, which yet it may be highly
expedient that he should possess. On this ground it is, that reli-
gion is the sustaining opposite of the law.

That Taylor, therefore, should have striven fervently against
the Article so interpreted and so vindicated, is (for me at least) a
subject neither of surprise nor of complaint. It is the doctrine
which he substitutes; it is the weakness and inconsistency be-
trayed in the defence of this substitute; it is the unfairness with
which he blackens the established Article—for to give it, as it
had been caricatured by a few Ultra-Calvinists during the fever

fect rectitude. Hence the close connection between the words righteousness
and godliness, that is, godlikeness.

I should be tempted to subjoin a few words on a predominating doctrine
closely connected with the present argument—the Paleyan principle of
general consequences; but the inadequacy of this principle as a criterion
of right and wrong, and above all its utter unfitness as a moral guide, have
been elsewhere so fully stated (Friend, Essay xv, II, p. 285), that even
in again referring to the subject I must shelter myself under Seneca's rule,
that what we cannot too frequently think of, we cannot too often be made
torecollect. It is, however, of immediate importance to the point in dis-
cussion, that the reader should be made to see how altogether incompatible
the principle of judging by general consequences is with the idea of an
Eternal, Omniscient Being;—that he should be made
aware of the absurdity of attributing any form of generalization to the All-
perfect Mind. To generalize is a faculty and function of the human under-
standing, and from the imperfection and limitation of the understanding are
the use and the necessity of generalizing derived. Generalization is a sub-
stitute for intuition, for the power of intuitive, that is, immediate knowl-
edge. As a substitute, it is a gift of inestimable value to a finite intelli-
gence, such as man in his present state is endowed with and capable of ex-
ercising; but yet a substitute only, and an imperfect one to boot. To at-
tribute it to God is the grossest anthropomorphism: and grosser instances
of anthropomorphism than are to be found in the controversial writings on
Original Sin and Vicarious Satisfaction, the records of superstition do not
supply.
of the (so-called) Quinquarticular controversy, was in effect to blacken it—and then imposes another scheme, to which the same objections apply with even increased force, a scheme which seems to differ from the former only by adding fraud and mockery to injustice;—these are the things that excite my wonder; it is of these that I complain. For what does the Bishop's scheme amount to? God, he tells us, required of Adam a perfect obedience, and made it possible by endowing him "with perfect rectitude and supernatural heights of grace" proportionate to the obedience which he required. As a consequence of his disobedience, Adam lost this rectitude, this perfect sanity and proportionateness of his intellectual, moral and corporeal state, powers and impulses; and as the penalty of his crime, he was deprived of all supernatural aids and graces. The death, with whatever is comprised in the Scriptural sense of the word, death, began from that moment to work in him, and this consequence he conveyed to his offspring, and through them to all his posterity, that is, to all mankind. They were born diseased in mind, body and will. For what less than disease can we call a necessity of error and a predisposition to sin and sickness? Taylor, indeed, asserts, that though perfect obedience became incomparably more difficult, it was not, however, absolutely impossible. Yet he himself admits that the contrary was universal; that of the countless millions of Adam's posterity, not a single individual ever realized, or approached to the realization of, this possibility; and (if my memory* does not deceive me) Taylor himself has elsewhere exposed—and if he has not, yet common sense will do it for him—the sophistry in asserting of a whole what may be true of the whole, but is in fact true

* I have, since this page was written, met with several passages in the Treatise on Repentance, the Holy Living and Dying, and the Worthy Communicant, in which the Bishop asserts without scruple the impossibility of total obedience; and on the same grounds as I have given.

[See the Doctrine and Practice of Repentance, c. I. s. 2, "—who—conclude that is possible to keep the commandments, though as yet no man ever did, but he that did it for us all." xv. "But in the moral sense, that is, when we consider what man is, and what are his strengths, and how many his enemies, and how soon he falls, and that he forgets when he should remember, and his faculties are asleep when they should be awake, and he is hindered by intervening accidents, and weakened and determined by superinduced qualities, habits and necessities,—the keeping of the commandments is morally impossible." xxxiv.—Ed.]
AIDS TO REFLECTION.

only of each of its component parts. Any one may snap a horse-

hair: therefore, any one may perform the same feat with the 
horse's tail. On a level floor (on the hardened sand for instance, 
of a sea-beach) I chalk two parallel straight lines, with a width 
of eight inches. It is possible for a man, with a bandage over 
his eyes, to keep within the path for two or three paces: there-
fore, it is possible for him to walk blindfold for two or three 
leagues without a single deviation! And this possibility would 
suffice to acquit me of injustice, though I had placed man-traps 
within an inch of one line, and knew that there were pit-falls 
and deep wells beside the other!

This assertion, therefore, without adverting to its discordance 
with, if not direct contradiction to, the tenth and thirteenth Arti-

cles of our Church, I shall not, I trust, be thought to rate below 
its true value, if I treat it as an infinitesimal possibility that may 
be safely dropped in the calculation: and so proceed with the argu-
ment. The consequence then of Adam's crime was, by a na-
tural necessity, inherited by persons who could not (the Bishop 
affirms) in any sense have been accomplices in the crime or par-
takers in the guilt: and yet consistently with the divine holiness, 
it was not possible that the same perfect obedience should not be 
required of them. Now what would the idea of equity, what 
would the law inscribed by the Creator on the heart of man, 
seem to dictate in this case? Surely, that the supplementary 
aids, the supernatural graces correspondent to a law above na-
ture, should be increased in proportion to the diminished strength 
of the agents, and the increased resistance to be overcome by 
them. But no! not only the consequence of Adam's act, but the 
penalty due to his crime, was perpetuated. His descendants 
were despoiled or left destitute of these aids and graces, while the 
obligation to perfect obedience was continued; an obligation too, 
the non-fulfilment of which brought with it death and the unut-
terable woe that cleaves to an immortal soul forever alienated 
from its Creator.

Observe that all these results of Adam's fall enter into Bishop 
Taylor's scheme of Original Sin equally as into that of the first 
Reformers. In this respect the Bishop's doctrine is the same 
with that laid down in the Articles and Homilies of the English 
Church. The only difference that has hitherto appeared, cons-
sists in the aforesaid mathematical possibility of fulfilling the
whole law, which in the Bishop's scheme is affirmed to remain still in human nature,* or (as it is elsewhere expressed) in the nature of the human will.† But though it were possible to grant this existence of a power in all men, which in no man was ever exemplified, and where the non-actualization of such power is, a priori, so certain, that the belief or imagination of the contrary in any individual is expressly given us by the Holy Spirit as a test, whereby it may be known that the truth is not in him, as an infallible sign of imposture or self-delusion!—though it were possible to grant this, which, consistently with Scripture and the principles of reasoning which we apply in all other cases, it is not possible to grant; and though it were possible likewise to over—

* "There is a natural possibility and a moral: there are abilities in every man to do any thing that is there commanded, and he that can do well today, may do so to-morrow; in the nature of things this is true: and since every sin is a breach of law, which a man might and ought to have kept, it is naturally certain, that whenever any man did break the commandment, he might have done otherwise. In man, therefore, speaking naturally and of the physical possibilities of things, there is by those assistances which are given in the Gospel, ability to keep the commandments evangelical. But in the moral sense," &c. ubi supra.—Ed.

† Availing himself of the equivocal sense, and (I most readily admit) the injudicious use of the word "free" in the—even on this account—faulty phrase, "free only to sin," Taylor treats the notion of a power in the will of determining itself to evil without an equal power of determining itself to good, as a "foolery." I would this had been the only instance in his Deus Justificatus of that inconsiderate contempt so frequent in the polemic treaties of minor divines, who will have ideas of reason, spiritual truths that can only be spiritually discerned, translated for them into adequate conceptions of the understanding. The great articles of Corruption and Redemption are propounded to us as spiritual mysteries; and every interpretation that pretends to explain them into comprehensible notions, does by its very success furnish presumptive proof of its failure. The acuteness and logical dexterity, with which Taylor has brought out the falsehood, or semblance of falsehood, in the Calvinistic scheme, are truly admirable. Had he next concentrated his thoughts in tranquil meditation, and asked himself: what then is the truth!—if a Will be at all, what must a Will be?—he might, I think, have seen that a nature in a will implies already a corruption of that will: that a nature is as inconsistent with freedom as free choice with an incapacity of choosing aught but evil. And lastly, a free power in a nature to fulfill a law above nature!—I, who love and honor this good and great man with all the reverence that can dwell "on this side idolatry," dare not retort on this assertion the charge of foolery; but I find it a paradox as startling to my reason as any of the hard sayings of the Dort divines were to his understanding.
look the glaring sophistry of concluding in relation to a series of indeterminate length, that whoever can do any one, can therefore do all; a conclusion, the futility of which must force itself on the common sense of every man who understands the proposition; still the question will arise—Why, and on what principle of equity, were the unoffending sentenced to be born with so fearful a disproportion of their powers to their duties? Why were they subjected to a law, the fulfilment of which was all but impossible, yet the penalty on the failure tremendous? Admit that for those who had never enjoyed a happier lot, it was no punishment to be made to inhabit a ground which the Creator had cursed, and to have been born with a body prone to sickness, and a soul surrounded with temptation, and having the worst temptation within itself in its own temptability;—to have the duties of a Spirit with the wants and appetites of an Animal! Yet on such imperfect creatures, with means so scanty and impediments so numerous, to impose the same task-work that had been required of a creature with a pure and entire nature, and provided with supernatural aids—if this be not to inflict a penalty; yet to be placed under a law, the difficulty of obeying which is infinite, and to have momently to struggle with this difficulty, and to live momently in hazard of these consequences—if this be no punishment;—words have no correspondence with thoughts, and thoughts are but shadows of each other, shadows that own no substance for their antitype.

Of such an outrage on common sense Taylor was incapable. He himself calls it a penalty; he admits that in effect it is a punishment: nor does he seek to suppress the question that so naturally arises out of this admission;—on what principle of equity were the innocent offspring of Adam punished at all? He meets it, and puts in an answer. He states the problem, and gives his solution—namely, that "God on Adam's account was so exasperated with mankind, that being angry he would still continue the punishment!"—"The case" (says the Bishop) "is this: Jonathan and Michal were Saul's children. It came to pass that seven of Saul's issue were to be hanged: all equally innocent, equally culpable." [Before I quote further, I feel myself called on to remind the reader, that these last two words were added by Taylor, without the least grounds in Scripture, according to which (2 Sam. xxi.) no crime was laid to their charge,
no blame imputed to them. Without any pretence of culpable conduct on their part, they were arraigned as children of Saul, and sacrificed to a point of state-expedience. In recommencing the quotation, therefore, the reader ought to let the sentence conclude with the words—"all equally innocent." David took the five sons of Michal, for she had left him unhandsomely. Jonathan was his friend: and therefore he spared his son, Mephibosheth. Now here it was indifferent as to the guilt of the persons (bear in mind, Reader, that no guilt was attached to any of them!) whether David should take the sons of Michal, or Jonathan's; but it is likely that as upon the kindness that David had to Jonathan, he spared his son: so upon the just provocation of Michal, he made that evil fall upon them, which, it may be, they should not have suffered, if their mother had been kind. Adam was to God, as Michal to David."

This answer, this solution, proceeding too from a divine so preeminently gifted, and occurring (with other passages not less startling) in a vehement refutation of the received doctrine, on the express ground of its opposition to the clearest conceptions and best feelings of mankind—this it is that surprises me. It is of this that I complain. The Almighty Father exasperated with those, whom the Bishop has himself in the same Treatise described as "innocent and most unfortunate"—the two things best fitted to conciliate love and pity! Or though they did not remain innocent, yet those whose abandonment to a mere nature, while they were left amenable to a law above nature, he affirms to be the irresistible cause, that they one and all did sin! And this decree illustrated and justified by its analogy to one of the worst actions of an imperfect mortal! From such of my Readers as will give a thoughtful perusal to these works of Taylor, I dare anticipate a concurrence with the judgment which I here transcribe from the blank space at the end of the Deus Justificatus in my own copy; and which, though twenty years have elapsed since it was written, I have never seen reason to recant or modify. "This most eloquent Treatise may be compared to a statue of Janus, with the one face, which we must suppose fronting the Calvinistic tenet, entire and fresh, as from the master's hand; beaming with life and force, witty scorn on the lip, and a brow at once bright and weighty with satisfying reason:—the other,
looking toward the "something to be put in its place," maimed, featureless, and weather-bitten into an almost visionary confusion and indistinctness."

With these expositions I hasten to contrast the Scriptural article respecting Original Sin, or the corrupt and sinful nature of the human Will, and the belief which alone is required of us as Christians. And here the first thing to be considered, and which will at once remove a world of error, is; that this is no tenet first introduced or imposed by Christianity, and which, should a man see reason to disclaim the authority of the Gospel, would no longer have any claim on his attention. It is no perplexity that a man may get rid of by ceasing to be a Christian, and which has no existence for a philosophic Deist. It is a fact affirmed, indeed, in the Christian Scriptures alone with the force and frequency proportioned to its consummate importance; but a fact acknowledged in every religion that retains the least glimmering of the patriarchal faith in a God infinite, yet personal:—a fact assumed or implied as the basis of every religion, of which any relics remain of earlier date than the last and total apostasy of the Pagan world, when the faith in the great I Am, the Creator, was extinguished in the sensual Polytheism, which is inevitably the final result of Pantheism, or the worship of Nature; and the only form under which the Pantheistic scheme—that, according to which the World is God, and the material universe itself the one only absolute Being—can exist for a people, or become the popular creed. Thus in the most ancient books of the Brahmins, the deep sense of this fact, and the doctrines grounded on obscure traditions of the promised remedy, are seen struggling, and now gleaming, now flashing, through the mist of Pantheism, and producing the incongruities and gross contradictions of the Brahmin Mythology; while in the rival sect—in that most strange phenomenon, the religious Atheism of the Buddhists, with whom God is only universal matter considered abstractedly from all particular forms—the fact is placed among the delusions natural to man, which, together with other superstitions grounded on a supposed essential difference between right and wrong, the sage is to decompose and precipitate from the menstruum of his more refined apprehensions! Thus in denying the fact, they virtually acknowledge it.

From the remote East, turn to the mythology of the Lesser Asia, to the descendants of Javan, who dwelt in the tents of Shem, and possessed the isles. Here, again, and in the usual form of an historic solution, we find the same fact, and as characteristic of the human race, stated in that earliest and most venerable mythus, or symbolic parable of Prometheus—that truly wonderful fable, in which the characters of the rebellious Spirit and of the Divine Friend of mankind (Θεός φιλάνθρωπος) are united in the same person;* thus in the most striking manner noting the forced amalgamation of the Patriarchal tradition with the incongruous scheme of Pantheism. This and the connected tale of Io, which is but the sequel of the Prometheus, stand alone in the Greek Mythology, in which elsewhere both gods and men are mere powers and products of nature. And most noticeable it is, that soon after the promulgation and spread of the Gospel had awakened the moral sense, and had opened the eyes even of its wiser enemies to the necessity of providing some solution of this great problem of the moral world, the beautiful parable of Cupid and Psyche was brought forward as a rival Fall of Man: and the fact of a moral corruption connatural with the human race was again recognized. In the assertion of Original Sin the Greek Mythology rose and set:

But not only was the fact acknowledged of a law in the nature of man resisting the law of God (and whatever is placed in active and direct oppugnancy to the good is, ipso facto, positive evil); it was likewise an acknowledged mystery, and one which by the nature of the subject must ever remain such—a problem, of which any other solution than the statement of the fact itself was demonstrably impossible. That it is so, the least reflection will suffice to convince every man, who has previously satisfied himself that he is a responsible being. It follows necessarily from the postulate of a responsible will. Refuse to grant this, and I have not a word to say. Concede this, and you concede all. For this is the essential attribute of a will, and contained in the very idea, that whatever determines the will, acquires this power from a previous determination of the will itself. The will is ultimately self-determined, or it is no longer a will under the law of perfect freedom, but a nature under the mechanism of cause and effect. And if by an act, to which it had determined

* See Lit. Remains, IV. pp. 344–365.—Ed.
itself, it has subjected itself to the determination of nature (in the language of St. Paul, to the law of the flesh), it receives a nature into itself, and so far it becomes a nature: and this is a corruption of the will and a corrupt nature. It is also a fall of man, inasmuch as his will is the condition of his personality; the ground and condition of the attribute which constitutes him man. And the ground-work of personal being is a capacity of acknowledging the moral law (the law of the Spirit, the law of freedom, the Divine Will) as that which should, of itself, suffice to determine the will to a free obedience of the law, the law working therein by its own exceeding lawfulness.* This, and this alone, is positive good; good in itself, and independent of all relations. Whatever resists, and, as a positive force, opposes this in the will, is therefore evil. But an evil in the will, is an evil will; and as all moral evil (that is, all evil that is evil without reference to its contingent physical consequences) is of the will, this evil will must have its source in the will. And thus we might go back from act to act, from evil to evil, ad infinitum, without advancing a step.

We call an individual a bad man, not because an action of his is contrary to the law, but because it has led us to conclude from it some principle opposed to the law, some private maxim or by-law in his will contrary to the universal law of right reason in the conscience, as the ground of the action. But this evil principle again must be grounded in some other principle which has been made determinant of his will by the will's own self-determination. For if not, it must have its ground in some necessity of nature, in some instinct or propensity imposed, not acquired, another's work not his own. Consequently neither act nor principle could be imputed; and relatively to the agent, not original, not sin.

Now let the grounds on which the fact of an evil inherent in the will is affirmable in the instance of any one man, be supposed equally applicable in every instance, and concerning all men: so that the fact is asserted of the individual, not because he has committed this or that crime, or because he has shown himself to be this or that man, but simply because he is a man. Let the evil be supposed such as to imply the impossibility of an individual's referring to any particular time at which it might be con-

* If the law worked on the will, it would be the working of an intrinsic and alien force, and, as St. Paul profoundly argues, would prove the will sinful.
ceived to have commenced, or to any period of his existence at which it was not existing. Let it be supposed, in short, that the subject stands in no relation whatever to time, can neither be called in time nor out of time; but that all relations of time are as alien and heterogeneous in this question, as the relations and attributes of space (north or south, round or square, thick or thin) are to our affections and moral feelings. Let the Reader suppose this, and he will have before him the precise import of the Scriptural doctrine of Original Sin; or rather of the fact acknowledged in all ages, and recognized, but not originating, in the Christian Scriptures.

In addition to this it will be well to remind the inquirer, that the steadfast conviction of the existence, personality, and moral attributes of God, is presupposed in the acceptance of the Gospel, or required as its indispensable preliminary. It is taken for granted as a point which the hearer had already decided for himself, a point finally settled and put at rest: not by the removal of all difficulties, or by any such increase of insight as enabled him to meet every objection of the Epicurean or the Skeptic, with a full and precise answer; but because he had convinced himself that it was folly as well as presumption in so imperfect a creature to expect it; and because these difficulties and doubts disappeared at the beam, when tried against the weight and convic-
tive power of the reasons in the other scale. It is, therefore, most unfair to attack Christianity, or any article which the Church has declared a Christian doctrine, by arguments, which, if valid, are valid against all religion. Is there a disputant who scorns a mere postulate, as the basis of any argument in support of the faith; who is too high-minded to beg his ground, and will take it by a strong hand? Let him fight it out with the Atheists, or the Manicheans; but not stoop to pick up their arrows, and then run away to discharge them at Christianity or the Church!

The only true way is to state the doctrine, believed as well by Saul of Tarsus, yet breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the Church of Christ, as by Paul the Apostle, fully preaching the Gospel of Christ. A moral evil is an evil that has its origin in a will. An evil common to all must have a ground common to all. But the actual existence of moral evil we are bound in conscience to admit; and that there is an evil common to all is a fact; and this evil must therefore have a
common ground. Now this evil ground can not originate in the Divine Will: it must therefore be referred to the will of man. And this evil ground we call original sin. It is a mystery, that is, a fact, which we see, but can not explain; and the doctrine a truth which we apprehend, but can neither comprehend nor communicate. And such by the quality of the subject (namely, a responsible will) it must be, if it be truth at all.

A sick man, whose complaint was as obscure as his sufferings were severe and notorious, was thus addressed by a humane stranger: “My poor Friend! I find you dangerously ill, and on this account only, and having certain information of your being so, and that you have not wherewithal to pay for a physician, I have come to you. Respecting your disease, indeed, I can tell you nothing that you are capable of understanding, more than you know already, or can only be taught by reflection on your own experience. But I have rendered the disease no longer irremediable. I have brought the remedy with me: and I now offer you the means of immediate relief, with the assurance of gradual convalescence, and a final perfect cure; nothing more being required on your part, but your best endeavors to follow the prescriptions I shall leave with you. It is, indeed, too probable, from the nature of your disease, that you will occasionally neglect or transgress them. But even this has been calculated on in the plan of your cure, and the remedies provided, if only you are sincere and in right earnest with yourself, and have your heart in the work. Ask me not how such a disease can be conceived possible. Enough for the present that you know it to be real: and I come to cure the disease, not to explain it.”

Now, what if the patient or some of his neighbors should charge this good Samaritan with having given rise to the mischievous notion of an inexplicable disease, involving the honor of the king of the country,—should inveigh against him as the author and first introducer of the notion, though of the numerous medical works composed ages before his arrival, and by physicians of the most venerable authority, it was scarcely possible to open a single volume without finding some description of the disease, or some lamentation of its malignant and epidemic character;—and, lastly, what if certain pretended friends of this good Samaritan, in their zeal to vindicate him against this absurd charge, should assert that he was a perfect stranger to this disease, and
boldly deny that he had ever said or done any thing connected with it, or that implied its existence?

In this apologue or imaginary case, Reader! you have the true bearings of Christianity on the fact and doctrine of Original Sin. The doctrine (that is, the confession of a known fact) Christianity has only in common with every religion, and with every philosophy, in which the reality of a responsible will, and the essential difference between good and evil, have been recognized. Peculiar to the Christian religion are the remedy and (for all purposes but those of a merely speculative curiosity) the solution. By the annunciation of the remedy it affords all the solution which our moral interests require; and even in that which remains, and must remain, unfathomable, the Christian finds a new motive to walk humbly with the Lord his God.

Should a professed believer ask you, whether that which is the ground of responsible action in your will could in any way be responsibly present in the will of Adam,—answer him in these words: "You, Sir! can no more demonstrate the negative, than I can conceive the affirmative. The corruption of my will may very warrantably be spoken of as a consequence of Adam's fall, even as my birth of Adam's existence; as a consequence, a link in the historic chain of instances, whereof Adam is the first. But that it is on account of Adam; or that this evil principle was, à priori, inserted or infused into my will by the will of another—which is indeed a contradiction in terms, my will in such case being no will—this is nowhere asserted in Scripture explicitly or by implication." It belongs to the very essence of the doctrine, that in respect of original sin every man is the adequate representative of all men. What wonder, then, that where no inward ground of preference existed, the choice should be determined by outward relations, and that the first in time should be taken as the diagram! Even in the book of Genesis the word Adam is distinguished from a proper name by an article before it. It is the Adam, so as to express the genus, not the individual—or rather, perhaps, I should say, as well as the individual. But that the word with its equivalent, the old man, is used symbolically and universally by St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 22, 45. Eph. iv. 22. Col. iii. 9. Rom. vi. 6), is too evident to need any proof.

I conclude with this remark. The doctrine of Original Sin concerns all men. But it concerns Christians in particular no
otherwise than by its connection with the doctrine of Redemption; and with the divinity and divine humanity of the Redeemer, as a corollary or necessary inference from both mysteries. Beware of arguments against Christianity, which can not stop there, and consequently ought not to have commenced there. Something I might have added to the clearness of the preceding views, if the limits of the Work had permitted me to clear away the several delusive and fanciful assertions respecting the state of our first parents, their wisdom, science, and angelic faculties, assertions without the slightest ground in Scripture:—or, if consistently with the wants and preparatory studies of those, for whose use this Volume was especially intended, I could have entered into the momentous subject of a spiritual fall or apostasy antecedent to the formation of man—a belief the Scriptural grounds of which are few and of diverse interpretation, but which has been almost universal in the Christian Church. Enough however has been given, I trust, for the Reader to see and (as far as the subject is capable of being understood) to understand this long controverted article, in the sense in which alone it is binding on his faith. Supposing him therefore to know the meaning of Original Sin, and to have decided for himself on the fact of its actual existence, as the antecedent ground and occasion of Christianity, we may now proceed to Christianity itself, as the edifice raised on this ground, that is, to the great constituent article of the faith in Christ, as the remedy of the disease—the doctrine of Redemption.

But before I proceed to this great doctrine, let me briefly remind the young and friendly pupil, to whom I would still be supposed to address myself, that in the following Aphorisms the word science is used in its strict and narrowest sense. By a science I here mean any chain of truths which are either absolutely certain, or necessarily true for the human mind, from the laws and constitution of the mind itself. In neither case is our conviction derived, or capable of receiving any addition, from outward experience, or empirical data—that is, matters of fact given to us through the medium of the senses—though these

* For a specimen of these Rabbinical dotages, I refer, not to the writings of mystics and enthusiasts, but to the shrewd and witty Dr. South, one of whose most elaborate sermons stands prominent among the many splendid extravaganzas on this subject. (See Sermons, II. Gen. i. 27.—Ed.)
data may have been the occasion, or may even be an indispensable condition, of our reflecting on the former, and thereby becoming conscious of the same. On the other hand, a connected series of conclusions grounded on empirical data, in contra-distinction from science, I beg leave (no better term occurring) in this place and for this purpose to denominate a scheme.

APHORISM XI

In whatever age and country it is the prevailing mind and character of the nation to regard the present life as subordinate to a life to come, and to mark the present state, the world of their senses, by signs, instruments, and mementos of its connection with a future state and a spiritual world;—where the mysteries of faith are brought within the hold of the people at large, not by being explained away in the vain hope of accommodating them to the average of their understanding, but by being made the objects of love by their combination with events and epochs of history, with national traditions, with the monuments and dedications of ancestral faith and zeal, with memorial and symbolical observances, with the realizing influences of social devotion, and, above all, by early and habitual association with acts of the will,—there Religion is. There, however obscured by the hay and straw of human will-work, the foundation is safe. In that country and under the predominance of such maxims, the National Church is no mere State-institute. It is the state itself in its intensest federal union; yet at the same moment the guardian and representative of all personal individuality. For the Church is the shrine of morality: and in morality alone the citizen asserts and reclaims his personal independence, his integrity. Our outward acts are efficient, and most often possible, only by coalition. As an efficient power, the agent is but a fraction of unity; he becomes an integer only in the recognition and performance of the moral law. Nevertheless it is most true (and a truth which can not with safety be overlooked) that morality, as morality, has no existence for a people. It is either absorbed and lost in the quicksands of prudential calculus, or it is taken up and transfigured into the duties and mysteries of religion. And no wonder: since morality (including the personal being, the I am, as its subject) is itself a mystery, and the ground and suppositum of all other mysteries, relatively to man.
Schemes of conduct, grounded on calculations of self-interest, or on the average consequences of actions, supposed to be general, form a branch of Political Economy, to which let all due honor be given. Their utility is not here questioned. But however estimable within their own sphere such schemes, or any one of them in particular, may be, they do not belong to moral science, to which, both in kind and purpose, they are in all cases foreign, and, when substituted for it, hostile. Ethics, or the science of Morality, does indeed in no wise exclude the consideration of action; but it contemplates the same in its originating spiritual source, without reference to space, or time, or sensible existence. Whatever springs out of the perfect law of freedom, which exists only by its unity with the will of God, its inherence in the Word of God, and its communion with the Spirit of God—that (according to the principles of moral science) is good—it is light and righteousness and very truth. Whatever seeks to separate itself from the divine principle, and proceeds from a false centre in the agent's particular will, is evil—a work of darkness and contradiction. It is sin and essential falsehood. Not the outward deed, constructive, destructive, or neutral,—not the deed as a possible object of the senses,—is the object of ethical science. For this is no compost, collectorium or inventory of single duties; nor does it seek in the multitudinous sea, in the predetermined wave, and tides and currents of nature, that freedom which is exclusively an attribute of Spirit. Like all other pure sciences, whatever it enunciates, and whatever it concludes, it enunciates and concludes absolutely. Strictness is its essential character; and its first proposition is, Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all. For as the will or spirit, the source and substance of moral good, is one and all in every part; so must it be the totality, the whole articulated series of single acts, taken as unity, that can alone, in the severity of science, be recognized as the proper counterpart and adequate representative of a good will. Is it in this or that limb, or not rather in the whole body, the entire organismus, that the law of Life reflects itself? Much less, then, can the law of the Spirit work in fragments.
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APHORISM XIII.

Wherever there exists a permanent* learned class, having authority, and possessing the respect and confidence of the country; and wherever the science of ethics is acknowledged and taught in this class, as a regular part of a learned education, to its future members generally, but as the special study and indispensable ground-work of such as are intended for holy orders;—there the article of Original Sin will be an axiom of faith in all classes. Among the learned an undisputed truth, and with the people a fact, which no man imagines it possible to deny: and the doctrine, thus interwoven in the faith of all, and coeval with the consciousness of each, will, for each and all, possess a reality, subjective indeed, yet virtually equivalent to that which we intuitively give to the objects of our senses.

With the learned this will be the case, because the article is the first—I had almost said spontaneous—product of the application of modern science to history, of which it is the interpreter. A mystery in its own right, and by the necessity and essential character of its subject—(for the will, like the life, in every act and product pre-supposes to itself a past always present, a present that evermore resolves itself into a past)—the doctrine of Original Sin gives to all the other mysteries of religion a common basis, a connection of dependency, an intelligibility of relation, and a total harmony, which supersede extrinsic proof. There is here that same proof from unity of purpose, that same evidence of symmetry, which in the contemplation of a human skeleton flashed conviction on the mind of Galen, and kindled meditation into a hymn of praise.

* A learned order must be supposed to consist of three classes. First, those who are employed in adding to the existing sum of power and knowledge. Second, and most numerous class, those whose office it is to diffuse through the community at large the practical results of science; and that kind and degree of knowledge and cultivation, which for all is requisite or clearly useful. Third, the formers and instructors of the second—in schools, halls and universities, or through the medium of the press. The second class includes not only the Parochial Clergy, and all others duly ordained to the ministerial office; but likewise all the members of the legal and medical professions, who have received a learned education under accredited and responsible teachers.—(See the Church and State, VI. p. 51.—Ed.)
Meanwhile the people, not goaded into doubt by the lessons and examples of their teachers and superiors; not drawn away from the fixed stars of heaven—the form and magnitude of which are the same for the naked eye of the shepherd as for the telescope of the sage—from the immediate truths, I mean of Reason and Conscience, to an exercise to which they have not been trained,—of a faculty which has been imperfectly developed,—on a subject not within the sphere of the faculty, nor in any way amenable to its judgment;—the people will need no arguments to receive a doctrine confirmed by their own experience from within and from without, and intimately blended with the most venerable traditions common to all races, and the traces of which linger in the latest twilight of civilization.

Among the revulsions consequent on the brute bewilderments of a Godless revolution, a great and active zeal for the interests of religion may be one. I dare not trust it, till I have seen what it is that gives religion this interest, till I am satisfied that it is not the interests of this world; necessary and laudable interests, perhaps, but which may, I dare believe, be secured as effectually and more suitably by the prudence of this world, and by this world's powers and motives. At all events, I find nothing in the fashion of the day to deter me from adding, that the reverse of the preceding—that where Religion is valued and patronized as a supplement of Law, or an aid extraordinary of Police; where moral science is exploded as the mystic jargon of dark ages; where a lax system of consequences, by which every iniquity on earth may be (and how many have been !) denounced and defended with equal plausibility, is publicly and authoritatively taught as Moral Philosophy; where the mysteries of religion, and truths supersensual, are either cut and squared for the comprehension of the Understanding, the faculty judging according to sense, or desperately torn asunder from the Reason, nay fanatically opposed to it; lastly, where private* interpretation is

* The Author of the Statesman's Manual must be the most inconsistent of men, if he can be justly suspected of a leaning to the Romish Church; or if it be necessary for him to repeat his fervent Amen to the wish and prayer of our late good old king, that "every adult in the British Empire should be able to read his Bible, and have a Bible to read!" Nevertheless, it may not be superfluous to declare, that in thus protesting against the license of private interpretation, I do not mean to condemn the exercise or deny the right of individual judgment. I condemn only the pretended right
every thing, and the Church nothing—there the mystery of Original Sin will be either rejected, or evaded, or perverted into the monstrous fiction of hereditary sin,—guilt inherited; in the mystery of Redemption metaphors will be obtruded for the reality; and in the mysterious appurtenants and symbols of Redemption (regeneration, grace, the Eucharist, and spiritual communion) the realities will be evaporated into metaphors.

APHORISM XIV.

Leighton.

As in great maps or pictures you will see the border decorated with meadows, fountains, flowers, and the like, represented in it, but in the middle you have the main design: so amongst the works of God is it with the fore-ordained redemption of man. All his other works in the world, all the beauty of the creatures, the succession of ages, and the things that come to pass in them, are but as the border to this as the mainpiece. But as a foolish unskilful beholder, not discerning the excellency of the principal piece in such maps or pictures, gazes only on the fair border, and goes no farther—thus do the greatest part of us as to this great work of God, the redemption of our personal being, and the reunion of the human with the divine, by and through the divine humanity of the Incarnate Word.

APHORISM XV.

Luther.

It is a hard matter, yea, an impossible thing, for thy human strength, whosoever thou art (without God's assistance), at such of every individual, competent and incompetent, to interpret Scripture in a sense of his own, in opposition to the judgment of the Church, without knowledge of the originals or of the languages, the history, customs, opinions and controversies of the age and country in which they were written; and where the interpreter judges in ignorance or in contempt of uninterrupted tradition, the unanimous consent of Fathers and Councils, and the universal faith of the Church in all ages. It is not the attempt to form a judgment, which is here called in question; but the grounds, or rather the no-grounds on which the judgment is formed and relied on.

My fixed principle is: that a Christianity without a Church exercising spiritual authority is vanity and delusion. And my belief is, that when Popery is rushing in on us like an inundation, the nation will find it to be so. I say Popery: for this too I hold for a delusion that Romanism or Roman Catholicism is separable from Popery. Almost as readily could I suppose a circle without a centre.
a time when Moses setteth on thee with the Law (see Aphorism XII.).—when the holy Law written in thy heart accuseth and condemneth thee, forcing thee to a comparison of thy heart there-with, and convicting thee of the incompatibleness of thy will and nature with Heaven and holiness and an immediate God—that then thou shouldst be able to be of such a mind as if no law nor sin had ever been! I say it is in a manner impossible that a human creature, when he feeleth himself assaulted with trials and temptations, and the conscience hath to do with God, and the tempted man knoweth that the root of temptation is within him, should obtain such mastery over his thoughts as then to think no otherwise than that from everlasting nothing hath been but only and alone Christ, altogether grace and deliverance!

COMMENT.

In irrational agents, namely, the brute animals, the will is hidden or absorbed in the law. The law is their nature. In the original purity of a rational agent the uncorrupted will is identical with the law. Nay, inasmuch as a will perfectly identical with the law is one with the Divine Will, we may say, that in the unfallen rational agent, the will constitutes the law.* But it is evident that the holy and spiritual power and light, which by a prolepsis or anticipation we have named law, is a grace, an inward perfection, and without the commanding, binding, and menacing character which belongs to a law, acting as a master or sovereign distinct from, and existing, as it were, externally for, the agent who is bound to obey it. Now this is St. Paul's sense of the word, and on this he grounds his whole reasoning. And hence too arises the obscurity and apparent paradox of several texts. That the law is a law for you; that it acts on the will

* In fewer words thus: For the brute animals, their nature is their law;—for what other third law can be imagined, in addition to the law of nature, and the law of reason? Therefore: in irrational agents the law constitutes the will. In moral and rational agents the will constitutes, or ought to constitute, the law: I speak of moral agents, unfallen. For the personal will comprehends the idea as a reason, and it gives causative force to the idea, as a practical reason. But idea with the power of realizing the same is a law; or say:—the spirit comprehends the moral idea, by virtue of its rationality, and it gives to the idea causative power, as a will. In every sense, therefore, it constitutes the law, supplying both the elements of which it consists, namely, the idea, and the realizing power.
not in it; that it exercises an agency from without, by fear and coercion; proves the corruption of your will, and presupposes it. Sin in this sense came by the law: for it has its essence, as sin, in that counter-position of the holy principle to the will, which occasions this principle to be a law. Exactly (as in all other points) consonant with the Pauline doctrine is the assertion of John, when—speaking of the re-adoption of the redeemed to be sons of God, and the consequent resumption (I had almost said re-absorption) of the law into the will (νόμον ἡλειον τὸν Ἰησοῦ τὸν θεουργόν, James i. 25)—he says, For the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.* That by the law St. Paul meant only the ceremonial law, is a notion that could originate only in utter inattention to the whole strain and bent of the Apostle’s argument.

APHORISM XVI.

Leighton and Coleridge.

Christ’s death was both voluntary and violent. There was external violence: and that was the accompaniment, or at most the occasion, of his death. But there was internal willingness, the spiritual will, the will of the Spirit, and this was the proper cause. By this Spirit he was restored from death: neither indeed was it possible for him to be holden of it. Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit, says St. Peter. But he is likewise declared elsewhere to have died by that same Spirit, which here, in opposition to the violence, is said to quicken him. Thus Heb. ix. 14, Through the eternal Spirit he offered himself. And even from Peter’s words, and without the epithet eternal, to aid the interpretation, it is evident that the Spirit, here opposed to the flesh by body or animal life, is of a higher nature and power than the individual soul, which can not of itself return to reinherit or quicken the body.

If these points were niceties, and an over-refining in doctrine, is it to be believed that the Apostles, John, Peter, and Paul, with the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, would have laid so great a stress on them? But the true life of Christians is to eye Christ in every step of his life—not only as their rule but as their strength: looking to him as their pattern both in doing and in suffering, and drawing power from him for going through both:

* John i. 17.—Ed.
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being without him able for nothing. Take comfort, then, thou that believest! It is he that lifts up the soul from the gates of death; and he hath said, I will raise thee up at the last day. Thou that believest in him, believe him and take comfort. Yea, when thou art most sunk in thy sad apprehensions, and he far off to thy thinking, then is he nearest to raise and comfort thee: as sometimes it grows darkest immediately before day.

APHORISM XVII

Leighton and Coleridge.

Would any of you be cured of that common disease, the fear of death? Yet this is not the right name of the disease, as a mere reference to our armies and navies is sufficient to prove: nor can the fear of death, either as loss of life or pain of dying, be justly held a common disease. But would you be cured of the fear and fearful questionings connected with the approach of death? Look this way, and you shall find more than you seek. Christ, the Word that was from the beginning, and was made flesh and dwelt among men, died. And he, who dying conquered death in his own person, conquered sin and death, which is the wages of sin, for thee. And of this thou mayest be assured, if only thou believe in him and love him. I need not add, keep his commandments: since where faith and love are, obedience in its threefold character, as effect, reward, and criterion, follows by that moral necessity which is the highest form of freedom. The grave is thy bed of rest, and no longer the cold bed: for thy Saviour has warmed it, and made it fragrant.

If then it be health and comfort to the faithful that Christ descended into the grave, with especial confidence may we meditate on his return from thence, quickened by the Spirit: this being to those who are in him the certain pledge, yea, the effectual cause of that blessed resurrection for which they themselves hope. There is that union betwixt them and their Redeemer, that they shall rise by the communication and virtue of his rising: not simply by his power—for so the wicked likewise to their grief shall be raised: but they by his life as their life.

COMMENT ON THE THREE PRECEDING APHORISMS.

To the Reader, who has consented to submit his mind to my temporary guidance, and who permits me to regard him as my
pupil or junior fellow-student, I continue to address myself. Should he exist only in my imagination, let the bread float on the waters! If it be the Bread of Life, it will not have been utterly cast away.

Let us pause a moment, and review the road we have passed over since the transit from Religious Morality to Spiritual Religion. My first attempt was to satisfy you, that there is a spiritual principle in man, and to expose the sophistry of the arguments in support of the contrary. Our next step was to clear the road of all counterfeits, by showing what is not the Spirit, what is not spiritual religion. And this was followed by an attempt to establish a difference in kind between religious truths and the deductions of speculative science; yet so as to prove, that the former are not only equally rational with the latter, but that they alone appeal to reason in the fulness and living reality of their power. This and the state of mind requisite for the formation of right convictions respecting spiritual truths, afterwards employed our attention. Having then enumerated the Articles of the Christian Faith peculiar to Christianity, I entered on the great object of the present Work: namely, the removal of all valid objections to these articles on grounds of right reason or conscience. But to render this practicable, it was necessary, first, to present each article in its true Scriptural purity, by exposure of the caricatures of misinterpreters; and this, again, could not be satisfactorily done till we were agreed respecting the faculty entitled to sit in judgment on such questions. I early foresaw that my best chance (I will not say, of giving an insight into the surpassing worth and transcendent reasonableness of the Christian scheme; but) of rendering the very question intelligible, depended on my success in determining the true nature and limits of the human Understanding, and in evincing its diversity from Reason. In pursuing this momentous subject, I was tempted in two or three instances into disquisitions, which if not beyond the comprehension, were yet unsuited to the taste, of the persons for whom the Work was principally intended. These, however, I have separated from the running text, and compressed into notes. The Reader will at worst, I hope, pass them by as a leaf or two of waste paper, willingly given by him to those for whom it may not be paper wasted. Nevertheless, I can not conceal that the subject itself supposes, on the part of
the Reader, a steadiness in self-questioning, a pleasure in referring to his own inward experience for the facts asserted by the Author, which can only be expected from a person who has fairly set his heart on arriving at clear and fixed conclusions in matters of faith. But where this interest is felt, nothing more than a common capacity, with the ordinary advantages of education, is required for the complete comprehension both of the argument and the result. Let but one thoughtful hour be devoted to the pages 183–190. In all that follows, the Reader will find no difficulty in understanding my meaning, whatever he may have in adopting it.

The two great moments of the Christian Religion are, Original Sin and Redemption; that the ground, this the superstructure of our faith. The former I have exhibited, first, according to the scheme of the Westminster Divines and the Synod of Dort; then, according to the* scheme of a contemporary Arminian divine;

* To escape the consequences of this scheme, some Arminian divines have asserted that the penalty inflicted on Adam, and continued in his posterity, was simply the loss of immortality—death as the utter extinction of personal being; immortality being regarded by them (and not, I think, without good reason) as a supernatural attribute, and its loss therefore involved in the forfeiture of supernatural graces. This theory has its golden side: and, as a private opinion, is said to have the countenance of more than one dignitary of our Church, whose general orthodoxy is beyond impeachment. For here the penalty resolves itself into the consequence, and this the natural and naturally inevitable consequence of Adam's crime. For Adam, indeed, it was a positive punishment: a punishment of his guilt, the justice of which who could have dared arraign? While for the offspring of Adam it was simply a not super-adding to their nature the privilege by which the original man was contra-distinguished from the brute creation—a mere negation of which they had no more right to complain than any other species of animals. God in this view appears only in his attribute of mercy, as averting by supernatural interposition a consequence naturally inevitable. This is the golden side of the theory. But if we approach to it from the opposite direction, it first excites a just scruple, from the countenance it seems to give to the doctrine of Materialism. The supporters of this scheme do not, I presume, contend that Adam's offspring would not have been born men, but have formed a new species of beasts! And if not, the notion of a rational and self-conscious soul, perishing utterly with the dissolution of the organized body, seems to require, nay, almost involves, the opinion that the soul is a quality or accident of the body,—a mere harmony resulting from organization.

But let this pass unquestioned. Whatever else the descendants of Adam might have been without the intercession of Christ, yet (this intercession
and lastly, in contrast with both schemes, I have placed what I firmly believe to be the Scriptural sense of this article, and vindicated its entire conformity with reason and experience. I now proceed to the other momentous article—from the necessitating occasion of the Christian dispensation to Christianity itself. For Christianity and Redemption are equivalent terms. And here my comment will be comprised in a few sentences: for I confine my views to the one object of clearing this awful mystery from those too current misrepresentations of its nature and import, that have laid it open to scruples and objections, not to such as shoot having been effectually made) they are now endowed with souls that are not extinguished together with the material body.—Now unless these divines teach likewise the Romish figment of Purgatory, and to an extent in which the Church of Rome herself would denounce the doctrine as an impious heresy: unless they hold, that a punishment temporary and remedial is the worst evil that the impenitent have to apprehend in a future state; and that the spiritual death declared and foretold by Christ, the death eternal where the worm never dies, is neither death nor eternal, but a certain quantum of suffering in a state of faith, hope, and progressive amendment—unless they go these lengths (and the divines here intended are orthodox Churchmen, men who would not knowingly advance even a step on the road towards them)—then I fear that any advantage their theory might possess over the Calvinistic scheme in the article of Original Sin, would be dearly purchased by increased difficulties, and an ultra-Calvinistic narrowness in the article of Redemption. I at least find it impossible, with my present human feelings, not to imagine that even in heaven it would be a fearful thing to know, that in order to my elevation to a lot infinitely more desirable than by nature it would have been, the lot of so vast a multitude had been rendered infinitely more calamitous; and that my felicity had been purchased by the everlasting misery of my fellow-men, who, if no redemption had been provided, after inheriting the pains and pleasures of earthly existence during the numbered hours, and the few and evil—evil yet few—days of the years of their mortal life, would have fallen asleep to wake no more,—would have sunk into the dreamless sleep of the grave, and have been as the murmur and the plaint, and the exulting swell and the sharp scream, which the unequal gust of yesterday snatched from the strings of a wind-harp.

In another place I have ventured to question the spirit and tendency of Taylor's Work on Repentance.* But I ought to have added, that to discover and keep the true medium in expounding and applying the efficacy of Christ's Cross and Passion, is beyond comparison the most difficult and delicate point of practical divinity—and that which especially needs a guidance from above.

* See also Literary Remains, V. pp. 194–212.—Ed.
forth from an unbelieving heart—(against these a sick bed will be a more effectual antidote than all the argument in the world) —but to such scruples as have their birth-place in the reason and moral sense. Not that it is a mystery—not that it passeth all understanding; if the doctrine be more than a hyperbolical phrase, it must do so;—but that it is at variance with the law revealed in the conscience; that it contradicts our moral instincts and intuitions—this is the difficulty which alone is worthy of an answer. And what better way is there of correcting the misconceptions than by laying open the source and occasion of them? What surer way of removing the scruples and prejudices, to which these misconceptions have given rise, than by propounding the mystery itself—namely, the Redemptive Act, as the transcendent cause of salvation—in the express and definite words in which it was enunciated by the Redeemer Himself?

But here, in addition to the three Aphorisms preceding, I interpose a view of Redemption as appropriated by faith, coincident with Leighton's, though for the greater part expressed in my own words. This I propose as the right view. Then follow a few sentences transcribed from Field (an excellent divine of the reign of James I., of whose work on the Church,* it would be difficult to speak too highly), containing the questions to be solved, and which are numbered as an Aphorism, rather to preserve the uniformity of appearance, than as being strictly such. Then follows the Comment: as part and commencement of which the Reader will consider the two paragraphs of pp. 172–3, written for this purpose, and in the foresight of the present inquiry: and I entreat him therefore to begin the Comment by re-perusing these.

**APHORISM XVIII**

*Steadfast by faith. This is absolutely necessary for resistance to the evil principle.* There is no standing out without some firm ground to stand on: and this faith alone supplies. *By faith in the love of Christ the power of God becomes ours.* When the soul is beleaguered by enemies, weakness on the walls, treachery at the gates, and corruption in the citadel, then by faith she says —Lamb of God slain from the foundation of the world! Thou art my strength! I look to thee for deliverance! And thus she

*See Literary Remains, V. pp. 52–73.—Ed.*
overcomes. The pollution (miasma) of sin is precipitated by his blood, the power of sin is conquered by his Spirit. The Apostle says not—steadfast by your own resolutions and purposes; but—steady by faith. Nor yet steadfast in your will, but steadfast in the faith. We are not to be looking to, or brooding over ourselves, either for accusation or for confidence, or (by a deep yet too frequent self-delusion) to obtain the latter by making a merit to ourselves of the former. But we are to look to Christ and him crucified. The law that is very nigh to thee, even in thy heart: the law that condemneth and hath no promise; that stoppeth the guilty past in its swift flight, and maketh it disown its name; the law will accuse thee enough. Linger not in the justice-court listening to thy indictment. Loiter not in waiting to hear the sentence. No, anticipate the verdict. Appeal to Caesar. Haste to the king for a pardon. Struggle thitherward, though in fetters; and cry aloud, and collect the whole remaining strength of thy will in the outcry—I believe; Lord, help my unbelief! Disclaim all right of property in thy fetters. Say that they belong to the old man, and that thou dost but carry them to the grave, to be buried with their owner! Fix thy thought on what Christ did, what Christ suffered, what Christ is—as if thou wouldst fill the hollowness of thy soul with Christ. If he emptied himself of glory to become sin for thy salvation, must not thou be emptied of thy sinful self to become righteousness in and through his agony and the effective merits of his Cross?* By what other

* God manifested in the flesh is eternity in the form of time. But eternity in relation to time is as the absolute to the conditional, or the real to the apparent, and Redemption must partake of both;—always perfected, for it is a Fiat of the Eternal;—continuous, for it is a process in relation to man; the former the alone objectively, and therefore universally, true. That Redemption is an opus perfectum, a finished work, the claim to which is conferred in Baptism;—that a Christian can not speak or think as if his redemption by the blood, and his justification by the righteousness of Christ alone, were future or contingent events, but must both say and think, I have been redeemed, I am justified; lastly, that for as many as are received into his Church by Baptism, Christ has condemned sin in the flesh, has made it dead in law, that is, no longer imputable as guilt, has destroyed the objective reality of sin;—these are truths, which all the Reformed Churches, Swedish, Danish, Evangelical (or Lutheran), the Reformed (the Calvinistic in mid-Germany, Holland, France, and Geneva, so called), lastly, the Church of England, and the Church of Scotland—nay, the best and most learned divines of the Roman Catholic Church have united in upholding as most
means, in what other form, is it possible for thee to stand in the presence of the Holy One? With what mind wouldst thou come before God, if not with the mind of Him, in whom alone God loveth the world? With good advice, perhaps, and a little assistance, thou wouldst rather cleanse and patch up a mind of certain and necessary articles of faith, and the effectual preaching of which Luther declares to be the appropriate criterion stantis vel cadentis Ecclesiae. The Church is standing or falling, according as this doctrine is supported, or overlooked, or countenanced. Nor has the contrary doctrine, according to which the baptized are yet individually to be called, converted, and chosen, with all the corollaries from this assumption, the watching for signs and sensible assurances, the frames, and the states, and the feelings, and the sudden conversions, the contagious fever-boils of the (most unfitly, so called) Evangelicals, and Arminian Methodists of the day, been in any age taught or countenanced by any known and accredited Christian Church, or by any body and succession of learned divines. On the other hand, it has rarely happened that the Church has not been troubled by Pharisaic and fanatical individuals, who have sought, by working on the fears and feelings of the weak and unsteady, that celebrity which they could not obtain by learning and orthodoxy; and alas! so subtle is the poison, and so malignant in its operation, that it is almost hopeless to attempt the cure of any person, once infected, more particularly when, as most often happens, the patient is a woman. Nor does Luther, in his numerous and admirable discourses on this point, conceal or palliate the difficulties which the carnal mind, that works under many and different disguises, throws in the way to prevent the laying firm hold of the truth. One most mischievous and very popular misbelief must be cleared away in the first instance—the presumption, I mean, that whatever is not quite simple, and what any plain body can understand at the first hearing, cannot be of necessary belief, or among the fundamental articles or essentials of Christian faith. A docile childlike mind, a deference to the authority of the Churches, a presumption of the truth of doctrines that have been received and taught as true by the whole Church in all times; reliance on the positive declarations of the Apostle—in short, all the convictions of the truth of a doctrine that are previous to a perfect insight into its truth, because these convictions, with the affections and dispositions accompanying them, are the very means and conditions of attaining to that insight—and study of, and quiet meditation on, them with a gradual growth of spiritual knowledge and earnest prayer for its increase; all these, to each and all of which the young Christian is so repeatedly and fervently exhorted by St. Paul, are to be superseded, because, forsooth, truths needful for all men must be quite simple and easy, and adapted to the capacity of all, even of the plainest and dullest understanding! What can not be poured all at once on a man, can only be supererogatory drops from the emptied show-water-bath of religious instruction! But surely, the more rational inference would be, that the faith, which is to save the whole man, must have its roots and justifying grounds in the very depths of our being. And
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thy own, and offer it as thy admission-right, thy qualification to Him who charged his angels with folly! Oh! take counsel of thy reason. It will show thee how impossible it is that even a world should merit the love of eternal wisdom and all-sufficing beatitude, otherwise than as it is contained in that all-perfect Idea, in which the Supreme Spirit contemplateth himself and the plenitude of his infinity—the Only-Begotten before all ages, the beloved Son, in whom the Father is indeed well pleased!

And as the mind, so the body with which it is to be clothed; as the indweller, so the house in which it is to be the abiding-place.* There is but one wedding-garment, in which we can he who can read the writings of the Apostles, John and Paul, without finding in almost every page a confirmation of this, must have looked at them, as at the sun in an eclipse, through blackened glasses.

* St. Paul blends both forms of expression, and asserts the same doctrine, when speaking of the celestial body provided for the new man in the spiritual flesh and blood, that is, the informing power and vivific life of the incarnate Word: for the blood is the life, and the flesh the power)—when speaking, I say, of this celestial body as a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens, yet brought down to us, made appropriable by faith, and ours—he adds, for this earthly house (that is, this mortal life, as the inward principle or energy of our tabernacle, or outward and sensible body) we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven: not that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life. 2 Cor. v. 1-4.

The last four words of the first verse (eternal in the heavens) compared with the conclusion of v. 2 (which is from heaven), present a coincidence with John iii. 13, "And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man, which is in heaven." Would not the coincidence be more apparent, if the words of John had been rendered word for word, even to a disregard of the English idiom, and with what would be servile and superstitious fidelity in the translation of a common classic! I can see no reason why the οὐδὲς, so frequent in St. John, should not be rendered literally, no one; and there may be a reason why it should. I have some doubt likewise respecting the omission of the definite articles τοῦ, τοῦ, τοῦ—and a greater as to the τῶν ὃν, both in this place and in John i. 18, being adequately rendered by our which is. What sense some of the Greek Fathers attached to, or inferred from, St. Paul's in the heavens, the theological student (and to theologians is this note principally addressed) may find in Waterland's letters to a Country Clergyman—a divine, whose judgment and strong sound sense are as unquestionable as his learning and orthodoxy. A Clergyman, in full orders, who has never read the works of Bull and Waterland, has a duty yet to perform.

Let it not be objected, that, forgetful of my own professed aversion to allegorical interpretations, I have, in this note, fallen into the fond humor
sit down at the marriage feast of Heaven: and that is the bridegroom's own gift, when he gave himself for us, that we might live in him and he in us. There is but one robe of righteousness, even the spiritual body, formed by the assimilative power of faith, for whoever eateth the flesh of the Son of Man, and drinketh his blood. Did Christ come from Heaven, did the Son of God leave the glory which he had with his Father before the world began, only to show us a way to life, to teach truths, to tell us of a resurrection? Or saith he not, I am the way—I am the truth—I am the resurrection and the life?

APHORISM XIX.

The Romanists teach that sins committed after Baptism (that is, for the immense majority of Christians having Christian pa-

of the mystic divines, and allegorizers of Holy Writ. There is, believe me, a wide difference between symbolical and allegorical. If I say that the flesh and blood (corpus noumenon) of the Incarnate Word are power and life, I say likewise that this mysterious power and life are verily and actually the flesh and blood of Christ. They are the allegorizers who turn the sixth chapter of the Gospel according to St. John, the hard saying—who can hear it?—after which time many of Christ's disciples, who had been eye-witnesses of his mighty miracles, who had heard the sublime morality of his Sermon on the Mount, had glorified God for the wisdom which they had heard, and had been prepared to acknowledge, This is indeed the Christ,—went back and walked no more with him!—the hard sayings, which even the Twelve were not yet competent to understand farther than that they were to be spiritually understood; and which the chief of the Apostles was content to receive with an implicit and anticipative faith!—they, I repeat, are the allegorizers who moralize these hard sayings, these high words of mystery, into a hyperbolical metaphor per catachresin, which only means a belief of the doctrine which Paul believed, an obedience to the law respecting which Paul was blameless, before the voice called him on the road to Damascus! What every parent, every humane preceptor, would do when a child had misunderstood a metaphor or apologue in a literal sense, we all know. But the meek and merciful Jesus suffered many of his disciples to fall off from eternal life, when, to retain them, he had only to say,—O ye simple ones! why are ye offended? My words, indeed, sound strange; but I mean no more than what you have often and often heard from me before, with delight and entire acquiescence!—Credat Judaeus! Non ego. It is sufficient for me to know that I have used the language of Paul and John, as it was understood and interpreted by Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Irenæus, and (if he does not err) by the whole Christian Church then existing. [See Table Talk, VI. 316, 317.—Ed.]
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rents, all their sins from the cradle to the grave) are not so remitted for Christ's sake, but that we must suffer that extremity of punishment which they deserve: and therefore either we must afflict ourselves in such sort and degree of extremity as may answer the demerit of our sins, or be punished by God, here, or in the world to come, in such degree and sort that his justice may be satisfied. [As the encysted venom, or poison-bag, beneath the adder's fang, so does this doctrine lie beneath the tremendous power of the Romish Hierarchy. The demoralizing influence of this dogma, and that it curdled the very life-blood in the veins of Christendom, it was given to Luther, beyond all men since Paul, to see, feel, and promulgate. And yet in his large Treatise on Repentance, how near to the spirit of this doctrine—even to the very walls and gates of Babylon—was Jeremy Taylor driven, in recoiling from the fanatical extremes of the opposite error!] But they that are orthodox teach that it is injustice to require the paying of one debt twice. * * * It is no less absurd to say, as the Papists do, that our satisfaction is required as a condition, without which Christ's satisfaction is not applicable unto us, than to say, Peter hath paid the debt of John, and he to whom it was due accepteth of the payment on the condition that John pay it himself also. * * * The satisfaction of Christ is communicated and applied unto us without suffering the punishment that sin deserveth [and essentially involveth], upon the condition of our faith and repentance. [To which I would add: Without faith there is no power of repentance: without a commencing repentance no power to faith: and that it is in the power of the will either to repent or to have faith in the Gospel sense of the words, is itself a consequence of the redemption of mankind, a free gift of the Redeemer: the guilt of its rejection, the refusing to avail ourselves of the power, being all that we can consider as exclusively attributable to our own act.]

comment. (containing an application of the principles laid down in pp. 235-6.)

Forgiveness of sin, the abolition of guilt, through the redemptive power of Christ's love, and of his perfect obedience during his voluntary assumption of humanity, is expressed, on account of the resemblance of the consequences in both cases, by the pay-
ment of a debt for another, which debt the payer had not himself incurred. Now the impropriation of this metaphor—(that is, the taking it literally)—by transferring the sameness from the consequents to the antecedents, or inferring the identity of the causes from a resemblance in the effects—this is the point on which I am at issue: and the view or scheme of Redemption grounded on this confusion I believe to be altogether un-Scrip-
tural.

Indeed, I know not in what other instance I could better exemplify the species of sophistry noticed in p. 245, as the Aristotelian μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, or clandestine passing over into a diverse kind. The purpose of a metaphor is to illustrate a something less known by a partial identification of it with some other thing better understood, or at least more familiar. Now the article of Redemption may be considered in a two-fold relation—in relation to the antecedent, that is, the Redeemer's act, as the efficient cause and condition of redemption; and in relation to the consequent, that is, the effects in and for the Redeemed. Now it is the latter relation, in which the subject is treated of, set forth, expanded, and enforced by St. Paul. The mysterious act, the operative cause, is transcendent. Factum est: and beyond the information contained in the enunciation of the fact, it can be characterized only by the consequences. It is the consequences of the act of Redemption, which the zealous Apostle would bring home to the minds and affections both of Jews and Gentiles. Now the Apostle's opponents and gainsayers were principally of the former class. They were Jews: not only Jews unconverted, but such as had partially received the Gospel, and who, sheltering their national prejudices under the pretended authority of Christ's original Apostles and the Church in Jerusalem, set themselves up against Paul as followers of Cephas. Add too, that Paul himself was a Hebrew of the Hebrews; intimately versed in the Jews' religion above many his equals in his own nation, and above measure zealous of the traditions of his fathers. It might, therefore, have been anticipated that his reasoning would receive its outward forms and language, that it would take its predominant colors, from his own past, and his opponents' present, habits of thinking; and that his figures, images, analogies and references would be taken preferably from objects, opinions, events, and ritual observances ever uppermost in the
imaginations of his own countrymen. And such we find them;—yet so judiciously selected, that the prominent forms, the figures of most frequent recurrence, are drawn from points of belief and practice, forms, laws, rites and customs, which then prevailed through the whole Roman world, and were common to Jew and Gentile.

Now it would be difficult if not impossible to select points better suited to this purpose, as being equally familiar to all, and yet having a special interest for the Jewish converts, than those are from which the learned Apostle has drawn the four principal metaphors, by which he illustrates the blessed consequences of Christ's redemption of mankind. These are: 1. Sin offerings, sacrificial expiation. 2. Reconciliation, atonement, καταλλαγή.*

* This word occurs but once in the New Testament, Rom. v. 11, the marginal rendering being *reconciliation*. The personal noun, καταλλακτής, is still in use with the modern Greeks for a money-changer, or one who takes the debased currency, so general in countries under a despotic or other dishonest government, in exchange for sterling coin or bullion; the purchaser paying the καταλλαγή, that is, the difference. In the elder Greek writers, the verb means to exchange for an opposite, as, καταλλάσσετο τὴν ἐχθρὸν τοῖς στασιῶν—He exchanged within himself enmity for friendship (that is, he reconciled himself), with his party;—or, as we say, made it up with them, an idiom which (with whatever loss of dignity) gives the exact force of the word. He made up the difference. The Hebrew word, of very frequent occurrence in the Pentateuch, which we render by the substantive atonement, has its radical or visual image in copher, pitch. Gen. vi. 14, Thou shalt pitch it within and without with pitch;—hence to unite, to fill up a breach or leak, the word expressing both the act, namely the bringing together what had been previously separated, and the means, or material, by which the re-union is effected, as in our English verbs, to caulk, to solder, to pay or pay (from poix, pitch), and the French suiver. Thence, metaphorically, expiation, the piaçula having the same root, and being grounded on another property or use of gums and resins, the supposed cleansing powers of their fumigation; Numb. viii. 21: made atonement for the Levites to cleanse them.—Lastly (or if we are to believe the Hebrew Lexicons, properly and most frequently) it means ransom. But if by proper, the interpreters mean primary and radical, the assertion does not need a confutation: all radicals belonging to one or other of three classes:—1. Interjections, or sounds expressing sensations or passions. 2. Imitations of sounds, as splash, roar, whiz, &c. 3. and principally, visual images, objects of sight. But as to frequency, in all the numerous (fifty I believe) instances of the word in the Old Testament, I have not found one in which it can, or at least need, be rendered by ransom: though beyond all doubt ransom is used in the Epistle to Timothy as an equivalent term.
3. Ransom from slavery, redemption, the buying back again, or being bought back. 4. Satisfaction of a creditor's claims by a payment of the debt. To one or other of these four heads all the numerous forms and exponents of Christ's mediation in St. Paul's writings may be referred. And the very number and variety of the words or periphrases used by him to express one and the same thing, furnish the strongest presumptive proof that all alike were used metaphorically. [In the following notation, let the small letters represent the effects or consequences, and the capitals the efficient causes or antecedents. Whether by causes we mean acts or agents, is indifferent. Now let X signify a transcendent, that is, a cause beyond our comprehension, and not within the sphere of sensible experience; and on the other hand, let A, B, C, and D represent each one known and familiar cause, in reference to some single and characteristic effect: namely, A in reference to k, B to 1, C to m, and D to n. Then I say \(X + \text{k} + \text{l} + \text{m} + \text{n}\) is indifferent places expressed by \(A + \text{k}\); \(B + \text{l}\); \(C + \text{m}\); \(D + \text{n}\). And these I should call metaphorical exponents of X.]

Now John, the beloved disciple, who leaned on the Lord's bosom, the Evangelist εὼν τὸν πνεῦμα, that is according to the spirit, the inner and substantial truth of the Christian Creed—John, recording the Redeemer's own words, enunciates the fact itself, to the full extent in which it is enunciable for the human mind, simply and without any metaphor, by identifying it in kind with a fact of hourly occurrence—expressing it, I say, by a familiar fact the same in kind with that intended, though of a far lower dignity;—by a fact of every man's experience, known to all, yet not better understood than the fact described by it. In the redeemed it is a re-generation, a birth, a spiritual seed impregnated and evolved, the germinal principle of a higher and enduring life, of a spiritual life—that is, a life the actuality of which is not dependent on the material body, or limited by the circumstances and processes indispensable to its organization and subsistence. Briefly, it is the differential of immortality, of which the assimilative power of faith and love is the integrant, and the life in Christ the integration.

But even this would be an imperfect statement, if we omitted the awful truth, that besides that dissolution of our earthly tabernacle which we call death, there is another death, not the mere negation of life, but its positive opposite. And as there is a
mystery of life, and an assimilation to the principle of life, even to him who is the Life; so is there a mystery of death, and an assimilation to the principle of evil; a fructifying of the corrupt seed, of which death is the germination. Thus the regeneration to spiritual life is at the same time a redemption from the spiritual death.

Respecting the Redemptive Act itself, and the Divine Agent, we know from revelation that he was made a quickening (ζωοοσσων, life-making) Spirit: and that in order to this it was necessary that God should be manifested in the flesh; that the Eternal Word, through whom and by whom the world (κόσμος, the order, beauty, and sustaining law of visible natures) was and is, should be made flesh, assume our humanity personally, fulfil all righteousness, and so suffer and so die for us, as in dying to conquer death for as many as should receive him. More than this, the mode, the possibility, we are not competent to know. It is, as hath been already observed concerning the primal act of apostasy, a mystery by the necessity of the subject—a mystery which at all events it will be time enough for us to seek and expect to understand, when we understand the mystery of our natural life, and its conjunction with mind and will and personal identity. Even the truths that are given to us to know, we can know only through faith in the spirit. They are spiritual things, which must be spiritually discerned. Such, however, being the means and the effects of our redemption, well might the fervent Apostle associate it with whatever was eminently dear and precious to erring and afflicted mortals, and (where no expression could be commensurate, no single title be other than imperfect) seek from similitude of effect to describe the superlative boon, by successively transferring to it, as by a superior claim, the name of each several act and ordinance, habitually connected in the minds of all his hearers with feelings of joy, confidence, and gratitude.

Do you rejoice when the atonement made by the priest has removed the civil stain from your name, restored you to your privileges as a son of Abraham, and replaced you in the respect of your brethren?—Here is an atonement which takes away a deeper and worse stain, an eating canker-spot in the very heart of your personal being. This, to as many as receive it, gives the privilege to become sons of God (John i. 12); this will admit
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you to the society of angels, and insure to you the rights of brotherhood with spirits made perfect (Heb. xii. 22). Here is a sacrifice, a sin-offering for the whole world: and a High Priest, who is indeed a Mediator; who, not in type or shadow, but in very truth, and in his own right, stands in the place of Man to God, and of God to Man; and who receives as a Judge what he offered as an advocate.

Would you be grateful to one who had ransomed you from slavery under a bitter foe, or who brought you out of captivity? Here is redemption from a far direr slavery, the slavery of sin unto death; and he who gave himself for the ransom, has taken captivity captive.

Had you by your own fault alienated yourself from your best, your only sure friend;—had you, like a prodigal, cast yourself out of your Father's house;—would you not love the good Samaritan, who should reconcile you to your friend? Would you not prize above all price the intercession, which had brought you back from husks, and the tending of swine, and restored you to your father's arms, and seated you at your father's table?

Had you involved yourselves in a heavy debt for certain gewgaws, for high-seasoned meats, and intoxicating drinks, and glittering apparel, and in default of payment had made yourself over as a bondsman to a hard creditor, who, it was foreknown, would enforce the bond of judgment to the last tittle;—with what emotions would you not receive the glad tidings that a stranger, or a friend whom in the days of your wantonness you had neglected and reviled, had paid the debt for you, had made satisfaction to your creditor? But you have incurred a debt of death to the evil nature; you have sold yourself over to sin; and, relatively to you, and to all your means and resources, the seal on the bond is the seal of necessity. Its stamp is the nature of evil. But the stranger has appeared, the forgiving friend has come, even the Son of God from heaven: and to as many as have faith in his name, I say—the debt is paid for you;—the satisfaction has been made.

Now, to simplify the argument, and at the same time to bring the question to the test, we will confine our attention to the figure last mentioned, namely, the satisfaction of a debt. Passing by our modern Alögi, who find nothing but metaphors in either Apostle, let us suppose for a moment, with certain divines, that
our Lord's words, recorded by John, and which in all places repeat and assert the same analogy, are to be regarded as metaphorical; and that it is the varied expressions of St. Paul that are to be literally interpreted: for example, that sin is, or involves, an infinite debt (in the proper and law-court sense of the word, debt)—a debt owing by us to the vindictive justice of God the Father, which can only be liquidated by the everlasting misery of Adam and all his posterity, or by a sum of suffering equal to this. Likewise, that God the Father, by his absolute decree, or (as some divines teach) through the necessity of his unchangeable justice, had determined to exact the full sum: which must, therefore, be paid either by ourselves or by some other in our name and behalf. But besides the debt which all mankind contracted in and through Adam, as a homo publicus, even as a nation is bound by the acts of its head or its plenipotentiary, every man (say these divines) is an insolvent debtor on his own score. In this fearful predicament the Son of God took compassion on mankind, and resolved to pay the debt for us, and to satisfy the divine justice by a perfect equivalent. Accordingly, by a strange yet strict consequence, it has been holden, by more than one of these divines, that the agonies suffered by Christ were equal in amount to the sum total of the torments of all mankind here and hereafter, or to the infinite debt, which in an endless succession of instalments we should have been paying to the divine justice, had it not been paid in full by the Son of God incarnate!

It is easy to say—"O but I do not hold this, or we do not make this an article of our belief!" The true question is: "Do you take any part of it; and can you reject the rest without being inconsequent?" Are debt, satisfaction, payment in full, creditor's rights, and the like, nomina propria, by which the very nature of Redemption and its occasion are expressed;—or are they, with several others, figures of speech for the purpose of illustrating the nature and extent of the consequences and effects of the Redemptive Act, and to excite in the receivers a due sense of the magnitude and manifold operation of the boon, and of the love and gratitude due to the Redeemer? If still you reply, the former: then, as your whole theory is grounded on a notion of justice, I ask you—Is this justice a moral attribute? But morality commences with, and begins in, the sacred distinction between thing and person. On this distinction all law, human and
divine, is grounded: consequently, the law of justice. If you attach any meaning to the term justice, as applied to God, it must be the same to which you refer when you affirm or deny it of any other personal agent—save only, that in its attribution to God, you speak of it as unmixed and perfect. For if not, what do you mean? And why do you call it by the same name? I may, therefore, with all right and reason, put the case as between man and man. For should it be found irreconcilable with the justice which the light of reason, made law in the conscience, dictates to man, how much more must it be incongruous with the all-perfect justice of God! Whatever case I should imagine would be felt by the reader as below the dignity of the subject, and in some measure jarring with his feelings; and in other respects the more familiar the case, the better suited to the present purpose.

A sum of £1000 is due from James to Peter, for which James has given a bond. He is insolvent, and the bond is on the point of being put in suit against him, to James's utter ruin. At this moment Matthew steps in, pays Peter the thousand pounds, and discharges the bond. In this case, no man would hesitate to admit, that a complete satisfaction had been made to Peter. Matthew's £1000 is a perfect equivalent for the sum which James was bound to have paid, and which Peter had lent. It is the same thing, and this is altogether a question of things. Now instead of James's being indebted to Peter in a sum of money which (he having become insolvent) Matthew pays for him, let me put the case, that James had been guilty of the basest and most hard-hearted ingratitude to a most worthy and affectionate mother, who had not only performed all the duties and tender offices of a mother, but whose whole heart was bound up in this her only child—who had foregone all the pleasures and amusements of life in watching over his sickly childhood, had sacrificed her health and the far greater part of her resources to rescue him from the consequences of his follies and excesses during his youth and early manhood; and to procure for him the means of his present rank and affluence—all which he had repaid by neglect, desertion, and open profligacy. Here the mother stands in the relation of the creditor: and here too, I will suppose the same generous friend to interfere, and to perform with the greatest tenderness and constancy all those duties of a grateful and affec-
tionate son, which James ought to have performed. Will this satisfy the mother's claims on James, or entitle him to her esteem, approbation, and blessing? Or what if Matthew the vicarious son, should at length address her in words to this purpose: "Now, I trust you are appeased, and will be henceforward reconciled to James. I have satisfied all your claims on him. I have paid his debt in full: and you are too just to require the same debt to be paid twice over. You will therefore regard him with the same complacency, and receive him into your presence with the same love, as if there had been no difference between him and you. For I have made it up." What other reply could the swelling heart of the mother dictate than this: "O misery! and is it possible that you are in league with my unnatural child to insult me? Must not the very necessity of your abandonment of your prophersphere form an additional evidence of his guilt? Must not the sense of your goodness teach me more fully to comprehend, more vividly to feel, the evil in him? Must not the contrast of your merits magnify his demerits in his mother's eye, and at once recall and embitter the conviction of the canker-worm in his soul?"

If indeed by the force of Matthew's example, by persuasion, or by additional and more mysterious influences, or by an inward co-agency, compatible with the existence of a personal will, James should be led to repent; if through admiration and love of this great goodness gradually assimilating his mind to the mind of his benefactor, he should in his own person become a grateful and dutiful child—then doubtless the mother would be wholly satisfied? But then the case is no longer a question of things, or a matter of debt payable by another. Nevertheless, the effect,—and the Reader will remember that it is the effects and consequences of Christ's mediation, on which St. Paul is dilating—the effect to James is similar in both cases, that is in the case of James, the debtor, and of James, the undutiful son. In both cases, James is liberated from a grievous burthen: and in both cases, he has to attribute his liberation to the act and free grace of another. The only difference is, that in the former case (namely, the payment of the debt) the beneficial act is, singly and without requiring any reaction or co-agency on the part of James, the efficient cause of his liberation; while in the latter case (namely, that of Redemption) the beneficial
act is the first, the indispensable condition, and then, the co-efficient.

The professional student of theology will, perhaps, understand the different positions asserted in the preceding argument more readily if they are presented synoptically, that is, brought at once within his view, in the form of answers to four questions, comprising the constituent parts of the Scriptural doctrine of Redemption. And I trust that my lay readers of both sexes will not allow themselves to be scared from the perusal of the following short catechism, by half a dozen Latin words, or rather words with Latin endings, that translate themselves into English, when I dare assure them, that they will encounter no other obstacle to their full and easy comprehension of the contents.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CONSTITUENT POINTS IN THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION, IN FOUR QUESTIONS, WITH CORRESPONDENT ANSWERS.

QUESTIONS.

1. Agens causator?
2. Actus causativus?
3. Effectum causatum?
4. Consequentia ab effecto?

ANSWERS.

I. The Agent and personal Cause of the Redemption of mankind is—the co-external Word and only begotten Son of the Living God, incarnate, tempted, agonizing (agonistes ἀγωνίζομαι), crucified, submitting to death, resurgent, communicant of his Spirit, ascendent, and obtaining for his Church the descent and communion of the Holy Spirit, the Comforter.

II. The Causative Act is—a spiritual and transcendent mystery, that passeth all understanding.

III. The Effect Caused is—the being born anew; as before in the flesh to the world, so now born in the spirit to Christ.

IV. The Consequences from the Effect are—sanctification from sin, and liberation from the inherent and penal consequences of sin in the world to come, with all the means and processes of sanctification by the Word and the Spirit: these consequents being the same for the sinner relatively to God and his own soul, as the satisfaction of a debt for a debtor relatively to his creditor;
aphorisms on spiritual religion indeed.

as the sacrificial atonement made by the priest for the transgressor of the Mosaic Law; as the reconciliation to an alienated parent for a son who had estranged himself from his father's house and presence; and as a redemptive ransom for a slave or captive.

Now I complain, that this metaphorical naming of the transcendent causative act through the medium of its proper effects from actions and causes of familiar occurrence connected with the former by similarity of result, has been mistaken for an intended designation of the essential character of the causative act itself; and that thus divines have interpreted de omni what was spoken de singulo, and magnified a partial equation into a total identity.

I will merely hint to my more learned readers, and to the professional students of theology, that the origin of this error is to be sought for in the discussions of the Greek Fathers, and (at a later period) of the Schoolmen, on the obscure and abysmal subject of the divine A-seity, and the distinction between the θεῖος and the ψυχή, that is, the Absolute Will, as the universal ground of all being, and the election and purpose of God in the Personal Idea, as the Father. And this view would have allowed me to express what I believe to be the true import and Scriptural idea of Redemption in terms much more nearly resembling those used ordinarily by the Calvinistic divines, and with a conciliative show of coincidence. But this motive was outweighed by the reflection, that I could not rationally have expected to be understood by those to whom I most wish to be intelligible: et si non vis intelligi, cur vis legi?

Not to countervene the purpose of a Synopsis, I have detached the confirmative or explanatory remarks from the answers to questions II. and III., and place them below as scholia. A single glance of the eye will enable the reader to re-connect each with the sentence it is supposed to follow.

scholium to ans. ii.

Nevertheless, the fact or actual truth having been assured to us by revelation, it is not impossible, by steadfast meditation on the idea and supernatural character of a personal Will, for a mind spiritually disciplined to satisfy itself, that the redemptive Act supposes (and that our redemption is even negatively conceivable
only on the supposition of) an Agent who can at once act on the Will as an exciting cause, quasi ab extra; and in the Will, as the condition of its potential, and the ground of its actual, being.

**SCHOLIUM TO ANS. III.**

Where two subjects, that stand to each other in the relation of antithesis or contradistinction, are connected by a middle term common to both, the sense of this middle term is indifferently determinable by either; the preferability of the one or the other in any given case being decided by the circumstance of our more frequent experience of, or greater familiarity with, the term in this connection. Thus, if I put hydrogen and oxygen gas, as opposite poles, the term gas is common to both; and it is a matter of indifference by which of the two bodies I ascertain the sense of the term. But if, for the conjoint purposes of connection and contrast, I oppose transparent crystallized alumen to opaque derb or uncrystallized alumen;—it may easily happen to be far more convenient for me to show the sense of the middle term, that is alumen, by a piece of pipe-clay than by a sapphire or ruby; especially if I should be describing the beauty and preciousness of the latter to a peasant woman, or in a district where a ruby was a rarity which the fewest only had an opportunity of seeing. This is a plain rule of common logic directed in its application by common sense.

Now let us apply this to the case in hand. The two opposites here are Flesh and Spirit: this in relation to Christ, that in relation to the world; and these two opposites are connected by the middle term, Birth, which is of course common to both. But for the same reason, as in the instance last-mentioned, the interpretation of the common term is to be ascertained from its known sense, in the more familiar connection—birth, namely, in relation to our natural life and to the organized body, by which we belong to the present world. Whatever the word signifies in this connection, the same essentially in kind, though not in dignity and value, must be its signification in the other. How else could it be (what yet in this text it undeniably is), the punctum indifferens, or nota communis of the thesis, Flesh or the World and the antithesis Spirit or Christ? We might therefore, upon the supposition of a writer having been speaking of river-water in dis-
tinction from rain-water, as rationally pretend that in the latter phrase, the term, water, was to be understood metaphorically, as that the word, Birth, is a metaphor, and means only so and so in the Gospel according to St. John.

There is, I am aware, a numerous and powerful party in our Church, so numerous and powerful as not seldom to be entitled the Church, who hold and publicly teach, that "Regeneration is only Baptism." Nay, the writer of the article on the lives of Scott and Newton, in our ablest and most respectable Review, is but one among many who do not hesitate to brand the contrary opinion as heterodoxy, and schismatical superstition.* I trust that I think as seriously as most men of the evil of schism; but with every disposition to pay the utmost deference to an acknowledged majority, including, it is said, a very large proportion of the present dignitaries of our Church, I can not but think it a sufficient reply, that if Regeneration means Baptism, Baptism must mean Regeneration; and this too, as Christ himself has declared, a regeneration in the Spirit. Now I would ask these divines this simple question: Do they believingly suppose a spiritual regenerative power and agency inhering in or accompanying the sprinkling of a few drops of water on an infant's face? They can not evade the question by saying that Baptism is a type or sign. For this would be to supplant their own assertion, that Regeneration means Baptism, by the contradictory admission, that Regeneration is the significatum, of which Baptism is the significant. Unless, indeed, they would incur the absurdity of saying, that Regeneration is a type of Regeneration, and Baptism a type of itself—or that Baptism only means Baptism! And this indeed is the plain consequence to which they might be driven, should they answer the above question in the negative.

But if their answer be, "Yes! we do suppose and believe this efficiency in the Baptismal act"—I have not another word to say. Only, perhaps, I might be permitted to express a hope that, for consistency's sake, they would speak less slightly of the insufflation, and extreme unction, used in the Romish Church; notwithstanding the not easily to be answered arguments of our Christian Mercury, the all-eloquent Jeremy Taylor, respecting the latter,—"which, since it is used when the man is above half dead, when he can exercise no act of understanding, it must needs be nothing.

For no rational man can think, that any ceremony can make a spiritual change without a spiritual act of him that is to be changed; nor that it can work by way of nature, or by charm, but morally and after the manner of reasonable creatures."

It is too obvious to require suggestion, that these words here quoted apply with yet greater force and propriety to the point in question; as the babe is an unconscious subject, which the dying man need not be supposed to be. My avowed convictions respecting Regeneration with the spiritual Baptism, as its condition and initiative (Luke iii. 16; Mark i. 7; Matt. iii. 11), and of which the sacramental rite, the Baptism of John, was appointed by Christ to remain as the sign and figure; and still more, perhaps, my belief respecting the mystery of the Eucharist,—concerning which I hold the same opinions as Bucer,† Peter Martyr, and presumably, Cranmer himself—these convictions and this belief will, I doubt not, be deemed by the orthodox de more Grotii, who improve the letter of Arminius with the spirit of Socinus, sufficient data to bring me in guilty of irrational and superstitious mysticism. But I abide by a maxim which I learned at an early period of my theological studies, from Benedict Spinoza. Where the alternative lies between the absurd and the incomprehensible, no wise man can be at a loss which of the two to prefer. To be called irrational, is a trifle: to be so, and in matters of religion, is far otherwise: and whether the irrationality consists in men's believing (that is, in having persuaded themselves that they believe) against reason, or without reason, I have been early instructed to consider it as a sad and serious evil, pregnant with mischiefs, political and moral. And by none of my numerous instructors so impressively as by that great and shining light of our Church in the era of her intellectual splendor, Bishop Jeremy Taylor: from one of whose works,‡ and that of especial authority for the safety as well as for the importance of the principle, inasmuch as it was written expressly ad populum, I will now, both for its own intrinsic worth, and to relieve the attention, wearied, perhaps, by the length and argumentative character of the preceding discussion, interpose the following Aphorism.

* Dedicate to Holy Dying.—Ed.
† Strype—Cranmer, Append.—Ed.
‡ Worthy Communicant, c. iii. s. 5.—Ed.
APHORISMS ON SPIRITUAL RELIGION INDEED.

APHORISM XX.
Taylor.

Whatever is against right reason, that no faith can oblige us to believe. For though reason is not the positive and affirmative measure of our faith, and our faith ought to be larger than (speculative) reason, and take something into her heart, that reason can never take into her eye; yet in all our creed there can be nothing against reason. If reason justly contradicts an article, it is not of the household of faith. In this there is no difficulty, but that in practice we take care that we do not call that reason, which is not so.* For although reason is a right judge,† yet it ought not to pass sentence in an inquiry of faith, until all the information be brought in; all that is within, and all that is without, all that is above, and all that is below; all that concerns it in experience, and all that concerns it in act; whatsoever is of pertinent observation, and whatsoever is revealed. For else reason may argue very well, and yet conclude falsely. It may conclude well in logic, and yet infer a false proposition in theology.‡ But when our judge is fully and truly informed in all that whence she is to make her judgment, we may safely follow her whithersoever she invites us.

APHORISM XXI.
Taylor.

He that speaks against his own reason, speaks against his own conscience: and therefore it is certain, no man serves God with a good conscience, who serves him against his reason.

APHORISM XXII.
Taylor.

By the eye of reason through the telescope of faith, that is, revelation, we may see what without this telescope we could never have known to exist. But as one that shuts the eye hard,

* See ante, p. 241.—Ed.
† Which it could not be in respect of spiritual truths and objects supersensuous, if it were the same with, and merely another name for the faculty judging according to sense—that is, the understanding, or (as Taylor most often calls it in distinction from reason) discourse (discurseus seu facultas discursiva vel discursoria). The reason, so instructed and so actuated as Taylor requires in the sentences immediately following, is what I have called the Spirit. [See ante, pp. 252, 253.—Ed.
‡ See ante, p. 256.—Ed.
AIDS TO REFLECTION.

and with violence curls the eye-lid, forces a fantastic fire from the crystalline humor, and espies a light that never shines, and sees thousands of little fires that never burn; so is he that blinds the eye of reason, and pretends to see by an eye of faith. He makes little images of notions, and some atoms dance before him; but he is not guided by the light, nor instructed by the proposition, but sees like a man in his sleep. In no case can true reason and a right faith oppose each other.

NOTE PREFATORY TO APHORISM XXIII.

Less on my own account, than in the hope of forearming my youthful friends, I add one other transcript from Bishop Taylor, as from a writer to whose name no taint or suspicion of Calvinistic or schismatical tenets can attach, and for the purpose of softening the offence which, I can not but foresee, will be taken at the positions asserted in the first paragraph of Aphorism VII. p. 229, and the documental proofs of the same in pp. 231, 232; and this by a formidable party composed of men ostensibly of the most dissimilar creeds, regular Church-divines, voted orthodox by a great majority of suffrages, and the so-called free-thinking Christians, and Unitarian divines. It is the former class alone that I wish to conciliate: so far at least as it may be done by removing the aggravation of novelty from the offensive article. And surely the simple re-assertion of one of “the two great things,” which Bishop Taylor could assert as a fact,—which, he took for granted, that no Christian would think of controverting,—should at least be controverted without bitterness by his successors in the Church. That which was perfectly safe and orthodox in 1657, in the judgment of a devoted Royalist and Episcopalian, ought to be at most but a venial heterodoxy in 1825. For the rest, I am prepared to hear in answer,—what has already been so often and with such theatrical effect dropped as an extinguisher on my arguments—the famous concluding period of the fourth book of Paley’s Moral and Political Philosophy, declared by Dr. Parr to be the finest prose passage in English literature. Be it so. I bow to so great an authority. But if the learned doctor would impose it on me as the truest as well as the finest, or expect me to admire the logic equally with the rhetoric—ἀφιετάμαι—I start off. As I have been un-English enough to
find Pope's tomb-epigram on Sir Isaac Newton nothing better than a gross and wrongful falsehood, conveyed in an enormous and irreverent hyperbole; so with regard to this passage in question, free as it is from all faults of taste, I have yet the hardihood to confess, that in the sense in which the words "discover" and "prove" are here used and intended, I am not convinced of the truth of the principle (that he alone discovers who proves), and I question the correctness of the particular case, brought as instance and confirmation. I doubt the validity of the assertion as a general rule; and I deny it, as applied to matters of faith, to the verities of religion, in the belief of which there must always be somewhat of moral election, "an act of the will in it as well as of the understanding, as much love in it as discursive power. True Christian faith must have in it something of in-evidence, something that must be made up by duty and by obedience."*—

But most readily do I admit, and most fervently do I contend that the miracles worked by Christ, both as miracles and as ful-filments of prophecy, both as signs and as wonders, made plain discovery, and gave unquestionable proof, of his divine character and authority; that they were to the whole Jewish nation true and appropriate evidences, that He was indeed come who had promised and declared to their forefathers, Behold your God will come with vengeance, even God with a recompense. He will come and save you.† I receive them as proofs, therefore, of the truth of every word which he taught who was himself The Word; and as sure evidences of the final victory over death and of the life to come, in that they were manifestations of Him, who said: I am the resurrection and the life!

The obvious inference from the passage in question, if not its express import, is: Miracula experimenta crucis esse, quibus solis probandum erat, homines non, pecudum instar, omnino perituros esse. Now this doctrine I hold to be altogether alien from the spirit, and without authority in the letter, of Scripture. I can recall nothing in the history of human belief that should induce me, I find nothing in my own moral being that enables me, to understand it. I can, however, perfectly well understand, the readiness of those divines in hoc Paleii dictum ore pleno jurare, qui nihil alium in toto Evangelio invenire posse profitten tur.

* J. Taylor's Worthy Communicant.—Ed.
† Isaiah xxxiv. compared with Matt. x. 34, and Luke xii. 49.—Ed.
The most unqualified admiration of this superlative passage I find perfectly in character for those, who while Socinianism and Ultra-Socinianism, are spreading like the roots of an elm, on and just below the surface, through the whole land, and here and there at least have even dipped under the garden-fence of the Church, and blunted the edge of the laborer’s spade in the gayest parterres of our Baalhamon,—who,—while heresies, to which the framers and compilers of our Liturgy, Homilies, and Articles would have refused the very name of Christianity, meet their eyes on the list of religious denominations for every city and large town throughout the kingdom—can yet congratulate themselves with Dr. Paley, in his book on the Evidences,* that the rent has not reached the foundation;—that is, that the corruption of man’s will; that the responsibility of man in any sense in which it is not equally predicable of dogs and horses; that the divinity of our Lord, and even his pre-existence; that sin, and redemption through the merits of Christ; and grace; and the especial aids of the Spirit; and the efficacy of prayer; and the subsistency of the Holy Ghost; may all be extruded without breach or rent in the essentials of Christian Faith;—that a man may deny and renounce them all, and remain a fundamental Christian, notwithstanding! But there are many who can not keep up with Latitudinarians of such a stride; and I trust that the majority of serious believers are in this predicament. Now for all these it would seem more in character to be of Bishop Taylor’s opinion, that the belief in question is presupposed in a convert to the truth in Christ—but at all events not to circulate in the great whispering-gallery of the religious Public suspicions and hard thoughts of those who, like myself, are of this opinion; who do not dare decry the religious instincts of humanity as a baseless dream; who hold, that to excavate the ground under the faith of all mankind, is a very questionable method of building up our faith as Christians; who fear, that instead of adding to, they should detract from the honor of the Incarnate Word by disparaging the light of the Word, that was in the beginning, and which lighteth every man; and who, under these convictions, can tranquilly leave it to be disputed, in some new Dialogues in the shades, between the fathers of the Unitarian Church on the one side, and Maimonides, Moses Mendelssohn, and Lessing on the other, whether the fa-

* Conclusion, Part III. ch. 8.—Ed.
ous passage in Paley does or does not contain the three dialectic flaws, *petitio principii, argumentum in circulo,* and *argumentum contra rem a premisso rem ipsam includente.*

Yes! fervently do I contend, that to satisfy the understanding that there is a future state, was not the specific object of the Christian Dispensation; and that neither the belief of a future state, nor the rationality of this belief, is the exclusive attribute of the Christian religion. An essential, a fundamental, article of all religion it is, and therefore of the Christian; but otherwise than as in connection with the salvation of mankind from the terrors of that state, among the essential articles peculiar to the Gospel Creed (those, for instance, by which it is *contra*-distinguished from the creed of a religious Jew), I do not place it. And before sentence is passed against me, as heterodox, on this ground, let not my judges forget who it was that assured us, that if a man did not believe in a state of retribution after death, previously and on other grounds, *neither would he believe, though a man should be raised from the dead.*

Again, I am questioned as to my proofs of a future state by men who are so far, and only so far, professed believers, that they admit a God, and the existence of a law from God. I give them: and the questioners turn from me with a scoff or incredulous smile. Now should others of a less scanty creed infer the weakness of the reasons assigned by me from their failure in convincing these men; may I not remind them, who it was, to whom a similar question was proposed by men of the same class? But at all events it will be enough for my own support to remember it; and to know that He held such questioners, who could not find a sufficing proof of this great all-concerning verity in the words, *The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob* unworthy of any other answer—men not to be satisfied by any proof—by any such proofs, at least, as are compatible with the ends and purposes of all religious conviction;—by any proofs that would not destroy the faith they were intended to confirm, and reverse the whole character and quality of its effects and influences. But if, notwithstanding all here offered in defence of my opinion, I must still be adjudged heterodox and in error,—what can I say but that *malo cum Platone errare,* and take refuge behind the ample shield of Bishop Jeremy Taylor?
In order to his own glory, and for the manifestation of his goodness, and that the accidents of this world might not overmuch trouble those good men who suffered evil things, God was pleased to do two great things. The one was: that he sent his Son into the world to take upon him our nature, that every man might submit to a necessity, from which God's own Son was not exempt, when it behooved even Christ to suffer, and so to enter into glory. The other great thing was: that God did not only by revelation and the sermons of the Prophets to his Church, but even to all mankind competently teach, and effectively persuade, that the soul of man does not die; that though things were ill here, yet to the good who usually feel most of the evils of this life, they should end in honor and advantages. And therefore Cicero had reason on his side to conclude, that there is a time and place after this life, wherein the wicked shall be punished, and the virtuous rewarded; when he considered that Orpheus and Socrates, and many others, just men and benefactors of mankind, were either slain or oppressed to death by evil men. And all these received not the promise. But when virtue made men poor, and free speaking of brave truths made the wise to lose their liberty: when an excellent life hastened an opprobrious death, and the obeying reason and our conscience lost us our lives, or at least all the means and conditions of enjoying them: it was but time to look about for another state of things where justice should rule, and virtue find her own portion. And therefore men cast out every line, and turned every stone, and tried every argument: and sometimes proved it well, and when they did not, yet they believed strongly; and they were sure of the thing, when they were not sure of the argument.*

COMMENT.

A fact may be truly stated, and yet the cause or reason assigned for it mistaken, or inadequate, or pars pro toto,—one only or few of many that might or should have been adduced. The preceding Aphorism is an instance in point. The phænomenon here brought forward by the Bishop, as the ground and occasion

* Sermon at the Funeral of Sir George Dalston.—Ed.
of men's belief of a future state—namely, the frequent, not to
say ordinary, disproportion between moral worth and worldly
prosperity—must, indeed, at all times and in all countries of the
civilized world have led the observant and reflecting few, the
men of meditative habits and strong feelings of natural equity, to
a nicer consideration of the current belief, whether instinctive or
traditional. By forcing the soul in upon herself, this enigma of
Saint and Sage from Job, David and Solomon, to Claudian and
Boetius,—this perplexing disparity of success and desert,—has, I
doubt not, with such men been the occasion of a steadier and
more distinct consciousness of a something in man different in
kind, and which not merely distinguishes but contradistinguishes
him from brute animals—at the same time that it has brought
into closer view an enigma of yet harder solution—the fact, I
mean, of a contradiction in the human being, of which no traces
are observable elsewhere in animated or inanimate nature:—a
struggle of jarring impulses; a mysterious diversity between the
injunctions of the mind and the elections of the will; and (last
not least) the utter incommensurateness and the unsatisfying
qualities of the things around us, that yet are the only objects
which our senses discover, or our appetites require us to pursue:
—hence for the finer and more contemplative spirits the ever-
strengthening suspicion, that the two phenomena must in some
way or other stand in close connection with each other, and that
the riddle of fortune and circumstance is but a form or effluence
of the riddle of man:—and hence again, the persuasion, that the
solution of both problems is to be sought for—hence the presenti-
ment, that this solution will be found—in the contra-distinctive
constituent of humanity, in the something of human nature which
is exclusively human:—and—as the objects discoverable by the
senses, as all the bodies and substances that we can touch, meas-
ure, and weigh, are either mere totals, the unity of which results
from the parts, and is of course only apparent; or substances,
the unity of action of which is owing to the nature or arrange-
ment of the partible bodies which they actuate or set in motion
(steam for instance, in a steam-engine:)—as on the one hand the
condition and known or conceivable properties of all the objects
which perish and utterly cease to be, together with all the prop-
erties which we ourselves have in common with these perishable
things, differ in kind from the acts and properties peculiar to our
humanity, so that the former can not even be conceived, can not
without a contradiction in terms, be predicated, of the proper and
immediate subject of the latter— (for who would not smile at an
ounce of truth, or a square foot of honor?)— and as, on the other
hand, whatever things in visible nature have the character of
permanence, and endure amid continual flux unchanged like a
rainbow in a fast-flying shower (for example, beauty, order, har-
mmony, finality, law), are all akin to the peculia of humanity, are
all congenera of mind and will, without which indeed they would
not only exist in vain, as pictures for moles, but actually not
exist at all;— hence, finally, the conclusion that the soul of man,
as the subject of mind and will, must likewise possess a principle
of permanence, and be destined to endure. And were these
grounds lighter than they are, yet as a small weight will make
a scale descend, where there is nothing in the opposite scale, or
painted weights, which have only an illusive relief or prominence;
so in the scale of immortality slight reasons are in effect weighty,
and sufficient to determine the judgment, there being no counter-
weight, no reasons against them, and no facts in proof of the con-
trary, that would not prove equally well the cessation of the eye
on the removal or diffraction of the eye-glass, and the dissolution
or incapacity of the musician on the fracture of his instrument or
its strings.

But though I agree with Taylor so far, as not to doubt that the
misallotment of worldly goods and fortunes was one principal oc-
casion, exciting well-disposed and spiritually awakened natures
by reflections and reasonings, such as I have here supposed, to
mature the presentiment of immortality into full consciousness,
into a principle of action and a well-spring of strength and conso-
lation; I can not concede to this circumstance any thing like the
importance and extent of efficacy which he in this passage attrib-
utes to it. I am persuaded, that as the belief of all mankind, of
all* tribes, and nations, and languages, in all ages, and in all

* I say all: for the accounts of one or two travelling French philoso-
phers, professed atheists and partisans of infidelity, respecting one or two
African hordes, Caffres, and poor outlawed Boecmen, hunted out of their
humanity, ought not to be regarded as exceptions. And as to Hearne's as-
sertion respecting the non-existence and rejection of the belief among the
Copper-Indians, it is not only hazarded on very weak and insufficient
grounds, but he himself, in another part of his work, unconsciously supplies
states of social union, it must be referred to far deeper grounds, common to man as man; and that its fibres are to be traced to the tap-root of humanity. I have long entertained, and do not hesitate to avow, the conviction that the argument from universality of belief urged by Barrow and others in proof of the first article of the Creed, is neither in point of fact—for two very different objects may be intended, and two or more diverse and even contradictory conceptions may be expressed, by the same name—nor in legitimacy of conclusion as strong and unexceptionable, as the argument from the same ground for the continuance of our personal being after death. The bull-calf butts with smooth and unarmed brow. Throughout animated nature, of each characteristic organ and faculty there exists a pre-assurance, an instinctive and practical anticipation; and no pre-assurance common to a whole species does in any instance prove delusive.* All other prophecies of nature have their exact fulfilment—in every other ingrafted word of promise, Nature is found true to her word; and is it in her noblest creature that she tells her first lie?—(The Reader will, of course, understand, that I am here speaking in the assumed character of a mere naturalist, to whom no light of revelation had been vouchsafed; one, who

with gentle heart
Had worship’d Nature in the hill and valley,
Not knowing what he loved, but loved it all.)

Whether, however, the introductory part of the Bishop’s argument is to be received with more or less qualification, the fact itself, as stated in the concluding sentence of the Aphorism, remains unaffected, and is beyond exception true.

data, from whence the contrary may safely be concluded. Hearne, perhaps, put down his friend Motanabbì’s Fort-philosophy for the opinion of his tribe; and from his high appreciation of the moral character of this murderous gymnosophist, it might, I fear, be inferred, that Hearne himself was not the very person one would, of all others, have chosen for the purpose of instituting the inquiry.

* See Baron Field’s Letters from New South Wales. The poor natives, the lowest in the scale of humanity, evince no symptom of any religion, or the belief of any superior power as the maker of the world; but yet have no doubt that the spirits of their ancestors survive in the form of porpoises, and mindful of their descendants, with imperishable affection, drive the whales ashore for them to feast on.
If other argument and yet higher authority were required, I might refer to St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and to the Epistle to the Hebrews, which whether written by Paul, or, as Luther conjectured, by Apollos, is out of all doubt the work of an Apostolic man filled with the Holy Spirit, and composed while the Temple and the glories of the Temple worship were yet in existence. Several of the Jewish and still Judaizing converts had begun to vacillate in their faith, and to stumble at the stumbling-stone of the contrast between the pomp and splendor of the old Law, and the simplicity and humility of the Christian Church. To break this sensual charm, to unfascinate these bedazzled brethren, the writer to the Hebrews institutes a comparison between the two religions, and demonstrates the superior spiritual grandeur, the greater intrinsic worth and dignity of the religion of Christ. On the other hand, at Rome where the Jews formed a numerous, powerful, and privileged class (many of them, too, by their proselyting zeal and frequent disputations with the priests and philosophers trained and exercised polemics), the recently-founded Christian Church was, it appears, in greater danger from the reasonings of the Jewish doctors and even of its own Judaizing members, respecting the use of the new revelation. Thus the object of the Epistle to the Hebrews was to prove the superiority of the Christian religion; the object of the Epistle to the Romans to prove its necessity. Now there was one argument extremely well calculated to stagger a faith newly transplanted and still loose at its roots, and which if allowed, seemed to preclude the possibility of the Christian religion, as an especial and immediate revelation from God—on the high grounds, at least, on which the Apostle of the Gentiles placed it, and with the exclusive rights and superseding character; which he claimed for it. "You admit" (said they) "the divine origin and authority of the Law given to Moses, proclaimed with thunders and lightnings and the voice of the Most High heard by all the people from Mount Sinai, and introduced, enforced, and perpetuated by a series of the most stupendous miracles. Our religion, then, was given by God: and can God give a perishable imperfect religion? If not perishable, how can it have a successor? If perfect, how can it need to be superseded? The entire argument is indeed comprised in the latter attribute of our law. We know, from an authority which you yourselves acknowledge for divine,
that our religion is perfect. *He is the rock, and his work is perfect.* (Deut. xxxii. 4.) If then the religion revealed by God himself to our forefathers is perfect, what need have we of another?"—This objection, both from its importance and from its extreme plausibility, for the persons at least to whom it was addressed, required an answer in both Epistles. And accordingly the answer is included in the one (that to the Hebrews) and it is the especial purpose and main subject of the other. And how does the Apostle answer it? Suppose—and the thing is not impossible*—a man of sense, who had studied the evidences of Priestley and Paley with Warburton’s Divine Legation, but who should be a perfect stranger to the writings of St. Paul, and that I put this question to him:—“What do you think, will St. Paul’s answer be?” "Nothing," he would reply, "can be more obvious. It is in vain, the Apostle will urge, that you bring your notions of probability and inferences from the arbitrary interpretation of a word in an absolute rather than a relative sense, to invalidate a known fact. It is a fact, that your religion is (in your sense of the word) not perfect: for it is deficient in one of the two essential constituents of all true religion, the belief of a future state on solid and sufficient grounds. Had the doctrine indeed been revealed, the stupendous miracles, which you most truly affirm to have accompanied and attested the first promulgation of your religion, would have supplied the requisite proof. But the doctrine was not revealed; and your belief of a future state rests upon no solid grounds. You believe it (as far as you believe it, and as many of you as profess this belief) without revelation, and without the only proper and sufficient evidence of

* The case here supposed actually occurred in my own experience in the person of a Spanish refugee, of English parents, but from his tenth year resident in Spain, and bred in a family of wealthy, but ignorant and bigoted, Roman Catholics. In mature manhood he returned to England, disgusted with the conduct of the priests and monks, which had indeed for some years produced on his mind its so common effect among the better-informed natives of the south of Europe—a tendency to Deism. The results, however, of the infidel system in France, with his opportunities of observing the effects of irreligion on the French officers in Spain, on the one hand; and the undeniable moral and intellectual superiority of Protestant Britain on the other, had not been lost on him: and here he began to think for himself and resolved to study the subject. He had gone through Bishop Warburton's Divine Legation, and Paley’s Evidences; but had never read the Gospels consecutively, and the Epistles not at all.
its truth. Your religion, therefore, though of divine origin, is (if taken in disjunction from the new revelation, which I am commissioned to proclaim) but a \textit{religio dimidiata}; and the main purpose, the proper character, and the paramount object of Christ's mission and miracles, is to supply the missing half by a clear discovery of a future state; and (since "he alone discovers who proves") by proving the truth of the doctrine now for the first time declared with the requisite authority, by the requisite, appropriate, and alone satisfactory evidences."

But is this the Apostle's answer to the Jewish oppugners, and the Judaizing false brethren of the Church of Christ? It is not the answer, it does not resemble the answer, returned by the Apostle. It is neither parallel nor corradial with the line of argument in either of the two Epistles, or with any one line; but it is a chord that traverses them all, and only touches where it cuts across. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the directly contrary position is repeatedly asserted: and in the Epistle to the Romans, it is everywhere supposed. The death to which the Law sentenced all sinners (and which even the Gentiles without the revealed law had announced to them by their consciences, \textit{the judgment of God having been made known even to them}) must be the same death, from which they were saved by the faith of the Son of God; or the Apostle's reasoning would be senseless, his \textit{antithesis} a mere equivocation, a play on a word, \textit{quod idem sonat, aliud vult}. Christ redeemed mankind from the curse of the law; and we all know, that it was not from temporal death, or the penalties and afflictions of the present life, that believers had been redeemed. The Law of which the inspired sage of Tarsus is speaking, from which no man can plead excuse; the Law, miraculously delivered in thunders from Mount Sinai, which was inscribed on tables of stone for the Jews, and written in the hearts of all men (Rom. ii. 15) the law holy and spiritual! What was the great point, of which this law, in its own name offered no solution; the mystery which it left behind the veil, or in the cloudy tabernacle of types and figurative sacrifices? Whether there was a judgment to come, and souls to suffer the dread sentence? Or was it not far rather—what are the means of escape; where may grace be found and redemption? St. Paul says, the latter. The law brings condemnation: but the conscience-sentenced transgressor's ques-
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"What shall I do to be saved? Who will intercede for me?" it dismisses as beyond its jurisdiction and takes no cognizance thereof, save in prophetic murmurs or mute out-shadowings of mystic ordinances and sacrificial types. Not therefore, that there is a life to come, and a future state; but what each individual soul may hope for itself therein: and on what grounds: and that this state has been rendered an object of aspiration and fervent desire, and a source of thanksgiving and exceeding great joy; and by whom, and through whom, and for whom, and by what means, and under what conditions—these are the peculiar and distinguishing fundamentals of the Christian Faith. These are the revealed lights and obtained privileges of the Christian Dispensation. Not alone the knowledge of the boon, but the precious inestimable boon itself, is the grace and truth that came by Jesus Christ: I believe Moses, I believe Paul; but I believe in Christ.

APHORISM XXIV.

ON BAPTISM.

In those days came John the Baptist, preaching.—It will suffice for our present purpose, if by these* words we direct the attention to the origin, or at least first Scriptural record, of Baptism, and to the comibeminent of preaching therewith; their aspect each to the other, and their concurrence to one excellent end; the word unfolding the sacrament, and the sacrament sealing the word; the word as a light, informing and clearing the sense of the seal; and this again as a seal, confirming and ratiifying the truth of the word; as you see some significant seals, or engraven signets, have a word about them expressing their sense.

But truly the word is a light, and the sacraments have in them of the same light illuminating them. This sacrament of Bapt-

* By certain Biblical philologists of the Teutonic school (men distinguished by learning, but still more characteristically by hardihood in conjecture, and who suppose the Gospels to have undergone several successive revisions and enlargements by, or under the authority of, the sacred historians) these words are contended to have been, in the first delivery, the common commencement of all the Gospels καὶ ἄρα (that is, according to the flesh), in distinction from St. John's or the Gospel καὶ πρεποῦ (that is, according to the Spirit).
tism, the ancients do particularly express by light. Yet are they both nothing but darkness to us, till the same light shine in our hearts; for till then we are nothing but darkness ourselves, and therefore the most luminous things are so to us. Noonday is as midnight to a blind man. And we see these ordinances, the word and the sacrament, without profit or comfort for the most part, because we have not that divine light within us. And we have it not, because we ask it not.

COMMENT, OR AN AID TO REFLECTION IN THE FORMING OF A SOUND JUDGMENT RESPECTING THE PURPORT AND PURPOSE OF THE BAPTISMAL RITE, AND A JUST APPRECIATION OF ITS VALUE AND IMPORTANCE.

A born and bred Baptist, and paternally descended from the old orthodox Non-conformists, and both in his own and his father's right a very dear friend of mine, had married a member of the National Church. In consequence of an anxious wish expressed by his lady for the baptism of their first child, he solicited me to put him in possession of my views respecting this controversy; though principally as to the degree of importance which I attached to it. For as to the point itself, his natural prepossession in favor of the persuasion in which he was born had been confirmed by a conscientious examination of the arguments on both sides. As the comment on the preceding Aphorism, or rather as an expansion of its subject-matter, I will give the substance of the conversation: and amply shall I have been remunerated, should it be read with the interest and satisfaction with which it was heard. More particularly, should any of my Readers find themselves under the same or similar circumstances.

Our discussion is rendered shorter and more easy by our perfect agreement in certain preliminary points. We both disclaim alike every attempt to explain anything into Scripture, and every attempt to explain anything out of Scripture. Or if we regard either with a livelier aversion it is the latter, as being the more fashionable and prevalent. I mean the practice of both high and low Grotian divines to explain away positive assertions of Scripture on the pretext, that the literal sense is not agreeable to reason, that is, their particular reason. And inasmuch as (in the only right sense of the word) there is no such thing as a particular reason, they must, and in fact they do, mean that the literal
sense is not accordant to their understanding, that is, to the notions which their understandings have been taught and accustomed to form in their school of philosophy. Thus a Platonist who should become a Christian would at once, even in texts susceptible of a different interpretation, recognize, because he would expect to find, several doctrines which the disciple of the Epicurean or mechanic school will not receive on the most positive declarations of the divine word. And as we agree in the opinion that the Minimi-fidian party err grievously in the latter point, so I must concede to you, that too many Pædo-baptists (assertors of Infant Baptism) have erred, though less grossly, in the former. I have, I confess, no eye for these smoke-like wreaths of inference, this ever-widening spiral ergo from the narrow aperture of perhaps a single text; or rather an interpretation forced into it by construing an idiomatic phrase in an artless narrative with the same absoluteness as if it had formed part of a mathematical problem. I start back from these inverted pyramids, where the apex is the base. If I should inform any one that I had called at a friend’s house, but had found nobody at home, the family having all gone to the play; and if he on the strength of this information should take occasion to asperse my friend’s wife for unmotherly conduct in taking an infant six months old to a crowded theatre; would you allow him to press on the words “nobody” and “all the family,” in justification of the slander? Would you not tell him, that the words were to be interpreted by the nature of the subject, the purpose of the speaker, and their ordinary acceptation; and that he must or might have known, that infants of that age would not be admitted into the theatre? Exactly so, with regard to the words, he and all his household. Had Baptism of infants at that early period of the Gospel been a known practice, or had this been previously demonstrated,—then indeed the argument, that in all probability there were infants or young children in so large a family, would be no otherwise objectionable than as being superfluous, and a sort of anticlimax in logic. But if the words are cited as the proof, it would be a clear petition principii, though there had been nothing else against it. But when we turn back to the Scriptures preceding the narrative, and find repentance and belief demanded as the terms and indispensable conditions of Baptism,—then the case above imagined applies in its full force. Equally vain is the pretended anal-
ogy from Circumcision, which was no Sacrament at all; but the means and mark of national distinction. In the first instance it was, doubtless, a privilege or mark of superior rank conferred on the descendants of Abraham. In the Patriarchal times this rite was confined (the first governments being theocracies) to the priesthood, who were set apart to that office from their birth. At a later period this token of the premier class was extended to kings. And thus, when it was re-ordained by Moses for the whole Jewish nation, it was at the time said—Ye are all priests and kings; ye are a consecrated people. In addition to this, or rather in aid of this, Circumcision was intended to distinguish the Jews by some indelible sign; and it was no less necessary that Jewish children should be recognizable as Jews than Jewish adults—not to mention the greater safety of the rite in infancy. Nor was it ever pretended that any grace was conferred with it, or that the rite was significant of any inward or spiritual operation. In short, an unprejudiced and competent reader need only peruse the first thirty-three paragraphs of the eighteenth section of Taylor's Liberty of Propheaying; and then compare with these the remainder of the section added by him after the Restoration: those, namely, in which he attempts to overthrow his own arguments. I had almost said, affects: for such is the feebleness, and so palpable the sophistry, of his answers, that I find it difficult to imagine that Taylor himself could have been satisfied with them. The only plausible arguments apply with equal force to Baptist and Pædo-baptist; and would prove, if they proved anything, that both were wrong, and the Quakers only in the right.

Now, in the first place, it is obvious, that nothing conclusive can be drawn from the silence of the New Testament respecting a practice, which, if we suppose it already in use, must yet, from the character of the first converts, have been of comparatively rare occurrence; and which, from the predominant and more concerning objects and functions of the Apostolic writers (1 Cor. i. 17), was not likely to have been mentioned otherwise than incidentally, and very probably therefore might not have occurred to them to mention at all. But, secondly, admitting that the practice was introduced at a later period than that in which the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles were composed: I should yet be fully satisfied, that the Church exercised herein a sound*

* That every the least permissible form and ordinance, which at different
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discretion. On either supposition, therefore, it is never without regret that I see a divine of our Church attempting to erect forts on a position so evidently commanded by the stronghold of his antagonists. I dread the use which the Socinians may make of their example, and the Papists of their failure. Let me not, however, deceive you. (The Reader understands, that I suppose myself conversing with a Baptist.) I am of opinion, that the divines on your side are chargeable with a far more grievous mistake, that of giving a carnal and Judaizing interpretation to the various Gospel texts in which the terms, baptism and baptize, occur, contrary to the express and earnest admonitions of the Apostle Paul. And this I say without in the least retracting my former concession, that the texts appealed to, as commanding or authorizing Infant Baptism, are all without exception made to bear a sense neither contained nor deducible; and likewise that (historically considered) there exists no sufficient positive evidence that the Baptism of infants was instituted by the Apostles in the practice of the Apostolic age.*

times it might be expedient for the Church to enact, are pre-enacted in the New Testament; and that whatever is not to be found there, ought to be allowed nowhere—this has been asserted. But that it has been proved, or even rendered plausible; or that the tenet is not to be placed among the revolutionary results of the Scripture-slighting will-worship of the Romish Church; it will be more sincere to say I disbelieve, than that I doubt. It was chiefly, if not exclusively, in reference to the extravagances built on this tenet, that the great Selden ventured to declare that the words, Scrutaminis Scripturarum, had set the world in an uproar.

Extremes appear to generate each other; but if we look steadily, there will most often be found some common error, that produces both as its positive and negative poles. Thus superstitions go by pairs, like the two Hungarian sisters, always quarrelling and inveterately averse, but yet joined at the trunk.

* More than this I do not consider as necessary for the argument. And as to Robinson's assertion in his History of Baptism, that Infant Baptism did not commence till the time of Cyprian, who, condemning it as a general practice, allowed it in particular cases by a dispensation of charity: and that it did not actually become the ordinary rule of the Church, till Augustine, in the fever of his Anti-Pelagian dispute had introduced the Calvinistic interpretation of Original Sin, and the dire state of infants dying unbaptized—I am so far from acceding to them, that I reject the whole statement as rash, and not only unwarranted by the authorities he cites, but unanswerably confuted by Baxter, Wall, and many other learned Pseudo-baptists before and since the publication of his work. I confine myself to the
Lastly, we both coincide in the full conviction, that it is neither the outward ceremony of Baptism, under any form or circumstances, nor any other ceremony, but such a faith in Christ as tends to produce a conformity to his holy doctrines and example in heart and life, and which faith is itself a declared mean and condition of our partaking of his spiritual body, and of being clothed upon with his righteousness,—that properly makes us Christians, and can alone be enjoined as an article of faith necessary to salvation, so that the denial thereof may be denounced as a damnable heresy. In the strictest sense of essential, this alone is the essential in Christianity, that the same spirit should be growing in us which was in the fulness of all perfection in Christ Jesus. Whatever else is named essential, is such because, and only as far as, it is instrumental to this, or evidently implied herein. If the Baptists hold the visible right to be indispensable to salvation, with what terror must they not regard every disease that befalls their children between youth and infancy! But if they are saved by the faith of the parent, then the outward rite is not essential to salvation, otherwise than as the omission should arise from a spirit of disobedience: and in this case it is the cause not the effect, the wilful and unbaptized heart, not the unbaptizing hand, that perils it. And surely it looks very like an inconsistency to admit the vicarious faith of the parents, and the therein implied promise, that the child shall be Christianly bred up, and as much as in them lies prepared for the communion of saints—to admit this, as safe and sufficient in their own instance, and yet to denounce the same belief and practice as hazardous and unavailing in the Church—the same, I say, essentially, and only differing from their own by the presence of two or three Christian friends as additional securities, and by the promise being expressed!

But you, my filial friend! have studied Christ under a better teacher—the spirit of adoption, even the spirit that was in Paul, and which still speaks to us out of his writings. You remember and admire the saying of an old divine, that a ceremony duly instituted is a chain of gold around the neck of faith; but if in the wish to make it co-essential and consubstantial, you draw it closer and closer, it may strangle the faith it was meant to deck assertion—not that Infant Baptism was not—but that there exist no sufficient proofs that it was—the practice of the Apostolic age.
and designate. You are not so unretentive a scholar as to have forgotten the *pateris et auro* of your Virgil: or if you were, you are not so inconsistent a reasoner as to translate the Hebraism, spirit and fire, in one place by spiritual fire, and yet refuse to translate water and spirit by spiritual water in another place; or if, as I myself think, the different position marks a different sense, yet that the former must be *ejusdem generis* with the latter—the water of repentance, reformation in conduct; and the spirit that which purifies the inmost principle of action, as fire purges the metal substantially, and not cleansing the surface only.

But in this instance, it will be said, the ceremony, the outward and visible sign, is a Scripture ordinance. I will not reply that the Romish priest says the same of the anointing of the sick with oil and the imposition of hands. No, my answer is: that this is a very sufficient reason for the continued observance of a ceremonial rite so derived and sanctioned, even though its own beauty, simplicity, and natural significancy had pleaded less strongly in its behalf. But it is no reason why the Church should forget that the perpetuation of a thing does not alter the nature of the thing, and that a ceremony to be perpetuated is to be perpetuated as a ceremony. It is no reason why, knowing and experiencing even in the majority of her own members the prone-ness of the human mind to superstition,* the Church might not rightfully and piously adopt the measures best calculated to check this tendency, and to correct the abuse to which it had led in any particular rite. But of superstitious notions respecting the Baptismal ceremony, and of abuse resulting, the instances were flagrant and notorious. Such, for instance, was the frequent deferring of the Baptismal rite to a late period of life, and even to the deathbed, in the belief that the mystic water would cleanse the baptized person from all sin, and (if he died immediately after the performance of the ceremony), send him pure and spotless into the other world.

Nor is this all. The preventive remedy applied by the Church is legitimated as well as additionally recommended by the following consideration. Where a ceremony answered and was in-

* Let me be permitted to repeat and apply the note in a former page. Superstition may be defined as *superstantium (cujusmodi sunt ceremoniae et signa externa qua, nisi in significando, nihil sunt et pene nihil) substantiatio.*
tended to answer several purposes, which purposes at its first institution were blended in respect of the time, but which afterwards by change of circumstances (as when, for instance, a large and ever-increasing proportion of the members of the Church, or those who at least bore the Christian name, were of Christian parents) were necessarily dis-united—then either the Church has no power or authority delegated to her (which is shifting the ground of controversy), or she must be authorized to choose and determine, to which of the several purposes the ceremony should be attached. Now one of the purposes of Baptism was—the making it publicly manifest, first, what individuals were to be regarded by the World (Phil. ii. 15) as belonging to the visible communion of Christians: inasmuch as by their demeanor and apparent condition, the general estimation of the city set on a hill and not to be hid (Matth. v. 14) could not but be affected—the city that even in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation was bound not only to give no cause, but by all innocent means, to prevent every occasion, of rebuke. Secondly, to mark out, for the Church itself, those that were entitled to that especial dearness, that watchful and disciplinary love and loving-kindness, which over and above the affections and duties of philanthropy and universal charity, Christ himself had enjoined, and with an emphasis and in a form significant of its great and especial importance,—A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another. By a charity wide as sunshine, and comprehending the whole human race, the body of Christians was to be placed in contrast with the proverbial misanthropy and bigotry of the Jewish Church and people: while yet they were to be distinguished and known to all men, by the peculiar love and affection displayed by them towards the members of their own community; thus exhibiting the intensity of sectarian attachment, yet by the no less notorious and exemplary practice of the duties of universal benevolence, secured from the charge so commonly brought against it, of being narrow and exclusive. "How kind these Christians are to the poor and afflicted, without distinction of religion or country; but how they love each other!"

Now combine with this the consideration before urged—the duty, I mean, and necessity of checking the superstitious abuse of the Baptismal rite: and I then ask, with confidence, in what way could the Church have exercised a sound discretion more
wisely, piously, or effectively, than by fixing, from among the
several ends and purposes of baptism, the outward ceremony to
the purposes here mentioned? How could the great body of
Christians be more plainly instructed as to the true nature of all
outward ordinances? What can be conceived better calculated
to prevent the ceremony from being regarded as other and more
than a ceremony, if not the administration of the same on an ob-
ject (yea, a dear and precious object) of spiritual duties, though
the conscious subject of spiritual operations and graces only by
anticipation and in hope;— a subject unconscious as a flower of
the dew falling on it, or the early rain, and thus emblematic of
the myriads who (as in our Indian empire, and henceforward, I
trust, in Africa) are temporally and even morally benefited by
the outward existence of Christianity, though as yet ignorant of
its saving truth? And yet, on the other hand, what more reve-
sential than the application of this the common initiatory rite of
the East sanctioned and appropriated by Christ— its application,
I say, to the very subjects, whom he himself commanded to be
brought to him—the children in arms, respecting whom Jesus
was much displeased with his disciples, who had rebuked those
that brought them? What more expressive of the true charac-
ter of that originant yet generic stain, from which the Son of
God, by his mysterious Incarnation and Agony and Death and
Resurrection, and by the Baptism of the Spirit, came to cleanse
the children of Adam, than the exhibition of the outward element
to infants, free from and incapable of crime, in whom the evil
principle was present only as potential being, and whose outward
semblance represented the kingdom of Heaven? And can it—
to a man, who would hold himself deserving of anathema ma-
ranatha (1 Cor. xvi. 22) if he did not love the Lord Jesus—can
it be nothing to such a man, that the introduction and commen-
dation of a new inmate, a new spiritual ward, to the assembled
brethren in Christ (—and this, as I have shown above, was one
purpose of the Baptismal ceremony—) does in the Baptism of an
infant recall our Lord’s own presentation in the Temple on the
eighth day after his birth? Add to all these considerations the
known fact of the frequent exposure and the general light regard
of infants, at the time when Infant Baptism is by the Baptists
supposed to have been first ruled by the Catholic Church, not
overlooking the humane and charitable motives, that influenced
Cyprian's decision in its favor. And then make present to your imagination, and meditatively contemplate the still continuing tendency, the profitable, the beautiful effects of this ordinance now and for so many centuries back, on the great mass of the population throughout Christendom—the softening, elevating exercise of faith, and the conquest over the senses, while in the form of a helpless crying babe the presence, and the unutterable worth and value, of an immortal being made capable of everlasting bliss are solemnly proclaimed and carried home to the mind and heart of the hearers and beholders! Nor will you forget the probable influence on the future education of the child, the opportunity of instructing and impressing the friends, relatives, and parents in their best and most docile mood. These are, indeed, the mollia tempora fundi.

It is true, that by an unforeseen accident, and through the propensity of all zealots to caricature partial truth into total falsehood—it is too true, that a tree the very contrary in quality of that shown to Moses (Exod. xv. 25) was afterwards cast into the sweet waters from this fountain, and made them like the waters of Marah, too bitter to be drunk. I allude to the Pelagian controversy, the perversion of the article of Original Sin by Augustine, and the frightful conclusions which this durus pater infantum drew from the article thus perverted. It is not, however, to the predecessors of this African, whoever they were that authorized Paedo-Baptism, and at whatever period it first became general—it is not to the Church at the time being, that these consequences are justly imputable. She had done her best to preclude every superstition, by allowing, in urgent cases, any and every adult, man and woman, to administer the ceremonial part, the outward rite of Baptism: but reserving to the highest functionary of the Church (even to the exclusion of the co-presbyters) the more proper and spiritual purpose, namely, the declaration of repentance and belief, the free choice of Christ as his Lord, and the open profession of the Christian title by an individual in his own name and by his own deliberate act. This office of religion, the essentially moral and spiritual nature of which could not be mistaken, this most solemn office the Bishop alone was to perform.

Thus—as soon as the purposes of the ceremonial rite were by change of circumstances divided, that is, took place at different
periods of the believer’s life—to the outward purposes, where the effect was to be produced on the consciousness of others, the Church continued to affix the outward rite; while to the substantial and spiritual purpose, where the effect was to be produced on the individual’s own mind, she gave its beseeeming dignity by an ordinance not figurative, but standing in the direct cause and relation of means to the end.

In fine, there are two great purposes to be answered, each having its own subordinate purposes and desirable consequences. The Church answers both, the Baptists one only. If, nevertheless, you would still prefer the union of the Baptismal rite with the Confirmation, and that the presentation of infants to the assembled Church had formed a separate institution, avowedly prospective—I answer: first, that such for a long time and to a late period was my own judgment. But even then it seemed to me a point, as to which an indifference would be less inconsistent in a lover of truth, than a zeal to separation in a professed lover of peace. And secondly, I would revert to the history of the Reformation, and the calamitous accident of the Peasants’ War: when the poor ignorant multitude, driven frantic by the intolerable oppressions of their feudal lords, rehearsed all the outrages that were acted in our own times by the Parisian populace headed by Danton, Marat, and Robespierre; and on the same outrageous principles, and in assertion of the same rights of brutes to the subversion of all the duties of men. In our times, most fortunately for the interest of religion and morality, or of their prudential substitutes at least, the name of Jacobin was everywhere associated with that of Atheist and Infidel. Or rather, Jacobinism and Infidelity were the two heads of the revolutionary Geryon—connatural misgrowths of the same monster-trunk. In the German convulsion, on the contrary, by a mere but most unfortunate accident, the same code of Caliban jurisprudence, the same sensual and murderous excesses, were connected with the name of Anabaptist. The abolition of magistracy, community of goods, the right of plunder, polygamy, and whatever else was fanatical, were comprised in the word Anabaptism. It is not to be imagined that the Fathers of the Reformation could, without a miraculous influence, have taken up the question of Infant Baptism with the requisite calmness and freedom of spirit. It is not to be wished that they should have entered on the dis-
cussion. Nay, I will go farther. Unless the abolition of Infant Baptism can be shown to be involved in some fundamental article of faith, unless the practice could be proved fatal or imminently perilous to salvation, the Reformers would not have been justified in exposing the yet tender and struggling cause of Protestantism to such certain and violent prejudices as this innovation would have excited. Nothing less than the whole substance and efficacy of the Gospel Faith was the prize, which they had wrestled for and won; but won from enemies still in the field, and on the watch to retake, at all costs, the sacred treasure, and consign it once again to darkness and oblivion. If there be a time for all things, this was not the time for an innovation that would and must have been followed by the triumph of the enemies of Scriptural Christianity, and the alienation of the governments that had espoused and protected it.

Remember I say this on the supposition of the question's not being what you do not pretend it to be, an essential of the Faith by which we are saved. But should it likewise be conceded that it is a disputable point—and that in point of fact it is and has been disputed by divines whom no pious Christian of any denomination will deny to have been faithful and eminent servants of Christ; should it, I say, be likewise conceded that the question of Infant Baptism is a point, on which two Christians, who perhaps differ on this point only, may differ without giving just ground for impeaching the piety or competence of either; in this case I am obliged to infer that the person who at any time can regard this difference as singly warranting a separation from a religious community, must think of schism under another point of view than that in which I have been taught to contemplate it by St. Paul in his Epistles to the Corinthians.

Let me add a few words on a diversity of doctrine closely connected with this;—the opinions of Doctors Mant and D'Oyly as opposed to those of the (so called) Evangelical clergy. "The Church of England (says Wall*) does not require assent and con-

* Conference between Two Men that had Doubts about Infant Baptism. By W. Wall, Author of the History of Infant Baptism, and Vicar of Shoreham in Kent. A very sensible little tract, and written in an excellent spirit; but it failed, I confess, in satisfying my mind as to the existence of any decisive proofs or documents of Infant Baptism having been an Apostolic usage, or specially intended in any part of the New Testament; though
sent” to either opinion “in order to lay communion.” But I will suppose the person a minister: but minister of a Church which has expressly disclaimed all pretense to infallibility; a Church which in the construction of its Liturgy and Articles is known to have worded certain passages for the purpose of rendering them subscribable by both A and Z—that is, the opposite parties as to

deducible generally from many passages, and in perfect accordance with the spirit of the whole.

A mighty wrestler in the cause of spiritual religion and Gospel morality, in whom more than in any other contemporary I seem to see the spirit of Luther revived, expressed to me his doubts whether we have a right to deny that an infant is capable of a spiritual influence. To such a man I could not feel justified in returning an answer ex tempore, or without having first submitted my convictions to a fresh revisal. I owe him, however, a deliberate answer; and take this opportunity of discharging the debt.

The objection supposes and assumes the very point which is denied, or at least disputed—namely, that Infant Baptism is specially enjoined in the Scriptures. If an express passage to this purport had existed in the New Testament—the other passages, which evidently imply a spiritual operation under the condition of a preceding spiritual act on the part of the person baptized, remaining as now—then indeed, as the only way of removing the apparent contradiction, it might be allowable to call on the Anti-paedobaptist to prove the negative—namely, that an infant a week old is not a subject capable or susceptible of spiritual agency. And, vice versa, should it be made known to us, that infants are not without reflection and self-consciousness—then, doubtless, we should be entitled to infer that they were capable of a spiritual operation, and consequently of that which is signified in the Baptismal rite administered to adults. But what does this prove for those who not only cannot show, but who do not themselves profess to believe the self-consciousness of a new-born babe, but who rest the defence of Infant Baptism on the assertion, that God was pleased to affix the performance of this rite to his offer of salvation as the indispensable, though arbitrary, condition of the infant’s salvability!—As kings, in former ages, when they conferred lands in perpetuity, would sometimes, as the condition of the tenure, exact from the beneficiary a hawk, or some trifling ceremony, as the putting on or off of their sandals, or whatever royal caprice or the whim of the moment, might suggest. But you, honored Irving, are as little disposed as I am, to favor such doctrine!

Friend pure of heart and fervent! we have learnt
A different lore. We may not thus profane
The idea and name of Him whose absolute will
Is reason, truth supreme, essential order.*

* See Church and State, VI pp. 114, 115, note.—Ed.
the points in controversy. I suppose this person's convictions those of Z, and that out of five passages there are three, the more natural and obvious sense of which is in his favor; and two of which, though not absolutely precluding a different sense, yet the more probable interpretation is in favor of A, that is, of those who do not consider the Baptism of an infant as prospective, but hold it to be an opus operans et in praesenti. Then I say, that if such a person regards these two sentences or single passages as obliging or warranting him to abandon the flock intrusted to his charge, and either to join such as are the avowed enemies of the Church on the double ground of its particular constitution and of its being an establishment, or to set up a separate church for himself—I can not avoid the conclusion, that either his conscience is morbidly sensitive in one speck to the exhaustion of the sensibility in a far larger portion; or that he must have discovered some mode beyond the reach of my conjectural powers, of interpreting the Scriptures enumerated in the following excerpt from the popular Tract before cited, in which the writer expresses an opinion to which I assent with my whole heart, namely:

"That all Christians in the world that hold the same fundamentals ought to make one Church, though differing in lesser opinions; and that the sin, the mischief, and danger to the souls of men, that divide into those many sects and parties among us, does (for the most of them) consist not so much in the opinions themselves, as in their dividing and separating for them. And in support of this tenet, I will refer you to some plain places of Scripture, which if you please now to peruse, I will be silent the while. See what our Saviour himself says, John x. 16. John xvi. 11. And what the primitive Christians practised, Acts ii. 46, and iv. 32. And what St. Paul says, 1 Cor. i. 10, 11, 12, and 2, 3, 4, also, the whole 12th chapter: Eph. ii. 17, &c. to the end. Where the Jewish and Gentile Christians are showed to be one body, one household, one temple fitly framed together: and these were of different opinions in several matters. Likewise chap. iii. 6, iv. 1–13, Phil. ii. 1, 2, where he uses the most solemn adjurations to this purpose. But I would more especially recommend to you the reading of Gal. v. 20, 21. Phil. iii. 15, 16, the 14th chapter to the Romans, and part of the 15th, to verse 7, and also Rom. xv. 17.

"Are not these passages plain, full, and earnest? Do you
find any of the uncontroverted points to be determined by Scripture in words nigh so plain or pathetic?"

If I had addressed the ministers recently seceded, I would have first proved from Scripture and reason the justness of their doctrines concerning Baptism and conversion. 2. I would have shown, that even in respect of the Prayer-book and Homilies of the Church of England, taken as a whole, their opponents were comparatively as ill off as themselves, if not worse. 3. That the few mistakes or inconvenient phrases of the Baptismal Service did not impose on the conscience the necessity of resigning the pastoral office. 4. That even if they did, this would by no means justify schism from lay-membership: or else there could be no schism except from an immaculate and infallible Church. Now, as our Articles have declared that no Church is or ever was such, it would follow that there is no such sin as that of schism, that is, that St. Paul wrote falsely or idly. 5. That the escape through the channel of dissent is from the frying-pan to the fire—or, to use a less worn and vulgar simile, the escape of a leech from a glass-jar of water into the naked and open air. But never, never, would I in one breath allow my Church to be fallible, and in the next contend for her absolute freedom from all error—never confine inspiration and perfect truth to the Scriptures, and then scold for the perfect truth of each and every word in the Prayer-book. Enough for me, if in my heart of hearts, free from all fear of man and all lust of preferment, I believe (as I do) the Church of England to be the most Apostolic Church; that its doctrines and ceremonies contain nothing dangerous to righteousness or salvation; and that the imperfections in its Liturgy are spots indeed, but spots on the sun, which impede neither its light nor its heat, so as to prevent the good seed from growing in a good soil, and producing fruits of redemption.

[* "8 May, 1828. I see the necessity of greatly expanding and clearing up the chapter on Baptism in the Aids to Reflection, and of proving the substantial accordance of my scheme with that of our Church.

* The paragraphs which the Editor has, after some consideration, thought it advisable to print within brackets in the text of this edition of the Aids to Reflection, are taken from one of the deeply interesting Note Books, kept by Mr. Coleridge with great care during the later years of his life. The material contents of these Books are in process of publication.—Ed."

...
“I still say that an assertion of an act of the Spirit in time—that at the moment of the uttering of the words, I baptize thee in the name, &c., it may be declared, ‘Now the Spirit begins to act’—is false in philosophy, and contrary to Scripture; and that our Church Service needs no such hypothesis. Further, I still say that the communication of the Spirit as of a power in principle not yet possessed to an unconscious agent by human ministry, is without precedent or warrant in Scripture;—that the nature of the Spirit communicated by the Apostles by imposition of hands, is a very difficult question; and that the reasons for supposing it to be certain miraculous gifts of the Spirit, peculiar to the first age of Christianity, and during the formation of the Church, are neither few nor insignificant.

“Further, I say that in itself it might be indifferent, whether, the outward Rite of Baptism formed the initiation into the Baptismal period, εἰς τὸ γεννησίν, or the finale and coronation:—that from the necessity of the circumstances, that is, the non-existence of the Church as the sponsor and security for the undertaking of the enlightening process, and the adult age of the persons to be baptized, the latter was, and could not but be, the practice of the Apostolic age;—but that in after-times both the commencement and the close were ritually solemnized;—in the first, the Church conferring all the privileges of Christianity;—in the second, the donee acknowledging the gift, and declaring his consent to the conditions, and the Church confirming the gift, and receiving the individual as, ἥδη παρακολουθοῦνε ὡς καὶ παλαια, as one being enlightened. Now it is notorious that during the first two centuries, the catechumens generally were not baptized, and that their baptism was immediately followed by admission to the Eucharist. And such was the force of custom, that when the baptism of infants became the rule of the Church, the Eucharist was administered to them;—a practice which greatly obscured, if it did not destroy, the beautiful harmony and distinct significancy of the two Rites as symbolic,—the one of the Light of the Word, the other of the Life; and therefore with great reason was the practice discontinued.

“Observe, I do not deny—God forbid! the possibility or the reality of the influence of the Spirit on the soul of the infant. His first smile bespeaks a reason—the Light from the Life of the Word—as already existent; and where the Word is, there will
the Spirit act. Still less do I think lightly of the graces which the child receives, as a living part of the Church, and whatever flows from the Communion of Saints, and the πνευμάτων of the Spirit. Our Church most wisely and scripturally precludes all the mischievous fanaticism of moments of conversion. Except the time when the Church receives the subject into her own body, and co-organizes the person therewith, no time can be specified for the Spirit's descent and incoming. For the operations of the Spirit are as little referable to Time as to Space; but in reference to our principles of conduct toward, and judgment concerning, our neighbors, the Church declares, that before the time of the Baptism, there is no authority for asserting,—and that since the time there is no authority for denying,—that gift and regenerate presence of the Holy Spirit, promised by an especial covenant to the members of Christ's mystical body; and consequently, no just pretence for expecting or requiring another new initiation or birth into the state of Grace.”]
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I am not so ignorant of the temper and tendency of the age in which I live, as either to be unprepared for the sort of remarks which the literal interpretation of the Evangelist will call forth, or to attempt an answer to them. Visionary ravings, obsolete whimsies, transcendental trash, and the like, I leave to pass at the price current among those who are willing to receive abusive phrases as substitutes for argument. Should any suborned of anonymous criticism have engaged some literary bravo or buffoon beforehand to vilify this Work, as in former instances, I would give a friendly hint to the operative critic, that he may compile an excellent article for the occasion, and with very little trouble, out of Warburton's Tract on Grace and the Spirit, and the Preface to the same. There is, however, one objection, which will so often be heard from men, whose talents and reputed moderation must give a weight to their words, that I owe it both to my own character and to the interests of my readers, not to leave it unnoticed. The charge will probably be worded in this way:—There is nothing new in all this. (As if novelty were any merit in questions of revealed religion!) It is mysticism, all taken out of William Law, after he had lost his senses in brooding over the visions of a delirious German cobbler, Jacob Böhme.

Of poor Jacob Böhme I have delivered my sentiments at large in another work. Those who have condescended to look into his writings must know that his characteristic errors are: first, the mistaking the accidents and peculiarities of his own overwrought mind for realities and modes of thinking common to all minds: and secondly, the confusion of Nature, that is, the active powers communicated to matter, with God the Creator. And if the same persons have done more than merely looked into the pres-
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ent Volume, they must have seen, that to eradicate, and, if possible, to preclude both the one and the other, stands prominent among its avowed objects.

Of William Law's Works I am acquainted with the Serious Call; and besides this I remember to have read a small Tract on Prayer, if I mistake not, as I easily may, it being at least six-and-twenty years since I saw it. He may in this or in other tracts have quoted the same passages from the fourth Gospel which I have done. But surely this affords no presumption that my conclusions are the same with his; still less, that they are drawn from the same premises; and least of all, that they were adopted from his writings. Whether Law has used the phrase, assimilation by faith, I know not; but I know that I should expose myself to a just charge of an idle parade of my reading, if I recapitulated the tenth part of the authors, ancient and modern, Romish and Reformed, from Law to Clemens Alexandrinus and Irenæus, in whose works the same phrase occurs in the same sense. And after all, on such a subject, how worse than childish is the whole dispute!

Is the fourth Gospel authentic? And is the interpretation I have given true or false? These are the only questions which a wise man would put, or a Christian be anxious to answer. I not only believe it to be the true sense of the texts; but I assert that it is the only true, rational, and even tolerable sense. And this position alone I conceive myself interested in defending. I have studied with an open and fearless spirit the attempts of sundry learned critics of the Continent to invalidate the authenticity of this Gospel, before and since Eichorn's Vindication. The result has been a clearer assurance and (as far as this was possible) a yet deeper conviction of the genuineness of all the writings which the Church has attributed to this Apostle. That those, who have formed an opposite conclusion, should object to the use of expressions which they had ranked among the most obvious marks of spuriousness, follows as a matter of course. But that men, who with a clear and cloudless assent receive the sixth chapter of this Gospel as a faithful, nay, inspired record of an actual discourse, should take offence at the repetition of words which the Redeemer himself, in the perfect foreknowledge that they would confirm the disbelieving, alienate the unsteadfast, and transcend the present capacity even of his own elect, had
chosen as the most appropriate; and which, after the most decisive proofs that they were misinterpreted by the greater number of his hearers, and not understood by any, he nevertheless repeated with stronger emphasis and without comment as the only appropriate symbols of the great truth he was declaring, and to realize which ὑπερπνεόντο σαρκι;*—that in their own discourses these men should hang back from all express reference to these words, as if they were afraid or ashamed of them, though the earliest recorded ceremonies and liturgical forms of the primitive Church are absolutely inexplicable, except in connection with this discourse, and with the mysterious and spiritual, not allegorical and merely ethical, import of the same; and though this import is solemnly and in the most unequivocal terms asserted and taught by their own Church, even in her Catechism, or compendium of doctrines necessary for all her members;—this I may perhaps understand; but this I am not able to vindicate or excuse.

There is, however, one opprobrious phrase which it may be profitable for my younger readers that I should explain, namely, Mysticism. And for this purpose I will quote a sentence or two from a dialogue which, had my prescribed limits permitted, I should have attached to the present work; but which with an Essay† on the Church, as instituted by Christ, and as an establishment of the State, and a series of Letters‡ on the right and the superstitious use and estimation of the Bible, will hereafter appear by themselves, should the reception given to the present Volume encourage or permit the publication.

* Of which our he was made flesh, is a very inadequate translation. The Church of England in this as in other doctrinal points has preserved the golden mean between the superstitious reverence of the Romanists, and the avowed contempt of the Sectarians, for the writings of the Fathers, and the authority and unimpeached traditions of the Church during the first three or four centuries. And how, consistently with this honorable characteristic of our Church, a minister of the same could, on the Sacramentary scheme now in fashion, return even a plausible answer to Arnauld’s great work on Transubstantiation (not without reason the boast of the Romish Church), exceeds my powers of conjecture.

† See the Church and State, VI.—Ed.
‡ See Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit. 1840. V.—Ed.
MYSTICS AND MYSTICISM.

Antinous.—"What do you call Mysticism? And do you use the word in a good or in a bad sense?"

Nous.—"In the latter only; as far, at least, as we are now concerned with it. When a man refers to inward feelings and experiences, of which mankind at large are not conscious, as evidences of the truth of any opinion—such a man I call a Mystic: and the grounding of any theory or belief on accidents and anomalies of individual sensations or fancies, and the use of peculiar terms invented, or perverted from their ordinary significations, for the purpose of expressing these idiosyncracies and pretended facts of interior consciousness, I name Mysticism. Where the error consists simply in the Mystic's attaching to these anomalies of his individual temperament the character of reality, and in receiving them as permanent truths, having a subsistence in the Divine Mind, though revealed to himself alone; but entertains this persuasion without demanding or expecting the same faith in his neighbors—I should regard it as a species of enthusiasm, always indeed to be deprecated, but yet capable of co-existing with many excellent qualities both of head and heart. But when the Mystic, by ambition or still meanker passions, or (as sometimes is the case) by an uneasy and self-doubting state of mind which seeks confirmation in outward sympathy, is led to impose his faith, as a duty, on mankind generally: and when with such views he asserts that the same experiences would be vouchsafed, the same truths revealed, to every man, but for his secret wickedness and unholy will;—such a Mystic is a fanatic, and in certain states of the public mind, a dangerous member of society. And most so in those ages and countries in which fanatics of elder standing are allowed to persecute the fresh competitor. For under these predicaments, Mysticism, though originating in the singularities of an individual nature, and therefore essentially anomalous, is nevertheless highly contagious. It is apt to collect a swarm and cluster circum fana, around the new fane; and therefore merits the name of fanaticism, or as the Germans say, Schwärmerey, that is, swarm-making."

We will return to the harmless species, the enthusiastic Mystics;—a species that may again be subdivided into two ranks.
And it will not be other than germane to the subject, if I endeavor to describe them in a sort of allegory or parable. Let us imagine a poor pilgrim benighted in a wilderness or desert, and pursuing his way in the starless dark with a lantern in his hand. Chance or his happy genius leads him to an oasis or natural garden, such as in the creations of my youthful fancy I supposed Enos,* the child of Cain, to have found. And here, hungry and thirsty, the way-wearied man rests at a fountain; and the taper of his lantern throws its light on an over-shadowing tree, a boss of snow-white blossoms, through which the green and growing fruits peeped, and the ripe golden fruitage glowed. Deep, vivid, and faithful are the impressions, which the lovely imagery comprised within the scanty circle of light makes and leaves on his memory. But scarcely has he eaten of the fruits and drunk of the fountain, ere scared by the roar and howl from the desert he hurries forward: and as he passes with hasty steps through grove and glade, shadows and imperfect beholdings and vivid fragments of things distinctly seen blend with the past and present shapings of his brain. Fancy modifies sight. His dreams transfer their forms to real objects; and these lend a substance and an outness

* Will the Reader forgive me if I attempt at once to illustrate and relieve the subject by annexing the opening lines of a poem composed in the same year in which I wrote the Ancient Mariner and the first Book of Christabel?

"Encinctur'd with a twine of leaves,
That leafy twine his only dress!
A lovely boy was plucking fruits
In a moonlight wilderness.
The moon was bright, the air was free,
And fruits and flowers together grew
On many a shrub and many a tree:
And all put on a gentle hue,
Hanging in the shadowy air
Like a picture rich and rare.
It was a climate where, they say,
The night is more beloved than day.
But who that beauteous boy beguiled
That beauteous boy, to linger here?
Alone, by night, a little child,
In place so silent and so wild—
Has he no friend, no loving mother near?"

WANDERINGS OF CAIN.
Poet. Works, VII. p. 292.—Ed.
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to his dreams. Apparitions greet him; and when at a distance from this enchanted land, and on a different track, the dawn of day discloses to him a caravan, a troop of his fellow-men, his memory, which is itself half fancy, is interpolated afresh by every attempt to recall, connect, and piece out his recollections. His narration is received as a madman's tale. He shrinks from the rude laugh and contemptuous sneer, and retires into himself. Yet the craving for sympathy, strong in proportion to the intensity of his convictions, impels him to unbother himself to abstract auditors; and the poor quietist becomes a penman, and, all too poorly stocked for the writer's trade, he borrows his phrases and figures from the only writings to which he has had access, the sacred books of his religion. And thus I shadow out the enthusiastic Mystic of the first sort; at the head of which stands the illuminated Teutonic theosopher and shoemaker, honest Jacob Böhme, born near Gorlitz, in Upper Lusatia, in the 17th of our Elizabeth's reign, and who died in the 22d of her successor's.

To delineate a Mystic of the second and higher order, we need only endow our pilgrim with equal gifts of nature, but these developed and displayed by all the aids and arts of education and favorable fortune. He is on his way to the Mecca of his ancestral and national faith, with a well-guarded and numerous procession of merchants and fellow-pilgrims, on the established track. At the close of day the caravan has halted: the full moon rises on the desert: and he strays forth alone, out of sight but to no unsafe distance; and chance leads him, too, to the same oasis or islet of verdure on the sea of sand. He wanders at leisure in its maze of beauty and sweetness, and thrids his way through the odorous and flowering thickets into open spots of greenery, and discovers statues and memorial characters, grottos, and refreshing caves. But the moonshine, the imaginative poesy of Nature, spreads its soft shadowy charm over all, conceals distances, and magnifies heights, and modifies relations; and fills up vacuities with its own whiteness, counterfeiting substance; and where the dense shadows lie, makes solidity imitate hollowness; and gives to all objects a tender visionary hue and softening. Interpret the moonlight and the shadows as the peculiar genius and sensibility of the individual's own spirit; and here you have the other sort; a Mystic, an enthusiast of a nobler breed—a Fenelon. But the residentiary, or the frequent visitor of the favored spot, who
has scanned its beauties by steady daylight, and mastered its true proportions and lineaments,—he will discover that both pilgrims have indeed been there. He will know, that the delightful dream, which the latter tells, is a dream of truth; and that even in the bewildered tale of the former there is truth mingled with the dream.

But the source, the spring-head, of the charges which I anticipate, lies deep. Materialism, conscious and avowed Materialism, is in ill repute: and a confessed Materialist therefore a rare character. But if the faith be ascertained by the fruits: if the predominant, though most often unsuspected, persuasion is to be learnt from the influences, under which the thoughts and affections of the man move and take their direction; I must reverse the position. Only not all are Materialists. Except a few individuals, and those for the most part of a single sect: every one who calls himself a Christian, holds himself to have a soul as well as a body. He distinguishes mind from matter, the subject of his consciousness from the objects of the same. The former is his mind: and he says, it is immaterial. But though subject and substance are words of kindred roots, nay, little less than equivalent terms, yet nevertheless it is exclusively to sensible objects, to bodies, to modifications of matter, that he habitually attaches the attributes of reality, of substance. Real and tangible, substantial and material, are synonyms for him. He never indeed asks himself, what he means by mind? But if he did, and tasked himself to return an honest answer—as to what, at least, he had hitherto meant by it—he would find, that he had described it by negatives, as the opposite of bodies, for example, as a somewhat opposed to solidity, to visibility, and the like, as if you could abstract the capacity of a vessel, and conceive of it as a somewhat by itself, and then give to the emptiness the properties of containing, holding, being entered, and so forth. In short, though the proposition would perhaps be angrily denied in words, yet in fact he thinks of his mind, as a property, or accident of a something else, that he calls a soul or spirit: though the very same difficulties must recur, the moment he should attempt to establish the difference. For either this soul or spirit is nothing but a thinner body, a finer mass of matter: or the attribute of self-subsistency vanishes from the soul on the same grounds, on which it is refused to the mind.
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I am persuaded, however, that the dogmatism of the Corpuscular School, though it still exerts an influence on man's notions and phrases, has received a mortal blow from the increasingly dynamic spirit of the physical sciences now highest in public estimation. And it may safely be predicted that the results will extend beyond the intention of those, who are gradually effecting this revolution. It is not Chemistry alone that will be indebted to the genius of Davy, Oersted, and their compeers: and not as the founder of physiology and philosophic anatomy alone, will mankind love and revere the name of John Hunter. These men have not only taught, they have compelled us to admit, that the immediate objects of our senses, or rather the grounds of the visibility and tangibility of all objects of sense, bear the same relation and similar proportion to the intelligible object—that is, to the object which we actually mean when we say, "It is such or such a thing," or "I have seen this or that,"—as the paper, ink, and differently combined straight and curved lines of an edition of Homer bear to what we understand by the words, Iliad and Odyssey. Nay, nothing would be more easy than so to construct the paper, ink, painted capitals, and the like, of a printed disquisition on the eye, or the muscles and cellular texture (that is, the flesh) of the human body, as to bring together every one of the sensible and ponderable stuffs or elements, that are sensuously perceived in the eye itself, or in the flesh itself. Carbon and nitrogen, oxygen and hydrogen, sulphur, phosphorus, and one or two metals and metallic bases, constitute the whole. It can not be these therefore, that we mean by an eye, by our body. But perhaps it may be a particular combination of these? Now here comes a question: In this term do you or do you not include the principle, the operating cause, of the combination? If not, then detach this eye from the body. Look steadily at it—as it might lie on the marble slab of a dissecting-room. Say it were the eye of a murderer, a Bellingham: or the eye of a murdered patriot, a Sidney!—Behold it, handle it, with its various accompaniments or constituent parts, of tendon, ligament, membrane, blood-vessel, gland, humors; its nerves of sense, of sensation, and of motion. Alas! all these names, like that of the organ itself, are so many anachronisms, figures of speech, to express that which has been: as when the guide points with his finger to a heap of stones, and tells the traveller, "That is Babylon, or Persepolis."—Is this cold
jelly the light of the body? Is this the micranthropos in the marvellous microcosm? Is this what you mean when you well describe the eye as the telescope and the mirror of the soul, the seat and agent of an almost magical power?

Pursue the same inquisition with every other part of the body, whether integral or simply ingredient; and let a Berzelius or a Hatchett be your interpreter, and demonstrate to you what it is that in each actually meets your senses. And when you have heard the scanty catalogue, ask yourself if these are indeed the living flesh, the blood of life? Or not far rather—I speak of what, as a man of common sense, you really do, not what, as a philosopher, you ought to believe—is it not, I say, far rather the distinct and individualized agency that by the given combinations utters and bespeaks its presence? Justly and with strictest propriety of language may I say, speaks. It is to the coarseness of our senses, or rather to the defect and limitation of our perceptive faculty, that the visible object appears the same even for a moment. The characters which I am now shaping on this paper, abide. Not only the forms remain the same, but the particles of the coloring stuff are fixed, and, for an indefinite period at least, remain the same. But the particles that constitute the size, the visibility of an organic structure, are in perpetual flux. They are to the combining and constitutive power as the pulses of air to the voice of a discoursor; or of one who sings a roundelay. The same words may be repeated; but in each second of time the articulated air hath passed away, and each act of articulation appropriates and gives momentary form to a new and other portion. As the column of blue smoke from a cottage chimney in the breathless summer noon, or the steadfast-seeming cloud on the edge point of a hill in the driving air-current, which momently condensed and recomposed is the common phantom of a thousand successors;—such is the flesh, which our bodily eyes transmit to us; which our palates taste; which our hands touch.

But perhaps the material particles possess this combining power by inherent reciprocal attractions, repulsions, and elective affinities; and are themselves the joint artists of their own combinations? I will not reply, though well I might, that this would be to solve one problem by another, and merely to shift the mystery. It will be sufficient to remind the thoughtful querist, that even herein consists the essential difference, the contra-distinc-
tion, of an organ from a machine; that not only the characteristic shape is evolved from the invisible central power, but the material mass itself is acquired by assimilation. The germinal power of the plant transmutes the fixed air and the elementary base of water into grass or leaves; and on these the organific principle in the ox or the elephant exercises an alchemy still more stupendous. As the unseen agency weaves its magic eddies, the foliage becomes indifferently the bone and its marrow, the pulpy brain, or the solid ivory. That what you see is blood, is flesh, is itself the work, or shall I say, the translucence, of the invisible energy, which soon surrenders or abandons them to inferior powers (for there is no pause nor chasm in the activities of nature), which repeat a similar metamorphosis according to their kind;—these are not fancies, conjectures, or even hypotheses, but facts; to deny which is impossible, not to reflect on which is ignominious. And we need only reflect on them with a calm and silent spirit to learn the utter emptiness and unmeaningness of the vaunted Mechanico-corpuscular philosophy, with both its twins, Materialism on the one hand, and Idealism, rightlier named subjective Idolism, on the other: the one obtruding on us a world of spectres and apparitions; the other a mazy dream.*

Let the Mechanic or Corpuscular scheme, which in its absoluteness and strict consistency was first introduced by Des Cartes, be judged by the results. By its fruits shall it be known.

In order to submit the various phenomena of moving bodies to geometrical construction, we are under the necessity of abstracting from corporeal substance all its positive properties, and obliged to consider bodies as differing from equal portions of space†

* See the Author's Theory of Life, Appendix C.—Am. Ed.
† Such is the conception of body in Des Cartes' own system. Body is everywhere confounded with matter, and might in the Cartesian sense be defined space or extension, with the attribute of visibility. As Des Cartes at the same time zealously asserted the existence of intellectual beings, the reality and independent self-subsistence of the soul, Berkeleyanism or Spinosism was the immediate and necessary consequence. Assume a plurality of self-subsisting souls, and we have Berkeleyanism; assume one only (unam et unicum substantiam), and you have Spinosism, that is, the assertion of one infinite Self-subsistent, with the two attributes of thinking and appearing. Cogitatio infinita sine centro, et omniformis apparito. How far the Newtonian vis inertiae (interpreted any otherwise than as an arbitrary term—x y z, to represent the unknown but necessary supplement or inte-
only by figure and mobility. And as a fiction of science, it would be difficult to overvalue this invention. It possesses the same merits in relation to geometry that the atomic theory has in relation to algebraic calculus. But in contempt of common sense, and in direct opposition to the express declarations of the inspired historian (Gen. i.), and to the tone and spirit of the Scriptures throughout, Des Cartes propounded it as truth of fact, and instead of a world created and filled with productive forces by the almighty Fiat, left a lifeless machine whirled about by the dust of its own grinding: as if death could come from the living fountain of life; nothingness and phantom from the plenitude of reality, the absoluteness of creative will!

Holy! Holy! Holy! let me be deemed mad by all men, if such be thy ordinance: but, O! from such madness save and preserve me, my God!

When, however, after a short interval, the genius of Kepler, expanded and organized in the soul of Newton, and there (if I may hazard so bold an expression) refining itself into an almost celestial clearness, had expelled the Cartesian vortices; then the gration of the Cartesian notion of body) has patched up the flaw, I leave for more competent judges to decide. But should any one of my Readers feel an interest in the speculative principles of natural philosophy, and should be master of the German language, I warmly recommend for his perusal the earliest known publication of the great founder of the Critical Philosophy, (written in the twenty-second year of his age!) on the then eager controversy between the Leibnitzian and the French and English Mathematicians, respecting the living forces—Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte: 1747—in which Kant demonstrates the right reasoning to be with the latter; but the truth of the fact, the evidence of experience, with the former; and gives the explanation, namely: body, or corporeal nature, is something else and more than geometrical extension, even with the addition of a vis inerti<e. And Leibnitz, with the Bernouillis, erred in the attempt to demonstrate geometrically a problem not susceptible of geometrical construction. This tract, with the succeeding Himmels-System, may with propriety be placed, after the Principia of Newton, among the striking instances of early genius; and as the first product of the dynamic philosophy in the physical sciences, from the time, at least, of Giordano Bruno, whom the idolaters burned for an Atheist, at Rome, in the year 1600.—[See The Friend, II. p. 110 note.—Ed.]

* For Newton’s own doubtfully suggested ether or most subtle fluid, as the ground and immediate agent in the phenomena of universal gravitation, was either not adopted or soon abandoned by his disciples; not only as introducing, against his own canons of right reasoning, an ens imaginarium
necessity of an active power, of positive forces present in the material universe, forced itself on the conviction. For as a law without a lawgiver is a mere abstraction; so a law without an agent to realize it, a constitution without an abiding executive, is, in fact, not a law but an idea. In the profound emblem of the great tragic poet, it is the powerless Prometheus fixed on a barren rock. And what was the result? How was this necessity provided for? God himself—my hand trembles as I write! Rather, then let me employ the word, which the religious feeling, in its perplexity, suggested as the substitute—the Deity itself was declared to be the real agent, the actual gravitating power! The law and the lawgiver were identified. God (says Dr. Priestley) not only does, but is every thing. *Jupiter est quodcumque vides.* And thus a system, which commenced by excluding all life and immanent activity from the visible universe, and evacuating the natural world of all nature, ended by substituting the Deity, and reducing the Creator to a mere *anima mundi*: a scheme that has no advantage over Spinosism but its inconsistency, which does indeed make it suit a certain order of intellects, who, like the pleuronectae (or flat fish) in ichthyology which have both eyes on the same side, never see but half of a subject at one time, and forgetting the one before they get to the other are sure not to detect any inconsistency between them.

And what has been the consequence? An increasing unwillingness to contemplate the Supreme Being in his personal attributes: and thence a distaste to all the peculiar doctrines of the Christian Faith, the Trinity, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and Redemption. The young and ardent, ever too apt to mistake the inward triumph in the detection of error for a positive love of truth, are among the first and most frequent victims to this epidemic *fastidium*. Alas! even the sincerest seekers after light are not safe from the contagion. Some have I known, con-
stitutionally religious—I speak feelingly; for I speak of that which for a brief period was my own state—who under this unhealthful influence have been so estranged from the heavenly Father, the living God, as even to shrink from the personal pronouns as applied to the Deity. But many do I know, and yearly meet with, in whom a false and sickly taste co-operates with the prevailing fashion: many, who find the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, far too real, too substantial; who feel it more in harmony with their indefinite sensations.

To worship Nature in the hill and valley,
Not knowing what they love:—

and (to use the language, but not the sense or purpose, of the great poet of our age) would fain substitute for the Jehovah of their Bible

A sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things!—Wordsworth.

And this from having been educated to understand the Divine Omnipresence in any sense rather than the only safe and legitimate one, the presence of all things to God!

Be it, however, that the number of such men is comparatively small; and be it (as in fact it often is) but a brief stage, a transitional state, in the process of intellectual growth. Yet among a numerous and increasing class of the higher and middle ranks, there is an inward withdrawing from the life and personal being of God, a turning of the thoughts exclusively to the so-called physical attributes, to the omnipresence in the counterfeit form of ubiquity, to the immensity, the infinity, the immutability;—the attributes of space with a notion of power as their substratum,—a Fate, in short, not a moral Creator and Governor. Let intelligence be imagined, and wherein does the conception of God differ essentially from that of gravitation (conceived as the cause of gravity) in the understanding of those, who represent the Deity not only as a necessary but as a necessitated being; those, for whom justice is but a scheme of general laws; and holiness, and the divine hatred of sin, yea, and sin itself, are words without
meaning, or accommodations to a rude and barbarous race? Hence, I more than fear the prevailing taste for books of natural theology, physico-theology, demonstrations of God from Nature, evidences of Christianity, and the like. Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence,—remembering only the express declaration of Christ himself: *No man cometh to me, unless the Father leadeth him.* Whatever more is desirable—I speak now with reference to Christians generally, and not to professed students of theology—may, in my judgment, be far more safely and profitably taught, without controversy or the supposition of infidel antagonists, in the form of Ecclesiastical history.

The last fruit of the Mechanico-corporeal philosophy, say rather of the mode and direction of feeling and thinking produced by it on the educated class of society—or that result, which as more immediately connected with my present theme I have reserved for the last—is the habit of attaching all our conceptions and feelings, and of applying all the words and phrases expressing reality to the objects of the senses: more accurately speaking to the images and sensations by which their presence is made known to us. Now I do not hesitate to assert, that it was one of the great purposes of Christianity, and included in the process of our redemption, to rouse and emancipate the soul from this debasing slavery to the outward senses, to awaken the mind to the true criteria of reality, namely, permanence, power, will manifested in act, and truth operating as life. *My words,* said Christ, *are spirit:* and they (that is, the spiritual powers expressed by them) *are truth:* that is, very being. For this end our Lord, who came from heaven to take captivity captive, chose the words and names, that designate the familiar yet most important objects of sense, the nearest and most concerning things and incidents of corporeal nature; water, flesh, blood, birth, bread! But he used them in senses, that could not without absurdity be supposed to respect the mere *phænomena,* water, flesh, and the like; in senses that by no possibility could apply to the color, figure, specific mode of touch or taste produced on ourselves, and by which we are made aware of the presence of the things and understand them—*res, qua sub apparitionibus istis statuenda sunt.* And
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this awful recalling of the drowsed soul from the dreams and phantom world of sensuality to actual reality,—how has it been evaded! These words, that were spirit,—these mysteries, which even the Apostles must wait for the Paraclete in order to comprehend,—these spiritual things which can only be spiritually discerned,—were mere metaphors, figures of speech, oriental hyperboles! "All this means only morality!" Ah! how far nearer to the truth would these men have been, had they said that morality means all this!

The effect, however, has been most injurious to the best interests of our Universities, to our incomparably constituted Church, and even to our national character. The few who have read my two Lay Sermons are no stranger to my opinions on this head; and in my treatise on the Church and Churches, I shall, if Providence vouchsafe, submit them to the Public, with their grounds and historic evidences in a more systematic form.

I have, I am aware, in this present Work furnished occasion for a charge of having expressed myself with slight and irreverence of celebrated names, especially of the late Dr. Paley. O, if I were fond and ambitious of literary honor, of public applause, how well content should I be to excite but one third of the admiration which, in my inmost being, I feel for the head and heart of Paley! And how gladly would I surrender all hope of contemporary praise, could I even approach to the incomparable grace, propriety, and persuasive facility of his writings! But on this very account I believe myself bound in conscience to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of this triumphal car, on which the tutelary genius of modern idolatry is borne, even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels. I have at this moment before my eyes the eighteenth of his Posthumous Discourses: the amount of which is briefly this,—that all the words and passages in the New Testament which express and contain the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, the paramount objects of the Christian Revelation, all those which speak so strongly of the value, benefit, and efficacy of the death of Christ, assuredly mean something: but what they mean, nobody, it seems, can tell! But doubtless we shall discover it, and be convinced that there is a substantial sense belonging to these words in a future state! Is there an enigma or an absurdity in the Koran or the Vedas, which might not be defended on the same pretence? A similar impres-
CONCLUSION.

sion, I confess, was left on my mind by Dr. Magee's statement or exposition (ad normam Grotianam) of the doctrine of Redemption; and deeply did it disappoint the high expectations, sadly did it chill the fervid sympathy, which his introductory chapter, his manly and masterly disquisition on the sacrificial rites of Paganism, had raised in my mind.

And yet I can not read the pages of Paley, here referred to aloud, without the liveliest sense, how plausible and popular they will sound to the great majority of readers. Thousands of sober, and in other way pious, Christians will echo the words, together with Magee's kindred interpretation of the death of Christ, and adopt the doctrine for their make-faith; and why? It is feeble. And whatever is feeble is always plausible: for it favors mental indolence. It is feeble: and feebleness, in the disguise of confessing and condescending strength, is always popular. It flatters the reader by removing the apprehended distance between him and the superior author; and it flatters him still more by enabling him to transfer to himself, and to appropriate, this superiority; and thus to make his very weakness the mark and evidence of his strength. Ay, quoth the rational Christian—or with a sighing, self-soothing sound between an Ay and an Ah!—I am content to think with the great Dr. Paley, and the learned Archbishop of Dublin—

Man of sense! Dr. Paley was a great man, and Dr. Magee is a learned and exemplary prelate; but You do not think at all!

With regard to the convictions avowed and enforced in my own Work, I will continue my address to the man of sense in the words of an old philosopher:—Tu vero crassis auribus et obstinato corde respues que forsitan vere perhibeantur. Minus hercule calles pravissimis opinionibus ea putari mendacia, que vel auditu nova, vel visu rudia, vel certe supra captum cogitationis (extemporaneæ tuae) ardua videantur: que si paulo accuratius exploraris, non modo compertu evidentia, sed etiam factu facilia, senties.*

In compliance with the suggestion of a friend, the celebrated conclusion of the fourth book of Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, referred to in p. 258, of this Volume, is here transprinted for the convenience of the Reader:—

* Apul. Metam. I.—Ed.
"Had Jesus Christ delivered no other declaration than the following—The hour is coming, in which all that are in the grave shall hear his voice, and shall come forth: they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation;—he had pronounced a message of inestimable importance, and well worthy of that splendid apparatus of prophecy and miracles with which his mission was introduced and attested: a message in which the wisest of mankind would rejoice to find an answer to their doubts, and rest to their inquiries. It is idle to say, that a future state had been discovered already;—it had been discovered as the Copernican system was;—it was one guess among many. He alone discovers, who proves; and no man can prove this point, but the teacher who testifies by miracles that his doctrine comes from God."

Pædianus says of Virgil,—Usque adeo expers invidiae ut siquid erudite dictum inspiceret alterius, non minus gauderet ac si suum esset. My own heart assures me that this is less than the truth: that Virgil would have read a beautiful passage in the work of another with a higher and purer delight than in a work of his own, because free from the apprehension of his judgment being warped by self-love, and without that repressive modesty akin to shame, which in a delicate mind holds in check a man's own secret thoughts and feelings, when they respect himself. The cordial admiration with which I peruse the preceding passage as a master-piece of composition would, could I convey it, serve as a measure of the vital importance I attach to the convictions which impelled me to animadvert on the same passage as doctrine.
SUMMARY OF THE SCHEME OF THE ARGUMENT TO PROVE THE DIVERSITY IN KIND OF THE REASON AND THE UNDERSTANDING. See p. 188.

The position to be proved is the difference in kind of the understanding from the reason.

The axiom, on which the proof rests, is: subjects, which require essentially different general definitions, differ in kind and not merely in degree. For difference in degree forms the ground of specific definitions, but not of generic or general.

Now reason is considered either in relation to the will and moral being, when it is termed the practical* reason = A: or relatively to the intellective and sciential faculties, when it is termed theoretic or speculative reason = a. In order therefore to be compared with the reason, the understanding must in like manner be distinguished into the understanding as a principle of action, in which relation I call it the adaptive power, or the faculty of selecting and adapting means and medial of proximate ends = B: and the understanding, as a mode and faculty of thought, when it is called reflection = b. Accordingly, I give the general definitions of these four: that is, I describe each severally by its essential characters: and I find, that the definition of A differs toto genere from that of B, and the definition of a from that of b.

Now subjects that require essentially different definitions do themselves differ in kind. But Understanding and Reason require essentially different definitions. Therefore Understanding and Reason differ in kind.

* The Practical Reason alone is Reason in the full and substantive sense. It is Reason in its own sphere of perfect freedom; as the source of ideas, which ideas, in their conversion to the responsible Will, become ultimate ends. On the other hand, Theoretic Reason, as the ground of the universal and absolute in all logical conclusion, is rather the light of Reason in the Understanding, and known to be such by its contrast with the contingency and particularity which characterize all the proper and indigenous growths of the Understanding.
APPENDIX B.

WHAT is Instinct?* As I am not quite of Bonnet's opinion "that philosophers will in vain torment themselves to define instinct until they have spent some time in the head of the animal without actually being that animal," I shall endeavor to explain the use of the term. I shall not think it necessary to controvert the opinions which have been offered on this subject, whether the ancient doctrine of Descartes, who supposed that animals were mere machines; or the modern one of Lamark, who attributes instincts to habits impressed upon the organs of animals, by the constant efflux of the nervous fluid to these organs to which it has been determined in their efforts to perform certain actions, to which their necessities have given birth. And it will be here premature to offer any refutation of the opinions of those who contend for the identity of this faculty with reason, and maintain that all the actions of animals are the result of invention and experience;—an opinion maintained with considerable plausibility by Dr. Darwin.

"Perhaps the most ready and certain mode of coming to a conclusion in this intricate inquiry will be by the apparently circuitous route of determining first, what we do not mean by the word. Now we certainly do not mean, in the use of the term, any act of the vital power in the production or maintenance of an organ: nobody thinks of saying that the teeth grow by instinct, or that when the muscles are increased in vigor and size in consequence of exercise, it is from such a cause or principle. Neither do we attribute instinct to the direct functions of the organs in providing for the continuance and sustentation of the whole co-organized body. No one talks of the liver secreting bile, or of the heart acting for the propulsion of the blood, by instinct. Some, indeed, have maintained that breathing, even voiding the excrement and urine, are instinctive operations; but surely these, as well as the former, are automatic, or at least are the necessary result of the organization of the parts in and by which the actions are produced. These instances seem to be, if I may so say, below instinct. But again, we do not attribute instinct to any actions preceded by a will conscious of its whole purpose, calculating

* Green's Vital Dynamics, Appendix F, p. 88. See ante, p. 257.—Ed.
its effects, and predetermining its consequences, nor to any exercise of the intellectual powers, of which the whole scope, aim, and end are intellectual. In other terms, no man who values his words will talk of the instinct of a Howard, or of the instinctive operations of a Newton or Leibnitz, in those sublime efforts, which ennoble and cast a lustre, not less on the individuals than on the whole human race.

"To what kind or mode of action shall we then look for the legitimate application of the term? In answer to this query, we may, I think, without fear of the consequences, put the following cases as exemplifying and justifying the use of the term, Instinct, in an appropriate sense. First, when there appears an action, not included either in the mere functions of life, acting within the sphere of its own organismus; nor yet an action attributable to the intelligent will or reason: yet at the same time, not referable to any particular organ, we then declare the presence of an Instinct. We might illustrate this in the instance of a bull-calf butting before he has horus, in which the action can have no reference to its internal economy, to the presence of a particular organ, or to an intelligent will. Secondly, likewise if it be not indeed included in the first, we attribute Instinct where the organ is present, if only the act is equally anterior to all possible experience on the part of the individual agent, as for instance, when the beaver employs its tail for the construction of its dwelling; the tailor-bird its bill for the formation of its pensile habitation; the spider its spinning organ for fabricating its artfully woven nets, or the viper its poison, fang for its defence. And lastly, generally, where there is an act of the whole body as one animal, not referable to a will conscious of its purpose, nor to its mechanism, nor to a habit derived from experience, nor previous frequent use. Here with most satisfaction, and without doubt of the propriety of the word, we declare an Instinct; as examples of which, we may adduce the migratory habits of birds, the social instincts of the bees, the construction of their habitations, composed of cells formed with geometrical precision, adapted in capacity to different orders of the society, and forming storehouses for containing a supply of provisions; not to mention similar instances in wasps, ants, termites; and the endless contrivances for protecting the future progeny.

"But if it be admitted that we have rightly stated the application of the term, what we may ask is contained in the examples adduced, or what inferences are we to make as to the nature of Instinct itself, as a source and principle of action? We shall, perhaps, best aid ourselves in the inquiry by an example, and let us take a very familiar one of a caterpillar taking its food. The caterpillar seeks at once the plant, which furnishes the appropriate aliment, and this even as soon as it creeps from the ovum; and the food being taken into the stom-
ach, the nutritious part is separated from the innutritious, and is disposed of for the support of the animal. The question then is, what is contained in this instance of instinct? In the first place what does the vital power in the stomach do, if we generalize the account of the process, or express it in its most general terms? Manifestly it selects and applies appropriate means to an immediate end, prescribed by the constitution; first of the particular organ, and then of the whole body or organisms. This we have admitted is not instinct. But what does the caterpillar do? Does it not also select and apply appropriate means to an immediate end prescribed by its particular organization and constitution? But there is something more; it does this according to circumstances; and this we call Instinct. But may there not be still something more involved? What shall we say of Hübner's humble-bees? A dozen of these were put under a bell glass along with a comb of about ten silken cocoons, so unequal in height as not to be capable of standing steadily; to remedy this, two or three of the humble-bees got upon the comb, stretched themselves over its edge, and with their heads downwards, fixed their forefeet on the table on which the comb stood, and so with their hindfeet kept the comb from falling: when these were weary others took their places. In this constrained and painful posture, fresh bees relieving their comrades at intervals, and each working in its turn, did these affectionate little insects support the comb for nearly three days; at the end of which time they had prepared sufficient wax to build pillars with it. And what is still further curious, the first pillars having got displaced, the bees had again recourse to the same manoeuvre. What then is involved in this case? Evidently the same selection and appropriation of means to an immediate end as before; but observe! according to varying circumstances.

"And here we are puzzled; for this becomes Understanding. At least no naturalist, however predetermined to contrast and oppose Instinct to Understanding, but ends at last in facts in which he himself can make out no difference. But are we hence to conclude that the instinct is the same, and identical with the human understanding? Certainly not; though the difference is not in the essential of the definition, but in an addition to, or modification of, that which is essentially the same in both. In such cases, namely, as that which we have last adduced, in which instinct assumes the semblance of understanding, the act indicative of instinct is not clearly prescribed by the constitution or laws of the animal's peculiar organization, but arises out of the constitution and previous circumstances of the animal, and those habits, wants, and that predetermined sphere of action and operation which belong to the race, and beyond the limits of which it does not pass. If this be the case, I may venture to assert that I have determined an appropriate sense for instinct: namely, that it is
a power of selecting and applying appropriate means to an immediate end, according to circumstances and the changes of circumstances, these being variable and varying; but yet so as to be referable to the general habits, arising out of the constitution and previous circumstances of the animal considered not as an individual, but as a race.

"We may here, perhaps, most fitly explain the error of those who contend for the identity of Reason and Instinct, and believe that the actions of animals are the result of invention and experience. They have, no doubt, been deceived, in their investigation of Instinct, by an efficient cause simulating a final cause; and the defect in their reasoning has arisen in consequence of observing in the instinctive operations of animals the adaptation of means to a relative end, from the assumption of a deliberate purpose. To this freedom or choice in action and purpose, instinct, in any appropriate sense of the word, can not apply, and to justify and explain its introduction, we must have recourse to other and higher faculties than any manifested in the operations of instinct. It is evident, namely, in turning our attention to the distinguishing character of human actions, that there is, as in the inferior animals, a selection and appropriation of means to ends—but it is (not only according to circumstances, not only according to varying circumstances, but it is) according to varying purposes. But this is an attribute of the intelligent will, and no longer even mere understanding.

"And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy of this investigation are greatly increased by our not considering the understanding (even our own) in itself, and as it would be were it not accompanied with and modified by the co-operation of the will, the moral feeling, and that faculty, perhaps best distinguished by the name of Reason, of determining that which is universal and necessary, of fixing laws and principles whether speculative or practical, and of contemplating a final purpose or end. This intelligent will,—having a self-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light of the reason, by which its acts are made to bear as a whole upon some end in and for itself, and to which the understanding is subservient as an organ or the faculty of selecting and appropriating the means—seems best to account for that progressiveness of the human race, which so evidently marks an insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between man and the inferior animals; but which would be inexplicable, were there no other difference than in the degree of their intellectual faculties.

"Man doubtless has his instincts, even in common with the inferior animals, and many of these are the germs of some of the best feelings of his nature. What, amongst many, might I present as a better illustration, or more beautiful instance, than the storge or maternal instinct? But man's instincts are elevated and ennobled by the moral
ends and purposes of his being. He is not destined to be the slave of blind impulses, a vessel purposeless, unmeant. He is constituted by his moral and intelligent will, to be the first freed being, the masterpiece and the end of nature; but this freedom and high office can only co-exist with fealty and devotion to the service of truth and virtue. And though we may even be permitted to use the term instinct, in order to designate those high impulses which in the minority of man's rational being, shape his acts unconsciously to ultimate ends, and which in constituting the very character and impress of the humanity reveal the guidance of Providence; yet the convenience of the phrase, and the want of any other distinctive appellation for an influence de supra, working unconsciously in and on the whole human race, should not induce us to forget that the term instinct is only strictly applicable to the adaptive power, as the faculty, even in its highest proper form, of selecting and adapting appropriate means to proximate ends according to varying circumstances,—a faculty which, however, only differs from human understanding in consequence of the latter being enlightened by reason, and that the principles which actuate man as ultimate ends, and are designed for his conscious possession and guidance, are best and most properly named Ideas."
APPENDIX C.

The following tract published in England under the title of *Hints towards the Formation of a more Comprehensive Theory of Life*, by S. T. Coleridge, is inserted here, because it contains a fuller and more systematic development of the general views presented on pages 357-359 of the *Aids to Reflection*. This seems to be its most appropriate place in the collection, and the reader will find it both in matter and form, one of the most profound and elegant exhibitions that have yet been made of the Dynamic Theory of Life.—*Am. Ed.*

THEORY OF LIFE.

*When* we stand before the bust of John Hunter, or as we enter the magnificent museum furnished by his labors, and pass slowly, with meditative observation, through this august temple, which the genius of one great man has raised and dedicated to the wisdom and uniform working of the Creator, we perceive at every step the guidance, we had almost said, the inspiration, of those profound ideas concerning Life, which dawn upon us indeed, through his written works, but which he has here presented to us in a more perfect language than that of words—the language of God himself, as uttered by Nature.

That the true idea of Life existed in the mind of John Hunter I do not entertain the least doubt; but it may, perhaps, be doubted whether his incessant occupation, and his stupendous industry in the service, both of his contemporaries and of posterity, added to his comparatively slight acquaintance with the arts and aids of logical arrangement, permitted him fully to unfold and arrange it in distinct, clear, and communicable conceptions. Assuredly, however, I may, without incurring the charge of arrogance or detraction, venture to assert that, in his writings the light which occasionally flashes upon us seems at other times, and more frequently, to struggle through an unfriendly medium, and even sometimes to suffer a temporary occultation. At least, in order to dissipate the undeniable obscurities, and to reconcile the apparent contradictions found in his works,—to distinguish, in
short, the numerous passages in which without, perhaps, losing sight internally of his own peculiar belief, he yet falls into the phraseology and mechanical solutions of his age,—we must distinguish such passages from those in which the form corresponds to the substance, and in which, therefore, the nature and essential laws of vital action are expressed, as far as his researches had unveiled them to his own mind, without disguise. To effect this, we must, as it were, climb up on his shoulders, and look at the same objects in a distincter form, because seen from the more commanding point of view furnished by himself. This has, indeed, been more than once attempted already, and, in one instance, with so evident a display of power and insight as announces in the assertor and vindicator of the Hunterian Theory a congenial intellect, and a disciple in whom Hunter himself would have exulted. Would that this attempt had been made on a larger scale, that the writer to whom I refer* had in consequence developed his opinions systematically, and carried them yet further back, even to their ultimate principle!

But this the scientific world has yet to expect; or it is more than probable that the present humble endeavor would have been superseded, or confined, at least, to the task of restating the opinion of my predecessor with such modifications as the differences that will always exist between men who have thought independently, and each for himself, have never failed to introduce, even on problems of far easier and more obvious solution.

Without further preface or apology, therefore, I shall state at once my objections to all the definitions that have hitherto been given of Life, as meaning too much or too little, with an exception, however, in favor of those which mean nothing at all; and even these last must, in certain cases, receive an honor they do not merit, and be confuted, or rather detected, on account of their too general acceptance, and the incalculable power of words over the minds of men in proportion to the remoteness of the subject from the cognizance of the senses.

It would be equally presumptuous and unreasonable should I, with a late writer on this subject, "exhort the reader to be particularly on his guard against loose and indefinite expressions;” but I perfectly agree with him that they are the bane of all science, and have been remarkably injurious in the different departments of physiology.

The attempts to explain the nature of Life, which have fallen within my knowledge, presuppose the arbitrary division of all that surrounds us into things with life, and things without life—a division grounded on a mere assumption. At the best, it can be regarded only as a hasty deduction from the first superficial notices of the objects that surround us, sufficient, perhaps, for the purpose of ordi-

* Mr. Abernethy.
APPENDIX C.

nary discrimination, but far too indeterminate and diffuent to be
taken unexamined by the philosophic inquirer. The positions of
science must be tried in the jeweller's scales, not like the mixed com-
modities of the market, on the weigh-bridge of common opinion
and vulgar usage. Such, however, has been the procedure in the
present instance, and the result has been answerable to the coarseness
of the process. By a comprisal of the *petitio principii* with the
*argumentum in circulo*,—in plain English, by an easy logic, which
begins with begging the question, and then moving in a circle, comes
round to the point where it began,—each of the two divisions has
been made to define the other by a mere reassertion of their assumed
contrariety. The physiologist has luminously explained $y + x$ by
informing us that it is a somewhat that is the antithesis of $y - x$;
and if we ask, what then is $y - x$? the answer is, the antithesis of
$x + y$, a reciprocation of great service, that may remind us of the
twin sisters in the fable of the Lamia, with but one eye between
them both, which each borrowed from the other as either happened
to want it; but with this additional disadvantage, that in the present
case it is after all but an eye of glass. The definitions themselves
will best illustrate our meaning. I will begin with that given by
Bichat. "Life is the sum of all the functions by which death is
resisted," in which I have in vain endeavored to discover any other
meaning than that life consists in being able to live. This author,
with a whimsical gravity, prefaced his definition with the remark,
that the nature of life has hitherto been sought for in abstract con-
siderations; as if it were possible that four more inveterate abstrac-
tions could be brought together in one sentence than are here assem-
bled in the words, life, death, function, and resistance. Similar
instances might be cited from Richerand and others. The word Life
is translated into other more learned words; and this *paraphrase* of
the term is substituted for the *definition* of the thing, and therefore
(as is always the case in every real definition as contra-distinguished
from a *verbal* definition), for at least a partial *solution* of the *fact.*
Such as these form the *first* class.—The second class takes some one
particular function of Life common to all living objects,—nutrition,
for instance; or, to adopt the phrase most in vogue at present, assim-
ilation, for the purposes of reproduction and growth. Now this, it is
evident, can be an appropriate definition only of the very lowest
species, as of a Fungus or a Mollusca; and just as comprehensive
an idea of the mystery of Life, as a Mollusca might give, can this
definition afford. But this is not the only objection. For, *first,* it is
not pretended that we begin with seeking for an organ evidently
appropriated to nutrition, and then infer that the substance in which
such an organ is found lives. On the contrary, in a number of cases
among the obscurer animals and vegetables we infer the organ from
the pre-established fact of its life. Secondly, it identifies the process itself with a certain range of its forms, those, namely, by which it is manifested in animals and vegetables. For this, too, no less than the former, presupposes the arbitrary division of all things into not living and lifeless, on which, as I before observed, all these definitions are grounded. But it is sorry logic to take the proof of an affirmative in one thing as the proof of the negative in another. All animals that have lungs breathe, but it would be a childish oversight to deduce the converse, viz. all animals that breathe have lungs. The theory in which the French chemists organized the discoveries of Black, Cavendish, Priestley, Scheele, and other English and German philosophers, is still, indeed, the reigning theory, but rather, it should seem, from the absence of a rival sufficiently popular to fill the throne in its stead, than from the continuance of an implicit belief in its own stability. We no longer at least cherish that intensity of faith which, before Davy commenced his brilliant career, had not only identified it with chemistry itself, but had substituted its nomenclature, even in common conversation, for the far more philosophic language which the human race had abstracted from the laboratory of Nature. I may venture to prophesy that no future Beddoes will make it the corival of the mathematical sciences in demonstrative evidence. I think it a matter of doubt whether, during the period of its supposed infallibility, physiology derived more benefit from the extension, or injury from the misdirection, of its views. Enough of the latter is fresh in recollection to make it but an equivocal compliment to a physiological position, that it must stand or fall with the corpuscular philosophy, as modified by the French theory of chemistry. Yet should it happen (and the event is not impossible, nor the supposition altogether absurd), that more and more decisive facts should present themselves in confirmation of the metamorphosis of elements, the position that life consists in assimilation would either cease to be distinctive, or fall back into the former class as an identical proposition, namely, that Life, meaning by the word that sort of growth which takes place by means of a peculiar organization, consists in that sort of growth which is peculiar to organized life. Thirdly, the definition involves a still more egregious flaw in the reasoning, namely, that of *cum hoc, ergo propter hoc* (or the assumption of causation from mere coexistence); and this, too, in its very worst form. For it is not *cum hoc solo, ergo propter hoc*, which would in many cases supply a presumptive proof by induction, but *cum hoc, et plurimis alis, ergo propter hoc*! Shell, of some kind or other, is common to the whole order of testacea, but it would be absurd to define the *eis vita* of testaceous animals as existing in the shell, though we know it to be the constant accompaniment, and have every reason to believe the constant effect, of the specific life that acts in those animals. Were we (argumenti
causa) to imagine shell coextensive with the organized creation, this would produce no abatement in the falsity of the reasoning. Nor does the flaw stop here; for a physiological, that is, a real, definition, as distinguished from the verbal definitions of lexicography, must consist neither in any single property or function of the thing to be defined, nor yet in all collectively, which latter, indeed, would be a history, not a definition. It must consist, therefore, in the law of the thing, or in such an idea of it, as being admitted, all the properties and functions are admitted by implication. It must likewise be so far causal, that a full insight having been obtained of the law, we derive from it a progressive insight into the necessity and generation of the phenomena of which it is the law. Suppose a disease in question, which appeared always accompanied with certain symptoms in certain stages, and with some one or more symptoms in all stages—say deranged digestion, capricious alternation of vivacity and languor, headache, dilated pupil, diminished sensibility to light, &c.—Neither the men who selected the one constant symptom, nor he who enumerated all the symptoms, would give the scientific definition talem seilitet, qualis scientia fit vel datur, but the man who at once named and defined the disease hydrocephalus, producing pressure on the brain. For it is the essence of a scientific definition to be causative, not by introduction of imaginary somewhat, natural or supernatural, under the name of causes, but by announcing the law of action in the particular case, in subordination to the common law of which all the phenomena are modifications or results.

Now in the definition on which, as the representative of a whole class, we are now animadverting, a single effect is given as constituting the cause. For nutrition by digestion is certainly necessary to life, only under certain circumstances, but that life is previously necessary to digestion is absolutely certain under all circumstances. Besides, what other phenomenon of Life would the conception of assimilation, per se, or as it exists in the lowest order of animals, involve or explain? How, for instance, does it include sensation, locomotion, or habit? or if the two former should be taken as distinct from life, toto genera, and supervenient to it, we then ask what conception is given of vital assimilation as contra-distinguished from that of the nucleus of a crystal?

Lastly, this definition confounds the Law of Life, or the primary and universal form of vital agency, with the conception, Animals. For the kind, it substitutes the representative of its degrees and modifications. But the first and most important office of science, physical, or physiological, is to contemplate the power in kind, abstracted from the degree. The ideas of caloric, whether as substance or property, and the conception of latent heat, the heat in ice, &c., that excite the wonder or the laughter of the vulgar, though susceptible of the most
important practical applications, are the result of this abstraction; while the only purpose to which a definition like the preceding could become subservient, would be in supplying a nomenclature with the character of the most common species of a genus—its genus generalissimum, and even this would be useless in the present instance, inasmuch as it presupposes the knowledge of the things characterized.

The third class, and far superior to the two former, selects some property characteristic of all living bodies, not merely found in all animals alike, but existing equally in all parts of all living things, both animals and plants. Such, for instance, is the definition of Life, as consisting in anti-putrescence, or the power of resisting putrefaction. Like all the others, however, even this confines the idea of Life to those degrees or concentrations of it, which manifest themselves in organized beings, or rather in those the organization of which is apparent to us. Consequently, it substitutes an abstract term, or generalization of effects, for the idea, or superior form of causative agency. At best, it describes the vis viva by one only of its many influences. It is however, as we have said before, preferable to the former, because it is not, as they are, altogether unfruitful, inasmuch as it attests, less equivocally than any other sign, the presence or absence of that degree of the vis viva which is the necessary condition of organic or self-renewing power. It throws no light, however, on the law or principle of action; it does not increase our insight into the other phenomena; it presents to us no inclusive form, out of which the other forms may be developed, and finally, its defect as a definition may be detected by generalizing it into a higher formula, as a power which, during its continuance, resists or subordinates heterogeneous and adverse powers. Now this holds equally true of chemical relatively to the mechanical powers; and really affirms no more of Life than may be equally affirmed of every form of being, namely, that it tends to preserve itself, and resists, to a certain extent, whatever is incompatible with the laws that constitute its particular state for the time being. For it is not true only of the great divisions or classes into which we have found it expedient to distinguish, while we generalize, the powers acting in nature, as into intellectual, vital, chemical, mechanical; but it holds equally true of the degrees, or species of each of these genera relatively to each other: as in the decomposition of the alkalies by heat, or the galvanic spark. Like the combining power of Life, the copula here resists for awhile the attempts to dissolve it, and then yields, to reappear in new phenomena.

It is a wonderful property of the human mind, that when once a momentum has been given to it in a fresh direction, it pursues the new path with obstinate perseverance, in all conceivable bearings, to its utmost extremes. And by the startling consequences which arise
out of these extremes, it is first awakened to its error, and either recalled to some former track, or receives some fresh impulse, which it follows with the same eagerness, and admits to the same monopoly. Thus in the 13th century the first science which roused the intellects of men from the torpor of barbarism, was, as in all countries ever has been, and ever must be the case, the science of Metaphysics and Ontology. We first seek what can be found at home, and what wonder if truths, that appeared to reveal the secret depths of our own souls, should take possession of the whole mind, and all truths appear trivial which could not either be evolved out of similar principles, by the same process, or at least brought under the same forms of thought, by perceived or imagined analogies? And so it was. For more than a century men continued to invoke the oracle of their own spirits, not only concerning its own forms and modes of being, but likewise concerning the laws of external nature. All attempts at philosophical explication were commenced by a mere effort of the understanding, as the power of abstraction; or by the imagination, transferring its own experiences to every object presented from without. By the former, a class of phenomena were in the first place abstracted, and fixed in some general term: of course this could designate only the impressions made by the outward objects, and so far, therefore, having been thus metamorphosed, they were effects of these objects; but then made to supply the place of their own causes, under the name of occult qualities. Thus the properties peculiar to gold, were abstracted from those it possessed in common with other bodies, and then generalized in the term Aureity: and the inquirer was instructed that the Essence of Gold, or the cause which constituted the peculiar modification of matter called gold, was the power of aureity. By the latter, i.e. by the imagination, thought and will were superadded to the occult quality, and every form of nature had its appropriate Spirit, to be controlled or conciliated by an appropriate ceremonial. This was entitled its Substantial Form. Thus, physic became a sort of dull poetry, and the art of medicine (for physiology could scarcely be said to exist) was a system of magic, blended with traditional empiricism. Thus the forms of thought proceeded to act in their own emptiness, with no attempt to fill or substantiate them by the information of the senses, and all the branches of science formed so many sections of logic and metaphysics. And so it continued, even to the time that the Reformation sounded the second trumpet, and the authority of the schools sank with that of the hierarchy, under the intellectual courage and activity which this great revolution had inspired. Power, once awakened, cannot rest in one object. All the sciences partook of the new influences. The world of experimental philosophy was soon mapped out for posterity by the comprehensive and enterprising genius of Bacon, and the laws explained by which
experiment could be dignified into experience.* But no sooner was
the impulse given, than the same propensity was made manifest of
looking at all things in the one point of view which chanced to be of
predominant attraction. Our Gilbert, a man of genuine philosophical
genius, had no sooner multiplied the facts of magnetism, and extended
our knowledge concerning the property of magnetic bodies, but all
things in heaven, and earth, and in the waters beneath the earth,
were resolved into magnetic influences.

Shortly after a new light was struck by Harriott and Descartes,
with their contemporaries, or immediate predecessors, and the resto-
ration of ancient geometry, aided by the modern invention of algebra,
placed the science of mechanism on the philosophic throne. How
widely this domination spread, and how long it continued, if, indeed,
even now it can be said to have abdicated its pretensions, the reader
need not be reminded. The sublime discoveries of Newton, and,
together with these, his not less fruitful than wonderful application,
of the higher mathesis to the movements of the celestial bodies, and
to the laws of light, gave almost a religious sanction to the corpuscu-
lar system and mechanical theory. It became synonymous with
philosophy itself. It was the sole portal at which truth was per-
mitted to enter. The human body was treated of as an hydraulic
machine, the operations of medicine were solved, and alas! even
directed by reference partly to gravitation and the laws of motion,
and partly by chemistry, which itself, however, as far as its theory
was concerned, was but a branch of mechanics working exclusively
by imaginary wedges, angles, and spheres. Should the reader chance
to put his hand on the 'Principles of Philosophy,' by La Forge, an
immediate disciple of Descartes, he may see the phenomena of sleep
solved in a copper-plate engraving, with all the figures into which
the globules of the blood shaped themselves, and the results demon-
strated by mathematical calculations. In short, from the time of
Kepler† to that of Newton, and from Newton to Hartley, not only
all things in external nature, but the subtlest mysteries of life and
organization, and even of the intellect and moral being, were conjured
within the magic circle of mathematical formulæ. And now a new
light was struck by the discovery of electricity, and, in every sense
of the word, both playful and serious, both for good and for evil, it
may be affirmed to have electrified the whole frame of natural phi-
losophy. Close on its heels followed the momentous discovery of
the principal gases by Scheele and Priestley, the composition of water

* Experiment, as an organ of reason, not less distinguished from the blind or dreaming
industry of the alchemists, than it was successfully opposed to the barren subtleties of the
schoolmen.
† Whose own mind, however, was not comprehended in the vortex; where Kepler
erred it was in the other extreme.
by Cavendish, and the doctrine of latent heat by Black. The scientific world was prepared for a new dynasty; accordingly, as soon as Lavoisier had reduced the infinite variety of chemical phenomena to the actions, reactions, and interchanges of a few elementary substances, or at least excited the expectation that this would speedily be effected, the hope shot up, almost instantly, into full faith, that it had been effected. Henceforward the new path, thus brilliantly opened, became the common road to all departments of knowledge; and, to this moment, it has been pursued with an eagerness and almost epidemic enthusiasm which, scarcely less than its political revolutions, characterize the spirit of the age. Many and inauspicious have been the invasions and inroads of this new conqueror into the rightful territories of other sciences; and strange alterations have been made in less harmless points than those of terminology, in homage to an art unsettled, in the very ferment of imperfect discoveries, and either without a theory, or with a theory maintained only by composition and compromise. Yet this very circumstance has favored its encroachments, by the gratifications which its novelty affords to our curiosity, and by the keener interest and higher excitement which an unsettled and revolutionary state is sure to inspire. He who supposes that science possesses an immunity from such influences knows little of human nature. How, otherwise, could men of strong minds and sound judgments have attempted to penetrate by the clue of chemical experiment, the secret recesses, the sacred adyta of organic life, without being aware that chemistry must needs be at its extreme limits, when it has approached the threshold of a higher power? Its own transgressions, however, and the failure of its enterprises will become the means of defining its absolute boundary, and we shall have to guard against the opposite error of rejecting its aid altogether as analogy, because we have repelled its ambitious claims to an identity with the vital powers.

Previously to the submitting my own ideas on the subject of life, and the powers into which it resolves itself, or rather in which it is manifested to us, I have hazarded this apparent digression from the anxiety to preclude certain suspicions, which the subject itself is so fitted to awaken, and while I anticipate the charges, to plead in answer to each a full and unequivocal—not guilty!

In the first place, therefore, I distinctly disclaim all intention of explaining life into an occult quality; and retort the charge on those who can satisfy themselves with defining it as the peculiar power by which death is resisted.

Secondly. Convinced—by revelation, by the consenting authority of all countries, and of all ages, by the imperative voice of my own conscience, and by that wide chasm between man and the noblest
animals of the brute creation, which no perceivable or conceivable
difference of organization is sufficient to overbridge—that I have a
rational and responsible soul, I think far too reverentially of the same
to degrade it into an hypothesis, and cannot be blind to the contra-
diction I must incur, if I assign that soul which I believe to constitute
the peculiar nature of man as the cause of functions and properties,
which man possesses in common with the oyster and the mushroom.*

Thirdly, while I disclaim the error of Stahl in deriving the phe-
nomena of life from the unconscious actions of the rational soul, I
repel with still greater earnestness the assertion and even the suppo-
sition that the functions are the offspring of the structure, and “Life
the result of organization,” connected with it as effect with cause.
Nay, the position seems to me little less strange, than as if a man
should say, that building with all the included handicraft, of plaster-
ing, sawing, planing, &c. were the offspring of the house; and that
the mason and carpenter were the result of a suite of chambers, with
the passages and staircases that lead to them. To make A the off-
spring of B, when the very existence of B as B presupposes the exist-
ence of A, is preposterous in the literal sense of the word, and a con-
summate instance of the hysteron proteron in logic. But if I reject
the organ as the cause of that, of which it is the organ, though I
might admit it among the conditions of its actual functions; for the
same reason I must reject fluids and ethers of all kinds, magnetical,
electrical, and universal, to whatever quintessential thinness they
may be treble distilled, and (as it were) super-substantiated. With
these, I abjure likewise all chemical agencies, compositions, and de-
compositions, were it only that as stimulants they suppose a stimula-
bility sui generis, which is but another paraphrase for life. Or if they
are themselves at once both the excitant and the excitability, I miss
the connecting link between this imaginary ether and the visible body,
which then becomes no otherwise distinguished from inanimate mat-
ter, than by its juxtaposition in mere space, with an heterogeneous
inmate, the cycle of whose actions revolves within itself. Besides
which I should think that I was confounding metaphors and realities
most absurdly, if I imagined that I had a greater insight into the
meaning and possibility of a living alcohol, than of a living quicksil-
ver. In short, visible surface and power of any kind, much more the
power of life, are ideas which the very forms of the human under-

* But still less would I avail myself of its acknowledged inappropriateness to the pur-
poses of physiology, in order to cast a self-complacent sneer on the soul itself, and on all
who believe in its existence. First, because in my opinion it would be impertinent; sec-
ondly, because it would be imprudent and injurious to the character of my profession;
and, lastly, because it would argue an irreverence to the feelings of mankind, which I
deem scarcely compatible with a good heart, and a degree of arrogance and presumption
which I have never found, except in company with a corrupt taste and a shallow capacity.
† Vide Lawrence’s Lecture.
standing make it impossible to identify. But whether the powers 
which manifest themselves to us under certain conditions in the forms 
of electricity, or chemical attraction, have any analogy to the power 
which manifests itself in growth and organization, is altogether a dif-
ferent question, and demands altogether a different chain of reason-
ing: if it be indeed a tree of knowledge, it will be known by its 
fruits, and these will depend not on the mere assertion, but on the 
inductions by which the position is supported, and by the additions 
which it makes to our insight into the nature of the facts it is meant 
to illustrate.

To account for Life is one thing: to explain Life another. In the 
first we are supposed to state something prior (if not in time, yet in 
the order of Nature) to the thing accounted for, as the ground or 
cause of that thing, or (which comprises the meaning and force of 
both words) as its sufficient cause, quae et facit, et subest. And to 
this, in the question of Life, I know no possible answer, but God. 
To account for a thing is to see into the principle of its possibility, 
and from that principle to evolve its being. Thus the mathematician de-
monstrates the truths of geometry by constructing them. It is an 
admirable remark of Joh. Bapt. a Vico, in a Tract published at Naples, 
1710,* "Geometrica ideae demonstramus, quia facimus; physica si 
demonstrare possimus, faceremus. Metaphysici veri claritas eadem 
ae lucis, quam non nisi per opaca cognoscimus; nam non lucem sed 
Lucidas res videmus. Physica sunt opaca, nempe formata et finita, 
in quibus Metaphysici veri lumen videmus." The reasoner who 
assigns structure or organization as the antecedent of Life, who names 
the former a cause, and the latter its effect, is he who pretend to 
account for life. Now Euclid would, with great right, demand of 
such a philosopher to make Life; in the same sense, I mean, in which 
Euclid makes an Icosaedron, or a figure of twenty sides, namely, in 
the understanding or by an intellectual construction. An argument 
which, of itself, is sufficient to prove the untenable nature of Mate-
rialism.

To explain a power, on the other hand, is (the power itself being 
assumed, though not comprehended, ut qui datur, non intelligitur) to 
unfold or spread it out: ex implicito planum facere. In the present 
instance, such an explanation would consist in the reduction of the 
idea of Life to its simplest and most comprehensive form or mode of 
action; that is, to some characteristic instinct or tendency, evident in 
all its manifestations, and involved in the idea itself. This assumed 
as existing in kind, it will be required to present an ascending series 
of corresponding phenomena as involved in, proceeding from, and so 
far therefore explained by, the supposition of its progressive inten-

* Joh. Bapt. a Vico, Neapol. Reg. eloq. Professor, de antiquissima Italorum sapientia 
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sity and of the gradual enlargement of its sphere, the necessity of which again must be contained in the idea of the tendency itself. In other words, the tendency having been, given in kind, it is required to render the phenomena intelligible as its different degrees and modifications. Still more perfect will the explanation be, should the necessity of this progression and of these ascending gradations be contained in the assumed idea of life, as thus defined by the general form and common purport of all its various tendencies. This done, we have only to add the conditions common to all its phenomena, and those appropriate to each place and rank, in the scale of ascent, and then proceed to determine the primary and constitutive forms, i.e. the elementary powers in which this tendency realizes itself under different degrees and conditions.*

* The object I have proposed to myself, and wherein its distinction exists, may be thus illustrated. A complex machine is presented to the common view, the moving power of which is hidden. Of those who are studying and examining it, one man fixes his attention on some one application of that power, on certain effects produced by that particular application, and on a certain part of the structure evidently appropriated to the production of these effects, neither the one or other of which he had discovered in a neighboring machine, which he at the same time asserts to be quite distinct from the former, and to be moved by a power altogether different, though many of the works and operations are, he admits, common to both machines. In this supposed peculiarity he places the essential character of the former machine, and defines it by the presence of that which is, or which he supposes to be, absent in the latter. Supposing that a stranger to both were about to visit the two machines, this peculiarity would be so far useful as that it might enable him to distinguish the one from the other, and thus to look in the proper place for whatever else he had heard remarkable concerning either; not that he or his informant would understand the machine any better or otherwise, than the common character of a whole class in the nomenclature of botany would enable a person to understand all, or any one of the plants contained in that class. But if, on the other hand, the machine in question were such as no man was a stranger to, if even the supposed peculiarity, either by its effects, or by the construction of that portion of the works which produced them, were equally well known to all men, in this case we can conceive no use at all of such a definition; for at the best it could only be admitted as a definition for the purposes of nomenclature, which never adds to knowledge, although it may often facilitate its communication. But in this instance it would be nomenclature misplaced, and without an object. Such appears to me to be the case with all those definitions which place the essence of Life in nutrition, contractility, &c. As the second instance, I will take the inventor and maker of the machine himself, who knows its moving power, or perhaps himself constitutes it, who is, as it were, the soul of the work, and in whose mind all its parts, with all their bearings and relations, had pre-existed long before the machine itself had been put together. In him therefore there would reside, what it would be presumption to attempt to acquire, or to pretend to communicate, the most perfect insight not only of the machine itself, and of all its various operations, but of its ultimate principle and its essential causes. The mysterious ground, the efficient causes of vitality, and whether different lives differ absolutely or only in degree, He alone can know who not only said, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature, the beast of the earth after his kind, and it was so;" but who said, "Let us make man in our image, who himself breathed into his nostrils the breath of Life, and man became a living soul."

The third case which I would apply to my own attempt would be that of the inquirer, who, presuming to know nothing of the power that moves the whole machine, takes those parts of it which are presented to his view, seeks to reduce its various movements to as few and simple laws of motion as possible, and out of their separate and conjoint action proceeds to explain and appropriate the structure and relative positions of the
What is Life? Were such a question proposed, we should be tempted to answer, what is not Life that really is? Our reason convinces us that the quantities of things, taken abstractedly as quantity, exist only in the relations they bear to the percipient; in plainer words, they exist only in our minds, ut quorum esse est percipi. For if the definite quantities have a ground, and therefore a reality, in the external world, and independent of the mind that perceives them, this ground is ipso facto a quality; the very etymon of this word showing that a quality, not taken in its own nature but in relation to another thing, is to be defined causa sufficiens, entia, de quibus logimur; esse tali, qualia sunt. Either the quantities perceived exist only in the perception, or they have likewise a real existence. In the former case, the quality (the word is here used in an active sense) that determines them belongs to Life, per ipsum hypothesen; and in the other case, since by the agreement of all parties Life may exist in other forms than those of consciousness, or even of sensibility, the onus probandi falls on those who assert of any quality that it is not Life. For the analogy of all that we know is clearly in favor of the contrary supposition, and if a man would analyze the meaning of his own words, and carefully distinguish his perceptions and sensations from the external cause exciting them, and at the same time from the quantity or superficies under which that cause is acting, he would instantly find himself, if we mistake not, involuntarily identifying the ideas of Quality and Life. Life, it is admitted on all hands, does not necessarily imply consciousness or sensibility; and we, for our parts, can not see that the irritability which metals manifest to galvanism, can be more remote from that which may be supposed to exist in the tribe of lichens, or in the helvella, pezizee, &c., than the latter is from the phenomena of excitability in the human body, whatever name it may be called by, or in whatever way it may modify itself.* That the mere act of growth does not constitute the idea of Life, or the absence of that act exclude it, we have a proof in every egg before it is placed under the hen, and in every grain of corn before it is put into the soil. All that could be deduced by fair reasoning would amount to this only, that the life of metals, as the power which affects and determines their comparative cohesion, ductility, &c., was yet lower on the scale than the Life which produces the first attempts of

* The arborescent forms on a frosty morning, to be seen on the window and pavement, must have some relation to the more perfect forms developed in the vegetable world.
organization, in the almost shapeless tremella, or in such fungi as
grow in the dark recesses of the mine.

If it were asked, to what purpose or with what view we should
generalize the idea of Life thus broadly, I should not hesitate to reply
that, were there no other use conceivable, there would be some ad-
vantage in merely destroying an arbitrary assumption in natural phi-
losophy, and in reminding the physiologists that they could not hear
the life of metals asserted with a more contemptuous surprise than
they themselves incur from the vulgar, when they speak of the Life
in mould or mucor. But this is not the case. This wider view not
only precludes a groundless assumption, it likewise fills up the arbi-
trary chasm between physics and physiology, and justifies us in using
the former as means of insight into the latter, which would be con-
trary to all sound rules of ratiocination if the powers working in the
objects of the two sciences were absolutely and essentially diverse.
For as to abstract the idea of kind from that of degrees, which are
alone designated in the language of common use, is the first and in-
dispensable step in philosophy, so are we the better enabled to form
a notion of the kind, the lower the degree and the simpler the form is
in which it appears to us. We study the complex in the simple; and
only from the intuition of the lower can we safely proceed to the
intellection of the higher degrees. The only danger lies in the leap-
ing from low to high, with the neglect of the intervening gradations.
But the same error would introduce discord into the gamut, et ab
abusu contra usum non valet consequentia. That these degrees will
themselves bring forth secondary kinds sufficiently distinct for all the
purposes of science, and even for common sense, will be seen in the
course of this inquisition: for this is one proof of the essential vitality
of nature, that she does not ascend as links in a suspended chain, but
as the steps in a ladder; or rather she at one and the same time as-
cends as by a climax, and expands as the concentric circles on the
lake from the point to which the stone in its fall had given the first
impulse. At all events, a contemptuous rejection of this mode of
reasoning would come with an ill grace from a medical philosopher,
who cannot combine any three phenomena of health or of disease
without the assumption of powers, which he is compelled to deduce
without being able to demonstrate; nay, even of material substances
as the vehicles of these powers, which he can never expect to exhibit
before the senses.

From the preceding it should appear, that the most comprehensive
formula to which life is reducible, would be that of the internal copula
of bodies, or (if we may venture to borrow a phrase from the Platonic
school) the power which discloses itself from within as a principle of
unity in the many. But that there is a physiognomy in words, which,
without reference to their fitness or necessity, make unfavorable as
well as favorable impressions, and that every unusual term in an abstruse research incurs the risk of being denominated jargon, I should at the same time have borrowed a scholastic term, and defined life absolutely, as the principle of unity in multeity, as far as the former, the unity to wit, is produced *ad intra; but eminently (sensu eminenti), I define life as the principle of individuation, or the power which unites a given all into a whole that is presupposed by all its parts. The link that combines the two, and acts throughout both, will, of course, be defined by the tendency to individuation. Thus, from its utmost latency, in which life is one with the elementary powers of mechanism; that is, with the powers of mechanism considered as qualitative and actually synthetic, to its highest manifestation (in which, as the *via vita vivida*, or life as life, it subordinates and modifies these powers, becoming contra-distinguished from mechanism, *ad extra, under the form of organization), there is an ascending series of intermediate classes, and of analogous gradations in each class. To a reflecting mind, indeed, the very fact that the powers peculiar to life in living animals include cohesion, elasticity, &c. (or, in the words of a late publication, "that living matter exhibits these physical properties,"†) would demonstrate that, in the truth of things, they are homogeneous, and that both the classes are but degrees and different dignities of one and the same tendency. For the latter are not subjected to the former as a lever, or walking-stick to the muscles; the more intense the life is, the less does elasticity, for instance, appear as elasticity. It sinks down into the nearest approach to its physical form by a series of degrees from the contraction and elongation of the irritable muscle to the physical hardness of the insensitive nail. The lower powers are assimilated, not merely employed, and assimilation presupposes the homogeneous nature of the thing assimilated; else it is a miracle, only not the same as that of a creation, because it would imply that additional and equal miracle of annihilation. In short, all the impossibilities which the acutest of the reformed Divines have detected in the hypothesis of transubstantiation would apply, *totidem verbis et syllabis*, to that of assimilation, if the objects and the agents were really heterogeneous. Unless, therefore, a thing can exhibit properties which do not belong to it, the very admission that living matter exhibits physical properties, includes the further admission, that those physical or dead properties are themselves vital

* Thus we may say that whatever is organized from without, is a product of mechanism; whatever is mechanized from within, is a product of organization.

† "The matter that surrounds us is divided into two great classes, living and dead; the latter is governed by physical laws, such as attraction, gravitation, chemical affinity; and it exhibits physical properties, such as cohesion, elasticity, divisibility, &c. Living matter also exhibits these properties, and is subject, in great measure, to physical laws. But living bodies are endowed moreover with a set of properties altogether different from these, and contrasting with them very remarkably." (Vide Lawrence's Lectures, p. 121.)
in essence, really distinct but in appearance only different; or in absolute contrast with each other.

In all cases that which, abstractly taken, is the definition of the kind, will, when applied absolutely, or in its fullest sense, be the definition of the highest degree of that kind. If life, in general, be defined vis ab intra, cujus proprium est coadunare plura in rem unicum, quantum est res unica; the unity will be more intense in proportion as it constitutes each particular thing a whole of itself; and yet more, again, in proportion to the number and interdependence of the parts, which it unites as a whole. But a whole composed, ab intra, of different parts, so far interdependent that each is reciprocally means and end, is an individual, and the individuality is most intense where the greatest dependence of the parts on the whole is combined with the greatest dependence of the whole on its parts; the first (namely, the dependence of the parts on the whole) being absolute; the second (namely, the dependence of the whole on its parts) being proportional to the importance of the relation which the parts have to the whole, that is, as their action extends more or less beyond themselves. For this spirit of the whole is most expressed in that part which derives its importance as an End from its importance as a Mean, relatively to all the parts under the same copula.

Finally, of individuals, the living power will be most intense in that individual which, as a whole, has the greatest number of integral parts presupposed in it; when, moreover, these integral parts, together with a proportional increase of their interdependence, as partes, have themselves most the character of wholes in the sphere occupied by them. A mathematical point, line, or surface, is an ens rationis, for it expresses an intellectual act; but a physical atom is ens fictitium, which may be made subservient, as ciphers are in arithmetic, to the purposes of hypothetical construction, per regulam falsi; but transferred to Nature, it is in the strictest sense an absurd quantity; for extension, and consequently divisibility, or multeity* (for space cannot be divided), is the indispensable condition, under which alone any thing can appear to us, or even be thought of, as a thing. But if it should be replied, that the elementary particles are atoms not positively, but by such a hardness communicated to them as is relatively invincible, I should remind the asserter that temeraria citatio supernaturalium est pulvinar intellectus pigri, and that he who requires me to believe a miracle of his own dreaming, must first work a mira-

* Much against my will I repeat this scholastic term, multeity, but I have sought in vain for an unequivocal word of a less repulsive character, that would convey the notion in a positive and not comparative sense in kind, as opposed to the unus et simplex, not in degree, as contracted with the few. We can conceive no reason that can be adduced in justification of the word caloric, as invented to distinguish the external cause of the sensation heat, which would not equally authorize the introduction of a technical term in this instance.
cle to convince me that he had dreamt by inspiration. Add too, the gross inconsistency of resorting to an immaterial influence in order to complete a system of materialism, by the exclusion of all modes of existence which the theorist cannot in imagination, at least, finger and peep at! Each of the preceding gradations, as above defined, might be represented as they exist, and are realized in Nature. But each would require a work for itself; co-extensive with the science of metals, and that of fossils (both as geologically applied); of crystallization; and of vegetable and animal physiology, in all its distinct branches. The nature of the present essay scarcely permits the space sufficient to illustrate our meaning. The proof of its probability (for to that only can we arrive by so partial an application of the hypothesis), is to be found in its powers of solving the particular class of phenomena, that form the subjects of the present inquisition, more satisfactorily and profitably than has been done, or even attempted before.

Exclusively, therefore, for the purposes of illustration, I would take as an instance of the first step, the metals, those, namely, that are capable of permanent reduction. For, by the established laws of nomenclature, the others (as sodium, potassium, calcium, silicium, &c.) would be entitled to a class of their own, under the name of bases. It is long since the chemists have despaired of decomposing this class of bodies. They still remain, one and all, as elements or simple bodies, though, on the principles of the corpuscularian philosophy, nothing can be more improbable than that they really are such; and no reason has or can be assigned on the grounds of that system, why, in no one instance, the contrary has not been proved. But this is at once explained, if we assume them as the simplest form of unity, namely, the unity of powers and properties. For these, it is evident, may be endlessly modified, but can never be decomposed. If I were asked by a philosopher who had previously extended the attribute of Life to the _Byssus speciosa_, and even to the crustaceous matter, or outward bones of a lobster, &c., whether the ingot of gold expressed life, I should answer without hesitation, as the ingot of gold assuredly not, for its form is accidental and _ab extra_. It may be added to or detracted from without in the least affecting the nature, state, or properties in the specific matter of which the ingot consists. But as gold, as that special union of absolute and of relative gravity, ductility, and hardness, which, wherever they are found, constitute gold, I should answer no less fearlessly, in the affirmative. But I should further add, that of the two counteracting tendencies of nature, namely, that of _detachment_ from the universal life, which universality is represented to us by gravitation, and that of _attachment_ or reduction into it, this and the other noble metals represented the units in which the latter tendency, namely, that of identity with the life of
nature, subsisted in the greatest overbalance over the former. It is the form of unity with the least degree of tendency to individuation.

Rising in the ascent, I should take, as illustrative of the second step, the various forms of crystals as a union, not of powers only, but of parts, and as the simplest forms of composition in the next narrowest sphere of affinity. Here the form, or apparent quantity, is manifestly the result of the quality, and the chemist himself not seldom admits them as infallible characters of the substances united in the whole of a given crystal.

In the first step, we had Life, as the mere unity of powers; in the second we have the simplest forms of totality evoluted. The third step is presented to us in those vast formations, the tracing of which generically would form the science of Geology, or its history in the strict sense of the word, even as their description and diagnostics constitute its preliminaries.

Their claim to this rank I cannot here even attempt to support. It will be sufficient to explain my reason for having assigned it to them, by the avowal, that I regard them in a twofold point of view: 1st, as the residue and product of vegetable and animal life; 2d, as manifesting the tendencies of the Life of Nature to vegetation or animalization. And this process I believe—in one instance by the peat morasses of the northern, and in the other instance by the coral banks of the southern hemisphere—to be still connected with the present order of vegetable and animal Life, which constitutes the fourth and last step in these wide and comprehensive divisions.

In the lowest forms of the vegetable and animal world we perceive totality dawning into individuation, while in man, as the highest of the class, the individuality is not only perfected in its corporeal sense, but begins a new series beyond the appropriate limits of physiology. The tendency to individuation, more or less obscure, more or less obvious, constitutes the common character of all classes, as far as they maintain for themselves a distinction from the universal life of the planet; while the degrees, both of intensity and extension, to which this tendency is realized, form the species, and their ranks in the great scale of ascent and expansion.

In the treatment of a subject so vast and complex, within the limits prescribed for an essay like the present, where it is impossible not to say either too much or too little (and too much because too little), an author is entitled to make large claims on the candor of his judges. Many things he must express inaccurately, not from ignorance or oversight, but because the more precise expression would have involved the necessity of a further explanation, and this another, even to the first elements of the science. This is an inconvenience which presses on the analytic method, on however large a scale it may be conducted, compared with the synthetic; and it must bear with a
APPENDIX C.

According to the plan I have prescribed for this inquisition, we are now to seek for the highest law, or most general form, under which this tendency acts, and then to pursue the same process with this, as we have already done with the tendency itself, namely, having stated the law in its highest abstraction, to present it in the different forms in which it appears and reappears in higher and higher dignities. I restate the question. The tendency having been ascertained, what is its most general law? I answer—polarity, or the essential dualism of Nature, arising out of its productive unity, and still tending to reaffirm it, either as equilibrium, indifference, or identity. In its pro-
ductive power, of which the product is the only measure, consists its incomparability with mathematical calculus. For the full applicability of an abstract science ceases, the moment reality begins.* Life, then, we consider as the copula, or the unity of thesis and antithesis, position and counterposition,—Life itself being the positive of both; as, on the other hand, the two counterpoints are the necessary conditions of the manifestations of Life. These, by the same necessity, unite in a synthesis; which again, by the law of dualism, essential to all actual existence, expands, or produces itself, from the point into the line, in order again to converge, as the initiation of the same productive process in some intenser form of reality. Thus, in the identity of the two counter-powers, Life subsists; in their strife it consists: and in their reconciliation it at once dies and is born again into a new form, either falling back into the life of the whole, or starting anew in the process of individuation.

Whence shall we take our beginning? From Space, istud litigium

* For abstractions are the conditions and only subject of all abstract sciences. Thus the theorist (vide Dalton's Theory), who reduces the chemical process to the positions of atoms, would doubtless thereby render chemistry calculable, but that he commences by destroying the chemical process itself, and substitutes for it a *mitis dance* of abstractions; for even the powers which he appears to leave real, those of attraction and repulsion, he immediately unrealizes by representing them as diverse and separable properties. We can abstract the quantities and the quantitative motion from masses, passing over or leaving for other sciences the question of what constitutes the masses, and thus apply not to the masses themselves, but to the abstractions therefrom,—the laws of geometry and universal arithmetic. And where the quantities are the infallible signs of real powers, and our chief concern with the masses is as *signs*, sciences may be founded thereon of the highest use and dignity. Such, for instance, is the sublime science of astronomy, having for its objects the vast masses which "God placed in the firmament of the heaven to be for signs and for seasons, for days and years." For the whole doctrine of physics may be reduced to three great divisions: First, *quantitative motion*, which is proportioned to the quantity of matter exclusively. This is the science of weight or statistics. Secondly, *relative motion*, as communicated to bodies externally by impact. This is the science of mechanics. Thirdly, *qualitative motion*, or that which is accordant to properties of matter, and this is chemistry. Now it is evident that the first two sciences presuppose that which forms the exclusive object of the third, namely, quality; for all quantity in nature is either itself derived, or at least derives its powers from some *quality*, as that of weight, specific cohesion, hardness, &c.; and therefore the attempt to reduce to the distances or impacts of atoms, under the assumptions of two powers, which are themselves declared to be no more than mere general terms for those quantities of motion and impact (the atom itself being a fiction formed by abstraction, and in truth a third occult quality for the purpose of explaining hardness and density), amounts to an attempt to destroy chemistry itself, and at the same time to exclude the sole reality and only positive contents of the very science into which that of chemistry is to be degraded. Now what qualities are to chemistry, *productiveness* is to the science of Life; and this being excluded, physiology or zoonomy would sink into chemistry, chemistry by the same process into mechanics, while mechanics themselves would lose the substantial principle, which, bending the lower extreme towards its apex, produces the organic circle of the sciences, and elevates them all into different arcs or stations of the one absolute science of Life.

This explanation, which in appearance only is a digression, was indispensably requisite to prevent the idea of polarity, which has been given as the universal law of Life, from being misunderstood as a mere refinement on those mechanical systems of physiology, which it has been my main object to explode.
philosophorum, which leaves the mind equally dissatisfied, whether we deny or assert its real existence. To make it wholly ideal, would be at the same time to idealize all phenomena, and to undermine the very conception of an external world. To make it real, would be to assert the existence of something, with the properties of nothing. It would far transcend the height to which a physiologist must confine his flights, should we attempt to reconcile this apparent contradiction. It is the duty and the privilege of the theologian to demonstrate, that space is the ideal organ by which the soul of man perceives the omnipresence of the Supreme Reality, as distinct from the works, which in him move, and live, and have their being; while the equal mystery of Time bears the same relation to his Eternity, or what is fully equivalent, his Unity.

Physiologically contemplated, Nature begins, proceeds, and ends in a contradiction; for the moment of absolute solution would be that in which Nature would cease to be Nature, i.e. a scheme of ever-varying relations; and physiology, in the ambitious attempt to solve phenomena into absolute realities, would itself become a mere web of verbal abstractions.

But it is in strict connection with our subject, that we should make the universal forms as well as the not less universal law of Life, clear and intelligible in the example of Time and Space, these being both the first specification of the principle, and ever after its indispensable symbols. First, a single act of self-inquiry will show the impossibility of distinctly conceiving the one without some involution of the other; either time expressed in space, in the form of the mathematical line, or space within time, as in the circle. But to form the first conception of a real thing, we state both as one in the idea, duration. The formula is: \( A = B + B = A = A = A \), or the oneness of space and time, is the predicate of all real being.

But as little can we conceive the oneness, except as the mid-point producing itself on each side; that is, manifesting itself on two opposite poles. Thus, from identity we derive duality, and from both together we obtain polarity, synthesis, indifference, predominance. The line is Time + Space, under the predominance of Time: Surface is Space + Time, under the predominance of Space, while Line + Surface as the synthesis of units, is the circle in the first dignity; to the sphere in the second; and to the globe in the third. In short, neither can the antagonists appear but as two forces of one power, nor can the power be conceived by us but as the equatorial point of the two counteracting forces; of which the hypomochlion of the lever is as good an illustration as any thing can be that is thought of mechanically only, and exclusively of life. To make it adequate, we must substitute the idea of positive production for that of rest, or mere neutralization. To the fancy alone it is the null-point, or zero, but to the
reason it is the punctum saliens, and the power itself in its eminence. Even in these, the most abstract and universal forms of all thought and perception—even in the ideas of time and space, we slip under them, as it were, a substratum; for we can not think of them but as far as they are co-inherent, and therefore as reciprocally the measures of each other. Nor, again, can we finish the process without having the idea of motion as its immediate product. Thus we say, that time has one dimension, and imagine it to ourselves as a line. But the line we have already proved to be the productive synthesis of time, with space under the predominance of time. If we exclude space by an abstract assumption, the time remains as a spaceless point, and represents the concentrated power of unity and active negation, i.e. retraction, determination, and limit, ab intra. But if we assume the time as excluded, the line vanishes, and we leave space dimensionless, an indistinguishable ALL, and therefore the representative of absolute weakness and formlessness, but, for that very reason, of infinite capacity and formability.

We have been thus full and express on this subject, because these simple ideas of time, space, and motion; of length, breadth, and depth, are not only the simplest and universal, but the necessary symbols of all philosophic construction. They will be found the primary factors and elementary forms of every calculus and of every diagram in the algebra and geometry of a scientific physiology. Accordingly, we shall recognize the same forms under other names; but at each return more specific and intense; and the whole process repeated with ascending gradations of reality, exempli gratia: Time + space = motion; tm + space = line + breadth = depth; depth + motion = force; \( \mathbf{U} + \mathbf{v} = \mathbf{v} \); \( \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{v} \); attraction + repulsion = gravitation; and so on, even till they pass into outward phenomena, and form the intermediate link between productive powers and fixed products in light, heat, and electricity. If we pass to the construction of matter, we find it as the product, or tertium alibi, of antagonist powers of repulsion and attraction. Remove these powers, and the conception of matter vanishes into space—conceive repulsion only, and you have the same result. For infinite repulsion, uncounteracted and alone, is tantamount to infinite, dimensionless diffusion, and this again to infinite weakness; viz., to space. Conceive attraction alone, and as an infinite contraction, its product amounts to the absolute point, viz., to time. Conceive the synthesis of both, and you have matter as a fluxional antecedent, which, in the very act of formation, passes into body by its gravity, and yet in all bodies it still remains as their mass, which, being exclusively calculable under the law of gravitation, gives rise, as we before observed, to the science of statics, most improperly called celestial mechanics.

In strict consistence with the same philosophy which, instead of
considering the powers of bodies to have been miraculously stuck into a prepared and pre-existing matter, as pins into a pin-cushion, conceives the powers as the productive factors, and the body or phenomenon as the fact, product, or fixture; we revert again to potentiated length in the power of magnetism; to surface in the power of electricity; and to the synthesis of both, or potentiated depth, in constructive, that is, chemical affinity. But while the two factors are as poles to each other, each factor has likewise its own poles, and thus in the simple cross—

\[ M | S \\
\| \|
\]

\[ N | E \]

\[ m | m \]

\[ M \]

\[ M \]

M M being the magnetic line, with S S its northern pole, or pole of attraction; and m m its south, or pole of repulsion, E E one of the lines that spring from each point of M M, with its east, or pole of contraction, and d its west, or pole of diffuseness and expansion—we have presented to us the universal quadruplicity, or four elemental forms of power; in the endless proportions and modifications of which, the innumerable offspring of all-bearing Nature consist. Wisely docile to the suggestions of Nature herself, the ancients significantly expressed these forces under the names of earth, water, air, and fire; not meaning any tangible or visible substance so generalized, but the powers predominant, and, as it were, the living basis of each, which no chemical decomposition can ever present to the senses, were it only that their interpenetration and co-inherence first constitutes them sensible, and is the condition and meaning of a—thing. Already our more truly philosophical naturalists (Ritter, for instance) have begun to generalize the four great elements of chemical nomenclature, carbon, azote, oxygen, and hydrogen: the two former as the positive and negative pole of the magnetic axis, or as the power of fixity and mobility; and the two latter as the opposite poles, or plus and minus states of cosmical electricity, as the powers of contraction and dilatation, or of comburence and combustibility. These powers are to each other as longitude to latitude, and the poles of each relatively as north to south, and as east to west. For surely the reader will
find no distrust in a system only because Nature, ever consistent with herself, presents us everywhere with harmonious and accordant symbols of her consistent doctrines. Nothing would be more easy than, by the ordinary principles of sound logic and common sense, to demonstrate the impossibility and expose the absurdity of the corpusscularian or mechanic system, or than to prove the untenable nature of any intermediate system. But we can not force any man into an insight or intuitive possession of the true philosophy, because we can not give him abstraction, intellectual intuition, or constructive imagination; because we can not organize for him an eye that can see, an ear that can listen to, or a heart that can feel, the harmonies of Nature, or recognize in her endless forms, the thousandfold realization of those simple and majestic laws, which yet in their absoluteness can be discovered only in the recesses of his own spirit,—not by that man, therefore, whose imaginative powers have been ossified by the continual reaction and assimilating influences of mere objects on his mind, and who is a prisoner to his own eye and its reflex, the passive fancy!—not by him in whom an unbroken familiarity with the organic world, as if it were mechanical, with the sensitive, but as if it were insensate, has engendered the coarse and hard spirit of a sorcerer. The former is unable, the latter unwilling, to master the absolute prerequisites. There is neither hope nor occasion for him "to cudgel his brains about it, he has no feeling of the business." If he do not see the necessity from without, if he have not learned the possibility from within, of interpenetration, of total intussusception, of the existence of all in each as the condition of Nature's unity and substantiality, and of the latency under the predominance of some one power, wherein subsists her life and its endless variety, as he must be, by habitual slavery to the eye, or its reflex, the passive fancy, under the influences of the corpusscularian philosophy, he has so paralyzed his imaginative powers as to be unable—or by that hardness and heart-hardening spirit of contempt, which is sure to result from a perpetual commune with the lifeless, he has so far debased his inward being—as to be unwilling to comprehend the pre-requisite, he must be content, while standing thus at the threshold of philosophy, to receive the results, though he can not be admitted to the deliberation—in other words, to act upon rules which he is incapable of understanding as laws, and to reap the harvest with the sharpened iron for which others have delved for him in the mine.

It is not improbable that there may exist, and even be discovered, higher forms and more akin to Life than those of magnetism, electricity, and constructive (or chemical) affinity appear to be, even in their finest known influences. It is not improbable that we may hereafter find ourselves justified in revoking certain of the latter, and unappropriating them to a yet unnamed triplicity; or that, being thus
assisted, we may obtain a qualitative instead of a quantitative insight into vegetable animation, as distinct from animal, and that of the insect world from both. But in the present state of science, the magnetic, electric, and chemical powers are the last and highest of inorganic nature. These, therefore, we assume as presenting themselves again to us, in their next metamorphosis, as reproduction (i. e. growth and identity of the whole, amid the change or flux of all the parts), irritability and sensibility; reproduction corresponding to magnetism, irritability to electricity, and sensibility to constructive chemical affinity.

But before we proceed further, it behooves us to answer the objections contained in the following passage, or withdraw ourselves in time from the bitter contempt in which it would involve us. Acting under such a necessity, we need not apologize for the length of the quotation.

1. "If," says Mr. Lawrence, "the properties of living matter are to be explained in this way, why should not we adopt the same plan with physical properties, and account for gravitation, or chemical affinity, by the supposition of appropriate subtle fluids? Why does the irritability of a muscle need such an explanation, if explanation it can be called, more than the elective attraction of a salt?"

2. "To make the matter more intelligible, this vital principle is compared to magnetism, to electricity, and to galvanism; or it is roundly stated to be oxygen. 'Tis like a camel, or like a whale, or like what you please."

3. "You have only to grant that the phenomena of the sciences just alluded to depend on extremely fine and invisible fluids, super-added to the matters in which they are exhibited, and to allow further that Life, and magnetic, galvanic, and electric phenomena correspond perfectly; the existence of a subtle matter of Life will then be a very probable inference."

4. "On this illustration you will naturally remark, that the existence of the magnetic, electric, and galvanic fluids, which is offered as a proof of the existence of a vital fluid, is as much a matter of doubt as that of the vital fluid itself."

5. "It is singular, also, that the vital principle should be like both magnetism and electricity, when these two are not like each other."

6. "It would have been interesting to have had this illustration prosecuted a little further. We should have been pleased to learn whether the human body is more like a lodestone, a voltaic pile, or an electrical machine; whether the organs are to be regarded as Leyden jars, magnetic needles, or batteries."

7. "The truth is, there is no resemblance, no analogy, between Electricity and Life; the two orders of phenomena are completely
distinct; they are incommensurable. Electricity illustrates life no more than life illustrates electricity.*

To avoid unnecessary description, I shall refer to the passages by the numbers affixed to them, for that purpose, in the margin.

In reply to No. 1, I ask whether, in the nature of the mind, illustration and explanation must not of necessity proceed from the lower to the higher? or whether a boy is to be taught his addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, by the highest branches of algebraic analysis? Is there any better way of systematic teaching, than that of illustrating each new step, or having each new step illustrated to him by its identity in kind with the step the next below it? though it be the only mode in which this objection can be answered, yet it seems affronting to remind the objector, of rules so simple as that the complex must even be illustrated by the more simple, or the less scritible by that which is more subject to our examination.

In reply to No. 2, I first refer to the author's eulogy on Mr. Hunter, p. 163, in which he is justly extolled for having "surveyed the whole system of organized beings, from plants to man:" of course, therefore, as a system; and therefore under some one common law. Now in the very same sense, and no other, than that in which the writer himself by implication compares himself as a man to the dermeses typographicus, or the focus scorpioides, do I compare the principle of Life to magnetism, electricity, and constructive affinity,—or rather to that power to which the two former are the thesis and antithesis, the latter the synthesis. But if to compare involve the sense of its etymon, and involve the sense of parity, I utterly deny that I do at all compare them; and, in truth, in no conceivable sense of the word is it applicable, any more than a geometrician can be affirmed to compare a polygon to a point, because he generates the line out of the point. The writer attributes to a philosophy essentially vital the barrenness of the mechanic system, with which alone his imagination

* I apprehend that by men of a certain school it would be deemed no demerit, even though they should never have condescended to look into any system of Aristotelian Logic. It is enough for these gentlemen that they are experimentalists! Let it not, however, be supposed that they make more experiments than their neighbors, who consider induction as a means and not an end; or have stronger motives for making them, unless it can be believed that Tycho Brahe must have been urged to repeat his sweeps of the heavens with greater accuracy and industry than Herschel, for no better reason than that the former flourished before the theory of gravitation was perfected. No, but they have the honor of being mere experimentalists! If, however, we may not refer to logic, we may to common sense and common experience. It is not improbable, however, that they have both read and studied a book of hypothetical psychology on the assumptions of the crudest materialism, stolen too without acknowledgment from our David Hartley's Essay on Man, which is well known under the whimsical name of Condillac's Logic. But, as Mr. Brand has lately observed, "The French are a queer people," and we should not be at all surprised to hear of a book of fresh importation from Paris, on determinate proportions in chemistry, announced by the author in his title-page as a new and improved system either of arithmetic or geometry.
APPENDIX C.

has been familiarized, and which, as hath been justly observed by a contemporary writer, is contra-distinguished from the former principally in this respect; that demanding for every mode and act of existence real or possible visibility, it knows only of distance and nearness, composition (or rather compaction) and decomposition, in short, the relations of unproductive particles to each other; so that in every instance the result is the exact sum of the component qualities, as in arithmetical addition. This is the philosophy of Death, and only of a dead nature can it hold good. In Life, and in the view of a vital philosophy, the two component counter-powers actually interpenetrate each other, and generate a higher third, including both the former, "ita tamen ut sit alia et major."

As a complete answer to No. 3, I refer the reader to many passages in the preceding and following pages, in which, on far higher and more demonstrative grounds than the mechanic system can furnish, I have exposed the unmeaningness and absurdity of these finer fluids, as applied even to electricity itself; unless, indeed, they are assumed as its product. But in addition I beg leave to remind the author, that it is incomparably more agreeable to all experience to originate the formative process in the fluid, whether fine or gross, than in corporeal atoms, in which we are not only deserted by all experience, but contradicted by the primary conception of body itself.

Equally inapplicable is No. 4: and of No. 5 I can only repeat, first, that I do not make Life like magnetism, or like electricity; that the difference between magnetism and electricity, and the powers illustrated by them, is an essential part of my system, but that the animal Life of man is the identity of all three. To whatever other system this objection may apply, it is utterly irrelevant to that which I have here propounded: though from the narrow limits prescribed to me, it has been propounded with an inadequacy painful to my own feelings.

The ridicule in No. 6 might be easily retorted; but as it could prove nothing, I will leave it where I found it, in a page where nothing is proved.

A similar remark might be sufficient for the bold and blank assertion (No. 7) with which the extract concludes; but that I feel some curiosity to discover what meaning the author attaches to the term analogy. Analogy implies a difference in sort, and not merely in degree; and it is the sameness of the end, with the difference of the means, which constitutes analogy. No one would say the lungs of a man were analogous to the lungs of a monkey, but any one might say that the gills of fish and the spiracula of insects are analogous to lungs. Now if there be any philosophers who have asserted that electricity as electricity is the same as Life, for that reason they can not be analogous to each other; and as no man in his senses, philosopher or not, is capable of imagining that the lightning which destroys
a sheep, was a means to the same end with the principle of its organization; for this reason, too, the two powers can not be represented as analogous. Indeed I know of no system in which the word, as thus applied, would admit of an endurable meaning, but that which teaches us, that a mass of marrow in the skull is analogous to the rational soul, which Plato and Bacon, equally with the "poor Indian," believe themselves to have received from the Supreme Reason.

It would be blindness not to see, or affectation to pretend not to see, the work at which these sarcasms were levelled. The author of that work is abundantly able to defend his own opinions; yet I should be ambitious to address him at the close of the contest in the lines of the great Roman poet:

"Et nostola, Palor, ferrumque baud debile dextra
Spargimus, et nostro sequitur, de vulnere sanguis."

In Mr. Abernethy's Lecture on the Theory of Life, it is impossible not to see a presentiment of a great truth. He has, if I may so express myself, caught it in the breeze: and we seem to hear the first glad opening and shout with which he springs forward to the pursuit. But it is equally evident that the prey has not been followed through its doublings and windings, or driven out from its brakes and covers into full and open view. Many of the least tenable phrases may be fairly interpreted as illustrations, rather than precise exponents of the author's meaning; at least, while they remain as a mere suggestion or annunciation of his ideas, and till he has expanded them over a larger sphere, it would be unjust to infer the contrary. But it is not with men, however strongly their professional merits may entitle them to reverence, that my concern is at present. If the opinions here supported are the same with those of Mr. Abernethy, I rejoice in his authority. If they are different, I shall wait with an anxious interest for an exposition of that difference.

Having reasserted that I no more confound magnetism with electricity, or the chemical process, than the mathematician confounds length with breadth, or either with depth; I think it sufficient to add that there are two views of the subject, the former of which I do not believe attributable to any philosopher, while both are alike disclaimed by me as forming any part of my views. The first is that which is supposed to consider electricity identical with life, as it subsists in organized bodies. The other considers electricity as everywhere present, and penetrating all bodies under the image of a subtile fluid or substance, which, in Mr. Abernethy's inquiry, I regard as little more than a mere diagram on his slate, for the purpose of fixing the attention on the intellectual conception, or as a possible product (in which case electricity must be a composite power), or at worst, as words qua humana incouria fudit. This which, in inanimate Nature,
is manifested now as magnetism, now as electricity, and now as
chemical agency, is supposed, on entering an organized body, to con-
stitute its vital principle, something in the same manner as the steam
becomes the mechanic power of the steam-engine, in consequence of
its compression by the steam-engine; or as the breeze that murmurs
indistinguishably in the forest becomes the element, the substratum,
of melody in the Æolian harp, and of consummate harmony in the
organ. Now this hypothesis is as directly opposed to my view as
supervention to evolution, inasmuch as I hold the organized body
itself, in all its marvellous contexture, to be the product and repre-
sentant of the power which is here supposed to have supervened to
it. So far from admitting a transfer, I do not admit it even in elec-
tricity itself, or in the phenomena universally called electrical; among
other points I ground my explanation of remote sympathy on the
directly contrary supposition.

But my opinions will be best explained by a rapid exemplification
in the processes of Nature, from the first rudiments of individualized
life in the lowest classes of its two great poles, the vegetable and ani-
mal creation, to its crown and consummation in the human body;
thus illustrating at once the unceasing polarity of life, as the form of
its process, and its tendency to progressive individuation as the law of
its direction.

Among the conceptions, of the mere ideal character of which the
philosopher is well aware, and which yet become necessary from the
necessity of assuming a beginning; the original fluidity of the planet
is the chief. Under some form or other it is expressed or implied in
every system of cosmogony and even of geology, from Moses to
Thales, and from Thales to Werner. This assumption originates in
the same law of mind that gave rise to the prima materia of the
Peripatetic school. In order to comprehend and explain the forms of
things, we must imagine a state antecedent to form. A chaos of het-
erogeneous substances, such as our Milton has described, is not only an
impossible state (for this may be equally true of every other attempt),
but it is palpably impossible. It presupposes, moreover, the thing it
is intended to solve; and makes that an effect which had been called
in as the explanatory cause. The requisite and only serviceable fiction,
therefore, is the representation of CHAOS as one vast homogeneous
drop! In this sense it may be even justified, as an appropriate symbol
of the great fundamental truth that all things spring from, and subsist
in, the endless strife between indifference and difference. The whole
history of Nature is comprised in the specification of the transitional
states from the one to the other. The symbol only is fictitious: the
thing signified is not only grounded in truth—it is the law and actu-
ating principle of all other truths, whether physical or intellectual.

Now, by magnetism in its widest sense, I mean the first and sim-
plest differential act of Nature, as the power which works in length, and produces the first distinction between the indistinguishable by the generation of a line. Relatively, therefore, to fluidity, that is, to matter, the parts of which can not be distinguished from each other by figure, magnetism is the power of fixity; but, relatively to itself, magnetism, like every other power in Nature, is designated by its opposite poles, and must be represented as the magnetic axis, the northern pole of which signifies rest, attraction, fixity, coherence, or hardness; the element of earth in the nomenclature of observation and the carbonic principle in that of experiment; while the southern pole, as its antithesis, represents mobility, repulsion, incoherence, and fusibility; the element of air in the nomenclature of observation (that is, of Nature as it appears to us when unquestioned by art), and azote or nitrogen in the nomenclature of experiment (that is, of Nature in the state so beautifully allegorized in the Homeric fable of Proteus bound down, and forced to answer by Ulysses, after having been pursued through all his metamorphoses into his ultimate form*). That nothing real does or can exist corresponding to either pole exclusively, is involved in the very definition of a thing as the synthesis of opposing energies. That a thing is, is owing to the co-inherence therein of any two powers; but that it is that particular thing arises from the proportions in which these powers are co-present, either as predominance or as reciprocal neutralization; but under the modification of twofold power to which magnetism itself is, as the thesis to its antithesis.

The correspondent, in the world of the senses, to the magnetic axis, exists in the series of metals. The metallicity, as the universal base of the planet, is a necessary deduction from the principles of the system. From the infusible, though evaporable, diamond to nitrogen itself, the metallic nature of which has been long suspected by chemists, though still under the mistaken notion of an oxyde, we trace a series of metals from the maximum of coherence to positive fluidity, in all ordinary temperatures, we mean. Though, in point of fact, cold itself is but a superinduction of the one pole, or, what amounts to the same thing, the subtraction of the other, under the modifications afore described; and therefore are the metals indecomposable, because they are themselves the decompositions of the metallic axis, in all its degrees of longitude and latitude. Thus the substance of the planet from which it is, is metallic; while that which is ever becoming, is in like manner produced through the perpetual modification of the first by the opposite forces of the second; that is, by the principle of contraction and difference at the eastern extreme—the element of fire, or

* Such is the interpretation given by Lord Bacon. To which of the two gigantic intellects, the poet’s or philosophic commentator’s, the allegory belongs, I shall not presume to decide. Its extraordinary beauty and appropriateness remains the same in either case.
the oxygen of the chemists; and by the elementary power of dilata-

tion, or universality at its western extreme—the ὑδρά ἐν ὑδατί of the

anancients, and the hydrogen of the laboratory.

It has been before noticed that the progress of Nature is more truly
represented by the ladder, than by the suspended chain, and that she
expands as by concentric circles. This is, indeed, involved in the very
conception of individuation, whether it be applied to the different
species or to the individuals. In what manner the evident interspace
is reconciled with the equally evident continuity of the life of Nature,
is a problem that can be solved by those minds alone, which have in-
tuitively learnt that the whole actual life of Nature originates in the
existence, and consists in the perpetual reconciliation, and as perpet-
ual resurgency of the primary contradiction, of which universal po-
arity is the result and the exponent. From the first moment of the
derential impulse—(the primeval chemical epoch of the Wernerian
school)—when Nature, by the tranquil deposition of crystals, pre-
pared as it were, the fulcrum of her after-efforts, from this, her first,
and in part irrevocable, self-contraction, we find, in each ensuing pro-
duction, more and more tendency to independent existence in the in-
creasing multitude of strata, and in the relics of the lowest orders,
first of vegetable and then of animal life. In the schistous forma-
tions, which we must here assume as in great measure the residue of
vegetable creations, that have sunk back into the universal life, and in
the later predominant calcareous masses, which are the caput mortuam
of animalized existence, we ascend from the laws of attraction and
repulsion, as united in gravity, to magnetism, electricity, and construc-
tive power, till we arrive at the point representative of a new and
far higher intensity. For from this point flow, as in opposite direc-
tions, the two streams of vegetation and animalization, the former
characterized by the predominance of magnetism in its highest power,
as reproduction, the other by electricity intensified—as irritability, in
like manner. The vegetable and animal world are the thesis and an-
tithesis, or the opposite poles of organic life. We are not, therefore,
to seek in either for analogies to the other, but for counterpoints. On
the same account, the nearer the common source, the greater the
likeness; the farther the remove, the greater the opposition. At the
extreme limits of inorganic Nature, we may detect a dim and obscure
prophecy of her ensuing process in the twigs and rude semblances
that occur in crystallization of some of the copper ores, and in the
well-known arbor Diana, and arbor Veneris. These latter Ritter has
already ably explained by considering the oblique branches and their
acute angles as the result of magnetic repulsion, from the presentation
of the same poles, &c. In the corals and conchylia, the whole act
and purpose of their existence seems to be that of connecting the ani-
mal with the inorganic world by the perpetual formation of calcareous
earth. For the corals are nothing but polypi, which are characterized by still passing away and dissolving into the earth, which they had previously excreted, as if they were the first feeble effort of detachment. The power seems to step forward from out the inorganic world only to fall back again upon it, still, however, under a new form, and under the predominance of the more active pole of magnetism. The product must have the same connection, therefore, with azote, which the first rudiments of vegetation have with carbon: the one and the other exist not for their own sakes, but in order to produce the conditions best fitted for the production of higher forms. In the polypi, corallines, &c., individuality is in its first dawn; there is the same shape in them all, and a multitude of animals form, as it were, a common animal. And as the individuals run into each other, so do the different genera. They likewise pass into each other so indistinguishably, that the whole order forms a very network.

As the corals approach the conchylia, this interramification decreases. The tubipora forms the transition to the serpula; for the characteristic of all zoophytes, namely, the star shape of their openings, here disappears, and the tubipora are distinguished from the rest of the corals by this very circumstance, that the hollow calcareous pipes are placed side by side, without interbranching. In the serpula they have already become separate. How feeble this attempt is to individuate, is most clearly shown in their mode of generation. Notwithstanding the report of Professor Pallas, it still remains doubtful whether there exists any actual copulation among the polypi. The mere existence of a polypus suffices for its endless multiplication. They may be indefinitely propagated by cuttings, so languid is the power of individuation, so boundless that of reproduction. But the delicate jelly dissolves, as lightly as it was formed, into its own product, and it is probable that the Polynesia, as a future continent, will be the gigantic monument, not so much of their life, as of the life of Nature in them. Here we may observe the first instance of that general law, according to which Nature still assimilates her extreme points. In these, her first and feeblest attempts to animalize organization, it is latent, because undeveloped, and merely potential; while, in the human brain, the last and most consummate of her combined energies, it is again lost or disguised in the subtlety* and multiplicity of its evolution.

In the class immediately above (Mollusca) we find the individuals separate, a more determinate form; and in the higher species, the rudiment of nerves, as the first scarce distinguishable impress and exponent of sensibility; still; however, the vegetative reproduction is the predominant form; and even the nerves "which float in the same

* The Anatomical Demonstrations of the Brain, by Dr. Spurzheim, which I have seen, presented to me the most satisfactory proof of this.
cavity with the other viscera," are probably subservient to it, and extend their power in the increased intensity of the reproductive force. Still prevails the transitional state from the fluid to the solid; and the jelly; that rudiment in which all animals, even the noblest, have their commencement; constitutes the whole sphere of these rudimentary animals.

In the snail and muscle, the residuum of the coral reappears, but refined and ennobled into a part of the animal. The whole class is characterized by the separation of the fluid from the solid. On the one side, a gelatinous semi-fluid; on the other side, an entirely inorganic, though often a most exquisitely mechanized, calcareous excretion! Animalization in general is, we know, contra-distinguished from vegetables in general by the predominance of azote in the chemical composition, and of irritability in the organic process. But in this and the foregoing classes, as being still near the common equator, or the punctum indifferentiae, the carbonic principle still asserts its claims, and the force of reproduction struggles with that of irritability. In the unreconciled strife of these two forces consists the character of the Vermes, which appear to be the preparatory step for the next class. Hence the difficulties which have embarrassed the naturalists, who adopt the Linnean classification, in their endeavors to discover determinate characters of distinction between the vermes and the insects.

But no sooner have we passed the borders, than endless variety of form and the bold display of instincts announce, that Nature has succeeded. She has created the intermediate link between the vegetable world, as the product of the reproductive or magnetic power, and the animal as the exponent of sensibility. Those that live and are nourished, on the bodies of other animals, are comparatively few, with little diversity of shape, and almost all of the same natural family. These we may pass by as exceptions. But the insect world, taken at large, appears as an intenser life, that has struggled itself loose and become emancipated from vegetation, Flora liberti, et libertini! If for the sake of a moment's relaxation we might indulge a Darwinian flight, though at the risk of provoking a smile, (not, I hope, a frown,) from sober judgment, we might imagine the life of insects an apotheosis of the petals, stamina, and nectaries, round which they flutter, or of the stems and pedicles, to which they adhere. Beyond and above this step, Nature seems to act with a sort of free agency, and to have formed the classes from choice and bounty. Had she proceeded no further, yet the whole vegetable, together with the whole insect creation, would have formed within themselves an entire and independent system of Life. All plants have insects, most commonly each genus of vegetables its appropriate genera of insects; and so reciprocally interdependent and necessary to each other are they, that we
can almost as little think of vegetation without insects, as of insects without vegetation. Though probably the mere likeness of shape, in the *papilio*, and the papilionaceous plants, suggested the idea of the former, as the latter in a state of detachment, to our late poetical and theoretical brother; yet a something, that approaches to a graver plausibility, is given to this fancy of a flying blossom; when we reflect how many plants depend upon insects for their fructification. Be it remembered, too, that with few and very obscure exceptions, the irritable power and an analogon of voluntary motion first dawn on us in the vegetable world, in the stamens, and anthers, at the period of impregnation. Then, as if Nature had been encouraged by the success of the first experiment, both the one and the other appear as predominance and general character. The insect world is the exponent of irritability, as the vegetable is of reproduction.

With the ascent in power, the intensity of individuation keeps even pace; and from this we may explain all the characteristic distinctions between this class and that of the vermes. The almost homogeneous jelly of the animalcula infusoria became, by a vital oxydation, granular in the polypi. This granulation formed itself into distinct organs in the mollusces; while for the snails, which are the next step, the animalized lime, that seemed the sole final cause of the life of the polypi, assumes all the characters of an anterior purpose. Refined into a horn-like substance, it becomes to the snails the substitute of an organ, and their outward skeleton. Yet how much more manifold and definite, the organization of an insect, than that of the preceding class, the patient researches of Swammerdam and Lyonnet have evinced, to the delight and admiration of every reflecting mind.

In the insect, for the first time, we find the distinct commencement of a separation between the exponents of sensibility and those of irritability; i. e. between the nervous and the muscular system. The latter, however, asserts its pre-eminence throughout. The prodigal provision of organs for the purposes of respiration, and the marvellous powers which numerous tribes of insects possess, of accommodating the most corrupted airs, for a longer or shorter period, to the support of their excitability, would of itself lead us to presume, that here the *vis irritabilis* is the reigning dynasty. There is here no confluence of nerves into one reservoir, as evidence of the independent existence of sensibility as sensibility;—and therefore no counterpoise of a vascular system, as a distinct exponent of the irritable pole. The whole muscularity of these animals is the organ of irritability; and the nerves themselves are probably feeders of the motory power. The petty rills of sensibility flow into the full expanse of irritability, and there lose themselves. The nerves appertaining to the senses, on the other hand, are indistinct, and comparatively unimportant. The multitude of immovable eyes appear not so much conductors of light, as
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its ultimate recipient. We are almost tempted to believe that they constitute, rather than subserve, their sensorium.

These eye-facets form the sense of light, rather than organs of seeing. Their almost paradoxical number at least, and the singularity of their forms, render it probable that they impel the animal by some modification of its irritability, herein likewise containing a striking analogy to the known influence of light on plants, than as excitements of sensibility. The sense that is nearest akin to irritability, and which alone resides in the muscular system, is that of touch, or feeling. This, therefore, is the first sense that emerges. Being confined to absolute contact, it occupies the lowest rank; but for that very reason it is the ground of all the other senses, which act, according to the ratio of their ascent, at still increasing distances, and become more and more ideal, from the tentacles of the polypus, to the human eye; which latter might be defined the outward organ of the identity, or at least of the indifference, of the real and ideal. But as the calcareous residuum of the lowest class approaches to the nature of horn in the snail, so the cumbrous shell of the snail has been transformed into polished and movable plates of defensive armor in the insect. Thus, too, the same power of progressive individualization articulates the tentacula of the polypus and holothuria into antennæ; thereby manifesting the full emersion and eminency of irritability as a power which acts in, and gives its own character to, that of reproduction. The least observant must have noticed the lightning-like rapidity with which the insect tribes devour and eliminate their food, as by an instinctive necessity, and in the least degree for the purposes of the animal's own growth or enlargement. The same predominance of irritability, and at the same time a new start in individualization, is shown in the reproductive power as generation. There is now a regular projection, ab intra ad extra, for which neither sprouts nor cuttings can any longer be the substitutes. We have not space for further detail; but there is one point too strikingly illustrative and even confirmative of the proposed system, to be omitted altogether. We mean the curious fact, that the same characteristic tendency, ad extra, which in the males and females of certain insect tribes is realized in the functions of generation, conception, and parturiency, manifests and expands itself in the sexless individuals (which are always in this case the great majority of the species), as instincts of art, and in the construction of works completely detached and inorganic; while the geometric regularity of these works, which bears an analogy to crystallization, is demonstrably no more than the necessary result of uniform action in a compressed multitude.

Again, as the insect world, averaging the whole, comes nearest to plants (whose very essence is reproduction), in the multitude of their germs; so does it resemble plants in the sufficiency of a single im-
pregnination for the evolution of myriads of detached lives. Even so, the metamorphoses of insects, from the egg to the maggot and caterpillar, and from these, through the nympha and aurelia into the perfect insect, are but a more individuated and intenser form of a similar transformation of the plant from the seed-leaflets, or cotyledons, through the stalk, the leaves, and the calyx, into the perfect flower, the various colors of which seem made for the reflection of light, as the antecedent grade to the burnished scales, and scale-like eyes of the insect. Nevertheless, with all this seeming prodigality of organic power, the whole tendency is ad extra, and the life of insects, as electricity in the quadrat, acts chiefly on the superficies of their bodies, to which we may add the negative proof arising from the absence of sensibility. It is well known, that the two halves of a divided insect have continued to perform, or attempt, each their separate functions, the trunkless head feeding with its accustomed voracity, while the headless trunk has exhibited its appropriate excitability to the sexual influence.

The intropulsive force, that sends the ossification inward as to the centre, is reserved for a yet higher step, and this we find embodied in the class of fishes. Even here, however, the process still seems imperfect, and (as it were) initiatory. The skeleton has left the surface, indeed, but the bones approach to the nature of gristle. To feel the truth of this, we need only compare the most perfect bone of a fish with the thigh-bones of the mammalia, and the distinctness with which the latter manifest the co-presence of the magnetic power in its solid parietes, of the electrical in its branching arteries, and of the third greatest power, viz., the qualitative and interior, in its marrow. The senses of fish are more distinct than those of insects. Thus, the intensity of its sense of smell has been placed beyond doubt, and rises in the extent of its sphere far beyond the irritable sense, or the feeling, in insects. I say the feeling, not the touch; for the touch seems, as it were, a supervention to the feeling, a perfection given to it by the reaction of the higher powers. As the feeling of the insect, in subtlety and virtual distance, rises above the solitary sense of taste* in the mollusca, so does the smell of the fish rise above the feeling of the insect. In the fish, likewise, the eyes are single and movable, while it is remarkable that the only insect that possesses this latter privilege, is an inhabitant of the waters. Finally, here first, unequivocally, and on a large scale (for I pretend not to control the freedom, in which the necessity of Nature is rooted, by the precise limits of a system),—here first, Nature exhibits, in the power of sensibility, the consummation of those vital forms (the niusus formativi)

* The remark on the feeling of the antenna, compared with the touch of man, or even of the half-reasoning elephant, is yet more applicable to the taste, which in the gelatinous animals might, perhaps not inappropriately, be entitled the gastric sense.
the adequate and the sole measure of which is to be sought for in their several organic products. But as if a weakness of exhaustion had attended this advance in the same moment it was made, Nature seems necessitated to fall back, and re-exert herself on the lower ground which she had before occupied, that of the vital magnetism, or the power of reproduction. The intensity of this latter power in the fishes, is shown both in their voracity and in the number of their eggs, which we are obliged to calculate by weight, not by tale. There is an equal intensity both of the immanent and the projective reproduction, in which, if we take in the comparative number of individuals in each species, and likewise the different intervals between the acts, the fish (it is probable) would be found to stand in a similar relation to the insect, as the insect, in the latter point, stands to the system of vegetation. Meantime, the fish sinks a step below the insect, in the mode and circumstances of impregnation. To this we will venture to add, the predominance of length, as the form of growth in so large a proportion of the known orders of fishes, and not less of their rectilineal path of motion. In all other respects, the correspondence combined with the progress in individuation, is striking in the whole detail. Thus the eye, in addition to its movability, has besides acquired a saline moisture in its higher development, as accordant with the life of its element. Add to these the glittering covering in both, the splendor of the scales in the one answering to the brilliant plates in the other,—the luminous reservoirs of the fire-flies,—the phosphorescence and electricity of many fishes,—the same analoga of moral qualities, in their rapacity, boldness, modes of seizing their prey by surprise,—their gills, as presenting the intermediate state between the spiracula of the grade next below, and the lungs of the step next above, both extremes of which seem combined in the structure of birds and of their quill-feathers; but above all, the convexity of the crystalline lens, so much greater than in birds, quadrupeds, and man, and seeming to collect, in one powerful organ, the hundredfold microscopic facetttes of the insect's light organs; and it will not be easy to resist the conviction, that the same power is at work in both, and reappears under higher auspices. The intention of Nature is repeated; but, as was to have been expected, with two main differences. First, that in the lower grade the reproductions themselves seem merged in those of irritability, from the very circumstance that the latter constitutes no pole, either to the former, or to sensibility. The force of irritability acts, therefore, in the insect world, in full predominance; while the emergence of sensibility in the fish calls forth the opposite pole of reproduction, as a distinct power, and causes therefore the irritability to flow, in part, into the power of reproduction. The second result of this ascent is the direction of the organizing power, ad intra, with the consequent greater simplicity of the

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exterior form, and the substitution of condensed and flexible force, 
with comparative unity of implements, for that variety of tools, 
almost as numerous as the several objects to which they are to be 
applied, which arises from, and characterizes the superficial life of 
the insect creation. This grade of ascension, however, like the for-
mer, is accompanied by an apparent retrograde movement. For from 
this very accession of vital intensity we must account for the absence 
in the fishes of all the formative, or rather (if our language will per-
mit it) fabricative instincts. How could it be otherwise? These in-
stincts are the surplus and projection of the organizing power in the 
direction ad extra, and could not, therefore, have been expected in 
the class of animals that represent the first intuitive effort of organ-
ization, and are themselves the product of its first movement in the 
direction ad intra. But Nature never loses what she has once learnt, 
though in the acquirement of each new power she intermits, or per-
forms less energetically, the act immediately preceding. She often 
drops a faculty, but never fails to pick it up again. She may seem 
forgetful and absent, but it is only to recollect herself with additional, 
as well as recruited vigor, in some after and higher state; as if the 
sleep of powers, as well as of bodies, were the season and condition 
of their growth. Accordingly, we find these instincts again, and 
with them a wonderful synthesis of fish and insect, as a higher third, 
in the feathered inhabitants of the air. Nay, she seems to have gone 
yet further back, and having given \( B + C = D \) in the birds, so to have 
sporied with one solitary instance of \( B + D = A \) in that curious animal 
the dragon, the anatomy of which has been recently given to the 
public by Tiedemann; from whose work it appears, that this creature 
presents itself to us with the wings of the insect, and with the nervous 
system, the brain, and the cranium of the bird, in their several rudi-
ments.

The synthesis of fish and insect in the birds, might be illustrated 
equally in detail with the former; but it will be sufficient for our 
purpose, that as in both the former cases, the insect and the fish, so 
here in that of the birds, the powers are under the predominance of 
irritability; the sensibility being dormant in the first, awakening in 
the second, and awake, but still subordinate, in the third. Of this 
my limits confine me to a single presumptive proof, viz., the superi-
ority in strength and courage of the female in the birds of prey. For 
herein, indeed, does the difference of the sexes universally consist, 
wherever both the forces are developed, that the female is character-
ized by quicker irritability, and the male by deeper sensibility. How 
large a stride has been now made by Nature in the progress of individ-
uation, what ornithologist does not know? From a multitude of in-
stances we select the most impressive, the power of sound, with the 
first rudiments of modulation! That all languages designate the
melody of birds as singing (though according to Blumenbach man
only sings, while birds do but whistle), demonstrates that it has been
felt as, what indeed it is, a tentative and prophetic prelude of some-
thing yet to come. With this conjoin the power and the tendency to
acquire articulation, and to imitate speech; conjoin the building in-
stinct and the migratory, the monogamy of several species, and the
pairing of almost all; and we shall have collected new instances of
the usage (I dare not say law) according to which Nature lets fall, in
order to resume, and steps backward the furthest, when she means to
leap forwards with the greatest concentration of energy.

For lo! in the next step of ascent the power of sensibility has as-
sumed her due place and rank: her minority is at an end, and the
complete and universal presence of a nervous system unites absolutely,
by instantiety of time what, with the due allowances for the transi-
tional process, had before been either lost in sameness, or perplexed
by multiplicity, or compacted by a finer mechanism. But with this,
all the analogies with which Nature had delighted us in the preceding
step seem lost, and, with the single exception of that more than valu-
able, that estimable philanthropist, the dog, and, perhaps, of the horse
and elephant, the analogies to ourselves, which we can discover in
the quadrupeds or quadrumanini, are of our vices, our follies, and our
imperfections. The facts in confirmation of both the propositions are
so numerous and so obvious, the advance of Nature, under the pre-
dominance of the third synthetic power, both in the intensity of life
and in the intenseness and extension of individuality, is so undeniable,
that we may leap forward at once to the highest realization and recon-
ciliation of both her tendencies, that of the most perfect detachment
with the greatest possible union, to that last work, in which Nature
did not assist as handmaid under the eye of her sovereign Master,
who made Man in his own image, by superadding self-consciousness
with self-government, and breathed into him a living soul.

The class of Vermes deposit a calcareous stuff, as if it had torn loose
from the earth a piece of the gross mass which it must still drag about
with it. In the insect class this residuum has refined itself. In the
fishes and amphibia it is driven back or inward, the organic power
begins to be intuitive, and sensibility appears. In the birds the bones
have become hollow; while, with apparent proportional recess, but,
in truth, by the excitement of the opposite pole, their exterior pre-
sents an actual vegetation. The bones of the mammals are filled up,
and their coverings have become more simple. Man possesses the
most perfect osseous structure, the least and most insignificant cover-
ing. The whole force of organic power has attained an inward and
centripetal direction. He has the whole world in counterpoint to
him, but he contains an entire world within himself. Now, for the
first time at the apex of the living pyramid, it is Man and Nature, but
Man himself is a syllepsis, a compendium of Nature—the Microcosm! Naked and helpless cometh man into the world. Such has been the complaint from eldest time; but we complain of our chief privilege, our ornament, and the connate mark of our sovereignty. Porphyrogenitus namus! In Man the centripetal and individualizing tendency of all Nature is itself concentrated and individualized—he is a revelation of Nature! Henceforward, he is referred to himself, delivered up to his own charge; and he who stands the most on himself, and stands the firmest, is the truest, because the most individual, Man. In social and political life this acme is inter-dependence; in moral life it is independence; in intellectual life it is genius. Nor does the form of polarity, which has accompanied the law of individuation up its whole ascent, desert it here. As the height, so the depth. The intensities must be at once opposite and equal. As the liberty, so must be the reverence for law. As the independence, so must be the service and the submission to the Supreme Will! As the ideal genius and the originality, in the same proportion must be the resignation to the real world, the sympathy and the inter-communion with Nature. In the conciliating mid-point, or equator, does the Man live, and only by its equal presence in both its poles can that life be manifested!

If it had been possible, within the prescribed limits of this essay, to have deduced the philosophy of Life synthetically, the evidence would have been carried over from section to section, and the quod erat demonstrandum at the conclusion of one section would reappear as the principle of the succeeding—the goal of the one would be the starting-post of the other. Positions arranged in my own mind, as intermediate and organic links of administration, must be presented to the reader in the first instance, at least, as a mere hypothesis. Instead of demanding his assent as a right, I must solicit a suspension of his judgment as a courtesy; and, after all, however firmly the hypothesis may support the phenomena piled upon it, we can deduce no more than a practical rule, grounded on a strong presumption. The license of arithmetic, however, furnishes instances that a rule may be usefully applied in practice, and for the particular purpose may be sufficiently authenticated by the result, before it has itself been duly demonstrated. It is enough, if only it hath been rendered fully intelligible.

In a system where every position proceeds from a scientific preconstruction, a power acting exclusively in length, would be magnetism by virtue of our own definition of the term. In like manner, a surface power would be electricity, as far as that system was concerned, whether it accorded or not with the facts ordinarily so called. But it is incumbent on us, who must treat the subject analytically, to show by experiment that magnetism does in fact act longitudinally, and
electricity superficially; and that, consequently, the former is distinguished from, and yet contained in, the latter, as a straight line is distinguished from, yet contained in, a superficies.

First, that magnetism, in its conductors, seeks and follows length only, and by the length itself conducted, has been proved by Brugmans, in his philosophical Essay on the Matter of Magnetism, where he relates that a magnet capable of supporting a body four times heavier than itself, and which acted as a magnetic needle at the distance of twenty inches, was so weakened by the interposition of three cast-iron plates of considerable thickness, as scarcely to move the magnetic needle from its place at a distance of only three inches. A similar experiment had been made by Descartes. I concluded, therefore, said Brugmans, that if the iron plates were interposed between the magnet and the needle lengthways, instead of breadthways or right across, the action of the magnet on the magnetic needle would, in consequence of this great increase of resistance, become still weaker, or perhaps evanescent. But not less to my surprise than my admiration, I found that the power of the magnet was so far from being diminished by this change in the relative position of the iron-plates; that, on the contrary, it now extended to a far greater distance than when no iron at all was interposed. Some time after the same philosopher, out of several iron bars, the sides of which were an inch broad each, composed a single bar of the length of more than ten feet, and observed the magnetism make its way through the whole mass. But, in order to try whether the action could be propagated to any length indefinitely, after several experiments with bars of intermediate lengths, in all of which he had succeeded, he tried a four-cornered iron rod, more than twenty feet long, and it was at this length that the magnetic power first began to be diminished. So far Brugmans.

But the shortest way for any one to convince himself of this relation of the magnetic power would be, in one and the same experiment, to interpose the same piece of iron between the magnet and the compass needle first breadthways; and in this case it will be found that the needle, which had been previously deflected by the magnet from its natural position at one of its poles, will instantly resume the same, either wholly or very nearly so—then to interpose the same piece of iron lengthways; in which case the position of the compass needle will be scarcely or not at all affected.

The assertion of Bernoulli and others, that the absolute force of the artificial magnet increases in the ratio of its superficies, stands corrected in the far more accurate experiments of Coulomb (published in his Treatise on Magnetism), which proves that the increase takes place (in a far greater degree) in the ratio of its length. The same naturalist even found means to determine that the directing powers
of the needle, which he had measured by help of his *balance de tortion*,
stand to the length of the needle in such a ratio as that, provided only
the length of the needle is from forty to fifty times its diameter, the
moments of these directing powers will increase in the very same
direct proportion as the length is increased. Nor is this all that may
be deduced from the experiment last mentioned. If only the magnet
be strong enough, it will show likewise that magnetism *seeks* the
length. The proof is contained in the remarkable fact, that the iron
interposed between the magnet and the magnetic needle *breadthways*
constantly acquires its two opposite poles at both ends *lengthways*.
Though the preceding experiments are abundantly sufficient to prove
the position, yet the following deserves mention for the beautiful
clearness of its evidence. If the magnetic power is determined ex-
clusively by length, it is to be expected that it will manifest no force,
where the piece of iron is of such a shape that no one dimension pre-
dominates. Bring a *cube* of iron near the magnetic needle and it will
not exert the slightest degree of power beyond what belongs to it as
mere iron. By the perfect equality of the dimension, the magnetism
of the earth appears, as it were, perplexed and doubtful. Now, then,
attach a second cube of iron to the first, and the instantaneous act of
the iron on the magnetic needle will make it manifest that with the
length thus given, the magnetic influence is given at the same mo-
ment.

That electricity, on the other hand, does not act in length merely,
is clear, from the fact that every electric body is electric over its whole
surface. But that electricity acts both in length and breadth, and *only*
in length and breadth, and not in depth; in short, that the (so-called)
electrical fluid in an electrified body spreads over the whole surface
of that body without penetrating it, or tending *ad intra*, may be proved
by direct experiment. Take a cylinder of wood, and bore an indefi-
nite number of holes in it, each of them four lines in depth and four
in diameter. Electrify this cylinder, and present to its superficies a
small square of gold-leaf, held to it by an insulating needle of gum
lac, and bring this square to an electrometer of great sensibility. The
electrometer will instantly show an electricity in the gold-leaf, similar
to that of the cylinder which had been brought into contact with it.
The square of gold-leaf having thus been discharged of its electricity,
put it carefully into one of the holes of the cylinder, *so*, namely, that
it shall touch only the bottom of the hole, and present it again to the
electrometer. It will be then found that the electrometer will exhibit
no signs of electricity whatsoever. From this it follows, that the
electricity which had been communicated to the cylinder had confined
itself to the *surface*. If the time and the limit prescribed would
admit, we could multiply experiments, all tending to prove the same
law; but we must be content with the barely sufficient. But that
the chemical process acts in depth, and first, therefore, realizes and integrates the fluxional power of magnetism and electricity, is involved in the term composition; and this will become still more convincing when we have learnt to regard decomposition as a mere co-relative, i.e. as decomposition relatively to the body decomposed, but composition actually and in respect of the substances, into which it was decomposed. The alteration in the specific gravity of metals in their chemical amalgams, interesting as the fact is in all points, is decisive in the present; for gravity is the sole inward of inorganic bodies—it constitutes their depth.

I can now, for the first time, give to my opinions that degree of intelligibility, which is requisite for their introduction as hypotheses; the experiments above related, understood as in the common mode of thinking, prove that the magnetic influence flows in length, the electric fluid by suffusion, and that chemical agency (whatever the main agent may be) is qualitative and in intimis. Now my hypothesis demands the converse of all this. I affirm that a power, acting exclusively in length, is (wherever it be found) magnetism; that a power which acts both in length and in breadth, and only, in length and breadth, is (wherever it be found) electricity; and finally, that a power which, together with length and breadth, includes depth likewise, is (wherever it be found) constructive agency. That is but one phenomenon of magnetism, to which we have appropriated and confined the term magnetism; because of all the natural bodies at present known, iron, and one or two of its nearest relatives in the family of hard yet coherent metals, are the only ones, in which all the conditions are collected, under which alone the magnetic agency can appear in and during the act itself. When, therefore, I affirm the power of reproduction in organized bodies to be magnetism, I must be understood to mean that this power, as it exists in the magnet, and which we there (to use a strong phrase) catch in the very act, is to the same kind of power, working as reproductive, what the root is to the cube of that root. We no more confound the force in the compass needle with that of reproduction, than a man can be said to confound his liver with a lichen, because he affirms that both of them grow.

The same precautions are to be repeated in the identification of electricity with irritability; and the power of depth, for which we have yet no appropriated term, with sensibility. How great the distance is in all, and that the lowest degrees are adopted as the exponent terms, not for their own sakes, but merely because they may be used with less hazard of diverting the attention from the kind by peculiar properties arising out of the degree, is evident from the third instance, unless the theorist can be supposed insane enough to apply sensation in good earnest to the effervescence of an acid or an alkali, or to sympathize with the distresses of a vat of new beer when it is
working. In whatever way the subject could be treated, it must have remained unintelligible to men who, if they think of space at all, abstract their notion of it from the contents of an exhausted receiver. With this, and with an ether, such men may work wonders; as what, indeed, can not be done with a plenum and a vacuum, when a theorist has privileged himself to assume the one, or the other, ad libitum?— in all innocence of heart, and undisturbed by the reflection that the two things can not both be true. That both time and space are mere abstractions I am well aware; but I know with equal certainty that what is expressed by them as the identity of both is the highest reality, and the root of all power, the power to suffer, as well as the power to act. However mere an ens logicum space may be, the dimensions of space are real, and the works of Galileo, in more than one elegant passage, prove with what awe and amazement they fill the mind that worthyly contemplates them. Dismissing, therefore, all facts of degrees, as introduced merely for the purposes of illustration, I would make as little reference as possible to the magnet, the charged phial, or the processes of the laboratory, and designate the three powers in the process of our animal life, each by two co-relative terms, the one expressing the form, and the other the object and product of the power. My hypothesis will, therefore, be thus expressed, that the constituent forces of life in the human living body are— first, the power of length, or reproduction; second, the power of surface (that is, length and breadth), or irritability; third, the power of depth, or sensibility. With this observation I may conclude these remarks, only reminding the reader that Life itself is neither of these separately, but the copula of all three—that Life, as Life, supposes a positive or universal principle in Nature, with a negative principle in every particular animal, the latter, or limitative power, constantly acting to individualize, and, as it were, figura the former. Thus, then, Life itself is not a thing—a self-subsistent hypostasis—but an act and process; which, pitiable as the prejudice will appear to the forts esprits, is a great deal more than either my reason would authorize or my conscience allow me to assert—concerning the Soul, as the principle both of Reason and Conscience.
THE STATESMAN'S MANUAL
THE

STATESMAN'S MANUAL;

OR, THE BIBLE THE BEST GUIDE TO POLITICAL SKILL AND
FORESIGHT: A LAY SERMON, ADDRESSED TO
THE HIGHER CLASSES OF SOCIETY,

WITH AN APPENDIX,
CONTAINING COMMENTS AND ESSAYS CONNECTED WITH THE
STUDY OF THE INSPIRED WRITINGS.

BY SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

WITH THE AUTHOR'S LAST CORRECTIONS AND NOTES,
BY
HENRY NELSON COLERIDGE, ESQ., M.A.

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1853.
Ad isthæo quæso vos, qualiaeunque primo videantur aspectus, attendite, ut qui vobis forsan insanire videar, saltem quibus insaniam rationibus cognoscatis.—GIORDANO BRUNO.
For he established a testimony in Jacob and appointed a law in Israel; which he commanded our fathers, that they should make them known to their children: that the generation to come might know them, even the children which should be born; who should arise and declare them to their children: that they might set their hope in God, and not forget the works of God.—Psalm LXXVIII. 5, 6, 7.

If our whole knowledge and information concerning the Bible had been confined to the one fact of its immediate derivation from God, we should still presume that it contained rules and assistances for all conditions of men under all circumstances; and therefore for communities no less than for individuals. The contents of every work must correspond to the character and designs of the work-master; and the inference in the present case is too obvious to be overlooked, too plain to be resisted. It requires, indeed, all the might of superstition to conceal from a man of common understanding the further truth, that the interment of such a treasure in a dead language must needs be contrary to the intentions of the gracious Donor. Apostasy itself dared not question the premisses: and that the practical consequence did not follow, is conceivable only under a complete system of delusion, which from the cradle to the death-bed ceases not to over-awe the will by obscure fears, while it pre-occupies the senses by vivid imagery and ritual pantomime. But to such a scheme all forms of sophistry are native. The very excellence of the Giver has been made a reason for withholding the gift; nay the transcendent value of the gift itself assigned as the motive of its detention. We may be shocked at the presumption, but need not be surprised at the fact, that a jealous priesthood should have ventured to represent the applicability of the Bible to all the wants and occasions of men as a wax-like pliancy to all their fancies and prepossessions. Faithful guardians of Holy Writ,
they are constrained to make it useless in order to guard it from profanation; and those, whom they have most defrauded, are the readiest to justify the fraud. For imposture, organized into a comprehensive and self-consistent whole, forms a world of its own, in which inversion becomes the order of nature.

Let it not be forgotten, however (and I recommend the fact to the especial attention of those among ourselves, who are disposed to rest contented with an implicit faith and passive acquiescence) that the Church of Rome never ceased to avow the profoundest reverence for the Scriptures themselves, and what it forbids its vassals to ascertain, it not only permits, but commands them to take for granted.

Whether, and to what extent, this suspension of the rational functions, this spiritual slumber, will be imputed as a sin to the souls who are still under chains of Papal darkness, we are neither enabled or authorized to determine. It is enough for us to know that the land, in which we abide, has like another Goshen been severed from the plague, and that we have light in our dwellings. The road of salvation for us is a high road, and the wayfarers, though simple, need not err therein. The Gospel lies open in the market-place and on every window-seat, so that (virtually at least) the deaf may hear the words of the book. It is preached at every turning, so that the blind may see them. (Isa. xxix. 18.) The circumstances then being so different, if the result should prove similar, we may be quite certain that we shall not be holden guiltless. The ignorance which may be the excuse of others will be our crime. Our birth and denizenship in an enlightened and Protestant land will, with all our rights and franchises to boot, be brought in judgment against us, and stand first in the fearful list of blessings abused. The glories of our country will form the blazonry of our own impeachment, and the very name of Englishmen, of which we are almost all of us too proud, and for which scarcely any of us are enough thankful, will be annexed to that of Christians only to light up our shame and to aggravate our condemnation.

I repeat, therefore, that the habitual unreflectingness, which in certain countries may be susceptible of more or less palliation in most instances, can in this country be deemed blameless in none. The humblest and least educated of our countrymen must have wilfully neglected the inestimable privileges secured to all
alike, if he has not himself found, if he has not from his own personal experience discovered, the sufficiency of the Scriptures* in all knowledge requisite for a right performance of his duty as a man and a Christian. Of the laboring classes, who in all countries form the great majority of the inhabitants, more than this is not demanded, more than this is not perhaps generally desirable. They are not sought for in public counsel, nor need they be found where politic sentences are spoken. It is enough if every one is wise in the working of his own craft: so best will they maintain the state of the world.

But you, my friends, to whom the following pages are more particularly addressed, as to men moving in the higher class of society,—you will, I hope, have availed yourselves of the ampler means intrusted to you by God's providence, for a more extensive study and a wider use of his revealed will and word. From you we have a right to expect a sober and meditative accommodation to your own times and country of those important truths declared in the inspired writings for a thousand generations, and of the awful examples, belonging to all ages, by which those truths are at once illustrated and confirmed. Would you feel conscious that you had shown yourselves unequal to your station in society,—would you stand degraded in your own eyes,—if you betrayed an utter want of information respecting the acts of human sovereigns and legislators? And should you not much rather be both ashamed and afraid to know yourselves inconversant with the acts and constitutions of God, whose law executeth itself, and whose Word is the foundation, the power, and the life of the universe? Do you hold it a requisite of your rank to show yourselves inquisitive concerning the expectations and plans of statesmen and state-councillors? Do you excuse it as natural curiosity, that you lend a listening ear to the guesses of state-gazers, to the dark hints and open revilings of our self-inspired state-fortune-tellers, the wizards, that peep and mutter and forecast, alarmists by trade, and malcontents for their bread? And should you not feel a deeper interest in predictions which are permanent prophecies, because they are at the same time eternal truths? Predictions which in containing the grounds of fulfilment involve the principles of foresight, and teach the science of the future in its perpetual elements?

* See App. (A.)—Ed.
But I will struggle to believe that of those whom I now suppose myself addressing there are few who have not so employed their greater leisure and superior advantages as to render these remarks, if not wholly superfluous, yet personally inapplicable. In common with your worldly inferiors, you will indeed have directed your main attention to the promises and the information conveyed in the records of the Evangelists and Apostles;—promises, that need only a lively trust in them, on our own part, to be the means as well as the pledges of our eternal welfare—information that opens out to our knowledge a kingdom that is not of this world, thrones that can not be shaken, and sceptres that can neither be broken nor transferred. Yet not the less on this account will you have looked back with a proportionate interest on the temporal destinies of men and nations, stored up for our instruction in the archives of the Old Testament: not the less will you delight to retrace the paths by which Providence has led the kingdoms of this world through the valley of mortal life;—paths engraved with the footmarks of captains sent forth from the God of armies;—nations in whose guidance or chastisement the arm of Omnipotence itself was made bare.

Recent occurrences have given additional strength and fresh force to our sage poet's eulogy on the Jewish Prophets;—

As men divinely taught and better teaching  
The solid rules of civil government  
In their majestic unaffected style,  
Than all the oratory of Greece and Rome.  
In them is plainest taught and easiest learnt  
What makes a nation happy and keeps it so,  
What ruins kingdoms and lays cities flat.  
Par. Reg. iv. 354.

If there be any antidote to that restless craving for the wonders of the day, which in conjunction with the appetite for publicity is spreading like an efflorescence on the surface of our national character; if there exist means for deriving resignation from general discontent, means of building up with the very materials of political gloom that steadfast frame of hope which affords the only certain shelter from the throng of self-realizing alarms, at the same time that it is the natural home and workshop of all the active virtues; that antidote and these means must be sought for in the collation of the present with the past, in the habit of thoughtfully assimilating the events of our own age to those of
the time before us. If this be a moral advantage derivable from history in general, rendering its study therefore a moral duty for such as possess the opportunities of books, leisure and education, it would be inconsistent even with the name of believers not to recur with pre-eminent interest to events and revolutions, the records of which are as much distinguished from all other history by their especial claims to divine authority, as the facts themselves were from all other facts by especial manifestation of divine interference. *Whatsoever things, saith Saint Paul (Rom. xv. 4), were written aforetime, were written for our learning; that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope.*

In the infancy of the world signs and wonders were requisite in order to startle and break down that superstition,—idolatrous in itself and the source of all other idolatry,—which tempts the natural man to seek the true cause and origin of public calamities in outward circumstances, persons, and incidents: in agents therefore that were themselves but surges of the same tide, passive conductors of the one invisible influence, under which the total host of billows, in the whole line of successive impulse, swell and roll shoreward; there finally, each in its turn, to strike, roar, and be dissipated.

But with each miracle worked there was a truth revealed, which thenceforward was to act as its substitute. And if we think the Bible less applicable to us on account of the miracles, we degrade ourselves into mere slaves of sense and fancy, which are indeed the appointed medium between earth and heaven, but for that very cause stand in a desirable relation to spiritual truth then only, when, as a mere and passive medium, they yield a free passage to its light. It was only to overthrow the usurpation exercised in and through the senses, that the senses were miraculously appealed to; for reason and religion are their own evidence.* The natural sun is in this respect a symbol of the spiritual. Ere he is fully arisen, and while his glories are still under veil, he calls up the breeze to chase away the usurping vapors of the night-season, and thus converts the air itself into the minister of its own purification: not surely in proof or elucidation of the light from heaven, but to prevent its interception.

Wherever, therefore, similar circumstances co-exist with the

* See App. (B.)—Ed.*
same moral causes, the principles revealed, and the examples recorded, in the inspired writings render miracles superfluous: and if we neglect to apply truths in expectation of wonders, or under pretext of the cessation of the latter, we tempt God, and merit the same reply which our Lord gave to the Pharisees on a like occasion. *A wicked and an adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, and there shall no sign be given to it, but the sign of the prophet Jonas (Matt. xvi. 4): that is, a threatening call to repentance.* Equally applicable and prophetic will the following verses be. The queen of the South shall rise up in the judgment with the men of this generation and condemn them: for she came from the utmost parts of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon; and, behold, a greater than Solomon is here. — The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation and shall condemn it; for they repented at the preaching of Jonas; and, behold, a greater than Jonas is here (Luke xi. 31, 32). For have we not divine assurance that Christ is with his Church even to the end of the world? And what could the queen of the South, or the men of Nineveh have beheld, that could enter into competition with the events of our own times, in importance, in splendor, or even in strangeness and significancy? The true origin of human events is so little susceptible of that kind of evidence which can compel our belief; so many are the disturbing forces which in every cycle of changes modify the motion given by the first projection; and every age has, or imagines it has, its own circumstances which render past experience no longer applicable to the present case; that there will never be wanting answers, and explanations, and specious flatteries of hope to persuade a people and its government that the history of the past is inapplicable to their case. And no wonder, if we read history for the facts instead of reading it for the sake of the general principles, which are to the facts as the root and sap of a tree to its leaves: and no wonder, if history so read should find a dangerous rival in novels, nay, if the latter should be preferred to the former on the score even of probability. I well remember, that when the examples of former Jacobins, as Julius Cæsar, Cromwell, and the like, were adduced in France and England at the commencement of the French Consulate, it was ridiculed as pedantry and pedant's ignorance to fear a repetition of usurpa-

* See App. (C.)—Ed.
tion and military despotism at the close of the enlightened eighteenth century! Even so, in the very dawn of the late tempestuous day, when the revolutions of Corecyra, the proscriptions of the Reformers, Marius, Caesar, and the like, and the direful effects of the levelling tenets in the Peasants' War in Germany, were urged on the Convention, and its vindicators; I well remember that the Magi of the day, the true citizens of the world, the plusquam-perfecti of patriotism, gave us set proofs that similar results were impossible, and that it was an insult to so philosophical an age, to so enlightened a nation, to dare direct the public eye towards them as to lights of warning! Alas! like lights in the stern of a vessel they illumined the path only that had been past over!

The politic Florentine* has observed, that there are brains of three races. The one understands of itself; the other understands as much as is shown it by others; the third neither understands of itself, nor what is shown it by others. In our times there are more perhaps who belong to the third class from vanity and acquired frivolity of mind, than from natural incapacity. It is no uncommon weakness with those who are honored with the acquaintance of the great, to attribute national events to particular persons, particular measures, to the errors of one man, to the intrigues of another, to any possible spark of a particular occasion, rather than to the true proximate cause (and which alone deserves the name of a cause), the predominant state of public opinion. And still less are they inclined to refer the latter to the ascendency of speculative principles, and the scheme or mode of thinking in vogue. I have known men, who with significant nods and the pitying contempt of smiles have denied all influence to the corruptions of moral and political philosophy, and with much solemnity have proceeded to solve the riddle of the French Revolution by Anecdotes! Yet it would not be difficult, by an unbroken chain of historic facts, to demonstrate that the most important changes in the commercial relations of the world had their origin in the closets or lonely walks of uninterested theorists;—that the mighty epochs of commerce, that have changed the face of empires; nay, the most impor-

* Sono di tre generazioni cervelli: l'uno intende per se; l'altro intende quanto da altri gli è mostrò; e il terzo non intende nè per se stesso nè per dimostrazione di altri. Il Principe, c. xxii.
tant of those discoveries and improvements in the mechanic arts, which have numerically increased our population beyond what the wisest statesmen of Elizabeth's reign deemed possible, and again doubled this population virtually; the most important, I say, of those inventions that in their results

best uphold

War by her two main nerves, iron and gold—

had their origin not in the cabinets of statesmen, or in the practical insight of men of business, but in the visions of recluse genius. To the immense majority of men, even in civilized countries, speculative philosophy has ever been, and must ever remain, a terra incognita. Yet it is not the less true, that all the epoch-forming revolutions of the Christian world, the revolutions of religion and with them the civil, social, and domestic habits of the nations concerned, have coincided with the rise and fall of metaphysical systems.* So few are the minds that really govern the machine of society, and so incomparably more numerous and more important are the indirect consequences of things, than their foreseen and direct effects.

It is with nations as with individuals. In tranquil moods and peaceable times we are quite practical. Facts only and cool common sense are then in fashion. But let the winds of passion swell, and straightway men begin to generalize; to connect by remotest analogies; to express the most universal positions of reason in the most glowing figures of fancy; in short, to feel particular truths and mere facts, as poor, cold, narrow, and incommensurate with their feelings.

With his wonted fidelity to nature, our own great poet has placed the greater number of his profoundest maxims and general truths, both political and moral, not in the mouths of men at ease, but of men under the influence of passion, when the mighty thoughts overmaster and become the tyrants of the mind that has brought them forth. In his Lear, Othello, Macbeth, Hamlet, principles of deepest insight and widest interest fly off like sparks from the glowing iron under the loud forge-hammer.†

* This thought might also be applied to, and exemplified by, the successive epochs in the history of the Fine Arts from the tenth century. 1827.
† It seems a paradox only to the unthinking, and it is a fact that none, but the unread in history, will deny, that in periods of popular tumult and
A calm and detailed examination of the facts justifies me to my own mind in hazarding the bold assertion, that the fearful blunders of the late dread Revolution, and all the calamitous mistakes of its opponents from its commencement even to the era of loftier principles and wiser measures (an era, that began with, and ought to be named from, the war of the Spanish and Portuguese insurgents) every failure with all its gloomy results may be unanswerably deduced from the neglect of some maxim or other that had been established by clear reasoning and plain facts in the writings of Thucydides, Tacitus, Machiavel, Bacon, or Harrington. These are red-letter names even in the almanacs of worldly wisdom: and yet I dare challenge all the critical benches of infidelity to point out any one important truth, any one efficient practical direction or warning, which did not pre-exist (and for the most part in a sounder, more intelligible, and more comprehensive form) in the Bible.

In addition to this, the Hebrew legislator, and the other inspired poets, prophets, historians and moralists of the Jewish Church have two peculiar advantages in their favor. First, their particular rules and prescripts flow directly and visibly from universal principles, as from a fountain: they flow from principles and ideas that are not so properly said to be confirmed by reasons as innovation the more abstract a notion is, the more readily has it been found to combine, the closer has appeared its affinity, with the feelings of a people and with all their immediate impulses to action. At the commencement of the French Revolution, in the remotest villages every tongue was employed in echoing and enforcing the almost geometrical abstractions of the physiocratic politicians and economists. The public roads were crowded with armed enthusiasts disputing on the inalienable sovereignty of the people, the imprescriptible laws of the pure reason, and the universal constitution, which, as rising out of the nature and rights of man as man, all nations alike were under the obligation of adopting. Turn over the fugitive writings, that are still extant, of the age of Luther; peruse the pamphlets and loose sheets that came out in flights during the reign of Charles I. and the Republic; and you will find in these one continued comment on the aphorism of Lord Bacon (a man assuredly sufficiently acquainted with the extent of secret and personal influence), that the knowledge of the speculative principles of men in general between the age of twenty and thirty, is the one great source of political prophecy. And Sir Philip Sidney regarded the adoption of one set of principles in the Netherlands, as a proof of the divine agency, and the fountain of all the events and successes of that Revolution.
to be reason itself. Principles in act and procession, disjoined from which, and from the emotions that inevitably accompany the actual intuition of their truth, the widest maxims of prudence are like arms without hearts, muscles without nerves. Secondly, from the very nature of those principles, as taught in the Bible, they are understood in exact proportion as they are believed and felt. The regulator is never separated from the main-spring. For the words of the Apostle are literally and philosophically true: *We (that is the human race) live by faith.* Whatever we do or know that in kind is different from the brute creation, has its origin in a determination of the reason to have faith and trust in itself. This, its first act of faith, is scarcely less than identical with its own being. *Implicit,* it is the *copula*—it contains the possibility—of every position, to which there exists any correspondence in reality.* It is itself, therefore, the realizing principle, the spiritual *substratum* of the whole complex body of truths. This primal act of faith is enunciated in the word, God: a faith not derived from, but itself the ground and source of, experience, and without which the fleeting chaos of facts would no more form experience, than the dust of the grave can of itself make a living man. The imperative and oracular form of the inspired Scripture is the form of reason itself in all things purely rational and moral.

If Scripture be the word of Divine Wisdom, we might anticipate that it would in all things be distinguished from other books, as the Supreme Reason, whose knowledge is creative, and antecedent to the things known, as distinguished from the understanding, or creaturely mind of the individual, the acts of which are posterior to the things which it records and arranges. Man alone was created in the image of God: a position groundless and inexplicable, if the reason in man do not differ from the understanding. For this the inferior animals (many at least) possess in degree: and assuredly the divine image or idea is not a thing of degrees.

*I mean that, but for the confidence which we place in the assertions of our reason and conscience, we could have no certainty of the reality and actual outness of the material world. It might be affirmed that in what we call "sleep" every one has a dream of his own; and that in what we call "awake," whole communities dream nearly alike. It is—*is a sense of reason: the senses can only say—*It seems! 1827.*
Hence it follows that what is expressed in the Scriptures is implied in all absolute science. The latter whispers what the former utters as with the voice of a trumpet. *As sure as God liveth,* is the pledge and assurance of every positive truth, that is asserted by the reason. The human understanding musing on many things snatches at truth, but is frustrated and disheartened by the fluctuating nature of its objects;* its conclusions therefore are timid and uncertain, and it hath no way of giving permanence to things but by reducing them to abstractions. *Hardly do we guess a right at things that are upon earth, and with labor do we find the things that are before us; but all certain knowledge is in the power of God, and a presence from above.* So only have the ways of men been reformed, and every doctrine that contains a saving truth, and all acts pleasing to God (in other words, all actions consonant with human nature, in its original intention) are through wisdom; that is, the rational spirit of man.

This then is the prerogative of the Bible; this is the privilege of its believing students. With them the principle of knowledge is likewise a spring and principle of action. And as it is the only certain knowledge, so are the actions that flow from it the only ones on which a secure reliance can be placed. The understanding may suggest motives, may avail itself of motives, and make judicious conjectures respecting the probable consequences of actions. But the knowledge taught in the Scriptures produces the motives, involves the consequences; and its highest formula is still: *As sure as God liveth,* so will it be unto thee! Strange as this position will appear to such as forget that motives can be causes only in a secondary and improper sense, inasmuch as the man makes the motive, not the motives the man; yet all history bears evidence to its truth. The sense of expediency, the cautious balancing of comparative advantages, the constant wakefulness to the *Cui bono?*—in connection with the *Quid mihi?*—all these are in their places in the routine of conduct, by which

*Ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβηναὶ δις τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ θ' Ἡράκλειτον, οὕτως θνηθῆς οὐσίας δις ἄφασμα κατὰ ἐξίν ἄλλα δεξίητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς σκίθηναι καὶ πάλιν συνάγει, μάλλον δὲ οὐδὲ πάλιν οὐδὲ διότερον ἄλλα ἀμα συνίσταται καὶ ἀπολείπει, καὶ πρόσειται καὶ ἅπειτα δεδουν οὐδὲ εἰς τὸ εἶναι περαινεῖ τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτῆς τῷ μηδέποτε λήγειν, μηδ' ἵστασθαι τὴν γένεσιν, κ. τ. λ.

Plutarch's De El. apud Delphos s. xviii.
the individual provides for himself the real or supposed wants of
to-day and to-morrow: and in quiet times and prosperous circum-
stances a nation presents an aggregate of such individuals, a busy
ant-hill in calm and sunshine. By the happy organization of a
well-governed society the contradictory interests of ten millions of
such individuals may neutralize each other, and be reconciled in
the unity of the national interest. But whence did this happy
organization first come? Was it a tree transplanted from Para-
dise, with all its branches in full fruitage? Or was it sowed in
sunshine? Was it in vernal breezes and gentle rains that it
fixed its roots, and grew and strengthened? Let history answer
these questions. With blood was it planted; it was rocked in
tempests; the goat, the ass, and the stag gnawed it; the wild
boar has whetted his tusks on its bark. The deep scars are still
extant on its trunk, and the path of the lightning may be traced
among its higher branches. And even after its full growth, in
the season of its strength, when its height reached to the heaven,
and the sight thereof to all the earth, the whirlwind has more
than once forced its stately top to touch the ground: it has been
bent like a bow, and sprang back like a shaft. Mightier powers
were at work than expediency ever yet called up; yea, mightier
than the mere understanding can comprehend. One confirmation
of the latter assertion you may find in the history of our country,
written by the same Scotch philosopher who devoted his life to
the undermining of the Christian religion; and expended his last
breath in a blasphemous regret that he had not survived it;—by
the same heartless sophist who, in this island, was the main
pioneer of that atheistic philosophy, which in France trans-
venomed the natural thirst of truth into the hydrophobia of a
wild and homeless skepticism; the Elias of that Spirit of Anti-
christ, which

\[
\text{still promising}
\]
\[
\text{Freedom, itself too sensual to be free,}
\]
\[
\text{Poisons life's amities and cheats the soul}
\]
\[
\text{Of faith, and quiet hope and all that lifts}
\]
\[
\text{And all that soothes the spirit!}
\]

This inadequacy of the mere understanding to the apprehen-
sion of moral greatness we may trace in this historian's cool sys-
tematic attempt to steal away every feeling of reverence for every

* Poet. Works, VII. pp. 110, 111.—Ed.
great name by a scheme of motives, in which as often as possible
the efforts and enterprises of heroic spirits are attributed to this
or that paltry view of the most despicable selfishness. But in
the majority of instances this would have been too palpably false
and slanderous: and therefore the founders and martyrs of our
Church and Constitution, of our civil and religious liberty, are
represented as fanatics and bewildered enthusiasts. But his-
tories incomparably more authentic than Mr. Hume's (nay, spite
of himself even his own history) confirm by irrefragable evidence
the aphorism of ancient wisdom, that nothing great was ever
achieved without enthusiasm. For what is enthusiasm but the
oblivion and swallowing up of self in an object dearer than self;
or in an idea more vivid? How this is produced in the enthu-
siasm of wickedness, I have explained in the second Comment
annexed to this Discourse. But in the genuine enthusiasm of
morals, religion, and patriotism, this enlargement and elevation
of the soul above its mere self attest the presence, and accom-
pany the intuition, of ultimate principles alone. These alone can
interest the undegraded human spirit deeply and enduringly, be-
cause these alone belong to its essence, and will remain with it
permanently.

Notions, the depthless abstractions of fleeting phænomena, the
shadows of sailing vapors, the colorless repetitions of rainbows,
have effected their utmost when they have added to the distinct-
ness of our knowledge. For this very cause they are of them-
selves adverse to lofty emotion, and it requires the influence of a
light and warmth, not their own, to make them crystallize into a
semblance of growth. But every principle is actualized by an
idea; and every idea is living, productive, partaketh of infinity,
and (as Bacon has sublimely observed) containeth an endless
power of semination. Hence it is, that science, which consists
wholly in ideas and principles, is power. Scientia et potentia
(saith the same philosopher) in idem coincidunt. Hence too it
is, that notions, linked arguments, reference to particular facts
and calculations of prudence, influence only the comparatively
few, the men of leisurely minds who have been trained up to
them: and even these few they influence but faintly. But for
the reverse, I appeal to the general character of the doctrines
which have collected the most numerous sects, and acted upon
the moral being of the converts with a force that might well
seem supernatural. The great principles of our religion, the sublime ideas spoken out everywhere in the Old and New Testament, resemble the fixed stars, which appear of the same size to the naked as to the armed eye; the magnitude of which the telescope may rather seem to diminish than to increase. At the announcement of principles, of ideas, the soul of man awakes and starts up, as an exile in a far distant land at the unexpected sounds of his native language, when after long years of absence, and almost of oblivion, he is suddenly addressed in his own mother-tongue. He weeps for joy, and embraces the speaker as his brother. How else can we explain the fact so honorable to Great Britain, that the poorest amongst us will contend with as much enthusiasm as the richest for the rights of property? These rights are the spheres and necessary conditions of free agency. But free agency contains the idea of the free will; and in this he intuitively knows the sublimity, and the infinite hopes, fears, and capabilities of his own nature. On what other ground but the cognateness of ideas and principles to man as man does the nameless soldier rush to the combat in defence of the liberties or the honor of his country?—Even men woful neglectful of the principles of religion will shed their blood for its truth.

Alas!—the main hindrance to the use of the Scriptures, as your manual, lies in the notion that you are already acquainted with its contents. Something new must be presented to you, wholly new and wholly out of yourselves; for whatever is within us must be as old as the first dawn of human reason. Truths of all others the most awful and mysterious and at the same time of universal interest are considered so true as to lose all the powers of truth, and lie bed-ridden in the dormitory of the soul, side by side with the most despised and exploded errors. But it should not be so with you! The pride of education, the sense of consistency should preclude the objection: for would you not be ashamed to apply it to the works of Tacitus, or of Shakspeare? Above all, the rank which you hold, the influence you possess, the powers you may be called to wield, give a special unfitness to this frivolous craving for novelty. To find no contradiction in

* The reader will remember the anecdote told with so much humor in Goldsmith’s Essay. But this is not the first instance where the mind in its hour of meditation finds matter of admiration and elevating thought in circumstances that in a different mood had excited his mirth.
the union of old and new, to contemplate the Ancient of days, his words and his works, with a feeling as fresh as if they were now first springing forth at his fiat—this characterizes the minds that feel the riddle of the world and may help to unravel it. This, most of all things, will raise you above the mass of mankind, and therefore will best entitle and qualify you to guide and control them. You say, you are already familiar with the Scriptures. With the words, perhaps, but in any other sense you might as wisely boast of your familiar acquaintance with the rays of the sun, and under that pretence turn away your eyes from the light of heaven.

Or would you wish for authorities, for great examples? You may find them in the writings of Thuanus, of Clarendon, of More, of Raleigh; and in the life and letters of the heroic Gustavus Adolphus. But these, though eminent statesmen, were Christians, and might lie under the thralldom of habit and prejudice. I will refer you then to authorities of two great men, both pagans; but removed from each other by many centuries, and not more distant in their ages than in their characters and situations. The first shall be that of Heraclitus, the sad and recluse philosopher. Πολυμαθίη νό̂ον ὸδ διδάσκει. Σιβύλλα δέ μανομένη στόματι ἀγελασία καὶ ἀκαλλάπησια καὶ ἀμφίβοτα φθογγομένη χιλίων ἕτων ἑξειπεῖται τῇ φωνῇ διὰ τὸν θεόν.* Shall we hesitate to apply to the prophets of God, what could be affirmed of the Sibyls by a philosopher whom Socrates, the prince of philosophers, venerated for the profundity of his wisdom?

For the other, I will refer you to the darling of the polished court of Augustus, to the man whose works have been in all ages deemed the models of good sense, and are still the pocket companions of those who pride themselves on uniting the scholar

* Multiscience (or a variety and quantity of acquired knowledge) does not teach intelligence. But the Sibyl with wild enthusiastic mouth shrilling forth unmirthful, inornate, and unperfumed truths, reaches to a thousand years, with her voice through the power of God.

---Not hers
To win the sense by words of rhetoric,
Lip-blossoms breathing perishable sweets;
But by the power of the informing Word
Roll sounding onward through a thousand years
Her deep prophetic bodements.

Lit. Rem. V. p. 268.—Ed.
with the gentleman. This accomplished man of the world has given an account of the subjects of conversation between the illustrious statesmen who governed, and the brightest luminaries who then adorned, the empire of the civilized world:

Sermo oritur non de villis domibus alienis
Nec, male nec ne Lepos saltet. Sed quod magis ad nos
Pertinet, et nescire malum est, agitamus: utrum ne
Divitiis homines, an sint virtute beati;
Et quod sit natura boni, summumque quid ejus.*

Berkeley indeed asserts, and is supported in his assertion by the great statesmen, Lord Bacon and Sir Walter Raleigh, that without an habitual interest in these subjects a man may be a dextrous intriguer, but never can be a statesman.

But do you require some one or more particular passage from the Bible, that may at once illustrate and exemplify its applicability to the changes and fortunes of empires? Of the numerous chapters that relate to the Jewish tribes, their enemies and allies, before and after their division into two kingdoms, it would be more difficult to state a single one from which some guiding light might not be struck. And in nothing is Scriptural history more strongly contrasted with the histories of highest note in the present age, than in its freedom from the hollowness of abstractions. While the latter present a shadow-fight of things and quantities, the former gives us the history of men, and balances the important influence of individual minds with the previous state of the national morals and manners, in which, as constituting a specific susceptibility, it presents to us the true cause both of the influence itself, and of the weal or woe that were its consequents. How should it be otherwise? The histories and political economy of the present and preceding century partake in the general contagion of its mechanic philosophy, and are the product of an unenlightened generalizing understanding. In the Scriptures they are the living educts of the imagination; of that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the reason in images of the sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors. These

* Hor. Serm. ii. t. 6, 71, dec.
are the wheels which Ezekiel beheld, when the hand of the Lord was upon him, and he saw visions of God as he sate among the captives by the river of Chebar. *Whithersoever the Spirit was to go, the wheels went, and thither was their spirit to go:*—*for the spirit of the living creature was in the wheels also.* The truths and the symbols that represent them move in conjunction and form the living chariot that bears up (for us) the throne of the Divine Humanity. Hence, by a derivative, indeed, but not a divided, influence, and though in a secondary yet in more than a metaphorical sense, the Sacred Book is worthily entitled the *Word of God.* Hence too, its contents present to us the stream of time continuous as life and a symbol of eternity, inasmuch as the past and the future are virtually contained in the present. According therefore to our relative position on the banks of this stream the Sacred History becomes prophetic, the Sacred Prophecies historical, while the power and substance of both inhere in its laws, its promises, and its comminations. In the Scriptures therefore both facts and persons must of necessity have a twofold significance, a past and a future, a temporary and a perpetual, a particular and a universal application. They must be at once portraits and ideals.

*Eheu! paupertina philosophia in paupertinam religionem ducit:*—A hunger-bitten and idea-less philosophy naturally produces a starveling and comfortless religion. It is among the miseries of the present age that it recognizes no medium between literal and metaphorical. Faith is either to be buried in the dead letter, or its name and honors usurped by a counterfeit product of the mechanical understanding, which in the blindness of self-complacency confounds symbols with allegories. Now an allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language, which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a symbol (σύμβολον ἀληθινόν) is characterized by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special, or of the universal in the general; above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal. It always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a

*Ezek. i. 20.*
living part in that unity of which it is the representative. The other are but empty echoes which the fancy arbitrarily associates with apparitions of matter, less beautiful but not less shadowy than the sloping orchard or hill-side pasture-field seen in the transparent lake below. Alas, for the flocks that are to be led forth to such pastures! *It shall even be as when a hungry man dreameth, and behold, he eateth; but he awaketh and his soul is empty: or as when a thirsty man dreameth, and behold he drinketh; but he awaketh and behold, he is faint!* O! that we would seek for the bread which was given from heaven, that we should eat thereof and be strengthened! O that we would draw at the well at which the flocks of our forefathers had living water drawn for them, even that water which, instead of mocking the thirst of him to whom it is given, becomes a well within himself springing up to life everlasting!

When we reflect how large a part of our present knowledge and civilization is owing, directly or indirectly, to the Bible; when we are compelled to admit, as a fact of history, that the Bible has been the main lever by which the moral and intellectual character of Europe has been raised to its present comparative height; we should be struck, methinks, by the marked and prominent difference of this book from the works which it is now the fashion to quote as guides and authorities in morals, politics, and history. I will point out a few of the excellences by which the one is distinguished, and shall leave it to your own judgment and recollection to perceive and apply the contrast to the productions of highest name in these latter days. In the Bible every agent appears and acts as a self-subsisting individual; each has a life of its own, and yet all are one life. The elements of necessity and free-will are reconciled in the higher power of an omnipresent Providence, that predestinates the whole in the moral freedom of the integral parts. Of this the Bible never suffers us to lose sight. The root is never detached from the ground. It is God everywhere: and all creatures conform to his decrees, the righteous by performance of the law, the disobedient by the sufferance of the penalty.

Suffer me to inform or remind you, that there is a threefold necessity. There is a logical, and there is a mathematical necessity; but the latter is always hypothetical, and both subsist

* Is. xxix. 8.—Ed.
formally only, not in any real object. Only by the intuition and immediate spiritual consciousness of the idea of God, as the One and Absolute, at once the ground and the cause, who alone containeth in himself the ground of his own nature, and therein of all natures, do we arrive at the third, which alone is a real objective, necessity. Here the immediate consciousness decides: the idea is its own evidence, and is insusceptible of all other. It is necessarily groundless and indemonstrable; because it is itself the ground of all possible demonstration. The reason hath faith in itself in its own revelations. Ο λόγος ἐφη. Ipse dixit. So it is: for it is so. All the necessity of causal relations (which the mere understanding reduces, and must reduce to co-existence and regular succession* in the objects of which they are predicated, and to habit and association in the mind predicating) depends on, or rather inheres in, the idea of the omnipresent and absolute: for this it is, in which the possible is one and the same with the real and the necessary. Herein the Bible differs from all the books of Greek philosophy, and in a two-fold manner. It doth not affirm a divine nature only, but a God: and not a God only, but the living God. Hence in the Scriptures alone is the jus divinum, or direct relation of the state and its magistracy to the Supreme Being, taught as a vital and indispensable part of all moral and of all political wisdom, even as the Jewish alone was a true theocracy.

Were it my object to touch on the present state of public affairs in this kingdom, or on the prospective measures in agitation respecting our sister island, I would direct your most serious meditation to the latter period of the reign of Solomon, and to the revolutions in the reign of Rehoboam, his successor. But I should tread on glowing embers. I will turn to a subject on which all men of reflection are at length in agreement—the causes of the Revolution and fearful chastisement of France. We have learned to trace them back to the rising importance of the commercial and manufacturing class, and its incompatibility with the old feudal privileges and prescriptions; to the spirit of sensuality and ostentation, which from the court had spread through all the towns and cities of the kingdom; to the predominance of a presumptuous and irreligious philosophy; to the extreme over-

* See Hume's Essays. The sophist evades, as Cicero long ago remarked, the better half of the predicament, which is not praetio but efficienter praemire.
rating of the knowledge and power given by the improvements of the arts and sciences, especially those of astronomy, mechanics, and a wonder-working chemistry; to an assumption of prophetic power, and the general conceit that states and governments might be and ought to be constructed as machines, every movement of which might be foreseen and taken into previous calculation; to the consequent multitude of plans and constitutions, of planners and constitution-makers, and the remorseless arrogance with which the authors and proselytes of every new proposal were ready to realize it, be the cost what it might in the established rights, or even in the lives, of men; in short, to restlessness, presumption, sensual indulgence, and the idolatrous reliance on false philosophy in the whole domestic, social, and political life of the stirring and effective part of the community: these all acting, at once and together, on a mass of materials supplied by the unfeeling extravagance and oppressions of the government, which showed no mercy, and very heavily laid its yoke.

Turn then to the chapter from which the last words were cited, and read the following seven verses; and I am deceived if you will not be compelled to admit that the Prophet revealed the true philosophy of the French revolution more than two thousand years before it became a sad irrevocable truth of history. And thou saidst, I shall be a lady forever: so that thou didst not lay these things to thy heart, neither didst remember the latter end of it. Therefore, hear now this, thou that art given to pleasures, that dwellest carelessly, that sayest in thine heart, I am, and none else beside me! I shall not sit as a widow, neither shall I know the loss of children. But these two things shall come to thee in a moment, in one day; the loss of children, and widowhood; they shall come upon thee in their perfection, for the multitude of thy sorceries, and for the great abundance of thine enchantments. For thou hast trusted in thy wickedness; thou hast said, None seeth me. Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, it hath perverted thee; and thou hast said in thine heart, I am, and none else beside me. Therefore shall evil come upon thee, thou shalt not know* from whence it riseth: and

* The reader will scarcely fail to find in this verse a remembrancer of the sudden setting-in of the frost, a fortnight before the usual time (in a country too where the commencement of the two seasons is in general scarcely less regular than that of the wet and dry seasons between the trop-
mischief shall fall upon thee, thou shalt not be able to put it off; and desolation shall come upon thee suddenly, which thou shalt not know. Stand now with thine enchantments, and with the multitude of thy sorceries, wherein thou hast labored from thy youth; if so be thou shalt be able to profit, if so be thou mayest prevail. Thou art wearied in the multitude of thy counsels. Let now the astrologers, the stargazers, the monthly prognosticators stand up, and save thee from these things that shall come upon thee. (Is. xlvi. 7, &c.)

There is a grace that would enable us to take up vipers, and the evil thing shall not hurt us: a spiritual alchemy which can transmute poisons into a panacea. We are counselled by our Lord himself to make unto ourselves friends of the Mammon of unrighteousness: and in this age of sharp contrasts and grotesque combinations it would be a wise method of sympathizing with the tone and spirit of the times, if we elevated even our daily newspapers and political journals into comments on the Bible.

When I named this Essay a Sermon, I sought to prepare the inquirers after it for the absence of all the usual softening suggested by worldly prudence, of all compromise between truth and courtesy. But not even as a sermon would I have addressed the present discourse to a promiscuous audience; and for this reason I likewise announced it in the title-page, as exclusively ad clerum; that is (in the old and wide sense of the word), to men of clerkly acquirements of whatever profession. I would that the greater part of our publications could be thus directed, each to its appropriate class of readers. But this can not be. For among other odd burs and kecksies, the misgrowth of our luxuriant activity, we have now a Reading Public*—as strange

* Some participle passive in the diminutive form, Eruditiorum Natio for instance, might seem at first sight a fuller and more exact designation; but the superior force and humor of the former become evident whenever
a phrase, methinks, as ever forced a spleenetic smile on the staid countenance of meditation; and yet no fiction. For our readers have, in good truth, multiplied exceedingly, and have waxed proud. It would require the intrepid accuracy of a Colquhoun to venture at the precise number of that vast company only, whose heads and hearts are dieted at the two public ordinaries of literature, the circulating libraries and the periodical press. But what is the result? Does the inward man thrive on this regimen? Alas! if the average health of the consumers may be judged of by the articles of largest consumption; if the secretions may be conjectured from the ingredients of the dishes that are found best suited to their palates; from all that I have seen, either of the banquet or the guests, I shall utter my profaccia with a desponding sigh. From a popular philosophy and a philosophic populace, Good Sense deliver us!

At present, however, I am to imagine for myself a very differ-

the phrase occurs as a step or stair in a climax of irony. By way of example take the following sentences, transcribed from a work demonstrating that the New Testament was intended exclusively for the primitive converts from Judaism, was accommodated to their prejudices, and is of no authority, as a rule of faith, for Christians in general. "The Reading Public in this enlightened age and thinking nation, by its favorable reception of liberal ideas, has long demonstrated the benign influence of that profound philosophy which has already emancipated us from so many absurd prejudices held in superstitious awe by our deluded forefathers. But the dark age yielded at length to the dawning light of reason and common sense at the glorious, though imperfect, Revolution. The people can be no longer duped or scared out of their imprescriptible and inalienable right to judge and decide for themselves on all important questions of government and religion. The scholastic jargon of jarring articles and metaphysical creeds may continue for a time to deform our Church-establishment; and like the grotesque figures in the niches of our old Gothic cathedrals, may serve to remind the nation of its former barbarism; but the universal suffrage of a free and enlightened Public," &c. &c.

Among the revolutions worthy of notice, the change in the nature of the introductory sentences and prefatory matter in serious books is not the least striking. The same gross flattery which disgusts us in the dedications to individuals in the elder writers, is now transferred to the nation at large, or the Reading Public: while the Jeremiads of our old moralists, and their angry denunciations concerning the ignorance, immorality, and irreligion of the People, appear (mutatis mutandis, and with an appeal to the worst passions, envy, discontent, scorn, vindictiveness) in the shape of bitter libels on ministers, parliament, the clergy: in short, on the State and Church, and all persons employed in them.
ent audience. I appeal exclusively to men, from whose station and opportunities I may dare to anticipate a respectable portion of that sound book-learnedness, into which our old public schools still continue to initiate their pupils. I appeal to men in whom I may hope to find, if not philosophy, yet occasional impulses at least to philosophic thought. And here, as far as my own experience extends, I can announce one favorable symptom. The notion of our measureless superiority in good sense to our ancestors, so general at the commencement of the French Revolution, and for some years before it, is out of fashion. We hear, at least, less of the jargon of this enlightened age. After fatiguing itself, as performer or spectator in the giddy figure-dance of political changes, Europe has seen the shallow foundations of its self-complacent faith give way; and among men of influence and property, we have now more reason to apprehend the stupor of despondence, than the extravagances of hope, unsustained by experience or of self-confidence not bottomed on principle.

In this rank of life the danger lies, not in any tendency to innovation, but in the choice of the means for preventing it. And here my apprehensions point to two opposite errors; each of which deserves a separate notice. The first consists in a disposition to think, that as the peace of nations has been disturbed by the diffusion of a false light, it may be re-established by excluding the people from all knowledge and all prospect of amelioration. O! never, never! Reflection and stirrings of mind, with all their restlessness, and all the errors that result from their imperfection, from the Too much, because Too little, are come into the world. The powers that awaken and foster the spirit of curiosity are to be found in every village: books are in every hovel. The infant's cries are hushed with picture-books: and the cottager's child sheds his first bitter tears over pages, which render it impossible for the man to be treated or governed as a child. Here as in so many other cases, the inconveniences that have arisen from a thing's having become too general are best removed by making it universal.

The other and contrary mistake proceeds from the assumption, that a national education will have been realized whenever the people at large have been taught to read and write. Now among the many means to the desired end, this is doubtless one, and not the least important. But neither is it the most so.
Much less can it be considered to constitute education, which consists in educing the faculties and forming the habits; the means varying according to the sphere in which the individuals to be educated are likely to act and become useful. I do not hesitate to declare, that whether I consider the nature of the discipline adopted,* or the plan of poisoning the children of the poor with a sort of potential infidelity under the "liberal idea" of teaching those points only of religious faith, in which all denominations agree, I can not but denounce the so-called Lancasterian schools as pernicious beyond all power of compensation by the new acquirement of reading and writing. But take even Dr. Bell's original and unsophisticated plan, which I myself regard as an especial gift of Providence to the human race; and suppose this incomparable machine, this vast moral steam-engine, to have been adopted and in free motion throughout the Empire; it would yet appear to me a most dangerous delusion to rely on it as if this of itself formed an efficient national education. We can not, I repeat, honor the scheme too highly as a prominent and necessary part of the great process; but it will neither supersede nor can it be substituted for sundry other measures, that are at least equally important. And these are such measures, too, as unfortunately involve the necessity of sacrifices on the side of the rich and powerful more costly and far more difficult than the yearly subscription of a few pounds;—such measures as demand more self-denial than the expenditure of time in a committee or of eloquence in a public meeting.

Nay, let Dr. Bell's philanthropic end have been realized, and the proposed *modicum* of learning have become universal; yet convinced of its insufficiency to stem the strong currents set in from an opposite point, I dare not assure myself that it may not be driven backward by them and become confluent with the evils which it was intended to preclude.†

* See Mr. Southey's Tract on the New or Madras system of education; especially toward the conclusion, where with exquisite humor as well as with his usual poignancy of wit he has detailed Joseph Lancaster's disciplinarian inventions. But even in the schools, that used to be called Lancasterian, these are, I believe, discontinued. The true perfection of discipline in a school is—the *maximum* of watchfulness with the *minimum* of punishment.

† See the Report of the House of Commons' Committee on the increase
What other measures I had in contemplation, it has been my endeavor to explain elsewhere. But I am greatly deceived, if one preliminary to an efficient education of the laboring classes be not the recurrence to a more manly discipline of the intellect on the part of the learned themselves, in short a thorough re-casting of the moulds, in which the minds of our gentry, the characters of our future land-owners, magistrates and senators are to receive their shape and fashion. O what treasures of practical wisdom would be once more brought into open day by the solution of this problem! Suffice it for the present to hint the master-thought. The first man, on whom the light of an idea dawned, did in that same moment receive the spirit and credentials of a lawgiver: and as long as man shall exist, so long will the possession of that antecedent knowledge (the maker and master of all profitable experience) which exists only in the power of an idea, be the one lawful qualification of all dominion in the world of the senses. Without this, experience itself is but a Cyclops walking backwards under the fascination of the past; and we are indebted to a lucky coincidence of outward circumstances and contingencies, least of all things to be calculated on in times like the present, if this one-eyed experience does not seduce its worshipper into practical anachronisms.

But alas! the halls of old philosophy have been so long deserted, that we circle them at shy distance as the haunt of phantoms and chimaeras.* The sacred grove of Academus is holden in like regard with the unfoodful trees in the shadowy world of Maro that had a dream attached to every leaf. The very terms of ancient wisdom are worn out, or (far worse!) stamped on baser metal: and whoever should have the hardihood to reproclaim its solemn truths must commence with a glossary.

In reviewing the foregoing pages, I am apprehensive that they may be thought to resemble the overflow of an earnest mind rather than an orderly premeditated composition. Yet this imperfection of form will not be altogether uncompensated, if it should be the means of presenting with greater liveliness the feelings and impressions under which they were written. Still less shall I regret this defect if it should induce some future of crime;—within the last twenty years quintupled over all England, and in several counties decupled. 28th September, 1828.

* See App. (E.)—Ed.
traveller engaged in the like journey to take the same station and to look through the same medium at the one main object which amid all my discursions I have still kept in view. The more, however, doth it behoove me not to conclude this address without attempting to recapitulate in as few and as plain words as possible the sum and substance of its contents.

There is a state of mind indispensable for all perusal of the Scriptures to edification, which must be learned by experience, and can be described only by negatives. It is the direct opposite of that which, if a moral passage of Scripture were cited, would prompt a man to reply, "Who does not know this?" But if the quotation should have been made in support of some article of faith, this same habit of mind will betray itself in different individuals, by apparent contraries, which yet are but the two poles, or plus and minus states, of the same influence. The latter, or the negative, pole may be suspected, as often as you hear a comment on some high and doctrinal text introduced with the words, "It only means so and so!" For instance, I object to a professed free-thinking Christian the following solemn enunciation of the riches of the glory of the mystery hid from ages and from generations by the philosophic Apostle of the Gentiles:—Who (namely, the Father) hath delivered us from the power of darkness and hath translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son: In whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins: Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature: For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him, and for him: And he is before all things, and by him all things consist. And he is the head of the body, the Church: who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead; that in all things he might have the pre-eminence. For it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell: And, having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven. Col. i. 13, &c. What is the reply?—Why, that by these words (very

* A mistaken translation. The words should be: Begotten before any kind of creation; and even this does not convey the full sense of the superlative, πρωτότοκος. (See Table Talk, VI. 478, (note.)—Ed.)
bold and figurative words it must be confessed, yet still) St. Paul only meant that the universal and eternal truths of morality and a future state had been reproclaimed by an inspired teacher and confirmed by miracles! The words only mean, Sir, that a state of retribution after this life had been proved by the fact of Christ's resurrection—that is all!

Of the positive pole, on the other hand, language to the following purport is the usual exponent. "It is a mystery: and we are bound to believe the words without presuming to inquire into the meaning of them." That is, we believe in St. Paul's veracity; and that is enough. Yet St. Paul repeatedly presses on his hearers that thoughtful perusal of the Sacred Writings, and those habits of earnest though humble inquiry which, if the heart only have been previously regenerated, would lead them to a full assurance of understanding εἰς ἑπτήμωσιν, (to an entire assent of the mind; to a spiritual intuition, or positive inward knowledge by experience) of the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ, in which (νεμπε, μνημησα) are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. Col. ii. 2, 3.

To expose the inconsistency of both these extremes, and by inference to recommend that state of mind, which looks forward to the fellowship of the mystery of the faith as a spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of God, the eyes of the understanding being enlightened (Eph. i. 17-18)— this formed my general purpose. Long has it been at my heart! I consider it as the contra-distinguishing principle of Christianity that in it alone πᾶς πλούτος τῆς πληροφορίας τῆς συνέσεως (the understanding in its utmost power and opulence) culminates in faith, as in its crown of glory, at once its light and its remuneration. On this most important point I attempted long ago to preclude, if possible, all misconception and misinterpretation of my opinions. Alas! in this time of distress and embarrassment the sentiments have a more especial interest, a more immediate application, than

* But I shall scarcely obtain an answer to certain difficulties involved in this free and liberal interpretation: for example, that with the exception of a handful of rich men considered as little better than infidels, the Jews were as fully persuaded of these truths as Christians in general are at the present day. Moreover that this inspired teacher had himself declared that if the Jews did not believe on the evidence of Moses and the Prophets, neither would they though a man should rise from the dead.
when they were first written. If (I observed)* it be a truth attested alike by common feeling and common sense, that the greater part of human misery depends directly on human vices, and the remainder indirectly, by what means can we act on men, so as to remove or preclude their vices and purify their principles of moral election? The question is not by what means each man is to alter his own character;—in order to this, all the means prescribed, and all the aidances given by religion may be necessary for him. Vain of themselves may be—

The sayings of the wise
In ancient and in modern books enroll'd

Unless he feel within
Some source of consolation from above,
Secret refreshings, that repair his strength,
And fainting spirits uphold. SAMSON AGONISTES.

This is not the question. Virtue would not be virtue could it be given by one fellow-creature to another. To make use of all the means and appliances in our power to the actual attainment of rectitude, is the abstract of the duty which we owe to ourselves: to supply those means as far as we can, comprises our duty to others. The question then is, what are these means? Can they be any other than the communication of knowledge and the removal of those evils and impediments which prevent its reception? It may not be in our power to combine both, but it is in the power of every man to contribute to the former, who is sufficiently informed to feel that it is his duty. If it be said, that we should endeavor not so much to remove ignorance, as to make the ignorant religious: religion herself through her sacred oracles answers for me, that all effective faith pre-supposes knowledge and individual conviction. If the mere acquiescence in truth, uncomprehended and unfathomed, were sufficient, few indeed would be the vicious and the miserable, in this country at least where speculative infidelity is, Heaven be praised! confined to a small number. Like bodily deformity, there is one instance here and another there; but three in one place are already an undue proportion. It is highly worthy of observation that the inspired Writings received by Christians are distinguishable from all other books pretending to inspiration, from the scriptures of the Bra-

* The Friend, II. p. 99.—Ed.
A LAY SERMON.

mins, and even from the Koran, in their strong and frequent recommendations of truth. I do not here mean veracity, which can not but be enforced in every code which appeals to the religious principle of man; but knowledge. This is not only extolled as the crown and honor of a man, but to seek after it is again and again commanded us as one of our most sacred duties. Yes, the very perfection and final bliss of the glorified spirit is represented by the Apostle as a plain aspect or intuitive beholding of truth in its eternal and immutable source. Not that knowledge can of itself do all. The light of religion is not that of the moon, light without heat; but neither is its warmth that of the stove, warmth without light. Religion is the sun whose warmth indeed swells, and stirs, and actuates the life of nature, but who at the same time beholds all the growth of life with a master-eye, makes all objects glorious on which he looks, and by that glory visible to others.

For this cause I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that he would grant you according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that ye being rooted and grounded in love, may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height; and to know the love of Christ which passeth all knowledge, that ye might be filled with the fulness of God. (Eph. iii. 14-19.) For to know God is (by a vital and spiritual act in which to know and to possess are one and indivisible)—to know God, I say, is—to acknowledge him as the infinite clearness in the incomprehensible fulness, and fulness incomprehensible with infinite clearness.

This, then, comprises my first purpose, which is in a two-fold sense general: for in the substance, if not in the form, it belongs to all my countrymen and fellow-Christians without distinction of class, while for its object it embraces the whole of the inspired Scriptures from the recorded first day of heaven and earth, ere the light was yet gathered into celestial lamps or reflected from their revolving mirrors, to the predicted Sabbath of the new creation, when heaven and earth shall have become one city with neither sun nor moon to shine in it; for the glory of God shall lighten it and the Lamb be the light thereof. My second purpose is after the same manner in a two-fold sense specific: for
as this Sermon is nominally addressed to, so was it for the greater part exclusively intended for, the perusal of the learned: and its object likewise is to urge men so qualified to apply their powers and attainments to an especial study of the Old Testament as teaching the elements of political science.

It is asked, in what sense I use these words? I answer: in the same sense as the terms are employed when we refer to Euclid for the elements of the science of geometry, only with one difference arising from the diversity of the subject. With one difference only; but that one how momentous! All other sciences are confined to abstractions, unless when the term science is used in an improper and flattering sense.—Thus we may speak without boast of natural history; but we have not yet attained to a science of nature. The Bible alone contains a science of realities: and therefore each of its elements is at the same time a living germ, in which the present involves the future, and in the finite the infinite exists potentially. That hidden mystery in every the minutest form of existence, which contemplated under the relations of time presents itself to the understanding retrospectively, as an infinite ascent of causes, and prospectively as an interminable progression of effects;—that which contemplated in space is beholden intuitively as a law of action and re-action, continuous and extending beyond all bound;—this same mystery freed from the phenomena of time and space, and seen in the depth of real being, reveals itself to the pure reason as the actual immanence or in-being* of all in each. Are we struck with admiration at beholding the cope of heaven imaged in a dew-drop? The least of the animalcule to which that drop would be an ocean, contains in itself an infinite problem of which God omnipresent is the only solution. The slave of custom is roused by the rare and the accidental alone; but the axioms of the unthinking are to the philosopher the deepest problems as being the nearest to the mysterious root, and partaking at once of its darkness and its pregnancy.

O what a mine of undiscovered treasures, what a new world of power and truth would the Bible promise to our future meditation, if in some gracious moment one solitary text of all its inspired contents should but dawn upon us in the pure untroubled

* In-being is the word chosen by Bishop Sherlock to express this sense. See his Tract on the Athanasian Creed. 1827.
brightness of an idea, that most glorious birth of the God-like within us, which even as the light, its material symbol, reflects itself from a thousand surfaces, and flies homeward to its Parent Mind enriched with a thousand forms, itself above form and still remaining in its own simplicity and identity! O for a flash of that same light, in which the first position of geometric science that ever loosed itself from the generalizations of a groping and insecure experience, for the first time revealed itself to a human intellect in all its evidence and all its fruitfulness, transparency without vacancy, and plenitude without opacity! O that a single gleam of our own inward experience would make comprehensible to us the rapturous Eureka, and the grateful hecatomb, of the philosopher of Samos;—or that vision which from the contemplation of an arithmetical harmony rose to the eye of Kepler, presenting the planetary world, and all its orbits in the divine order of their ranks and distances;—or which, in the falling of an apple, revealed to the ethereal intuition of our own Newton the constructive principle of the material universe. The promises which I have ventured to hold forth concerning the hidden treasures of the Law and the Prophets will neither be condemned as paradox or as exaggeration by the mind that has learned to understand the possibility, that the reduction of the sands of the sea to number should be found a less stupendous problem by Archimedes than the simple conception of the Parmenidean One. What however is achievable by the human understanding without this light, may be comprised in the epithet, κενοποιητικός: and a melancholy comment on that phrase would the history of human cabinets and legislators for the last thirty years furnish! The excellent Barrow, the last of the disciples of Plato and Archimedes among our modern mathematicians, shall give the description and state the value: and in his words I shall conclude.

"Aliud agere, to be impertinently busy, doing that which conduceth to no good purpose, is in some respect worse than to do nothing. Of such industry we may understand that of the Preacher, The labor of the foolish wearrieth every one of them."
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX,
CONTAINING COMMENTS AND ESSAYS.

(A.)

In this use of the word 'sufficiency,' I pre-suppose on the part of the reader or hearer an humble and docile state of mind, and above all the practice of prayer, as the necessary condition of such a state, and the best if not the only means of becoming sincere to our own hearts. Christianity is especially differenced from all other religions by being grounded on facts which all men alike have the same means of ascertaining with equal facility, and which no man can ascertain for another. Each person must be herein querist and respondent to himself; Am I sick, and therefore need a physician?—Am I in spiritual slavery, and therefore need a ransomer?—Have I given a pledge, which must be redeemed, and which I can not redeem by my own resources?—Am I at one with God, and is my will concentric with that holy power, which is at once the constitutive will and the supreme reason of the universe?—If not, must I not be mad if I do not seek, and miserable if I do not discover and embrace, the means of atonement?* To collect, to weigh, and to appreciate historical proofs and presumptions is not equally within the means and opportunities of every man. The testimony of books of history is one of the strong and stately pillars of the Church of Christ; but it is not the foundation, nor can it without loss of essential faith be mistaken or substituted for the foundation. There is a sect, which in its scornful pride of antipathy to mysteries (that is, to all those doctrines of the pure and intuitive reason, which transcend the understanding, and can never be contemplated by it, but through a false and falsifying perspective) affects to condemn all inward and preliminary experience as enthusiastic delusion or fanatical contagion. Historic evidence, on the other hand, these men treat, as the Jews of old treated the brazen

* This is a mistaken etymology, and consequently a dull, though unintentional, pun. Our atone is, doubtless, of the same stock with the Teutonic ausählen, verstehen, the Anglo-Saxon taking the t for the s.
serpent, which was the relic and evidence of the miracles worked by Moses in the wilderness. They turned it into an idol: and therefore Hezekiah (who clave to the Lord, and did right in the sight of the Lord, so that after him was none like him, among all the kings of Judah, nor any that were before him) not only removed the high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves; but likewise brake in pieces the brazen serpent that Moses had made: for the children of Israel did burn incense to it. (2 Kings xviii.)

To preclude an error so pernicious, I request that to the wilful neglect of those outward ministrations of the word which all Englishmen have the privilege of attending, the reader will add the setting at naught likewise of those inward means of grace, without which the language of the Scriptures, in the most faithful translation and in the purest and plainest English, must nevertheless continue to be a dead language,—a sun-dial by moonlight.

(B.)

Reason and Religion differ only as a two-fold application of the same power. But if we are obliged to distinguish, we must ideally separate. In this sense I affirm that reason is the knowledge of the laws of the whole considered as one; and as such it is contra-distinquished from the understanding, which concerns itself exclusively with the quantities, qualities, and relations of particulars in time and space. The understanding, therefore, is the science of phænomena, and of their subsumption under distinct kinds and sorts (genera and species). Its functions supply the rules and constitute the possibility of experience; but remain mere logical forms except as far as materials are given by the sense or sensations. The reason, on the other hand, is the science of the universal, having the ideas of oneness and allness as its two elements or primary factors. In the language of the old Schools,

\[
\text{Unity} + \text{Omneity} = \text{Totality}.
\]

The reason first manifests itself in man by the tendency to the comprehension of all as one. We can neither rest in an infinite that is not at the same time a whole, nor in a whole that is not infinite. Hence the natural man is always in a state either of resistance or of captivity to the understanding and the fancy, which can not represent totality without limit: and he either loses the one in the striving after the infinite, that is, atheism with or without polytheism, or he loses the infinite in the striving after the one, and then sinks into anthropomorphic monotheism.

The rational intellect, therefore, taken abstractedly and unbalanced, did, in itself (ye shall be as Gods, Gen. iii. 5), and in its consequences
(the lusts of the flesh, the eye, and the understanding, as in v. 5), form the original temptation, through which men fell: and in all ages has continued to originate the same, even from Adam, in whom we all fell, to the atheists who deified the human reason in the person of a harlot during the earlier period of the French Revolution.

To this tendency, therefore, religion, as the consideration of the particular and individual (in which respect it takes up and identifies with itself the excellence of the understanding), but of the individual, as it exists and has its being in the universal (in which respect it is one with the pure reason) — to this tendency, I say, religion assigns the due limits and is the echo of the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden. Hence in all the ages and countries of civilization religion has been the parent and fosterer of the fine arts, as of poetry, music, painting, and the like, the common essence of which consists in a similar union of the universal and the individual. In this union, moreover, is contained the true sense of the ideal. Under the old Law the altar, the curtains, the priestly vestments, and whatever else was to represent the beauty of holiness, had an ideal character: and the Temple itself was a master-piece of ideal beauty.

There exists in the human being, at least in man fully developed, no mean symbol of tri-unity in reason, religion, and the will. For each of the three, though a distinct agency, implies and demands the other two, and loses its own nature at the moment that from distinction it passes into division or separation. The perfect frame of a man is the perfect frame of a state: and in the light of this idea we must read Plato's Republic.*

The comprehension, impartiality, and far-sightedness of reason (the legislative of our nature) taken singly and exclusively, becomes mere visionariness in intellect, and indolence or hard-heartedness in morals. It is the science of cosmopolitism without country, of philanthropy without neighborliness or consanguinity, in short, of all the impostures of that philosophy of the French Revolution, which would sacrifice each to the shadowy idol of all. For Jacobinism is monstrum hybridi- dum, made up in part of despotism, or the lust of rule grounded in selfishness; and in part of abstract reason misapplied to objects that belong entirely to experience and the understanding. Its instinct and mode of action are in strict correspondence with its origin. In all places, Jacobinism betrays its mixed parentage and nature by applying to the brute passions and physical force of the multitude (that is, to man as a mere animal) in order to build up government and the frame of society on natural rights instead of social privileges, on the universals of abstract reason instead of positive institutions, the lights of specific experience, and the modifications of existing circumstances.

* If I judge rightly, this celebrated work is to 'The History of the Town of Man-soul,' what Plato was to John Bunyan.
Right in its most proper sense is the creature of law and statute, and only in the technical language of the courts has it any substantial and independent sense. In morals, right is a word without meaning except as the correlative of duty.

From all this it follows, that reason as the science of all as a whole must be interpenetrated by a power, that represents the concentration of all in each—a power that acts by a contraction of universal truths into individual duties, such contraction being the only form in which those truths can attain life and reality. Now this is religion, which is the executive of our nature, and on this account the name of highest dignity, and the symbol of sovereignty. To the same purport I have elsewhere defined religion as philosophy evolved from idea into act and fact by the superinduction of the extrinsic conditions of reality.

Yet even religion itself, if ever in its too exclusive devotion to the specific and individual it neglects to interpose the contemplation of the universal, changes its being into superstition, and becoming more and more earthly and servile, as more and more estranged from the one in all, goes wandering at length with its pack of amulets, bead-rolls, periapts, fetishes, and the like pedlery, on pilgrimages to Loretto, Mecca, or the temple of Juggernaut, arm in arm with sensuality on one side and self-torture on the other, followed by a motley group of friars, pardoners, faquirs, gamesters, flagellants, mountebanks, and harlots.

But neither can reason or religion exist or co-exist as reason and religion, except as far as they are actuated by the will (the Platonic $\theta\mu\lambda\varsigma$), which is the sustaining, coercive and ministerial power, the functions of which in the individual correspond to the officers of war and police in the ideal Republic of Plato. In its state of immanence or indwelling in reason and religion, the will appears indifferently as wisdom or as love: two names of the same power, the former more intelligent, the latter more spiritual, the former more frequent in the Old, the latter in the New Testament. But in its utmost abstraction and consequent state of reprobation, the will becomes Satanic pride and rebellious self-idolatry in the relations of the spirit to itself, and remorseless despotism relatively to others; the more hopeless as the more obdurate by its subjugation of sensual impulses, by its superiority to toil and pain and pleasure; in short, by the fearful resolve to find in itself alone the one absolute motive of action, under which all other motives from within and from without must be either subordinated or crushed.

This is the character which Milton has so philosophically as well as sublimely embodied in the Satan of his Paradise Lost. Alas! too often has it been embodied in real life. Too often has it given a dark and savage grandeur to the historic page. And wherever it has ap-
peared, under whatever circumstances of time and country, the same ingredients have gone to its composition; and it has been identified by the same attributes. Hope in which there is no cheerfulness; steadiness within and immovable resolve, with outward restlessness and whirling activity; violence with guile; temerity with cunning; and, as the result of all, interminableness of object with perfect indifference of means; these are the qualities that have constituted the commanding genius; these are the marks, that have characterized the masters of mischief, the liberticides, and mighty hunters of mankind, from Nimrod to Bonaparte. And from inattention to the possibility of such a character as well as from ignorance of its elements, even men of honest intentions too frequently become fascinated. Nay, whole nations have been so far duped by this want of insight and reflection as to regard with palliative admiration, instead of wonder and abhorrence, the Molochs of human nature, who are indebted for the larger portion of their meteoric success to their total want of principle, and who surpass the generality of their fellow-creatures in one act of courage only, that of daring to say with their whole heart, "Evil, be thou my good!"—All system so far is power; and a systematic criminal, self-consistent and entire in wickedness, who entrenches villany within villany, and barricades crime by crime, has removed a world of obstacles by the mere decision, that he will have no obstacles, but those of force and brute matter.

I have only to add a few sentences, in completion of this comment, on the conscience* and on the understanding. The conscience is neither reason, religion, or will, but an experience sui generis of the coincidence of the human will with reason and religion. It might, perhaps, be called a spiritual sensation; but that there lurks a contradiction in the terms, and that it is often deceptive to give a common or generic name to that, which being unique, can have no fair analogy. In strictness, therefore, the conscience is neither a sensation nor a sense; but a testifying state, best described in the words of Scripture, as the peace of God that passeth all understanding.

Of the latter faculty, namely, of the understanding, considered in and of itself the Peripatetic aphorism, nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, is strictly true as well as the legal maxim, de rebus non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio. The eye is not more inappropriate to sound, than the mere understanding to the modes and laws of spiritual existence. In this sense I have used the term; and in this sense I assert that the understanding or experiential faculty, unirradiated by the reason and the spirit, has no appropriate

* I have this morning read with high delight an admirable representation of what men in general think, and what ought to be thought, concerning the conscience in the translation of Swedenborg's Universal Theology of the New Church. II. pp. 361-370. 6 January, 1821.
object but the material world in relation to our worldly interests. The far-sighted prudence of man, and the more narrow but at the same time far less fallible cunning of the fox, are both no other than a nobler substitute for salt, in order that the hog may not putrefy before its destined hour.

It must not, however, be overlooked that this insulation of the understanding is our own act and deed. The man of healthful and undivided intellect uses his understanding* in this state of abstraction only as a tool or organ; even as the arithmetician uses numbers, that is, as the means not the end of knowledge. Our Shakspeare in agreement both with truth and the philosophy of his age names it "discourse of reason," as an instrumental faculty belonging to reason: and Milton opposes the discursive to the intuitive, as the lower to the higher,

Differing but in degree, in kind the same.

Of the discursive understanding, which forms for itself general notions and terms of classification for the purpose of comparing and arranging \textit{phænomena}, the characteristic is clearness without depth. It contemplates the unity of things in their limits only, and is consequently a knowledge of superficies without substance. So much so indeed that it entangles itself in contradictions in the very effort of

* Perhaps the safer use of the term, understanding, for general purposes, is, to take it as the mind, or rather as the man himself considered as a conceiving as well as perceiving being, and reason as a power supervening. The want of a clear notion respecting the nature of reason may be traced to the difficulty of combining the notion of an organ of sense, or a new sense, with the notion of the appropriate and peculiar objects of that sense, so that the idea evolved from this \textit{synthesis} shall be the identity of both. By reason we know that God is: but God is himself the Supreme Reason. And this is the proper difference between all spiritual faculties and the bodily senses;—the organs of spiritual apprehension having objects consubstantial with themselves (\textit{λογος}), or being themselves their own objects, that is, self-contemplative.

Reason may or rather must be used in two different yet correlative senses, which are nevertheless in some measure reunited by a third. In its highest sense, and which is the ground and source of the rest, reason is being, the Supreme Being contemplated objectively, and in abstraction from the personality. The Word or Logos is life, and communicates life; is light and communicates light. Now this light contemplated is \textit{abstract} is reason. Again as constituents of reason we necessarily contemplate unity and distinctness. Now the latter as the polar opposite to the former implies plurality: therefore I use the plural, distinctities, and say, that the distinctities considered apart from the unity are the ideas, and reason is the ground and source of ideas. This is the first and absolute sense.

The second sense comes when we speak of ourselves as possessing reason; and this we can no otherwise define than as the capability with which God had endowed man of beholding, or being conscious of, the divine light. But this very capability is itself that light, not as the divine light, but as the life or indwelling of the living Word, which is our light; that is, a life whereby we are capable of the light, and by which the light is present to us, as a being which we may call ours, but which I can not call mine: for it is the life that we individualize, while the light, as its correlative opposite, remains universal.

Most pregnant is the doctrine of opposite correlative as applied to Deity, but only as manifested in man, not to the Godhead absolutely. 1857.
comprehending the idea of substance. The completing power which unites clearness with depth, the plenitude of the sense with the comprehensibility of the understanding, is the imagination, impregnated with which the understanding itself becomes intuitive, and a living power. The reason (not the abstract reason, not the reason as the mere organ of science, or as the faculty of scientific principles and schemes a priori; but reason), as the integral spirit of the regenerated man, reason substantiated and vital, one only, yet manifold, overseeing all, and going through all understanding; the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence from the glory of the Almighty; which remaining in itself regenerates all other powers, and in all ages entering into holy souls maketh them friends of God and prophets; (Wisdom of Solomon, c. vii.) this reason without being either the sense, the understanding, or the imagination, contains all three within itself, even as the mind contains its thoughts, and is present in and through them all; or as the expression pervades the different features of an intelligent countenance. Each individual must bear witness of it to his own mind, even as he describes life and light: and with the silence of light it describes itself, and dwells in us only as far as we dwell in it. It cannot in strict language be called a faculty, much less a personal property, of any human mind. He, with whom it is present, can as little appropriate it, whether totally or by partition, as he can claim ownership in the breathing air or make an inclosure in the cope of heaven.

The object of the preceding discourse was to recommend the Bible, as the end and centre of our reading and meditation. I can truly affirm of myself, that my studies have been profitable and availing to me only so far as I have endeavored to use all my other knowledge as a glass enabling me to receive more light in a wider field of vision from the word of God. If you have accompanied me thus far, thoughtful reader, let it not weary you if I digress for a few moments to another book, likewise a revelation of God—the great book of his servant Nature. That in its obvious sense and literal interpretation it declares the being and attributes of the Almighty Father, none but the fool in heart has ever dared gainsay. But it has been the music of gentle and pious minds in all ages, it is the poetry of all human nature, to read it likewise in a figurative sense, and to find therein correspondences and symbols of the spiritual world.

I have at this moment before me, in the flowery meadow, on which my eye is now reposing, one of its most soothing chapters, in which there is no lamenting word, no one character of guilt or anguish. For never can I look and meditate on the vegetable creation without a feeling similar to that with which we gaze at a beautiful infant that has fed itself asleep at its mother's bosom, and smiles in its strange dream of obscure yet happy sensations. The same tender and genial
pleasure takes possession of me, and this pleasure is checked and
drawn inward by the like aching melancholy, by the same whispered
remonstrance, and made restless by a similar impulse of aspiration.
It seems as if the soul said to herself: From this state hast thou
fallen! Such shouldst thou still become, thyself all permeable to a
holier power! thyself at once hidden and glorified by its own trans-
parency, as the accidental and divinuous in this quiet and harmonious
object is subjected to the life and light of nature; to that life and light
of nature, I say, which shines in every plant and flower, even as the
transmitted power, love and wisdom of God over all fills, and shines
through, nature! But what the plant is by an act not its own and
unconsciously—that must thou make thyself to become—must by
prayer and by a watchful and unresisting spirit, join at least with the
preventive and assisting grace to make thyself, in that light of con-
science which inflameth not, and with that knowledge which puffeth
not up!

But further, and with particular reference to that undivided reason,
neither merely speculative or merely practical, but both in one, which
I have in this annotation endeavored to contra-distinguish from the
understanding, I seem to myself to behold in the quiet objects, on
which I am gazing, more than an arbitrary illustration, more than a
mere simile, the work of my own fancy. I feel an awe, as if there
were before my eyes the same power as that of the reason—the same
power in a lower dignity, and therefore a symbol established in the
truth of things. I feel it alike, whether I contemplate a single tree or
flower, or meditate on vegetation throughout the world, as one of the
great organs of the life of nature. Lo!*—with the rising sun it
commences its outward life and enters into open communion with all
the elements, at once assimilating them to itself and to each other.
At the same moment it strikes its roots and unfolds its leaves, absorbs
and respires, steams forth its cooling vapor and finer fragrance, and
breathes a repairing spirit, at once the food and tone of the atmos-
phere, into the atmosphere that feeds it. Lo!—at the touch of light
how it returns an air akin to light, and yet with the same pulse effec-
tuates its own secret growth, still contracting to fix what expanding
it had refined. Lo!—how upholding the ceaseless plastic motion of
the parts in the profoundest rest of the whole it becomes the visible
organismus of the entire silent or elementary life of nature and, there-
fore, in incorporating the one extreme becomes the symbol of the

* The remainder of this paragraph might properly form the conclusion of a disquisition
on the spirit, as suggested by meditative observation of natural objects, and of our own
thoughts and impulses without reference to any theological dogma, or any religious obli-
gation to receive it as a revealed truth, but traced to the law of the dependence of the
particular on the universal, the first being the organ of the second, as the lungs in rela-
tion to the atmosphere, the eye to light, crystal to fluid, figure to space, and the like.—
1832.
other; the natural symbol of that higher life of reason, in which the whole series (known to us in our present state of being) is perfected, in which, therefore, all the subordinate gradations recur, and are ordained in more abundant honor. We had seen each in its own cast, and we now recognize them all as co-existing in the unity of a higher form, the crown and completion of the earthly, and the mediator of a new and heavenly series.* Thus finally, the vegetable creation, in the simplicity and uniformity of its internal structure symbolizing the unity of nature, while it represents the omniformity of her delegated functions in its external variety and manifoldness, becomes the record and chronicle of her ministerial acts, and enchains the vast unfolded volume of the earth with the hieroglyphics of her history.

O!—if as the plant to the orient beam, we would but open out our minds to that holier light, which ‘being compared with light is found before it, more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of stars,’ (Wisdom of Solomon, vii. 29)—ungenial, alien, and adverse to our very nature would appear the boastful wisdom which, beginning in France, gradually tampered with the taste and literature of all the most civilized nations of Christendom, seducing the understanding from its natural allegiance, and therewith from all its own lawful claims, titles, and privileges. It was placed as a ward of honor in the courts of faith and reason; but it chose to dwell alone, and became a harlot by the way-side. The commercial spirit, and the ascendency of the experimental philosophy which took place at the close of the seventeenth century, though both good and beneficial in their own kinds, combined to foster its corruption. Flattered and dazzled by

* It may be shown that the plus or universal, which man as the minus or individual finds his correlative pole, can only be God. I. This may be proved, exhaustively, that all lower universals are already attached to lower particulars. II. It may be proved by the necessity of harmonic correspondence. The principle of personal individuality being the transcendent—(that is, the highest species of genus X, in which X rises, moritur, at dum moritur resurrect into the higher genus Y)—the personal principle, I say, being the transcendent of all particulars, requires for its correspondent opposite the transcendent of all universals: and this is God. The doctrine of the spirit thus generally conceived, and without being matured into any more distinct conceptions by revealed Scripture, is the ground of theopathy, religious feeling, or devoutness; while the reason,—as contrasted or distinguished from the understanding by logical processes, without reference to revelation or to reason sensu eminenti, as the self-subsistent Reason or Logos, and merely considered as the endowment of the human will and mind, having two definitions accordingly as it is exercised practically or intellectually,—is the ground of theology, or religious belief. Both are good in themselves, and the preconditions of the better; and therefore these disquisitions would form an appropriate conclusion to The Aids to Reflection. For as many as are wanting either in leisure or inclination, or belief of their own competency to go further—from the miscellaneous to the systematic—that volume is a whole, and for them the whole work. While for others these disquisitions form the drawbridge, the connecting link, between the disciplinary and preparatory rules and exercises of reflection, and the system of faith and philosophy of S. T. C.—1827.
the real or supposed discoveries which it had made, the more the under-
standing was enriched, the more did it become debased; till science
itself put on a selfish and sensual character, and immediate utility, in
exclusive reference to the gratification of the wants and appetites of
the animal, the vanities and caprices of the social, and the ambition
of the political, man was imposed as the test of all intellectual powers
and pursuits. Worth was degraded into a lazy synonyme of value;
and value was exclusively attached to the interest of the senses. But
though the growing alienation and self-sufficiency of the understand-
ing was perceptible at an earlier period, yet it seems to have been
about the middle of the last century, under the influence of Voltaire,
D'Alembert, Diderot, say generally of the so-called Encyclopedists,
and alas!—of their crowned proselytes and disciples, Frederick, Joseph,
and Catherine,—that the human understanding, and this too in its
narrowest form, was tempted to throw off all show of reverence to
the spiritual and even to the moral powers and impulses of the soul;
and usurping the name of reason openly joined the banners of Anti-
christ, at once the pander and the prostitute of sensuality, and whether
in the cabinet, laboratory, the dissecting room, or the brothel, alike
busy in the schemes of vice and irreligion. Well and truly might it,
thus personified in our fancy, have been addressed in the words of the
evangelical Prophet, which I have once before quoted. Thou hast
said, None seeth me. Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, it hath perverted
thee—and thou hast said in thy heart, I am, and there is none beside
me. (Isaiah xlvii. 10.)

Prurient, bustling, and revolutionary, this French wisdom has never
more than grazed the surfaces of knowledge. As political economy,
in its zeal for the increase of food it habitually overlooked the quali-
ties and even the sensations of those that were to feed on it. As
ethical philosophy, it recognized no duties which it could not reduce
into debtor and creditor accounts on the ledgers of self-love, where
no coin was sterling which could not be rendered into agreeable sen-
sations. And even in its height of self-complacency as chemical art,
greatly am I deceived if it has not from the very beginning mistaken
the products of destruction, cadavera rerum, for the elements of com-
position: and most assuredly it has dearly purchased a few brilliant
inventions at the loss of all communion with life and the spirit of na-
ture. As the process, such the result;—a heartless frivolity alternating
with a sentimentality as heartless; an ignorant contempt of anti-
quity; a neglect of moral self-discipline; a deadening of the religious
sense, even in the less reflecting forms of natural piety; a scornful
reprobation of all consolations and secret refreshings from above,—
and as the caput mortuum of human nature evaporated, a French na-
ture of rapacity, levity, ferocity, and presumption.

Man of understanding, canst thou command the stone to lie, canst
thou bid the flower bloom, where thou hast placed it in thy classification?—Canst thou persuade the living or the inanimate to stand separate even as thou hast separated them?—And do not far rather all things spread out before thee in glad confusion and heedless intermixture, even as a lightsome chaos on which the Spirit of God is moving?—Do not all press and swell under one attraction, and live together in promiscuous harmony, each joyous in its own kind, and in the immediate neighborhood of myriad others that in the system of thy understanding are distant as the poles?—If to mint and to remember names delight thee, still arrange and classify and pore and pull to pieces, and peep into death to look for life, as monkeys put their hands behind a looking-glass! Yet consider in the first sabbath which thou imposest on the busy discursion of thought, that all this is at best little more than a technical memory: that like can only be known by like: that as truth is the correlative of being, so is the act of being the great organ of truth: that in natural no less than in moral science, *quantum sumus, scimus*.

That which we find in ourselves is (*gradu mutato*) the substance and the life of all our knowledge. Without this latent presence of the 'I am,' all modes of existence in the external world would flit before us as colored shadows, with no greater depth, root, or fixture, than the image of a rock hath in a gliding stream or the rainbow on a fast-sailing rain-storm. The human mind is the compass, in which the laws and actuations of all outward essences are revealed as the dips and declinations. (The application of geometry to the forces and movements of the material world is both proof and instance.) The fact, therefore, that the mind of man in its own primary and constituent forms represents the laws of nature, is a mystery which of itself should suffice to make us religious: for it is a problem of which God is the only solution, God, the one before all, and of all, and through all!—True natural philosophy is comprised in the study of the science and language of symbols. The power delegated to nature is all in every part: and by a symbol I mean, not a metaphor or allegory or any other figure of speech or form of fancy, but an actual and essential part of that, the whole of which it represents. Thus our Lord speaks symbolically when he says that *the eye is the light of the body*. The genuine naturalist is dramatic poet in his own line: and such as our myriad-minded Shakspeare is, compared with the Racines and Metastasios, such and by a similar process of self-transformation would the man be, compared with the doctors of the mechanic school, who should construct his physiology on the heaven-descended, Know Thyself.

Even the *visions of the night* speak to us of powers within us that are not dreamt of in their day-dream of philosophy. The dreams, which we most often remember, are produced by the nascent sense-
tions and inward motio[n]ula (the fluxions) of the waking state. Hence, too, they are more capable of being remembered, because passing more gradually into our waking thoughts they are more likely to associate with our first perceptions after sleep. Accordingly, when the nervous system is approaching to the waking state, a sort of under-consciousness blends with our dreams, that in all we imagine as seen or heard our own self is the ventriloquist, and moves the slides in the magic-lantern. We dream about things.

But there are few persons of tender feelings and reflecting habits, who have not, more or less often in the course of their lives, experienced dreams of a very different kind, and during the profoundest sleep that is compatible with after-recollection,—states, of which it would scarcely be too bold to say that we dream the things themselves: so exact, minute, and vivid beyond all power of ordinary memory is the portraiture, so marvellously perfect is our brief metempsychosis into the very being, as it were, of the person who seems to address us. The dullest wight is at times a Shakspere in his dreams. Not only may we expect that men of strong religious feelings, but little religious knowledge, will occasionally be tempted to regard such occurrences as supernatural visitations; but it ought not to surprise us, if such dreams should sometimes be confirmed by the event, as though they had actually possessed a character of divination. For who shall decide, how far a perfect reminiscence of past experiences (of many perhaps that had escaped our reflex consciousness at the time)—who shall determine, to what extent this reproductive imagination, unsophisticated by the will, and undistracted by intrusions from the senses, may or may not be concentered and sublimed into foresight and presentiment?—There would be nothing herein either to foster superstition on the one hand, or to justify contemptuous disbelief on the other. Incredulity is but credulity seen from behind, bowing and nodding assent to the habitual and the fashionable.

To the touch (or feeling) belongs the proximate; to the eye the distant. Now little as I might be disposed to believe, I should be still less inclined to ridicule, the conjecture that in the recesses of our nature, and undeveloped, there might exist an inner sense (and therefore appertaining wholly to time)—a sense hitherto without a name, which as a higher third combined and potentially included both the former. Thus gravitation combines and includes the powers of attraction and repulsion, which are the constituents of matter, as distinguished from body. And thus, not as a compound, but as a higher third, it realizes matter (of itself nes fluxions et præfluum) and constitutes it body. Now suppose that this nameless inner sense stood to the relations of time as the power of gravitation to those of space? A priori, a presence to the future is not more mysterious or transcendent than a presence to the distant, than a power equally immediate.
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to the most remote objects, as it is to the central mass of its own body, toward which it seems, as it were, enchanting them: for instance, the gravity in the sun and moon to the spring-tides of our ocean. The true reply to such an hypothesis would be, that as there is nothing to be said against its possibility, there is, likewise, nothing to be urged for its reality; and that the facts may be rationally explained without it.

It has been asked why knowing myself to be the object of personal slander (slander as unprovoked as it is groundless, unless acts of kindness are provocation) I furnish this material for it by pleading in palliation of so chimerical a fancy. With that half-playful sadness, which at once sighs and smiles, I answered: why not for that very reason? —namely, in order that my calumniator might have, if not a material, yet some basis for the poison-gas of his invention to combine with? —But no,—pure falsehood is often for the time the most effective; for how can a man confute what he can only contradict?—Our opinions and principles can not prove an alibi. Think only what your feelings would be if you heard a wretch deliberately perjure himself in support of an infamous accusation, so remote from all fact, so smooth and homogeneous in its untruth, such a round Robin of mere lies, that you knew not which to begin with?—What could you do, but look round with horror and astonishment, pleading silently to human nature itself;—and perhaps (as hath really been the case with me) forget both the slanderer and his slander in the anguish inflicted by the passiveness of your many professed friends, whose characters you had ever been as eager to clear from the least stain of reproach as if a coal of fire had been on your own skin?—But enough of this which would not have occurred to me at all, at this time, had it not been thus suggested.

The feeling, which in point of fact chiefly influenced me in the preceding half apology for the supposition of a divining power in the human mind, arose out of the conviction that an age or nation may become free from certain prejudices, beliefs, and superstitious practices in two ways. It may have really risen above them; or it may have fallen below them, and become too bad for their continuance. The rustic would have little reason to thank the philosopher who should give him true conceptions of ghosts, omens, dreams, and presentiments at the price of abandoning his faith in Providence and in the continued existence of his fellow-creatures after their death. The teeth of the old serpent sowed by the Cadmuses of French literature under Lewis XV. produced a plenteous crop of such philosophers and truth-trumpeters in the reign of his ill-fated successor. They taught many facts, historical, political, physiological, and ecclesiastical, diffusing their notions so widely that the very ladies and hair-dressers of Paris became
fluent encyclopedists; and the sole price, which their scholars paid for these treasures of new light, was to believe Christianity an imposition, the Scriptures a forgery, the worship of God superstition, hell a fable, heaven a dream, our life without providence, and our death without hope. What can be conceived more natural than the result, that self-acknowledged beasts should first act, and next suffer themselves to be treated, as beasts?

Thank heaven!—notwithstanding the attempts of Thomas Paine and his compères, it is not so bad with us. Open infidelity has ceased to be a means even of gratifying vanity: for the leaders of the gang themselves turned apostates to Satan, as soon as the number of their proselytes became so large that atheism ceased to give distinction. Nay, it became a mark of original thinking to defend the Creed and the Ten Commandments: so the strong minds veered round, and religion came again into fashion. But still I exceedingly doubt, whether the superannuation of sundry superstitious fancies be the result of any real diffusion of sound thinking in the nation at large. For instance, there is now no call for a Picus Mirandula to write seven books against astrology. It might seem, indeed, that a single fact like that of the loss of Kempenfeldt and his crew, or the explosion of the ship L'Orient, would prove to the common sense of the most ignorant, that even if astrology could be true, the astrologers must be false: for if such a science were possible it could be a science only for gods. Yet Erasmus, the prince of sound common sense, is known to have disapproved of his friend's hardihood, and did not himself venture beyond skepticism; and the immortal Newton, to whom more than to any other human being Europe owes the purification of its general notions concerning the heavenly bodies, studied astrology with much earnestness, and did not reject it till he had demonstrated the falsehood of all its pretended grounds and principles. The exit of two or three superstitions is no more a proof of the entry of good sense, than the strangling of a despot at Algiers or Constantinople is a symptom of freedom. If, therefore, not the mere disbelief, but the grounds of such disbelief must decide the question of our superior illumination, I confess that I could not from my own observations on the books and conversation of the age vote for the affirmative without much hesitation. As many errors are despised by men from ignorance as from knowledge. Whether that be not the case with regard to divination, is a query that rises in my mind (notwithstanding my fullest conviction of the non-existence of such a power) as often as I read the names of the great statesmen and philosophers, which Cicero enumerates in the introductory paragraphs of his work de Divinatione.—

Socrates, omnesque Socratici, * * * plurimisque locis gravis auctor Democritus, * * * Oratipposque, familiaris noster, quem ego param summis Peripateticis judico, * * * praesensionem rerum futurarum
comprobarunt.* Of all the theistic philosophers, Xenophanes was the only one who wholly rejected it. *A stoicis degeneravit Panatius, nec tamen aures est negare vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare so dixit.* Nor was this a mere outward assent to the opinions of the State. Many of them subjected the question to the most exquisite arguments, and supported the affirmative not merely by experience, but (especially the Stoics, who of all the sects most cultivated psychology) by a minute analysis of human nature and its faculties: while on the mind of Cicero himself (as on that of Plato with regard to a state of retribution after death) the universality of the faith in all times and countries appears to have made the deepest impression. Gentem quidem nullam video, neque tam humanam atque doctam, neque tam immanem tamque barbaram, quae non significari futura, et a quibusdam intelligi prædicticpe posse censeat.†

I fear that the decrease in our feelings of reverence towards mankind at large, and our increasing aversion to every opinion not grounded in some appeal to the senses, have a larger share in this our emancipation from the prejudices of Socrates and Cicero, than reflection, insight, or a fair collation of the facts and arguments. For myself, I would much rather see the English people at large believe somewhat too much than merely just enough, if the latter is to be produced, or must be accompanied, by a contempt or neglect of the faith and intellect of their forefathers. For not to say, what yet is most certain, that a people can not believe just enough, and that there are errors which no wise man will treat with rudeness, while there is a probability that they may be the refraction of some great truth as yet below the horizon; it remains most worthy of our serious consideration, whether a fancied superiority to their ancestors’ intellects must not be speedily followed in the popular mind by disrespect for their ancestors’ institutions. Assuredly it is not easy to place any confidence in a form of Church or State, of the founders of which we have been taught to believe that their philosophy was jargon, and their feelings and notions rank superstition. Yet are we never to grow wiser?—Are we to be credulous by birthright, and take ghosts, omens, visions, and witchcraft, as an heirloom?—God forbid. A distinction must be made, and such a one as shall be equally availing and profitable to men of all ranks. Is this practicable?—Yes!—it exists. It is found in the study of the Old and New Testament, if only it be combined with a spiritual partaking of the Redeemer’s Blood, of which, mysterious as the symbol may be, the sacramental Wine is no mere or arbitrary memento. This is the only certain, and this is the universal, preventive of all debasing superstitions; this is the true Ἀειμονία (αἷμα, blood, ὀίνος, wine) which our Milton has beautifully allegorized in a passage strangely overlooked by all his commentators.

* L. i. s. 2.—Ed. † Ib.—Ed. ‡ L. s. L.—Ed.
Bear in mind, reader! the character of a militant Christian, and the results (in this life and the next) of the Redemption by the Blood of Christ; and so peruse the passage:—

Amongst the rest a small unsightly root,
But of divine effect, he called me out:
The leaf was darkish, and had prickles on it,
But in another country, as he said,
Bore a bright golden flower, but not in this soil!
Unknown and like esteemed, and the dull swain
Treads on it daily with his clefted shoes;
And yet more medicinal is it than that Moly
That Hermes once to wise Ulysses gave.

He called it Harmony and gave it me,
And bade me keep it as of sovereign use
'Gainst all enchantments, mildew, blast, or damp,
Or ghastly furies' apparition.

These lines might be employed as an amulet against delusions: for the man, who is indeed a Christian, will as little think of informing himself concerning the future by dreams or presentiments, as for looking for a distant object at broad noonday with a lighted taper in his hand.

But whatever of good and intellectual our nature worketh in us, it is our appointed task to render gradually our own work. For all things that surround us, and all things that happen unto us, have (each doubtless its own providential purpose, but) all one common final cause: namely, the increase of consciousness in such wise that whatever part of the terra incognita of our nature the increased consciousness discovers, our will may conquer and bring into subjection to itself under the sovereignty of reason.

The leading differences between mechanic and vital philosophy may all be drawn from one point: namely, that the former demanding for every mode and act of existence real or possible visibility, knows only of distance and nearness, composition (or rather juxtaposition) and decomposition, in short the relations of unproductive particles to each other; so that in every instance the result is the exact sum of the component quantities, as in arithmetical addition. This is the philosophy of death, and only of a dead nature can it hold good. In life, much more in spirit, and in a living and spiritual philosophy, the two component counter-powers actually interpenetrate each other, and generate a higher third, including both the former, ita tandem ut sit alia et major.

To apply this to the subject of this present comment. The elements (the factors, as it were) of religion are reason and understanding. If the composition stopped in itself, an understanding thus rationalized would lead to the admission of the general doctrines of natural religion, the belief of a God, and of immortality; and probably to an acquiescence in the history and ethics of the Gospel. But still it would
be a speculative faith, and in the nature of a theory; as if the main
object of religion were to solve difficulties for the satisfaction of the
intellect. Now this state of mind, which alas! is the state of too
many among our self-entitled rational religionists, is a mere balance
or compromise of the two powers, not that living and generative in-
terpenetration of both which would give being to essential religion;—
to the religion at the birth of which we receive the spirit of adoption,
whereby we cry Abba, Father; the Spirit itself bearing witness with
our spirit, that we are the children of God. (Rom. viii. 15, 16.) In
religion there is no abstraction. To the unity and infinity of the Di-
vine Nature, of which it is the partaker, it adds the fulness, and to
the fulness, the grace and the creative overflowing. That which in-
tuitively it at once beholds and adores, praying always, and rejoicing
always—that doth it tend to become. In all things and in each thing
—for the Almighty Goodness doth not create generalities or abide in
abstractions— in each, the meanest, object it bears witness to a mys-
tery of infinite solution. Thus beholding as in a glass the glory of the
Lord, it is changed into the same image from glory to glory. (2 Cor.
iii. 18.) For as it is born and not made, so must it grow. As it is
the image or symbol of its great object, by the organ of this similitude,
as by an eye, it seeth that same image throughout the creation; and
from the same cause sympathizeth with all creation in its groans to
be redeemed. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and tra-
vaileth in earnest expectation (Rom. viii. 20-23) of a renewal of its
forfeited power, the power, namely, of retiring into that image, which
is its substantial form and true life, from the vanity of self, which then
only is when for itself it hath ceased to be. Even so doth religion
finitely express the unity of the infinite Spirit by being a total act of
the soul. And even so doth it represent his fulness by its depth, by
its substantiality, and by an all-pervading vital warmth which—relax-
ing the rigid, consolidating the dissolute, and giving cohesion to that
which is about to sink down and fall abroad, as into the dust and
crumble of the grave—is a life within life, evermore organizing the
soul anew.

Nor doth it express the fulness only of the Spirit. It likewise repre-
sents his overflowing by its communicativeness, budding and blos-
soming forth in all earnestness of persuasion, and in all words of sound
doctrine: while, like the citron in a genial soil and climate, it bears a
golden fruitage of good-works at the same time, the example waxing
in contact with the exhortation, as the ripe orange beside the opening
orange-flower. Yea, even his creativeness doth it shadow out by its
own powers of impregnation and production (being such a one as
Paul the aged, and also a prisoner for Jesus Christ, who begat to a
lively hope his son Onesimus in his bonds) regenerating in and through
the Spirit the slaves of corruption, and fugitives from a far greater
and harder master than Philemon. The love of God, and therefore God himself who is love, religion strives to express by love, and measures its growth by the increase and activity of its love. For Christian love is the last and divinest birth, the harmony, unity, and god-like transfiguration of all the vital, intellectual, moral, and spiritual powers. Now it manifests itself as the sparkling and ebullient spring of well-doing in gifts and in labors; and now as a silent fountain of patience and long-suffering, the fulness of which no hatred or persecution can exhaust or diminish; a more than conqueror in the persuasion, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate it from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus the Lord. (Rom. viii. 38, 39.)

From God's love through his Son, crucified for us from the beginning of the world, religion begins: and in love towards God and the creatures of God it hath its end and completion. O, how heaven-like it is to sit among brethren at the feet of a minister who speaks under the influence of love and is heard under the same influence! For all abiding and spiritual knowledge, infused into a grateful and affectionate fellow-Christian, is as the child of the mind that infuses it. The delight which he gives he receives; and in that bright and liberal hour the gladdened preacher can scarce gather the ripe produce of today without discovering and looking forward to the green fruits and embryos, the heritage and reversionary wealth of the days to come; till he bursts forth in prayer and thanksgiving.—The harvest truly is plenteous, but the laborers few. O gracious Lord of the harvest, send forth laborers into thy harvest! There is no difference between Jew and Greek. Thou, Lord, over all, art rich to all that call upon thee. But how shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent? And O! how beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace, that bringeth glad tidings of good things, that publisheth salvation; that saith unto the captive soul, Thy God reigneth! God manifested in the flesh hath redeemed thee! O Lord of the harvest, send forth laborers into thy harvest.

Join with me, reader! in the fervent prayer that we may seek within us what we can never find elsewhere, that we may find within us what no words can put there, that one only true religion, which elevateth knowing into being, which is at once the science of being, and the being and the life of all genuine science.
Not without great hesitation should I express a suspicion concerning the genuineness of any the least important passage in the New Testament, unless I could adduce the most conclusive evidence from the earliest manuscripts and commentators, in support of its interpolation: well knowing that such permission has already opened a door to the most fearful license. It is indeed, in its consequences, no less than an assumed right of picking and choosing our religion out of the Scriptures. Most assuredly I would never hazard a suggestion of this kind in any instance in which the retention or the omission of the words could make the slightest difference with regard to fact, miracle, or precept. Still less would I start the question, where the hypothesis of their interpolation could be wrested to the discountenancing of any article of doctrine concerning which dissension existed: no, not though the doubt or disbelief of the doctrine had been confined to those, whose faith but themselves would honor with the name of Christianity; however reluctant we might be, both from the courtesies of social life and the nobler charities of humility, to withhold from the persons themselves the title of Christians.

But as there is nothing in Matthew xii. 40, which would fall within this general rule, I dare permit myself to propose the query, whether there does not exist internal evidence of its being a gloss of some unlearned, though pious, Christian of the first century, which has slpt into the text? The following are my reasons. 1. It is at all events a comment on the words of our Saviour, and no part of his speech. 2. It interrupts the course and breaks down the application of our Lord's argument, as addressed to men who from their unwillingness to sacrifice their vain traditions, gainful hypocrisy, and pride both of heart and of demeanor, demanded a miracle for the confirmation of moral truths that must have borne witness to their own divinity in the consciences of all who had not rendered themselves conscience-proof. 3. The text strictly taken is irreconcilable with the fact as it is afterwards related, and as it is universally accepted. I at least remember no calculation of time, according to which the inter-space from Friday evening to the earliest dawn of Sunday morning, could be represented as three days and three nights. As three days our Saviour himself speaks of it (John ii. 19) and so it would be described in common language as well as according to the use of the Jews; but I can find no other part of Scripture which authorizes the phrase of three nights. This gloss is not found either in the repetition of the circumstances by Matthew himself (xvi. 4), nor in Mark (viii. 12), nor in Luke (xii. 54). Mark's narration doth indeed most strikingly confirm my second reason, drawn from the purpose of our
Saviour's argument: for the allusion to the prophet Jonas is omitted altogether, and the refusal therefore rests on the depravity of the applicants, as proved by the wantonness of the application itself. All signs must have been useless to such men as long as the great sign of the times, the call to repentance, remained without effect. 4. The gloss corresponds with the known fondness of the earlier Jewish converts, and indeed of the Christians in general of the first century, to bring out in detail and into exact square every accommodation of the Old Testament, which they either found in the Gospels, or made for themselves. It is too notorious into what strange fancies (not always at safe distance from dangerous errors) the oldest uninspired writers of the Christian Church were seduced by this passion of transmuting without Scriptural authority incidents, names, and even mere sounds of the Hebrew Scriptures, into Evangelical types and correspondences.

An additional reason may perhaps occur to those who alone would be qualified to appreciate its force: namely, to Biblical scholars familiar with the opinions and arguments of sundry doctors, Rabbinical as well as Christian, respecting the first and second chapter of Jonah.

(D.)

In all ages of the Christian Church, and in the later period of the Jewish (that is, as soon as from their acquaintance first with the Oriental, and afterwards with the Greek, philosophy the precursory and preparative influences of the Gospel began to work) there have existed individuals (Laodiceans in spirit, minims in faith, and nominalists in philosophy) who mistake outlines for substance, and distinct images for clear conceptions; with whom, therefore, not to be a thing is the same as not to be at all. The contempt in which such persons hold the works and doctrines of all theologians before Grotius, and of all philosophers before Locke and Hartley (at least before Bacon and Hobbes), is not accidental, nor yet altogether owing to that epidemic of a proud ignorance occasioned by a diffused sciolism, which gave a sickly and hectic showiness to the latter half of the last century. It is a real instinct of self-defence acting offensively by anticipation. For the authority of all the greatest names of antiquity is full and decisive against them; and man, by the very nature of his birth and growth, is so much the creature of authority, that there is no way of effectually resisting it, but by undermining the reverence for the past in toto. Thus, the Jewish Prophets have, forsooth, a certain degree of antiquarian value, as being the only specimens extant of the oracles of a barbarous tribe; the Evangelists are to be interpreted with a due allowance for their superstitious prejudices concerning evil spirits, and St. Paul never suffers them to forget that he had been brought up at the feet of a Jewish Rabbi! The Greeks
indeed were a fine people in works of taste; but as to their philosophers—the writings of Plato are smoke and flash from the witch's caldron of a disturbed imagination:—Aristotle's works a quickset hedge of fruitless and thorny distinctions; and all the philosophers before Plato and Aristotle fablers and allegorizers!

But these men have had their day: and there are signs of the times clearly announcing that that day is verging to its close. Even now there are not a few, on whose convictions it will not be uninformative to know, that the power, by which men are led to the truth of things, instead of their appearances, was deemed and entitled the living and substantial Word of God by the soundest of the Hebrew Doctors; that the eldest and most profound of the Greek philosophers demanded assent to their doctrine, mainly as soφια θεοπαράδοτος, that is, a traditional wisdom that had its origin in inspiration; that these men referred the same power to the παράδειγμα ὑπὸ διαμαχόμενος λόγον; and that they were scarcely less express than their scholar Philo Judeus, in their affirmations of the Logos, as no mere attribute or quality, no mode of abstraction, no personification, but literally and mysteriously Deus alter et idem.

When education has disciplined the minds of our gentry for austerer study; when educated men shall be ashamed to look abroad for truths that can be only found within; within themselves they will discover, intuitively will they discover, the distinctions between the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world; and the understanding, which forms the peculium of each man, as different in extent and value from another man's understanding, as his estate may be from his neighbor's estate. The words of St. John i.7-12, are in their whole extent interpretable of the understanding, which derives its rank and mode of being in the human race (that is, as far as it may be contrasted with the instinct of the dog or elephant, in all, which constitutes it human understanding) from the universal light. This light comes therefore as to its own. Being rejected, it leaves the understanding to a world of dreams and darkness: for in it alone is life and the life is the light of men. What then but apparitions can remain to a philosophy, which strikes death through all things visible and invisible; satisfies itself then only when it can explain those abstractions of the outward senses, which by an unconscious irony it names indifferently facts and phænomena, mechanically—that is, by the laws of death; and brands with the name of mysticism every solution grounded in life, or the powers and intuitions of life?

On the other hand, if the light be received by faith, to such understandings it delegates the privilege (τύωνια) to become sons of God, expanding while it elevates, even as the beams of the sun incorporate with the mist, and make its natural darkness and earthly nature the
bearer and interpreter of their own glory. 'Εδώ μη πιστεύοντε, σοφία μη
συνήθε.

The very same truth is found in a fragment of the Ephesian Hera-
clitus, preserved by Stobæus. Εδώ νύρα λέγοντας λαχυρίζεσθαι κριτι τή
ζωή τώ πάντων τρέφονται γάρ πάντες οἱ ανθρώπινοι νόοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου
(Ἀγίου) κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁδόσον θέλει, καὶ ἐξαρκεί πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται.*

— To discourse rationally (if we would render the discursive under-
standing discourse of reason) it behooves us to derive strength from
that which is common to all men (the light that lighteth every man).
For all human understandings are nourished by the one Divine Word,
whose power is commensurate with his will, and is sufficient for all
and overfloweth (shineth in darkness, and is not contained therein, or
comprehended by the darkness).

This was Heraclitus, whose book is nearly six hundred years older
than the Gospel of St. John, and who was proverbially entitled the
Dark (ὁ σκοτεινός). But it was a darkness which Socrates would not
condemn,† and which would probably appear to enlightened Chris-
tians the darkness of prophecy, had the work, which he hid in the
temple, been preserved to us. But obscurity is a word of many
meanings. It may be in the subject; it may be in the author; or it
may be in the reader;—and this again may originate in the state of
the reader's heart; or in that of his capacity; or in his temper; or
in his accidental associations. Two kinds are especially pointed out
by the divine Plato in his Sophistes. The beauty of the original is
beyond my reach. On my anxiety to give the fulness of the thought,
I must ground my excuse for construing rather than translating. The
fidelity of the version may well atone for its harshness in a passage
that deserves a meditation beyond the ministry of words, even the
words of Plato himself, though in them, or nowhere, are to be heard
the sweet sounds, that issued from the head of Memnon at the touch
of light.— "One thing is the hardness to be understood of the sophist,
another that of the philosopher. The former retreating into the ob-
scurity of that which hath not true being (τοῦ μὴ δύνατος), and by long
intercourse accustomed to the same, is hard to be known on account
of the duskiness of the place. But the philosopher by contemplation
of pure reason evermore approximating to the idea of true being
(τοῦ δύνατος) is by no means easy to be seen on account of the splendor
of that region. For the intellectual eyes of the many flit, and are in-
capable of looking fixedly toward the God-like."‡

* Serm. III.— Ed.
† Diogenes Laertius has preserved the characteristic criticism of Socra-
tes. Φαιν ο νέριπειδήν αὐτῷ οὖν τῶ Ίρακλείτον σύγγραμμα, δρεαθα, Τί
dōkei; τῶν δὲ φάναι, 'Α μὲν συνήκα, γενναία' οίμαι δὲ, καὶ ὁ μὴ συνήκα πλὴν
Δρίλου γέ τινος δεῖται κοιλιμβητοῦ. Π. v. 7.— Ed.
‡ The passage is:—
ΣΕ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀνεν-
There are, I am aware, persons who willingly admit, that not in articles of faith alone, but in the heights of geometry, and even in the necessary first principles of natural philosophy, there exist truths of apodictic force in reason, which the mere understanding strives in vain to comprehend. Take, as an instance, the descending series of infinites in every finite, a position which involves a contradiction for the understanding, yet follows demonstrably from the very definition of body, as that which fills a space. For wherever there is a space filled, there must be an extension to be divided. When therefore maxims generalized from appearances (phantomena) are applied to substances; when rules, abstracted or deduced from forms in time and space, are used as measures of spiritual being, yea even of the Divine Nature which can not be compared or classed (For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. Isaiah iv. 8); such professors can not but protest against the whole process, as grounded on a gross metadasis elc allo yeno. Yet still they are disposed to tolerate it as a sort of sanative counter-excitement, that holds in check the more dangerous disease of Methodism. But I more than doubt of both the positions. I do not think Methodism, Calvinistic or Wesleyan, the more dangerous disease; and even if it were, I should deny that it is at all likely to be counteracted by the rational Christianity of our modern Alogi (logois pisteus logos!) who, mistaking unity for sameness, have been pleased, by a misnomer not less contradictory to their own tenets than intolerant to those of Christians in general, to entitle themselves Unitarians. The two contagions attack each a wholly different class of minds and tempers, and each tends to produce and justify the other, accordingly as the predisposition of the patient may chance to be. If fanaticism be as a fire in the flooring of the Church, the idolism of the unspiritualized understanding is the dry rot in its beams and timbers. "Υβριν χρη αβεννύειν μάλλον ἡ πυρκαλήν, says Heraclitus.* It is not the sect of Unitarian Dissenters, but the spirit of Unitarianism in the members of the Church that alarms me. To what open revilings, and to what whispered slanders, I subject my name by this public avowal, I well...
The accomplished author of the Arcadia, the star of serenest brilliance in the glorious constellation of Elizabeth's court, our England's Sir Philip Sidney, the paramount gentleman of Europe, the poet, warrior, and statesman, held high converse with Spenser on the idea of supersensual beauty; on all "earthly fair and amiable," as the symbol of that idea; and on music and poesy as its living educts. With the same genial reverence did the younger Algernon commune with Harrington and Milton on the idea of a perfect State; and in what sense it is true, that the men (that is, the aggregate of the inhabitants of a country at any one time) are made for the State, not the State for the men. But these lights shine no longer, or for a few. Exeunt: and enter in their stead Holofernes and Costard, masked as Metaphysics and Common-Sense. And these too have their ideas. The former has an idea that Hume, Hartley, and Condillac, have exploded all ideas, but those of sensation; he has an idea that he was particularly pleased with the fine idea of the last-named philosopher, that there is no absurdity in asking What color virtue is of? inasmuch as the proper philosophic answers would be black, blue, or bottle-green, according as the coat, waistcoat, and small clothes might chance to be of the person, the series of whose motions had excited the sensations, which formed our idea of virtue. The latter has no idea of a better-flavored haunch of venison than he dined off at the Albion. He admits that the French have an excellent idea of cooking in general, but holds that their best cooks have no more idea of dressing a turtle than the gourmands themselves, at Paris, have any real idea of the true taste and color of the fat.

It is not impossible that a portion of the high value attached of late years to the dates and margins of our old folios and quartos may be transferred to their contents. Even now there exists a shrewd suspicion in the minds of reading men, that not only Plato and Aristotle, but even Scotus Erigena,* and the schoolmen from Peter Lombard† to Duns Scotus,‡ are not such mere blockheads, as they pass for with those who have never perused a line of their writings. What the results may be, should this ripen into conviction, I can but guess. But all history seems to favor the persuasion I entertain, that in every age the speculative philosophy in general acceptance, the metaphysical opinions that happen to be predominant, will influence the theology of that age. Whatever is proposed for the belief, as true, must have

* He died at Oxford in 886.—Ed.
‡ He died Bishop of Paris in 1164.—Ed.
† He died in 1308.—Ed.
been previously admitted by reason as possible, as involving no contradiction to the universal forms or laws of thought, no incompatibility in the terms of the proposition; and the determination on this head belongs exclusively to the science of metaphysics. In each article of faith embraced on conviction, the mind determines, first intuitively on its logical possibility; secondly, discursively, on its analogy to doctrines already believed, as well as on its correspondence to the wants and faculties of our nature; and thirdly, historically, on the direct and indirect evidences. But the probability of an event is a part of its historic evidence, and constitutes its presumptive proof, or the evidence à priori. Now as the degree of evidence à posteriori, requisite in order to a satisfactory proof of the actual occurrence of any fact stands, in an inverse ratio the strength or weakness of the evidence à priori (that is, a fact probable in itself may be believed on slight testimony); it is manifest that of the three factors, by which the mind is determined to the admission or rejection of the point in question, the last, the historical, must be greatly influenced by the second, analogy, and that both depend on the first, logical congruity, not indeed as their cause or preconstituent, but as their indispensable condition; so that the very inquiry concerning them is preposterous (αὐταιαίρεται αὐτοῖς) as long as the first remains undetermined. Again: the history of human opinions (ecclesiastical and philosophical history) confirms by manifold instances, what attentive consideration of the position itself might have authorized us to presume, namely, that on all such subjects as are out of the sphere of the senses, and therefore incapable of a direct proof from outward experience, the question whether any given position is logically impossible (incompatible with reason) or only incomprehensible (that is, not reducible to the forms of sense, namely, time and space, or those of the understanding, namely, quantity, quality, and relation) in other words, the question, whether an assertion be in itself inconceivable, or only by us unimaginable, will be decided by each individual according to the positions assumed as first principles in the metaphysical system which he has previously adopted. Thus the existence of a Supreme Reason, the creator of the material universe, involved a contradiction for a disciple of Epicurus, who had convinced himself that causative thought was tantamount to something out of nothing or substance out of shadow, and incompatible with the axiom, *Nihil ex nihilo*: While on the contrary to a Platonist this position, that thought or mind essentially, *vel sensu eminenti*, is causative, is necessarily pre-supposed in every other truth, as that without which every fact of experience would involve a contradiction in reason. Now it is not denied that the framers of our Church Liturgy, Homilies and Articles, entertained metaphysical opinions irreconcilable in their first principles with the system of speculative philosophy which has been taught in this coun-
try, and only not universally received, since the asserted and generally believed defeat of the Bishop of Worcester (the excellent Stillingfleet) in his famous controversy with Mr. Locke. Assuredly therefore it is well worth the consideration of our Clergy whether it is at all probable in itself, or congruous with experience, that the disputed Articles of our Church de revelatis et credendis should be adopted with singleness of heart, and in the light of knowledge, when the grounds and first philosophy, on which the framers themselves rested the antecedent credibility (may we not add even the revelability?) of the Articles in question, have been exchanged for principles the most dissimilar, if not contrary? It may be said and truly, that the Scriptures, and not metaphysical systems, are our best and ultimate authority. And doubtless, on Revelation we must rely for the truth of the doctrines. Yet what is considered incapable of being conceived as possible, will be deemed incapable of having been revealed as real: and that philosophy has hitherto had a negative voice, as to the interpretation of the Scriptures in high and doctrinal points, is proved by the course of argument adopted in the controversial volumes of all the orthodox divines from Origen to Bishop Bull, as well as by the very different sense attached to the same texts by the disciples of the modern metaphysique, wherever they have been at liberty to form their own creeds according to their own expositions.

I repeat the question then: is it likely, that the faith of our ancestors will be retained when their philosophy is rejected,—rejected a priori, as baseless notions not worth inquiring into, as obsolete errors which it would be slaying the slain to confute? Should the answer be in the negative, it would be no strained inference that the Clergy at least, as the conservators of the national faith, and the accredited representatives of learning in general amongst us, might with great advantage to their own peace of mind qualify themselves to judge for themselves concerning the comparative worth and solidity of the two schemes. Let them make the experiment, whether a patient re-hearing of their predecessor's cause, with enough of predilection for the men to counterpoise the prejudices against their system, might not induce them to move for a new trial;—a result of no mean importance in my opinion, were it on this account alone, that it would recall certain ex-dignitaries in the book-republic from their long exile on the shelves of our public libraries to their old familiar station on the reading desks of our theological students. However strong the presumption were in favor of principles authorized by names that must needs be so dear and venerable to a minister of the Church in England, as those of Hooker, Whitaker, Field, Donne, Selden, Stillingfleet—(masonic intellects, formed under the robust discipline of an age memorable for keenness of research, and iron industry)—yet no
APPENDIX E.

undue preponderance from any previous weight in this scale will be apprehended by minds capable of estimating the counter-weights, which it must first bring to a balance in the scale opposite. The obstinacy of opinions that have always been taken for granted, opinions unassailable even by the remembrance of a doubt, the silent accretence of belief from the unwatched depositions of a general, never-contradicted, hearsay; the concurring suffrage of modern books, all pre-supposing or re-asserting the same principles with the same confidence, and with the same contempt for all prior systems;—and among these, works of highest authority, appealed to in our Legislature, and lectured on at our Universities; the very books, perhaps, that called forth our own first efforts in thinking; the solutions and confutations in which must therefore have appeared ten-fold more satisfactory from their having given us our first information of the difficulties to be solved, of the opinions to be confuted.—Verily, a clergyman's partiality towards the tenets of his forefathers must be intense beyond all precedent, if it can more than sustain itself against antagonists so strong in themselves, and with such mighty adjuncts.

Nor in this enumeration dare I (though fully aware of the obloquy to which I am exposing myself) omit the noticeable fact, that we have attached a portion even of our national glory (not only to the system itself, that system of disguised and decorous Epicureanism, which has been the only orthodox philosophy of the last hundred years; but also, and more emphatically) to the name of the assumed father of the system, who raised it to its present pride of place, and almost universal acceptance throughout Europe. And how was this effected? Externally, by all the causes, consequences, and accompaniments of the Revolution in 1688: by all the opinions, interests, and passions, which counteracted by the sturdy prejudices of the malcontents with the Revolution; qualified by the compromising character of its chief conductors; not more propelled by the spirit of enterprise and hazard in our commercial towns, than kept in check by the characteristic vis inertiae of the peasantry and landholders; both parties cooled and lessoned by the equal failure of the destruction, and of the restoration, of monarchy;—it was effected extrinsically, I say, by the same influences, which—(not in and of themselves, but with all these and sundry other modifications)—combined under an especial control of Providence to perfect and secure the majestic temple of the British Constitution:—but the very same which in France, without this providential counterpoise, overthrew the motley fabric of feudal oppression to build up in its stead the madhouse of Jacobinism. Intrinsically, and as far as the philosophic scheme itself is alone concerned, it was effected by the mixed policy and bonhomie, with which the author contrived to retain in his celebrated work whatever the system possesses of soothing for the indolence, and of flattering for the vanity,
of men's average understandings: while he kept out of sight all its
darker features which outrage the instinctive faith and moral feelings
of mankind, ingeniously threading-on the dried and shrivelled, yet
still wholesome and nutritious, fruits plucked from the rich grafts of
ancient wisdom, to the barren and worse than barren fig-tree of the
mechanic philosophy. Thus, the sensible Christians, the angels of the
church of Laodicea, with the numerous and mighty sect of their ad-
mirers, delighted with the discovery that they could purchase the de-
cencies and the creditableness of religion at so small an expenditure
of faith, extolled the work for its pious conclusions: while the in-
dels, wiser in their generation than the children (at least than these
nominal children) of light, eulogized it with no less zeal for the sake
of its principles and assumptions, and with the foresight of those ob-
vious and only legitimate conclusions, that might and would be de-
duced from them. Great at all times and almost incalculable are the
influences of party spirit in exaggerating contemporary reputation;
but never perhaps from the first syllable of recorded time were they
exerted under such a concurrence and conjunction of fortunate acci-
dents, of helping and furthering events and circumstances, as in the
instance of Mr. Locke.

I am most fully persuaded, that the principles both of taste, morals,
and religion taught in our most popular compendia of moral and po-
litical philosophy, natural theology, evidences of Christianity, and the
like, are false, injurious, and debasing. But I am likewise not less
deeply convinced that all the well-meant attacks on the writings of
modern infidels and heretics, in support either of the miracles or of
the mysteries of the Christian religion, can be of no permanent util-
ity, while the authors themselves join in the vulgar appeal to common
sense as the one infallible judge in matters, which become subjects of
philosophy only, because they involve a contradiction between this
common sense and our moral instincts, and require therefore an arbi-
ter, which containing both eminenter must be higher than either. We
but mow down the rank misgrowth instead of cleansing the soil, as long
as we ourselves protect and manure, as the pride of our garden, a tree
of false knowledge, which looks fair and showy and variegated with
fruits not its own, that hang from the branches which have at various
times been ingrafted on its stem; but from the roots of which under
ground the runners are sent off, that shoot up at a distance and bring
forth the true and natural crop. I will speak plainly, though in so
doing I must bid defiance to all the flatterers of the folly and foolish
self-opinion of the half-instructed many. The articles of our Church,
and the true principles of government and social order, will never be
effectually and consistently maintained against their antagonists till
the champions have themselves ceased to worship the same Baal with
their enemies, till they have cast out the common idol from the re-
cesses of their own convictions, and with it the whole service and ceremonial of idolism. While all parties agree in their abjuration of Plato and Aristotle, and in their contemptuous neglect of the Schoolmen and the scholastic logic, without which the excellent Selden (that genuine English mind whose erudition, broad, deep, and manifold as it was, is yet less remarkable than his robust healthful common sense) affirms it impossible for a divine thoroughly to comprehend or reputably to defend the whole undiminished and unadulterated scheme of Catholic faith, while all alike presume, with Mr. Locke, that the mind contains only the relics of the senses, and therefore proceed with him to explain the substance from the shadow, the voice from the echo,—they can but detect each the other's inconsistencies. The champion of orthodoxy will victoriously expose the bald and staring incongruity of the Socinian scheme with the language of Scripture, and with the final causes of all revealed religion:—the Socinian will retort on the orthodox the incongruity of a belief in mysteries with his own admissions concerning the origin, and nature of all tenable ideas, and as triumphantly expose the pretences of believing in a form of words, to which the believer himself admits that he can attach no consistent meaning. Lastly, the godless materialist, as the only consistent because the only consequent reasoner, will secretly laugh at both. If these sentiments should be just, the consequences are so important that every well-educated man, who has given proofs that he has at least patiently studied the subject, deserves a patient hearing. Had I not the authority of the greatest and noblest intellects for at least two thousand years on my side, yet from the vital interest of the opinions themselves, and their natural, unconstrained, and (as it were) spontaneous coalescence with the faith of the Catholic Church (they being, moreover, the opinions of its most eminent Fathers), I might appeal to all orthodox Christians, whether they adhere to the faith only or both to the faith and forms of the Church, in the words of my motto: *Ad isthaic quaevo vos, qualiaunque primo videantur aspectu attendite, ut qui robis forsan insanire videar, saltem quibus insaniam rationibus cognoscatis.

There are still a few, however, young men of loftiest minds, and the very stuff out of which the sword and shield of truth and honor are to be made, who will not withdraw all confidence from the writer, although

*Tis true, that passionate for ancient truths
And honoring with religious love the great
Of elder times, he hated to excess,
With an unquiet and intolerant scorn,
The hollow puppets of a hollow age
Ever idolatrous, and changing ever
Its worthless idols!*

* Poet. Works, VII. p. 153.—Ed.
a few there are, who will still less be indisposed to follow him in his milder mood, whenever their Friend,

Piercing the long-neglected holy cave,
The haunt obscure of Old Philosophy,
Shall bid with lifted torch its stary walls
Sparkle, as erst they sparkled to the flame
Of odorous lamps teaded by saint and sage!

I have hinted, above, at the necessity of a glossary, and I will conclude these supplementary remarks with a nomenclature of the principal terms which occur in the elements of speculative philosophy, in their old and rightful sense, according to my belief; at all events the sense in which I have myself employed them. The most general term (genus summum) belonging to the speculative intellect, as distinguished from acts of the will, is Representation, or (still better) Presentation.

A conscious Presentation, if it refers exclusively to the subject, as a modification of his own state of being, is = Sensation.

The same if it refers to an Object, is = Perception.

A Perception, immediate and individual, is = an Intuition.

The same, mediate, and by means of a character or mark common to several things, is = a Conception.

A Conception, extrinsic and sensuous, is = a Fact, or a Cognition.

The same, purely mental and abstracted from the forms of the understanding itself = a Notion.

A notion may be realized, and becomes cognition; but that which is neither a sensation nor a perception, that which is neither individual (that is, a sensible intuition) nor general (that is, a conception), which neither refers to outward facts, nor yet is abstracted from the forms of perception contained in the understanding; but which is an educt of the imagination actuated by the pure reason, to which there neither is nor can be an adequate correspondent in the world of the senses;—this and this alone is = an Idea. Whether ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise constitutive, and one with the power and life of nature, according to Plato, and Plotinus (ἐν λόγῳ ζωῆς ἡν, καὶ ὣς ἡ ἡν το φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων) is the highest problem of philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature.

* Poetical Works, VII. p. 154.—Ed.
† See Table Talk, VI. p. 293.—Ed. See also Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft; conclusion of the chapter Von den Ideen überhaupt.—2m. Ed.
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