THE WORKS
OF THE
RIGHT REVEREND
WILLIAM WARBURTON, D.D.
LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

A NEW EDITION,
IN TWELVE VOLUMES.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
A DISCOURSE BY WAY OF GENERAL PREFACE;
CONTAINING
SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND CHARACTER
OF THE AUTHOR;
BY RICHARD HURD, D.D.
LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER.

VOLUME THE TWELFTH.

London:
Printed by Luke Hansard & Son, near Lincoln's-Inn Fields,
FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES, IN THE STRAND.
1811.
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REMARKS

ON SEVERAL

OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS,

IN ANSWER TO

The Rev. Drs. Stebbing and Sykes:

Serving to explain and justify the two Dissertations in the Divine Legation, concerning the command to Abraham to offer up his Son; and the Nature of the Jewish Theocracy; Objected to by those Learned Writers.

PART II. and Last—continued.

Soon after the publication of Dr. Stebbing's Examination; another Book came out against me, as much larger in bulk as honester in its production: for it carried the name of its Author, Dr. A. A. Sykes, in the front. To this Gentleman, likewise, I sent a civil message; to inform him, that I had seen his Book, in which he likewise professes to "examine my Account" (for they are all Examiners, and would be Inquisitors) "of the Conduct of the Ancient Legislators—of the Double Doctrine of the Philosophers—of the Theocracy of the Jews—and of Sir I. Newton's Chronology." That I supposed he would think himself neglected to have no notice taken of him: that I was not at leisure to go through the whole; but that if he would point out to me which of the Four Parts he chose to trust to, I would endeavour to give him the satisfaction he seemed to want. To this, he sent me word back, "That he should not be, in the least, concern-ed, were I to forbear all notice of him: but, if I took any, that he hoped I would keep to the merits of his Book: that he was not to chuse for me; but that he thought, one or two of the parts were more immediately to the purpose to clear up: but expected that this should be done in such a manner as every good man wishes;
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"wishes; in the love of truth, and in the spirit of one;
that seeks it: and that then I should find, in him, a
mind open to conviction." All this was very well:
and, from the reasonableness of the demand, who
would not believe, but his book was a standard of
candour, politeness, and ingenuity? at least, who would
have suspected the contrary? So that his civil prelimi-
nary, when interpreted on the principles of the Double-
Doctrine, is in plain English this,—That the liberties
which he and old honest Mr. P. have so freely taken
with my book and character, should be entirely over-
looked, or received as compliments: and that I should
address myself to their conviction; as to the service of
my two best friends, who wrote only to recommend the
truths I had advanced; by putting me in a way to re-
move all doubts and difficulties concerning them. "And
therefore, that I should keep to the merits of his
book;" that is, be tender of his bad logic, and worse
criticism; overlook his ill expression; and find out his
meaning if I can. And, indeed, who would not engage
in any labour for the sake of finding so rare a curiosity,
as a "mind open to conviction," in an Answerer by pro-
fession? Well then, be it so. Since they profess to lye
so open, let them be received with good humour at least,
and suffered only to expose themselves;

"Laugh where we must, be candid where we can,

"But vindicate the Ways of God to Man."

However, this is a mere act of good-will; and what the
Doctor has not the least claim to; as may be seen by the
preliminary conversation between him and his old friend
Mr. P. part of which I shall here beg leave to transcribe
for the reader's entertainment:

"You know very well (says Dr. Sykes to the Rev.
Gent. to whom he addresses his Examination) our
old friend Mr. P***; he calls Mr. Warburton's book
a learned Romance; and he says, with some
humour, that the digressions in it about the Mysteries,
the Hieroglyphics*, the Book of Job, are, or may be

deeded,

* Foreigners seem to have a different opinion of The Divine
Legation, from these two learned friends. The Journal des Spavans,
March 1744, in an Abstract of a French translation of part of The
Divine
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"deemed, so many ingenious Novels, which serve to "relieve or divert the reader. But then he goes so far "as to doubt whether Mr. Warburton writes for utility "or for truth. For he has told us so much (says he) "about the practices of those old Philosophers, and "how much they were wont to lie for the public good— "and he declares himself to have come from the schools "of those Heathen Philosophers, that I cannot but "think he may be reasonably suspected—to "have received an infection from them, and to have "learnt to lie for the public good, as his masters did "before him. It is true (says our friend) that Mr. "Warburton does not think those men to be altogether "free from blame; and it may be said in his favour, "that what he blames a little in them, he would not do "himself: but yet his censure of them is so very soft, "and he is so tender of their moral character, while he "is so ready to flame out against, and to shew no mercy

"to

Divine Legation, speaks thus of the discourse on the Hieroglyphics:
"Il regne une si belle analogie dans le systeme de M. Warburton, "& toutes ses parties tiennent les unes aux autres par un lien si "naturel, qu'on est porté à croire que l'origine & les progres de "l'Ecriture & du Language ont été tels qu'il les a decrits. Le "Public doit avoir bien de l'obligation au Traducteur de lui avoir "fait connoitre un Ouvrage si curieux. Mais il aurait été à "souhaitez, pour rendre la lecture de sa traduction plus agreable," qu'il ne se fut pas si fort attaché à rendre mot a mot le texte "Anglois."

The judgment of the Jesuits of Treccou, in their Journal of July 1744, differs not much from that of Paris. "M. Warburton n'a "pu, sans une erudition profonde, une lecture murément digérée "& des reflexions infinies traiter avec tant de precision, de jus-"tesse, & de netteté, un sujet de lui même si difficile à mettre en "œuvre—Les plus savans hommes se sont laissé seduire sur "l'origine des Hieroglyphes, & la plupart ont regardé un effet du "peu d'expérience des Egyptiens, comme un raffinement de la plus "inysterieuse sagesses. C'est cette erreur que M. Warburton "s'applique particulierement à detruire dans la premiere partie. "Il le fait de la maniere la plus naturelle—ce n'est point un "Systeme fonde sur des imaginations vagues. Ses raisons "nemens, ses preuves, sont appuyées sur des faits, sur la nature "des choses, & sur les principes les plus lumineux du sens "commun." But as to this last testimony, I shall not chuse to "insist upon it; lest it should be now said, that these famous mo-
dern practisers of the Double Doctrine, and the Apologist for the "ancient inventors of it, had too close an understanding with one "another.

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"to others, who do not think as he does, that one cannot
"help imagining, that in his opinion, the good end they
"had in view, did sanctify the means they used, and that
"it was no great fault in them to have external and in-
"ternal doctrines*;" &c. &c. Now a man so apt to
flame out would have been as apt to call this a piece of
dull scurrilous buffoonry, in another writer; but in so
condemn a disputant as Dr. Sykes, who writes, we see by
his own words, "in the love of truth, and in the spirit
of one who seeks it," I can consider it only as the effect
of a pious zeal for the interests of Revelation, which is
apt to warm itself in a conversation between two such
friends; and a charitable fear that the author of the
Divine Legation was indeed artfully undermining the
foundation, while he pretended to new-fortify the struc-
ture of Religion: and they, good men, as faithful sentinels,
thought it their duty to give the alarm. But here, their
condemn simplicity of manners, which makes them utter
strangers to all the tricks of free-thinking, has put them
upon a false cry. It would be charity therefore to set
them right; and, as they have minds so open to convic-
tion, indeed but justice. And, for this, all the return I
ask, is only to share with them in the pleasure, which a
clear conviction, that their suspicions were groundless,
must needs give them.

In order, therefore, to this, it would seem sufficient to
observe, that if indeed the Divine Legation were written
to undermine Revelation, and (as is said) by an author
initiated in "the cabinet councils of old lawgivers," and
just come "from school, from Heathen Philosophers,"
he must have learnt very little of his masters: for it is
certainly the most bungling, ill-contrived attempt that was
ever made against Revelation. But if this be not enough,
let us go further, and consider how an artful Freethinker
would probably have executed such a design as is here
laid to my charge. And the same intimacy in the cabinet
councils of old lawgivers, and in the schools of Pagan
philosophers, which makes it so unlikely that I could have

* An Examination of Mr. Warburton's Account of the Conduct of
the Ancient Legislators, of the Double Doctrine of the old Philo-
sophers, of the Theocracy of the Jews, and of Sir Isaac Newton's
Chronology, 1744.
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...done no better on so good a ground; may enable me to shew how well a scheme of this nature might be executed by another: As the many unhappy examples we have amongst us, of real attempts against Religion, will enable the reader to judge how near I keep to probability. And thus qualified, I take the liberty to set our Underminer to work.

In the first place, I will suppose it not unlikely, that, in order to conceal his purpose, as well as to carry on his attacks more regularly, he should begin with an outwork of Religion, on pretence of some defect in its construction, that might prejudice the defence of the fort itself. For instance, let us suppose it to be that illustrious testimony of Paganism, recorded by Phlegon, for the unnatural darkness at the Crucifixion*. Where some mathematical unbeliever might very fitly serve him in the post of engineer. When he had tried what could be made of this, he might then come closer to his work.

And, as Miracles and Prophecies are the two great credentials of the Divine Legation of Jesus, he might now proceed directly to the sap.

And first, of the Miracles. The distempers cured by Jesus were of two sorts; natural, and supernatural. When the latter are removed, the other (as the Free-thinkers tell us) are easily dealt with. The force of imagination, in the patient, might be supposed to go a great way; and natural virtue, in the agent, a great way farther. Thus, long since (say they) distempers fled at Vespasian's touch; and very lately at Abbé Paris's tomb: but, in the still more famous case of Greatrakes the Irish Stroker, both causes seemed to concur to produce the most extraordinary effects. But neither natural virtue, I wist, nor force of imagination, could fright the Devil. Here now is a difficulty worthy of him,

"Nunc animis opus, Ænea! nunc pectore fermo.

What has he then to do, but, under pretence of freeing the Gospel-history from superstition, to write the Scripture Doctrine of Demoniasts†; that is, to persuade us

* See a Dissertation on the Eclipse mentioned by Phlegon—By A. A. Sykes, Q.D. 1732.
that there never was any? For you must know, the *Scripture Doctrine* of a thing, is the phrase in fashion, to prove—nothing. And in this service he would have the hardy and valiant *Hobbes* for his precursor in the *Kingdom of Darkness* ; or his captain of light-horse à batre l'estrade.

We have now only one stroke more to perfect our mine ; and that stroke is at *Prophecies*. Now Theology has divided the prophecies, that relate to *Jesus*, into two sorts ; such as foretel his mission in a primary and literal sense, and such as foretel it only in a secondary and figurative: but the Freethinkers assure us there was no need of this division ; for that all the prophecies, which relate to *Jesus*, relate to him only in a secondary and figurative sense. At this open, then, comes in our Underminer ; and shews†, that all pretence of prophecies to a *double meaning* is senseless and fanatical. And here he approaches under the cover of the great *Collins* ; who had so deeply intrenched himself before the place, that he could not of a long time be forced ; and our Underminer may be excused if he too hastily‡ concluded, that therefore he never *would*.

I might now turn to the learned Doctor, as little concerned as he is in all this ; and ask him whether this would not be doing like a workman. I own him indeed a very incompetent judge in such matters. His singleness of heart, his simplicity of manners, his zeal for religion, his total estrangement from Freethinkers and their arts, make him very unfit to be appealed to on this occasion. Yet methinks there is something so striking in the sketch here chalked out, that the most unexperienced man must feel both its natural and moral fitness for its end. Here we see a cautious, indeed, but a regular, a steady, and determined purpose. The approaches are made in form; the trenches opened; the battery played; the breach stormed; and at last the old hollow fortress

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* The title given by Hobbes to the Fourth Part of his *Leviathan*.
† See the Principles and Connection of Natural and Revealed Religion distinctly considered. By A. A. Sykes, D.D. 1740. p. 221, & seq.
‡ See *Divine Legation*, Book VI, § 6.
of Religion blown up into air. If ever this should happen, my main concern would be for old Mr. P. For what must be that good man's sorrows to see the Abomination of Desolation standing in the Holy Place; while he could start thus at his own shadow? For it must be his own and not mine if he saw infidelity so near a book, whose purpose was to shew the use of Religion in general, to human Society; and the superior fitness of Revealed Religion in particular: the truth of the Jewish, from the administration of an equal providence; and the truth of the Christian, from the completion of Jewish prophecies concerning it.

But now I talk of prophecies, let me ask the learned Doctor; but, gently in his ear, how it comes to pass, that when it was the subject of prophecies only which occasioned all this hostility, he should leave my confutation of his Discourse on Double Senses unanswered; and turn his pen to the four subjects above-mentioned? Did this forbearance suit a hand so accustomed to slaughter? or did this reserve indicate a mind so open to conviction? But perhaps in this he would emulate the great Scipio; who, when he had lost his own, had the courage to carry the war into his enemy's country.

I must pursue him therefore with the same disadvantage that the Carthaginian left the rich Campania of Italy, to follow his adversary through the barren sands of Afric. For the true explanation of the nature of the double sense of prophecies (of which I had shewn he had given a notion destructive of the connexion between the Old and New Testament, through his ignorance of the very terms of the question) is of the highest importance to religion: whereas the subjects, for the sake of which he hath forsaken this, are of infinitely less importance. And these too he has handled in so unusual a manner, that all we can collect from the first of them, on the conduct of the ancient legislators, is, that, in his opinion, Moses was but of the same species with the Pagan lawgivers*:

* That I do Dr. Sykes no wrong, when I say he regards Moses as of the same species, and puts him upon the very same footing with the Heathen legislators, appears from his own words: "This doctrine [of a future state] was universally believed. Now Moses, as a legislator, was to lay down laws to the Jews, and he..."
as to the *double doctrine of the old philosophers*, he has fairly shewn that he knew no more of it than of the *double sense of prophecies*; and with regard to *Sir I. Newton’s Chronology*, he mistakes the very question; imagining that I disputed the truth of his *Greek*, instead of his *Egyptian Chronology*. So that indeed there was nothing left that I could, in conscience, seize upon, but his Discourse of the *Theocracy of the Jews*. And this, I suppose, was the *thing*, which, in his answer to my message, he alluded to, when he said, "that he "thought one or two of the parts were more immediately "to the purpose to clear up."

I have another reason, too, to believe that he may esteem this the forte of his new excursions. An *extraordinary providence to particulars*, though expressly promised by, and, as I have shewn, a necessary consequence of, the *Law of Moses*; yet, partly from the nature of the thing, and partly from mistaken passages of misunderstood books of Scripture, is not entirely free from objections. Here then he thought he could do something; though it were but retelling the objections of others. And truly, as ill as he has managed these advantages, he was not mistaken in his choice. For the rest—it is all over such argument! and such criticism! as one might well conceive should be reserved to close the scene of letters in an age like this; when every science was

"was to incorporate their national religion into their civil law.
"This was done, not by inculcating what was universally received and "believed by them; but by inculcating such points as were to make the "national religion of the Jews. And in this he did exactly what "other legislators did: what was *useful to the state*, he ad-"mitted into the body of his *laws*; and so far as it was useful "to the state, but *further than that neither he nor "Zaleucus concerned themselves*, p. 59, 60. In which "short period are contained these four propositions—*That it is not the practice of legislators to inculcate what is universally believed*—"That a future state does not make one point of national religion— [And for a good reason. *Because*]—*That a future state is not use-"ful to society*—*That, further than the good of the state, Moses con-"cerned himself no more than Zaleucus, or any other Heathen legislator. How much now has this author to thank me for; when, instead of exposing the other three parts of his book, which abound with these beauties in every page, I confined myself to this, where the natural obscurity of the subject hides both his blunders and his blusses?"
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was retiring from its professors, to dictionary-makers and booksellers.

Remark I.—He begins his examination of the nature of the Jewish theocracy in this manner:—

"This form of government of the Jews, being properly called a theocracy, there are two points which Mr. Warburton has largely considered. The first is, in relation to the origin, continuation, and duration of this theocracy. The other is in relation to the exercise of an extraordinary Providence over particular persons, as well as over the state in general. In relation to the former of these points he tells us, That most Writers suppose it to have ended with the Judges, but scarce any bring it lower than the Captivity: on the contrary, I hold that in strict truth and propriety it ended not till the coming of Christ." Here it is that he attacks Dr. Spencer's Dissertation on the Jewish theocracy, a treatise by no means in the number of those on which Spencer raised his reputation: he goes on a wrong hypothesis; he uses weak arguments; and he is confused and inconsistent in his assertions.

"Are we not now, from hence, to imagine, that Dr. Spencer was one of those writers that supposed the theocracy to have ended with the Judges, or, at furthest, with the Captivity? And yet Mr. Warburton is forced to own that Spencer "supposes" [I say he positively asserts] "that some obscure footsteps of it remained to the time of Christ. Yes, and longer too, for his words are, ad extrema usque politiae suae tempora, i.e. quite to the latter times of their policy, even to the last times of expiring Judaism]."

I had observed, that most Writers suppose the theocracy to have ended with the Judges; scarce any bring it lower than the Captivity; I myself suppose it continued to the time of Christ: that Dr. Spencer wrote a weak and inconsistent treatise on this subject. Well, and what says our Answerer to this? "Are we

* Div. Leg. Book V. § 3. init.  † Ibid.  ‡ An Examination of Mr. Warburton's Account, &c. 168—170.
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"not now (says he) from hence to imagine that Dr.
"Spencer was one of those Writers that supposed the
"theocracy to have ended with the Judges?" What
demands of imagination his trade may have upon him
is hard to say. But, from my words, a reasoner would
conclude nothing but that I meant to prove what I said;
namely, that Dr. Spencer's Book of the theocracy was
weak and inconsistent. Few Answerers have stuck at
a misrepresentation; but then it was to carry on their
business, the manufactary of false argument. Our
Examiner, on the contrary, seems to do it only to
keep his hand in use; for argument he could make
none, though he had the laying together of his own
premisses. In a word, the whole is a studied mis-
representation of all I said on this subject. The
method of which was as follows: first, to shew*, that
the theocracy continued to the time of Christ.
Secondly, to confute Le Clerc's arguments for its
ceasing with the Judges. And this makes up the body
of the Discourse concerning the duration of the
theocracy. Having done this, I proceeded in these
words—Thus the dispute ended [namely between Le
Clerc and P. Simon]; and for further satisfaction
Le Clerc refers us to a Book of Spencer's, written
professedly upon this very subject. It is his tract
De Theocratia Judaica. What is to be found there,
besides the arguments Le Clerc borrowed from it,
and which have been considered already, I shall now,
with some reluctance, inform the Reader †. Then I
go on to give a character of this Tract, as quoted by the
Examiner. And to justify this character, I consider
what is there said that may seem to contradict what I
had before observed concerning the duration of the
theocracy. Now the Reader sees that this is only an
accessory to the body of the discourse, given, partly,
to enervate the authority which Le Clerc built upon
it; and partly, to strengthen and confirm what had
been advanced by myself. Yet our simple-minded
Doctor, after having concealed all this, says (quoting
the beginning of Sect. 3. Book V.) "Here it is that

* Div. Leg. Book V. § III. † Ibid.
he attacks Dr. Spencer's Dissertation;" whenas the very mention of Dr. Spencer does not commence till fourteen pages afterwards: and, as if that were not enough, goes on in this manner:—"Are we not now from hence to imagine that Dr. Spencer was one of those Writers that supposed the theocracy to have ended with the Judges? &c. And yet Mr. W. is forced to own that Spencer supposes," &c. I should not have been so long in laying open so immaterial a cheat, but as it was convenient the Reader should, on his first acquaintance with our Doctor, be let a little into his manners.

II. But he will not only shew, that my arraigning Spencer was absurd; but that the charge against him is unjust. "His first charge against him is, that he thought the theocracy was established by degrees, and abrogated by degrees. A conceit highly absurd (says Mr. Warburton) as God was legislator. But wherein lies the absurdity of this gradual progress and gradual declension, even in cases where God was legislator? I suppose he will say that the theocracy began at the instant of the Horeb covenant; and not when the Children of Israel were delivered from Egypt, and were first under the immediate protection of God.—But Spencer intended by his word theocracy, all the time that the Jews were under the direct power and immediate dominion of God; which certainly began at the deliverance of the Jews from Egypt, and was completed in the highest and fullest sense at the Horeb covenant, when God was constituted their King*. I called Spencer's notion of the gradual progress and gradual declension of a theocracy, an absurdity. He says, no: and how does he prove it is not? By shewing, that, by the word theocracy, Spencer meant a thing which gradually arose and gradually declined. But is not this the very absurdity I complain of? I call an opinion absurd: and he, to free it from this censure, tells us—what that opinion is. But as I do not suppose he will be ever able to answer my question, I will try if I can answer his—"Wherein

* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 170, 171.
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... lies the absurdity of this gradual progress and gradual declension even in the cases where God was legislator?" The absurdity, learned Sir, lies here: when God is pleased to assume the character of Civil Magistrate, he must, like all other magistrates, enter on his office at once; and (as common sense requires) leave it at once. Now the government, under such a magistrate, is, what we properly call a theocracy: therefore to talk of the gradual progress and gradual declension of this mode of civil relation, is the same absurdity as to talk of the gradual progress and gradual declension of paternity, or any other mode of natural relation. Whether this was a blunder or a sophism, is of no consequence; if the detection of it does but shew the Reader what good reason I had to suppose, that the theocracy began at the instant of the Horeb covenant; and how much Spencer was mistaken in the use of the term, if he intended by it, all the time that the Jews were under the direct power and immediate dominion of God. For, in that case, he should have used the word legislature, and not theocracy.—But I had best stop here, lest this new distinction should still further embarrass this able advocate of Dr. Spencer.

III. However, he goes on to support his reasoning in this manner:—" So when Dr. Spencer speaks of its declining gradually—of the government of God being lessened—of its making a nearer approach to its ceasing, I think, if there be any absurdity or inconsistency in this manner of speaking, it may be justified by Mr. Warburton's own authority. He himself tells us, that indeed in the period immediately preceding their [the Jews] captivity, on the gradual withdrawing the extraordinary providence from them—they began to entertain doubts concerning God's further peculiar regard to them as his chosen people*. So that he here expressly owns a gradual withdrawing of the extraordinary providence from the Jews. And where is the absurdity of Dr. Spencer's gradual declension or inuition of the theocracy, which Mr. Warburton's

“gradual withdrawing of the extraordinary providence is not liable unto? or was not the gradual withdrawing of the extraordinary providence a proper imputation of the theocracy?” He is so fond of this argument that he repeats it again at p. 218. “Dr. Spencer and Mr. Warburton seem to express themselves so exactly alike about the imputation of the theocracy, that one would wonder how it should happen that Dr. Spencer’s notion is a conceit highly absurd, and Mr. Warburton’s should be so consistent, and easy, and natural.” To all this I answer, that our advocate has hereby fairly convicted himself of a degree of ignorance that I never would have ventured to suspect of him, which is, the not knowing the difference between the form of government and the administration of it. Now Dr. Spencer talked of a gradual decline of the form of government; which I thought absurd. I, of the gradual decline of the administration of it; which, whether it be equally absurd, may be seen by a parallel instance. For though, not long since, I spoke of parallels, similitudes, and resemblances, as weak instruments for the discovery of truth; yet they are often of more use than better things for the detection of falsehood. If I should say then, that there was, during the reigns of James the First and Charles the Second, a gradual withdrawing the protection of the people, and the equal administration of justice; I should speak, I presume, both sense and truth: yet if Oldmixon himself should affirm that there was, during this period, a gradual withdrawing of the monarchy; I should go near to say, he talked as much like a fool in this, as he talks like a knave in most other parts of his History.

IV. Well, but our Advocate will go further; and shew, that though Dr. Spencer be consistent, yet I am not.—“I will observe further (says he) Dr. Spencer maintains that some obscure footsteps of the theocracy remained even to the time of Christ. And Mr. Warburton holds it ended not till the coming of Christ†. Dr. Spencer is consistent; but it is

* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account; &c. p. 171, 172.
† Div. Leg. Book V. § 2.
case of such kind of writers, when they stumble, is to run instinc-tively, as it were, from their own blunders. But our Doctor delights to dwell upon his, affects to enjoy them, though but for a moment, returns again and again to them, as if enamoured of his own image, in them.

V. But now for a master-stroke; worthy an Answerer by profession. "It [the extraordinary providence] had ceased (says he) some hundred of years before Christ came; as Mr. Warburton over and over confesses. The difficulty then is to shew that the theocracy continued, or, ended not till the coming of Christ." "Perhaps Mr. Warburton will distinguish between the ceasing of the theocracy, and the ceasing of the extraordinary providence: he may say that the theocracy continued till the coming of Christ; the extraordinary providence entirely ceased at the full settlement after the return of the Jews from their captivity. Let us then grant that the theocracy revived after the return from the captivity, as he tells us. And that that dispensation of Providence soon ceased after the re-establishment. We are still as much in the dark as ever; nor will this distinction help the matter, or free Mr. Warburton from great self-contradiction. For he tells us, one necessary consequence [of a theocracy] was an extraordinary providence. For the affairs of a people under a theocracy being administered by God as King; and his peculiar and immediate administration in human affairs being what we call an extraordinary providence, it follows that an extraordinary providence must needs be exercised over such a people. My meaning is, that if the Jews were really under a theocracy, they were really under an extraordinary providence. In a word, they must be either both true or both false, but still inseparable."

"If this be the case, then it is plain that a theocracy cannot be without an extraordinary providence. But then Mr. Warburton has shewn, and at large insists upon it, that the extraordinary providence entirely

"ceased several hundred years before Christ's coming: Nay he says, that he knows from the course and progress of God's economy, that the extraordinary providence would cease at the full settlement of the Jews after their return from the Captivity*. He has likewise proved by several arguments, that the theocracy continued even to the coming of Christ†. By this means we are left in inextricable difficulties: For first, we have a theocracy subsisting many hundred years without an extraordinary providence, viz. from the settlement of the Jews, after their return, to the time of Christ: And consequently, secondly, a theocracy wherein an extraordinary providence needs not be exercised. Thirdly, we have a theocracy without a necessary consequence of a theocracy, i.e. without an extraordinary providence. And whereas he asserts that the theocracy and extraordinary providence must be either both true or both false, but still inseparable, He himself has shewn them to be separable, by shewing that the one did in fact subsist without the other for so many hundred years as were between the settlement of the Jews after their return from captivity and the coming of Christ‡.

The first thing I shall observe is, that the theocracy and the extraordinary providence are now become two again, after they had been so long one. But who can help it! The Author of The Divine Legation would needs have them two. However, he will still shew they are inseparable; and that, from the Author's own confession. I have here quoted him word for word, without the omission of a syllable; that when we see what he was resolved not to see, we may the better judge of what he meant, by a mind open to conviction: no more, I dare say, than a man who had been often convicted; though never perhaps before in so flagrant an instance. The truth is, I had expressly and particularly considered and confuted this very objection, in the beginning of Sect. V. Book IV. of The Divine Legation, where (on the words—*They [the theocracy and extra-

* Book V. § 4. † Iibid. § 3. ‡ Exam. of Mr. W's Account, p. 180—182.
ordinary providence] must be either both true or both false, but still inseparable, words which our Examiner has twice quoted) I say—The thing here asserted has been misunderstood, as contradicting what I afterwards observe concerning the gradual decay and total extinction of the extraordinary providence, while the theocracy yet existed. But when I say an extraordinary providence was one necessary consequence of a theocracy, I must needs mean that it was so in its original constitution, and in the established nature of things: Not that in this, which was matter of compact, the contravening acts of one party might not make a separation. For as this extraordinary providence was, besides, a reward for obedience to the theocracy, it became subject to a forfeiture by disobedience and rebellion, though subjection to the government still continued. To illustrate this by a domestic instance: A voice in the supreme council of the kingdom is the necessary consequence of an English Barony; yet they may be separated by a judicial sentence; and actually have been so, as in the case of the famous Lord Bacon, who was deprived of his seat in the House of Lords, and yet held his Barony. This was the specific punishment of the rebellious Israelites. They were deprived of the extraordinary providence; and yet held subject to the theocracy, as appears from the sentence pronounced upon them by the mouth of the Prophet Ezekiel: "Ye pollute your¬ selves with your idols even unto this day: and shall I be enquired of by you, O House of Israel? As I live, saith the Lord God, I will not be enquired of by you. And that which cometh into your mind shall not be at all, that ye say, we will be as the Heathen, as the families of the countries to serve wood and stone. As I live, saith the Lord, with a mighty hand, with a stretched-out arm, and with fury poured out, will I rule over you. And I will bring you out from the people, and will gather you out of the countries wherein ye are scattered, with a mighty hand, and with a stretched-out arm, and with fury poured out. And I will bring you into the wilderness of the people, and there will I plead with you.
"face to face. Like as I pleaded with your fathers in
the wilderness of the Land of Egypt, so will I plead
with you, saith the Lord. And I will cause you to
pass under the rod. And I will bring you into the
It is here, we see, denounced that the extraordinary
providence should be withdrawn; or, in Scripture
phrase, that God would not be enquired of by them;
that they should remain in the condition of their
fathers in the wilderness, when the extraordinary pro-
vidence, for their signal disobedience, was for some
time suspended. But for all that, though they strove
to disperse themselves amongst the people round about,
and projected in their minds to be as the Heathen, and
the families of the countries to serve wood and stone, yet
they should still be held under the government of a
theocracy: which, when administered without its na-
turally attendant blessing of an extraordinary pro-
vidence, was, and was justly called, the ROD AND BOND
OF THE COVENANT*. He is now fairly and openly
convicted. What shall be his punishment? That which
hath proved, hitherto, his Reader's; To write on.

VI. He proceeds, "Mr. Warburton's second ob-
jection against Dr. Spencer is—in his arguments for
the abolition of the theocracy, instead of attempting
to prove it on the great principles of civil policy,
the only way of determining the question with cer-
tainty, he insists much on the disuse of urim and
thummim, &c. He brings the despotic power of
the kings, as another argument, which I think
proves the very contrary. For were these kings
the viceroys of God, whose power was despotic,
theirs must necessarily be the same; not so, if
monarchs in their own right †.—In his arguments
for the abolition of the theocracy. Has Dr. Spencer
any arguments for the abolition of the theocracy be-
fore the days of Christ? He has no such arguments;
nor, I dare say, never thought of such a topic; be-
cause he tells us it continued to the last times of their
policy. He has indeed a section about the duration
of the theocracy, in which he lays down four theses,
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"about the gradual declining of the theocracy: And is one of them he shews it was not at an end in Saul and David's days, because in their time the divine oracle was consulted; that in Solomon's time, there was a disuse of urim and thummim, which was a most eminent pledge and indication of the divine government: From this he concludes it nearer ἀφανεία, to a disappearing. But since he allows it to continue for a thousand or eleven hundred years after this, how is it possible for him to bring arguments for the abolition of the theocracy from the urim and thummim? He could mean only an abatement." Hear now my own words, fairly printed together, in The Divine Legation; and let the Reader believe it, if he can:—This treatise is by no means in the number of those on which Spencer raised his reputation. He goes on a wrong hypothesis; he uses weak arguments; and he is confused and inconsistent in his assertions.

1. He thinks the theocracy was established by degrees and abrogated by degrees. A conceit highly absurd, as God was legislator. He thinks the first step to its introduction was the delivery at the Red sea; and the first step to its abolition, the Israelites demand of him a king: That it was more impaired when Saul and David got possession of the throne: That it approached much nearer its end when it became hereditary, under Solomon: And yet, for all this, that some obscure footsteps of it remained even to the time of Christ. 2. In his argument for the abolition of the theocracy, instead of employing the great principles of civil policy, the only means of determining the question with certainty, he insists much on the disuse of urim and thummim, &c. He brings the despotic power of the kings as another argument; which, I think, proves just the contrary. For were these kings the viceroys of God, whose power was despotic, their power must necessarily be so too: not so, if monarchs, in their own right.

3. Though, as we observed, Spencer, in the second Section of the fourth Chapter, supposes a gradual decay of the theocracy; and that even some obscure footsteps
steps of it remained to the time of Christ; yet in the following Section he all the way argues upon the supposition of an absolute and entire abrogation by the establishment of the kings*. And in evidence of this last assertion, I quote at the bottom of the page these following words of Dr. Spencer:—


This then is the whole of what I said of Dr. Spencer on this occasion. Where the Reader sees, my sole purpose was to prove my assertion, that Dr. Spencer argued weakly and inconsistently. In the first paragraph, I shew his arguments for a gradual decay are weak. In the second, that his arguments for an abolition are as weak. And in the third, that he was inconsistent, talking one while of the continuance of it to the time of Christ; and another, of its abrogation under the kings. Now what says our learned Doctor to all this? Why in the first place, he detaches the second paragraph from the first and third; though they all relate to, and connect with one another; and quotes it alone as if intire and independent. With such a liberty the Reader would reasonably think he might have made some shew at least of an argument: but, by the good provision of Nature, his head was made an exact tally to his heart. I had said that Spencer talked inconsistently in, first, supposing a gradual decay and continuance to the time of Christ; and yet saying that it was abrogated under the kings. What is his answer? "Since Spencer " allows it to continue for a thousand or eleven hundred " years after Solomon's time, how is it possible for him " to bring arguments for the abolition of the theocracy " from the disuse of urim and thummim? He could " mean only an abatement." That is in plain English —How is it possible a man should contradict himself? Or in still plainer—Your charge of inconsistency must be false, otherwise Dr. Spencer would be inconsistent.

VII. "The third objection of Mr. Warburton (says " our Doctor) is, that though Spencer in one place

* Div. Leg. Book V. § 3.

" suppose
supposes a gradual decay of the theocracy, and that even some obscure footsteps of it remained to the time of Christ, yet in the following Section he all the way argues upon the supposition of an absolute and entire abrogation by the establishment of the kings*. Here again is Dr. Spencer much misrepresented, from not considering what he meant by the abrogation of God's government. Not that the theocracy entirely ceased; but the government received an alteration and abatement. And therefore he uses more than once the phrase of Regiminis mutati, in this very Section, and tells us that when the Israelites desired a king—hac in re Deus ab arte regis politici non recessit. God did not recede from the art of a political governor, but consented to their requests in order to avoid a greater evil. Where is the absurdity or inconsistency of this way of reasoning, unless abrogation is made to signify a total abolition; and duration is to be construed cessation†?

"Spencer (says he) is much misrepresented; he did not mean by abrogation a ceasing, but an alteration and abatement." In the first place then, it seems that when one charges an author with contradiction in his expressions; if he had a meaning, that was consistent, he is much misrepresented. A good commodious principle for the whole class of Answerers! Secondly, he says that abrogation [regimen abrogatum] does not signify ceasing. Where did he get his Latin? Cicero, Livy, and all the Roman writers, lawyers, as well as philosophers, use it only in the sense of dissolution, abolition, and the entire ceasing of an office or command. What then does it signify? why it signifies an alteration and abatement. But now, where did he get his English? What! is an alteration of Government only an abatement of it? The alteration of a theocracy we understand: But what is the abatement of it? That indeed I cannot tell. But this I know, that we have here a sufficient proof of what I laid to his charge.

* Div. Leg. Book V. § 3.
† Exam. of Mr. IV's Account, p. 185, 186.
that he perpetually confounds the mode of government with the administration of it: alteration being applicable to the former; and abatement only to the latter. Thirdly he says—"and therefore Spencer uses more "than once the phrase of regiminis mutati in this very "Section."—Therefore! Wherefore? why, because, by abrogati he meant only abated; therefore he uses mutati, more than once, to explain himself; that is to say, because, by totum, I mean pars; therefore I use omne, more than once, to explain my meaning. Well, if he did not satisfy us before; he has done it now. But abrogation must not only signify prorogation, but, what is more, mutati must signify immutati. Till now we thought that mutatus had signified changed; a gross misrepresentation, says he; it signifies unchanged, though indeed abated or diminished.

Fourthly, he says that Spencer tells us, when the Israelites desired "a King—hac in re Deus ab arte "regis politici non recessit; God did not recede from "the art of a political governor." This the reader is to take as a proof of Spencer's holding that God did not give up his office; and consequently, that there could be no abrogation; for we have here to do with a very subtle reasoner. Seriously, the blunder is a delightful one! ab arte regis politici non recessit, according to our critic, signifies, that God did not recede from the art or exercise of governing; or did not throw up his office. He has translated the words, we see, verbatim; so that it is a little hard when he stuck so close to his text, he should be thrown so wide from its meaning: which is, indeed, no more than this, that God con descended to use the address of political monarchs, who, when they cannot stop or repel a torrent, contrive to elude it. And "where (says he) is the absurdity or "inconsistency of this way of reasoning?" Nay, for that matter, the reasoning is full as good as the translation. But here he should have stopp'd. For so fatal is his expression, when the fit is upon him, that he cannot ask quarter for one blunder without committing another— "unless abrogation is made to signify a total aboli tion, and duration is construed to be cessation?"

I can find (says he) no absurdity or inconsistency in Dr.

Spencer.
Spencer, without perverting the common signification of words. This is his argument—*Without calling duration, cessation*—so far is well. But he goes on—and, *abrogation, abolition*. And here he sinks again. For *abrogation was abolition*, in all nations and languages, till Dr. Sykes first pleaded in *abatement*.

In a word, the charge against Spencer was of *absurdity* and *contradiction* in one instance amidst a thousand excellencies. Dr. Sykes assumes the honour of his defence. But with what judgment he soon lets us understand, when he can find no other part of that immortal book to do himself the credit of supporting than his treatise of the *theocracy*. Like the ancient advocate of Cicero, who, while that great man's character was torn in pieces by his enemies, the flatterers of *Octavius*, would needs vindicate him from the *wart* upon his nose, against his friends.

Hitherto the controversy was unnatural. Dr. Sykes became advocate for Spencer against an accusation brought by the Author of *The Divine Legation*. But both soon return again to their proper business: *He to objecting against the extraordinary providence of heaven; I, to a defence of this certain and necessary consequence of a theocracy.*

VIII. "Let us now proceed (*says the learned Doctor*) to the second point, which relates to the exercise of an extraordinary providence over *particular persons* as well as over the *state* in general. The scripture representation of the theocracy, as Mr. Warburton assures us, was, 1. *Over the state in general*: and 2. *Over private men in particular*.*

I have no doubts about the former of these cases: For where a law was given by God, and he condescended to become king of a nation, and a solemn covenant was entered into by the people, and by God, as their king, and where *blessings* were solemnly promised upon obedience to the law, or curses were denounced upon disobedience: and this by one who was able to execute whatever he engaged; no doubt can be about the reciprocal obligations, or about God's performing his part of the obligation, since it is his property not

to lie nor deceive. Temporal rewards and punish-
ments being then the sanction of the Jewish law, these
must be dispensed by God so as to make the state
happy and flourishing if they kept the law, or else
miserable if they disobeyed it. If they observed and
did all the commandments, which God commanded
them, God had engaged to make them high above
all nations which he had made, in praise, and in
name; and in honour; and if enemies rose up against
them, the Lord would cause them to be smitten.
On the other hand, if they grew negligent of the law,
or went aside from any of the words commanded
them—to serve other gods, then the Lord was to
send cursing, vexation, and rebuke in all thou
settest thine hand unto for to do, until thou be
destroyed, and until thou perish quickly. The
blessings and curses were general and national, agree-
able to the character of a king, and a legal administra-
tion: Such as related to them as a people; and not
to particular persons*.”

Here, he assures us, “he has no doubts about the
extraordinary providence over the state in general.” And
he tells us his reason,—because “the Law was given by
God, and he condescended to become the king of the
nation, by a solemn covenant made with the people.”
This, I say, is his reason; when taken out of the verbisage
of his expression. Now if it can be proved that this very
reason holds equally strong for an extraordinary provi-
dence over particulars, this second point, as he calls it,
will be soon decided between us. In order to this, let
me ask him what those reasons are whereby he infer-
that, from God’s becoming king of a nation, he must
administer an extraordinary providence over the state in
general, which do not equally conclude for God’s ad-
ministering it over particulars? Is not his inference
founded upon this, That where God condescends to
assume a civil character, he condescends to administer it
in a civil manner? Which is done by extending his care
over the whole. If our Doctor says, his inference is not
thus founded; I must then beg leave to tell him, that he
has no foundation at all to conclude, from God’s being

* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 186, 187.
king, that there was an extraordinary providence exerted over the state in general. If he says, it is thus founded; then I infer, upon the same grounds, an extraordinary providence over particulars. For the justice of the regal office is equally concerned in extending its care to particulars as to the state in general. It may be asked then, what hindered our Examiner from seeing so self-evident a truth? I reply, an old inveterate blunder, with which he first set out; and which yet sticks to him. I have observed above, what confusion he ran into by not being able to distinguish between the form of government and the administration of it. Here again he makes the same blind work for not seeing the difference between a legislator and a king. "For where a law "(says he) was given by God, and he condescended "to become the king of a nation," &c. implying that, in his opinion, the giving a law, and the becoming a king, was one and the same thing. Hence it was, that as the legislative power, in the institution of good laws, extends its providence only over the state in general, he concluded, that the executive power, in the administration of those laws, does no more. Which brings him to a conclusion altogether worthy the abilities exerted in the dilucidation of his premisses—"The blessings and "curses (says he) were general and national, agreea-
"ble to the character of a king and a legal "administration."—What! Is it only agreeable to the character of a king and a legal administration to take care of the state in general, and not of particulars? So, according to this new system of policy, it is agreeable to the constitution of England to fit out fleets, to protect the public from insults, and to enact laws to encourage commerce; but not to erect courts of equity, or to send about itinerant judges. What makes our examiner's ignorance in this matter the more inexcusable is, that I had pointed out to him this distinction, in the following passage; the former part of which he has quoted, but dropt the latter, as if determined that neither himself nor Reader should be the better for it. My words are these:
It [the extraordinary providence] is represented as administered, 1. Over the state in general. 2. Over private men in particular. And such a representa-
tion we should expect to find from the nature of the republic; because as an extraordinary providence over the state necessarily follows God's being their tutelary deity [in which capacity he gave them laws]; so an extraordinary providence to particulars follows as necessarily from his being their supreme magistrate.

Here then I might fairly leave him, having proved my position on the very same principles, and in the very same manner, he has proved his own. But let us hear him out.

IX. He proceeds to tell his Reader what is the question between us. But we now know enough of him to be upon our guard whenever he begins to tell his story. And, in truth, it is no more than needs. For here he tops his part. "The question then (says he) that now is to be considered is, whether an extraordinary providence was administered to particulars in such a manner, that no transgressor escaped punishment, nor any observer of the law missed his reward. This was the state of the Jews under an equal providence, as Mr. Warburton tells us; and by this means human affairs might be kept in good order without the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. That God did bless particular persons amongst the Jews, as well as now he does in all nations, is certain; but that he so dispensed his favours, as that no observer of the law missed his reward, nor did any transgressor escape punishment, is far from being clear. The nation, considered as a nation, had this peculiar to it, that when they did evil in the sight of the Lord, they were delivered into the hands of their enemies. When they repented, and put away the strange gods from amongst them, and served the Lord, they were delivered. Instances of this are frequent in the book of Judges, and in the history of the Kings of Israel. But if we descend to an extraordinary providence over particulars, even in those times, I do not remember what will amount to proof."

* Div. Leg. Book V. § 4. † Ibid. § 5. † Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 187, 188.
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He says the question between us is, "Whether an extraordinary providence to particulars was administered in such a manner, that no transgressor escaped punishment, nor any observer of the Law missed his reward." On the contrary, he himself owns, in the very preceding paragraph, that the question between us is simply this, whether the extraordinary providence was only over the state in general; or whether it extended to particulars. And on that occasion fairly quotes the passage where I stated the nature of this extraordinary providence. Nay, in the very paragraph just quoted from him, he owns, in conclusion, that the question is about an extraordinary providence over particulars; without confining or extending it to this or that mode; for he denies the very thing itself. What then are we to suppose was his drift in changing the state of the question; and telling us now, that it is, "whether the extraordinary providence was administered in such a manner that no transgressor escaped punishment, nor any observer of the law missed his reward?" What think you? But to introduce a commodious fallacy under an ambiguous expression; that should be always at hand to answer his occasions? Which, we shall find as we go along, this always is. And indeed the cautious Reader (and I would advise no other to have to do with him) will suspect no less, when he observes that the words [no transgressor escaped punishment, nor any observer of the law missed his reward] quoted from me, are not to be found in that place where I stated the nature of the extraordinary providence; but in another. Where I speak of the consequences of it, in these words:—We have shewn at large in the first volume, that under a common or unequal providence, civil government could not be supported without a religion, teaching a future state of reward and punishment. And it is the great purpose of this work to prove, that the Mosaic religion wanting that doctrine, the Jews must necessarily have enjoyed an equal providence under which Holy Scripture represents them to have lived. And then, no transgressor escaping punishment, nor any observer of the law missing his reward, human affairs must be kept
OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS.

kept in good order without the doctrine of a future state*.—What now has this Answerer by profession done? He has taken the words [no transgressor escaping punishment, nor any observer of the law missing his reward] from their natural place, misrepresented their purpose, and given them to the Reader as my definition of an extraordinary providence to particulars; and, not content with that, has put this false and sophistical sense upon them, that no one single person, without exception, ever escaped punishment, or ever missed his reward. And in this monstrous sense he, by the worst prevarication, repeats, and applies them, on every following occasion, as the sole answer to all my reasonings on the subject of an extraordinary providence. To prepare the Reader, therefore, for a proper reception of all the miserable chicane that arises out of this his ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΨΕΥΔΟΣ, I shall here shew, that the words [no transgressor escaping punishment, nor any observer of the law missing his reward] could not mean by any rules of just construction, that every single person, without exception, was thus punished and rewarded; but only that this very extraordinary providence over particulars, was so exactly administered, as that no one could hope to escape it, or fear to be forgotten by it.

First, then, Let it be observed, that the words are no absolute assertion; but a consequence of something asserted.—And then no transgressor escaping, &c.—which illative words the honest examiner omitted. Now what had been asserted was simply this, that the extraordinary providence over the Jews was, in Scripture, represented as administered over particulars; but that this very administration would of necessity be attended with some inequalities†. Must not then the consequence I draw from these premisses be as restrained as, the premisses themselves? Secondly, I said, that God had promised an equal providence to particulars, but that he had declared at the same time how it should be administered, viz. in such a manner as would occasion some few exceptions. If therefore Dr. Sykes would not allow me, he ought to have allowed God, at least, the right of

* Div. Leg. Book V. § 5. † Ibid. § 4. explaining
explaining himself. *Thirdly,* had the words been abso-
lute, as they then might have admitted of two senses, did
not common ingenuity require, that I should be under-
stood in that which was easiest to prove, when it was
equally to my purpose? *Which is an extraordinary pro-
vidence over particulars in the manner here explained.
But there was still more than this to lead an ingenious
man into my meaning; which was, that he might ob-
serve, that I used, throughout my whole Discourse of
the *Jewish* economy, the words *extraordinary pro-
vidence* and *equal providence,* as equivalent. By which
he would understand that I all along admitted of ex-
ceptions. *Fourthly,* If such rare cases of exception
destroyed an equal providence to *particulars* (which
providence I hold), it would destroy with it the equal
providence to the *state* (which Dr. *Sykes* pretends to
hold). But if not for the sake of truth in opinion, yet
for fair-dealing in practice, Dr. *Sykes* should have inter-
preted my words not absolutely, but with exceptions.
For thus stood the case. He quoted two positions from
the *Divine Legation:* 1. That there was an extra-
ordinary providence over the state in general; 2. Over
private men in particular. He grants the first; and
denies the second. But is not the extent of that pro-
vidence understood to be, in both cases, the same? *Now
in that over the *state,* he understands it to have been
with exceptions, as appears from his own mention of the
cases of *Achan* and of *David.* Ought he not then, by
all the rules of honest reason, to have understood the
proposition-denyed, in the same sense he understands the
proposition-granted? If in the administration over the
state in general, there were some few exceptions, why
not in that over private men in particular?

But if now the candid reader will ask me why I em-
ployed expressions that, when divorced from the context,
might be abused by a caviller to a perverse meaning, I
will tell him: I used them in imitation of the language of
the apostle, who says that, under the *Jewish* economy,
*every transgression and disobedience received a just*
*recompence of reward.* And if he be to be understood
with exceptions, why may not I?

* Heb. ii. 2.
Having now exposed, as it deserves, this master fallacy, the rabble of sophisms, which follow it, and pretend to make their fortune by it, are easily dispersed. But before we come to that, we have something further to say to the paragraph in hand. We observed, that, in concluding it, he returns again to the true state of the question. These are his words—"But if we descend to an extraordinary providence over particulars even in those times [the Judges and Kings of Israel], I do not remember what will amount to proof." To assist his bad memory, or long absence from his Bible, I shall quote again from The Divine Legation, the following passages. In the dedication of the first temple, Solomon addresses his prayer to God, that the covenant between him and the people might remain for ever firm and inviolate, and the old economy be still continued. And after having enumerated divers parts of it, he proceeds in these words: When the heaven is shut up, and there is no rain, because they have sinned against thee; yet if they pray towards this place, and confess thy name, and turn from their sin, when thou dost afflict them: then hear thou from heaven, and forgive the sin of thy servants, and of thy people Israel, when thou hast taught them the good way, wherein they should walk; and send rain upon the land, which thou hast given unto thy people for an inheritance. If there be dearness in the land, or if there be pestilence, if there be blasting or mildew, locust or caterpillars; if their enemies besiege them in the cities of their land; whatsoever sore or whatsoever sickness there be: Then what prayer or what supplication shall be made of any man, or of all thy people Israel, when every one shall know his own sore, and his own grief: and shall spread forth his hands in this house; then hear thou from heaven and forgive, and render unto every man according unto all his ways, whose heart thou knowest*. The Psalmist bears his testimony to the same economy: I have been young (says he) and now am old: yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging their bread†. God himself declares it by the prophet Isaiah: Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him: for they shall eat the fruit of their doings. Wo

* 2 Chron. vi. 28. et seq.
† Psal. xxxvii. 25.
unto the wicked, it shall be ill with him: for the reward of his hands shall be given him*. And again: He that walketh righteously and speaketh uprightly, etc. he shall dwell on high: his place of defence shall be the muni-
tions of rocks, bread shall be given him, his waters shall be sure†. And we learn from a parabolical command in Ezekiel how exactly these promises were fulfilled: And the Lord said unto him, Go through the midst of the city, through the midst of Jerusalem, and set a mark upon the foreheads of the men that sigh, and that cry for all the abominations that be done in the midst thereof. And to others he said in mine hearing, Go ye after him through the city, and smite: let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity. Slay utterly old and young, both maids and little children, and women; but come not near any man upon whom is the Mark; and begin at my sanctuary‡, &c. But God, by the prophet Amos, describes this administration of providence in the fullest manner: Also I have withheld the rain from you, when there was yet three months to the harvest, and I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city: one piece was rained upon, and the piece whereupon it rained not, withered. So two or three cities wandered into one city to drink water; but they were not satisfied: yet have ye not returned unto me, saith the Lord. I have smitten you with blasting and mildew, &c.§. And again: Lo I will command, and I will sift the house of Israel amongst all nations, like as corn is sifted in a sieve, yet shall not the least grain fall upon the earth‖. Yet all this he had overlooked as not amounting, I suppose, to proof.

X. At last he owns I had allowed, "that the sacred writings themselves freely speak of the inequality of providence to particulars in such a manner as men living under a common providence are accus-
tomed to speak¶." Which shews it was impossible I should mean the proposition of No transgressor ever-

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* Chap. iii. 10, 11.  
† Chap. xxxiii. 15, 16.  
‡ Chap. ix. 4, 5, 6.  
§ Chap. iv. 7—11.  
‖ Chap. ix. 9.  
¶ Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 188. See also Div. Leg—Book V. § 4.
escaping punishment, &c. in the sense he has put upon it. But this is so far from shaming him for his prevarication, that, after having given examples to confirm my observation of the Sacred Writers speaking of the inequalities of providence, he goes on thus: "This objection taken from the complaints made by the Sacred Writers was so full and strong, that, though Mr. War-" burton promises to prove hereafter that an equal providence was actually administered, yet, for his Reader's present satisfaction, he will shew, that these representations of inequality are very consistent with that before given of the equality of providence. "I will examine with as much brevity as I can, what he has said; and leave you to judge whether he has said enough to give his Reader present satisfaction.*" The first remark I shall make on this passage is, that it represents me forced to make an acknowledgment, not out of any regard to truth, but through necessity.—Secondly, where he says that I promise to prove hereafter that an equal providence was actually administered, he mistakes, as usual, my sense, and supposes I meant, in the third volume of The Divine Legation. Whereas all, who understand that book, know I meant, in the latter part of the second, then in my hands. And even he himself may now see as much by the short view I have given of it, in the first part of these Remarks: where speaking of this matter, I express myself in the following terms:—Here the reader should observe that my argument does not require me to prove more than that an extraordinary providence is represented in Scripture to be administered: the proof of its real administration it is the purpose of this Work to give through the great medium of my theses,—The omission of the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments.—If therefore I clearly shew from the whole Jewish history that the matter is thus represented, the inference from my medium, which proves the representation true, answers all objections, both as to our inadequate conception of the manner how such a providence could be administered; and as to certain passages in Holy Scripture that seem to

* Exam. &c. p. 191.
clash with this its general representation. And yet both these objections (to leave no shadow of doubt unsatisfied) are considered likewise. These considerations our Examiner has now attacked. Let us see with what success.

XI. He tells the reader, my first consideration is, “That when the Sacred Writers speak of the inequality of providence, and the unfit distribution of things, they sometimes mean that state of it amongst their Pagan neighbours, and not in Judea, as particularly in the Book of Psalms and Ecclesiastes.” To this he replies,—“Asaph, or who ever was the author of the psalm before cited, complains heavily at the prosperity of the wicked. These wicked men were, it seems, not Jews, but his Pagan neighbours†,” &c. Would not any one, now, believe that this Psalm before cited was one I had cited, to prove that, in the Book of Psalms the writers of it sometimes mean that state of providence amongst their Pagan neighbours? So far from it, I had cited it to the very contrary purpose; as a proof of the extraordinary providence to the Jewish people, who are there all along spoken of. But what then? He had cited it a page or two before: and his trade required him to cite it again. Or did he, indeed, imagine, that when I said, The writers of the Book of Psalms sometimes spoke of that state of providence amongst their Pagan neighbours, I meant in every psalm? It is hard to tell. I have sometimes caught him at a worse inference. However, as he loves to be encouraged, I shall say no more to him of the Psalms, till he has cited, and of course misinterpreted, every one of them: and then he may hear further from me.

In the other case of Ecclesiastes (thanks however to the nature of the book) he has argued fairer at least. Much less still (says he) is the reflection of the preacher in Ecclesiastes designed to relate to his Pagan neighbours. It is an universal observation, that the work of God is inscrutable even to a wise man. On which account the author proposes to de-

† Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, p. 191, 192.
"clare, that no man could judge of either love or hatred by what was before him, since all things come alike to all, there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, &c. This was an evil among all things done under the sun, that there is one event to all. Has he made any exception for Israel? No: but he maintains, that the race is not to the swift; nor the battle to the strong; neither yet bread to the wise; nor yet riches to the men of understanding; nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all. Eccles. ix. 11. Could a wise man, under an extraordinary providence himself, talk in this manner, thus universally, and make no exceptions for his own nation? Did he not see a difference betwixt the people of Israel, and all other people? Or if there was such a difference as Mr. Warburton contends for, could he fail taking notice of it? Would not his own people be led into wrong notions by such universal assertions? I cannot therefore but think, that this solution given by Mr. Warburton is not only not sufficiently well grounded, but that it has no foundation at all, viz. that the Psalmist, and the Son of David, spoke of their Pagan neigh-bours, and not of the Jews, when they expressed themselves so strongly about the prosperity of the wicked and the misfortune of good men*. I now begin to think, he had some reason to lament, that a right good critical and grammatical comment has never yet been wrote upon the Bible†. Till then I shall beg leave to supply his wants with a short account of the general plan and purpose of this famous book. It is a philosophical inquiry into the chief good or summum bonum, so universal a subject of dispute amongst the ancient Sages; and managed much in their way; i.e. chiefly employed in detecting the false notions of happiness. And that it was not unusual for Solomon to personate the garb and manners of the Gentile Sages we understand by Josephus, in the story he tells of Solomon sending riddles to the king of Tyre as trials of the abilities of his wise men; whose sagacity, at that time, lay

* Examination of Mr. W’s Account, p. 195, 196.
† Princip. and Connex. of Nat. and Rev. Relig. p. 217.
chiefly, as we find by *Herodotus*, towards such kind of decyphering.

This alone is sufficient to shew us, that the sacred Writer addressed himself to his countrymen, not so much under the idea of a selected nation, as to part of the posterity of *Adam* and of the human race at large. Otherwise, to what purpose was this philosophical inquiry? For as the chosen people, their law expressly pointed out, and led them *directly* to, the *supreme good*: which, indeed, the sacred Writer, at last ends with: and he could do no other, both as he was a *Jew*, and as he addressed himself to his countrymen, neither of whom could long divest themselves of their peculiar character. *Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter* (says he); *fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man*.

But to be a little more particular. The *book opens* in this manner:—*Vanity of vanities, all is vanity. What profit has a man of all his labour which he taketh under the sun?* All things are full of labour. *Man cannot utter it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing. The thing that hath been is that which shall be—and there is no new thing under the sun.* *Is there any thing whereof it may be said, See this is new?—There is no remembrance of former things; neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come, with those that shall come after†?*. The propositions are here all general; and plainly relative to mankind at large: for some of them are not true with respect to the chosen nation; such as the assertion that *nothing was new under the sun, &c.* But the following words more expressly declare his meaning to be general, *And I gave my heart to seek and search out by wisdom, concerning all things that are done under heaven—I have seen all the works that are done under the sun‡.* In the *second chapter* he still more professedly assumes the character of an ancient Sage; and inquires whether happiness be to be found in mirth and jollity; in magnificence; in luxury; in wealth; in power; or in wisdom. All, but the last, he gives up.

* Chap. xii. 18. † Chap. i. 2—12. ‡ Ibid. 13, 14.
This indeed had some pretensions to it: for he found wisdom exceeded folly as far as light exceedeth darkness*. Yet, when he observed that the same thing happened both to the fool and the wise†; he rejected this likewise with the rest: and, now floundering deeper and deeper in his philosophical inquiries, he sinks at last into gross Epicurism, There is nothing better for a man, than that he should eat and drink‡, &c. But then adding, and of such good who can enjoy more than I§? This recalls his real character, and affords him an opportunity of ending the inquiry in a decent manner, For God giveth to a man that is good in his sight, wisdom, and knowledge, and joy: but to the sinner he giveth travail||, &c. Which was done with the finest address; and prevented what he had said just before, in his personated character, from giving scandal, or being misunderstood. Let me observe too, that there is no way of reconciling this last verse with the 14th, where he declares, that one event happeneth to all, than by supposing, he there spoke of the state of mankind in general; and here of the Jewish nation in particular. On this principle, several other contradictory passages, to the same purpose, must needs be interpreted. In the third chapter, having resumed his personated character, he seeks for happiness, and finds nothing but vanity, in the natural constitution of things. In the fourth chapter, he seeks it, and finds the same, in the moral constitution of things. And here he, all along, speaks of mankind in general. I have seen the travail which God hath given to the sons of men, to be exercised in it. He hath made every thing beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart¶.—Nay, there are some places where his thought must be confined to other countries, as where he says (chap. vi. ver. 2.) A man to whom God hath given riches, wealth, and honour—yet God giveth him not power to eat thereof, but a stranger eateth it. This could not happen under Solomon in the Land of Judea, when inheritances never went out of the twelve tribes. Again, And moreover, I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that

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wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there*. Are we to think that Solomon was afraid of saying, this was in Judæa, which he governed absolutely; and so disguised his expression to make us believe he meant it of the world at large? Or could the civil administration of the land, which he governed with so much wisdom and equity, be in the miserable condition here described? The fourth chapter begins—So I returned, and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun.—Returned! from whence? From a contemplation of the natural state of things, (spoken of in the preceding chapter) to the moral, every where over the whole face of the habitable globe;—all the oppressions that are done under the sun. But the 13th and 14th verses certainly allude to some fact out of Judæa. Better is a poor and wise child, than an old and foolish king: for out of prison he cometh to reign; whereas also he that is born in his kingdom becometh poor. In the same manner we must interpret the 14th and 15th verses of the ixth chapter; and the 5th, 6th, and 7th verses of the xth chapter. From hence, that is, from the end of the fourth chapter, to the conclusion of the book, the sacred Writer employs himself in miscellaneous reflections illustrating and supporting his main question: partly abstracted, in his assumed character of Sage; and partly practical and didactic, in his character of Preacher: till he comes to the conclusion of his inquiry after happiness, which he places in God: Remember thy Creator, &c. And in this part, agreeable to the character in which he speaks, he sometimes asserts an equal providence, and sometimes an unequal. As where he says, in behalf of the first—It is good that thou shouldst take hold of this; yea, also from this withdraw not thine hand: for he that feareth God, shall come forth of them all†. Whoso keepeth the Commandments shall feel no evil thing‡. But it shall not be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow; because he feareth not before God§. On the contrary he says, in the very following verse: There is a vanity which is

* Ver. 16. † Chap. vii. 18. ‡ Chap. viii. 5. § Ver. 13.
OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS.

done upon the earth, that there be just men unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked: Again, there be wicked men to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous*. This is worthy our observation. When, in the preceding verse, he had asserted an equal providence; and by the words, prolong his days, marked it to be such a one as we are told in the law, was administered over the land of Judea; when he comes to speak in this verse of an unequal providence, he as plainly intimates that he meant it in the world at large, by the introductory expression of, There is a vanity which is done upon the earth.

But, how the Book of Ecclesiastes came to be written; and how it came to be cast into this form; though such an inquiry might tend to illustrate and support our interpretation; I shall not at present, nor, perhaps, ever hereafter, think fit to inform our Examiner. What has been already said, is more than sufficient to justify my assertion, That when the Writer of Ecclesiastes speaks of the inequality of providence, he means that state of it amongst his Pagan neighbours:—The argument stands thus: There are several places in the Book of Ecclesiastes where an equal providence it asserted; several, where an unequal. These can be only reconciled by supposing, that, in the first case, he speaks of it as administered in the Land of Judea; in the second, as in the world at large. The supposition is justified in this manner: 1. by shewing, that the very expression, in both cases, supports this distinction: 2. that the author sometimes speaks in the personated character of a Sage or philosophical inquirer after truth; in which, he transports himself into the world at large; sometimes, in his own character of a Preacher, where he confines himself to the Jewish people.—But to go on now with our Examiner.

XII. "Mr, Warburton (says he) has given us a " second solution of this difficulty, no better, I think, " than the former. We sometimes find particular men " complaining of inequalities in events, which were " indeed the effects of a most equal providence: such " as the punishment of posterity for the crimes of

* Ver. 14.
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"their forefathers, and of subjects for their kings."
"These are indeed remarkable instances of an extra-
"ordinary equal providence, where no transgressor
"could escape punishment, nor good man
"escape reward, to tell us of transgressing forefathers
"escaping, and their innocent children being
"punished; of wicked kings under no misfortunes,
"and innocent subjects suffering on their account."

And thus he goes on, repeating his ἡμῶν Ἰνδος, for
eight pages together. For now this mystery of iniquity
begins to work. He must be content, therefore, to be
reminded (for the first time) that he here stands charged
with putting a false sense upon, no transgressor
escaping punishment, &c., by which alone his argument
is supported. And we shall have frequent occasion, as
we go along, to repeat his crime, and set this black mark
upon him. But so gross a misrepresentation does not
stand single. It is accompanied with another as gross,
which, however, seems rather to be the fault of his under-
standing. He expressly represents me as affirming, that,
by the law of God, innocent children were pu-
nished for their guilty parents; in a manner
that cannot be reconciled to justice, or goodness, or
impartiality in an extraordinary providence. An
atrocious accusation! and without a possibility of proof.
For in this discourse, which our author refers to, and
understands not, I had shewn, 1. That where the pos-
terity of guilty parents were deprived of any of their
natural unconditional rights for their parents’ crimes,
there, the posterity were not innocent. Which, I ob-
served, might be understood, from the law itself; where,
although God allowed capital punishment to be in-
flicted for Lese Majesty on the person of the offender,
by the delegated administration of the Law; yet con-
cerning his family or posterity he reserved the inqui-
sition to himself; and expressly forbid the magistrate
to meddle with it in the common course of justice. For
why was the magistrate forbid to imitate God’s
method of punishing, but because no power less than
omniscent could, in all cases, keep clear of injustice in

* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, p. 196, 197.  † Ibid. p. 197.
† Div. Leg. Book V. § 5.
such a perquisition? But I observed further, that God had expressly declared why he reserved this method of punishment to himself, in the place where he informs us, how, or in what manner, he was pleased to administer it. Your iniquities (says he) and the iniquities of your fathers together*, &c. 2. I had shewn, that where an innocent posterity suffered for the crimes of guilty parents, it was only in the deprivation of their civil conditional rights. For the Israelites, as Scripture informs us, were supported in Judæa by an extraordinary administration of providence; the consequence of which were great temporal blessings given them on condition; and to which they had no natural claim. Nothing therefore could be more equitable than, on the violation of that condition, to withdraw those extraordinary blessings from a father thus offending. To confirm which, I shewed, that it exactly corresponded with the practice of all states, in attaint of blood and confiscation†. And now, was it possible for the most arrant Answerer by profession, had he understood what was said, to charge me with holding, that by the law of God, innocent children were punished for their guilty parents in a manner that cannot be reconciled to justice, or goodness, or impartiality in an extraordinary providence? Not but we must think that he had read that dissertation. For there is scarce any part of it which, under this head, he does not quote: but in so absurd a manner, and to so absurd purposes, as evidently shew, that he understood not what he read. Of which take the following instances:

To prove that the importance of the doctrine of a future state was well understood by Moses, I shew, that the law of punising the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, was a provision opposed to the inconvenient consequences of its omission. For that the violence of irregular passions would make some sort of men, of stronger complexions, superior to all the fear of personal temporal evil. To lay hold therefore of these, and to gain a due ascendant over the most determined, the punishments, in this institution, are extended to the posterity of wicked men; which the instinctive fondness of parents for their offspring would make terrible, even to

those who had hardened themselves into an insensibility
of personal punishment* . Now this Dr. Sykes expressly represents as said to "get rid of this difficulty,
" viz. How innocent children being made to suffer for
" their sinning parents can be consistent with the law of
" an equal providence †." This is scarce indeed to be
believed, though we see his end in his prevarication.
For now the answer comes out easy in a mere denial—
" This is not consistent with the law of an equal pro-
vidence." Whereas had he told the reader truth con-
cerning my purpose, in the observation, then, in order to
answer it, he must have proved, that the punishment on
the posterity of a wicked man did not lay hold of his in-
stinctive passions; which, I suppose, would have not
been so easy. But indeed I am always ready to suspect,
that I attribute more to design in this Writer, than I
ought. And, in his repetition of this false representation,
there is something so natural, that I am almost ready to
acquit him of all practice.—" It is certain (says he)
" the instinctive fondness of parents will restrain, &c.—
" But this is not the case in hand. The previous
" supposition is, that no transgressor is to escape
" punishment, &c. The question then is, upon
" this supposition, how a guilty parent’s crimes can be
" visited upon his innocent children ‡." For is it
possible he should knowingly venture the being detected
in so gross a misrepresentation by any one who will but
turn to Book V. § 5. of The Divine Legation?

His next observation collects his scattered absurdities
together; and so frees us at once from the trouble of any
further quotations from him on this head.

He says, the Author of The Divine Legation goes on
and observes " that this punishment [of visiting the
" iniquities of fathers upon children] was only to supply
" the want of a future state. But how will this
" extraordinary economy supply this want? The
" children at present suffer for their parents’ crimes; and
" are supposed to be punished when they have no guilt,
" Is not this a plain act of hardship? And if there
" be no future state or compensation made, the hardship

† Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 199. ‡ Ibid. p. 201.
"done must continue for ever a hardship on the un-
"happy sufferer*. 1. The question is, whether this
law of punishing, was a supply to the want of a future
state? If it laid hold of the passions, as he owns above
it did, it certainly was a supply. However, he will here
prove it was none. And how? Because it was a hard-
ship. 2. He supposes that when children were punished,
in the proper sense of the word, they were innocent,
which is absolutely false, for then they were always guilty.
When the innocent were affected by their parents' crimes,
it was by the deprivation of benefits, in their nature for-
feitable. 3. He supposes, that if Moses taught no future
state, it would then follow that there was none. Which
puts me in mind of the same sort of confusion which
the first volume of The Divine Legation underwent.
Where speaking of the true foundation of morality, I ob-
served, (to the discredit of Atheism, which I thought
destructive of society) that an Atheist could not, on his
principles, find any grounds of moral obligation. Hence
it was inferred that, on my reasoning, an Atheist, who
transgressed the rule of right, would not deserve punish-
ment. A conclusion founded in the same logic with our
learned Doctor's, that, if an Atheist thought there were
no God, then there was none. Otherwise, how the right
consequences drawn by him, from premisses which he
never could have embraced but through a criminal negli-
gence or partiality, should be faultless, I then had not,
nor yet have penetration enough to discover†.

But he ends his false reasoning on this subject, as all
false reasoning must end, when drawn out to that com-
fortable length with which Dr. Sykes always regales his
reader, in complete unintellectual absurdity. "Mr.
"Warburton (says he) had before him the practice of

* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 202, 203.
† I would not here be supposed to hint at a very ingenious
Writer, who seems to have fallen into this mistake, in a Discourse
printed in the Works of the Learned for August 1743, intitled,
Remarks upon some Writers concerning the Foundation of Moral
Obligation. A Writer by no means to be ranked with the riffraff
now upon my hands. The Discourse here mentioned being one of
the most polite, candid, rational performances, I ever saw on that
side the question; and enlightened with a spirit of sublime and
unaffected piety, superior to all reasoning.
" modern
modern states in attain of blood and confiscation, and he allows this to be done with the highest equity; and says, thus it must needs be under a theocracy; God supported the Israelites in Judea by an extraordinary administration of his providence: the consequence of which was great temporal blessings given them on condition and to which they had no natural claim. Could any thing be more equitable, than on the violation of that condition to withdraw those extraordinary blessings from the children of a father thus offending? It is true, that the Jews had no natural claim to great temporal blessings. But then they had a claim to them from express promise; which is as good a claim in the present case as any natural claim whatever. They had this claim indeed on condition; a condition of certain behaviour, which if they complied with, no observer was to miss his reward. The case is put of an innocent child suffering on account of a guilty father. The innocent child has a right to temporal blessings by virtue of express promise; and no sin of the father can deprive him of these blessings without a violation of the covenant: for if it would, an observer of the law would miss his reward. It would therefore in the present case be so far from equitable to withdraw those extraordinary blessings from the children of an offending parent, that it would be a direct violation of contract and engagement: it would be a breach of promise in God, and consequently a thing impossible in itself. What is it that our Answerer drives at? He grants the Jews had no natural claim to great temporal blessings; he grants, these were given on condition of obedience; he grants, that a punishment was denounced on posterity for the crimes of their parents. These three things he grants. Yet he affirms "that it would be so far from equitable to withdraw those extraordinary blessings from the children of an offending parent, that it would be a direct violation of contract and engagement." And does not this great Legist see, that a conditional grant,

† Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 203, 204.
when conveyed through parents to children, if forfeited by the parent, does not descend, of right, to the children; and consequently, may at any time, with the utmost justice, be resumed? For when a thing is given to parents and their posterity, on condition of obedience; and, at the same time, the punishment of offending parents threatened on their posterity, is not the parents' good behaviour part of the condition? What is it then, that could thus confound the understanding of our learned Doctor? His own sophistical prevarications. Which generally reward their inventors as the Devil does a witch, after having served them in many juggling tricks, at length draws them into a rope, and there leaves them. I had said that an innocent posterity were sometimes punished for the crimes of their wicked fathers. I had likewise said that no transgressor escaped punishment, nor any observer of the law missed his reward. Now, instead of interpreting the first proposition as I explained it, in the very place where I used it, to signify no more than that an innocent posterity were deprived of civil blessings which their fathers had legally forfeited; he represents me as saying, that by the law of God, "innocent children were punished for their guilty parents in a manner that cannot be reconciled to justice, or "goodness, or impartiality in an extraordinary providence." Instead of interpreting the second proposition in the sense of the apostle, from whence I borrowed the expression, who says that under the Jewish economy every transgression and disobedience received a just recompence and reward, he will have it to be my meaning that no one single person, without exception, ever escaped punishment, or ever missed his reward: though, as I have shewn, it contradicts all logical rules of interpretation. And now see what comes of it. By applying these prevarications to the place in question, he argues in such a manner as if he never had the least conception of what others call the common principles of sense or justice.

XIII. My "third solution of the difficulty (he tells us) stands thus, admitting the reality of an equal providence."

* An Exam. of Mr. W's Account, p. 197.
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"providence to particulars, in the Hebrew State, the
administration of it must needs be attended with
such circumstances as sometimes to occasion those
observations of inequality, i.e. in plain terms, an
equal providence must needs be unequal. Is not
this a plain acknowledgment, that an equal providence
cannot be administered at all, since it needs must be
attended with such circumstances as must appear un-
equal*?" I say, an equal providence must needs be attended with such circumstances as to occasion men's
observations of inequality. This proposition he affirms
is, in plain terms, equivalent to this other, that an equal
providence must needs be unequal. Which may perhaps be true when he has proved these three points:
1. That his sense of no transgressor escaping punish-
ment is no prevarication. 2. That some inequalities, in
an equal providence, is the same thing as the common
providence. 3. That the observations of men must needs
be infallible. But to shew his answer in its full shame,
let us consider only the last of them. The reader may
take notice that the words, immediately preceding these,
of men's observations of inequality] speak of the false-
hood of such observations, even in the case of David
himself, who owned that he was sometimes too hasty
in judging of these matters. And that he understood
not the course of God's justice till he had considered
the way in which an equal providence must necessarily
be administered under a theocracy, and the conse-
quen ces of such an administration†. Having said this,
I join it to the proposition in question, by the conjunc-
tion for; [for even admitting] and refer to it by the
pronoun those, [those observations of inequality.]—
But we have here to do with a Doctor, as little like
David in his piety, as his sense: who, if the adminis-
tration of an equal providence, under a theocracy, must
needs be attended with the appearances of inequality,
will shew that God could not administer it at all: without
doubt, upon this principle, that God either ought not, or
cannot do, what man, with the degree of light God has
been pleased to give him, cannot comprehend. An

* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, §c. p. 205.

argument.
argument worthy this great advocate for the light of nature. But he is not a man to be serious with. Having done me the honour of giving me this proposition, that an equal providence must needs be unequal; he will then tell the reader what I must needs infer from it.—

"Is not this (says he) a plain acknowledgment that an equal providence cannot be administered at all, since"

—Since what? The reader may imagine his premisses require him to conclude thus,—"Since it must needs be attended with such circumstances as occasion an unequal providence." But this would be concluding like other men. No, he says—"since it must needs be attended with such circumstances as to occasion men's observations of inequality." And thus he himself at length betrays his own sophistry. The truth is, it was so hardy in the proposition, that he was even ashamed to repeat it in the inference. And so became the dupe, not of his returning honesty, but of his deserted courage. His whole argument indeed is one complicated sophistry. First, he takes what is there said of men's observations of inequality to be true observations; whereas, they are there said to be false ones. Secondly, he makes them to signify that men observed an unequal providence; whereas, they mean that men observed some inequalities in an equal providence: which (whether he understands it or no) is a very different thing.

He goes on thus: "But the instances he brings to solve this difficulty [namely, the appearances of inequality] are so many clear proofs against the thing itself." How unlucky! The instances I brought were to shew from whence the difficulty arose, not to solve it. But with this writer, to solve or to raise a difficulty is indeed much the same. Well, the instances however are these: 1. It appears from the reason of the thing that this administration did not begin to be exerted in particular cases, till the civil laws of the republic had failed of their efficacy. Thus where any crime, as for instance, disobedience to parents, was public, it became the object of the civil tribunal, and accordingly ordered to be punished by the judge. But when private and secret, then it became the object.

* Exam. &c. p. 205. † Exod. xxii. 15. and 17.
REMARKS ON SEVERAL

object of divine vengeance*. Now the consequence of this was, that when the laws were remissly or corruptly administered, good and ill would sometimes happen unequally to men. For we are not to suppose that Providence in this case generally interfered, till the corrupt administration itself, when ripe for vengeance, had been first punished. 2. In this extraordinary administration, one part of the wicked was sometimes suffered as a scourge to the other. 3. The extraordinary providence to the state might sometimes clash with that to particulars, as in the plague for numbering the people. 4. Sometimes the extraordinary providence was suspended for a season to bring on a national repentance: but at the same time this suspension was publicly denounced†. And a very severe punishment it was, as leaving a state, which had not the sanction of a future state of rewards and punishments, in a very disconsolate condition. And this was what occasioned the complaints of the impatient Jews‡, after they had been so long accustomed to an extraordinary administration.§

Now what is our Doctor’s answer to all this? Why still the old song—“If he is obliged in virtue of the theocracy to see that no transgressor escapes punishment‖.” And again,—“because otherwise, some transgressors would escape punishment¶.”—And again,—“whether an extraordinary providence over particulars was then engaged so as that no transgressor should escape punishment, no observer of the law should miss present temporal blessings, is the point to be proved**.” And again,—“The great point was first to have proved, that ever there was such an extraordinary providence to particulars as that no transgressor ever escaped punishment, nor did any observer of the law miss his present reward††.” This therefore being all his answer, I had given him his reply beforehand. And have now nothing to do but to arraign

* Deut. xxvii. 16. and Prov. xxx. 17.
† Isaiah iii. 5. lix. 2. lxiv. 7.
‖ Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, p. 206.
¶ Ibid. p. 207.
†† Ibid. p. 216.
him again, for a second attempt of putting off his false ware.

But his logic is so very entertaining, that he will allow us to divert ourselves with it a little; especially as he has given us so much leisure, by trusting all to one pitiful sophism. It is where he says, "It appears from the reason of the thing, that this administration did not begin to be exerted in particular cases, till the civil laws of the republic had failed of their efficacy. Thus, where any crime, as for instance, disobedience to parents, was public, it became the object of the civil tribunal, and is accordingly ordered to be punished by the judge. But when private and secret, then it became the object of divine vengeance."

Let this be admitted. Now, says Mr. Warburton, the consequence of this was, that when the laws were remissly or corruptly administered, good and ill would sometimes happen unequally to men.

On the contrary, I say, that this is no consequence at all: for upon supposition of an extraordinary providence, equally administered, the guilty persons ought to suffer by divine vengeance, and the corrupt and remiss magistrate too, as being guilty of a crime in not doing his duty*. Here we see our disputant mistook, which part of the syllogism he was to oppose: and so instead of the premises, denied the conclusion. For if he will admit that the administration did not begin to be exerted till the civil laws had failed, the consequence is necessary, that, when the civil laws were remissly executed, good and ill would sometimes fall unequally.

No consequence at all, says Dr. Sykes. Why? because "upon supposition of an extraordinary providence equally administered, the guilty persons ought to suffer by divine vengeance," &c. A man is to be tried by the common commission of oyer and terminer. Let this be admitted, says our Disputant. Why then, say I, the consequence is, that he must stay till that time comes. This is no consequence at all, replies he; for, upon supposition that he ought to be hanged sooner, he ought to be tried sooner. But then, good Doctor, if you had this supposition in reserve, why did you admit my

* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, p. 205, 206.

Vol. XII. E premisses,
premisses, which, when admitted, exclude your supposition?—I thought I had done with him on this head when I had laughed at him; but there is something so malignant against the law itself, in his answer to what I say of the suspension of an extraordinary providence, that the Reader must bear a little longer with us both. "This suspension (he tells the Reader) I say was publicly denounced. But (he says) not one proof is produced of such a public denunciation of the suspension of the extraordinary providence to particulars. The only passages referred to for this public denunciation, are Isaiah iii. 5. lix. 2. lxiv. 7. Here is certainly a great evil threatened to Jerusalem and Judah; but as for a suspension of an extraordinary providence, here is not one word. It is as true now as it was then, that iniquities will separate between us and God; and it has no relation to any suspension of an extraordinary providence for a particular time." Was there ever such a reasoner! Suppose from a passage in Livy, which speaks of the creation of a Dictator, I should infer that the consular and senatorial, the tribunitial and popular powers were all for a time suspended; would it be sufficient to say,—No; all which that passage proves is the erection of a supreme magistrate; and erecting a supreme magistrate, which is a thing that may be done now, does not infer the suspension of those particular powers. If to this fine reasoning, it be replied, that the inference was fair, because, from other parts of Livy, we learn there were such powers in the Roman state; which consequently on the erection of an higher must needs be suspended; would not that teach the Reader a ready answer to our Doctor? Is not an extraordinary providence as clearly declared by the Law of Moses, as the consular and tribunitial power by the law of Rome? And consequently, when God tells his people that he will withdraw his face from them for their sins, and return to them on their repentance, is not this as plain a denunciation of the suspension of that extraordinary providence, as the creation of a dictator was a suspension of all the other magistracies? But so perverse are these Answerers, and so much strangers to their

* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 211, 212. Bible.
Bible, that an extraordinary providence to particulars, which is a Scripture doctrine they dispute with me as if it was my own; and a future state amongst the Jews, which is their own, they would have not disputed, as if it were a Scripture doctrine.—This being premised, let the Bible now speak for itself. Isaiah iii. For behold the Lord of Hosts doth take away from Jerusalem and from Judah the stay and the staff, the whole stay of bread, and the whole stay of water,—Thy men shall fall by the sword, and thy mighty in the war, ver. 1—25. Chap. lix. Behold the Lord’s hand is not shortened that it cannot save; neither his ear heavy that it cannot hear. But your iniquities have separated between you and your God, and your sins have hid his face from you, that he will not hear, &c. ver. 1, 2. Ch. lxiii. In all their affliction he was afflicted, and the Angel of his presence saved them: in his love and his pity he redeemed them, and he bare them, and carried them all the days of old. But they rebelled, and vexed his Holy Spirit; therefore he was turned to be their enemy, and he fought against them, ver. 9—11. Ch. lxiv. And there is none that calleth upon thy name, that stirreth up himself to take hold of thee: for thou hast hid thy face from us, and hast consumed us because of our iniquities, ver. 7.

Well, says he, “But let us admit that a suspension of the extraordinary providence was publicly denounced, in these passages of the Prophet. It was a very severe punishment. To whom? Why to all the Jews—all of that nation, the virtuous and wicked, the good and the bad*.”—Again, “The Jews had been much accustomed to an extraordinary dispensation, and now this extraordinary providence is suspended and publicly known to be so. This was a severe punishment certainly to all good men, because God was wont, and had engaged himself to grant particular blessings to all such; whereas by this suspension they were no longer intitled to any of them†.” This is his representation of the state of the case: and from this he forms all his difficulties against

* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, p. 213. † Ibid. p. 214.
my reasoning. Where he got it, I know not: but certainly not from the Bible; the book of all others he seems the least acquainted with. Had he looked into that, he would have found that he had given the most false and injurious, because most contrary representation of this whole matter. For the Bible tells us, that the severity of the punishment, in this suspension, fell, as it ought, not upon the good, but upon the evil only. Hear God's own express declaration in the very place, where this suspension is denounced, viz. the third chapter of Isaiah; which, too, our Examiner pretends to have read. Say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him: for they shall eat the fruit of their doings. Wo unto the wicked, it shall be ill with him; for the reward of his hands shall be given him, ver. 10, 11. And we learn, from a parabolical command in Ezekiel, how exactly these promises were fulfilled—And the Lord said unto him, Go through the midst of the city, through the midst of Jerusalem, and set a mark upon the foreheads of the men that sigh, and that cry for all the abominations that be done in the midst thereof. And to others he said in mine hearing, Go ye after him through the city and smite: Let not your eye spare, neither have you pity. Slay utterly old and young, both maids and little children and women; but come not near any man upon whom is the mark; and begin at my sanctuary, &c. chap. ix. ver. 4—6. And now, will our learned Doctor be pleased to take this for an answer likewise to the concluding words of his paragraph? "The great point was, first to have been proved that ever there was such an extraordinary providence to particulars—This, I say, should first have been proved which, I apprehend, has not been done. Nor, in course, will any of these passages from the Prophet prove a suspension of that equal providence over particulars, which seems never to have been exerted."

I should not leave the passage, here quoted, without observing, that, where I have made the break, it went on with the old sophism, in this manner,—"As that no

* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 214.
OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS.

"transgressor ever escaped punishment, nor did any observer of the law miss his present reward." But I wave it, as beginning now to pity him. It has been observed of your notorious story-tellers, that, by often repeating a favourite tale, they have at last come to believe themselves. And thus it seems to be with our good Doctor. He has urged his own sense of the proposition so often to all my arguments (not less, I dare say, than twenty times) that he now seems in good earnest, to take it for mine.

XIV. But we are drawing towards a conclusion with him. The Author of The Divine Legation (says he) proceeds, in the last place, to give a full and general solution of the difficulty. It stands thus: the common cause of these complaints arose from the gradual withdrawing the extraordinary providence. Under the Judges it was perfectly equal. When the people had rebelliously demanded a King, and—God suffered the theocracy to be administered by a viceroy, there was—a great abatement in the vigour of this extraordinary providence—From hence to the time of the Captivity the extraordinary providence kept gradually decaying; till, on their full settlement after their return, it entirely ceased. This leaves us as much in the dark as any of the solutions before given. For the extraordinary providence, over particulars (by which is always meant such a providence that no transgressor escaped punishment, nor observer of the law missed his reward) kept gradually decaying to the Captivity. After Samuel’s time there was a great abatement in its vigour; and, from this time, it gradually decayed. Its abatement then must be in not inflicting constantly temporal evils on the one, or in not giving constantly temporal rewards to the other: or else—Well, to stop him short, it did consist in not giving constantly. What then? Why then (says he) it cannot be the former of these notions, because if the equal providence was not constant, it would come to be the same as unequal. For what is the common providence, or not extraordinary, but where transgressors are often not punished here, but go on and prosper in their wickedness; and good men are often
not rewarded but sometimes suffer*?" A most admirable argument! and, as well expressed. It cannot (says he) be the former of these notions—meaning, I suppose, that if the former of these notions be mine, he will shew it to be a false one. Well, but his reason; "Because if an equal providence was not constant, it would come to be the same as unequal." Very well quibbled again. What is not perfectly equal must needs be unequal. Therefore, as more than ten may be either eleven or eleven thousand; so unequal may signify, as well the highest degree of inequality, such as that providence exercised at present, or some small deviation only from equality. And this being so, he only desires you, in courtesy to his argument, to understand it in the first sense. And then with the same success, he will dispute against the Moon's equal or regular motion round the Earth. You Astronomers, says he (for, to do him justice, nothing comes amiss to him; he has confounded all men in their turns, and put every science out of countenance) you contend for the moon's equal or regular motion; and yet you are forced to confess that there are some inequalities or irregularities in that motion, arising from the sun's attraction, the elliptical figure of its orbit, and its not moving in the plain of the earth's motion. Now if your equal motion be not constant, it would come to be the same as unequal. For what is regular motion but that which has no irregularities? In short, you have a great difficulty to surmount when you attempt upon your scheme of equality to account for the representations of inequality, which Nature so plainly makes. As great authors as you are, what has been hitherto published is all confusion, and full of inextricable difficulties.

But, to make his argument wear the better, he has lined his quibble with an equivocation. Observe his words: if an equal providence (says he) was not constant, it would come to be the same as unequal.—But when? Why the quibble encourages you to understand presently; which is to the purpose: but if that fail, the equivocation authorizes you to understand many ages afterwards, though it be nothing to the purpose.

* Exam. of Mr. W's Account, &c. p. 217—9.
This equal providence of Heaven kept gradually declining in its vigour, till it became at last the present common unequal providence; and so could be no longer called equal or extraordinary. Thus again, the regular motion of the moon, as our great philosopher, who has so well accounted for its present irregularities, tells us, will probably, for the reasons he assigns, grow more and more irregular, till it become at last so unconstant, that it will be no longer a regular but an irregular motion.

But we are not yet to the stress of the affair. The old sophism lies yet at the bottom of the inky horn: but now indeed so worn and hackneyed, that it is scarce able to support a miserable quibble. Yet it still puts its best foot forward. This choice reasoning being introduced as usual, "The extraordinary providence over particulars; by which is always meant such a providence that no transgressor escaped punishment, nor observer of the law missed his reward."—Always meant! Yes, truly, I can't but say he is constant enough in this meaning: For which reason I must here, for the third time, remind him whom it belongs to.—"Mr. Warburton (says he) produces some evidence that an extraordinary providence revived after the return from the Captivity. He cites Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi. But none of these places prove any thing more than a promised blessing to the Jews nationally considered.*" Indeed? Why then had he not the honesty to quote those places in The Divine Legation which do prove more? particularly from the prophet Amos, where this extraordinary providence is considered as administered to particulars. The words quoted in Book V. § 4. of The Divine Legation are these—Also I have withholden the rain from you, when there was yet three months to the harvest, and I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city, one piece was rained upon, and the piece whereupon it rained not, withered †.—But he goes on—"It proves a very strong promise to bless the nation of the Jews—but as to a proof of an extraordinary providence in the sense that no transgressor was to escape punishment, nor no

* Exam. of Mr. H's Account, &c. p. 229. † Amos. iv. 7. ** OBSERVER.
"Observer of the law miss his reward, I cannot see the force of his argument*. But I can see the force of his, though: and therefore here again accuse him, for the fourth and last time, of a very vile prevarication that has run through all his reasoning upon this subject.

And now we are happily got through his whole Examination of my Account of the Nature of the Jewish Theocracy. A very singular composition truly! One part blunder, and two parts fallacy! Which though it may sometimes make, as a great writer assures us, a good man of the world, has here however made a very wonder. For this kind of cases, a very nice adjustment. Otherwise, in playing the knave (whether it be on paper or in public) folly is so apt to get the upper hand, that very often the first dupe a designing man makes, is himself; as, not to mince the matter, is the case of our Examining Doctor, whose wantonness in undertaking a subject he did not understand, has so far outstript his art in managing it, that, before his fallacy had time to impose upon others, his too frequent and indiscreet repetition of it had so worked upon himself, that he became no longer able to judge of any thing I had written: and therefore confesses (and I dare say truly) that what I have hitherto published is all confusion, to him, and full of inextricable difficulties†.

"But 'tis the sport to have the engineer

"Hoist with his own petar."

We have now passed through our Two Examining Doctors. Happy for them had they but known or understood that maxin of a certain celebrated French writer—

DE PRENDRE POUR VRAI CE QUE DIT UN AUTEUR
SANS REJETTER COMME FAUX CE QU’IL NE DIT PAS

In these we find so great a similitude of talents, that Dr. S. might very well be mistaken for Dr. S. were it not for some minuter differences; a kind of polemic badges, that just serve to tell us to what party either wearer belongs.

But adjusting the merits of such kind of authors, is now the least of my concern. I here bid a final adieu to

* Exam. of Mr. W’s Account, &c. p. 221. † Ibid. p. 222.

controversy.
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controversy, unless some very gross provocation draw me back. For though I have not overloaded the Public with writings of this sort, nor attempted to engage its attention but on subjects of high importance; yet even these will receive their best defence and support, by being carefully considered together, in the order I first delivered them. For, as Lord Bacon says excellently well, the harmony of a science, supporting each part the other, is and ought to be the true and brief confutation and suppression of all the smaller sorts of objections.

But in taking a formal leave it may perhaps be expected, that I should say something why I ever answered at all: and why I answered in this manner.

To the first of these questions I must needs confess, that I have never yet seen any thing which, in my own opinion, deserved my notice. But I was willing to submit to better judgments. The Public (says a Friend) by what I can perceive, thinks there is something in this pamphlet—thinks there may be something in that.—Well, I subscribe to the public judgment. I examine, I write, I confute. And what do I get by it? The mortification of being told, that now, forsooth, the Public wonders why I should spend my time upon such Writers. And in this manner I have been served—more than once. The Public says this; the Public says that: in short, the Public's a wag, and loves to divert itself at the expence of us poor authors. Of which diversion, having so fairly contributed my quota, I shall now beg leave to retire—Lusisti satis.—

As to the manner in which I have answered some of my adversaries: their insufferable abuse, and my own love of quiet, made it necessary. I had tried all ways to silence an iniquitous clamour; by neglect of it; by good words, by an explanation of my meaning; and all without effect. The First Volume of this obnoxious Work had not been out many days, before I was fallen upon by a furious Ecclesiastical News-writer, with the utmost brutality. All the return I then made, or then ever intended to make, was a Vindication* of my moral character, wrote with such temper and forbearance as seemed.

* See Vol. XI.
affectation to those who did not know that I only wanted to be quiet. But I reckoned without my host. The angry man became ten times more outrageous. What was now to be done? I tried another method with him. I drew his picture; I exposed him naked; and shewed the Public of what parts and principles this tumour was made up. It had its effect; and I never heard more of him. On this occasion, let me tell the Reader a Story.

As a Scotch Bagpiper was traversing the mountains of Ulster, he was, one evening, encountered by a hunger-starved Irish wolf. In this distress, the poor man could think of nothing better than to open his wallet, and try the effects of his hospitality. He did so: and the savage swallowed all that was thrown him with so improving a voracity, as if his appetite was but just coming to him. The whole stock of provision, you may be sure, was soon spent. And now, his only recourse was to the virtue of the bagpipe; which the monster no sooner heard, than he took to the mountains with the same precipitation that he had come down. The poor Piper could not so perfectly enjoy his deliverance, but that, with an angry look at parting, he shook his head, and said, Ay! are these your tricks?—Had I known your humour, you should have had your music before supper.

But though I had the Caduceus of Peace in my hands, yet it was only in cases of necessity, that I made use of it. And therefore I chose to let pass, without any chastisement, such impotent raliers as Dr. Richard-Grey, and one Bate, a Zany to a Mountebank. On the other hand, when I happened to be engaged with such very learned and candid writers as Dr. Middleton and The Master of the Charter-house, I gave sufficient proof how much I preferred a different manner of carrying on a controversy, would my Answerers but afford me the occasion. But, alas! as I never should have such learned men long my adversaries, and never would have these other my friends, I found that, if I wrote at all, I must be condemned to a manner, which all, who know me, know to be most abhorrent to my natural temper. So, on the whole, I resolved to quit my hands of them at once: and turn again to nobler game, more suitable, as Dr. Stebbing tells me, to my clerical function, that pestilent
herd of libertine scribblers, with which the island is overrun; whom I would hunt down, as good King Edgar did his wolves; from the mighty Author of Christianity as old as the Creation, to the drunken blaspheming Cobbler, who wrote against Jesus and the Resurrection*.

To conclude, then, if hitherto, in the course of my just vindication, any thing has escaped me, offensive to the candid Reader, I heartily wish it unsaid. Not for the sake of those, the so proper subjects of it, for, Si indignus qui facerem, at illi digni hac contumeliam sunt maxime; but for the sake of the Public, to whom I have obligations for their fair and generous reception of my Writings. Not but the candour and equity of their judgment will, I know, always carry along with it what I am now about to say, in alleviation of any harshness that may have escaped me, under all the calumny that envy, in the disguise of false zeal, has so liberally poured out upon me: which is this: That my sole motive in writing The Divine Legation was the discovery and advancement of Truth, and (in that) the support and establishment of Revelation. And if I needed a voucher, I have the pleasure to observe, that the encouragement given to this attempt, is sufficient to shew, that no considerable man, either in Church or State, did, indeed, ever think that I had any other motive.

* In a pamphlet, intitled, The Resurrection of Jesus demonstrated to have no proof. In answer to a late pamphlet, called, the Resurrection of Jesus cleared, &c. London, printed for J. Jackman, in Fleet Street. Price One Shilling.—But some say this was no Cobbler, but Dr. Morgan's own Apothecary, who now writes by his Master's receipts. Indeed, he is of so strong a complexion as to make it very probable he must be one whose trade it has been to apply himself only to the wrong end of human kind. But whether he be of this, or the other cleaner trade, I would recommend it to the fine gentlemen to consider, if it will not soon be necessary, for their honour, to profess themselves on the side of religion, since infidelity is thus fallen into attainder, and can now descend no lower.
A
LETTER

to
THE EDITOR

OF THE

LETTERS

On the Spirit of Patriotism, The Idea of a Patriot King,
and The State of Parties, &c.

OCCASIONED BY

THE EDITOR’S ADVERTISEMENT.

—is this my Guide, Philosopher, and Friend?—Pope to L. B.

SIR,

I ADDRESS this to you, as to a person different from
the Author of these Letters. My respect for L. B
character will not suffer me to think you the same. You
Advertisement is the cruelest and most unmanage
attack on the honour of his deceased Friend; and it
appears to be under all the ties of that sacred relation
defend and protect it.

Your charge against Mr. Pope, is in these words,—
"The original draughts [of these Letters] were intrusted
"to a man, on whom the Author thought he might 
"entirely depend, after he had exacted from him, and take
"his promise, that they should never go into any hand
"except those of five or six persons, who were the
"named to him. In this confidence, the Author rete 
"securely for some years; and though he was not with
"out suspicion that they had been communicated 
"and o
more persons than he intended they should be, yet he was kept, by repeated assurances, even from suspecting that any copies had gone into hands unknown to him. But this man was no sooner dead, than he received information that an entire edition of 1500 copies of these papers had been printed; that this very man had corrected the press, and that he had left them in the hands of the printer, to keep with great secrecy till further orders. The honest printer kept his word with him better than he kept his with his friend; so that the whole edition came, at last, into the hands of the Author, except some few copies, which this person had taken out of the heap, and carried away. These are doubtless the copies which have been handed about, not very privately, since his death. The rest were all destroyed in one common fire.—By these copies it appeared, that the man who had been guilty of this breach of trust, had taken upon him further to divide the subject, and to alter and omit passages, according to the suggestions of his own fancy. What aggravates this proceeding extremely is, that the Author had told him, on several occasions, amongst other reasons, why he could not consent to the publication of these papers, that they had been written in too much heat and hurry for the public eye.—He chanced to know that scraps and fragments of these papers had been employed to swell a monthly magazine, and that the same honourable employment of them was to be continued—The Editor, therefore, who has in his hands the genuine copy—resolved to publish it.

This is the charge. And as to the fact, that "Mr. P. did print an entire edition of Lord B’s Letters without his consent," it must, as far as I can see, be taken for granted. For the man accused is dead. He cannot speak for himself; and his papers, which might have spoken for him, were all of them devised, by the dying man’s last Will, to the trust and absolute disposal of his noble friend.

My complaint (and, I persuade myself, all impartial men will indulge me in it) is, that the charge is enforced with
with so unfriendly, nay, so vindictive a severity, that the public is even invited to think the worst of the offender's intention: there being nothing so base, or so mean, which the terms of the accusation will not justify them to infer from it.

Since, therefore, you have so far forgot the office of a fair accuser, as not only to avoid assisting the judgment of the tribunal, you appeal to, in the nature of the fact; but to prefer your accusation in such terms as must necessarily mislead it; let me be allowed to remind the Public of what you have so disingenuously omitted or disguised. Which I shall do no otherwise, than by considering all the possible motives Mr. P. could have for this action, supposing it to have been committed in the manner charged upon him. For though the motive cannot so alter the nature of actions, as to make that right, which, in itself, is wrong: yet it may alleviate the weight of the very worst; it may make others pardonable, which are confessedly bad; and in some again, it may give even to their obliquities, an amiableness which a truly generous mind would honour; and which the severest casuists would only degrade into the limbus of their splendid peccata. Whether the crime, in question, be not of this class must be submitted to the tribunal, to which we now make our joint appeal.

In an offence of this nature, committed by one author against another, the motive, that most readily occurs to us, is plagiarism: so that one might suspect this breach of trust was accompanied with an intended violation of property; and that the offender proposed assuming to himself the glory of his friend's performance; especially as he took the liberties here complained of, "to divide the subject, and to alter and omit passages according to the suggestions of his own fancy." But if, in criminal proceedings, it be held a reasonable answer to the charge of a paltry theft, that the accused was immensely rich, we shall need no other plea to acquit Mr. P. of this suspicion. Besides, the Author of the Letters was well known to all L. B's friends; the title-page of this surreptitious edition tells us, they were written by a Person.
OF THE LETTERS.

Person of Quality; and the honest printer himself knew the true author, as appears by his applying to Lord B. with information of the 1500 copies.

As to any lucrative views; if Mr. P's beneficent temper, his generous contempt of money, which made him at several periods of his life refuse an honourable pension from ministers of more than one denomination; and decline every other way of establishing his fortune than by a noble appeal to the public taste: if this, I say, will not acquit him of so mean a suspicion, I might appeal to the very circumstances of the fact itself. His prints, at a considerable expense, 1500 copies of an eighteen-penny pamphlet, to lie in the printer's warehouse; and which, according to your own account, did actually lie there till his death. And what book? one, which of all the Author's writings, was least calculated to catch the public attention (however this extraordinary Advertisement may now raise their curiosity) as the subject of it had been so often hackneyed over in the papers of the Craftsman. Had profit been his point, who can doubt but he had rather chosen some of Lord B's historical tracts, which he had equally in his possession?

Least of all will it be suspected to have been done to injure L. B. in his fame or fortune; the book itself being manifestly calculated to support both, by putting him in that light wherein he most affects to be seen, a dispassionate and disinterested lover of his country. Had Mr. P. designed to hurt his ease or reputation, he would probably have enriched us with his philosophical or theological works, whose noble Friend gives less quarter to religious prejudices, than, here, to political corruptions; and which, by their being kept unpublished, deprive Religion of one considerable advantage.

In a word, had Mr. P. been conscious to himself of any low, oblique, or unfriendly motive, how happened it that, at his death, he chose it should come to the knowledge of his Friend? That he did chuse it, is most certain. "His honest printer," you tell us, "faithfully "kept his word with him." His last illness was long
and tedious, and known by him, as well as by his physicians, to be fatal. He might therefore have burnt these 1500 topics with a secrecy equal to the ostentation with which they were all destroyed in one common fire by this depository of the writings and reputation of a man, whose last vows to Heaven were for the prosperity of his surviving Friend.

But, if we allow the fact, some reason, after all, must be given for committing it. We have seen the high absurdity of supposing it to be on any of the motives already mentioned: which, indeed, only envy and malignity can suggest. One, only, remains: and happily, it is that which every man, at first sight, must acknowledge to be the true; an excessive and superstitious zeal for Lord B's glory. He paid, as all the world knows, a kind of idolatrous homage to the divine attributes of his friend. And should this be thought a folly by sober admirers, (a strange one it must be to Lord B. himself) yet, sure his Lordship, though the last, in justice, should be the first, in pity, to forgive it.

He was not only the warmest advocate for his Lordship's private and public virtues against his adversaries, but even against himself. It was his common subject of complaint, amongst his other friends, that Lord B. was faultily negligent of his glory, even where the good of his country, and the happiness of the world, depended on its being unveiled. That, though he seemed to be sent down hither by Providence, from some higher sphere, to become the conservator of the rights and reason of mankind, yet he suffered his actions to be misrepresented, and his character to be blackened, even where the shining himself, truly, tended to the happiness of the erroneous. And this being an important concern, was the reason, I suppose, why his Friend chose to prevent the loss of these Letters: which, likewise, very well account for his allaying the extreme splendor of them, so offensive to mere mortals, with that terrestrial mixture of his own.

The very circumstance, which you, Sir, well express, where you say, "he had taken upon him, further to divide the subject, and to alter and omit passages, according to"
OF THE LETTERS.

"the suggestions of his own fancy." Perhaps too he thought himself something more than a *porte-feuille* of his friend’s papers; for he frequently told his acquaintance (to whom I appeal on this occasion) that L. B. would, at his death, leave his writings to his disposal—a mutual confidence! which they placed in one another. But the execution of Mr. P’s part, at the same time that it makes the other probable, prevents our having any written evidence of it. But concerning the particular nature of those changes and interpolations, and the difference between the two editions, I shall say no more at present.

Having seen Mr. P’s motives for printing, the reader may be curious to know when he thought of publishing. It could not be till he had the author’s leave: that, the long detention of the pamphlet in the printer’s warehouse sufficiently shews. It could not be in expectation of his death: that, the great disparity in the chance of survivorship will not allow us to suppose. Besides, to what purpose was the expence of printing, and the hazard of secreting an edition, projected now, when he would have had it equally in his power, if that event happened, to do it then? We have nothing left, even on your own state of the case, but to believe that he expected very speedily to obtain L. B’s concurrence. What grounds he had for such expectation, the prudent disposition of his papers will not permit us to say.

The too eager pursuit then of his Friend’s glory being his only motive for this presumptuous liberty (a truth so evident, that, I am persuaded, Mr. P. has not a single friend or acquaintance remaining, who does not as firmly believe it, as that L. B. wrote the Letters, and that Mr. P. committed them to the press) since this, I say, is the case, his Lordship’s known *virtue* will never suffer me to suppose that you, Sir, and the Author of these Letters, can be the same person.

His known *wisdom* would less endure such an imputation. Whatever you, Sir, may think, his Lordship’s glory will never stand fairer with posterity, than in the
lines of this immortal poet. So that to defile the mirror, which holds him up, by a kind of magic virtue; to the admiration of all times and places, would indeed shew him more detached from the world, and indifferent to censure, than even you, his apologist, think fit to represent him. It must surely be some fatal necessity that could make him willing to risk so flattering an advantage. And yet your advertisement supplies neither him nor your reader with any excuse of this nature. You thought fit, I will suppose, that some reason should be given for the publication of the Letters. But had not your Bookseller done this already, when he so often told the public, that it was "to prevent their being imposed on by a "spurious and mangled edition, of which one or two "scrapes had appeared in a Magazine?" Possibly you will say, the reader might expect to know how they came there. Why then did you not seek out and detect the man engaged in that honourable employment, as by a proper irony you call it? Sure it was no difficult matter: for you tell us, again, that some of the copies had been handed about not very privately since Mr. P’s death. Besides, the law would have obligated the proprietor of the Magazine to discover from whom he had received his stolen goods. Why then so much tenderness for him, who manifested his design by publishing, and so little for him, who only gave suspicion of it, by printing? Or did the order of things, which, indeed, (in Mr. P’s language of his Lordship) was here violated, require, that vengeance should pursue, and trace up the crime, to the original offender: who had so audaciously stretched his hand to the forbidden tree, and gathered, without leave, of the knowledge of political good and evil? Or if the severity of justice required, even this; was it not enough to say, that the mischief came first from Mr. P. by his giving abroad too many copies; without telling their common enemies, that he had printed fifteen hundred? For it came not from these, (which, you own, “were all destroyed in one common fire”) but from a straggling copy which escaped that desolation. As this brand therefore on Mr. Pope’s memory was needless, it could not come from the hand of his noble Friend.

But
OF THE LETTERS. 67

But whatever high notions I myself may have of L. B. I am not so vain to think my readers must needs subscribe to them: They may, Sir, for aught I know, believe you and him to be the same. And then, I am half afraid, even his character, great as it is, will not secure him from their censure. Are the laws of friendship then so weak (may some of them be apt to say) are its bonds so slight, that one imprudent action committed against the humour of a friend, (in a mistaken fondness for his glory, which came near to adoration) that one shall obliterate the whole merit of a life of service, though flowing from the warmest heart that the passion of friendship ever took possession of? Obliterate, will they say, nay pursue, with inexorable vengeance, the poor delinquent to the foot of the most merciless tribunal; that public, one part of which he had much offended by a vigorous war upon the general profligacy of manners; another, much more offended by the insufferable splendor of his talents; and no small nor inconsiderable part, by his over-zealous attachment to his very accuser? Unhappy Poet! will they say, who has received the only wound to his honour from the hand of that friend, whose reputation, for many years, he had singly supported against an almost universal prejudice. But more unhappy friendship, if these be thy iniquitous conditions! Who after this shall seek, in thee, a solace for the cares of private life; or believe thee to be, what thou hast been so often boasted, the purest and largest source of public virtue? Never, after this, wilt thou be thought deserving of a fairer or better progeny than modern patriotism. Where true love of our country is, there friendship wears a different face. At such time it has been known, that when real and repeated injuries had torn in sunder a well-united friendship, the death of one has buried every past resentment, and revived, in the bosom of the other, all his ancient tenderness: as if the refined and defecated passions of him, who had shaken off mortality, had, by that divine sympathy of affections which lives in friendship, communicated of their virtue to the survivor. Nay, I have heard, some where or other, of a man, who, when his dying friend (at the instigation, and to quiet the impotent passions, of another;
another; for what generous mind has not been hurt by ill-placed friendships?) had inserted an unkind clause against him in his last Will, took no other revenge for an injury so unprovoked, than by doubling the legacy his deceased friend had left to an old faithful servant, because the survivor deemed it to be too little.

But the greatest have their weaknesses. A *French* author, I have some time read, who has given us a history of the *Hermetic Philosophy*, brings almost every great name into the number of his alchenists. He gives them all their due, but concludes every various eulogium alike — "now his folly was in hoping to *extract gold from baser metals.*" And may we not, after all the good that may be said of our illustrious Poet (and there are few of whom so much can be *justly* said) lament, that the folly which ran through his whole life was, in trying to *extract friendship from politics.*"

However, Sir, let the world think as it may. I must still persist in believing, that that noble Person had no hand in your *Advertisement*. On this principle, perhaps, it will be said, I might have left it to its own fortune, as not at all likely to mislead posterity; while it represents Mr. P. as mean, low, interested, and perfidious, whose nature, if I were to define it, I should do it by the word *friendship*; so pure and so warm was the ray of that sacred passion, which animated and governed all his faculties. But when I consider how light a matter very often subjects the best established characters to the suspicions of posterity, posterity, often as malignant to virtue as the age that saw it envious of its glory; and how ready a remote age is to catch at a low revived slander, which the times that brought it forth saw despised and forgotten almost in its birth, I cannot but think it a matter that deserves attention. These *Letters*, Sir, of your publishing, afford us an indignant instance. The chastity of the *first Scipio Africanus*, in the case of the *Spanish* captive, was as celebrated, and as notorious as Mr. P’s friendship for L. B. But one *Valerius Antias* (for calamity and history, the *Oldmixon of Rome*) "made no scruple to assert, that, far from restoring the fair Spaniard..."
OF THE LETTERS.

"Spaniard to her family, he debauched and kept her." One would have hoped so mean a slander might have slept forgotten in the dirty corner of a poor pedant's common-place. And yet we see it quoted as a fact †, by an instructor of kings. Who knows, but that at some happy time or other, when a writer wants to prove, that real friendship becomes a great man no more than real chastity †, this Advertisement of yours may be advanced to the same dignity of credit with the calumny of Valerius Antias? If it should, I would not undertake to dispute the fact, on which such an inference might be made; for I remember Tully, a great statesman himself, long ago observed, "Veræ amicitiae difficilissime reperiuntur in isis, "qui in republica versantur."

* A. Gellius.
† "Now the reputation of the first Scipio was not so clear and uncontroverted in private as in public life; nor was he allowed by all to be a man of such severe virtue as he affected, and as that age required. Nercius was thought to mean him in some verses Gellius has preserved. And Valerius Antias made no scruple to assert, that, far from restoring the fair Spaniard to her family, he debauched and kept her. Notwithstanding this, what authority did he not maintain? in what esteem and veneration did he not live and die?" p. 404, of The Idea of a Patriot King.

The words of Nercius are these, "Etiam qui res magnas manu sepe gessit gloriose, "Cujus facta viva nunc vigent; qui apud gentes solus "Frascat: eum suus pater cum pallio uno ab amica abduxit."

These obscure verses were, in Gellius's opinion, the sole foundation of Antias's calumny, against the universal concurrence of Historians. His ego versibus credo adductum Valerium Antiatem adversum ceteros omnes scriptores de Scipionis moribus sensisse, L. vi. c. 8. And what he thought of this historian's modesty and truth, we may collect from what he tells us of him in another place, where, having quoted two tribunical decrees, which he says he transcribed from Records [ex annalium monumentis] he adds, that Valerius Antias made no scruple to give the lie to them in public. "Valerius autem "Antias, contra hanc decretorum memoriam contraque auctoritates "veterum annalium"—dixit, &c. L. vii. c. 19. And Livy in his xxxvi. B. quoting this Antias for the particulars of a victory, subjoins, concerning the number slain, "scriptori parum fidei sit, quia "in eo augendo non alius interponentior est." And he that will amplify on one occasion, will diminish on another; for it is the same intemperate passion that carries him indifferently to either.

† See p. 201, of "The Idea of a Patriot King."
TO THE EDITOR, &c.

In conclusion, what we may learn from the moral of the tale is this, That excess, though in the social passions, lays us more open to popular censure than even the total want of them: because such excesses often produce effects that low minds cannot understand; or if they could, they would still want hearts warm enough to feel the value of them.

I am, Sir, &c.
A VIEW

OF

ORD BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY,

COMPLETE,

IN FOUR LETTERS TO A FRIEND;

which his whole System of Infidelity and Naturalism is exposed and confuted:

1754,

WITH

AN APOLOGY

FOR THE TWO FIRST LETTERS,

PREFIXED:

1755.

ître du feu President Montesquieu à l'Auteur.

anslation of ditto.

POLOGY for the two first Letters.

ETERS I. II. III. IV. of the View, &c. addressed to Ralph Allen, Esq.
LETTRE

du feu President MONTESQUIEU

à l'AUTEUR.

J'AY reçu, Monsieur, avec une reconnoissance très grande, les deux magnifiques ouvrages que vous avés eù la bonté de m'envoyer, et la lettre que vous m'aves fait l'honneur de m'écrire sur les œuvres posthumes de My Lord Bolingbroke : et comme cette lettre me paroit être plus à moi que les deux ouvrages qui l'accompagnent, auxquels tous ceux qui ont de la raison ont part, il me semble que cette Lettre m'a faït un plaisir particulier. J'ay lu quelques ouvrages de My Lord Bolingbroke, et s'il m'est permis de dire comment j'en ai été affecté, certainil il a beaucoup de chaleur : mais il me semble qu'il l'employe ordinairement contre les choses, et il ne faudroit l'employer qu'à peindre les choses. Or, Monsieur, dans cet ouvrage posthume, dont vous me donnes une idée, il me semble que vous prepare une matiere continuelle de triomphe. Celui qui attaque la Religion revelée n'attaque que la Religion revelée ; mais celui qui attaque la Religion naturelle attaque toutes les Religions du monde. Si l'on enseigne aux hommes qu'ils n'ont pas ce frein ci, ils peuvent penser qu'ils en ont un autre : mais il est bien plus pernicieux de leur enseigner qu'ils n'en ont pas du tout. Il n'est pas impossible d'attacker une Religion revelée, parce qu'elle existe par des faits particuliers, et que les faits, par leur nature, peuvent être une matiere de dispute : mais il n'en est pas de même de la Religion naturelle ; elle est tirée de la nature de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas disputer, et du sentiment interieur de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas disputer encore. J'ajoute à ceci, Quel peut être le motif d'attaquer la Religion revelée en Angleterre ? on l'y a tellement purgé de tout prejudgé destructeur qu'elle n'y peut faire de mal, et qu'elle y peut faire, au contraire, une infinité de biens. Je sais, qu'un homme en Espagne...
ou en Portugal que l'on va bruler, ou qui craint d'être brulé, parce qu'il ne croit point de certains articles dependans ou non de la Religion revelée, a une juste sujet de l'attaquer, parce qu'il peut avoir quelque esperance de pourvoir à sa defense naturelle: mais il n'en est pas de même en Angleterre, où tout homme qui attaque la Religion revelée l'attaque sans interest, et où cet homme quand il reussiroit, quand même il aurait raison dans le fond, ne feroit que detruire une infinité de bien praticques pour etablir une verité purement speculative.

J'ay été ravi, &c.

Montesquieu.

A Paris, ce 26 May 1754.

LETTER

from the late President Montesquieu
to the Author.

SIR,

I AM extremely obliged to you for the magnificent Present you have been pleased to make me of your Books, and for the Letter you did me the honour to write me on Lord Bolingbroke's Posthumous Works. As that Letter seems to be rather more my own than the two Books which accompany it, every reasonable creature being interested therein as well as myself, I enjoy it with particular delight. I have dipped into some of my Lord Bolingbroke's Discourses; and, if I may be allowed to say in what manner they affected me, I must own that he writes with a good deal of warmth; but methinks he generally employs it against things, whereas it ought to be employed only in painting them. Now it appears to me that, in the posthumous work of which you have given me an account, he hath prepared for you, Sir, continual matter of triumph. He who attacks revealed Religion, attacks revealed Religion only; but, he who attacks natural Religion, attacks all the Religions in the world. Though men should be taught to disbelieve the obligations of revealed Religion, they may still think themselves bound by some other; but it is most pernicious to endeavour to persuade them.
them that they are bound by none at all. It is not impossible to attack a revealed Religion, seeing it depends on particular facts, and facts are, in their own nature, liable to be controverted; but that is not the case with natural Religion; for it is drawn from the nature of Man, which cannot be disputed, and from the internal sentiments of mankind, which are equally indisputable. Besides, what motive can there be for attacking revealed Religion in England? In that country, it is so purged of all destructive prejudices, that it can do no harm; but, on the contrary, is capable of producing numberless good effects. I am sensible that, in Spain or Portugal, a man who is going to be burnt, or afraid of being burnt, because he does not believe certain articles, whether depending or not depending on revealed Religion, hath very good reason to attack it, because he may thereby hope to provide for his natural defence. But the case is very different in England, where a man that attacks revealed Religion does it without the least personal motive; and where this champion, if he should succeed, nay, should be in the right too, would only deprive his country of numberless real benefits, for the sake of establishing a merely speculative truth. I was charmed, &c.

Montesquieu,

Paris, May 26, 1754.
AN

APOLOGY

FOR

THE TWO FIRST LETTERS:

WHICH MAY NOW SERVE FOR

A VINDICATION OF THE WHOLE.

ON after the publication of the two first of these Letters, I had the honour of an anonymous adversary, in the warmest terms of friendship lamenting displeasure, which my treatment of Lord Bolingbroke given to that part of the Public, where the Adversary had an opportunity of making his observations.

Here was in this friendly notice so many sure marks of the Writer’s regard to the Author of the View; so good sense, elegance, and weight of authority in composition; and the whole so superior to every thing, but the force of plain and simple truth, that I had much pleasure in the honour of the admonition, as I real pain for the occasion.

He assures me I shall never know from what hand it is; so that when such a Writer will remain unknown, foolish as well as indecent to presume to guess.

Yet I am very confident that a Friend so generous and never intend, by keeping himself out of sight, to give me of the means of vindicating my conduct to others.

I am rather inclined to think, that he took this good to oblige me to convey my Apology to him, for he had a right to expect, through the hands of that Public, which appear to have none: and which yet, I persuaded, it was his principal concern, I should first of all. For I must inform my Reader, that the severe reflections,
reflections, I am about to quote, are not his proper sentiments, but the sentiments of those whom he is pleased to honour with the name of the Public.

They are introduced in this manner: *I am grieved to the heart to find the reception your two Letters meet with from the World.*—I am very sure he is; and so, I think, must every good man be; and more for the sake of that World than for mine. For what must an indifferent person think of a World, by profession, Christian, of so exceeding delicate a feeling as to be less scandalized at three or four bulky volumes of red-hot Impiety, because they come from a Lord, than at the cool contempt of such an insult, in a Defender of the Religion of his Country, because he may be a poor Priest or an ignoble Layman? Will not every impartial man lament with me so abject a state of things, as that must be, where atheistic principles give less offence to our politeness, than illmanners; and where, in good company you may be better received with the plague-sore upon you, than the itch?

*It vexes me* (says the anonymous writer) *to hear so many positively deciding that the Writer must be—by the scurrility and abuse.*——The term is a little strong. But the best of it is, that it is one of those words the Public think themselves at liberty to apply indiscriminately, either to scandalous abuse or to honest reproof, just as they happen to be disposed to the Author, or the Subject. The equity of this kind of judgment, so readily passed upon authors, had been sufficiently apparent in the case of one much more considerable than the Author of the View. The Author of *The Divine Legation of Moses* composed a book in support of Revelation; and sensible that the novelty of his argument would give the alarm, and bring down whole bands of Answerers upon him, he did all he could to invite fair quarter. He publicly engaged that a candid, and ingenuous Adversary should never repent him of his civility. Answerers, as he foresaw, came down in abundance: but it was not his hap to meet with one who treated him with common good manners. Of about a hundred of these writers, one or two, and no more, he thought fit to answer; and (who can wonder!) without much ceremony. This was
THE TWO FIRST LETTERS.

in the heat of controversy, when his resentments were fresh; and the injury aggravated by every circumstance of the lowest malice and most barefaced misrepresentation. Since that time to the present, a course of many years, he has seen these miserable railers, some with names, and some without, go on in all the nonsense and billingsgate with which they set out. Yet though he has seen all this, and without any other marks of resentment than a contemptuous silence, he could not escape the character of a scurrilous and abusive Writer. It was in vain to appeal to his provocations then, or to his forbearance ever since.

But to return to the Author of the View. He was detected, it seems, by his scurrility and abuse. Surely there must be some mistake, and my Lord's own dirt imputed to his Answerer. The Author of the View seems to be in the case of a scavenger (his enemies, I hope, will take no offence at the comparison), who may not indeed be overclean while at such sort of work; but it would be hard to impute that stink to him, which is not of his making, but of his removing.

The Letters are universally read; and it is almost universally agreed that Lord Bolingbroke deserved any treatment from You, both as a man personally ill used by him, and a member of that Order, which he has treated in the like manner:—In a Law of Vespasian, we read, Non oportere maledici Senatoribus; remaledici, civile fasque est. And the equity of it seems here to be allowed. But I will claim no benefit from the authority of Vespasian, nor even from that which I more reverence, my anonymous Friend's. The truth is, that nothing personal ever once entered into my thoughts while I was writing those two Letters.—Had that been the case, it would rather have been the subject of my vanity, than my resentment. For nothing could be more glorious for an obscure writer of these dark and cold days, than to find himself treated in the same manner with the greatest and most famous of the golden Ages of ancient and modern Literature.

—but (says the anonymous letter) it may dishonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman to give him that treatment he deserved, especially after his death. It is falling
failing into the very fault so justly objected to him: every body would have applauded your selecting those instances of his railing, arrogance, and abuse, had not you followed his example.—This Public then takes it for granted, that treating a licentious Writer as he deserves, may dishonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman. Here, I think, we should distinguish. When the thing concerns only the civil interests of particulars, a gentleman has but little provocation for unusual severity of language, and less right to personal reflection, especially on one of superior quality. But when the highest of our religious interests are attacked, the interests not of this man, nor of that; not of this community, nor the other; but of our common Nature itself; and where the People are appealed to, and invited to be judges, there, I think, all paltry distinctions of title cease, they vanish before so great an object, and every gentleman who loves his Religion and his Country should take the quarrel on himself, and repel the insult with all his vigour.

When truth or virtue an affront endures,
Th’ affront is mine, my Friend, and should be yours.

Pope.

The manners of a Clergyman, if they are to be distinguished from the manners of a Gentleman, consist in zeal for God, and charity towards man. The occasion will sometimes call out one, sometimes the other: they may be exerted separately, but never at one another’s expence; for they are disposed by Nature to be joint promoters of the common good: as in the case before us, I presume to say, a zeal for God is the greatest charity to man.

Now when opinions of that kind, which the View of L. Bolingbroke’s Philosophy exposes, proceed to their extreme, not to confute them in terms either of horror or ridicule, for fear of transgressing the civil maxims of politeness, would be like that Preacher, the Poet speaks of, who scrupled to mention Hell before his audience at Court.

If then, amongst the Christian duties, there be a force to be exerted against deceivers, as well as a patience to be observed in compassion to those who are misled; and
that the occasion before us was not a time for vigorous measures; I desire to know when this time comes?

When men are sincere in their mistakes, after a dili-
gen and candid search; when the subject is of small
moment, such as the mode of discipline, the measure of
conformity, or a distinction in metaphysics; the mistaken,
and even the perverse, should be treated with tenderness.
But when the avowed end of a Writer is the destruction
of Religion in all its forms; when the means he employs,
are every trick of prevarication and ill faith; and every
term of scurrility and abuse; when, to use the expression
of Cicero, est inter nos non de terminis, sed de tota
possessione contentio; Then, a practised calmness and
an affected management look like betraying the cause
we are intrusted to defend, or, what is almost as ill, like
defending it in that way only which may turn most to
our private advantage: as where, in questions of the
greatest moment, we comply with this fashionable indif-
ference; or flatter it into a virtue; when we should have
striven to rekindle the dying sparks of Religion by a vigo-
rous collision with its professed enemies, whose faces (to
use the unpolite language of the prophet) are harder than
a rock. *

Men who have had Christianity indeed at heart have
never been disposed, in capital cases like the present, to
spare or manage the offender. When the incomparable
Stillingfleet undertook to expose the enormity of the
Court of Rome, in turning the dispensation of the word
into a lucrative trade, he prosecuted the controversy with
so much vigour of style and sentiment, as to be reviled
by those who found themselves affected by it, with the
names of Buffoon and Comedian. The servant of the
Lord (said they) must not strive, but be gentle unto
all men; in meekness instructing those who oppose
themselves. An answer equally apt and satisfactory.
Without doubt, offenders would find themselves much at
their ease, when, secure from the resentment of the laws,
they understand they have nothing to fear from the ani-
madversion of the learned.

But this leads me to another consideration, which may
further justify the Author of the View, in the account he

* Jer. v. 3.
has given of this relentless enemy of Religion and Society.

The English Government, secure in the divinity of that Religion which it hath established, and jealous of that liberty which at so much expense it hath procured, doth now, with a becoming consciousness of the superiority of truth and reason, think fit to suffer this, and many other writings (though none so criminal in the form and manner) to pass through the press, into the hands of the People; writings, in which not only the institutions of positive and national worship have been insulted, but even those very grounds of natural religion, which hitherto have been esteemed the bond of civil society, as they enforce obedience on the principle of conscience. A bond, which no nation under heaven but our own have ever suffered to be brought in question: because no nation but our own has a perfect confidence in truth, or is in perpetual alarm for Liberty.

But do flagitious Writers therefore become more privileged or respectable? Or rather, Is there not the greater need that those evils, which the Public cannot redress, should at least be checked and opposed by a private hand? Why do the civil laws of all other nations interfere to punish these offenders, but to prevent the mischiefs of their writings? Why are not the same laws put in execution here, but from the experience, or, at least, from a foresight, that recourse to them has been, or may prove, injurious to public liberty? However, the end is confessed to be of the utmost importance, though these means may be thought incommodious. What is left then, but to use others of a private nature, where no ill consequences are derived to any but to the instrument employed in the correction of these evils? Now the mischief done by licentious Writers is from their credit with the people. If their credit be undeserved, the way lies open for the defender of religion to lessen it, either by ridicule or serious expostulation. The Author of the View preferred the first. He thought it more effectual; for now-a-days, folly discredits more than impiety: he thought it more generous; for he had no design of bringing in the magistrate to second his arguments. Nor is he one of those imper-
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impertinents who are for directing authority, or who think there is any need of such as him,

To virtue's work, to urge the tardy hall,
Or goad the prelate slumbering in his stall.

He rather thinks it becomes him to follow their example. The Convocation, in their late address to his Majesty, lament the depravity of our times, evidenced beyond all former examples, by the publication of writings which strike at the very vitals of all religion, and shake the foundations of civil government. Yet they are so far from throwing the scandal on the State, or calling out upon the civil Magistrate for redress, that, as if they even respected the slander of their enemies, they engage themselves to his Majesty to exert themselves to the utmost, to maintain the honour of our most holy faith. Let no one therefore take offence, that a private man has adventured to lend his hand to that work which the whole body of the Clergy hath, with so much glory to themselves, engaged to undertake.

But his Lordship's death is a further objection to the manner in which his writings are treated.

—— Cuperem ipse Parens spectator adeset!

Had these Essays been published during his life, and had the Author of the View deferred his remarks upon them, in expectation of this good time, the censure might appear to have its weight. But what shall we say if his Lordship was publicly invited to give his Philosophy to the world, by the promise of a speedy answer? If a writer's death may skreen his Works from the treatment they would deserve in his life, he has a very effectual way to secure both his person and his principles from disgrace. Yet, where this is mentioned as an aggravation, it is confessed that in these posthumous Works published by his Lordship's direction, the Author of the View is abused in the grossest manner. Now, what is said in discredit of a living writer, and by one of his Lordship's authority in politics and letters, may prove a real injury: the harm to a dead writer is but imaginary. This is only said to shew, that, had the Author of the View retaliated, as he never had it in his thoughts, the return had been still short of the provocation.
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But he commits the very fault objected to Lord Bolingbroke—and in selecting the instances of his railing and arrogance he follows his Lordship's example.—This would be weighed. Lord Bolingbroke has, in the most contemptuous manner, reviled almost all the Wise and Virtuous of ancient and modern times. He has railed at the primitive saints; the modern doctors, the whole body of the Christian clergy; and, in a word, the whole race of mankind; which, ever since religion came amongst us, deserves, he says, to be considered in no other light than as one great aggregate of lunatics. He has abused Moses and Paul; he has ridiculed the Son, and blasphemed the Father. Here is another writer, who by his scurrility and abuse is judged no other than—and what has he done? He has fallen into the same fault, and followed his example. What, Has he likewise railed at all the good, the virtuous, and the pious? Has he likewise had the arrogance to say, that the world was one great Bedlam? Has he likewise blasphemed his Creator and Redeemer? Alas! no—Two such writers would be too much for one age! And yet, what less can justify this Public in saying, that the Author of the View has fallen into the same fault with Lord Bolingbroke, and followed his example? All he has done is occasionally telling the world, That his Lordship, once in his life, was for bringing in Popery and the Pretender; and is now for introducing Naturalism, a more specious form of Atheism: that he is overrun with passion and prejudice: that he understands little or nothing of the subjects he handles, which yet he treats with sovereign contempt: that his learning is superficial, his reasoning sophistical, and his declamation inflated: and that, if ever religion should happen to regain its hold on the people, his philosophic works will run the hazard of being applied to the lowest and vilest uses. This is the substance of what he has said. And if this be falling into the same fault, and following his Lordship's example, the Author of the View, for aught I can perceive, must be content to plead guilty.

But we will suppose, the manner of writing only, as separated from the subject, is here to be understood. Is
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the railing at all mankind; at all religion; at God Almighty himself; but of the same specics of writing with his, who shall tell the world, that this railer was once as much an enemy to the civil, as now to the religious constitution of his country; that he reasons ill, and that he declares worse? Did the politeness of a clergyman or a gentleman require, under pain of being matched with his Lordship in railing and arrogance, that, after the Author of the View had quoted all his Lordship's horrors in principle and expression, he should have added,

"This, good People, is the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which is to be substituted amongst you, in the place of RELIGION. But take me along with you; Though this, indeed, be the bane and poison of your hopes; though it reduce humanity to the most disconsolate and forlorn condition, by depriving it of the moral Ruler of the World, and by dissolving all the ties of civil government; Yet, courage! The Author was a man of distinguished quality, of uncommon abilities, and of infinite politeness. His great talents for business enabled him to see what was best for society; his penetration into philosophic matters, what was best for human nature; and his profound knowledge of divinity, what was best for both. He had governed states; he had instructed kings; and this last great Book of Wisdom was the result of all his skill and experience."

All this indeed I might have said: and, it is probable, a good deal of it I should have said, had the aim of my View been to recommend myself; and to raise a reputation from the defeat of this mighty man. Had this, I say, been my aim, the raising the character of an adversary who was presently to fall by my hand, would hardly have been amongst the last of my contrivances. But as I had another purpose, the preventing the mischiefs of his Book, I took the different method of reducing his authority to its just value; which, by having been over-rated, had prepared the way for the easy reception of his opinions amongst a corrupt people.

The Letters, says this Public (whose sentiments have been, with so much real kindness, conveyed unto me) *purport*
purport to be a View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy. They are a view of his life, morals, politics, and conversation. It may be true and just. But that is not the question. Whether he made a good treaty, or wrote the Craftsman, neither concludes for nor against the divinity of the Christian Religion.

I readily confess, that, had Lord Bolingbroke's morals and politics nothing to do with his religious principles, I had acted both an invidious and an idle part to bring in his Treaties and his Craftsmen into a View of his Philosophy. But I held all these to be the various parts of the same system, which had contributed in support of one another to produce a whole. I can believe he found it for his ease in retirement, to adhere still closer to a set of principles, which having forwarded his practice, enabled him to bear the retrospect of its effects: but I am much mistaken if he did not begin the world with his notions of God and the Soul; hence his rounds of business and amusements——

"Now all for pleasure; now for church and state."

Pope.

The rest followed in course. For, as Cicero well observes, Cum enim Decretum proditur, Lex veri rectique proditur: quo a vito et amicitiarum proditiones, et rerum publicarum, nasci solent.

But this is not all. I beg leave to say, there was not only a close connexion between his principles and his practice, but that it was necessary to a just defence of Religion against him, to take notice of that connexion.

One of his Lordship's pretended purposes, in his philosophic Essays, was to detect the abuses brought into the Christian Religion by a corrupt clergy: my aim in this View was to expose a species of Atheism, inculcated on the ruin of all Religion by an impious layman.

Consider, how his Lordship proceeded.—Not that I place my justification on his example: that, indeed, would be confirming the charge I am endeavouring to refute; neither would I insist upon the right of retaliation; for, though that be something a better plea, it is the last which
which a writer for truth would willingly have recourse to. I quote his Lordship's method with perfect appro-
bation, as that which right reason prescribes to all who propose the detection of error and imposture. His Lord-
ship's point, as we said, was to shew, that the Clergy had corrupted the purity and simplicity of Religion. It is
not my design to inquire with what ingenuity he has re-
presented the fact, or how justly he has deduced the con-
sequences, which he pretends have risen from it. He has
shewn some corruptions; he has imagined more; and
dressed up the rest of his catalogue out of his own in-
vention; all which, he most unreasonably offers as a legi-
timate prejudice against Religion itself. Well, be it so,
that the Clergy are convicted of abuse and imposture.
The question, which every one is ready to ask, who thinks
himself concerned to inquire into the truth of the fact, is

cui bono? What end had the Clergy to serve by these
corruptions? His Lordship thinks the question reason-
able, and is ready to reply, That they had a wicked anti-
christian yoke to impose upon the necks of mankind: in
order to which, they contrived to introduce such kind of
corruptions into Religion as best tended to pervert men's
understandings, to intimidate their wills, and to impress
upon their consciences an awe and reverence for their
spiritual tyrants. The answer is satisfactory, and shews
the use of this method of detecting error. With his
rhetorical exaggerations, with the extension of his list of
corruptions, with his ridiculous inferences, I have, at
present, no concern.

As the Author of the Essays had, what he called, a
tyrannical hierarchy to unmask; so, the Author of the
View had, what he called, a declared, an impious, an
outrageous enemy of all Religion to expose. I believe
they are both rightly named. Now, as errors to be de-
tected, we must trace them to their source; and as errors
influencing practice, we shall find their original to be in
vice.

His Lordship had publicly and openly, in his respect-
able character of a Nobleman, a Statesman, and a
Philosopher, declared Religion to be all a cheat, sup-
ported only by knaves and madmen; which indeed was
a large party, since, by his own account, it takes in the
whole
whole body of mankind. His Lordship had been held up to the People* as an all-accomplished personage, full and complete in every endowment of civil and moral wisdom: and the enchanting vehicle in which his triumphant character was conveyed, had made it received, even against the information of our senses. A Public thus prejudiced, would, on such a representation of his Lordship's religious principles as his Essays contain, and the View collects together, be ready to ask, "Could so sublime a genius be disposed to deprive himself, and us, of all those blessings which Religion promises, had he not discovered, and been perfectly assured, that the whole was a delusion; and therefore, in pity to mankind, had broke the charm, which kept them from seeing their present good, in fond expectation of a recompence in the shadowy regions of futurity?" We say, deprive himself, for he seems sufficiently vexed, and sensible of his disappointment, when awaked from the pleasing dream of a life to come. There is no one thought (says his Lordship) which sooths my mind like this: I encourage my imagination to pursue it, and am heartily afflicted when another faculty of the intellect comes boisterously in, and wakes me from so pleasing a dream, if it be a dream †.—In this manner I supposed, that they, for whose use the View was intended, were disposed to argue; I mean that part of them who yet retain any concern for another life; and who have not thrown off, together with their guides, all thoughts of their journey thither. Now, against this dangerous prejudice, the Defender of Religion was to provide. He was first to remove their delusion concerning Lord Bolingbroke's philosophic character; and to shew, that he had none of those talents of reasoning, of learning, or philosophy, which are necessary to qualify a man to decide on so important a question. But this opposed only one half of their prejudice. They could by no means be brought to think that so good a man, so benevolent a citizen, so warm a friend to mankind, as his Lordship's Essays represent him, could be lightly willing to forego that great bond of

* See the Fourth Epistle of the Essay on Man, and the great Poet's other Works.
society, that great support of humanity, Religion. The Advocate of Religion therefore, unless he would betray his cause, was obliged to shew, that the social light, in which his Lordship puts himself, and in which he had been placed by his poetical Friend, was a false one; that his moral virtues were the counterpart of his religious principles; And public virtue (according to his favourite Cicero) embracing and comprehending all the private*, it was to the purpose of such a defence, to shew, that his Lordship had been a bad citizen.

"Prodita laxabat portarum claustra Tyrannis
"Exsulibus——"

Now though Religion has the strongest allurements for the good and virtuous, it abounds with objects of affright and terror to the profligate and abandoned; who, in such circumstances, have but this for their relief, Either to part with their vices, or their religion. All the world knows his Lordship’s choice. He himself tells us, it was made on the conviction of reason; others think, by the delusion of his passions. The world is to determine; and that they might judge with knowledge of the case, the Author of the View attempted to obviate the latter part of this popular prejudice; which would not suffer them to conceive any reason short of demonstration, that could induce a man in his senses to part with the soothing consolation of futurity, as his Lordship so justly calls it.

And now, I suppose, every candid reader will allow, at least I am sure the candid Writer of the anonymous Letter will allow, that his Lordship’s morals and politics come within the View of his Philosophy; where the question is of the truth or falsehood of Religion; and of his Lordship’s authority to decide in it.

To sum up this argument: His Lordship descants on Romish superstition; the Author of the View, on his Lordship’s Philosophy: not to shew for what end the one was established, or by what means the other was produced, is relating facts without their causes; which the Writer on the use of history justly throws into the class of unprofitable things: and therefore his Lordship, speaking of the corruptions brought by the Clergy, into

*Omnes omnium Charitates Patria una complexa est.

Religion.
Religion, accounts for them by a spirit of dominion; and the Author of the View speaking of his Lordship's religious principles, reminds the reader of his moral practice; but so far only as served that purpose, and was, besides, notorious to all mankind.

Lord Bolingbroke (says this Public) deserved every thing of you; but who are those friends and admirers of his, whom you represent applauding all he wrote; whom you bring in unnecessarily upon many occasions? I dare say they are very few. You had better have named them.

As unexceptionable perhaps as that liberty might have been thought, I should certainly have ventured on it, had I conceived it possible for the reader to understand, by such friends and admirers, any of those few illustrious persons, whom Lord Bolingbroke's politeness, his distance from business, his knowledge of the world, and, above all, his ambition to be admired, occasionally brought into his acquaintance; and who gave dignity and reputation to his retirement. The chief of these I have the honour to know, and the pleasure of being able to inform those who do not, that they were so far from being in the principles of his Philosophy, that some of them did not so much as know what those principles were; and those who did, gave him to understand, how much they detested them. Indeed, nothing but this fact, which I here assert on my own knowledge, can account for the disposition in his Will, concerning his philosophic papers. And were it only for the sake of this fair occasion, of explaining myself, I could readily excuse all the hard thoughts this Public seems to have entertained of me. As to the friends and admirers who applauded all he wrote, I meant those who persuaded him to change his mind, and give those Essays to the Public, which he had over and over declared were only for the inspection of a few; and which those few had given him to understand, were fit for nobody's inspection at all. Nay, he seems willing the world should know to whom it was indebted for this benefit, by his letting those places in his Essays stand, where he declares his own opinion of their unfitness for general communication.

But what grieves and hurts your friends most
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(says this Public) is still behind. Poor Pope did not
deserve to be treated by you with so much cruelty,
contempt, and injustice. In a work where Lord
Bolingbroke is represented as a monster, hated both
of God and Man, Why is Pope always and unneces-
sarily brought in, only as his friend and admirer?
Why as approving of, and privy to all that was ad-
dressed to him? Why should he, who had many
great talents, and amiable qualities, be described only
by the slighting epithets of tuneful and poetical. You
say, Pope announced the glad tidings of all these things.
In what work can he be said to have done it, except
in his Essay on Man? This is throwing a reflexion
on the excellent Commentary on that Essay.

The Editor of Pope's Works certainly thought with
this generous Animadverter, that the great Poet deserved
every thing of his friends. For he tells us, "That to
have been one of the greatest Poets in the world, was
but his second praise: that Pope was in a higher class.
He was one of the noblest works of God: he was an
honest man. A man who alone possessed more real
virtue than, in very corrupt times, needing a Satirist
like him, will sometimes fall to the share of multitudes.
His filial piety, his disinterested friendships, his re-
verence for the constitution of his country, his love and
admiration of virtue, and (what was the necessary con-
sequence) his hatred and contempt of vice, his exten-
sive charity to the indigent, his warm benevolence to
mankind, his supreme veneration of the Deity, and,
above all, his sincere belief of Revelation (the Editor
tells us), shall, amongst other things, be the subject of
the history of his Life. Nor (says he) shall his
faults be concealed. It is not for the interests
of his virtues that they should. Nor indeed could
they be concealed if we were so minded, for they shine
through his virtues; no man being more a dupe to
the specious appearance of virtue in others."

But then, who it was that treated poor Pope with
cruelty, contempt, and injustice, Lord Bolingbroke, or
the Author of the View, let this Public themselves judge;
and, by their freedom from passion and resentment, at a

* See the Editor's Advertisement to his Works.
time when a friend would be most hurt, they appear well qualified to judge impartially.

When, on the publication of the Patriot King, Lord Bolingbroke did indeed use the memory of poor Pope with exceeding contempt, cruelty, and injustice, by representing him, in the Advertisement to the Public, as a busy, ignorant interpolator of his works; a mercenary betrayer of his trust; a miserable, who bartered all the friendship of his philosopher and guide, for a little paltry gain. Who was it then that manifested his hurt and grief for poor Pope? Was it this Public! Or was it the Author of the Letter to Lord Bolingbroke, on that occasion?

But in what consists the contempt, cruelty, and injustice of the View? The contempt is in the slighting epithets of tuneful and poetical: the cruelty in giving instances of Pope's unbounded admiration of Lord Bolingbroke; and the injustice in saying that he denounced the glad tidings of the first philosophy, and that he approved and was privy to all that was addressed to him.

My using the epithets of tuneful and poetical, in speaking of a man who had many superior qualities, was, I humbly conceive, well suited to the occasion. It is where I speak of Pope as an idolatrous admirer of Lord Bolingbroke: and they aptly insinuate what I would have them mean, that, judgment had there nothing to do; but all was to be placed to the friendly extravagance of a poetical imagination. Who could fairly gather more from it, than that my intention was to place his Lordship's ingratitude and Mr. Pope's idolatry side by side, in order to their setting off one another?

But cruelty is added to contempt, in the instances I give of Pope's unbounded admiration. I am verily persuaded, had Pope lived to see Lord Bolingbroke's returns of friendship, as well in his Lordship's usual conversation*, as in the Advertisement to the Patriot King, he would have been amongst the first to have laughed at his own delusions, when this treatment of him had once broken and dissolved the charm; at least, he would have been ready to laugh with a friend, who should chuse to turn them into ridicule. For he held this to be amongst the

* See the conclusion of the fourth Letter.
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offices of friendship, to laugh at your friend's foibles till you brought him to laugh with you;

"Laugh at your friends; and if your friends be sore,
"So much the better, you may laugh the more."

as implying, that, while they continued sore, they continued to stand in need of this friendly operation.

My injustice consists in supposing Pope was privy to all that was addressed to him. An injustice indeed, had I supposed any such thing; I, who with greater certainty than most men, can affirm, that he was privy to nothing of the secret, but the design of the address, and the preliminary discourses. So little did Pope know of the principles of the first philosophy, that when a common acquaintance, in his last illness, chanced to tell him of a late conversation with Lord Bolingbroke, in which his Lordship took occasion to deny God's moral attributes as they are commonly understood, he was so shocked that he did not rest till he had asked Lord Bolingbroke, whether his informer was not mistaken? His Lordship assured him, he was; of which, Pope with great satisfaction informed his friend. Under this ignorance of his Lordship's real sentiments it was, that Pope gave easy credit to him, when he vapoured that he would demonstrate all the common metaphysics to be wicked and abominable*. And this leads me to that part of the charge, where it is said, I could only mean the Essay on Man, by the glad tidings of the first philosophy. I meant a very different thing; and alluded to the following passages in his Letters. Do not laugh at my gravity, but permit me to wear the beard of a philosopher, till I pull it off, and make a jest of it myself. Is just what my Lord Bolingbroke is doing with metaphysics. I hope you will live to see, and stare at the learned figure he will make on the same shelf with Locke and Malebranche†. And again, Lord Bolingbroke is voluminous, but he is voluminous only to destroy volumes. I shall not live, I fear, to see that work printed‡. Where, by the way, his fancy that this metaphysics was designed for the public, shews he

‡ Letter lxxiii.
knew nothing of the contents. This then was what I meant. The Essay on Man I could not mean. For in the 55th page of the View, I make the fundamental doctrines of that Poem and of his Lordship’s Essays to be directly opposite to one another. The one, a real vindication of Providence against libertines and bigots: the other a pretended vindication of it against an imaginary confederacy between divines and atheists.

Thus I have explained, in the best manner I am able, my reasons for speaking of this great Poet in terms which give offence. But what shall we say, if this air of negligence to his memory was assumed, the better to conceal the author of an anonymous epistle? The motive sure was excusable; though the project was without effect: for this Public have positively decided, that the author must be —— by the scurrility and abuse.

But, Had you pursued (say they), the advantage you have ingeniously taken from an expression in one of Pope’s letters, to have shewn that Pope differed from Bolingbroke where he was in the wrong; that he not only condemned but despised the futility of his reasoning against Revelation; that where he was right Pope improved but never servilely copied his ideas; you would have done honour to your friend and yourself; you would have served the cause of Religion; you would have discredited Lord Bolingbroke the more by the contrast——

Now all this, the reader will see in the fourth letter, I had actually done; and (as it was in its place) fully and largely too. In the mean time, every body might see, it was what I was ready, on a fit occasion, to do, by the passage referred to just above from the second; where Pope is honoured, and Lord Bolingbroke the more discredited by the contrast.

But I must not leave this head without taking notice of one expression in the censure. It is said, that the View represents L. Bolingbroke as a monster hated both of God and Man. The expression had been juster, had it been—from the View it may be collected; because, whatever ideas men may form of his Lordship from a perusal of the View, they arise from his Lordship’s own words, which are faithfully quoted. What
the Author of the View adds, is only a little harmless raillery, which can present the reader with no idea but what (in the opinion of Pope) arises from every fruitless attempt of impiety.

"Heaven still with laughter the vain toil surveys,
And buries madmen in the heaps they raise."

That the Author of the View assisted in the dressing up so strange a sight; as a monster hated both by God and Man, was very far from his intention. He made a scruple of accompanying his Lordship's quotations with those reflections of serious indignation which such a scene of horrors naturally suggests, lest he should be thought to aim at something more than private animadversion. He therefore generously endeavoured to turn the public attention from the horror, to the ridicule, of the first philosophy, and to get his Lordship well laughed at; as being persuaded, that when the public is brought to that temper, its resentment seldom rises to any considerable height.

Men had better speak out, and say, the Author of the View ought to have represented L. Bolingbroke as neither detestable nor ridiculous. He could have wished, that his sense of honour and duty would have permitted him to have done so. He is neither a fanatic, nor an enthusiast, and perhaps still less of a bigot. Yet there are occasions when the most sober and candid thinker will confess; that the interests of particulars should give way to those of the public. It is true, there are others, when politeness, civil prudence, and the private motives of friendship, ought to determine a man, who is to live in the world, to comply with the state and condition of the times; and even to chuse the worse, instead of the better method of doing good. But his misfortune was, that this did not appear to him to be one of those occasions; in which, when he had explained the doctrines and opinions of an erroneous writer, he could leave them with this reflection: "These are the Writer's notions on the most important points with regard to human happiness. They are indeed very singular and novel. But then consider; the Writer was a great man, and high in all the attainments of wisdom; therefore weigh well and reverendly before you condemn what I have here exposed."
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"exposed to your judgment." But had I, with a view to prudence, said this, Would it have secured me from offense, the very thing that prudence would most avoid? Would it not rather have furnished out another handle, a handle for the making me a confederate in his guilt, only a little better disguised? Had this happened, it would not have been the first time I had been so served, when endeavouring to avoid offence.

And yet there was but one of these three ways; either to laugh, to declaim, or to say nothing. I chose the first, as what I fancied least obnoxious; in which, however, I was mistaken; and as most likely to do good; in which, I still hope, I was not mistaken.

The only harm L. Bolingbroke, whose reputation of parts and wisdom had been raised so high, can possibly do, is amongst the people. His objections against Religion are altogether of the popular kind, as we feel by the effects they have had, when used by their original authors, long before his Lordship honoured them with a place in his Essays. What then was that man to aim at, who had made it his business (indeed without being set on work) to put a speedy stop to the mischief, and neither to palliate the doctrines, nor to compliment the author of them, but to give a true and succinct representation of his system, in a popular way; to make a right use of that abundance, which the essays and fragments afforded, to shew that his Lordship's principles were as foolish as they were wicked; and that the arguments used in support of them were as weak as they were bold and overbearing: that he was a pretender in matters of learning and philosophy; and knew no more of the genius of the Gospel, than of that supposed corruption of it, which he calls artificial theology. This I imagined to be the only way to reach his Lordship's authority, on which all depended; and then, the very weakest effort of ridicule would be able to do the rest. These were my motives for the method I laid down; and whatever impropriety there may be in divulging them in a way that tends to defeat their end, it should, I think, be laid to the account of those who make this explanation necessary.

I have been the longer on this matter as it will serve for an answer to what follows.
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Lord Bolingbroke (says this Public) is so universally and so justly obnoxious to all sorts and ranks of people, that from regard to him, nobody cares how he is treated; but he assured your manner has destroyed all the merit of the work.—Though with regard to the manner I have said enough; yet the candid reader, I am sure, will allow me to add a word or two concerning the effect of an unacceptable manner, in a work of public service. It had, till of late, been always deemed desert to do a general good, though in a way not perfectly acceptable. But we are now become so delicate and fastidious, that it is the manner of doing, even in things of highest importance, which carries away all the merit. And yet, this false delicacy on a question of no less moment than Whether we shall have any Religion or none at all, seems as absurd as it would be in a great man to take offence at an officious neighbour for saving his falling palace, by a few homely props near at hand, when he should have considered of a support more conformable to the general taste and style of architecture in his Lordship's superb piece; or to find him disconcerted by that charitable hand, which should venture to pull his grandeur by head and shoulders out of a flaming apartment.

But in these suppositions I grant much more than in reason I ought. I suppose the public taste, which the manner in question has offended, is a reality, founded in nature; whereas 'tis the fantastic creature of fashion, and as shifting and capricious as its parent. Truth, which makes the matter of every honest man's inquiry, is eternal; but the manner suited to the public taste, is nothing else than conformity to our present passions, or sentiments; our prejudices, or dispositions. When the truths or the practices of Religion have got possession of a people, then a warmth for its interests, and an abhorrence of its enemies, become the public taste; and men expect to find the zeal of an Apostle in every defender of Religion: but when this awful power has lost its hold, when, at best, it floats but in the brain, and comes not near the heart, then, if you expect to be read with approbation, you must conform your manner to that polite indifference.
indifference, and easy unconcern, with which we see every other trial of skill played before us.

But now I am advanced thus far, I will venture a step further. When infidelity first made its appearance amongst us in set discourses addressed to the public, our ecclesiastical watchmen instantly took the alarm; and communicated it to their brethren with a warmth and vigour that gave lustre to their high trust. No writer escaped unnoticed; no argument remained unanswered; and a learned critic received public honours, as the deliverer of his country, in rescuing common sense from the very silliest rhapsody* that ever disgraced human reason. But since the danger is become imminent, or, to speak more properly, since the mischief so much dreaded has done its work, and one would naturally expect to see this vigilance increased, and the body up in arms, we find a perfect peace and tranquillity reign amongst them. Which, were it not attended with equal unconcern, one might mistake for a well-grounded confidence in vigorous measures. As if it were our unhappy fate to be still mistaken, as well when we thought the Church in danger, as now when we appear to believe it triumphant!

Indeed (says this Public) it [your manner] has furnished your enemies with a handle to do you infinite mischief. Your cold friends lament and make the worst sort of excuse, by imputing it to a temper contracted from the long habit of drawing blood in controversy; Your warm friends are out of countenance, and forced to be silent, or turn the discourse.

Would not any one by this imagine, that the Author of the View, after much pretended opposition to infidelity, was at last detected of being in confederacy with it, and all along artfully advancing its interests; that the mask had unwarily dropt off, and that he stood confessed, what Lord Bolingbroke has been pleased to call him, an advocate for civil and ecclesiastical tyranny? At least, no one would imagine, that this handle afforded to his enemies of doing him mischief, was no other than the treating the Author of the most impious and insulting

* Discourse of Freethinking.
book that ever affronted public justice, as a bad reasoner and a worse philosopher, whose vanity led him to abuse every name of learning, and his fear to discredit every mode of religion.

These cold friends however acted in character; the great secret of whose address is the well poisoning an apology, or, as the excellent writer better expresses it, making the very worst excuse they can find. But here, methinks, we want their usual caution, which rarely suffers an ambiguous expression to admit of a favourite meaning: for, the compliment of drawing blood in controversy, the Author of the View may fairly take to himself with great complacency. As his controversy has always lain in a quarter very remote from political altercation; neither with ministers nor factions; and on no less a question than the truth and honour of Religion, against infidels and bigots; the drawing blood shews him to have been in earnest, which is no vulgar praise. It would be but poor commendation, I ween, of a brave English veteran, who had seen many a well-fought field for liberty and his country, to say, he never drew blood; though such a compliment might recommend the humanity of a champion at Hockley-hole. When the situation of the times have engaged two learned men, at the head of opposite factions in a Church, to engage in a party-quarrel, and play a prize of disputation, with the reward placed, and often divided, between them, it is no wonder if there should be much ceremony, and little blood shed. But the Author of the View writes for no party, nor party-opinions; he writes for what he thinks the truth; and, in the point in question, for the Clergy, its Ministers (they will forgive him this wrong); and as both of them are yet by good fortune of public authority, he thinks himself at liberty to support them, though it be by drawing blood from premeditated impiety, from low envy, or malicious bigotry; which, he apprehends, are not to be subdued by management or a mock-fight. Yet as much in earnest as he is, he should be ashamed to turn the same arms against simple error; against a naked adversary; or against the man who had thrown away his weapons; or, indeed, against any but him, who stands up boldly to defy religion, or, what is almost as bad, to
dishonour it, by false and hypocritic zeal for the errors and corruptions which have crept into it. In a word, had I written with any oblique views, and not from a sense of duty, I should have suited the entertainment to the taste of my superiors. For a man must be of a strange complexion indeed, who, when he has conformed to religion for his convenience, will yet scruple to go on, and reap the benefit of his compliance, by conforming to the fashion.

So far as to the Author’s cold friends. With respect to his warm ones, They have not played their parts so well; they seem to have given up their cause too soon. They might have said with truth, and a full knowledge of what they said, “That no man was more disposed than the Author of the View, to comply with the temper of the times; and especially with the inclinations of his friends; to whose satisfaction he has been ever ready to sacrifice his own inclinations; but, to their services, every thing—except his duty and his honour: was he capable of doing this, he would not deserve a virtuous friend: that probably he considered the matter in question as one of those excepted cases, where he could hearken to nothing but the dictates of honour, and the duties of his station: that he saw religion insulted, a moral governor defied; Naturalism, a species of Atheism, openly, and with all the arts of sophistry and declamation, inculcated; and the opposing world insolently branded as a cabal of fools, knaves, and madmen.” They might have said, “That where errors of small consequence are in question, or even great ones, when delivered with modesty and candour, suitable measures are to be observed: but that here the impiety and the insult were both in the extreme.”

To which, in the last place, they might have added most of those other considerations, which have been urged in the course of this Apology. And had they been so pleased, the Defence had not only been better made, but with much more dignity and advantage to their client.

However, the Author of the View has yet the vanity amidst all this mortification, to reflect, that there is very wide difference between displeasing, and the being disapproved: and that this very Public, who complain by the pen of my anonymous friend, feel that difference.
THE TWO FIRST LETTERS.

The decencies of acquaintance, the impressions of habit, and even the most innocent partialities, might make them uneasy to see Lord Bolingbroke exposed to contempt: but their love of the Public, their reverence both for its civil and religious interests, will make them see with pleasure his principles confuted and exposed. When a noble Roman had in public Senate accused one of the greatest pests of his age and country, he observed that the vigour with which he pursued this enemy of the Republic, made many worthy men uneasy; but he satisfied himself with this reflection, tantum ad fiduciam vel metum differt, nolint homines quod facias, an non probent.

In a word, my duty to God, to my country, to mankind at large, had, as I fancied, called upon me to do what I did, and in the manner I have done it. If I have offended any good man, any friend to my person, or my cause, it is a sacrifice to duty; which yet I must never repent of having made, though the displeasure of a friend be the severest trial of it. I know what that man has to expect, both from infidelity and bigotry, who engages without reserve in the service of Religion.

"Ah! let not Virtue too, commence his Foe!"

However, I have long since taken my party:

"Omnia praecepi, atque animo mecum ante peregi.
"Nec recuso, si ita casus attulerit, luere poenas ob honestissima facta, dum flagitiosissima ulciscor."

Jan. 4, 1755.
A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE’S PHILOSOPHY.

LETTER I.

to

RALPH ALLEN, ESQ.

DEAR SIR,

LORD BOLINGBROKE’S PHILOSOPHY, so much and so long talked of, is now come, and very fairly, into the hands of the Public. For I think it would be injustice to the Editor to suppose his Lordship did not design us this legacy. His last Will sufficiently declares his kindness to us. But, you will say, he speaks of his Philosophy as a thing composed only for the solace of a few friends in a corner*. What then? might not his Lordship change his mind, and extend his benefits? Hardly, you think, without contradicting his professed principles. So much the better. The publication then will be of a piece with the rest. And never trouble your

* "Let us seek truth, but seek it quietly as well as freely. Let us not imagine, like some who are called FREE-TINKERS, that every man who can think and judge for himself (as he has a right to do) has therefore a right of speaking, any more than of acting, according to the full freedom of his thoughts. The free dom belongs to him as a rational creature. He lies under the restraint as a member of society.—As we think for ourselves, we may keep our thoughts to ourselves or communicate them with a due reserve, and in such manner only, as it may be done without offending the laws of our country, and disturbing the public peace."—Bolingbroke’s Works, Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope.
read with one *contradiction*, where you may meet with a thousand.

*Quid te exempta levat spinis de pluribus una?*

Now though I know you have as little curiosity to hear what a Freethinker can object to the faith which has got possession of your heart, as what a pick-pocket can chicane to the property in your purse; yet the name of L. Bolingbroke's *Metaphysics* (which, I think, were become as famous, and hitherto as little understood, as his *Politics*) cannot sure but incline you to some slight acquaintance at least with this first *Philosophy*, as he calls it; and which, in the manner of other conquerors, he erects on a general desolation.

The only part of his Lordship's character, that yet remained equivocal, was his *literary*. How this will fare by the publication of his *Philosophy*, I will not pretend to say; perhaps not altogether so well as his friends might give him the pleasure to expect. He frequently tells his reader, that the doctrine of his *Essays* and *Fragments* had been occasionally thrown out amongst them, and made the subject of many free conversations. And while he harangued in that circle, I will suppose he met with the applause he sought after. But had he chose himself to bring them to the bar of the Public, he might have seen strange revolutions. "*Illic, et Judex tacet, et Adversarius obstrepit, et nihil temere dicitum perit: et, siquid tibi ipse sumas, probandum est: et, omissa magna semper flandi tumore, loquendo dum est.*" Indeed his Lordship could hardly expect to escape the severity of this tribunal but by the superior evidence of his principles: since his meditations on divine matters are so extensive, that scarce any one, who has written in defence of virtue, or religion, but will find himself either insulted in his person, or misrepresented in his opinions; and this, merely for being in the great man's way.

But surely, when a person of his Lordship's polite manners had condescended to enter into learned altercation, the world might expect, at least for the *courteous management of controversy*, a most consummate model,
which should either reform, or should for ever discredit, the grosser polemics of the schools. So that though the Divine might expect no great matter from these oracles of reason, yet he should readily accept his amends in the manner of so elegant a pen. And perhaps you, who have observed their commerce with the world, and their conduct to one another, might be apt to think they would have been no losers by the bargain. Indeed, Divines have been generally thought wanting in forms; whether their pride prompts them to appeal to the authority of reason; or their prudence teaches them to submit to the wisdom of their betters. And the management of their controversies in the schools, and their interests in courts, have, on different accounts, been equally obnoxious both to the dealers in truth and falsehood. I would willingly avoid both their extremes. For I would, if possible, preserve and support that love and reverence to an useful body, which the noble Writer, relying not on his own politics but on other men’s, has in his fourth Essay devoted to destruction. He, indeed, may call for aid on the secular arm; he has the old reason for so doing; but I dare say, the Clergy never will. Things are now come to that pass, that the State seems to be in more need of their support, than they, of the State’s. For, though the cavils of licentious men always end in the confirmation of truth and virtue, yet they generally set out in loosening the hold, which religion had got upon the people. And when that is gone, what other engine the magistrate will invent, to keep the multitude in order, they, whose principal concern it is, would do well to consider.

As I said, then, I had taken it for granted, that our noble Adversary, for an adversary he has condescended to be, would be principally anxious to teach us in his writings, what was his wont in conversation, that studied politeness, which is so well fitted to keep inferiors at a distance; and that, when he had declared mortal war against every thing the world hath hitherto called religion; and against every order of priests, or ministers, which civil government has thought proper to establish for the support of it, we should see his attack carried on by the fairest as well as strongest reasoning, the gentlest
as well as firmest address, and the politest as well as keenest raillery.

But how were we disappointed, to find this conservator of states, this legislator in philosophy and religion, utterly unable to raise his head above the rank contagion of the schools: to see polemics go their usual train: and this sun of our new system, whisked along the turbid vortex of controversy, like any the most ignoble of the earthly bodies! But his poet, or rather his prophet (who so magnificently announced to us the glad tidings of all these good things) had prepared us for it. He had contemplated this strange phenomenon: not, indeed, without surprize. Is it not, says he,

"A fit of vapours clouds this demi-god!"

To be plain, I met with nothing in these big volumes, but the rankness of South without his force; and the malignity of Marvel without his wit. You shall not take it on my word: the evidence lies before us. Give me leave then to present you with a specimen, under his own hand, of his candour, his temper, and infinite politeness. And though one can but ill judge of the harvest by a sample of the field-flowers, yet we may form a pretty good guess of the soil.

Nor is this intemperance of language, of which I propose to give you a taste, the mere escape of fancy or humour, which it would be candid to overlook: it is a sort of formula dicendi, without which all his Lordship's authentic acts of legislation would be invalid: it is the very spirit of his new religion, without which, the whole would be indeed but a dead letter.

It was with the less reluctance I entered upon this part of my design, that I might have to justify myself to the world for the plainness and freedom with which I may hereafter chance to treat his Lordship's reasoning; for, as Quintilian well observes, "Praetatur hoc ali- quando etiam dignitatibus ut libertatis nostrae ratio reddatur, ne quis nos aut petulantes in laedendis his, aut etiam ambitiosos putet."

Without any further prologue, then, let the show begin: only premising, that as his Lordship had a first philosophy to erect, he had an immense deal of rubbish to remove…
remove: the authority of every great name, and of every sacred order, standing directly in his way.

With Cudworth he begins: and of Cudworth he says, The heads of many reverend persons have been turned by a preternatural fermentation of the brain, or a philosophical delirium. None hath been more so than this Divine*. Again, Cudworth [in his Intellectual System] gives you little less than a nonsensical paraphrase of nonsense. It was not his fault. The good man passed his life in the study of an unmeaning jargon; and, as he learned, he taught.

To talk, like Cumberland, of promoting the good of the whole system of rational agents, amongst whom God is included, and of human benevolence towards him, is to talk metaphysical jargon and theological blasphemy.

Clarke triumphs in this foolish and wicked rode-montade, &c. All Clarke says about the discovery of God’s will, is a rhapsody of presumptuous reasoning and of profane absurdities.—Audacious and vain sophist! His terms have a solemn air, that may impose on the unwary, and confirm the habitual prejudices of others; but more absurdity cannot be stuffed into so few words.

Of Wollaston, he says, But I will detain you no longer about such discourse as would convince you, if you heard it at Monroe’s, that the Philosopher who held it was a patient of the Doctor’s not yet perfectly restored to his senses. Again, of the same excellent person, We have here an example of the second sort of madness mentioned above. The man who writ all this nonsense was a man of parts.—But when these learned lunatics, &c.

Clarke and Wollaston soon grow outrageous; and ready to be chained together. Indeed, from henceforth, they are rarely shewn asunder. We sometimes find them in the height of a metaphysical frenzy: and,

* Not to distract the attention by numerous particular references to the Quarto Edition of Bolingbroke’s Works, we presume on the Author’s accuracy of quotation, and refer the Reader generally to the Octavo Edition lately published, in eight volumes. Ed.
by what one can perceive, without much provocation. They had proved the soul to be a thinking substance distinct from matter: we may allow them to be jealous of the glory of this achievement. But who contested it with them? Nobody, that I know of, before his Lordship. And he very civilly let them enjoy the honour of it for life.

The President Forbes is really mad; but it is only quoad hoc. For observe, he was no Divine by profession, but something better. Indeed, not much—He was a Lawyer. Of which unlearned profession, as he calls it, ninety-nine in a hundred at least (he says) are petty-foggers, sharpers, brawlers, and covillers.

But, to give the better edge to his well-tempered language, he sometimes dips it in irony: and then it is, The good Earl of Nottingham; and the righteous Bishop Sherlock. They deserved his anger. The first publicly defended, and ably too, that faith which stands so much in his way: and the other ventured to oppose that party, whose patronage he had condescended to assume.*

He comes next to the whole body of the Christian Clergy. And now the first Philosophy begins to work, and the task to grow serious. The primitive saints and doctors have the precedence, as is fitting. "The list of martyrs consisted, I believe, of those who suffered for breaking the peace. The primitive clergy were, under pretence of religion, a very lawless tribe." "All the Christian fathers using a delirious style, it became that of Christian theology." "It would scarce be possible to believe that the greatest saints and doctors of the Church had talked so much blasphemous nonsense, and employed so much artifice about it, if their writings were not extant."—"Of all this absurdity, profaneness, and ridicule, they who built up Christian theology were guilty."—You ask, with surprise and impatience, what this absurdity was? He was going to tell you; for he never minces matters. "They added (says he) the epistles to the gospels; the doctrines of Paul to those of Christ; till the apocalypse became * See The Craftsman.
"part of our holy Scriptures." And now, I hope, you are satisfied. If not, take what follows, "Christian divines and philosophers have done more to debase our notions of the Supreme Being, than all the doctors of Polytheism."

This was reasonably well, for new-beginners: but nothing like the exploits of modern divines.

"It is madness, or something worse than madness, for divines to imagine themselves able to comprehend a whole economy of divine wisdom from Adam down to Christ. And yet this is so customary, that not only the learned and ingenious, but every dabbler in theology, who must pass for a fool or a knave whenever he grows extravagant, affects to reason in the same manner."

― "Would divines insist chiefly on the external proofs of the authenticity of Scripture—they would avoid a great deal of blasphemy."—They are absurd and licentious in urging both the external and internal evidence of Revelation."

― "Our divines turn themselves to declaim on certain and undoubted marks of divine authority of the Scriptures of the Israelites—Let us compare some of these supposed marks with those of human original, and they will stare us in the face, and point out plainly the fraud and imposture."

― "It is common and yet astonishing to observe, with how much solemnity and confidence almost all those who teach and defend Christianity, presume to affirm any thing, though never so evidently false."

― "The best, and even such as pass for the fairest controversial Writers, improve by artifice the natural infirmity of the human mind. They do, on purpose, confound ideas and perplex the signification of signs—the most scandalous frauds are applauded under the name of subtleties. This I call theological fraud."

Hence, in another place, he says, that "folly and knavery prevail most amongst divines": and again, that They are the plagues and scourges of the world.

"The doctrine of Clarke and other Christian divines, about our obligation to imitate God, is false and profane."
"Divines have impudently and wickedly assumed, that there is a law of right reason common to God and man."
"What I have advanced will be treated as an impious paradox by some of the trifling solemn dogmatists in criticism and theology, who have advanced so many absurd and impious paradoxes of their own."

We now come to what the noble Author calls the delirium of metaphysical theology. "The man who walked soberly about in the Bedlam of Paris, and believed himself God the Father, was mad. Thus the philosopher, who takes a bold leap from a few clear and distinct ideas to the first principles of things, is mad."

"The reasoners à priori resemble very much one sort of madmen. Some of these are so very mad, that they lose all use of their reason. Others again deduce consequences, and argue very justly, but are still mad: because they reason from principles that have no appearance of reality out of their own overheated and disordered imaginations. You will find instances of this kind, without the trouble of going to Bedlam; but you will find them principally in colleges and schools."

"They deserve to be treated like patients proper for Dr. Monroe, and to be put under his care. Nothing less than metaphysics could have turned so many good heads."

Well then, divines are all mad; and, for fear of mischief, in safe custody. Sometimes, indeed, his Lordship lets them out to cool, and air themselves; nay, he is so good to give them their lucid intervals; but it is only to play the rogue, and to cant in the pulpit; and then, back again to their kennel, to Monroe, and his discipline; or, what is much worse, to his Lordship’s; to hear themselves called fools, knaves, cheats, madmen, impostors, and blasphemers. And, for these hasty changes of the scene, he has contrived a most ingenious expedient. He has divided the clergy into the two classes of theologians and metaphysicians: in the first of which, the knave is predominant; in the second, the madman. So that he has of either sort always ready and at hand.
just as he wants them. But as madmen are much easier dealt with than knaves, he has prepared one common bedlam for them all. For God forbid (he says) he should be as uncharitable as divines, to think they deserved a worse place, as blaspheming in their senses. Good man! How kind now is all this! How humane! What shall the clergy do for him in return? Alas! he thinks not of it: his modesty is still greater than his charity: and he is only anxious not to be misunderstood. He is even ready to fear that divines should take his honest freedom in dudgeon; and that it may possibly procure him, in return, some ecclesiastical billingsgate; to be called infidel, deist, and perhaps atheist. My reply (says he) to so angry disputants should be calm, and such as might teach charity to those who preach it so much, and practise it so little. To say the truth, his Lordship seems, like justice shallow in the play, to be suspicious of those he had so well entertained. Davy (says the Justice, of his Court-guests) be civil to these knaves, for they will backbite. Not worse than they are bitten (replies Davy) for they have marvellous foul linen. Whether his Lordship found the priest's surplice in the like condition, or whether he has left it so, is not material. No marvel at its evil plight, when it has been so long overrun with vermin; such as Toland, Chub, Morgan, and those who have been since bred out of them.

The billingsgate, however, if we give but equal credit to what we see of his Lordship, and to what we hear of the clergy from their enemies, lies pretty nearly between them. Yet I agree with him it becomes the ministers of religions, much less than it does his Lordship. They are disputants; he is an orator. Their business is to reason; his is to rail. While each confines himself to his province, all goes well. But should they change weapons; should the orator attempt to reason, and the disputant be provoked to rail, every thing would be out of order. I venture, on the authority of Quintilian, to reckon railing amongst the arts of eloquence. "Con-" "vitii implere vacua causarum," says this able rhetor. It is true he holds it to be of the less perfect kind—"c. t enim prorsus canina eloquentia." But
his Lordship might naturally think, that his dog-eloquence was well enough fitted to their dog-logic. However, Quintilian would not overload this species of eloquence, nor would I; though neither of us be disposed to extol it; he confesses there is yet a ranker kind. "Sed haec "minora sunt illo vitio animi, quo maleficus a "malefico non distat, nisi occasione." "In which "(says he) nothing but opportunity is wanting to make "the evil-speaker an evil-doer." But the minister of state must join the orator before this compound excellence can display itself; just as the divine and atheist must conspire to make that artificial blasphemy, which gives his Lordship so much concern.

But the mention of this conspiracy reminds me that it is now high time to give you some account of it.

Hitherto we have only the outlines, or at most the general air of this clerical portrait; all he could catch at the first sitting. A horrid combination finishes the picture: a confederacy between divines and atheists, to dishonour and degrade the God of the universe. This is the striking feature; and so artificially disposed, that, turn the portrait which way you will, it has still a plotting, which, in his Lordship’s justice, is little better than a hanging look.

A confederacy so mad, so monstrous, may perhaps startle you at first. But do not be frightened. Take my word for it, it will come to nothing. It is a treaty of his own making. And you have heard enough of his talents for treaty-making. It is true, you say, he could reconcile the most unnatural alliances to the delicacy of his morals; and the most ridiculous miscarriages to the superiority of his politics; but a confederacy between divines and atheists! Was any thing so odious! What think you, my Friend, of that blind bargain he once drove between certain of King George’s Protestant Subjects, and a Popish Pretender? How that came to nothing, he has not thought fit to tell us, in his curious account of that transaction*. But, as to this confederacy, I may have an opportunity of shewing you, that, after all his pains to form it, he betrayed and dissolved it himself. At present, my business is only to shew you what he says of it.

* See the whole Letter to Sir W. Windham.
After pleading the cause of natural and revealed religion, I am to plead the cause of God himself, against DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERACY.

The conduct of Christian divines has been so far from defending the Providence of God, that they have joined in the clamour against it. Nothing has hindered, even those who pretend to be his messengers, his ambassadors, his plenipotentiaries, from renouncing their allegiance to him, as they themselves have the front to avow, but the hypothesis of a future state. On this hypothesis alone they insist; and therefore, if this will not serve their turn, God is disowned by them, as effectually as if he was so in terms.

Divines, if not atheists, yet are abettors of atheism.

That there were some men who knew not God in all ages may be true: but the scandalous task of combating his existence, under the mask of theism, was reserved for metaphysicians and theologians.

—"Divines are still more to be blamed. A CONFEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS becomes ill the professors of theism. No matter. They persist, and have done their best, in concert with their allies, to destroy the belief of the goodness of God: they endeavour to destroy that of his goodness, which is a farther article of their alliance."

"The CONFEDERACY between atheists and divines appears to have been carried very far.—Nay the atheist will appear, to that reason to which they both appeal, more consistent in his absurdity than the divine."

"Divines upbraid God's goodness, and censure his justice."

"Injustice is, in this life, ascribed to God, by divines."

"The whole tribe of divines, like Wollaston and Clarke, do in effect renounce the God whom you and I adore, as much as the rankest of the atheistical tribe. Your priests and our parsons will exclaim most pathetically, and rail outrageously at this assertion. But have a little patience, and I will prove it to their shame to be true."
Lett. I.] BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY. 111

Give me leave, Sir, for once, to go a little out of my way to vindicate the whole body of divines from the horrid calumny of this imaginary confederacy. To say the truth, the charge is too serious to be passed over with the same lightness I am disposed to treat the rest of his Lordship's extravagances.

Be pleased then to understand, that Atheism has ever endeavoured to support itself, on a fact, which has indeed all the certainty that the evidence of sense can give it; namely, the unequal distribution of moral good and evil.

—"Cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
   Adspicerem, laetosque diu florere nocentes,
   Vexarique pios——labefacta cadebat
   Religio"——

was the common language of the impatient sufferer.—From hence the atheist inferred, that the universe was without an intelligent Ruler; and all things driven about by that fate or fortune, which first produced them. Divines opposed this conclusion: for they did not venture to be so paradoxical as, with his Lordship, to call in question the premisses, a phenomenon which objected itself to all their senses. They demonstrated, strictly demonstrated, the being of a God, and his moral attributes: and then shewed, that if the whole of man's existence were included in this life, the present distribution of moral good and evil would contradict that demonstration. They, therefore, inferred, on their part, that the whole was not included in this life: but that man was reserved for an after-reckoning; in which, an equal distribution of rewards and punishments would amply vindicate the providence of a righteous Governor.

But atheists were not the only enemies that divines had to deal with. There was a set of men, who allowed an intelligent first Cause, endowed with those moral attributes, which divines had demonstrated: and, on that account, called themselves Deists. Yet they agreed so far with atheism, as to confine the whole of man's existence to the present life. These, the divines combated, in their turn; and with the same arms; but in an inverted order. In disputing with the atheist, the principle held
held in common was *the present unequal distribution of good and evil.* So that to cut off their conclusion from it, of *no God,* they demonstrated his being and attributes: and from that proof inferred that the inequality would be set right. With the *deist,* the common principle was *the being and attributes of God.* Therefore, to bring them to the allowance of a *future state,* they appealed to the present *unequal distribution* of good and evil (which these men, as well as his Lordship, were very backward to allow and very industrious not to see), and from that inequality inferred, that there must be such a state.

This is a short and true account of their contest with *atheists* and *deists,* so far as the subject of a *future state* came in question: in either controversy, that state is deduced from *the moral attributes:* only with this difference. In the dispute with atheists, the demonstration of those attributes is *made:* in the dispute with deists, it is *allowed.* The final purpose against atheism is to prove the *being and attributes of God:* the final purpose against deism is to prove a *future state:* for neither *natural nor revealed religion* can subsist without believing that *God is,* and that he is a *rewarder of them that seek him.* Thus, we see, the question, in either controversy, being different; the premises, by which each was to be proved, must needs be different. The difference is here explained: the premises, in the argument with atheists, were the *moral attributes;* the premises, in the argument with deists, the *unequal distribution* of good and evil.

What enemy to religion now could ever hope to see a calumny either thrive or rise on so unpromising a ground? or flatter himself with the expectation of an advocate bold enough to tell the world, that this conduct of the *divines* was a *confederacy with atheists,* to *decry God's providence; to blot out his attributes of goodness and justice; to combat his government; and to deny his very existence?* The *right honourable Author* does all this: and more;—he expects to be believed. It is true, this is a fine believing age; yet I hardly think he would have carried his confidence in our

* St. Paul.
credulity so far, had he seen his way clear before him.—
His Lordship is always sublime, and therefore often cloudy; commonly, at too great a distance to look into the detail of things, or to enter into their minuteness; (for which, indeed, he is perpetually felicitating his genius.) So that, in his general view of theologic matters, he has jumbled these two controversies into one; and, in the confusion, commodiously slipped in one fact for another. He, all the way, represents divines as making a future state the proof of God’s moral attributes: whereas, we now see, on the very face of the controversy, that they make the moral attributes a proof of a future state. Let us consider how the dispute stands with atheists. These men draw their argument against a God, from the condition of the moral world: the divine answers, by demonstrating God’s being and attributes; and, on that demonstration, satisfies the objection. Consider how it stands with the deist. Here, God’s being and attributes is a common principle: and on this ground the divine stands, to deduce a future state from the unequal distribution of things. But this was to support his slander of a confederacy. There was no room to pretend that God’s being was made precarious, by proving a future state, from his attributes; but could he get it believed, that divines proved the attributes from a future state, he would easily find credit with his kind readers, for the rest.

Well then, the whole amount of his chimerical confederacy comes to this, That divines and atheists hold a principle in common; but in common too with all the rest of mankind; namely, that there are irregularities in the distribution of moral good and evil. His Lordship has been angry with all political, as well as all religious parties in their turns. Suppose he had taken it into his head to ornament a craftsman with the detection of a political confederacy, between the Whigs and Jacobites, to dethrone King George; because both denied that he reigned jure divino; Mother Osborne would have smiled at this, in spite of all her gravity; and told him, that the Whigs only urged a common principle to support their Monarch’s title against indefeasible hereditary right, the nonsensical claim of
his Adversary. And is it not as evident that, in this pretended anti-theological conspiracy, divines employ the other common principle, to support religion against atheism and deism! But whatever his Lordship might think proper to disguise in this reasoning, there is one thing the most careless reader will never overlook; which is, that, under all this pomp of words and solemnity of accusation, you see lurking that poor species of a bigot calumny, which, from one principle held in common with an obnoxious party, charges his Adversary, with all the follies or impetities that have rendered it odious. This miserable artifice of imposture had now been long hushed out of learned controversy, when the noble Lord took it up; and, with true political skill, worked it into a sham plot; to make religion distrust its best friends, and take refuge in the first philosophy.

Tindal and Collins were mainly adversaries. They knew how to invent, to push, and to pursue an argument. But what does this noble Writer know—His follower will tell you. They admire him for his wit and eloquence. But they admire, where you and I see nothing but an inflamed spirit, and an inflated style. For (to use the words of a great master* of expression) true eloquence I find to be none but the serious and hearty love of truth; and that, whose mind soever is full possessed with a fervent desire to know good things and with the dearest charity to infuse the knowledge of them into others, when such a man would speak his words, like so many nimble and airy servitors, tri about him at command, and in well-ordered files, a he would wish, fall aptly into their own places.

He has not yet done with the Christian Clergy. What remained behind was to collect together his scattered abuse; and to pour it all at once on that venerable body, with an unfeeling hand, and unrelenting heart.

"Nothing more (says he) will be wanting to answer all the ends of artificial theology, than to assure that they who minister in holy things are the Omrah, the Vizirs, and the Bassas of this mighty King whose commands they publish, interpret, and execute or cause to be executed, rather than his Emissary.

* Milton.
"Dors: by assuming which latter characters, they seem
"to lessen, over modestly, the dignity of their own order,
"and to raise that of the laity too high: But I am
"ashamed to have said so much on this
"subject."

He may pretend what he pleases. But whoever it
was that brought him to shame, it certainly was not the
clergy. They are ready to assure him, in the words of
the Poet,

"Let shame come when it will, we do not call it."

Besides, after what has passed, I see nothing he has
to be ashamed of; unless it be for stealing the paltry joke
of Embassadors and Plenipotentiaries* from Lord
Shaftsbury:

"Far be it from me (pursues this Right Honourable
"Person) and from every lover of truth and common
"sense, to wish that the race of metaphysicians and
"casuists should increase, or so much as continue. But
"since there are, have been, and will be such men in
"all ages, it is very reasonable to wish that they may
"serve to the same good purpose that the helotes, the
"drunken slaves, did at Sparta; and that their de-
"lirium, instead of imposing on others, and even in-
"fecting many, may be at length laughed out of the
"world." What pity is it his Lordship himself had not
tried this expedient (whose efficacy, other Lords of better
 temper so kindly recommend and practice), and em-
ployed the pleasantry of his wit to laugh the clergy out
of the world, rather than the sublimity of his eloquence
to scold them out of it! He may rail through all his
figures, at the impertinence of logic, the futility of
metaphysics, the fraud of disputation, and the blas-
phemy of divinity: these are the arms of impotent hyster-
cal women, when they want to have their will. After
the long labours of a Hooker, a Stillingfleet, a
Cudworth, a Spencer, a Tillotson, and a Clarke,
the English clergy may answer his Lordship, in the words
of De Rosny, as I think the story goes, to some old
ladies of the Guisian League; who, when Henry IV.
had got possession of Paris, were one day very eloquent

* See p. 110, of this Letter.
in their invectives against him: "Good ancient Gentle-women," said this rough old soldier, "spare your breath, and set your hearts at rest, for our master is not a man to be scratched and scolded out of his kingdom."—But when, between his malice and his magic, he had transformed the clergy into drunken slaves; you must not think he would neglect so good an occasion of exposing them to his noble Spartans. Indeed the entertainment is at hand: and no cost is spared of lavish expression to set out these drunken revels. "The choirs of birds (says he) who whistle and sing, or scream at one another, or herds of beasts who bleat and low, or chatter and roar, at one another, have just as much meaning, and communicate it as well—Such is the common conversation—Such, too, for the most part, are all the public discourses that are held, and the solemn harangues of the pulpit."

After so large a gleaning from his Lordship's abundance, you will dispense with me from gathering up his looser flowers of speech; such as, absurdity, effronderie, knavery, folly, nonsense, delirium, frenzy, lunacy, downright madness, impiety, prophaneness, blasphemy, and atheism: which, like seed-pearl, are every where scattered over the embroidery of his eloquence.

Though our indignation at this torrent of ribaldry makes us prompt enough to ask,

"An quæ Turpio cerdoni, Volesos Brutumque decebunt?"

yet I am ready, in charity, to suspect that his Lordship may be abused. Who knows, but just as his Lordship gave Bownce (his friend's dog) the sentiments of his master*, so his Lordship's Secretary, attending to two

* "The world (says his Lordship to Pope) is as well fitted for Bownce as for you, with respect to physical nature; and with respect to moral nature, Bownce has little to do beyond hearkening to the still whispers, the secret suggestions, and the sudden influences of instinct." This, the reader sees, is intended for a compliment on the following stanza of his Friend's Universal Prayer:

"Where I am right, THY grace impart,
"Still in the right to stay;
"Where I am wrong, O TEACH MY heart
"To find that better way."
at once, his Lord and his Lord's Parrot, might unaware
put down to the great man, what indeed belonged to the
favourite: who, however eloquent he might be, yet, we
are told, was no philosopher.

"The coxcomb bird, so talkative and grave,
"That from his cage cries cuckold, whore, and knave,
"Though many a passenger he rightly call,
"We hold him no philosopher at all."

And I the rather suppose the Secretary to be here in
fault, since his Lordship, in one place, seems to think,
that ribaldry and ill language disgrace the animal im-
plume, pipes, the two-legged, unfeathered philosopher.
For, speaking of Spinoza and Hobbes, he says, Let it
not be said, they are men of depraved understand-
ings, and depraved morals; this is to rail, not
to argue. To rail, then, when we should argue, is,
in his Lordship's opinion, unbecoming a philosopher,
unless you will suppose, that these two atheists were
especially favoured, for not being found in bad company,
or taken in the fact, wickedly confederating with
divines and metaphysicians.

Seriously, as good men may be scandalized to find their
best and ablest pastors accused of blasphemy and pro-
faneness, it will be right to tell the plain truth: which
is no more than this, that his Lordship is apt to annex
new ideas to old words; and not very careful to give us
notice of his handy-work. So, in the case before us,
Who would suspect, that teaching a law of right reason,
common to God and man, and enforcing man's obligation
to imitate God, were blasphemy and profaneness?
Yet such they are; or we must renounce the first
Philosophy*. 

So then, as what has hitherto been piety is become
blasphemy, we need not wonder that his Lordship turns
the garb of old threadbare blasphemy, and gives it the
new gloss of piety.

But now comes a scene indeed. The two Reve-
lations and their two founders are brought upon the

* "Divines have impudently and wickedly assumed,
that there is a law of right reason common to God
and man." And again, "To preach up the obligation of
imitating God, is false and profane."
stage. And here, his piety pretends so much to the impulse of conscience, that you would suspect he thought himself, like St. Paul, under the malediction of a woe if he preached not his new gospel.

Of Moses, he says, "It is impossible to excuse all the puerile, romantic, and absurd circumstances in the author of the book of Genesis, which nothing could produce but the habit of dealing in trifling traditions, and a most profound ignorance. It is impossible to read what he has writ on this subject, without feeling contempt for him as a philosopher, and horror as a divine."

"The Pentateuch has such evident marks of falsehood, as can be objected to no other writings, except to professed Romances, nor even always to them."

"We may laugh at Don Quixote, for reading Romances till he believed them to be true histories, and for quoting Archbishop Turpin with great solemnity; but when divines speak of the Pentateuch as of an authentic history, and quote Moses as solemnly as he did Turpin, are they much less mad than he was?"

Don Quixote is his Lordship's favourite simile; and comes as often over as the ass and lion in Homer. But mocking (as the proverb says) is catching. Whoever attentively considers his Lordship's essays, will, I dare say, be of my mind, That the much reading his master Locke, who was deeply engaged with school-divines and metaphysicians, had the same effect on his Lordship's temper, in an advanced age, and under a bilious habit, that the reading books of Chivalry had on the prudent gentleman of La Mancha. And, by his own confession, a man's head is soon turned by complex and abstract ideas. From henceforth the enchantments of schoolmen and the gigantic forms of metaphysical divines got entire possession of his understanding. Consider what you can make of the following remark, without supposing with me that these fancies had made very deep havoc in his brain."

"That theology, says he, which pretends to deduce the duties of a man from speculations concerning the moral attributes of God, is to be reckoned in the class with natural magic." Now, if you seek, I do not say for the elegance, but for the common propriety of..."
this observation, any where out of his Lordship’s hurt and wounded imagination, you will seek for it in vain. Yet, allow him but his theological magicians, and you see, their theology could be nothing else than natural magic.

So again—Clarke shall not force me into atheism; no, nor Wollaston neither. What is this, but Don Quixote, up and down? dreadfully afraid that these Necromancers would, at last, force him into their enchanted castle of a future state; for so he calls it in a letter to Lord Bathurst *, where he threatens to demolish it, as built upon unholy ground, by divines and atheists in confederacy.

No doubt, every Reader must have observed this unaccountable rage and horror whenever a divine comes cross his Lordship’s fancy. One would think, they had served him the same trick the enchanters played Don Quixote; that they had run away with his library, and walled up his study-door. Most true it is, that not long before this immense treasure of the first philosophy was given to the world, certain of these wicked magicians had turned it all into faerie-favours: and the public, on its first appearance, found nothing in it better proved than the truth of the old adage, Pro Thesaurus, Carbones. And indeed, if I was not perfectly satisfied that no man in his senses could mistake the value of this new money, I should make a scruple of laying so much of it before him; especially the following pieces, which have an uncommon glow, as if they came hot from the place where they were minted.

"The whole system of the law of Moses, like the whole system of his conduct, was founded on murder."

"The Jews blended together, at once, in the moral character of God, injustice, cruelty, and partiality.—They made him an object of terror, more than of awe and reverence; and their religion was a system of the rankest superstition."

"The Jews with more inconsistence, and not less profanation, than the Pagans, dressed up the one Supreme...

"To discover error in axioms (says he), or in first principles grounded on facts, is like breaking of a charm. The enchanted castle, the steepy rock, and the burning lake, disappear."

"Being
"Being in all the rags of humanity; which composed a kind of motley character, such as foolish superstition and mad enthusiasm alone could ascribe to him, and such as no man, who believes him an all-perfect Being, can hear without horror."

"The Jews give such notions of the Supreme Being as no people on earth, but this, would have ascribed, I do not say to God, but to the worst of those monsters, who are suffered or sent by God, for a short time, to punish the iniquity of men."

From Moses and Judaism, his Lordship descends to Paul and Christianity. Let us see whether he gives Them better quarter.

"Christianity abrogated the law, and confirmed the history of Moses; from the times, at least, when St. Paul undertook, like a true cabalistical architect, with the help of type and figure, to raise a new system of religion on the old foundations." "The Gospel of Christ is one thing; the gospel of St. Paul another." "He preached a gospel in contradiction to Christ's, and directly repugnant to it."

On this account, I suppose, it was, that he dignifies Paul, with the elegant appellation of the leather-dressing pontiff. But the immediate occasion of giving him this new title of honour, was particularly happy. His Lordship was on a favourite topic; he was abusing the first messengers of the Gospel, for their claim to maintenance. He was conscious, Paul came not within his censure. So that, lest this should give the apostle too much credit; he informs the reader, in his polite way, that he had a trade, and could shift for himself. For it seems, nothing but downright starving will acquit the apostles of theft and extortion, at his Lordship's tribunal.

"Jesus (in his opinion) had no intention of spreading his religion further than amongst the Jews; but Paul, bred at the feet of Gamaliel, saw further than that poor ignorant fisherman Peter." The sense requires you should read, that poor ignorant carpenter Jesus; and so without doubt his Lordship designed his compliment. Well, but what did Paul see further? It was this, "That the contempt and aversion in which both..."
"the nation and the religion of the Jews were held by
the rest of mankind, would make it much more easy to
convert the Gentiles at once to Christianity, than to
make them Jews first, in order to make them Chris-
tians afterwards."

For it seems—"To dissemble was a fundamental
principle of apostolical conduct. Paul practised it.
We have his own word for this; and he boasts of it." His Lordship lets us know, that Paul had assurance
each to do anything. For, speaking of the apostle's
famous argument ad modestiam—Nay, but, O man,
who art thou that repliest against God? &c. He
says, "There is something so impudent, as well as ab-
surd in this proceeding, that, common as it is, one can
see no example of it without surprise."

"Can he be less than mad, says his Lordship, who
boasts a revelation superadded to reason, to supply the
defects of it, and who superadds reason to revelation,
to supply the defects of this too, at the same time?
This is madness, or there is no such thing incident to
our nature. And into this kind of madness, St. Paul,
"profound in cabalistical learning, hath fallen." And
yet, as mad as it is, all Governments have matched it,
when they superadded civil laws, to natural conscience
or religion, to supply the defects of it; and super-
added natural conscience or religion to civil laws, to sup-
ply the defects of those too, at the same time. But
more of this in its place.

"St. Paul carried into the apostleship a great deal
of that assuming air, which is apt to accompany
much learning, or the opinion of it—a great profu-
sion of words, and of involved, and unconnected dis-
course, even on those subjects which required to be most
clearly and distinctly developed. He was a loose pa-
"rphraser, a cabalistical commentator, as much, at
"least, as any ancient or modern rabbin."—"St. Paul's
system of religion, is an intricate and dark system,
with, here and there, an intelligible phrase, that
casts no light on the rest, but is rather lost in the
"gloom of the whole."—"Having said so much of the
intelligibility of Paul's gospel, Truth authorises me
"to add, that where it is intelligible, it is often absurd, or
"profane.
"profane, or trifling."—"Paul taught predestination and unlimited passive obedience: the one absurd, the other both absurd and impious."

Was it allowable to laugh, amidst all these horrors, what mortal could forbear? Unlimited passive obedience, quoth he! The noble Lord had been so long accustomed to the cant of his faction, which made St. Paul the preacher of I cannot tell what nonsense under that name, that he seems now in good earnest to believe he was so. A just judgment on the politician; to come at last to give credit to his own flims. However, in this instance, at least, one would hope St. Paul might have been spared, if it were only for old acquaintance sake; and the hard service they had put the leather-dressing pontiff upon. But it is bad trusting; we see, to the gratitude of statesmen. Happy for us, Paul has yet an able defender; who will never be wanting in what he owes to gratitude and honour. I only take the liberty to drop a hint. It is well known to those who were in the secret of his Lordship's passions and his party, that Clarke and Wollaston found the worse treatment for being the favourite philosophers of Q. C. Who knows, whether St. Paul bore the better for being patronized by his learned friend?

"Christianity (says his Lordship) became fanaticism in the first professors of it. Men corrupted it by artificial theology. And some will be apt to think, that the first of these men was Paul—Divines will be furious to hear such language." Alas! No. He guessed ill of the mood in which his works were to find them. They laugh at his vanity; and pity the fury that inspired such language. Indeed he gives them ample exercise for all their pity: for, having done with Paul, he now directs the poison of his tongue against Jesus Christ himself.

"The truth is, Christianity preserved, in many respects, a strong tang of the spirit of Judaism. The Supreme Being took a milder appearance; his favour was confined no longer to one people. The Messiah came and redeemed fallen Man. Christian theology discovers in this mysterious proceeding the love of God to Man; his infinite justice and goodness. But..."
BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY.

But reason will discover the fantastical, confused, and inconsistent notions of Jewish theology, latent in it; and applied to another system of religion. This love will appear partiality; this justice will appear injustice; this goodness will appear cruelty. On the whole, the moral character imputed to the Supreme Being by Christian theology, differs little from that imputed to him by the Jewish. The difference is rather apparent than real.

"The scene of Christianity has been always a scene of dissention, of hatred, of persecution, and of blood."

Speaking of Christ's Sermon on the Mount, be says—"Some [of the precepts] are directed to the Jews only, and some more immediately to the disciples of Christ. The second sort seem fit enough for a religious sect; but are by no means practicable in the general society of mankind. Considered as general duties they are impracticable, inconsistent with natural instinct, as well as law, and quite destructive of society."

"The Christian theology has derived from the Jewish, a profane licence, which makes men blaspheme without knowing they blaspheme, and makes their very devotion impious."

"I would sooner be reputed, nay I would sooner be, a Pagan than a Christian, or an Atheist than a Theist, if to be one or the other it was necessary to believe such absurdities as these; which, however disguised and softened by a certain cant of expression, are directly profane; and indirectly, or by consequence at least, blasphemous."

"All the bedlams of the world cannot match the absurdities that have been propagated by Christians, whether heretics or orthodox, concerning the making and governing of the world by the ministration of inferior Beings: Beings not eternal, but produced in time by emanation, or some other inconceivable manner of generation."

"We cannot believe the Scriptures to be God's word, though we know the physical and moral system are his work, while we find in them such repugnancies.
to the nature of an all-perfect Being; not mysteries, but absurdities; not things incomprehensible, but things that imply manifestly contradiction with his nature."

In a word, he tells us, that "the Religion of Nature has been turned almost into blasphemy by Revelation." "To believe (says he) that Jesus was the Messiah, is said by some [meaning his Master Locke] to be the unum necessarium of faith; but, to observe the Law of Nature, is the unum necessarium of duty."

But now having exposed Moses, Christ, and Paul; having decried the falsehood of the two Revelations, and ridiculed the absurdity of sacred Scripture; he shews us, in mere charity, after the example of the wise Alphonso, how either system might have been mended, had his Lordship been consulted while, like the wise Alphonso, he believes just as much of God's word, as the other did of his works.

First, he hints, how the Law might have been better planned. "God purchased the obedience of the Jewish people by a mercenary bargain. It was ill kept on their part. And the Law, with all its sanctions, was continually violated; sometimes rejected; and had, in no degree, a force sufficient to maintain itself in observation and reverence. Now, one of the most conceivable perfections of a law is, that it be made with such a foresight of all possible accidents, and with such provisions for the due execution of it, in all cases, that the law may be effectual to govern and direct these accidents, instead of lying at the mercy of them.—Another the most conceivable perfection of a law consists in the clearness and precision of its terms.—These will be found, no doubt, and ought to be expected, when God is the legislator."

He next shews us, how he could have improved the Gospel, had he been of God's privy-counsel. "Had the doctrine of future rewards and punishments been taught by Christianity in terms more general and less descriptive; had the punishments been represented, for instance, like the rewards, to be, simply, such as eye never saw, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man could conceive, it might have been maintained
"in credit, and had an universal and real influence
perhaps, to the great advantage of religion."

An inattentive reader may be surprised perhaps, at
this wantonness of his Lordship's pen, That when he had
given it as his fixed decree, that all which the world hath
hitherto called religion, is a public mischief, and a future
state, an absurd fable; he should with great formality
deliver in a plan which would have given credit and real
efficacy to nonsense and impiety. But we must consider,
He had been so long playing the philosopher, that he
had reason to apprehend we might forget the other part
of his sublime character, the legislator. He therefore
deemed it expedient to give us a slight cast of his office,
in rectifying the blunders of Moses and Jesus Christ.

With regard to Moses and his Law, I have so much
to say to his Lordship, that I shall reserve it for an after-
reckoning. The other is but a small matter, and may
be settled here.

I suspect then, our legislator, in this remark con-
cerning the manner in which Jesus revealed a future
state, did not sufficiently attend either to the nature of
the human mind, or to the genius of the Gospel. He
would have, we see, the account of future punishments
as general, and as little descriptive, as that of future
rewards. He seems to think the latter well managed,
and with propriety: which yet he measures on the ima-
ginary impropriety of the other: he appears to have no
idea of any positive excellency it has in itself. I shall
endeavour therefore to explain why this method of re-
presenting future rewards was right: by which it will
appear, that the other, of representing future punish-
ments, was by no means wrong.

To grow particular and descriptive, whether of future
rewards, or future punishments, the speaker must borrow
his images from material and corporeal things; because
the hearer has no faculties of sensation proper to com-
prehend ideas taken from things spiritual. Now when
a follower of Christ is so far advanced as to have his faith
work by hope, his sentiments grow refined, his ideas
purify, and he is rising apace towards that perfection
which the Gospel encourages him to aspire after. But
while fear of punishment chiefly operates upon him, he
is yet in the lowest state of probation; his imagination is gross, and his appetites sensual. Is it not evident, then, that a descriptive heaven of delights would be ill suited to that purity and elevation of mind, solely fixed by hope, on happiness; and as evident, that a general undefined denunciation of hell would not have force enough to make the necessary impression on a sensual fancy agitated by fear? Let not his Lordship's admirers, therefore, be offended, if we believe that, in this point, the Author of our salvation went at least one step beyond their master, in true politics.

At length, for a concluding stroke, his Lordship comes from vilifying both religions, and their founders, to rail against the God of both religions. And with this I shall close the horrid scene.

"If we believe in Moses, and his God, we cannot believe in that God whom our reason shews us."

"Can any man presume to say, that the God of Moses, or the God of Paul, is the true God? The God of Moses is partial, unjust, and cruel; delights in blood, commands assassinations, massacres, and even exterminations of people. The God of Paul elects some of his creatures to salvation, and predestinates others to destruction, even in the womb of their mothers. And, indeed, if there was not a Being infinitely more perfect than these, there would be no God at all, nor any true Religion in the world."

Who, that hears this dreadful language, without knowing from what quarter it comes, but will straight call to mind the words of the satirist?

"Not Danté, dreaming all th' infernal state,
Beheld such scenes of envy, sin, and hate."

But when we understand them to be the ejaculations of this noble philosopher, the confessor of truth, the advocate of virtue, and the restorer of banished nature; employed, as he himself tells us, or rather, set apart, to plead the cause of God himself against divines and atheists in confederacy; when we consider I say, all this, What are we to think, but that they are the pious breathings of an over-heated zeal: and though
expressed in no consecrated terms (indeed such as had been much worn in the service of the Craftsman) yet when new-set in his Lordship’s immortal panoply of the First Philosophy, they may now prove as useful, to advance the fear of God, as before, to promote the honour of the king.

It is in hate as in love; hard to distinguish the divine from the carnal species; or rather to separate the different ebullitions of what is but one and the same species. Hence it is, that the melting strains of the Mystic, the Methodist, and the Moravian, so often smell of the stews; and hence, by parity of reason, the thunder of his Lordship’s eloquence may naturally re-echo, as it were, from Billingtons gate.

But these things make you serious; and you ask, “Who, that hath ever heard Lord Bolingbroke’s story, would have suspected, that his God and his country lay so near his heart?” And yet his political and philosophic writings, say you, are full of laments; where, like another Jeremy, he bewails the dishonours which wicked priests, and wicked politicians, have brought upon the Church and State: Nay, in his extreme fondness for these his favourite objects, he suffers himself to be alarmed with something less than panic terrors. He is afraid the Whigs will bring in the Pretender; and apprehends, the English clergy have made large steps towards atheism.”

I know what you drive at. You would insinuate, that those who have nothing to fear, and a great deal to hope from Religion, are not wont to give it up so easily. For hope encourages men to search into the grounds of what Religion promises; though fear often hinders them from giving proper attention to what it threatens. You are ready to say to his Lordship,

“Si Virtutis eras avidus, rectique bonique
Tam sitiens, quid Religio tibi sancta nocebat?
Aspera quippe nimis visa est? Asperrima certe
Gaudenti vitios, sed non virtutis amanti.”

Card. Polig.

You are for applying to his right honourable person, the old trite aphorism, That wicked principles spring out of a wicked life. But what says another noble peer to this?
this? "Fain would the bigot, in consequence of his "moral maxims, and political establishments, con-"found licentiousness in morals with liberty of thought," and make the libertine, who has the least mastery "of himself, resemble his direct opposite*." It may be so, you will say. But Lord Bolingbroke, sure, could never object to the imputation which bad morals cast upon a teacher of truth: He, who sees it so clearly, and presses it so charitably, upon the whole body of the Christian clergy. "How" (says his Lordship) "can the clergy of your church, or of ours, "pretend that they contribute now, or ever did con-"tribute, to the reformation of mankind? No age "can be pointed out, wherein all the vices, that "Tully imputes to most of the Heathen philosophers, "did not prevail amongst most of the Christian divines "with great circumstances of aggravation. They have "not only all the vices incident to human nature in "common with other men, but they have had the peculiar vices of their order. I will say boldly, they "are, in general, much fitter to hinder, by their example, than to promote by their doctrine, the advance-"ment of Religion, natural or revealed."

We have, it is true, been favoured with very ample accounts of the immoral conduct both of ancient philosophers and modern churchmen; and these, even by some of the more charitable of their own respective bodies.—Freethinkers have been bashful, and more on the reserve: nay, they might have been thought saints, for any thing their modesty would have suffered, had it not been for the Confessions of one of them, the famous Cardan; who, like another St. Austin, seems sworn to leave nothing behind him in the ink-horn. The account he gives of himself deserves transcribing.—"In diem viventem, "nugacem, religionis contemptorem, illatae injuriae me-"morem, invidium, tristem, insidiatorem, proditorem, "suorum osorem, turpi libidini deditum, solitariun, "inamœnum, austerum, obscenum, lascivum, maledi-"cum, varium, ancipitem, impurum, calumniatorem†," &c. This was fair dealing: and he, who was so free with himself, might be excused if he spared nobody else.

* Characteristicks, Vol. iii. Misc. 5. Chap. 3. † De vita sua.
But man do not use to be wanton on so nice a subject; and Freethinkers have generally more mastery of themselves, says the noble Author of the Characteristics: whenever therefore we see it done, we must conclude it to be done for some good purpose; such as, emulation of the Christian confessors; who, to display the powers of grace, did not scruple to tell the world, with great simplicity, what they were by nature: and thus Cardan, to shew us that the first philosophy is as efficacious in all great changes, has fairly told us how well befriended he had been by his stars. However, let his design, in presenting us with this picture of his amiable turn of mind, be what it would, we are much beholden to him for setting the example. Though, like all other good examples, it may possibly end where it set out; and the first philosophy wait with patience for some less commodious way of recommending itself. And indeed, while infidelity, which is the cure, is unjustly supposed the cause of these peccadillos, we need not wonder our philosophers should soon think themselves at liberty, and be as soon disposed, to turn their view from their own morals to those of the clergy: and affirm boldly, with his Lordship, that the order in general is much fitter to hinder by their example, than to promote by their doctrine, the advancement of religion.

What shall we say then? May it not be better to leave the examples of both to shift for themselves; and to consider only their doctrines? I think it would; and will therefore proceed from his Lordship’s temper, to his principles. But this must be the subject of another Letter.—I am, &c.

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LETTER II.

IT has been observed, that uncommon blessings, whether civil or religious, seldom happen till hope grows desperate; and long expectation has wearied out itself in vain. Then it is the crisis approaches, the superior Genius
bestirs himself, and the *admiring* world is taken in by surprise.

——Quod optanti Divûm, promittere nemo
Auderet, volvenda dies en! attulit ultron.

Never was this observation so well verified: for never was mankind in so deplorable a way as when his Lordship arrived from—which other system is not yet discovered; though his tuneful Friend was very positive he belonged not to this: insomuch, that when the last Comet appeared, and came pretty near the Earth, he used to tell his acquaintance, he should not be surprised if in the event it proved, that it was sent only to convey his Lordship home again; just as a stage-coach stops at your door to take up a passenger. Be this as it will: bad indeed was our condition when Lord Bolingeroke arrived,—what shall I say, *to be a light to those who sat in darkness?* No, this is the work of meager missionaries; but, to restore mankind to their senses.

For his Lordship, in his account of the general delirium which had seized the clergy, had given us but a specimen of our condition: the madness was universal. Insomuch, that (as he well expresses it) all the bedlams of the world were not sufficient for these things. And indeed how should they! For, to confess the truth, these visions of what he calls an overheated imagination, such as, belief in the moral attributes of God, the immortality of the soul, a particular providence, and a future state, had infected all times and places.

*All Europe* (says his Lordship) grew delirious. Christianity was left to shift for itself in the midst of a frantic world. And again, "Our world seems "to be, in many respects, the bedlam of every "other system of intelligent creatures; and, "with this unlucky circumstance, that they who are "most mad govern, in things of the greatest moment, "them who are least so." By what is here dropt in the concluding words, you understand why his Lordship chose to make the clergy lead up the brawls in this mad dance; and the leather-dressing Pontiff himself to preside as Master of the Revels.
But to find all mankind mad, is perhaps more than you expected. What then? Is the madness less real for being universal?—I think not: but surely, more desperate. Tell us, therefore, what strange disaster occasioned this general insanity. Was it some evil disposition of the stars?—So, indeed, it is reported * . The world, it seems, like the men of Abdera †, had seen a tragedy in a very hot day: which left so strong an impression on their fancies, that they all thought themselves concerned in the subject. Some ran about from country to country, to tell their story; and the rest have been ever since rehearsing and celebrating those affecting scenes, at home! till Lord Bolingbroke, like another Hippocrates, came to their relief: and, having first well physicked them of their faith and their fancies, brought them to themselves, by applying to their hurt imaginations, the sovereign restorative of his first philosophy. Of which, I am now, as I promised, to give you some account.

But to see this extraordinary man in a just light, it will be proper to shew what Man was before him. A religious animal he is allowed to be, on all hands: and, till the coming of this first philosophy, Religion was understood to rise on that wide basis, on which the fanatical knave, Paul, had the art to place it; that "He who cometh to God must believe that he is: and that he is a rewarder of them who diligently seek him ‡." For, men who supposed the infinite goodness and justice of God to be as demonstrable as his infinite power and wisdom, could not but conclude from his moral attributes, that he rewarded; as well as from his natural attributes, that he created.

On the more complex notion, therefore, of a moral governor, all mankind supposed religion to arise; while naturalism, the ape of religion, was seen to spring from the simpler notion of a physical preserver: which, however, they were ready to distinguish, on the other hand, from the unnaturalism (if one may so call it) of ranker atheism.

* Vid. D. N. J. C. gueseos thema, inter Cardani opera.  
† Sée Lucian. de conscr. Hist.  
‡ Heb. xi. 6.
Religion, therefore, stands, and must, I think, for ever stand, on those two immovable principles, of preserver and rewarer, in conjunction.

The length or shortness of human existence was not primarily in the idea of Religion, not even in the complete idea of it, as delivered in St. Paul's general definition. "The Religionist," says he, "must believe that God is, and that he rewards."

But when it came to be seen, that he was not always a rewarer here, men concluded this life not to be the whole of their existence. And thus a future state was brought into Religion; and from thenceforth became a necessary part of it.

To explain my meaning, if so clear a thing needs further explanation. God, under the physical idea of preserver and Creator, appears uniform, regular, and instant to his creatures: Under the moral idea of Rewarer and Governor, he seems frequently to be withdrawn from his servants. For though, in the moral dispensations of things here, good and evil be often proportioned to desert; yet often, too, they are otherwise adjusted. The ancient religionist, therefore, confiding in his demonstration of the moral as well as the natural attributes of the Deity, concluded, That the present was not the only state ordained for man; but that in some other life these irregularities would be set right. Hence a future state became in all ages and countries (except one, where the moral administration of Providence was different) inseparable from, and essential to, the various Religions of mankind. Even the mere vulgar, who did not reach the force of this demonstration, yet, seeing the marks of moral government, amidst the frequent interruptions of it, embraced the doctrine of a future state as confidently as the learned. For plain Nature had instructed them to reason thus,—If all were regular, nothing needed to be set right: and if all were irregular, there was no one to set them right.

Such was the antient religion of nature: to which, modern divines have generally agreed to give the name of theism, when professed by those who never heard of revelation; and the name of deism, when professed by those who would never give credit to it.
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In this state our noble Philosopher found the religious world; or, more properly, this was the language he heard re-echoed from one end of the globe to the other; But it was a language, he tells us, he did not understand. It was to his ears, like the choirs of birds, who whistle and sing, or scream, at one another; or the herds of beasts, who bleat and low, or chatter and roar, at one another. He rejects it, therefore, in the lump, as the inarticial din of enthusiasm and absurdity; the brutal issue of pride and ignorance; and so, but with much greater of his own, erects the first philosophy on its ruins.

1. He permits us to believe, that an intelligent Cause made the world; and, by his physical and general laws still governs it: but not by moral or particular.

2. He bids us to understand, that this world was no more made for man, than for every animal besides: nor man made for any other world, nor consequently (as divines have dreamt) for happiness.

3. That, by the arbitrary constitution of things in the human system (which may have a contrary disposition in other systems), virtue promotes happiness, and vice brings on misery.

4. That this constitution, together with the co-activity of civil laws, contain all the rewards and punishments attendant on virtue and on vice.

5. That prayer, supplication, and every other office of religion in use amongst men, to implore good, and to deprecate evil, are foolish and fanatical: for that all religious duty is comprised in submission to the established order of things.

He sums up his whole system in these words:—"A self-existent Being the first cause of all things, infinitely powerful and infinitely wise, is the God of natural theology. And the whole system of Natural Religion rests on it, and requires no broader foundation." That is, it is enough for him who cometh to this new religion, to believe that God is; and not that he is a rewarder of them who seek him. And again, "When men have proved the existence of an all-perfect Being, the Creator and Governor of the Universe, and do monstrated his infinite power and wisdom, from his works,"
works, when they have done this, they have done all; this includes the whole of natural theology, and serves abundantly to all the ends of natural religion."

What these ends of natural religion are, he tells us very plainly. They are, to fit us for our station here, and to supply our real wants in it. — "In like manner [that is, as he expresses it, for the necessary uses of human life and no more] the knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts necessary to such a creature as man: and therefore we are able to arrive, by a proper exercise of our mental faculties, from the knowledge of God's works, to a knowledge of his existence, and of that infinite power and wisdom which are demonstrated to us in them. Our knowledge concerning God goes no further."

Now though we should be so complaisant to these principles as not to call them atheistic, yet I am afraid the professor of them, whoever he be, must be content with no better a name. For though the principles may be called naturalism, yet if Scripture has defined an atheist right, to be one who has no hope, and is without God in the world*, our Professor of Naturalism comes within the description. For though he acknowledges the being of a God, yet as he is without a God in the world, that is, a Being who presides over it, as the moral Governor of it, which is the foundation on which all religion stands, religionists will think of no other title for him. And surely he will be properly defined. For though the abstract term atheism carries, as its principal idea, a relation to God's being; yet, atheist, in the concrete, seems to have its chief relation to God's government. This is not observed for any kind of consequence it is to religion, in what class the Public shall be pleased to rank his Lordship: but merely to set in a true light the honourable Person's ingenuity, in assuming the character of an Advocate for Religion, at the very time he is labouring to root it out of human society.

Old naturalism, thus travestied in the garb of new religion, his Lordship bestows, as his last and most pre-
cious legacy, in his own dear country: if you will believe him, the only reformed religion that can be called pure, and the only revealed religion that has the mark of truth. What the world hath hitherto called by those names, being, as he assures us, an evil in itself; and mischievous to man in its essential constitution. And he proves it, as they say, in mood and figure.—“To keep up the sense of it [i.e. of religion] in the minds of men, there seem to be but two ways. To strike the senses frequently, by public and solemn acts of religious worship; and to heat the brain by notions of an inward operation of the Spirit, and of a sort of mystical devotion, independent of outward forms, and even inconsistent with them. One of these leads to superstition, the other to enthusiasm. Both are silly—Superstition is folly: enthusiasm is madness. It is good to be on our guard against both.”

Without doubt. But how shall it be done! Religion is an evil in itself, and so admits of no qualification. It necessarily requires, as his Lordship tells us, on man’s part, public acts of worship; and on God’s, the private operation of the Spirit: But these lead to superstition and enthusiasm; that is, to folly and madness; to the depravation, nay to the destruction of our reasonable nature. This is not all: these necessary means are not only hurtful, but impracticable. You could not use them, was you foolish or mad enough to venture on them; for they are, he says, inconsistent, and destroy one another. What then is to be done? To be upon our guard; to keep Religion at arms length, till his Lordship brings up his reserve of Naturalism, to our relief. Let this be our shield of brass. Under this we may repose in peace, undisturbed by any frightful dreams of Hell and the Devil.

This, Sir, is the enchiridion of his Lordship’s first philosophy. How simple, you will say, how close, how round, how full, is this new dispensation! A dispensation of religion shall we call it? No matter. The times are ripe for it under any name. Yet I can hardly agree to those fancies, I told you of, which had possessed his poetical Friend; who, misled perhaps by that obscure hint, that our world was only the Bedlam of every other
other system of intelligent creatures, supposed, in
good earnest, his Philosopher and Guide to be sent
down from some superior orb, as physician to the hospi-
tal. Without question, he was made for the age, and the
age for him. And they may well congratulate one an-
other on their happy meeting. Yet, if we must be docetri-
nated by a poet (and, now-a-days, Milton is much oftener
quoted by Divines, than Hooker), I should be rather dis-
posed to give credit to the man who told me, that he
heard the evil Genius of Britain address his Lordship, on
his first setting out, in strains like these,

"Be as a planetary plague, when Jove
"Will o'er some high-vic'd city hang his poison
"In the sick air." – – –

But to return to his system. It rises on these four
principles:

First, That we have no adequate ideas of the moral
attributes of God, his goodness and his justice, as we
have of his natural, to wit, his power and his wisdom.

Secondly, That a future state is a fable.

Thirdly, That the Jewish and the Christian
Revelations are false. And,

Fourthly, That Revelation itself is impossible.

Indulge me, with a few remarks on his Lordship's
management, under each of these heads.

1. Divines, in their proof of the moral attributes,
having of late much insisted on the arguments à priori,
as they are called, his Lordship suspected, and what he
suspects of ill he always takes for granted, that these at-
tributes could not be proved à posteriori, or from God's
works; the way by which, he owns, his natural attribu-
tes may be demonstrated. So that having pronounced
the arguments à priori to be jargon, nonsense, impiety
and blasphemy; the moral attributes of God are fairly
erased at once out of the intellectual system. And he
had no farther trouble on this head than to decorate
Clark, who was chiefly conversant in the reasoning
à priori, with variety of abusive names. As to the
reasoning itself, our great man's respect for that is so pro-
found and so distant, that I defy any one, unacquainted
with metaphysical arguments, even to guess what kind
of things they are for which the famous minister of St.
James's
James's is so severely handled. For while the divine suffers, the reasoner, as we say, always escapes. Now indeed you see him seized upon, and ready, as you would think, to be cut up alive, and immolated to the first philosophy; when a fit of railing shakes his Lordship; and the storm falls upon the whole body of modern schoolmen: and so the Doctor escapes for that time. He is again laid hold on, and every thing ready for execution; when a fit of learning comes upon his Lordship; and Pythagoras, Plato, Socrates, and the whole band of ancient metaphysicians, pass in review, and each receives a lash as he passes: and so the Doctor escapes for the second time. After all these victories without bloodshed, his Lordship, as is fitting, takes his ease, intent only on his future triumphs: in the mean time, amidst such self-applause, his Essays end, and the subtile Doctor remains unhurt.

But when need requires, I would have you know, nothing can keep him from his logic. Marry, then, on some great occasion indeed, as when the novelty of the subject invites him, or the true state of it is little understood, you shall have no reason to complain of brevity: then you shall see him employ one half of his volumes to prove the corruptions of the Church of Rome, and near another half, to expose the jargon of the schoolmen.

2. We come to the second point, the doctrine of a future state; which being supported by the great moral argument of "the unequal distribution of good and evil amongst men," his Lordship is as large in confuting this, as he was sparing in his answer to the metaphysical proofs of the moral attributes.

He first endeavours to shew the argument to be founded on a mistaken fact, and that there is no such unequal distribution: he is almost tempted to tell you, that every thing is exactly regular and in order. But this is a paradox too unmanageable even for his Lordship. He therefore comes down somewhat lower; and appears to be tolerably contented, if you will but take his word that the inequality is not near so great as pulpit-declaimers would make you believe: that the disorders which follow the abuse of man's free-will are not to be placed to the account of that dispensation, which our ignorance and presumption
presumption make us fancy God is obliged to alter and reform. However, equal or unequal, his capital maxim clears up all. Whatever is, is right: and therefore the argument of those confederated Divines, which goes upon a supposed wrong, is absurd and blasphemy. Whatever answer this reasoning may deserve, I believe no man who understands the world will expect that a well-bred man should give it.

But I cannot omit, on this occasion, to do justice to his poetical Friend; by shewing the difference between Mr. Pope's philosophy and his Lordship's. They both employ the maxim of Whatever is, is right. But to know, with what propriety and judgment, we must consider against whom they write. Mr. Pope's Essay on Man is a real vindication of Providence against libertines and atheists; who quarrel with the present constitution of things, and deny a future state. To these he answers, that whatever is, is right: and the reason he gives, is, that we see only a part of the moral system, and not the whole; therefore these irregularities serving to great purposes, such as the fuller manifestation of God's goodness and justice, they are right. Lord Bolingbroke's Essays are a pretended vindication of Providence against an imaginary confederacy between divines and atheists; who use a common principle, namely, the inequalities in God's moral government here, for different ends and purposes; the one to establish a future state; the other to discredit the being of a God. His Lordship, who opposes their different conclusions, endeavours to overthrow their common principle, by his friend's maxim, that whatever is, is right; not because the present state of our moral world (which is part only of a more general system) is necessary for the greater perfection of the whole, but because our moral world is an entire system of itself. His Lordship applies the maxim no better than he understands it. Mr. Pope urges it against atheists and libertines, who say the constitution of things is faulty: so that the reply, whatever is, is right, is pertinent. His Lordship directs it against divines, who say, indeed, that this constitution is imperfect, if considered separately, because it is a part only of a whole, but are as far as his Lordship from calling it faulty:
faulty: therefore the reply, whatever is, is right, is impertinent. In a word, the Poet directs it against atheists and libertines, in support of Religion properly so called; the Philosopher, against divines, in support of Religion improperly so called, namely, Naturalism: and the success is answerable. Mr. Pope's argument is manly, systematical, and convincing. Lord Bolingbroke's, confused, prevaricating, and inconsistent. Thus, his Lordship will have nothing irregular or amiss in the moral world; for this is impiety, the very bond of that confederacy sealed between divines and atheists. In vain you tell him of a future state, to vindicate the providence of God; this is visionary nonsense. But if you talk of physical evil, he has his answer ready, This world is but one wheel of a vast machine. You will ask, then, why Pope's solution is not to be admitted, who says the same of moral evil which his Lordship does of physical? For a plain reason; his Lordship can allow our physical system to be only a part, without any hazard of his first philosophy. But when once you allow as much to the moral, you are in danger of bringing in religion.

But why, you will ask again, would his Lordship thus run himself a-ground; sometimes by discrediting his reasoning with a silly paradox; sometimes by betraying it with an unwilling confession; and, at best, by only giving it the poor support of a misunderstood and misapplied maxim; when his great and noble principle of no moral attributes dissolves the confederacy at once. For if we have no ideas of God's moral attributes, the issue of our reasoning on his ways will be the same as if he had none. And if he has none, they need not, sure, be vindicated: which is the sole purpose of his reasoning on the state of the moral world. All I can say to this is; that his Lordship appears to have been so harassed with this phantom of a future state, that no charm, no security, was to be neglected, that could contribute to his ease or protection. Hence it is he will depend on neither of his arguments, of—no inequality, or—but a little: and therefore, to make all sure, casts about for a third, of more acknowledged efficacy.

This he finds in the soul's materiality. From whence, he contrives to persuade himself that it can be
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no substance (which he calls pneumatical madness) but a mere quality of body, produced by the configuration of its parts, and perishing with that disposition of them. I say, he contrives to persuade himself; and I mean no more. Had his point been to persuade his reader, we must suppose he would have ventured, at least, to confute the arguments of Clarke and Baxter: who, on the principles of the Newtonian philosophy, have demonstrated that the soul is a substance, distinct from the body, and different from matter. Instead of this, he flies to his usual consolation, abuse. He calls them impious and blasphemers, for presuming to limit the Omnipotent: when the highest of their presumption amounts but to this, the supposing God can exert no power, which implies a contradiction; since this imaginary power is indeed impotency. Nay, he would willingly persuade himself there was no such arguments in being. For, speaking of the reasoning, which induced men to conclude the soul to be a substance distinct from the body, he represents it thus: "Men taking it for granted that they knew all the perceivable properties of matter, they concluded that such things as could not be accounted for by these, were to be accounted for by the properties of some other substance." And again: "Vanity and presumption determine philosophers to conclude, that because they cannot account for the phenomena of the mind by what they know very superficially of solid extended substance, this mind must be some other substance." Such, indeed, was the state of the controversy when Locke skimmed over the argument. But Clarke and Baxter went deeper. They draw their conclusion, not on the presumption that they knew all the knowable qualities of matter, and that between these and thought there was no perceivable connexion; but from this clear and solid truth, that from the little we do know of body, we see a contradiction in supposing intelligence to be a quality of matter. For thus they reasoned, though we know not all the powers of matter; yet we know certainly it cannot have inconsistent and contradictory powers. It is allowed to have essentially a vis inertiae, or that it resists a change of its state; it is impossible, therefore, that it should, at the same
same time, have spontaneous motion, or effect a change of its state. If this be the case (and to deny that it is the case, is confounding all the principles of human knowledge), then it is impossible the soul should be material.—But his Lordship feasts us with the same fine argument on the motion of body. "They are unable (says he) to conceive how body can act at all, and therefore they suppose the immediate presence and action of an incorporeal agent in every operation of corporeal nature." Whereas the truth is, they fully conceive from the *vis inertiae* of body, or its resistance to a change of its state, the absolute impossibility that it should act at all: and from thence see the necessity of an incorporeal agent in every operation of corporeal nature. You will think, perhaps, his Lordship knew no more of this question than as it stood in his *Master Locke*; and that he had never heard of Baxter, who has carried it farthest, and treated it the most profoundly. I should have thought so too, but that I find his Lordship, in one place, speaking with that contempt of Baxter’s reasoning which is his wont, whenever any thing he cannot answer bears hard upon the *first philosophy*. It is where he honours us with his own thoughts concerning attraction. "Attraction (saith his Lordship) may be, notwithstanding all the silly abstract reasoning to the contrary, a real property of matter." Now you are to understand that Baxter, when he has evinced the truth of Newton’s idea of attraction (who makes it no real, or essential property of matter), employs this idea to prove, that it implies a contradiction to suppose, the soul may be a quality of matter. This great truth, deep reflection, and a thorough comprehension of the Newtonian philosophy, enabled Baxter to demonstrate. On the other hand, no reflection, no philosophy, nothing but mere intuition made his Lordship conclude that it is so far from being a contradiction, that the soul is a quality of matter, that it is a self-evident fact. But, you shall hear his own marvellous words: “I am persuaded that God can make material systems capable of thought, because I must renounce one of the kinds of knowledge that he has given me, and the first, though not the principal in the order of knowing,
“knowing, or admit that he hath done so.” Locke only contended for a bare *possibility:* his Lordship sees the *necessity:* so much wiser is the disciple than his master.

3. But let us now go on with his Lordship’s system. His third great principle is the *falsehood* of the *Jewish* and *Christian* *revelations.* And here you will find no argument omitted that bears with the least force against either of them. It is true, they are none of his own. They are borrowed from the *minute philosophers* that went before him: of whom it must be owned his Lordship is a very close and humble imitator.

His attack on revealed religion is in two parts. The *first* is a confutation of its truth, as it lies in its purity, in sacred Scripture: the *second,* an insinuation of its falsehood, as it is seen in its corrupt state amongst modern churches.

*Judaism* is attacked more fully and avowedly in the *first way:* and *Christianity,* in the latter.

1. All the arguments against revelation, as represented in the Bible, are taken from *Blount, Toland, Collins, Chubb, Morgan,* and their fellows. I must except, indeed, the atrocious terms in which they are always informed. For the iniquity of the times would not suffer those confessors of truth *to put forth more than half their strength,* as his Lordship assures us. When I observe, his reasoning here is taken from these men, it is not spoken in disparagement of it: for, to say the truth, it is the best in all his *Essays.*

One thing, indeed, falls out unluckily. All his Lordship’s great originals; in common with the rest of mankind, professed to believe the *moral attributes* of the Deity. And, on this principle, inforced their arguments against the truth of revealed religion: indeed, what other principle is there that will afford any ground for an objection against it? It is doubted, whether a moral dispensation come from the Author to whom it is ascribed. The doubt arises from our knowledge of his moral character; between which and the dispensation there is a supposed discordancy: but take away the moral character, and the doubt ceases with it. Yet his Lordship professes to have no idea of these *moral attributes.* No matter. They
They were necessary to be taken into service here, for the sake of carrying on his schemes: and a philosopher can drop his principle, as a politician does his friend, when he is of no use, and renew his acquaintance again when he is. These discarded attributes therefore are on this occasion taken into favour; soon indeed, to be dismissed again, and his old principle of no morality in the Godhead, reasserted, when he wants to guard against the terrors of a future state; in which, to do it justice, it performs true knights-service. Much indeed is it to be lamented, that his old principle should ever grow capricious; and that when it had so effectually excluded God's moral government, as recommended by natural religion, it should oppose itself to those arguments which are for excluding God's moral government as recommended by revelation. But after all, what if his Lordship played booty, and was for bringing in a political religion by a side-wind; just as Father Harduin established church tradition. The Jesuit, when he had destroyed all the monuments of antiquity, concluded we should be glad to take refuge in an infallible guide: and the noble Politician could not but see that when he had taken away God's moral attributes, he had removed all grounds for doubting of the divine origin of the Magistrate's religion, from Amasis and Meneves, to Thor and Odin.

2. An historical deduction of the abuses and corruptions of Christianity in the Church of Rome, to advance superstition, fanaticism, and spiritual tyranny, makes the second part of his Lordship's reasoning against revelation; and the subject of the largest of his four Essays.

On this head he expatiates in all the forms of piety, patriotism, and humanity. He bewails the dishonours done to religion; he resents the violations of civil liberty; and he vindicates the common sense of mankind from the scholastic jargon of an ignorant, debauched, and avaricious clergy.

"Felicia tempora, quae te Moribus opponunt: habeat jam Roma pudorem."

On so trite a topic, the triumph of every true Protestant, from Fox to Mr. Chandler, that is, from the first to the last.
last good writer upon the subject, his Lordship may be well excused for unloading his Common-place. Whatever there is of a better taste, he has taken from Hooker, Stillingfleet, Barrow, and such other of the English clergy who have most successfully detected the errors, and set bounds to the usurpations of Popery. But as the object of our divines in this detection was to recommend the Gospel-truth; and of his Lordship, to discredit it; he had need of other helps: and these, too, were at hand; such as Hobbes, Toland, Tindal, and Gordon; whom he faithfully copies, both in exaggerating the abuses, and in drawing false consequences from the reform of them. Thus, according to those divines who wrote for truth, school philosophy was modestly complained of as hindering the advancement of real knowledge; as keeping men busied in trifling controversies; and as making them often mistake words for things. But with my Lord, and these his better guides, who wrote against revelation, school philosophy is boldly accused to have blotted out all knowledge, and to have left nothing in its stead but madness, frenzy, and delirium. So again, The end of those divines in opposing church-tyranny was to introduce a religious society on the principles of Gospel-liberty: but the end of these philosophers in decrying Popery is to establish a civil, in the place of a religious usurpation, and to make the church a creature of the state. In the mean time, he says boldly and well, "That some men are impudent enough to pretend, others silly enough to believe, that they adhere to the Gospel, and maintain the cause of God against infidels and heretics, when they do nothing better nor more than expose the conceits of men." But while he is thus busy in observing what happens at one end of this common fallacy, where the conceits of men are mistaken for the cause of God, he suffers himself to slip in, at the other: and does just the same against the Gospel, which these impudent and silly men do for it. He exposes the knavery of powerful churchmen, and the folly of profound divines; and then pretends, or believes, that he hath discredited revelation itself.

However, to part friends with the divines, after so many hard words, he teaches them how to grow up, in
some plausible way, their bungling systems of artificial theology, just as he had before taught God Almighty himself to mend his two dispensations. “Let us (says he) suppose a theist objecting—the believer might reply—he might add—he might add—and all this with great plausibility at least.” You will say now, I envy my Lord the glory of his instructions, so well calculated to defend artificial theology, or otherwise I, who am not sparing of my quotations, would have given them at large. To tell you the truth, I suppressed them with design; and in order to excite the reader’s curiosity. I am told there is need of it; and that this first philosophy, this physic of the soul, is not swallowed with that eagerness which might be expected or hoped for, on the first appearance of so great a blessing. You will suspect, by what you have observed in my former Letter, that the public may possibly be over-dosed. But what if they be? It is only making it a little more palatable, and his followers will soon reconcile them to their physic.

4. His Lordship’s fourth and last great principle is the impossiability of revelation in general.

He has refused no arms, we see, to combat the revelations God hath actually given. He would seem to relax a little of his hostility, as to those which God may possibly give: for in one place he says he will not absolutely pronounce against the possibility of God’s revealing his will to man. But whether he equivocates, whether he altered his mind, or whether he simply forgot himself (a matter of little consequence), most true it is, that he hath formally laid down, and largely insisted upon, certain principles, which make revealed religion a thing utterly impossible.

First, As to inspiration, He not only denies all reality in the thing, but will not allow so much as any meaning in the word. And a miracle, he holds amongst matters impossible; what never did, nor ever can exist. But now, Without the first, no divine messenger could be sent; for he must receive his orders from God: and, without the second, no divine messenger would be believed; for he must have his credentials to
man: and these credentials, on his Lordship's own principles, can be no other than miracles.

But here again you are to observe, that on this subject likewise, infidelity is no more indebted to him than for his good will. All he urges against inspiration and miracles having been first urged by Hobbes and Spinoza: by the one, with more subtlety and exactness; by the other, with infinite more elegance.

Secondly, As to natural religion, his Lordship holds it to be full, perfect, and well understood. He holds, likewise, that the only conceivable purpose of revelation must be to republish this natural religion. The consequence is, and this his Lordship gives us to understand, that the use of revelation is superseded. For if it teaches more than natural Religion taught, or different from what it taught, the revelation is evidently false; if only the same, it is evidently superfluous.

Thirdly, As to a particular providence, This, his Lordship utterly rejects. But revealed religion is nothing else than the exercise of that very providence, to some declared end and purpose in the moral system.

On all these accounts, he concludes, and consequentially enough, that reason has nothing further to do, when revelation begins.

You have now, Sir, the whole of his Lordship's system, together with his principal topics for the support of it; both indeed very succinctly delivered: enough however to shew you that these famous Essays, which you have so often heard cried up as the very mine and treasury of all divine and human truths, are indeed little other than a magazine or warehouse of other men's lumber: or (not to dishonour his Lordship by a low comparison) like the mouth of your neighbouring Severn, turbulent and dirty: which, let fabling Poets say what they please, we are sure never derived its source from the pure and perennial urn of a demi-god: but, if one may guess by the taste and colour, became thus considerable from the confluence of shallow brooks and babbling rivulets, of stagnant ditches, common-sewers, and yet stranger mixtures, scoured off and put into a ferment by the hasty rage of some peevish land-torrent.

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THE main pillar of his system, you see, is this extravagant paradox, *That we have no adequate ideas of God’s moral attributes, his goodness and justice, as we have of his natural, his wisdom and power.*—And here, let me observe once for all, that his Lordship uses the words, *inadequate ideas,* and, *no ideas,* as terms of the same import. And, I think, not improperly. I have therefore followed him in the indifferent use of either expression. For the reason of his calling our ideas of God’s moral attributes, *inadequate,* is, because he denies that goodness and justice in God, and goodness and justice amongst Men, are the same in kind. But if not the *same in kind,* we can have *no idea of them;* because we have no idea of any *other kind* of goodness and justice.

As the reasoning on this head, contrary to his usual wont, is entirely his own, and extremely curious in itself, I will once more go a little out of my way to set it in a true light; that it may neither impose by its novelty; nor too much shock You and all good men by its unchecked atrocity.

His three positions are,

1. That, by *metaphysics,* or the reasoning *à priori,* we can gain no knowledge of God at all.

2. That our knowledge of his *attributes* are to be acquired only by a contemplation on his *works,* or by the reasoning *à posteriori.*

3. That in this way, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his *natural* attributes, not of his *moral.*

"It is from the constitution of the world alone (says his Lordship) and from the state of mankind in it, that we can acquire any ideas, of the divine attributes, or a right to affirm any thing about them."

"The knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts necessary to such a creature as man: and therefore we are made able to arrive, by a proper exercise of our mental faculties, from a knowledge of God’s works to a knowledge of his existence, and of that infinite power and wisdom which are demonstrated to us in them. Our knowledge concerning God goes no further."

"Artificial theology connects by very problematical reasoning
"reasoning à priori, moral attributes, such as we conceive them, and such as they are relatively to us, with the physical attributes of God; though there be no sufficient foundation for this proceeding, nay, though the phenomena are in several cases repugnant."

Having thus assured us that the ideas of God's moral attributes are to be got by no consequential reasoning at all, either à priori or à posteriori, the only two ways we have to knowledge; He rightly concludes, that if Man hath such ideas, they were not found but invented by him. And therefore, that nothing might be wanting to the full dilucidation of this curious point, he acquaints us who were the authors of the fiction, and how strangely the thing came about.

"Some of the Philosophers (says his Lordship) having been led by a more full and accurate contemplation of nature to the knowledge of a supreme self-existent Being of infinite power and wisdom, and the first cause of all things, were not contented with this degree of knowledge. They made a system of God's moral as well as physical attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of His providence."

These Philosophers, then, it seems, invented the system of God's moral attributes, in order to account for the difficulties arising from the view of God's moral government. If the world till now had been so dull as to have no conception of these attributes; his Lordship's Philosophers, we see, made amends: who were so quick-witted to conceive, and so sharp-sighted to find out, the obliquities of a crooked line before they had got any idea of a straight one. For just to this, neither more nor less, does his Lordship's observation amount, that—they made a system of God's moral attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of his providence.—Till now, no man could conceive how any doubts concerning moral government could arise but on the previous ideas of the moral attributes of the Governor. This invention of his Lordship's old philosophers puts us in mind of an ingenious modern, the curious Sancho Pancha; who, as his historian tells us, was very inquisitive to discover the author of that very useful invention we call sleep; for, with this worthy Magistrate,
sleep and good cheer were the first philosophy. Now
the things sought after by Sancho and his Lordship were
at no great distance: for if sleeping began when men first
shut their eyes, it is certain the idea of God's goodness
appeared as soon as ever they opened them.

Dr. Clarke's demonstration of the moral attributes
à priori, I shall leave, as his Lordship is pleased to do,
in all its force. If the Doctor's followers think their
master's honour concerned, where his arguments are not,
they have a large field and a safe to shew their prowess.
I rather chuse to undertake the noble Philosopher on his
own terms, without any other arms than the arguments
à posteriori. For he is such a champion for the good
cause, that he not only appoints his adversaries the field,
but prescribes to them the use of their weapons.

But his Lordship, like other great men, is not easily
approached; and when he is, not always fit to be seen.
You catch his first philosophy, as Butler's hero did
Aristotle's first matter, undressed, and without a
rag of form, however flaunting and fluttering in frag-
ments. To speak plainly, his Lordship's entire neglect
of method betrays him into endless repetitions: and
in these, whether for want of precision in his ideas, prop-
riety in his terms, or art in his composition, the question
is perpetually changing; and rarely without being new-
covered by an equivocal expression. If you add to this,
the perpetual contradictions into which he falls,
either by defect of memory, excess of passion, or distress
of argument, you will allow it to be no easy matter to
take him fairly, to know him fully, and to represent him
to the best advantage: in none of which offices would I
be willingly defective. Indeed, when you have done
this, the business is over; and his Lordship's reasoning
generally confutes itself.

When I reflect upon what this has cost me, the reading
over two or three bulky volumes to get possession of a
single argument; which now you think you hold, and then
again you lose; which meets you full when you least
expect it; and slips away from you the very moment it
promises to do most: when, I say, I reflect upon all this,
I cannot but lament the hard luck of the English
clergy, who, though apparently least fit, as being made

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parties, certainly least affected, as there is nothing that can impose on a scholar, and a great deal that may mislead the people, are likely to be the men most engaged with his Lordship in this controversy. Time was, when if a writer had a disposition to seek objections against Religion, though he found them hardly, and urged them heavily, yet he would digest his thoughts, and methodize his reasoning. The clergy had then nothing to do but to answer him, if they found themselves able. But since this slovenly custom (as Lord Shaftesbury calls it) has got amongst our Free-thinkers, of taking their physic in public, of throwing about their loose and crude indigestions under the name of fragments, things which in their very name imply not so much the want, as the exclusion of all form, the advocate of Religion has had a fine time of it: he must work them into consistence, he must mould them into shape, before he can safely lay hold of them himself, or present them handsomely to the public. But these gentlemen have provided that a clergyman should never be idle. All, he had of old, to attend, was the saving the souls of those committed to his care. He must now begin his work a great deal higher; he must first convince his flock that they have souls to be saved. And the spite of all is, that at the same time his kind masters have doubled his task, they appear very well disposed to lessen his wages.

We have observed, that the denial of God’s moral attributes is the great barrier against Religion in general; but it is more especially serviceable in his Lordship’s idiosyncratic terrors; the terrors of a future state. To these we owe his famous book of fragments, composed occasionally, and taken as an extemporary cordial, each stronger than the other, to support himself under his frequent paroxysms. For, set the moral attributes aside, and we can neither form any judgment of the end of man, nor of the nature of God’s moral government. All our knowledge will be confined to our present state and condition*. It is by these attributes, we learn, that man was made for happiness; and that God’s dispensa-

*One of his Lordship’s corollaries therefore from the proposition of no moral attributes, is this, “Our knowledge concerning God goes no further than for the necessary use of human life.”
tion to us here is but part of our moral system: This naturally extends our views to, and terminates our knowledge in, futurity.

The fate of all Religion therefore being included in the question of God's moral attributes, I hold it of much importance to prove against his Lordship, that men may acquire adequate ideas of them in the same way, and with equal certainty, in which they acquire the knowledge of God's natural attributes: and the knowledge of these, his Lordship deduces from its original in the following words—

"All our knowledge of God (says he) is derived from his works. Every part of the immense universe, and the order and harmony of the whole, are not only conformable to our ideas or notions of wisdom and power, but these ideas and notions were impressed originally and principally by them, on every attentive mind; and men were led to conclude, with the utmost certainty, that a Being of infinite wisdom and power made, preserved, and governed the system. As far as we can discover, we discern these in all his works; and where we cannot discern them, it is manifestly due to our imperfection, not to his. This now is real knowledge, or there is no such thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects themselves, in God, and in nature, the work of God. We know what wisdom and power are: we know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work: and therefore we know demonstratively that such they are in the worker."

All this is mighty well: and on these very grounds I undertake to prove that men may get as clear and precise ideas of God's goodness and justice.

But, to prevent, or, indeed, now things are gone thus far, rather to redress all ambiguity in the terms, and equivocation in the use of them; it will be proper to explain what true philosophy means by God's works, whether physical or moral.

Now, it means, if I am not mistaken, that constitution of things which God hath established, and directed to a plain and obvious end: no regard being had..."
to those impediments or obstructions in its course, which the Author of Nature hath permitted to arise from any part of the material, or intellectual creation.

Thus, when we consider his physical works, in order to make our estimate of his wisdom and power, we conceive them as they are in themselves; and in the perfection of their constitution; though the greater portions of the physical system may, from the intractability of matter, be subject to some inconsiderable irregularities; which, as the true philosopher* observes, will be apt to increase till this system wants a reformation: and though the smaller portions, such as the bodies of animals, may, from various accidents in their conception and birth, often want that convenient formation and adaption of their parts, from the wonderful contrivance of which, in the various bodies of animals in general, arises so illustrious an evidence of the wisdom and power of the Workman.

Surely, then, common sense and all equitable measure require us to estimate God's moral works upon the same standard: to consider what the moral constitution is in itself: and (when the question is of God's goodness and justice) to keep that view distinct: and not suffer it to be disturbed or broken by any interruptions occasioned by the perverse influence either of the passion or action of material or immaterial Beings. For, here, both concur to violate the constitution: in the natural system, man's free-will has no place: in the moral, the abuse of free-will occasions the greatest of its disorders.

In prosecuting this question, therefore, As, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of God's wisdom and power, we consider the natural system so far forth only as its order and harmony is supported by the general laws of matter and motion: so, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of his goodness and justice, we should regard the moral system so far forth only as its order and harmony is supported by that general law, which annexes happiness to virtue. and to vice, misery.

Thus much, and only thus much, is God's work, in either system; and it is from God's work we are to demonstrate his attributes. The rest, (where disorders real or apparent obtrude themselves to obstruct our views in

* Newton.
these discoveries) proceeds from matter and the human mind.

And it is not to be forgotten, that the conclusion we draw from hence, in support of our adequate ideas of God's moral attributes, has the greater strength upon his Lordship's own principles: who holds, that this constitution arises solely from the will of God: for then we are sure that the will, which annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice, must arise from God's moral rather than from his first physical nature.

Having premised thus much; no more, indeed, than necessary to obviate one continued sophism, that runs through all his Lordship's reasonings, against the moral attributes (where, the course and operation of that moral constitution, as it appears under the disturbances occasioned by man's free will, is perpetually put for the constitution itself), I now proceed to shew, from God's works, that we have as precise ideas of his goodness and justice, as of his power and wisdom.

His Lordship observes, that from every part of the immense universe, and from the harmony of the whole, men are led to conclude, with the utmost certainty, that a Being of infinite wisdom and power made, preserved, and governed the system. This, he observes in favour of the natural attributes. And what should hinder men from making the same observation in favour of the moral, viz. That the happiness and misery, by the very constitution of nature, attendant on virtue and on vice, lead men to conclude, with equal certainty, that a Being of infinite goodness and justice made, preserves, and governs the system?

The existence of this moral constitution his Lordship acknowledges. Let us consider it, therefore, both as it respects bodies of men, and individuals.

That communities are always happy or miserable in proportion as their manners are virtuous or vicious, his Lordship himself is the readiest to demonstrate. If such a constitution of things does not bespeak the Author of it good and just, how is it possible to conclude any thing of the character of the Creator from his works? His Lordship thinks, that from the marks of wisdom and power in the physical system we learn with the utmost certainty
certainty that God is wise and powerful; and he says, that we acquire this knowledge immediately, as it were, by our senses. Are there not the self-same marks of goodness and justice in this part at least of the moral system that respects communities? And do not we come to know as immediately by our senses, and as certainly by our reason, that God is good and just?

If we consider the moral constitution, as it respects particulars, we see virtue and vice have the same influence on our happiness and misery. Here, indeed, we find more interruptions in the means to the end than in the other part. Our material and our intellectual natures have here more power to disorder the harmony of the system. In communities, it can rarely be disturbed, but by a pestilence, or that other moral plague, a hero or a conqueror: amongst particulars, indeed, physical evil and the abuse of free-will operate more strongly. But when once the demonstration of the moral attributes is clearly made from that part of the constitution which regards communities, it can never be shaken by the disorders in that which regards particulars. The established truth is now a principle for further discoveries; and all we can fairly deduce from these disorders is the certainty of a future state. But this by the way.

What I insist upon at present is, that, to decide the question concerning God's attributes, we are to consider the constitution of things, as it is in itself, simply. This is, properly, God's work. The disorders in it, occasioned by the abuse of man's free-will, is not his work, but man's. This, his Lordship too, upon another occasion, namely, when he combats the argument of a future state, from an unequal providence, is perpetually repeating. So that these disorders must, even on his Lordship's own principles, be excluded from the account, when we estimate God's nature and attributes from his works.

"But we see not those disorders in the natural world, which we both see and feel in the moral." This would be some objection did God in the moral, as in the natural system, direct immediately, or constitute things mechanically; or had free-will the same influence on the natural as on the moral system.—Did God direct in both constitutions, immediately or mechanically; or
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did he direct immediately and mechanically in neither,
and that yet the moral remained more subject to disorder
than the natural; it might indeed follow that we had
not so clear ideas of God's goodness and justice as of
his wisdom and power: but since he has thought fit to
leave man free; and has been pleased to suffer the
abuse of free-will to affect the moral system, and not the
natural; as this, I say, is the case, the superior irreg-
ularities in the one do not take off from the equal clear-
ness of the demonstration, which results from the nature
of both constitutions. "This difference" (to speak in
the words of a late writer) "is not to be ascribed to a
contrary conduct in the Governor of the two systems,
but to the contrary natures of the subjects. Passive
matter being totally inert, its resistance to the laws
impressed upon it must be extremely weak: and con-
sequently the disorders arising from that resistance
proportionably slow and unheeded: while that active
self-moving principle, the mind, flies out at once from
the centre of its direction, and can every moment de-
fect from the line of truth and reason. Hence moral
disorders began early, became excessive, and have
continued, through all ages, to disturb the harmony of
the system."

What is here said will, I suppose, be sufficient to con-
fute the following assertions; and to detect the mistake
on which they arise.

"Every thing (says his Lordship) shews the wisdom
and power of God conformably to our ideas of wisdom
and power in the physical world and in the moral.
But every thing does not shew in like manner the
justice and goodness conformably to our ideas of
these attributes in either. The physical attri-
butes are in their nature more glaring and less
equivocal."

And again, "There is no sufficient foundation in the
phenomena of nature, to connect the moral attributes
with the physical attributes of God. Nay, the
phenomena are in several cases repugnant."

But since he goes so far as to talk of the want of a

* The Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, in a course
of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn.—See Vol. IX. p. 48.
foundation, and even a repugnancy; Before I proceed with the main branch of my reasoning, I will just urge one single argument for the reality and full evidence of the moral attributes: and it shall be taken from himself, and shall conclude on his own principles.

He tells us, that such as he, "who apply themselves to the first philosophy, apply themselves to the noblest objects that can demand the attention of the mind——

"To the signification of God's will, concerning the duties we owe to him, and to one another."

And again, "It is sufficient to establish our moral obligations, that we consider them relatively to our own system. From thence they arise: and since they arise from thence, it must be the will of that Being who made the system, that we should observe and practise them."

Let me ask then, How it is that we collect this will from the objects which his Lordship allows us to contemplate, namely, his works in this system? He will say from certain qualities in those objects.—What are those qualities? He will reply, the fitnesses of means to ends.—Who was the Author of these fitnesses? He hath told us, the God of nature.—It was God's will then, that we should use the means, in order to obtain the ends. Now, in the moral System, the means are virtuous practice; the end, happiness. Virtue therefore must needs be pleasing to him; and Vice, as its contrary, displeasing. Well, but then, as to this like and dislike; it must be either capricious, or it must be regulated on the nature of things. Wisdom, which his Lordship condescends to give his Maker, will not allow us to suppose it capricious. It is regulated therefore on the nature of things. But if the nature of things be, as his Lordship holds it is, the constitution of God, and dependent on his will, then he who is pleased with virtue, and displeased with vice, must needs be himself good and just.

To proceed now with the principal branch of our reasoning. His Lordship goes on thus. But men not only might collect God's natural attributes from the physical system, but in effect they did: and all men, at all times, had these notions so strongly impressed on them, that they were led to conclude with the utmost
utmost certainty for a Being of infinite power and
wisdom.

I desire to know in what time or place it ever hap-
pened, before his Lordship philosophised at Battersea,
and could find no foundation, in the phenomena of
nature, to connect the moral with the physical attrib-
utes of God, that a man, who believed God's infinite
wisdom and power, did not with equal confidence believe
his infinite goodness and justice? In truth, these two
sets of ideas, the physical and moral attributes of the
Deity, were equally extensive, they were equally steady,
and, till now, they were always inseparable.

He says, that as far as we can discover, we discern
infinite wisdom and power in all God's works; and
where we cannot discern them, it is manifestly due
to our imperfection, not to his.

What his Lordship here says will deserve to be con-
sidered. A comparison is insinuated between our dis-
covery of infinite power and wisdom from the physical
works of God; and our discovery of infinite goodness
and justice from his moral works; in which, the advan-
tage is given to the former. Now, in order to come to
a just decision in this point (omitting at present the notice
of his general sophism, which operates in this observation,
as in the rest), we must distinguish between the means of
acquiring the knowledge of God's attributes, and that
knowledge when acquired.

As to the first (the means of acquiring) there seems
to be some advantage on the side of God's physical
works. For, as his Lordship rightly observes, where we
cannot discern wisdom and power in the physical
works, it is due to our imperfection, not to his: for
as men advance in the knowledge of nature we see
more and more of wisdom and power. And he insi-
nuates, we cannot say the same concerning the difficulties
in the moral system. It is true, we cannot. But then,
let us tell him, neither can we say the contrary. The
reason is, The physical system lies open to our enquiries;
and by the right application of our senses to well tried
experiments, we are able to make considerable advances
in the knowledge of Nature. It is not so in the moral
system; all we know here are a few general principles
concerning its constitution; and further than this, human wit or industry is unable to penetrate. These general principles are, indeed, amply sufficient to deduce and establish the moral attributes from the moral system; but not sufficient to remove all difficulties that arise from what we see of the actual administration of that system. So that, though we cannot say, that as we advance in the knowledge of the moral system we see more and more of goodness and justice; So neither can his Lordship say (though his words seem to insinuate he could) that as we advance, we see less and less. Whereas the truth is, beyond those general principles, we cannot advance at all.

But then, as to the second part in the distinction (the knowledge of the attributes, when acquired), I hold the advantage, and a great one it is, lies altogether on the side of the moral. And this, I cannot better explain to you than in the words of the writer, quoted just before: "Though the idea (says this Divine) of God's natural attributes be as clear in the abstract, as that of his moral, yet the idea of his moral attributes is, in the concrete, more adequate than that of his natural. The reason seems convincing. The moral relation in which we stand to God, as free agents, is just the same whether man exists alone, or whether he be but a link in the chain of innumerable orders of intelligences surrounding the whole creation. Hence we must needs have a full knowledge of our duty to him, and of his disposition towards us: on which knowledge is founded the exactness of our conceptions of his moral attributes, his justice and goodness. But the natural relation in which we, or any of God's creatures, stand towards him, as material Beings, is not the same when considered simply, as when a portion of a dependent and connected whole. Because, whenever such a whole exists, the harmony and perfection of it must first of all be consulted. This harmony ariseth from the mutual subserviency and union of its parts. But this subserviency may require a ministration of government, with regard to certain portions of matter thus allied, different from what might have followed had those portions stood alone, because that precise disposition, which might
be fit in one case, might be unfit in the other. Hence we, who know there is a Whole, of which our material system is a Part, and yet are totally ignorant both of its nature and extent, can have but a very confused idea of that physical relation in which we stand towards God; so that our conceptions of his natural attributes, his power and wisdom, which are founded on that idea, must in the concrete be proportionably vague and in-adequate*.

But you will ask, perhaps, whence arises this reciprocal advantage which the moral and the natural attributes have over one another, in the means of acquiring the knowledge of them, and the precision of that knowledge when acquired? I will tell you in two words. Of our own physical system, we know many particulars, (that is, we discover much of the means, but nothing of the end); and of the universal physical system we are entirely ignorant. On the other hand, we know but few particulars of our own moral system, (that is, we discover only the end, and not the means); and of the universal moral system, we understand the general principles.

His Lordship proceeds. This now [the knowledge of God's natural attributes] is real knowledge; or there is no such thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects themselves, in God, and in Nature the work of God.

What his Lordship means by, in God, in distinction from the work of God, I confess I do not understand: Perhaps it may be intended to insinuate, in honour of the natural attributes, that they may be even proved à priori; for this is not the first time by many, when after having heartily abused a person or thing, he has been reduced to support himself on the authority, or the reasoning they afford him. Or perhaps, it was only used to round the period, and set off his eloquence. However, I agree with him, that this is real knowledge. And so too, I think, is the knowledge of the moral attributes, so gained. Why truly, says his Lordship, I do allow just so much goodness and justice in God as we see in that constitution, which annexes happiness to

* The Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, in a course of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn.—See Vol. IX. pp. 42, & seq.
virtue, and misery to vice. But this, says he, I think, had better be called wisdom. I think so too; if by so much, he means no more than what concerns God’s natural government: and that he means no more, is plain, from his making the natural consequence of vice and virtue the only sanction of the moral law. But I will venture to go further, and say, that, from what we see in this constitution, we may collect perfect goodness and justice. Matter and man’s free-will disturb the system: But if the constitution be the effect of God’s will, as his Lordship holds it is; and the mark of his wisdom, as all mankind hold with him; Does not that wisdom require that his will should not be defeated? Would it not be defeated, if the disorders occasioned by the perversity of his creatures were not remedied and set right? And is not a remedy the clearest mark of perfect goodness and justice?

Take it in another light. Free-will crosses the constitution, which God, by establishing, shews he intended should take place. This present disturbance could not have been prevented, because, according to my Lord and his Poet, it was necessary to the schemes of Divine Wisdom, that there should be such a creature as Man:

“For in the scale of reasoning life, ’tis plain
“There must be, somewhere, such a rank as Man.”

The consequence is, that the disorder will be hereafter rectified.

Had Man indeed been made unnecessarily; and this Man had broke in upon God’s general system, his Lordship might have had some pretence to say, as he does, that God meant the system should not be further pursued; that is, that the scheme which annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice, should remain in its present condition of an incomplete dispensation, to all eternity. But since Man is acknowledged to be a necessary part of a general system, complete in all its members, it is nonsense to talk of God’s not meaning the particular system should be further pursued, when that further pursuit is only to bring it to its natural period; short of which, it would remain unfinished, nay uninformed.
He goes on. We know what wisdom and power are. We know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work; and therefore we know demonstratively that such they are in the worker.

And do we not know what goodness and justice are? Do we not intuitively, and by the help of our senses know, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work, namely, in that constitution of things which, his Lordship tells us, annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice? And may we not demonstratively collect from thence that such they are in the worker, since this constitution, his Lordship tells us again, is the effect of God's will? On his own principles, therefore, applied to his own state of the reasoning à posteriori, it appears, that God is of infinite goodness and justice, as well as of infinite wisdom and power.

But to give authority to his partial reasoning (the usual support of all partialities) he, in one place, puts it into the mouth of Anaxagoras. "Should you ask: "Anaxagoras (says he) what goodness is, or justice, he might bid you, perhaps, turn your eyes inward, first; then, survey mankind; observe the wants of individuals, the benefits of society, and, from these particulars, frame the general notions of goodness and justice. He might go a step further: and add, this is human goodness and human justice, such as we can comprehend, such as we can exercise, and such as the Supreme Mind has made it both our duty and interest to exercise, by the constitution of the human system, and by the relations which arise in it: from all which our notions of goodness and justice result, and are compounded."

We know, then, what goodness and justice are; as well as what wisdom and power are; we know both intuitively and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work. For he bids us turn our eyes inward; then survey mankind; and lastly, observe how reason, from the constitution of human nature, confirms our intuitive knowledge, and that which we gain by the help of our senses.
senses. But what does all this signify, if Anaxagoras or his Lordship be in an humour of concluding against their own premisses? Hear then how the speech ends—"Of "divine goodness and divine justice might this philoso-
pher conclude, I am unable to frame any ade-
quate notions." What! Unable to frame those notions which God, by his moral constitution, has put into our hands; and by the declaration of his will has taught us to apply?—This old philosopher, I suppose, was not brought in to be laughed at, like his drunken church-nelotes; yet he plays the fool to admiration.—We do know, says Anaxagoras, what goodness and justice are: we know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work; and therefore we do not know that such they are in the worker.

Might I be permitted to address myself to this renegade sophist, I would say—Your brethren, the ancient philosophers, reasoned à posteriori in this manner, "Can you think there is wisdom and power in you, and none in your Maker?"—By no means. They reasoned well.—Let me ask you then, "Is there goodness and justice in you, and none in your Maker?" His answer, I suppose, would be the same. But, prompted by his Lordship, into whose service he is now entered, he perhaps might add, That, from human goodness and justice we cannot come to the nature of the divine. What hinders us, I pray you? Is it not from our intuitive conception of our own wisdom and power that we gain an adequate idea of God's? Are wisdom and power more perfect, as they are found in Man, than goodness and justice? If therefore the imperfection of these attributes in Man hinder our acquiring an adequate idea of those in God, we can have no adequate idea of his wisdom and power: If the imperfection does not hinder, then we may have an adequate idea of his goodness and justice.

But, the inference to God's power and wisdom, his Lordship says, is supported by what men see of the effects of them, in his Works; the order and harmony of the physical system. Do we not see likewise the effects of God's goodness and justice, in the order and harmony of the moral, in the happiness that naturally attends
virtue, and the misery consequent on vice? And is not the moral system as much God's work, as the physical?

Thus, Sir, you see, that by the very reasoning his Lordship employs to prove the natural attributes, and by the very method he prescribes to us for proving the moral, we have demonstrated these with a precision and a certainty, at least equal to the other. His Lordship seems to have been aware of the event; and therefore, when he had set us at defiance, he tried to put the change upon us, under pretence of reminding us that the moral attributes should be examined by, or applied to, the constitution of the world, and the state of mankind in it. I had full as much reason to be aware of his Lordship. And therefore, in stating the question, at my entrance on the subject, I obviated this miserable sophism. I call it by no better name, because it is not the constitution of the world, or the state of mankind in it, but the constitution of the moral system, or the nature of virtue and vice, as they essentially operate to produce happiness and misery, by which God's moral attributes are to be tried and ascertained. But this, which is a steady, uniform view, he would have us turn from; to contemplate that obscure, disturbed, and shifting scene, the actual state of vice and virtue, of misery and happiness, amongst men. That is, he would have us conclude concerning God's nature, not from his voluntary constitution of things, but from the breaches in that constitution made by the abuse of man's free-will: which yet (when he is arguing for an equal providence) he again and again confesses ought not to be charged upon God; and declaims violently against the folly of those who impute the effects of that abuse to him. Though here (in his various attempts to blot out the idea of God's moral attributes) he be full of the disorders of the moral system considered as part of God's design.

But since I have mentioned his arguments for an equal providence, I should be unjust to You, who expect a fair view of his Lordship's philosophy from me, if I concealed another of his contradictions.—He had both Man's future state and God's moral attributes to throw out of the religious world; or, to speak more properly, he had re-
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LIGION to overturn, by taking away its very essence: and as the irregularities in the present administration of Providence stood in the way of his first attempt; and the consistency of the moral system, in the way of the other; when he argues against a future state, You would think there were no irregularities; and when he argues against the moral attributes, You would think there was no consistency.

We now come to his Lordship’s particular objections against the moral attributes. One of them is, that they are bounded.

"They [the Divines] go further. As God is perfect, and Man very imperfect, they talk of his infinite goodness and justice, as of his infinite wisdom and power; though the latter may preserve their nature without any conceivable bounds, and the former must cease to be what they are, unless we conceive them bounded. Their nature implies necessarily a limitation in the exercise of them. Thus then the moral attributes, according to this theology, require infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exercise to one another: greater profusion in bestowing benefits and rewards, greater vigour in punishing offences."

You have here his Lordship’s own words; and nothing less could induce any one to think so disadvantageously of this Righter of wrongs and Redresser of grievances, as they necessarily imply. Let us consider the premises, and examine the inferences both implied and expressed.

He says, 1. That the moral attributes are bounded; 2. That the natural are not bounded. Let us see to what the first proposition amounts; and how much truth there is in the second.

1. The moral attributes are considered by us as relative to intelligent creatures: The natural are not so considered. Thus the goodness and justice, when relative to man, are greatly bounded; a certain low degree of reward suffices for his good; a certain low degree of punishment for his evil actions. Let God’s goodness and justice respect a higher rank of intelligent beings, and they will be then less bounded; for greater rewards and punishments will be required; and so on, to the highest rank.
rank of intelligent creatures. Yet, as the highest is at infinite distance from the Creator, the exercise of the moral attributes, as they bear relation to his intelligent creatures, must be still bounded.

2. His second proposition is, that the natural attributes are not bounded. It is true, these cannot be considered as relative to God's intelligent creatures; yet since, in their exercise, they must be considered as relative to his Creation at large; and since Creation, however immense, is not infinite, the natural attributes so considered are not infinite: but if not infinite, they are bounded. There is no difference therefore, in the exercise of God’s attributes, between the moral and the natural, save only in the degree.

But if we consider God's moral and natural attributes more abstractedly, not as they are in the exercise, and relative to intelligent beings, and to actual creation, but as they are in his nature, then they are both unbounded. Thus we see his Lordship's notable distinction is both imaginary and useless.

However, let us give him all he asks; and then see what he will be able to infer from it.

1. His first inference seems to be this: As the moral attributes are bounded, and not infinite like the natural, our idea of them must be obscure and inadequate. What! because they are better adapted, as things bounded certainly are than things infinite, to human contemplation? Our idea of such of God's attributes as bear relation to a Being, whose nature and properties we know, namely man, must needs be more adequate and better defined than the idea of such attributes as bear relation to beings, whose nature and properties we know not, namely the universe.

2. His other inference is expressed in these words: Thus then the moral attributes, according to this theology, require infinitely more of God to man, than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exercise to one another. To say, the moral attributes, according to Christian theology, or, as he is pleased to call it, artificial theology, requires infinitely more, is a wretched calumny. To say, it requires more, is true. And for this plain reason: the relation between
Creator and creature is very different from that between fellow-creatures; therefore the goodness is more abundant: The relation between lord and servant is very different from that between fellow-servants; therefore the justice is more severe. And if it would not be deemed too impudent to refer his Lordship to Scripture, for instruction (especially in a matter where the abuse of Scripture was chiefly intended), he might there have found a parable which would have set him right: and has always kept artificial theology, whatever he might think, from going wrong. But infinite, when applied to the exercise of a moral attribute in reference to man, is his Lordship's nonsense, with due reverence be it spoken, not the nonsense of artificial Divines. They were not ignorant that the rule, infirmiorem vel deteriorem partem sequitur consequentia, held as well in morals as in logic. Though God be infinite, man is finite; and therefore, with respect to him, the exertion of a moral attribute is finite, not infinite. His Lordship himself saw something of this, as appears by his own words. The nature of the moral attributes implies necessarily a limitation in the use of them. And why would he suppose Divines could not see as far into this matter as himself?

But if there be an error in artificial theology, he is as sure, at one time or other, to espouse it; as he is, at all times, ready to calumniate the Divine who holds it. Men, in their ill-advised zeal to defend the Scripture-doctrine of the Son's divinity, were not always sufficiently careful in selecting their arguments. Amongst such as had perhaps been better let alone, they employed this; That as man's offence was against an infinite Being, it required an infinite satisfaction; which none but such a Being could give. Now his Lordship, we see, espouses this very principle, to discredit God's moral attributes, and the artificial theology of Jesus Christ; which speaks, indeed, of infinite rewards; but not as matter of due, but of grace.

As the being bounded is one of his Lordship's objections against the moral attributes, so the being merely human is another.

"After Dr. Clarke (says he) has repeated over and "over that all the moral attributes are the same in
God as in our ideas; and that he who denies them to be so, may as well deny the divine physical attributes, the Doctor insists only on two of the former, on those of justice and goodness. He was much in the right to contract the generality of his assertion. The absurdity of ascribing temperance, for instance, or fortitude, to God, would have been too gross, and too visible even to eyes that prejudice had blinded the most. But that, of ascribing justice and goodness to him, according to our notions of them, might be better covered, and was enough for his purpose, though not less really absurd."

Which shall we most admire: His knowledge or his ingenuity? Or shall we follow the advice of his motto, and Wonder at nothing?"

When men contemplate what they call moral virtue, or the attributes of humanity, they divide them into two classes, perfectly distinct from one another. In the first are comprised those which belong to man under the idea of a free intelligent being, such as goodness and justice: in the second, those which belong to him under the idea of a creature of his own imperfect species, such as temperance and fortitude. The first belong to all free intelligent beings; the latter, only to such a being as man: those arise out of the nature of free intelligence, and so are common to all: these, from the imperfections of a very inferior creature, and so are peculiar to humanity; for we easily conceive a higher Order of free intelligences, in which the moral virtues of the second class have no place. They are superior to the impressions of fear, and so have no occasion to exert fortitude: they are removed from the temptation of excess, and so have no room for the exercise of temperance. Now when Clarke, or any other Divine, had said, that the moral attributes are the same in God as in our ideas, What attributes could they possibly mean but those of the first class; those which belong to beings under the idea of free intelligences? Stupid as his Lordship is pleased to make divines, they could never blunder at such a rate as to conceive that those virtues or moral attributes, which proceed from the imperfection of the creature,

\* Nil admirari.

\* M 4
might belong in any manner to the Creator, whom they
supposed to be all perfect. They held, with his Lord-
ship, and they will hold without him, that the great God
is infinitely wise and powerful. Were they then in any
danger to give him temperance, which implied his being
obnoxious to folly; or fortitude, which argued im-
puissance? Infinite wisdom, therefore, and infinite
power, exclude from God the very ideas of temperance
and fortitude. But do infinite wisdom and infinite
power exclude from God the ideas of goodness and
justice? On the contrary, his Lordship, as we shall see
presently, is reduced to the poor shift of owning goodness
and justice to be contained in infinite wisdom and power.

At present I leave his Lordship's admirers to their
own meditations on their master's ipse dixit, That the
ascribing goodness and justice to God is no less
really absurd than the ascribing temperance and
fortitude to him.

—But Clarke contracted the generality of the
assertion, to serve a purpose. I think he did: and for
one of the best purposes in the world, that of common
sense. Had his Lordship been pleased to contract
himself on the same principle, he had passed, perhaps,
for a greater philosopher; though he had certainly been
a less writer.

But then, if you ask, What purpose his Lordship had
to serve, when he used the equivocal word all (which
may signify either all of one kind, or all of every kind),
where he observes, Clarke holds, that all the moral
attributes are the same in God, &c.? I answer, it was
to give himself the poor pretence to say, that Clarke
afterwards contracted his generality, or, in other words,
contradicted himself.

A third objection against the moral attributes is,
"That passions and affections mix with our good-
ness and justice; which therefore cannot be supposed to
be the same in kind with God's; though our wisdom
and power, with which no passions or affections mix,
must be the same in kind with his."

Were passion and affection inseparable from human
goodness and justice, the objection might seem to have
some force; indeed, not much even then. But how
miserable
miserable must the objection appear to those who see, as all men may, that they are separable? Separable, I mean, in practice as well as speculation. The true idea of human goodness and justice excludes all passion and affection. What hinders then our rising, from that idea, to divine goodness and justice, any more than our rising, from the idea of human wisdom and power, to the divine wisdom and power; and from perceiving, that as well the moral, as the natural attributes, are the same in kind, both in God and man?

But, this is not all that may be said in favour of our adequate idea of God’s moral attributes, when compared with the natural. For though passion mixes not with the human attributes of wisdom and power, yet something else does, much more difficult to be separated than passion, from the human attributes of goodness and justice, I mean the instrumentality of matter. We can conceive nothing of human power without the use of such an instrument: yet this, by his Lordship’s own confession, does not hinder us from rising from the idea of our own wisdom and power, to the wisdom and power of God; and from seeing that they are the same in kind. Why then should the other foreign combination hinder us from seeing that goodness and justice are the same in kind?

Still further: The manner of knowing in God, on which depends his natural attribute of wisdom, is confessedly different from what it is in man; and, at the same time, is a thing of which we have no conception: yet this, according to his Lordship’s account, does not hinder our attaining to an adequate idea of divine wisdom, though it rises from what we see of the human.

How happens it then, that, in both these cases, notwithstanding the foreign mixture of the instrumentality of matter, and the manner of knowing, we attain an adequate idea of God’s wisdom and power? His Lordship will tell you, it is by separating what is foreign from what is native to the ideas of wisdom and power. And shall not I have as much credit with You, when I tell you we acquire an adequate idea of God’s goodness and justice, by separating from the idea of human goodness and justice, the foreign mixture of passion and affection? But
But his Lordship has a greater quarrel than all this with the moral attributes. They give rise to embarrassed questions, dishonourable to God, and mischievous to religion.

"As they [the Divines] modelled God's government on a human plan, so they conceived his perfections, moral as well as physical, by human ideas.—Thus God was said to be the first good: but then the general notion or abstract idea of this good was not only taken from human goodness, but was considered too with little or no other relation than to man—A question arose therefore on these hypotheses, How could evil come into a system of which God was the author?

—this question made a further hypothesis necessary; another first God, another coeternal and coequal principle, was introduced to solve it; a first cause of all evil, as the other was of all good."

The false representation of this fact I reserve for another occasion: the false inference from it is what I now propose to consider.

His Lordship supposes, that the notion of God's moral attributes gave birth to an insoluble question concerning the origin of evil; and that this occasioned the invention of the mischievous hypothesis of the two principles. Who would have suspected all this evil to arise from the first good! Yet so it was: and therefore the notion of such a good must be false; or, at least, very hurtful.

1. As to the first, if his Lordship's inference be right, it will unsettle all useful knowledge; because there is no great principle, either in physics, or in natural theology, but which, if we be not on our guard, and wise enough to stop at the extent of our ideas, will lead us into inextricable embarras: as one might instance in a point that arises out of both these sciences—The agreement between free-will and prescience. This is a well-known case: and as one of the principal designs of this View is to illustrate his Lordship's great talents, I chose it before any other, because he pretends to untie this knot, which hath so long kept the learned world intangled.

"Our ideas (says he) of divine intelligence and wis. dom may be neither fantastical nor false, and yet God's
"God's manner of knowing may be so different from ours, that fore-knowledge, as we call it improperly in him, may be consistent with the contingency of events; although that which we call properly fore-knowledge in ourselves, be not so."

I have two or three remarks to make on these words. Our ideas of God's moral attributes, his goodness and justice, he makes fantastical and false, on account of difficulties arising from them: yet God's natural attributes, his intelligence and wisdom, may, he says, be neither fantastical nor false, though a difficulty as great arises from them; namely, the apparent discordancy between free-will and prescience.

My second remark is, that his solution is more fantastical and false than the wildest chimera of school-metaphysics. The difficulty in reconciling God's prescience to man's free-will does not arise from our ignorance in God's manner of knowing, but from God's actual knowledge.

My third remark is, that his Lordship, who is here so penetrating, that he can easily reconcile prescience and free-will, is yet, in another place, so cloudy, that he cannot see how an equal providence and free agency may stand together.*

My last remark is (and it rises out of the foregoing) that where Religion is not concerned, his Lordship sees no difficulties in any part of the system of creation: but as soon as ever Religion appears, then difficulties start up by dozens.

Of this, take an instance from the case in hand. Our ideas of God's moral attributes, he says, must needs be false, because the conceiving of them by human goodness and justice leads to the question of the origin of evil, considered morally. Well. And does not the conceiving of God's physical attributes, by human wisdom and power, lead to the question of the origin of evil, considered naturally? Yet our ideas of the physical attributes are neither false nor fantastical. But to this, his Lordship replies, Evil, considered naturally, is not real, but apparent only. Why so? Because it contributes to the greater good of the whole. May not the

* See Letter iv.
same thing be said of evil, considered morally? Nay, hath it not been actually said, and proved too, on the same principles? It follows then, that they are either both real, or both fantastick.

In a word, the truth is no more than this, Presumptuous man knows not where to stop. He would penetrate even to the arcana of the Godhead.

"For fools rush in, where angels fear to tread."

And this impious humour it was which gave birth to the absurd hypothesis of two principles. But is the folly to be charged upon our idea of the moral attributes? Ridiculous! We see its cause is in vanity and self-conceit; passions that operate alike on all principles.

2. As to his Lordship's second inference, that this idea is at least productive of much mischief, and therefore it would be better to have none at all; let me observe, that the idea of God's very existence is productive of mischief, even all the mischiefs of superstition. Is it therefore better to be without a God? Who, besides his Lordship, would say so? Why then should we think it better to be without the idea of the moral attributes, even though the evils it produced were necessary? But that is not the case. They are casual only: the issue of pride and presumption; which this idea does not at all influence.

3. However, these moral attributes, if not hurtful, are useless; and this is his next cavil. "Infinite " wisdom and power (says his Lordship) have made " things as they are: how goodness and justice required " they should be made is neither coram judice, nor to " any rational purpose to enquire." To inquire how the universe of things should be made, serves indeed to no reasonable purpose. But to inquire concerning our own state and condition in this universe, is either coram judice, or we were sent into the world to stare about us, and pass judgment upon nothing. His Lordship's sophistry seems to confound two things that common sense has always distinguished; our own business from other men's. When the king holds a bed of justice, 'tis not for

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* He indeed says, he had rather be an Atheist, than acknowledge the Christian Theology; and we may believe him.
every particular to inquire into all his measures: but
every particular who is summoned to attend the court, is
much concerned to know how he himself shall be dealt
with. His Lordship, indeed, is ready to say, We are not
summoned; that is, we are not accountable creatures.
But this is begging the question.

Again, to inquire, much more to prescribe how things
should be made, in any particular system, has all the
folly, presumption, and impiety, which his Lordship
charges upon it: because the parts having a relation to
the whole, an all-wise Architect makes them in conformity
to that whole, of which we know nothing; and therefore
our only conclusion should be, that the part we do know
is constituted for the best. But it is another thing to say
(which is all that Divines have said, how differently soever
his Lordship is pleased to represent the matter) that God
will act equitably with his rational creation, by distrib-
uting good and evil to them according to their deserts;
because this does not depend upon any whole, of which
we know nothing, but on his attributes of goodness and
justice, of which we know enough to determine with cer-
tainty concerning his final dealing with men. To pass
our judgment here is so far from folly or impiety, that
not to do it would be stupidity or hypocrisy. To call this
proceeding, as his Lordship does, the patching or botching
up one system with another, is a gross misrepresentation.
It is fairly taking in the whole, to determine concerning
the destination of the parts.

At length, he ends just where he set out, That we
have no ideas of the moral attributes at all. "Upon
the whole matter (says he) we may conclude safely
from error, and in direct opposition to Clarke, that
goodness and justice in God cannot be conceived,
without manifest presumption and impiety, to be
the same as in the ideas we frame of these per-
fessions when we consider them in men, or when we
reason about them abstractedly in themselves; but
that in the supreme Governor of the World they are
something transcendental, and of which we cannot
make any true judgment, nor argue with any certainty
about them." And in this, his Lordship tells us he is
justified by the authority of St. Paul and Dr. Barrow.

These
These two great Divines (says he) are on my side.—
Who would have thought of two such honourable Supporters for his Lordship's achievements? One thing I have observed, which may be worth reflecting on: a strange propensity in Freethinkers to mistake their enemies for their friends; and as strange a propensity in the Clergy to mistake their friends for their enemies. The turn is odd enough on both sides; and, at first view, seems a little mysterious; when, perhaps, there may be no more in it than this,—Free-thinkers have invented this trick, to amuse the Clergy, in order to kindle their suspicions, and inflame their jealousy against their best friends: and, unhappily, the Clergy have, now and then, fallen into the snare.

But, after what has passed, who would expect that the leather-dressing Pontiff, of all men, should have been thought worthy to support the first philosophy! What has St. Paul done at last to deserve this honour?—Why, in answer to the objections against God's dispensations in the religious world, the Apostle refers us, "for entire satisfaction, to the incomprehensible wisdom of God, who frequently in the course of his providence ordereth things in methods transcending our abilities to discover or trace." This solution, which is here extolled for its great modesty, is referred to, in another place, for its greater impudence. It may be either, just as his Lordship is in humour; who, notwithstanding his long study of Locke, seems totally to have lost all ideas of moral modes. How else was it possible, after having treated the whole body of mankind in the manner he has done, he should gravely tell his friend, "That few men, he believes, have consulted others both living and the dead, with less presumption, and in a greater spirit of docility, than he has done*." I sometimes thought a word was wrong printed; and that for consulted, we should read, insulted; for, in a great man, there is no presumption, whatever meanness there may be, in insulting his inferiors. And as for his docility, that will hardly be disputed, it being certain that from the Author, whom he has insulted most, he has condescended to steal more.

* Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope.
But St. Paul says, we must have recourse to the incomprehensible wisdom of God. In good time. But how does this prove that, in Paul's opinion, we have no adequate idea of the moral attributes, unless the quality of an agent, and his action, be one and the same thing? You, Sir, have an adequate conception, I am sure, of our gracious Monarch's goodness and justice; but you have a very imperfect comprehension of several of his State-measures. I frequently attempted to illustrate my reasoning on divine matters from examples in human rulers. This is a ticklish point. And therefore I have been very careful that those regal acts, by which I would illustrate the divine, be not such as proceed from the weakness and imperfections of humanity. If they be, the instance is impertinent, and serves for nothing but to mislead us. This was the more carefully to be observed, because writers have carried these illustrations into much abuse. And nobody more than this noble Lord, so famous as he is likely to become with posterity, for every species of false reasoning.

Dr. Barrow, I presume, will stand his Lordship in no better stead than St. Paul. "As the dealings of every wise man (says the Doctor) are sometimes founded upon maxims, and admit justifications not obvious or penetrable by vulgar conceit, so may God act according to rules of wisdom and justice, which it may be quite impossible by our faculties to apprehend, or with our means to discern. As there are natural modes of being and operation, so there may be prudential and moral modes of proceeding, far above our reach, peculiar objects of divine wisdom not to be understood by any creature, especially by creatures who stand in the lowest form of intelligence; one remove from beasts. In fine, those rules of equity and experience which we in our transactions with one another do use, if they be applied to the dealings of God, will be found very incongruous or deficient, the case being vastly altered from that infinite distance in nature and state between God and us, and from the immense difference which his relations towards us have from our relations to one another." What now has all this (which relates only to the incomprehensible nature of God's providence)
providence) to do with our inadequate ideas of his moral attributes? At least, if his Lordship will contend, that the man who thinks God's providence incomprehensible must needs think our ideas of his moral attributes inadequate, he must go a step further, and confess, that Barrow supposed our ideas of the natural attributes to be inadequate likewise, for he puts both on the same footing. As there are natural modes of being and operation (says the Doctor), so there may be prudential and moral modes of proceeding far above our reach. But as this would be going too far, farther than the first philosophy will allow of, I suppose he would be content to give up this quotation from Barrow, as nothing to the purpose.

At last, and when you would least expect it, common-sense and common-sentiments return. And God's moral attributes, after much ado, are allowed to be in Nature. "Where religions" (says his Lordship) "which pretend to be revealed, prevail, a new character of God's goodness arises—an artificial goodness, which stands often in the place of the natural." And this, after he had so often told us, that we have no adequate idea of any goodness at all. Well, but as awkwardly as God's natural goodness comes, and, in every sense, à posteriori, yet it comes, and deserves to be made welcome. "All the knowledge (says he) that God has given us the means to acquire, and therefore all he designed we should have of his physical and moral nature and attributes, is derived from his works, and from the tenour of that providence by which he governs them." You will observe the words—the tenour of that providence—I have detected the sophistry of them before, where I have stated the meaning of the terms, God's works. I bid you observe them now, to judge of the following climax (if I may so call it), or walk down stairs. "The wisdom is not so often discernible by us [in God's works] as the power of God, nor the goodness as the wisdom." As scanty and slender as the knowledge is of God's moral attributes, which his Lordship here allows us to collect from his works, yet it flatly contradicts what his system had obliged him over and over to maintain; particularly in the fol-

lowing
lowing words—Of divine goodness and divine justice
(says his Lordship in the person of Anaxagoras) I am
unable to frame any adequate notions, from God's
works.

This mock-concession is again repeated, and as care-
fully guarded. "By natural theology (says his Lordship)
"we are taught to acknowledge and adore the infinite
"wisdom and power of God, which he has manifested
"to us in some degree or other in every part, even the
"most minute, of his Creation. By that too, we are
"taught to ascribe goodness and justice to him,
"wherever he intended we should so ascribe them,
"that is, wherever either his works, or the dispensations
"of his providence, do as necessarily communicate
"these notions to our minds, as those of wisdom and
"power are communicated to us, in the whole extent of
"both."

What his Lordship would have you infer from this is,
that we are no where taught to ascribe goodness and
justice to God; since the dispensations of his pro-
vidence do no where, in his Lordship's opinion, neces-
sarily communicate these notions. But allow him
his premises, that neither God's works nor dispensations
do necessarily communicate to us the notions of God's
goodness and justice; Would his conclusion follow, that
therefore we are no where taught in these works and dis-
persations to ascribe those attributes unto him? Suppose
these works and dispensations did only probably com-
municate these notions to our minds; will not this pro-
bability teach us to ascribe goodness and justice to him?
God hath so framed the constitution of things, that man,
throughout his whole conduct in life, should be necessarily
induced to form his judgment on appearances and pro-
bable arguments. Why then not in this, as well as the
rest? or rather, why not in this, above the rest, if so be
that indeed God had not (as I have shewn he hath)
necessarily communicated these notions?—But still, what
is this to our adequate idea of the moral attributes, the
point in question? God's not necessarily communicat-
ing affects only the reality, not the precision of the idea.
All therefore we learn by the observation, which would
thus put the change upon us, is, that his Lordship has a

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very
very strong inclination, that God should have neither goodness nor justice, so far as they carry with them any disposition to reward or punish. For as to the attributes themselves, divested of their consequence; and undisturbed by our impious imitation*, he has little or no quarrel with them. His Lordship certainly never intended to teach the common reader more of the secrets of his philosophy than what necessarily arises from his professions. But to make God treat mankind in this manner, communicate to their minds the appearance of attributes which he has not, is drawing an image of the Deity from his Lordship's own likeness; the very fault he so much censures in Divines. But if it must needs be that God is to be represented either after them, or after his Lordship, I should choose to have the Clergy's God, though made out of no better stuff than artificial theology, because this gives him goodness and justice, rather than his Lordship's God, which has neither, although composed of the more refined materials of the first philosophy. In the mean time, I will not deny but He may be right in what he says, That men conceive of the Deity, more humano; and that his Lordship's God and the Clergy's God are equally faithful copies of themselves.

In a word, if God teaches, whether clearly or obscurely, he certainly intended we should learn. And what we get even by appearances, is real knowledge, upon his Lordship's own principles. For if truth be, as he assures us it is, of so precarious a nature as to take its being from our own system, it must be real as far as it appears. "Our knowledge (says this great philosopher) is so "dependent on our own system, that a great part of it "would not be knowledge perhaps, but error in any "other."

It is thus he involves himself in perpetual contradictions: and it is always thus, when men dispute (for believe they cannot†) against common notices, and the most

* "Our obligation to imitate God, is a false and profane doctrine."
† Hear what he himself says of free-will. The free-will of man no one can deny he has, without lying, or renouncing his intuitive knowledge.

obvious
obvious truths; such as liberty of will; the certainty of knowledge; and this, which, I reckon, obtrudes itself upon us as forcibly as either, the moral attributes of the Deity.

But the game is now on foot. Let us follow closely. We have unravelled him through all his windings; and we may soon expect to see him take shelter in the thick cover of God’s incomprehensible nature; and rather than allow, more than in jest, the moral attributes of the Deity, ready to resolve all his attributes, both natural and moral, into one indefinite perfection.

But soft—Not yet—We must come to it by degrees and regular advances. First, the moral attributes are to be resolved into the natural.

“‘If they [the natural and moral attributes] may be considered separately, as we are apt to consider them; and if the latter, and every thing we ascribe to these, are not to be resolved rather into the former; into, his infinite intelligence, wisdom, and power.” It is yet, we see, but a question; and that only, whether the moral attributes are not to be resolved into the natural. In the next passage the matter is determined. “‘I think” (and what he thinks, he holds it but reasonable we should all think) “that the moral attributes of the Supreme Being are absorbed in his wisdom; that we should consider them only as different modifica-

tions of this physical attribute.”

We are not yet near the top. However, before we go any higher, let us set together his inconsistencies, as they appear in this situation. Sometimes the ideas of divine wisdom are better determined than those of divine goodness: sometimes we have no ideas at all of divine goodness: and sometimes again (as in the place before us) the divine goodness is the same as wisdom, and therefore, doubleless, the idea of it is as well defined. Now, of all these assertions, to which will his Lordship stick? To which, do you ask? To none of them, longer than they will stick to him: and straggling, undisciplined principles, picked up at adventures, are not apt to stick long to any side: as soon as they begin to incline towards the enemy, he has done with them.—Come, if you will needs have it, you shall. The secret is this. The attri-
butes are mere names; and there is an end of them. All that remains, worth speaking of, is one undefined eternal reason; and so the farce concludes.

"The moral attributes (says he) are barely names that we give to various manifestations of the infinite wisdom of one simple uncompounded being."

"Of divine goodness and divine justice I am unable to frame any adequate notions; and instead of conceiving such distinct moral attributes in the Supreme Being, we ought, perhaps, to conceive nothing more than this, that there are various applications of one eternal reason, which it becomes us little to analyze into attributes."

To this miserable refuge is his Lordship reduced, to avoid divine justice. But why, you say, did he not speak out at first, and end his quarrel with the moral attributes at once? Your humble servant for that. Barefaced naturalism has not such charms as to make her received when and wherever she appears. There is need of much preparation, and not a little disguise, before you can get her admitted even to what is called good company. But then, after he had resolved to speak out, Why, you ask, does he stop again in his career; and, when his premisses are general against all attributes, his conclusion is particular, against the moral only? Not without reason, I assure you. He had need of the natural attributes, to set up against the moral: and therefore had himself analyzed this eternal reason into the specific attributes of wisdom and power. But when he saw his adversaries might, by the same way, analyze it into goodness and justice, he then thought fit to pick a quarrel with his own method: but it was to be done obliquely: and hence arises all this embarrass and tergiversation. He would willingly, if his Reader be so pleased, analyze the eternal reason into wisdom and power: but there he would stop: and leave the other side of the eternal reason, unanalyzed: and if goodness and justice should chance to start out, he has a trick to resolve and absorb them into wisdom and power, as only different modifications of the physical attributes. But if this revolts his Readers, and they expect equal measure; then, rather than give them back the goodness and justice which he was.
has been at all this pains to proscribe, he will throw wisdom and power after them, and resolve all into the one eternal reason.

Bashful naturalism has now thrown aside her veil; and is, we see, ready to face down and defy her rival; whom till now she was content to counterfeit. Give me leave, therefore, to repress this last effort of her insolence by another passage from the Sermons quoted once or twice already.

"We have been told, and with airs of superior knowledge, that these pretended attributes, as they are commonly specified, and distinguished into natural and moral, are a mere human fiction; invented, by aid of analogy from the actions, passions, and qualities observable in man: and that the simple nature of Deity is one uniform perfection; of which, infinity being the base, we can have no distinct idea or conception.

"To this it will be sufficient to reply, that it is indeed true, that these specific attributes, from which we deduce all our knowledge of the nature and will of God, are formed on analogy, and bear relation to ourselves. But then we say such attributes are not, on that account, the less real or essential. The light of the Sun is not, in the orb itself, what we see it in the rainbow. There it is one candid, uniform, perfect blaze of glory: here, we separate its perfection into the various attributes of red, yellow, blue, purple, and what else the subtle optician so nicely distinguishes. But still the solar light is not less real in the rainbow, where its rays become thus untwisted, and each differing thread distinctly seen in its effect, than while they remained united and incorporated with one another in the Sun. Just so it is with the divine nature: it is one simple individual perfection in the Godhead himself: but when refracted and divericated, in passing through the medium of the human mind, it becomes power, justice, mercy; which are all separately and adequately represented to the understanding*." But that his Lordship so frequently discards his own principles, I

should hope he would submit to this illustration, since he owns that we see the Deity in a reflected, not in a direct light.

It is a true light then and not a false: and the knowledge it conveys is real, not fantastic: for mirrors are not wont to reflect the species of the mind's visions, but things exterior and substantial. To turn us, therefore, from God's attributes, (though the indirect, yet the well-defined, image of him) because they discover something to us we may not like, a hell and a future judgment; to turn us, I say, from these, to the undefined eternal reason, is doing like certain French philosophers, who, when they quarrelled with Newton's theory of light and colours, contrived to break the prism by which it was demonstrated.

And now, Sir, to conclude my long letter. Who is there that deserves the name of man, and will not own, that they are the moral attributes of the Deity which make him amiable; just as the natural attributes make him revered and adorable?—What is his Lordship's quarrel with the God of Moses and Paul; but that he is made unamiable, and represented without goodness or justice? Their God, therefore, he expressly tells us, shall not be his God. Well then: he has his God to make. And who would not expect to find him, when made by such a workman, a God of infinite goodness and justice. No such matter: These qualities come not out of his Lordship's hands; so, cannot enter into the composition of his God: They are barely names that men give to various manifestations of the infinite wisdom of one simple uncompounded Being. The pretended want of them in the God of the Jews afforded his Lordship a commodious cavil; for he had religion to remove out of his way: but when he came to erect naturalism in its stead, it had been very inconvenient to give them to his own idol.

Honest Plutarch, though a priest, was as warm an enemy to priestcraft as his Lordship. He derives all the evils of superstition from men's not acquiring the idea of a God infinitely good, and just. And proposes this knowledge as the only cure for superstition. This is consistent. But what would the ancient World have thought.
thought of their Philosopher, had his remedy, after hunting for it through a hundred volumes, been a God without any goodness and justice at all.

Nature tells us, that the thing most desirable is the knowledge of a God, whose goodness and justice gives to every man according to his works. His Lordship tells us, that reason or natural religion discovers to us no such God. Now, if both speak truth, how much are we indebted to revelation! Which, when natural religion failed us, brings us to the knowledge of a God infinitely good and just; and gives us an adequate idea of those attributes! I say no more than his Lordship has confessed—Christianity, says he, discovers the love of God to man; his infinite justice and goodness.

Is this a blessing to be rejected? His Lordship has no room to say so, since the discovery is made in that very way, in which, upon his own principles, it only could be made. He pretends, "We have no other natural way of coming to the knowledge of God, but from his works. By these, he says, we gain the idea of his physical attributes; and if there be any thing in his works which seems to contradict those attributes, 'tis only seeming. For as men advance in the knowledge of nature, the difficulties vanish. It is not so, he says, with regard to the moral attributes. There are so many phæenomena which contradict these, and occasion difficulties never to be cleared up, that they hinder us from acquiring an adequate idea of the moral attributes."

Now admitting all this to be true, (for generally, his Lordship's assertions are so extravagant, that they will not even admit a supposition of their truth, though it be only for argument's sake) What does it effect but this, additional credit to Revelation? The physical difficulties clear up as we advance in our knowledge of Nature, and we advance in proportion to our diligence and application. But the moral difficulties never clear up, because they rise out of the whole system of God's moral dispensation; which is involved in clouds and darkness, impenetrable to mortal sight: and all the force of human wit alone will never be able to draw the veil. The assistance must come from another quarter. It must come, if it comes at all, from the Author of the Dispensa-
tion. Well; Revelation hath drawn this veil, and so removed the darkness which obstructed our attaining an adequate idea of the moral attributes. Shall we yet stand out? And, when we are brought hither upon his Lordship's own principles, still withheld our assent? Undoubtedly you must. Beware (says he) of a pretended revelation. Why so? "Because the religion of nature is perfect and absolute: and therefore revelation can teach nothing but what religion hath already taught." Strange! Why, Revelation teaches those moral attributes; which you, my Lord, own, natural religion does not teach—Here the dialogue breaks off.

"Dic aliquem sodces, dic, Quintiliane, colorem;
"Haeremus—"

And here, we are like to stick. His Lordship leaves us in a riddle. Will you have the solution? It is foolish enough; as such kind of things generally are. But if you kept your good humour, which, I confess, is difficult amidst all these provocations of impiety, it is enough to make you laugh. I told you before, that his Lordship borrowed all his reasoning against Revelation from such as Tindal, Toland, Collins, Chubb, and Morgan. This solemn argument particularly, of the perfection of natural religion, and the superseded use of Revelation, he delivers to us just as he found it in Tindal. Now Tindal, who held, that natural religion taught both the moral attributes and a future state, had some pretence for saying that it was perfect and absolute. But what pretence has his Lordship to say it after him, who holds that natural religion taught neither one nor the other? The truth is, he refused no arms against revelation; and the too eager pursuit of this his old enemy through thick and thin has led him into many of these scrapes.

I have now considered all I could find urged by the Noble Writer in support of his great principle of no adequate ideas of God's moral attributes: on which the whole system of Naturalism is, and must be, founded: and you see to what this all amounts: If I should say, to just nothing, I shall speak more favourably of it than it deserves; for it tends, as I have shewn you, in many instances, to confirm the great truth it is

brought
brought to overthrow. And now what I proposed for the subject of this second Letter is pretty well exhausted. My first was employed in giving you a specimen of his temper; this undertakes to explain his system; and I reserve the two next for a display of his marvellous talents; though, it is true, I have a little anticipated the subject. For you cannot but have conceived already a very uncommon idea of his abilities, on seeing him use Tindal's arguments against Revelation, and for the perfection of natural religion, along with his own principles of no moral attributes and no future state. The first of which principles makes one entire absurdity of all he borrows from Tindal against Revelation; and the second takes away the very pretence for perfection in natural religion.

His Lordship's friend, Swift, has somewhere or other observed, that no subject in all nature but religion could have advanced Toland and Asgill into the class of reputable authors. Another of his friends seems to think that no subject but religion could have sunk his Lordship so far below it: if ever Lord Bolingbroke trifles (says Pope), it will be when he writes on divinity *. But this is the strange fate of authors, whether with wit, or without, when they choose to write on certain subjects. For it is with authors, as with men: Who can guess which vessel was made for honour, and which for dishonour, when sometimes one and the same is made for both? Even this choice vessel of the first philosophy, his Lordship's sacred pages, may be put to very different uses, according to the different tempers in which they chance to find his few admirers and the public; like the china jordan in the Dunciad, which one hero p—d into, and another carried home for his head-piece. I am, &c.

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LETTER III.

LET me first claim your thanks for sparing you so long on the chapter of Lord Bolingbroke; and then ask,

what you now think of this paper-meteor, which so flames and sparkles, and, while it kept at distance (like a comet, traversing the celestial orbs, and domineering over the established system) drew after it the admiring crowd; divided in their opinions between the presage of superstitious Divines who saw it threaten pestilence and ruin to the world beneath, and the more philosophic determination of his followers who judged it was to recreate and revive the dryness and sterility of exhausted nature.

But your love of mankind makes you view this strange phenomenon with horror. Is it for this, you say, that such a torrent of abuse has been poured out upon every private character, upon every public order, upon every branch of learning, and upon every institution of Religion?—They were not poured out at hazard, for all these things stood in his way: they were not poured out in vain, for they are given for arguments, and will, I make no doubt, be so received.

The wise Quintilian, it is true, has observed, Proprium moderationem quaedam causæ desiderant. And it must be confessed, that if ever moderation, or temperance of expression, became an author, or was well suited to his discourse, it was when the purpose of his work, like that of his Lordship's, was to overturn all established religion, founded in the belief of a Sovereign Master, supremely just and good; and all authentic learning, employed for the defence of such Religion: and, on their ruins, to erect naturalism, instead of real theism, and a first philosophy, instead of real science. When, I say, a writer had thought fit to insult the common sentiments of mankind on points esteemed so essential to their well-being, common policy as well as common decency required that it should be done by the most winning insinuation and address; and not by calling madman, knave, fool, and blasphemer, every man who would not take his system upon trust.

But superior geniuses have always thought themselves above the restraint of rules. Tully observes that Arcesilas, fitted by a turbulence of temper to confound the peace and overturn the established order of things, had done that mischief in philosophy which Tiberius Gracchus
GRACCHUS had projected in the Republic*. But his Lordship, prompted by a nobler ambition, would play both parts in their turns, and shine an Arcessilas and a Gracchus too.

His ill success in business made him turn his great talents from politics to philosophy. But he had not yet mortified that ambition which was always prompting him to aspire at superiority: and he carried with him that sufficiency and those resentments which had proved so ill suited to the cabinets of princes, into the closet of the philosopher. We may add, that he entered upon letters in an advanced age; and this still further vitiated his natural temper by an acquired infirmity, to which, as Tully observes, these untimely adventures are extremely subject. ΟΥΙΜΑΘΕΙΣ autem homines scis quam insolentes sint: “You know, says he, how insolent those men generally are, who come late to their book.”

But now having given you my thoughts of his Lordship’s assuming temper, it would be unfair not to give you his own. He had kept, it seems, ill company; and his natural candour and modesty had been hurt by it. But let him tell his own story: “I grow very apt to assume, "by conversing so much with ecclesiastical writers, "who assume much oftener than they prove.”

But whatever causes concurred to form this overbearing humour, certain it is, that his contempt of others was become so habitual to him, that it operates where no reasonable provocation can be assigned. I have shewn you, in my first Letter, at what a rate, his disgust to the morals, and his aversion to the sanctions, of the Gospel, disposed him to treat all who had contributed to propagate or to support Revelation. But how the honest Pagans of antiquity had offended, who, many of them, believed no more of a future state than himself, is a little hard to conceive.

Yet Pythagoras, he tells you, was a turbulent fellow, and a fanatical subverter of States.

Nor did Plato’s delirious brains secure him from becoming, on occasion, a paltry cheat, and a mercenary

flatterer. For almost all his madmen are knaves into
the bargain. But Plato had made himself obnoxious to
his Lordship, by the blasphemous title he had given to
the First Cause; in which his delirious brains could find
nothing but a first good: so that he was to be stigma-
tized as the ringleader of that wicked sect who ascribe
moral attributes to the Deity.

Even Socrates, whose glory it was, as Tully assures
us, to take philosophy out of the clouds, and bring it
down to dwell amongst cities and men, substituted (in
his Lordship's opinion) fantastic, for real knowledge—
and entertained and propagated theological and
metaphysical notions, which are not, most certainly,
parts of natural theology. We understand his
Lordship very well. He means a particular providence
and a future state, the moral attributes of the Deity
and the substantiality of the soul. This apparently is
the fantastic knowledge which makes no part of
natural theology.

Nor could his own Seneca, though so serviceable*
to him in his Exile, escape the nickname of the Stoical
For: a character indeed, which, in the discourse referred
to at the bottom, Seneca has enabled his follower most
admirably to sustain.

When these Pagan heroes fare no better; who would
be concerned for churchmen? or think much to hear
Cyprian called a “liar and a madman;” Jerome
a surly foul-mouthed bully; and Epiphanius, an
idiot?

But now comes on a difficulty indeed.—Paul and
Plato bear their crimes in their countenance: The Gos-
pel of peace, he tells us, disclosed nothing but murders;
and the idea of a first Good occasioned all our com-
plaints of evil. But what had Scipio done, or Regulus,
to incur his displeasure? They were neither artificial
theologers, nor yet crazy metaphysicians; but plain,
sober Statesmen. His Lordship's quarrel, we know, is
with divinity in all its forms; but he professes to ad-
mire the moral virtues. And if there be any of higher
dignity than the rest, and in which his Lordship would be
* See his Lordship's tract, intituled, Reflections on Exile.
more desirous to shine, they must needs be chastity and good faith,

"Cui, Pudor, et Justitiae soror,

"Incorrupta Fides," &c. &c.

Yet he wrests all his reading to deprive those two brave Romans of their glory; so nobly earned, and so generously paid, by the universal voice of all ages. I am not ignorant of that childish infirmity of our nature, the fondness of ingressing to ourselves those shining qualities, with which we happen to be dazzled; but every one will acquit his Lordship of so impotent a project: much less would I suppose him capable of thinking, that Scipio and Regulus may be still the great men they have been accounted, though stained all over with lust and perfidy.

It is true, indeed, the new Historian of Great Britain, another of these first-philosophy men (for the essence of the sect consisting in paradox, it doth as well in history as divinity), he, I say, tells us, that it will admit of a doubt, whether severity of manners alone, and abstinence from pleasure, can deserve the name of virtue*. But then he is as singular in his notions of religion: He holds but two species of it in all Nature, superstition and fanaticism: and under one or other of them, he gives you to understand †, the whole of Christian profession is, and ever was, included. On the Church of England, indeed, he is so indulgent, to bestow all that religion has to give: for when he sets it against Popery, it is fanaticism: but as often as it faces about, and is opposed to the Puritans, it then becomes superstition; and this as constantly as the occasions return.

You will say I grow partial to his Lordship, in appearing so anxious for his reputation, while Your two favourite characters lie expiring under his pen. Never fear it. They have not lived so long to die of a fright. When his Lordship blusters, we know how to take him down. It is only leading him back to that antiquity he has been abusing.

Half the work is done to my hands; and I shall have only the trouble of transcribing the defence of Scipio

† See his History throughout.
against his Lordship's suspicions, as I find it in an ex-
postulatory letter to him, on his recent treatment of a
decceased friend.—

"The reputation of the first Scipio (says his Lord-
ship) was not so clear and uncontroverted in private
as in public life; nor was he allowed by all to be a
man of such severe virtue as he affected, and as that
age required. Nævius was thought to mean him,
in some verses Gellius has preserved; and Valerius
Antias made no scruple to assert, that, far from
restoring the fair Spaniard to her family, he de-
bauched and kept her*. One would have hoped so
mean a slander might have slept forgotten in the dirty
corner of a pedant's† common-place. And yet we
see it quoted as a fact by an instructor of kings. Who
knows but at some happy time or other, when a writer
wants to prove that real friendship becomes a great
man as little as real chastity‡, this advertisement§
of yours may be advanced to the same dignity of credit
with the calumny of Valerius Antias. If it should,
I would not undertake to dispute the fact on which
such an inference might be made; for, I remember,
Tully, a great Statesman himself, long ago observed,
Vere amicitiae difficilium reperiuntur in iis, qui
in Republica versantur.—But the words of Nævius
were these:

"Etiam qui res magnas manus sepe gessit glorioso,
Cujus facta viva nunc vigent; qui apud gentes solus
Præsint: eum suus pater cum pallio uno abs amica
"abduxit.

These obscure verses were, in Gellius's opinion, the
sole foundation of Antias's calumny, against the uni-
versal concurrence of historians||. And what Gellius
thought of this historian's modesty and truth, we may
collect from what he says of him in another place,
where, having quoted two tribunitial decrees, which,

* P. 204, of the Idea of a Patriot King.
† A. Gellius. † See p. 201, of the Patriot King.
§ Advertisement concerning Mr. Pope, prefixed to the Patriot
King.
|| His ego versibus credo adductum Valerium Antiatem adversum
eternos omnes scriptores de Scipioniis moribus sensisse.
he tells us, he transcribed from records [ex annalium monumentis], he adds, that Valerius Antias made no scruple to give them the lie in public*. And Livy quoting this Antias, for the particulars of a victory, subjoins concerning the number slain†,—but there is little credit to be afforded this writer, who, of all historians, is the most given to amplify. And he who will enlarge on one occasion, will diminish on another; for it is the same impotence of temper which carries him indifferently to either‡.

Regulus's virtue falls next under his Lordship's censure: “I know not (says he) whether Balbus would have called in question the story of Regulus. Vid. Au. Gellium. It was probably fabulous, in many circumstances at least, and there were those amongst the Romans who thought it to be so.” Would not any one now imagine, by his bringing Au. Gellium again upon the stage, that there was another Valerius Antias in reserve, to depose against Regulus likewise? Just the contrary. The grammarian, in the IVth chapter of his VIth book, confirms the common story, with an addition of the testimonies of the historians Tubero and Tuditanus. The truth however is, that his Lordship had his voucher, though he was shy of producing him. It was the respectable Mr. Toland; to whom his Lordship is much indebted for better things. Amongst the posthumous tracts of that virtuous writer, there is a Dissertation, intitled, The fabulous Death of Atilius Regulus: in which, from a fragment of Diodorus Siculus, preserved by Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, he endeavours to prove, against all the Roman writers, with Cicero at their head, that Regulus did not die in torments, but of mere chagrin. Toland only denied that his virtue was put to so severe a trial; but this was enough for his Lordship, to call in question the whole story; and to add, that there were those amongst the Romans who thought it to be fabulous. Unluckily, the Roman writers are unanimous.

* Valerius autem Antias, contra hanc decretorum memoriam contraque auctoritates veterum annalium—dixit, &c. L. vii. c. 19.
† Scriptori parum fidei sit, quia in augendo non alius interperantior est. Lib. xxxvi.
‡ A Letter to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism, the Idea of a Patriot King, and the State of Parties, &c.
for the truth of the story. How then shall we account for his Lordship's assertion? Did he take Diodorus Siculus for a Latin writer, because he had not seen him in Greek? Or did he understand A. Gellius as quoting Tubero and Tuiditanus for doubters of the common story?

As we see little reason therefore to dissent from the general opinion, and much less to join his Lordship against it, let Scipio and Regulus still preserve their rank in our esteem and admiration. For as an excellent French writer, in a letter to his Lordship, well observes, "C'est être vertueux que de rendre à la beauté des moeurs l'hommage d'amour et de respect, qui lui est dû."

His Lordship's ambition was uniform and simple: it was only, as we said, to be at the head of things. As he comes nearer home, therefore, he is more and more alarmed. He found his place already occupied by certain counterfeits and pretenders, who had, somehow or other, got into the throne of science, and had actually received homage from the literary world. But these, as it was fitting, he unmasks and deposes.

"Selden, Grotius, Puffendorf, and Cumberland (says his Lordship), seem to be great writers, by much the same right as he might be called a great traveller, who should go from London to Paris by the Cape of Good Hope." I can hardly think they took so large a compass. But let us trust to the proverb: they and his Lordship will prove it between them: he shews us a ready road indeed, but it leads to Atheism; whereas, if they take us a little about, they bring us the nearest way home to Religion.

He professes "a thorough contempt for the whole business of the learned lives of Scaliger, Bochart, Petavius, Usher, and Marsham." This was natural. He owed them nothing. But those to whom he is most indebted have no better quarter.

Marcilius Ficinus, he calls the best interpreter of Plato; but, at the same time, assures us, he was perfectly delirious. But why, you ask, is Ficinus the best interpreter of Plato, since J. Scaliger, who knew something of the matter, says, that he stript his master of his purple, and put him on his own beggarly rags? For a good reason; Ficinus taught his Lordship all he knew
knew of Platonism. But why is he then perfectly delirious? For a better still: he holds opinions already condemned by his Lordship.

His very favourite Barrow, he tells us, "goes on a long while begging the question, and talking in a logical cant more worthy of Paul than of a man like him—flimzy stuff, which a man is obliged to vend, when he puts on a black gown and band."

Locke and Newton, he insinuates, were the men: nay, such is his humility, that he puts himself to school to Locke. Yet this does not secure his master from being mighty liable to a Philosophical Delirium. And as for Newton, the application of his philosophy is grown, or growing into some abuse. Would you know how? By affording Clarke and Baxter the principles whereby to demonstrate, that the soul is an immaterial substance. An abuse indeed!

But as for his master—and Bacon too, as much as he admires them, he is not blind to their errors; but can, without being dazzled, discern spots in these Suns.

Before I go any further, I dare venture a wager that I know what those spots are. They are, or I am much mistaken, the stains of faith and the impurities of revelation. But let us hear him. "I can discern a tincture, and sometimes more than a tincture, in Bacon, of those false notions, which we are apt to imbibe as men, as individuals, as members of society, and as scholars. I can discern in Locke sometimes ill-abstracted and ill-determined ideas, from which a wrong application of words proceeds; and propositions to which I can, by no means, assent. I confess further, that I have been, and still am at a loss, to find any appearance of consistency in an author, who published a Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, and a treatise on the Reasonableness of Christianity (which he endeavours to prove by fact and by argument) after having stated clearly as he has done the conditions and measures of historical probability; and after having written as strongly as he has done against the abuse of words." Did not I tell you so?

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as the poet has it, in his description of the pestilence at Thebes; not more fatal to great cities than this bloated vapour of a first philosophy, which mimics, and, as it reflects, defiles this sun of science, and turns Nature into prodigy;

Et solem geminum et duplices se ostendere Thebas, &c.

But his Lordship's account of his other luminary, Bacon, is still more extraordinary—He thinks he discerns in him a tincture, and more than a tincture of those false notions, which we are apt to imbibe as men, as individuals, as members of society, and as scholars.—That is, as men, we are apt to think we have a soul; as individuals, we are in expectation of a future state; as members of society, we are inclined to reverence the established religion; and as scholars, we are taught to reason, and not to harangue. If any of his Lordship's followers can give a better account of this oracular passage, I am very ready to resign the office of his commentator.

In truth, his Lordship deals by religion, and its advocates, as a certain French author, I have read, does by alchemy and the hermetic philosophers: he brings almost every great name into the number; and, after having entertained his reader much at their expense, concludes each various eulogy alike,—"Now his folly was "in hoping to extract gold from baser metals;" just as the folly of all his Lordship's alchemists is the hope of bettering human nature by grace.

You now, Sir, may understand, how well the disposition of his mind and temper was fitted to his system. It often happens, that men who arraign religion, have been first arraigned by it; and their defiance of truth is only a reprisal upon conscience. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder they should go to work much out of humour; though it be in an affair which requires perfect tranquility, and freedom from all perturbations. But his Lordship has the miserable advantage of being the first who has written under one unintermitting fit of rage and resentment. In this state, like a man in a fever, whom no
posture can ease, whom no situation can accommodate, he is angry at philosophers for explaining what they cannot comprehend; he is angry at divines for believing without explaining: well then, they change hands; the philosopher believes, and the divine explains. No matter. He is angry still. In this temper then we leave him, and turn to the proper subject of my Letter.

You would know, you say, with what abilities he supports his system.

The attacks upon religion have been always carried on like war, by stratagem and force. I shall therefore first speak of his arts, and then of his powers of controversy.

It has been observed how closely, and how humbly too, he copies the free-thinkers who went before him, even to the stalest of their paltry stratagems.

When free-thinking first went upon its mission, the public were not disposed to understand raillery on a subject of such importance: so that it is possible there might be found, amongst the more early of these our anti- apologists, a confessor or two to the glorious cause of infidelity. This put their successors on their guard; or, what was better, gave them a pretence to affect it. From henceforth you hardly saw an infidel-book, which was not introduced with a mysterious reserve; with the obligations the reader had to these servants of truth, for venturing so far in his service, while the secular arm hung so fearfully over them; with the disadvantages their cause now lay under, while it could be but half explained and half supported; and with the wonders they would do by powers they had in reserve, when a little more Christian liberty should suffer them to be drawn out. This miserable crambe made so constant a part of our diet, and had been dished out from time to time with so little variety, that it grew both offensive and ridiculous; for what could more provoke our spleen or our laughter, than to feign an apprehension of the magistrate’s resentment, after they had written at their ease for almost a whole century together, with the most uncontrolled and unbridled licence?

In such a state of things, would you easily believe his lordship could pride himself in cooking up this cold kitchen...
kitchen-stuff, and serving it again and again, amidst so elegant an entertainment. "Gassendi (says he) apprehended enemies much more formidable than mere philosophers, because armed with ecclesiastical and civil power. It is this fear which has hindered those who have combated error in all ages, and who combat it still, from taking all the advantages which a full exposition of the truth would give them. Their adversaries triumph as if the goodness of their cause had given them the victory, when nothing has prevented their entire defeat, or reduced their contest to a drawn battle, except this, that they have employed arms of every kind, fair and foul, without any reserve; while the others have employed their offensive weapons with much reserve, and have even blunted their edge when they used them."

"The adversaries [of Religion] (says he again) seldom speak out, or push the instances and arguments they bring, so far as they might be carried. Instead of which, these orthodox bullies affect to triumph over men who employ but part of their strength," &c.

What it is, which his Lordship, who affects to tread in the steps of these cautious men, keeps thus hid and is so shy of producing, is not easy to guess. But

"Sous cet air capable où l'on ne comprend rien,
S'il cache un honnête homme, il se cache tres-bien."

However, having (after his masters) thus feigned a fear, he feigns all the obliquity and doubling, which fear produces. He professes to believe the mission of Christ, though founded on the dispensation of Moses, a dispensation he ridicules and execrates: he professes to believe the doctrines of Christ, though he rejects his gift of life and immortality: he professes to believe him the Saviour of the world, though he laughs at the doctrine of redemption, which constitutes the essence of that character.

Well fare the New Historian of Great Britain; who, having writ without control against miracles, and even the very being of a God, gratefully acknowledges the blessing; and owns that We now enjoy to the full that liberty of the Press which is so necessary.
in every monarchy confined by legal limitations*. Nor is it, let me tell you, the worst part of the observation, that though the Monarch should be confined by legal limitations, yet the Writer for the Press should not.

It would be endless to enter into his Lordship’s small arts of controversy; yet it may not be amiss to touch upon one or two of them, such I mean as are of more general use and best disposed for service.

The first is, To honour the name, when you have taken away the thing: As thus, To express the highest devotion to God, when you have deprived him of his moral attributes;—the greatest zeal for religion, while you are undermining a future state;—and the utmost reverence for revelation, when you have stript it of miracles and prophecies.

2. A second is, To dishonour persons and opinions the most respectable, by putting them into ill company, or by joining them with discredited follies. Thus, Divines and Atheists; Clarkians and Malebranchians, are well paired, and always shewn together: In like manner, the propositions, that the world was made for man, and that man was made for happiness, are to be boldly represented as inseparable parts of the same system. From whence, these advantages follow, that if an Atheist be odious, a Malebranchian mad, and the proposition of the world’s being made for man, absurd; the odium, the madness, and the absurdity fall equally on the Divines, on Dr. Clarke, and on the proposition, that man was made for happiness.

3. A third is, To bring the abuse of a thing in discredit of the thing itself: Thus the visions of the Rabbins are made to confute Judaism; Popery and school-learning, to decry the discipline and doctrine of Christianity: and the dreams of Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Berkeley, to confute the waking thoughts of Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, and Baxter: for his Lordship is just such a confuter of metaphysics, as that man would be of ethics or chemistry, who should content himself with exposing the absurdities of the Stoics, and the whimsies of the Alchemists, and yet fraudulently*

* The History of Great Britain; Vol. I. p. 213.
forget that there are such authors as Cicero and Boer-
haave.—To overturn a future state, he employs all
the superstitious fables of the Poets and the people con-
cerning it: to discredit revelation, he enumerates all
the impostors and pretenders to revelation in all ages:
and to dishonour divine worship, he is very par-
ticular in describing the rites and ceremonies of the
ancient Church of Egypt, and the modern Church of
Rome. In a word, you are sure to find, on these occa-
sions, every sort of topic, but what a sober and intelligent
reader would require; Considerations drawn from the
nature of the thing itself.

You expect, however, that when the abuses of things
have done him this service, so as to stand, where he has
placed them, for the things themselves, he would for
once, at least, spare the authors of the abuse, if it were
only for the sake of carrying on the fraud. But you ex-
pect more than you will find. His Lordship can, in the
same breath, call the abuses of Revelation and the Gospel,
by the names of Revelation and the Gospel, and rail at
that Divine, or at that Church, which has introduced
those abuses.

Thus far, for a specimen of his Lordship’s arts of
controversy. But as a good mimic is commonly a bad
actor, and a good juggler a bad mechanic; so an artful
caviller is as often a very poor reasoner.

You will not be surprised therefore, if, in examining
his Lordship’s philosophic character, under the several
heads of his ingenuity, his truth, his consistency,
his learning, and his reasoning, you find him not
to make so good a figure, as in the professed arts of
controversy.

I. Of his ingenuity, which comes first, I shall be
very short: for his arts of controversy, of which you
have had a taste, are one continued example of it.

1. Speaking of the Christians of the Apostolic age, he
thus represents their character and manners:—“Not-
withstanding the sanctity of their profession, the
greatest crimes, even that of incest, were prac-
tised amongst them.” Is it possible (you ask) that his
Lordship should give credit to the exploded calumnies
of the Pagans and Apostates here alluded to? Think better,
of his sense: he alludes to no such matter. St. Paul is his authority: and on the Apostle's accusation he grounds his charge. This surprises you the more. It may be so: for philosophers, as well as poets, of a certain rank, aim at nothing but (as Bayes expresses it) to elevate and surprise. Who would not conclude from this account that the first Christians, notwithstanding their sanctity, began their profession in a total corruption of manners; and, like the Magi of old, intermarried with their mothers and daughters? It would never be imagined, that the simple fact, as St. Paul states it, in his first and second epistles to the Corinthians, was but barely this, That a certain man (whether before or after his conversion, we know not) had married his father's wife; and, on the Apostle's reprehension, convinced and ashamed of his folly, had repented and made satisfaction to the Church for the scandal he had occasioned.

2. Again, this first philosophy tells us, that when Jesus speaks of legions of Angels, it is the language of Paganism; but when Lord Bolingbroke speaks of numberless created intelligences superior to man, it is the language of Nature; for, this doctrine of intelligences, his Lordship assures us, is founded on what we know of actual existence. We are led to it by plain, direct, unforced analogy. But the doctrine of angelic legions, if you will believe him, stands on no other foundation, philosophically speaking, than of a mere possible existence of such spirits, as are admitted for divers theological uses. But why this different measure for himself and his friends? The last words may let us into the secret. His philosophical intelligences are a very harmless race; but the Gospel legions are much given to theological mischief. Ministering Angels bring in, what he can by no means away with, a particular and moral providence. God's physical providence, and the civil providence of the Magistrate, make the only government he can relish. Now his intelligences, like Epicurus's gods, are still, as they should be, at an idle end; but Angels are busy and meddling; indeed, too headstrong to be trusted under his Lordship's philosophic administration.
You cannot, however, but be pleased to find, that the method of reasoning by analogy, which you had cause to believe his Lordship had totally discarded, from the hard language he has so often bestowed upon it, is brought again into favour, and now does wonders. For, it not only opens the door to his Lordship’s intelligences, by a plain, direct, and unforced application, but, as you will see under the next head, it shuts it against Jesus Christ’s.

3. “I only intend to shew (says his Lordship) that since men have not admitted, in favour of revelation, a system of physics that is inconsistent with philosophic truth, there is no reason for admitting, in favour of the same revelation, a system of pneumaticis that is so too.”

Now the friends of revelation say, this is a mere begging the question. The reasoning, when fairly represented, stands thus—“Divines reject the Scripture system of physics, which they hold to be false; therefore, they should reject the Scripture system of pneumaticis, which his Lordship holds to be false.”—Indeed, they conceive the argument to be no better than if one should say, because politicians, in speaking of the first source of civil regimen, have called it the primum mobile, alluding to the old erroneous system of astronomy; and because they have talked too of a balance of power, alluding to the true principles of mechanics; therefore, if we reject their system of astronomy, we should reject their system of mechanics likewise.

II. Thus much for this noble philosopher’s ingenuity. Give me leave to lead you next and bring you to a place where you may have an advantageous view of his truth, the very soul of philosophy.

1. “The Christian theology (says he) has derived a profane licence from the Jewish; which Divines have rendered so familiar and so habitual, that men blaspheme without knowing they blaspheme, and that their very devotion is impious. The licence I mean is that of reasoning and of speaking of the divine, as of the human, nature, operations, and proceedings; sometimes with, and sometimes without the salvo of those distinguishing
distinguishing epithets and forms of speech, which can, in very few instances, distinguish enough. The Jewish Scriptures ascribe to God, not only corporeal appearance, but corporeal action, and all the instruments of it; eyes to see, ears to hear, mouth and tongue to articulate, hands to handle, and feet to walk. **Divines tell us indeed, that we are not to understand all this according to the literal signification.** The meaning is, they say, that God has a power to execute all those acts, to the effecting of which, these parts, in us, are instrumental. The literal signification is, indeed, abominable; and the flimsy analogical veil, thrown over it, is stolen from the wardrobe of Epicurus; for he taught, that the Gods had not literally bodies, but something like to bodies, quasi corpus: not blood, but something like to blood, quasi sanguinem.

**Divines say, that God has no body nor any thing like to body, but is immaterial.** Epicurus said, that his God had not a gross earthly body, but something like to that body, and was material.” Yet “Divines have stolen their flimsy analogical veil from the wardrobe of Epicurus.” Truly a very subtle theft; which extracts matter from figurative expression! and well suited to his Lordship's legerdemain, which draws an analogical veil out of a metaphor. Indeed, to fit it the better to Epicurus's wardrobe, he makes it but a flimsy one.

But let us now observe the various shifts he was reduced to, in order to support his principal calumny, that Divines stole from Epicurus the method of explaining the nature of the Godhead. He says, when the Jewish Scriptures had given God a body, the Divines found out that it was not to be understood literally. They had been strange Divines had they not found it out, when these Scriptures declare that God is a spirit, or immaterial; in contradistinction to body or matter. And the best of it is, that in other places (as we have seen just before) his Lordship quarrels with the Scriptures on this very account, for their system of pneumatic. Now what could these Divines conclude, but that where the Scriptures describe God's actions, in accommodation to the gross conceptions of men, they are to be understood figuratively? But,
But this would not serve his Lordship's purpose; which was, to convict the Divines of nonsense and prevarication. He, therefore, turns, what every body else calls metaphor, which is a figure of speech, into analogy, which is a mode of reasoning,—a flimsy analogical veil: and Epicurus's analogy (that the Gods had not earthly bodies, but something like them, that is to say, material) he turns into a metaphor. Epicurus (says he) taught that the Gods had not literally bodies. Epicurus's question was not about literal or figurative expression; but about similar and dissimilar things.—But you have enough, you say, of this great restorer of truth, and reformer of reason. I will therefore be as short as possibly I can, on this head.

2. The Jews (his Lordship tells us) suppose cruelty to be one of the attributes of the Deity.—These very Jews themselves say, That the Lord is gracious and full of compassion; slow to anger, and of great mercy: That he is good to all and his tender mercies are over all his works.* That his mercy endureth for ever†: That the earth is full of the goodness and mercy of the Lord‡: That his mercy is from everlasting to everlasting.§—Now, which of them will you believe?

3. "Superstition (says his Lordship) impersonated chance under the name of fortune: and this chimical Divinity was supposed to direct arbitrarily all the events, whose causes were not apparent, or which exceeded in good or ill the expectations of men. The Heathens accounted by it for past events; consulted in about future; and referred themselves to it in doubtful cases. It is strange that such superstitions, instead of being confined to the Heathen world, should have been as prevalent amongst God's chosen people, both Jews and Christians; and should be scarce exploded at this hour. It is stranger still, that a recourse to the decision of chance should be expressly commanded in the Old Testament, and occasionally countenanced in the New, even on so

* Ps. cxlv. 8, 9. † Chron. Jer. Esdras, Psalms, &c.
‡ Ps. xxxiii. 5.—cxix. 64. § Ps. c. 5.—vi. 17.
"important an occasion, as the election of an apostle
in the place of Judas Iscariot."
The assertion, you see, is, 1st, that the Jews and
Christians, as well as the Heathens, impersonated chance under the name of fortune: and, 2dly, that
their having recourse to lots, was having recourse to the
decision of fortune.
As to the first, it is so remote from all truth, That the
custom of the Jewish people, in referring all events to
God, and to him only and immediately, has given a handle
to Spinoza, Toland, and others, to bring in question the
very existence of an extraordinary providence in the
Mosaic dispensation; in which, to observe it by the way,
and with the abhorrence it ought to excite, they have
had too many followers amongst the Divines who have
written against The Divine Legation.
As to the second, we must consider that lots are of
three distinct kinds.
One sort is a civil balloting: of general use in states,
to prevent intrigues and partialities. Sortem posuisse
says Tacitus, ne ambitioni aut inimicitias locus forset.
Another, is a superstitious appeal to the imaginary
deity, chance or fortune.
And there is yet another, which is a reference of the
event to heaven: and this, by God's own direction and
appointment.
Of the second, and only reprehensible sort, Revelation,
as we have just now shewn, is entirely innocent.
Of the first, his Lordship, as a politician, will not dis-
allow the use.
His quarrel, as a philosopher, is with the third. And
he has no way to support his charge, but by sophistically
reducing it into the second; that is, representing it as
having all the superstition of the second. Now in this he
begs the question.—Are the Jewish and Christian Revela-
tions true or false? False, says his Lordship, for several
reasons; and, amongst the rest, for this, they authorize
the Pagan superstition of lots.—What made the
Pagan superstition of lots? Their being the inventions of
men, while they pretended to be of divine appointment.—
Very well: but the Jewish and Christian lots were of
divine appointment. Pretended to be so, if you please.
says his Lordship; and this puts them into the condition of Pagan lots.—Softly, my Lord; your argument must not take that for granted, which your argument is employed to prove.

But his Lordship had his head full of that master-sophism of the first philosophy, which concludes against the reason or justice of a divine commission from the abuse of it; and because subsequent impostors pretended to the like authority. For, according to the logic and theology of these Gentlemen, God must not cast out Devils, because it afterwards gave a handle for Popish Priests to juggle with their exorcisms. He must not direct a thing to be decided by lot, because a village-conjuror would afterwards employ the sieve and shears. He must not make use of human instruments in punishing a people abandoned to unnatural crimes, because an Arabian impositor would afterwards pretend to the like commission. He must not institute a multifarious ritual, though it was to keep a people separate, and to secure them from the contagion of idolatry, because wicked priests or politicians would establish superstitious ceremonies to keep communities enslaved to civil or religious tyrants. These scrupulous Gentlemen, when their hand was in, had done well to tell us, that God should not have given men riches, knowledge, and power, because there have been such as Chartres, Spinoza, and Muly Molech.

But to go on with his Lordship's veracity.

4. He asserts, that they [the Jews] made beasts accountable like moral agents. He is aware that to mitigate this absurdity, as he expresses it, both the Jewish and Christian commentators say, that the pain inflicted on beasts was to shew the heinousness of human crimes—to blot out the memory of a great scandal—to punish the owner for his negligence. But he despises all these solutions, as so many pitiful evasions. Would you believe now that in the same breath, and merely to shew his reading, he should confute his own false assertion? I know nothing more absurd (says he) than this, except a custom or law at Athens. The weapons by which murder had been committed were brought into court; as if they, too, were liable to punishment; and
and the statue that had killed a man by its fall, was by a solemn sentence of that wise people, the Thasii, founded on a law of Draco, cast into the sea. Now what was his Lordship to prove? That Moses was so ignorant a lawgiver, and the Jews so stupid a people, that they made beasts accountable like moral agents. And he illustrates it by a law of the most celebrated legislator and of the politest people upon earth, Draco and the Athenians; who, just in the same manner, made even weapons and statues, moral agents. The Athenians and Draco perhaps would have said, that they enacted these laws to shew their abhorrence of murder, and to punish the careless erecter of a statue at a time, when in some of their cities there were more statues than men. Mere shifts and evasions, says his Lordship.

But what I chiefly wonder at is, that when his Lordship was in so good a train, he had not told us, that the stupidity of these Jews went still further, even to imagine walls and garments subject to human diseases. Here he would have had a little truth on his side, and a much better subject for his contempt. This is only a word to the wise, and for his followers to improve upon. Let them try what they can make of it, and then they may hear further of this matter.

5. Again, "God (says his Lordship) was forced to indulge the Jews in several superstitious prejudices, as learned Divines scruple not to affirm." Had learned Divines no more scruples in affirming, than his Lordship, I should hardly have thought them worth my defending.

What they scruple not to say is this—That idolatrous worship was never so entirely corrupt, but that some of its rites were still rational, or, at least, continued innocent; and might be used in the service of the true God without superstition: that the Israelites being fond of Egyptian ceremonies, God indulged them in the use of such as were harmless; and of no other. For this, his Lordship calls them, bold judges of the principles and views of God's proceedings. But in what does their temerity consist? In teaching, that God always chooses to take the ordinary means, before the extraordinary, when either may be made indifferently to serve

* Levit. xiv.
his purpose. And that, therefore, he saw fit to indulge the Jews in their fondness for old habits; and to turn their propensities for the Egyptian rites, upon such only as were innocent; rather than to give them new habits; and new propensities, by a miraculous impression on their minds, which should overrule their wills and affections.'

6. **We know (says his Lordship) that all their [the Jews] sacred writings were compiled after their captivity.** Balzac speaks of a certain Critic who used to boast, that nobody, besides God and himself, knew the meaning of such or such a verse in Persius. His Lordship's [we know] is just such another revelation. Only the Critic's meaning might be true; but the Philosopher's knowledge is certainly false. A falsehood so notorious, that I am in some doubt whether this stricture belong properly to his dogmatic or to his laconic style. For we know, may signify—*We know that the spurious Esdras says so.* And then he gets the two things he most wanted; a very useful truth, and a very noble authority.

7. "The justice [of the great day] (says his Lordship) "**if it may be called justice, most certainly requires** that rewards and punishments should be measured out, in every particular case, in proportion to the merit and demerit of each individual. But instead of this, it is assumed, conformably to the doctrine of Plato, that the righteous are set on the right hand of the Judge, and the wicked, on the left; from whence, they are transported into Heaven, or plunged into Hell. They are tried individually, they seem to be rewarded or punished collectively, without any distinction of the particular cases, which have been so solemnly determined, and without any proportion observed between the various degrees of merit and demerit, of innocence and guilt, in the application of these rewards and punishments."

*If it may be called justice—Marry, well put in. For who knows but as this is the general day of reckoning, and that men see, such a day will be wanted, rather than be without any, they might be foolish enough to take up with this?—They seem to be rewarded or punished collectively. Should I seriously quote the words of Jesus,
Jesus,—The servant, which knew his Lord's will, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes*. Should I seriously, I say, quote these words, to confute the noble Writer's observation, that men at the great tribunal seem to be rewarded or punished collectively, he would, I suppose, have been amongst the first to laugh at my simplicity; at least, the intelligent reader would not thank me for my diligence.

III. I proceed now to his Lordship's consistency; the next feature in his philosophic countenance. You have seen with what bravery he contradicts all others; you shall now see with what greater bravery he contradicts himself.

There be two things which characterize the reasoning part of his Lordship's writings (if any part of so declamatory a work can be called reasoning), and distinguish them from all other men's; His incessant repetitions; and his incessant contradictions. Indeed, these beauties beget one another. For when a writer can furnish out no better an entertainment than a parcel of groundless flames, he will be much subject to repetition; and every repetition as likely to be graced with a variation; for his tales having neither foundation in fact, nor measure in truth, what is produced for admiration will be always new-modelling for convenience, as best suits his present passions and purposes.

His repetitions I leave for the refreshment of those who are disposed to read him through; this short specimen of his contradictions I propose for the amusement of more cursory readers.

But as professed Answerers never abuse our patience and understandings more than in this kind of discoveries; it may not be amiss, to say a word or two of a species of confutation, which such men are always ready to urge, on the very slightest grounds, for the convenience which attends it; the convenience of making an Author confute himself, when the Answerer is unable so to do.

Sometimes the imaginary inconsistency arises out of the slow conception, or cloudy apprehension, of the answerer.
when the Author is too brief or too refined: sometimes from the less accurate expression of the Author, when the Answerer is too subtle or too captious. It sometimes arises from the Answerer’s prejudices, and sometimes again from the Author’s prevarication.

Nay, which is stranger still, the very exactness of the distinctions, and correctness of the terms (and the correcter and exacter they will be in proportion to the Author’s knowledge of words and things), the more shall the discourse abound with these fancied contradictions. For a heavy or a precipitate Answerer will never be able to distinguish things similar from things identical.

Prejudice for a set of opinions may make an Answerer mistake some things to be in nature, what they are only in the combinations of the schools; and finding them considered differently, that is, under other associations by his adversary, who may have no prejudices, or prejudices of another kind, he will be extreme ready to call these differences, by the more commodious name of contradictions.

Lastly, the Author, if he be a Free-thinker, has a right by ancient custom* to two or three, or indeed, two or three dozen of characters, as may best suit his purpose, or errand: a practice, which, being begun amongst us moderns, under a want of liberty, was continued out of licentiousness, and is still kept up for the sake of its conveniencies. Now if such a one be too lazy to assume a personated character in form, then (as Lord Shaftesbury observes) a dull kind of irony, which amuses all alike, becomes his favourite figure of speech. But with such a Writer, an inattentive or plain-dealing Answerer may give himself much trouble, to collect his contradictions, and all, to be well laughed at for his pains.

I have honestly marked out these various delusions, that you may have it in your power to detect me, should I be tempted to impose upon you, myself. Not that I claim much merit from this fair dealing; for his Lordship’s contradictions are so gross and substantial, so frequent and obvious, that I was under no temptation to make out my specimen by any thing doubtful or ambiguous.

* See Celsus and Porphyry.
1. "I could not (says his Lordship) have discovered, as Newton did, that universal law of corporeal Nature, which he has demonstrated. But further than that, he could go no more than I; nor discover the action of the first cause, by which this law was imposed on all bodies, and is maintained in them." Here he owns attraction not to be a real, or essential property of matter, but the action of the first cause upon it. Yet in another place he observes, that "attraction may be, notwithstanding all the silly abstract reasoning to the contrary, a real property of matter." The truth is, that for anything his Lordship knew of this universal law, attraction might be action, passion, magic, or the man in the moon. He only followed his leaders. Mr. Collins displayed the same philosophic spirit in speaking of gravity, the effect of attraction: and Clarke's animadversion on him will exactly suit his Lordship.—"Not content to have erred so very grossly in the first foundation of all natural philosophy; you could not forbear professing further, that you have often admired that gravitation should be esteemed a matter of such difficulty amongst philosophers; and that you think it to be so evident and necessary an effect of matter in constant motion perpetually striking one part against another, that you wonder every body should not see it. I suppose the rest of the world will no less admire at you, for imagining that, by so slight an admiration you could at once set aside all the propositions in that most excellent book [the Principia of Newton] wherein it is made appear by strictly mathematical demonstrations, drawn from the laws of motion, now agreed on by mathematicians, and established by experiments, and from the phenomena of the heavenly bodies; that the present operations of nature, depending upon gravitation, cannot possibly be mechanical effects of matter in constant motion perpetually striking one part against another.—Upon the whole, all that you have advanced about gravitation is such marvellous reasoning, to be made use of in the present age, after so many great discoveries, founded upon experience, and even mathematical demonstration; that
though I have no cause at all to be displeased with you
for arguing in such a manner; yet, I believe, your
readers cannot but think you might very well have for-
born going out of your way, to give so very disadvan-
tageous a representation of your own philosophy *.

2. In one place, his Lordship tells us, that the right
of the Israelites to the land of Canaan was founded
on the prophecy of Noah: in another, that it was
founded on the promise to Abraham. Second thought
are best. He seems to come a little nearer the truth
here. For though a promise may intitle to a possession,
I do not see how a prophecy can do more than foretell
one: Unless his Lordship has some ethical engine of
a new invention, to extend the grounds of obligation, un-
known to Grotius, Selden, and Cumberland; y et
they travelled for it; and, if we may believe his Lord-
ship's account of their famous journey to Paris, spare
for no room in laying foundations. But, in this affair of
the promise, his Lordship insinuates an untruth; whi ch
is a great deal meaner than to tell one: for he represen
ts the favour as capricious, arbitrary, and without any rea-
sion assigned.

3. "The Jews (says his Lordship) as often as the y
made God descend from heaven, and as much as th ey
made him reside on earth, were far from cloathing
him with corporeity, and imputing corporeal vices to
him." Yet two or three pages forward, so prevale n t
is his lust of abuse, that he expressly says, they did
clothe him with corporeity. These are his words:
"The Jewish scriptures ascribe to God not only cor p o-
real appearance, but corporeal action, and all the in-
struments of it; eyes to see, ears to hear, mouth and
tongue to articulate, hands to handle, and feet to
walk." You will say, perhaps, that his Lordship
meant, the Scriptures indeed ascribed all this to God; but in a figurative, not in a literal, sense. I would have
said so too, but that his Lordship goes on rating the
Divines for understanding this Scripture-representation
in a figurative sense. Which, too, he shews does not
mend the matter; for this figurative sense, it seems, was

* Clarke's Third Defence of the Immateriality and Natural Im-
mortality of the Soul, against Collins.
stolen from Epicurus. Now we know that Epicurus certainly believed the Gods to be corporeal, if he believed any, though made of somewhat a finer stuff than mere mortal bodies. "Divines" (says his Lordship) "tell us "indeed, that we are not to understand all this according. "to the literal signification, &c. But this flimsy theolo-
"gical veil thrown over the literal signification, is stolen "from the wardrobe of Epicurus." His Lordship's 
wardrobe seems to be as rich as Epicurus's, in veils: a 
little after, we have a very curious one, a thin and trite 
veil of analogy: and he is ready to lend them to 
Divines, as Lucullus did his cloaks to the players, by the 
dozens.

But whenever his Lordship speaks of Christianity, 
a kind of fatality attends him; and then his contradictions 
have neither stop nor measure.

4. Speaking of the last supper, he says, "The person "by whom it was instituted is represented sometimes "under images, that render it impossible to frame "any, of the efficacy, or even of the institution of "this sacrament. Christ is a vine, he is a rock, nay he "is a coat, according to St. Paul," &c. And yet no "further off than four pages, he says, "There is no one "[figurative expression] perhaps in the whole Gospel, "less liable to any equivocal sense, than that which "Christ employed when he said, This is my body, and "This is my blood, in the very act of giving bread and "wine to his disciples, who were at supper with him, just "before his death, for a remembrance of which, this "ceremony of a supper was then instituted by him. The "figure was easy, the application natural, and they "could not understand the expression literally."

His Lordship, as you may well think, has often different 
purposes to serve by his contradictions. Here his pur-
pose is one and the same; to discredit a Gospel-institu-
tion: which is equally done by shewing it to be mysterious, 
Obscure, and incomprehensible, where it pretends to 
Clarity and precision; and low, trite, and mean, where it 
pretends to something august, peculiar, and in the 
highest degree efficacious. All the fault in this case, ex-
cept his Lordship's most profound ignorance of the nature
of the rite*, is his bringing these two curious observations so near to one another.

5. "Christianity [says his Lordship] as the Saviour published it, was full and sufficient to all the purposes of it. Its simplicity and plainness shewed that it was designed to be the religion of mankind, and manifested likewise the divinity of its original." This is very gracious. Yet the scene changes with his Lordship: his humour; and the simplicity and plainness now become dark, ambiguous, and incomprehensible. "That there are many ambiguous expressions, many dark sayings, in the Gospel; many doctrines, which reason could never have taught, nor is able to comprehend, now they are taught, cannot be denied."

But let him recover his temper, and Christianity by brightens up with it. "The system of Religion (says he) which Christ published, and his Evangelists recorded, is a complete system to all the purposes of true Religion, natural and revealed. It contains all the duties of the former, it enforces them by asserting the divine mission of the Publisher, who proved his assertion at the same time by his miracles." But it is only restored to be as suddenly deposed. Its birth is so far from being divine, that he insinuates it to be spurious, and neither better nor worse than a kind of bastard Platonism. "It is astonishing to observe the strange conformity between PLATONISM and GENUINE CHRISTIANITY itself, such as it is taught in the original Gospel. We need not stand to compare them here: particularly instances of conformity will occur often enough. I general, the Platonic and Christian systems have very near resemblance, QUALIS DECET ESSE SORORUM." He then goes on to shew, that the common parent of both was not reason, but ENTHUSIASM.

Enthusiasm, you will say, is now fairly brought to be of twins, PLATONISM and CHRISTIANITY. No such matter. GENUINE CHRISTIANITY was taught of God.

* See what is said of it, in "A rational Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper," prefixed to the Author's Sermons.
of Religion: it is in truth the system of natural Religion." Well then we shall hear no more of this sisterly resemblance to Platonism. Perhaps not. But you shall hear, and that soon too, of as good a thing. This Christianity is at last found to be derived from Judaism, that very Judaism, which he had told us, was itself aised on theft and murder—"On the Religion of the Jews, and on the authority of their scriptures, Christianity was founded." Again, "They who prefer the example and doctrine of Christ to those of Paul, will find reason to think that the Messiah intended rather to reform and to graft upon Judaism, than to abolish it." And again; He accuses Paul or preaching a new Gospel, called by the apostle, my Gospel: and this new, or peculiar gospel, his Lordship tells us, was the mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles, so inconsistent with the declarations and practice of Jesus. Yet for all this, had Christ's Gospel been propagated with the same simplicity with which it was originally taught by Christ, it would (he tells us) have been to the unspeakable benefit of mankind."

Let us now sum up his Lordship's instructions to his disciples, concerning the Gospel of Jesus. "It is simple, clear, and of divine original:" but it is, at the same time, "dark, ambiguous, incomprehensible; and like its sister Platonism, the issue of enthusiasm."—As Jesus published it, the Gospel is a complete system of natural religion, and tends to the unspeakable benefit of mankind: but as Jesus published it, the Gospel was only a reform of that imposture Judaism, on which it was founded, and was intended by Jesus to be confined to the Jewish people; it being Paul, who, in direct contradiction to the declarations and the practice of Jesus, turned it into a complete system of natural religion, and made it tend to the unspeakable benefit of mankind, by extending it to the Gentiles. And thus he goes on contradicting his own assertions, as fast as he advances them, from one end of his Essays to the other.

The same self-contradictions, which confute his calumnies against Christianity itself, still follow him when he comes to speak of the propagators of Christianity.
6. "He [says this noble Lord] who compares the "Epistles of James, of Peter, and John, such as we "have them, with those of Paul, and all these with the "doctrines of the Gospel, will be perhaps of my opi- "nion; at least he will have no ground to say of the "three first, that they were authors of new Gos- "pels, as he will have grounds to say of the last, and "as the last does in effect say of himself." What was this new Gospel? It was, as we have seen just before, the mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles. James, Peter, and John, therefore, according to his Lordship, taught not this mystery; so inconsistent, as he says, with the declarations and practice of Jesus. Yet soon after he confesses, that James, Peter, and John, did teach this mystery, and forsook Christ's for Paul's new Gospel. For, speaking of the Council of Jerusalem, he says, The Apostles had given no directions to insist that the Gentiles should or should not submit to circumcision, and to the yokes of the Law: which necessarily implies a concession, that they too were authors of this new Gospel, the mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles. The taking in the Gentiles, we see, he supposes a thing agreed on by all the Apostles: and that, what was yet undone, was the settling the precise terms of their admission.

Our unbelievers look so monstrously asquint upon religion, that prejudice with opposite rays is always disturbing and confounding its own malignant aims. Yet, in general, it requires pains to fix the contradictions which spring out of these fugitive cross lights. Commend me therefore to his Lordship, who brings his contradictions to a point: and requires nothing of you but eyesight to see them in their full glare.

His pro and con then being so near neighbours, we shall not be surprised to find them at last incorporated, as it were, into one another! as in the following instances:

7. "I much doubt [says his Lordship] whether the "Evangelists would understand the Epistles of St. "Paul, though one of them was his scribe."—

It was said of somebody, that he believed against hope: a matter of much mirth to our first philosophy-men,
but what is that, to his Lordship’s greater strength of
mind, who can doubt against certainty! Paul and
Luke agreed to preach the Gospel together: and not
only so, but that Luke’s pen should be employed to
convey their common sentiments and adventures to pos-
session. And yet he questions whether Luke understood
Paul’s Epistles. Somebody, I suppose, when he had
enunced this doubt, might tell him, that one of these
Evangelists was Paul’s companion, his amanuensis and
historian. But the observation was too good to be thrown
away; he therefore adds, with infinite dexterity and ad-
dress—though one of them was his scribe.

8. Again, Speaking of the moral attributes, he
observes, “We make God so much a copy of man, that
we design the worst, as well as the best of our own
features, if I may so say, in our representations of him:
and, as common as it is, no unprejudiced thinking man
can hear, without astonishment, our perfections and
our imperfections imputed to the Divine Being in the
same breath, and by the same men; with this difference
at most, that the former are imputed directly, and the
latter sometimes under the thin and trite veil of
analogy. In a Being thus constituted, they may
well imagine that the moral virtues are the same as
they are in our ideas: and theology may easily deduce,
from his attributes, the characters theology has given
them.”

We cannot, says his Lordship, without astonishment,
see our perfections and our imperfections imputed to
the Divine Being. His astonishment is all a flam.
His very words prove that he well knew imperfections
are not imputed. For when he thus boldly affirms,
they are, he was so twitched in conscience, that he was
forced to add, under the thin and trite veil of analogy:
that is, not imputed. For when Scripture speaks of the
out-stretched arm of God, and his all-seeing eye, does
it impute arms and eyes to God, in the sense it imputes
justice and goodness to him? Yes, says he—under the
thin and trite veil of analogy: i. e. Not in the same
sense. As if we should say, His Lordship affirms
under the thin and trite veil of a denial.
This, Sir, is a very scanty specimen of his Lordship's contradictions. Yet no man appears to be more sensible of the disgrace which contradictions bring upon a writer. For, speaking of the whole College of Apostles, he says, These inconsistent writers talk often a different language on the same subject; and contradict in one place what they have said in another.

IV. His Lordship's profound learning comes next to be considered.

1. The first instance I shall give is fetched from the very penetralia of the first philosophy. "Human knowledge is so entirely and solely derived from actual being, that, without actual being, we should not have even one of those simple ideas, whereof all the complex and abstract notions that turn our heads are composed."

Here, his Lordship cried ἐξικτῆσθαι, and should have sacrificed a bull for his discovery: which informs us of no less a truth than this, that if men had had no being, they would have had no sensation: in other words, that qualities cannot exist without a substance: for if, by actual being he did not take in the Thinker's own, the observation is false: a rational being, though existing singly, will have yet the idea of his own existence. But the observation is every way extraordinary. He supposes our simple ideas to be real; he supposcs our complex and abstract notions to be compounded of the simple ideas; and yet he supposes that the composition has turned our heads. Till now, I understood it was fantastic, and not real knowledge, which turned men's heads. But I forget; His Lordship found the whole world in a frenzy; and then indeed it is hardly worth while to enquire what set them going.

2. "The Pagans [says his Lordship] do not appear to have interpolated the ancient Doctors of Paganism; nor is there any pretence to say that they have imposed any spurious books on the world, under the name of those Doctors."

Orpheus and Mercurius Trismegistus were certainly Pagan Doctors, if ever there were any: and did
his Lordship never hear, that the books, hymns, and poems, under their names, which are come down to us from times preceding Christianity, were Pagan forgeries? I will not insist upon the sibylline oracles, which Cicero assures us had been interpolated (for the Pagans interpolated their very forgeries), because I do not know to what conditions his Lordship confines the Doctorate in the Pagan world, or whether he admits the fair sex to the honour of the hood. However, let us not think him so unlearned as not to have heard of these forgeries. He had both heard of them, and considered them well: and as he is always for putting the saddle on the right horse (as where he loads Divines with Atheism) he charges all these iniquities on the Christians. "It was, says he, to promote the opinion, that all the mysteries of their [the Christians] religion, had been revealed by the writings of Pagan philosophers many centuries before Christ, that so many books were forged under the names of Mercurius Trismegistus, of Hystaspes, of the Sibyls, and perhaps of others." We are got a good way towards doctorating these old women: they are become philosophers, we see. But whether the Christians were the only forgers of Sibylline oracles, must be left to be decided between Tully and his Lordship. The truth is, and who, that understands antiquity, ever doubted of it! that some paganized Christians learnt this trade of forging books, under ancient names, from those whose superstition they had left, but not that spirit of imposture which supported it.

3. "The [Greek] historians, says his Lordship, observing how fond their countrymen were of those who writ fables, turned history into romance; and studied to make their relations marvellous and agreeable, with little regard to truth, in which they were encouraged, after Alexander's expedition into Asia, by the difficulty of disproving any thing they said of countries so remote." A vulgar man, and one of those his Lordship calls, pedants, would have said—before Alexander's expedition: because the difficulty in a great measure ceased after that conqueror had opened, and his successors had kept open, a communication with those remote countries.

4. He
4. He calls Aristotle's logic, "the rules of a dialectic, "that seemed to prove, and did prove indifferently "either in favour of truth or error." Exaggeration is his Lordship's favourite figure of speech: but here it seems carried a little too far; for, not content with saying that Aristotle's rules of syllogising (for that is what he means by the rules of a dialectic) seemed to prove, he will needs add, and did prove. Which shews such a knowledge of syllogism, as needed not the following words to set it off: "It must not (says he) be imagined, "that he who reasons, or seems, rather, to reason closely "and consequentially, has therefore truth always on his "side." I desire to know who ever thought he had, who did not mistake, as his Lordship here seems to do, the art of ranging arguments, for the art of finding them? "Nobody, his master Locke would tell him, can hinder, "but that syllogism, which was intended for the service of truth, will sometimes be made use of against it. "But it is nevertheless on truth's side, and "always turns upon the adversaries of it.*"

5. Speaking of Angels, his Lordship thinks fit to hazard this observation: "There is another cause of this pneu-
"matical madness [the belief of such beings] the "fondness of making man pass for one of those beings "that participated of the Divine nature. This had "long possessed the heathen Theists; and it possessed "the Christians with more advantage."

This seems a demonstration that his Lordship either never read, or at least never understood, an antient Apologist. The truth is, there was not one extravagance in all Paganism, which afforded so much advantage to the primitive Christians, as this fond opinion of the antient philosophers, that the human soul was part or portion of the Divine nature; nor was there any, which they were more solicitous, and for a very important reason†, to expose: they laboured, indeed, with so much warmth, and sometimes with so little discretion, that it hath given a handle for some learned moderns to pretend, that all the antient fathers believed the natural mortality of the

soul*. Well, but if the Christians were not possessed with this fondness, his Lordship will shew you, at least, they might have been possessed with it, and to more advantage too. But this part of his Lordship's philosophic character, his argumentation, I am not yet come to. However, as we are now upon the borders of it, you may not think it amiss to have it ushered in with this curious reason, which is to shew, that the impious notion of the human soul's participating of the Divine nature, possessed, or at least might have possessed, the Christians with more advantage, than it did the heathenists. Now, what do you think it is? You will hardly guess. It is, because Christians are wont to assume that man is compounded of body and soul.

Well, it must needs be allowed, that till we assume, man has a soul, we can never be possessed with an opinion that his soul participates of the Divine nature. So much then is admitted, that since Christians hold, man is composed of soul and body, they may be possessed with advantage. But how it should be with more advantage, than the Heathens, I cannot comprehend. Did not the Heathens as well as Christians hold that man was composed of soul and body? We need not, I think, any other proof than this notion of participation, imputed to them: for they could not, sure, be so absurd to hold that nothing might participate of something. However, of this I will not be over-positive, since his Lordship tells us, they all laboured under an incurable pneumatical madness.

V. Such an escape of his Lordship's logic must needs awaken us to expect great things from this last capital accomplishment of the philosopher, his art of reasoning: to which we are now arrived.

1. He will prove against Locke, that the notion of spirit involves more difficulty or obscurity in it than the notion of body. Nay, he says he will make Locke prove this against himself, that we have more and clearer primary ideas belonging to body, than we have of those belonging to immaterial spirit. And thus he argues: "Primary ideas are the ideas of such qualities as exist always in the substance to which they belong."

*See Dodwell on this subject.*
whether they are perceived or no. They are therefore essential to it, and productive, by their operations, of those secondary qualities which may be said only to exist in our perceptions of them. Of the first sort are solidity and extension, to mention no others, the primary qualities, and in our ideas the essence of matter, of which we can frame no conception exclusively of them. These notions I have taken from Mr. Locke, and they lead me to ask what the primary ideas are of spirit or immaterial substance? The primary idea, of the essence of it, is thought; as body is the extended. ed, this is the thinking substance, says Des Cartes. Thought then, actual thought, is the essence of the soul or spirit, and, by consequence, so inseparable from it, that we cannot conceive the soul or spirit to exist separately from, or exclusively of, thought. But this I know to be untrue: and I may well own since Locke has owned the same, that I have one of those dull souls that does not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas.

You will naturally suspect him of foul play, when you find him employing the language of one Philosopher, to confute the sentiment of another. He is confuting Locke's assertion concerning the equal evidence of the primary qualities of body and spirit; and he takes Des Cartes's definition of the primary qualities of spirit, to make good his point. In plain truth, he puts the change upon us: he uses thought, or actual thinking, for the faculty of thinking. It is this last, which is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it: it is this last, which being a power, is fitly predicated of an agent; as extension, which is a property, is fitly predicated of a patient. It is this last, which Locke understood to be the primary idea of a spirit or immaterial substance, when he said that the notion of spirit involves no more difficulty nor obscurity in it than that of body: and it is this last, of which it may be truly said, that we cannot conceive the soul or spirit to exist separately from, or exclusively of it.

2. His Lordship owns, that it is above humanity to comprehend that virtue, whatever it be, whereby one being acts upon another, and becomes a cause. Whatever
Whatever knowledge (says he) we acquire of apparent causes, we can acquire none of real casualty: by which, I mean, that force, that power, that virtue, whatever it be, by which one being acts on another, and becomes a cause. We may call this by different names, according to the different effects of it; but to know it in its first principles, to know the nature of it, would be to know as God himself knows, and therefore will be always unknown to us in causes that seem to be most under our inspection, as well as in those that are the most remote from it.

Would you believe, now, that it was but just before, in this very Essay, that for want of this knowledge (which yet to affect even in causes that seem to be most under our inspection, would be to affect knowing as God himself knows) he denies the soul to be a substance distinct from body. "They (says he) who hold the hypothesis of two distinct substances, must explain in some tolerable manner, which they have not yet done, the union and mutual action on one another, of unextended and extended beings, or else deny the absolute existence of any thing extrinsical to the mind." That is, those who hold the hypothesis of two distinct substances, must either do that which he holds no Being but the Omniscient can do; or they must run mad; or (which I think is something worse) they must give themselves up to his Lordship's direction.

He employs the same arms to combat inspiration; and with the same advantage. The notion of inspiration is idle and visionary, because "He has no more conception of this supposed action of the divine, on the human mind, than he has of the inspiration by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and Son, according to the decision of the council of Florence." That is, he rejects inspiration, because he does not comprehend that virtue by which one being acts upon another, and becomes a cause; although he owns none but God can comprehend it.

But his argument against the existence of the soul, and the reality of inspiration, is doubly faulty. For, as it is the height of extravagance to reject a revealed truth, because the proposition in which it is contained is unaccompanied
unaccompanied with that explanation of the cause, of which our faculties are incapable; so is it no small degree of unreasonableness and folly to reject such truth, because the proposition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of which our faculties are capable.

3. His Lordship endeavours to shew, that a future state was not the sanction of the law or religion of Nature. And thus he sets about it. "Sanctions must be contained in the law to which they belong; they must be a part of it. In their promulgation, they must precede, as the law does, necessarily, all acts of obedience, or disobedience to it—they must be as public—These conditions are essential, there can be no sanction without them. And therefore the rewards of a future state, which have not these conditions, are no sanctions of the natural law. Reason and experience, that taught men this law, shewed them the sanctions of it. But neither of them pointed out these. Have we any grounds to believe, that they were known to the antediluvian world? Do they stand at the head or tail of the seven precepts given to the sons of Noah? Were they so much as mentioned by Moses?"

Can you forbear laughing? Had he found a future state in the seven precepts of Noah, or in the books of Moses, be assured he would have employed this lucky circumstance to prove, that a future state was not the sanction of the law of nature, but of a positive law, or of a pretended revelation, only. For in the beginning of this very section, he has attempted to prove it was the sanction of positive law, from its being found in the Gospel. "God (says he) has given a law, the law of nature and reason, to all his human creatures: the sanctions of it are a natural tendency of virtue to the happiness, and vice to the misery, of mankind—They are imperfect—to supply the imperfection [revelation pretends that] there must be necessarily some further sanctions of this law, and these are the rewards and punishments reserved to a future state. Here is ample room for reflections." In truth there is: but as they would make so little for the
credit of his Lordship's learning, his followers will not
be offended with me for not pursuing them.

4. He tells us, that the worship of the one true
God was not the first religious worship.—The Bible
says it was. No matter for that. The Bible is a far-
rage of inconsistencies. "Methusalem saw both Adam
and Noah, to both of whom God revealed himself in
his unity. Shem, the son of Noah, lived even to the
days of Abraham. Need I stay to shew how im-
possible it is for any man in his senses to believe
that a tradition derived from God himself, through so
few generations, was lost amongst the greatest part
of mankind; or that polytheism and idolatry were
established on the ruins of it in the days of Serug,
before those of Abraham, and so soon after the De-
lude? I should think it impossible even for the Jews
to themselves to swallow so many fables and so many
anachronisms. Since the unity of God was not uni-
versally taught in those early days, it was not so re-
vealed, nor preserved in the manner assumed." This
account, therefore, he tells us, is inconsistent with
itself. Now the utmost that prejudice in its senses can
make of it is an improbability: and this improbabi-
ity, his Lordship himself, but two pages afterwards, is
so good to remove. He delivers it as a general truth,
that "the vulgar easily embrace polytheism and ido-
latry, even after the true doctrine of the divine unity
has been taught and received; as we may learn from
the example of the Israelites: and superstitions grow
apace, and spread wide, where Christianity has
been established and is daily taught, as we may
learn from the example of the Roman churches."

Now, Sir, I argue thus. If amongst the Israelites,
idolatry and superstition so easily, so frequently, and so
instantaneously succeeded, to the worship of the true God,
and needed such severe punishments to bring men back
again to reason, in a place where many extraordinary
helps were provided to keep them in their duty; and if,
amongst Christians, idolatry and superstition grow apace
and spread wide where the true doctrine of the unity
is daily taught; how can we wonder that, in the few
generations from Adam to Serug, polytheism and ido-
latry
latriy should establish themselves on the ruins of the unity; as this happened in an age, where we hear of no other provision for the truth than the long lives of the Patriarchs; and Methusalem’s seeing both Adam and Noah? If you deny this to have been the case of Jews and Christians, his Lordship tells you, you are out of your senses: if you own this to have been the case of the Antediluvians, you are out of your senses still. What is to be done? There is but one way; which is, subscribing to his Lordship’s unerring wisdom.

But I have something more to say of this pretended inconsistency.—Can any man in his senses believe that a tradition, derived from God himself, should be lost in so few generations, and so soon after the deluge?—How few, and how soon, I beseech your Lordship? I am not captious: I have a special reason for asking. The chronology of this period is not uniform or constant; there is a wide difference in the several Bible-accounts: so that I suspect foul play as well as inaccuracy, in your thus putting us off with the vague reckoning of, so few, and, so soon.

To be plain, though the Hebrew copy make it no more than three hundred years from the Deluge to Abraham; yet the Septuagint, and Josephus, reckon about a thousand: time more than sufficient to sink the greatest part of mankind into idolatry and polytheism, so early as the days of Serug. And here lies the difficulty: the best chronologers agree in preferring the Septuagint and Josephus, to the Hebrew copy—But I forget myself: his Lordship has “a thorough contempt for the whole business of the learned lives “of Scaliger, Bochart, Petavius, Usher, and “Marshall:” to whom (he says) the whole tribe of scholars bow with reverence, and consequently he must have the same contempt for chronology; which, indeed, he has shewn on more occasions than one; but never to so much advantage, as where he seems to have supposed that Livy and Tacitus flourished before Virgil.*

But this by the way only. My business with his Lord-

* See Dr. Newton’s learned and judicious Dissertations on the Prophecies, p. 33.
ship at present lies in another quarter. For, having, in his attempt to shew that the worship of the one true God was not the first religious worship, thrown the Bible out of the account, he goes on in this manner: "If the inconsistency of this account makes us reject it, we shall find less reason to believe, on the authority of profane traditions, that the unity of God was the primitive faith of mankind. Revelations to the Father and to the Restorer of the whole human race might have established this faith universally: but without revelation it could not be that of any one people, till observation and meditation—till a full and vigorous exercise of reason made it such." The reasoning is truly admirable. The supposed fact, as we find it in antiquity, stands thus. The Bible tells us, that the worship of the true God was the first religious worship; general tradition says the same. Between these two testimonies there is a natural and strong connexion; the tradition appearing to rise out of the truth of the written word; for, as his Lordship well observes, nothing but a revelation could establish this faith universally, not even amongst one people, till observation and meditation had made it familiar to them. Here you have the fact proved in the strongest manner a fact can be proved; by the concurrence of two witnesses, coming from different quarters, and strangers to each other's evidence; which yet not only agree, but mutually support one another. What would you more?—Hold a little, says his Lordship. This boasted connexion is not real, but imaginary: sacred history concerning a revelation is not to be believed, because inconsistent: profane tradition is not to be believed, because without revelation the unity of God could not be the first faith of any one people. Thus stands his Lordship's reasoning, or thus, at least, it would stand, had he urged it to the best advantage. And to this, I reply, first, that his Lordship, in calling the Bible account inconsistent, is guilty of an abuse of words: that, all which his own premisses infer is only an improbability; and this improbability likewise, he himself fairly contradicts and confutes. Secondly, He infers inconsequentially in supposing that from the inconsistency of a certain relation
concerning revelation, there never was any revelation at all. But though this be no proof that revelation was not, yet an universal tradition that the primitive faith was, the doctrine of the unity (which doctrine, in his Lordship's reckoning, could come in no other way than by revelation) may be a very good proof that it was. But I go farther, and, in defence of the Bible-account, observe, That, if what he says be true, that observation and meditation, and a full and vigorous exercise of reason, are necessary for the gaining the knowledge of the unity in a natural way, and that these qualities are long a coming, then it is highly probable, that the want of this observation and meditation, when the unity was revealed to the first man, might have been the occasion of the speedy loss of it. He expressly tells us, that this truth has been subject to as sudden revolutions, in the times of Judaism and Popery, when men were in full possession of it, with all their observation, meditation, and vigorous exercise of reason, at the height; and twenty other advantages to boot.

But his Lordship's general management of this question, of the first religious worship, should not be overlooked, though it belong properly to another head. He discusses the point at large, in two several dissertations: each of which is so well qualified, and so fitly accommodated to the other, that the second is a complete confutation of the first. How this came about, is not unworthy the Reader's notice. His Lordship does things in order. He had it first of all in his purpose to discredit the Mosaic account of the Creation: and Moses representing the worship of the true God as the original religion, he set himself to prove that Moses was both a fool and a liar. Soon after, he had another prophet to bring into contempt, the prophet Isaiah, who informs us, that the Jews were the only nation under heaven which had the worship of the one God. A truth which Eusebius has taken upon his word*. His Lordship will shew that neither do they deserve any credit. And then he ransacks all the dark corners, not of antiquity, but of those moderns who have rendered antiquity still darker: in which he succeeds so well, as to persuade

himself that the world, many ages before the foundation
of the Jewish republic, had the knowledge of the one
God; nay, that there was no time so early in which the
one God was unknown. In a word, he overturns, as
we said, and very completely too, every thing he had
written on the same subject, in the other dissertation,
against Moses. But as all this is directly levelled at the
author of The Divine Legation, I leave that writer to
do his own argument justice as he shall find himself
able.

5. In the mean time, I proceed to give you one of his
Lordship’s palmary arguments against revelation.

“Can he be less than mad, who boasts a revelation
superadded to reason, to supply the defects of it, and who superadds reason to revelation to supply the defects of this too, at the same time?

This is madness, or there is no such thing
incident to our nature.”

Now as every man, who believes revelation, was in
these circumstances, his Lordship (and reason good) con-
cluded the madness to be universal; and none but himself in his senses: and standing thus alone he has
thought proper to give us frequent notice of this extra-
ordinary case, Insanire me aiunt, ultro cum ipsi insan-
niant. But if he will needs reduce us to this sad alterna-
tive, I shall make no scruple to vindicate our common
nature, be it never so much at his Lordship’s expence.
For, as to the body of mankind, who “hold that reve-
lation was superadded to reason, to supply the defects
of reason; and that reason was at the same time
superadded to revelation, to supply the defects of
revelation;” I am so far from seeing in them any of
those unfavourable symptoms, his Lordship speaks of,
that I think, whoever had done otherwise, had deserved
(at least, on the principles of his Lordship’s rigid justice)
to be sent to Bedlam. Indeed some, for so doing, have
been actually sent thither. For what, for the most part,
are the religious inhabitants of that place, but such, who,
having superadded revelation to supply the defects of
reason, would not superadd reason to supply the defects
of revelation; but were for making the laws of
the Gospel the sole rule of all civil as well as of all

religious
religious measures: in other words, such as were grown outrageously fanatical.

Let us consider how the case truly stands. The religionist, his Lordship says, becasts, that revelation was superadded to reason, to supply the defects of reason. Very well. Reason then is the foundation, and revelation the superstructure. Revelation meddles not with the work of reason, but supplies us with new truths, where reason stops short. And why was this done?—For the sake of an adequate rule of life. Is reason alone this rule?—Then the superstructure of revelation was not wanted. Is revelation alone the rule?—Then reason was built upon no purpose. The adequate rule therefore is composed of both. But if so, When revelation has been added to reason to supply the wants of reason, must not reason he added to revelation to supply the wants of revelation? Must not two things, thus related, be mutually applied to the aid of one another's insufficiencies? Reason is the base; revelation is the upper-building. It is owned, the upper-building is necessary to perfect the base: must it not be owned, that the base is as necessary to bear the upper-building?

But, (what is more) it is the gospel itself, and not artificial theology, as his Lordship pretends, which gives us this direction. For the Gospel being to serve (as is confessed) for a superaddition to the first building of natural religion, it delivers no complete system of moral law (for which it is so often reproached by his Lordship), because the general parts of that system are to be found in natural religion. To supply this defect, if it be one, St. Paul has pointed out an expedient—the study of natural religion; from whence, together with the Gospel, such a complete system may be collected. "Finally, "Brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things "are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever "things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever "things are of good report; if there be any "virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things."

This then is the scheme of true Christianity. It superadds revelation to reason, to supply the defects of it; and superadds reason to revelation, to supply...
the defects of this too at the same time. And can any thing be more rational than such a scheme?

Indeed, was revelation only a republication of the religion of nature, his Lordship's charge, though extravagantly urged, would appear to have some foundation. For then revelation must be supposed to be the religion of nature, restored and perfected; and then to recur back to natural religion to rectify revelation, after revelation had been introduced to rectify natural religion, would have, though none of the marks of madness, which consists in arguing consequentially from false principles, yet great symptoms of folly, which consists in arguing like his Lordship, from the true. But he owns Christianity to be founded on the principle of redemption. Indeed he is as variable in this, as in most other points, and as often represents it to be a republication of the religion of nature: when he chooses to employ the gentler method of extirpation, the explaining it away, it is then a republication: when, the rougher and directer method of exposing it to contempt, it is then founded in the doctrine of redemption. Therefore, as we have all along made the best of his contradictions, c'en let him do the same; for it seems not fit, he should be deprived of any advantages of his own procuring.

Let us set his Lordship's argument in another light; and turn from his philosophic to his legislative character; and suppose him to reason thus, (for change but the terms, and the reasoning will hold just as well in civil as in theologic matters). "Can he be less than "mad, who boasts a system of civil laws superadded to "the natural, to supply the defects of it; and who "superadds the natural to the civil, to supply the de "fects of this too, at the same time?" Now look, what figure the Politician would make, who should thus instruct his pupils, even such does our noble Theologian make in dictating to all mankind.

Amongst the numerous absurdities in this famous argument, I don't know if it be worth while to take notice of one in the expression; for as it seems not to be committed with design, it hardly deserves the name of a sophism; and that is, the repetition of the word super-
ADD: for though revelation may be superadded to reason, yet reason can never be said to be superadded to revelation, how closely soever it may be joined with it; because the two systems can never become top and bottom in their turns, after it has been owned that one is the foundation, and the other the superstructure.

6. Another of his Lordship's general objections to revelation, is as follows:

"It is not, in any degree, so agreeable to the notions of infinite wisdom, that God should deal out his revelations by parcels, instead of making a system of moral law, when he created moral agents, that might answer his whole purpose, in all circumstances of time, place, and persons; just as he made a physical system of laws for the other part, the inanimate part of his creation."

Now with his Lordship's good leave, I am bold to think the contrary the more probable; and that too, on those very principles of analogy, which his Lordship employs, to prove it less so. He argues against the likelihood of God's giving the moral law in parcels, because the physical law was given at once. This plainly proceeds on a supposition that the nature of the two systems is the same; and that there is the like constancy and regularity in the moral as in the physical; or the like irregularity in the physical as in the moral: For unless there be the same tendency to order, or to disorder, in two general systems, the means of governing them can hardly be the same. But in these two systems, obedience to their respective laws is far unlike: passive matter (the subject of the physical) obeys, with small irregularities, the laws impressed upon it by its Creator; but an active mind (the subject of the moral) is perpetually deviating from that rule of right which the Governor of the World prescribed for its observance. The method therefore of governing in the two systems must needs, according to all our ideas of wisdom, be very different. And this difference, which our senses tell us has been observed, is that which natural reason teaches us to conclude, should be observed; namely, to a physical system (whose subject would constantly and invariably obey) a law given at once; and to a moral system
(whose subject inclined it to frequent deviations) a law given in parcels; which might, from time to time, reform the disorders as they arose.

But the folly, in thus embarrassing ourselves about the fit ordinance of God's dispensations, has its source in a madness that his Lordship perhaps least suspected, and which yet he was most concerned to guard against; the madness of supposing that Eternal Wisdom needed the aid of our contrivance to make things as they should be.

7. I shall conclude my specinnen with some of his Lordship's more particular objections to the Bible.

Speaking of the civil punishment of idolatry, under the Jewish theocracy, he says, "God himself was the legislator. The citizens, therefore, of that commonwealth, who apostatized, were proceeded against as traitors and rebels, guilty of no less than high treason. Let it be so. The objections of injustice and cruelty to those laws will remain in their full force, and be of more weight to prove them human, than all these hypotheses to prove them divine. God was King, and idolatry was no less than high treason; no objection therefore can lie against the punishment of it. None certainly; but every objection to the manner and degree in which this punishment was to be inflicted, stands good."

Here his Lordship, to make amends, as it were, for his frequent denial of the truth, without understanding the question, has for once ventured to agree to it, upon the same terms. It had been said, "that as God was King of the Jews, idolatry was high treason." To this, his Lordship condescends. But to shew us how well he understood the principle on which it stands, he affirms, that God's being their legislator, made idolatry high treason. As if the barely giving laws to a people conferred the magistracy on the giver: or as if there could be high treason against any but the magistrate. But you shall see more of his talent for philosophic politics, if it fall in my way (as perhaps it will) to speak of his abilities in his own trade. It is his reasoning on the subject, not his general knowledge of the case (things rarely to be found together in his Lordship's Essays) that I now propose to examine.
You observe then, he owns idolatry, in Judæa, to be high treason; and the punishment of it (which is everywhere capital) to be just. But the manner and degree of that punishment he pronounces, both unjust and cruel. Was this like a philosophic legislator! — When the question is of the justice or injustice of a public law, every man of common sense, and endowed with the instinctive knowledge of right and wrong, may pass a true judgment on it; because it stands on the unalterable nature of things; in human laws, on the relation between magistrate and subject; in divine laws, on the relation between God and man; and in a system of laws, like the Mosaic, both on one and the other, in conjunction. Now his Lordship, in passing judgment on the case upon these principles, pronounces the law against idolatry to be right and equitable. What can be more honourable for this part of the Jewish system? It is Lord Bolingbroke who decrees in favour of it; and is here aided, which he rarely is, by the plainest and clearest principles of common sense. Hold, says his Lordship; take this along with you, Though no objection can lie against the punishment, yet every objection lies against the manner and degree of it.

Let us see, then, whether this stands upon the same plain and clear principles with the other.

To judge truly of the manner and degree of a punishment, I apprehend, more is required than to judge of the punishment itself. It requires an intimate acquaintance with the people to whom this law against idolatry was given; a knowledge of their manners, tempers, dispositions, prejudices, and situation; in a word, of a thousand other circumstances, which none but the lawgiver himself could perfectly understand; certainly, not this Politician of yesterday. So that, it appears, the justice or injustice of the manner and degree of a punishment is not determinable on those simple and obvious principles which shew the justice or injustice of the punishment itself, but on other considerations which determine of right and wrong from many shifting circumstances; from the degree of temptation in the object; from the degree of prejudice in the subject; of propensity to the crime; of malignity to the system; and from other various connexions.
connexions, of which only those who are perfect in the knowledge of ancient manners in general, and of the Jewish people's in particular, can form any reasonable ideas.

This is enough to shew the folly of cavilling at the manner and degree of the punishment of idolatry, after the punishment itself is allowed to be just and right. But this is not all; the very allowance of the punishment implies a presumption in favour of the manner and degree. The punishment of idolatry, a punishment which could take place in no system of government but the Mosaic, is, when examined on plain and clear principles, found to be just: admit now, the manner and degree of it to be doubtful for want of knowledge sufficient to shew us the necessity, and consequently the justice of them. Is it not fair to infer, that the lawgiver, who so wisely and equitably observed the rule of justice in the punishment itself, observed it likewise in the manner and degree of the punishment?

This, as to the general meaning, of the manner and degree of a punishment. But, if I be not mistaken, this manner and degree here insisted on have a peculiar reference to his Lordship's own system of divinity and politics. I suppose, his principal objection to the manner might arise from the punishment's being inflicted by the civil justice of the state, and not by the immediate hand of God. But he should have considered, that the law all along distinguishes between the crimes capable of legal conviction, and such as were inscrutable to all but Omniscience. The latter, God reserves for his own inquisition*: but the crime in question was an overt-act of idolatrous worship, and therefore came reasonably and equitably before the civil tribunal.—His cavil at the degree comes next to be considered. Its being simply capital was not, I believe, that for which his Lordship imputed injustice and cruelty to it. The being attended with confiscation, as in the case of Naboth, was what seems principally to have incurred his displeasure. But in a case, where his Lordship was personally prejudiced, he should have mistrusted his own judgment; he should have examined the force of those arguments, by

* See Div. Leg.
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which a great lawyer had lately evinced, that forfeiture for high treason is perfectly just and equitable.

8. The noble Lord, haranguing on the conditions of historical authenticity, delivers this, for one of the chief, but the facts, the principal facts at least, be confirmed by collateral testimony. By collateral testimony (says he) I mean the testimony of those who had no common interest of country, of religion, or of profession; to disguise or falsify the truth.

This condition of historical authenticity will be easily agreed to; as well as his definition of collateral testimony; and the quotations of Josephus and Eusebius, from Egyptians, Phenicians, Chaldeans, and Greeks, will without doubt be urged by the defenders of religion, as such collateral testimony, where the witnesses had no common interest of country, of religion, or of profession, to disguise or falsify the truth.—Pardon me, says his Lordship, “Josephus indeed attempts to support his history [the Bible] by collateral testimonies, those of Egyptians, Phenicians, Chaldeans, and even Greeks. But these testimonies, were they never so full to his purpose, would cease to be collateral testimonies, by coming through him, who had a common interest of country and religion to disguise and to falsify the truth.”

This seems a little hard, that, when our advantages of defence are, in his Lordship’s opinion, so rare, the few we have should be lost the very moment they are gained. Josephus has no sooner seized this important mark of historical authenticity, but it slips through his fingers as he is urging it; and, what is still more extraordinary, because he urges it. The book of life and the seat of life, it seems, have this property in common—

“Like following life through creatures you dissect,
You lose it in the moment you detect.”

For, as Tully well observes, all human things are given to change. “Corpora nostra non novimus. “Itaque
male ipsi, quorum intercerat ea nosse, aparuerunt ut vivi erentur: nce to tamen aint Empirici notiora
esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta et detecta,
nullentur.”

But
But to canvass this wonderful reasoning a little closer; let us make a supposition, or rather, let us lay down a fact, that Apion, like his Lordship, had insisted on this very condition of historical authenticity; and that Josephus, who defended the Bible against his cavils, took him at his word, and agreed to put the issue of the debate on that circumstance; and thereupon produced the testimony of Egyptians, Phenicians, Chaldeans, and even Greeks, to support the sacred story. Thus far, his Lordship will allow, matters went glibly on, and the argument had its proper efficacy. Josephus quoted from the works of Pagan writers, transmitted to him through the hands of Pagan readers; and being engaged with a clear-sighted adversary, without doubt, quoted fairly. The historical authenticity of the Bible therefore was established on the terms his adversary required. How then comes it to pass, that an argument which was once conclusive, has now lost its force? What was truth in that age must be allowed to be truth in this; or not only the authenticity, but the very being of history will become precarious. Do these Pagan testimonies, in running through the channel of Josephus, become polluted, as soon as the original books cease to exist? No, says his Lordship; but they may be suspected. On what account, I pray? Could he prove that Josephus burnt them; or was aiding in their destruction; or had fore-knowledge of their loss; his Lordship might then indeed have some reason to suspect. But to talk of suspicion, merely because Josephus was interested that the quotation should be to his purpose, is so vague a cavil, as shows the objector will never be at a loss for an evasion. Were the originals still in being, he would then suspect that these passages had been foisted in by some Jewish or Christian impostor; at least, by somebody or other, who had a common interest of country, of religion, or of profession, to disguise or falsify the truth. In short, he would suspect all the world sooner than his own power to impose upon us.

To shew you, this is said neither at random nor in malice, consider his Lordship's conduct where this collateral testimony is circumstanced in the manner he himself requires. The defenders of religion say that the Pentateuch,
PENTATEUCH, which represents Moses as the leader and legislator of the Israelites, is supported by that evidence which his Lordship calls collateral. What says his good Lordship to this? "Be it so, that the Israelites had a leader, and legislator called Moses is proved by the consent of foreign, whom I call collateral evidences. But surely it will not follow, that this man conversed with the Supreme Being face to face, which these collateral witnesses do not affirm." Thus, you see, these collateral evidences will always be rejected, whether they tell their story viva voce, or whether their depositions be taken down by such who avail themselves of their testimony. — But, they do not say that this man conversed with the Supreme Being face to face. Would his Lordship have believed them, if they did? Why, no, says he, my faith goes no further than to civil facts; and I must needs reckon such tales amongst the miracles of the Greek and Roman historians. Very well, my Lord. And does not this shew, that if the collateral evidence speak, but to Moses's legislation and civil rule, they speak to every thing they are called for, in support of Scripture against such writers as your Lordship. To illustrate the case: It is doubted, for instance, whether Livy gives us a true account of such or such a campaign between Hannibal and the Roman generals. Polybius, Plutarch, and Appian, being Greeks, are produced as collateral evidences; but they speak not a word of those prodigies which the Roman historian relates at large.

9. But his hate to Moses is immortal: notwithstanding all his Lordship's pretended contempt of him, as a legislator, it looks as if, in his heart, he thought him a very formidable rival. Archbishop Tillotson had attempted to defend the authenticity of his writings, on this postulatum, that the unbeliever would only give the same credit to them, which he gives to every civil history. His Lordship owns the demand to be reasonable; and is willing to try his brother legislator, on these terms. In order to this, he observes, "That one condition of the authenticity of any human history, and such alone (says he) we are to consider in this place; that it contains nothing repugnant to the experience of mankind. Things repugnant to this exper-
rience are to be found in many that pass however for
"authentic; in that of Livy, for instance: but then
"these incredible anecdotes stand by themselves, as it
"were, and the history may go on without them. But
"this is not the case of the Pentateuch, nor of the other
"books of the Old Testament. Incredible anecdotes
"are not mentioned seldom and occasionally in them:
"the whole history is founded on such, it con-
"sists of little else; and if it were not a history
"of them, it would be a history of nothing."

The unbeliever's objection to the authenticity of the
Bible as a civil history, is, that it is full of miracles:
and, supposing the defender of revelation ready to reply;
"So likewise is the history of Livy; and yet that does
"not destroy its credit;" his Lordship obviates the reply
extremely well: "There is an essential difference,"
(says he) "between the incredible anecdotes of Moses
"and of Livy. The Roman Historian's miracles are
"detached pieces; they make no part of the subject, and
"are extraneous to it: but the miracles of the Jewish
"Writer are intimately related to all the civil affairs, and
"make a necessary and inseparable part; the whole
"history is founded on them. Take away Livy's
"miracles, and the train of civil events goes on just as
"well without them; take away Moses's, and his
"history becomes a heap of confusion, or, more properly,
"it is a history of nothing."

I am proud of any opportunity to acknowledge the
obligations which learning or religion have to his Lord-
ship; I only wish the occasions had been more frequent.

In a word, his Lordship's observation on the difference
between the miracles in Moses and in Livy, is solid
and masterly. And this difference, let me observe, is
a certain mark, though not of that civil authenticity
which the good Archbishop's argument requires, yet of
that divine original which the scriptures arrogate to
themselves.

It is the specious, but trite, objection of infidelity
against the miracles recorded in the Bible, that those
remote ages were full of prodigies and portents. "Why,
"then, says the Freethinker, should we believe the in-
"credible anecdotes of Moses, rather than those of
"Livy?"
"Livy?" For a very good reason, replies his Lordship, we find them in a history essentially different from that of Livy. Take away his miracles, together with all those of the other Pagan historians, and the story stands just as it did. But take away the Bible miracles, and you reduce the civil part of the relation to a state of inexplicable confusion.

Again, one of the least hackneyed, and indeed least futile observations, I have ever heard urged against the Bible (and it has been urged to me), is the want of a necessary connexion between the civil and the miraculous parts of that history. Here again his Lordship comes in; in support of revelation, and says, that this necessary connexion is evident to all, for that nothing can be made of the civil part if you take away the miraculous. Which sure is a connexion of some strength.

Thus has his Lordship, before he was aware, in attempting to destroy the civil authenticity of the Bible; supported its divine original. And this good, though undesigned, ought however to be acknowledged. But you may think, perhaps, that a matter of this importance is not here sufficiently developed. Without doubt, it is not. This is a long story; and as I pretend to have supplied this desideratum, The want of a connexion between the miraculous and civil part of the sacred history, I shall refer you to the proper place, where it is to be found.

In the mean time, give me leave to go on with his Lordship; and proceed to the proposition itself, That the miracles recorded in the Bible destroy its credit as a civil history. Now this I apprehend to be a pure piece of chicane. Let us see how the matter stands between the Archbishop and his Lordship.

Believers say, the Bible-History is the history of a dispensation really divine: Unbelievers say, it is the history of one only pretended; and endeavour to support their assertion, by shewing it to have the civil marks of falsehood and imposture. Here the Archbishop steps forward, and offers to try the authenticity of the Bible on the standard of a civil history. Agreed, replies his Lordship; And what say you to miracles? Say?

Why, that miracles are out of the question; and some not
into consideration till the divine authority be contended for. When we agreed to consider the Bible as a civil history only, it was not for truth's, but for argument's sake. If we held the writers of it to be mere civil historians, the miracles, recorded in it, might be fairly urged against us; and urged with advantage, if indeed there be that difference between them and Livy's, which is pretended. But we hold the writers were indeed inspired: and you, my Lord, have shewn us, by that difference, to justify the miraculous part, whenever their inspiration becomes a question between us. In the mean time, stick to your point; and never fancy you can make our Divines the dupes of so pitiful a sophism. You have drawn us (while we debate a particular question with you) to exclude for argument's sake one of our principles; and then urge against that question, a fact, which stands, and is to be defended on the excluded principle; and so cannot be maintained while the principle remains excluded: which is just as if, when you had persuaded us to tie our hands, on promise that the question should be only about the use of our feet, you should object to us our inability of laying fast hold upon you. Your own words, my Lord, where you push this imaginary advantage, best detect the fraud and imposture of your proceeding. "The Old Testament (you say) is founded in incredibility. Almost every event contained in it is incredible in its causes or consequences; and I must accept or reject the whole, as I said just now. No one, except here and there a divine, will presume to say, that the histories of the Old Testament are conformable to the experience of mankind, and the natural course of things."—Except here and there a Divine, do you say? Nor they neither, I assure our Lordship. What they say is this, That every thing of a mere civil nature in the Old Testament has all the marks of civil authenticity. This is all they said, and all they meant to say. And, on what good grounds they said it, give me leave to shew your Lordship a little more at large.

The Bible tells us, the world was created in time; and that time at no immense distance, as several fabulous
relations of Pagan antiquity had pretended. — And does not the late invention of arts prove that the Bible says nothing but what appears very probable?

It says, the earth was overflowed by a deluge of waters. And do not the contents of its surface demonstrate that it has suffered this catastrophe?

The Bible says, again, that the founders of cities were the inventors of arts; and that the first civil governments composed of small monarchies arose from the domestic. And do not experience and the natural course of things support so credible an anecdote?

The Pentateuch informs us, that the Israelites, after a long abode in Egypt, went out as a great people, and in a hostile manner, to seek new habitations. And of this, have we not both external and internal evidence? The external in the Egyptian, Phœnician, Chaldee, and Greek writers, quoted by Josephus and Eusebius: the internal in the whole Jewish ritual.

Scripture relates the defection of the ten tribes to idolatry; their transportation to a foreign land; and the re-peopling that part of Judea with a new colony of idolaters — And of the truth of all this, we say, the Samaritan Pentateuch, yet existing, is a strong and amazing testimony.

These, my Lord, are a very few of the numerous instances which might be produced; to shew the civil authenticity of the Bible. And on these and such as these, the Clergy's challenge stood, when they undertook to prove that authenticity, on the common principles of historic credit. Further, or other than this, they neither said nor meant to say. They understood, as well as your Lordship, the difference between Moses's incredible anecdotes and those of Livy; and that the Jewish history, unlike to all other, is wholly founded on miracles. But they distinguished better than your Lordship, of Moses's civil history: which consists of two parts; the peculiar dispensation to that people; and the occasional story of the rest of mankind.

It is the peculiar dispensation only to which his Lordship's observation can be applied, viz: that the civil cannot be separated from the miraculous part: nor did the Clergy attempt to do it. It was the occasional story
of the human race, we must needs suppose, to which the Archbishop's challenge referred: and I have shewn just above, that we are able to make his challenge good.

Thus would I have reasoned with his Lordship; and thus, in fact, was he reasoned with (as I may have occasion to tell you in my next Letter): but he was deaf to all advice, though it was given in private, and to save his memory from the disgrace of these portentous Essays. What remained was to expose them, as they deserved, to the laughter and contempt of mankind.

And now, Sir, I think I have pretty well discharged my general promise to you. When one looks back upon this poor collection of meagre, disjointed reasoning, tacked together by his system, and swelled up to the semblance of a body by the tumor of his rhetoric, one sees revived in these Essays the old story of Prometheus; his Lordship insulting the sanctity of the public, just as that most ancient of Freethinkers did the altar of Jupiter; on which, as the Poets tell us, he offered up to the King of gods and men, a heap of dry bones covered with fat. I am, &c.

LETTER IV.

You will wonder to hear again from me on so trifling a subject as this first philosophy. And had not Lord Bolingbroke reduced us to this alternative, either to give up the Bible or his Lordship to contempt, I should willingly have left him in possession of his admirers.

My last Letter examined his Lordship's value in every point of view, in which a philosopher would desire to shine. I shall now push my inquiry a little further, and venture into his own province. I shall crave your patience while I try his talents in his political capacity, as an analyser of states, a balancer of power, and a distributor of civil and religious sanctions.

But now we must recede a little from the method hitherto observed, which was to defend against his Lordship's calumnies, not this or that body of Divines, but the general principles of natural and revealed religion. Here I shall have occasion to patronise a single clergyman;
and not such a one neither as I could have wished; a Cudworth, a Clarke, a Cumberland, or a Tillootson (established names! which the public are ready to make their own quarrel); but a writer of very ambiguous fame, the Author of The Divine Legation of Moses, and of The Alliance between Church and State: of whom I pretend to know little, but from the talk of his adversaries; his friends possessing him, as they do a good conscience, in silence and complacency; and from his adversaries I learn—"But hold, you cry. let us drop both his friends and his enemies, and hear what the learned abroad say of him; for his works are well known, and have been frequently translated and criticised both in Germany and France; We may expect to hear truth from strangers who are without selfish partialities or personal prejudices."—Indeed, the Author would owe you his thanks for referring him to that decision; foreign critics of the greatest name have spoken so differently of him from the scribblers at home, that, was I to tell you what they have told the world, you would suspect their encomiums for the civilities of his most partial friends. So to his adversaries, I say again, I commit him: and, from them I learn that he abounds in paradoxes, that he delights in refinements, and would fain pass upon the world a heap of crude index-reading, for well-digested learning: that, on his first appearance, he was shrewdly suspected of infidelity; but that (nobody knows how) he has worked men into an opinion, of his being a sort of friend to religion; indeed, in his own way: I suppose he sees it for his interest to stick to the established church; for I know no other reason why there should have been different opinions concerning him. In a word, as I judge of him from the representation of his enemies, I can allow him little other claim to literary merit, than that very doubtful one, The dunces, of all denominations, being in confederacy against him. Indeed, since his Lordship’s discovery of a confederacy between Divines and Atheists, the word confederacy is likely to become as ridiculous as the word ode, which, our Laureate foretells, nobody for the future will hear spoken of without laughing. However, it shall pass; for were there no more in this confederacy, than in his Lordship’s,
and that every individual blockhead only followed the bent of his own natural bias, it would but make the wonder still more.

Such then is the Writer I am forced to take up with: in truth, I could not find another, so proper for my purpose; which was, as I said, to display Lord Bolingbroke's political talents. For though his Lordship be very profuse in his ill language to all who have undertaken the defence of religion and church government; yet the Author of The Divine Legation of Moses is the only one whom he does more than rail at and abuse on these accounts. For while he keeps at a respectful distance from the arguments of others, he comes, boldly, up to this Writer's, and sits down before them in form. He disputes with him, the knowledge of the Unity—the sense and reason of a select people—of a tutelary Deity—of compliance with human prejudices; and, in a word, every leading principle of the Author's Book. This seems not greatly for his Lordship's honour after he had defied all the mighty chieftains of literature, to decline the combat, and think himself quit by accepting the gauntlet from this puny Writer.

His Lordship begins his attack on that capital circumstance in the Jewish economy, the omission of a future state: He pretends to account for it independently of the extraordinary or equal providence, which Moses assured his people was to be administered under a theocracy; and which the Author of The Divine Legation attempts to prove, from this very circumstance of the omission, was actually administered.

But to make this intelligible to the common reader, it will be necessary to give a summary view of that famous argument pursued at large through two volumes of The Divine Legation, and yet conceived by many of the learned, to be left imperfect; marry, by some, if you were to judge from the knowledge they seem to have of it, hardly to be begun.

Religion has been always held necessary to the support of civil society; and (under the common dispensation of Providence) a future state, as necessary to religion; because, nothing but a future state can
remove the objections to God's moral government, under such a Providence, whose phenomena are apt to disturb the serious professors of religion, as it is of the essence of religious profession, to believe that God is a rewarder of those who diligently seek him.

Moses, who instituted a religion and a republic, and incorporated them together, stands single amongst ancient and modern lawgivers, in teaching a religion without the sanction, or even the mention, of a future state of rewards and punishments. The same Moses, by uniting the religion and the republic of the Jews into one system, made God by consequence their supreme civil magistrate, whereby the form of Government became truly and properly theocratical.

The natural consequence of a theocratic rule is an extraordinary or equal providence. And such, indeed, the Jewish Lawgiver has everywhere represented it to be. Now, the question between infidels and believers is, whether this extraordinary providence was real or only pretended?

Here the Author of The Divine Legation interposes; and undertakes to prove, from the circumstance of the omission of a future state, that it was real. His argument stands thus:

If religion be necessary to civil government, and if religion cannot subsist, under the common dispensation of Providence, without a future state of rewards and punishments, so consummately a lawgiver would never have omitted to inculcate the belief of such a state, unless he had been well assured that an extraordinary providence was indeed to be administered over his people; or were it possible he had been so infatuated, the impotency of a religion wanting a future state, must very soon have concluded in the destruction of his republic; but his republic nevertheless continued flourishing and sovereign, for many ages.

This is the plain and simple argument of The Divine Legation; which the first and the second volumes* of that Work are employed to explain and illustrate. And it must be owned, Lord Bolingbroke saw it in its force, as appears from his various contrivances to evade it.

* Books I. II. III. & IV. V, VI.
praise it would be unjust to deny him, when others have understood so little of the argument, as to imagine that the two first volumes had left it unfinished; and that the third was to complete the syllogism; though the author had told us, more than once, that the purpose of the last volume was only to enforce the various parts of the foregoing argument, by many new considerations.

To evade, as we say, this argument, his Lordship casts about for a reason, independent of the extraordinary providence, to account for Moses's omission of a future state. And his first solution is this, "Moses did not believe the immortality of the soul, nor the rewards and punishments of another life, though it is possible he might have learnt those doctrines from the Egyptians, who taught them very early, perhaps as they taught that of the unity of God. When I say, that Moses did not believe the immortality of the soul, nor future rewards and punishments, my reason is this, that he taught neither, when he had to do with a people whom a theocracy could not restrain; and on whom, therefore, terrors of punishment, future as well as present, eternal as well as temporary, could never be too much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated."

This reasoning is altogether worthy of his Lordship. Here we have a doctrine, plausible in itself, and therefore of easy admittance; most alluring to human nature, and therefore embraced by all mankind; of highest account among the Egyptians, and therefore ready to be embraced by the Israelites, who were fond of Egyptian manners; of strongest efficacy on the minds of an unruly people, and therefore of indispensable use; yet, all this notwithstanding, Moses did not believe it, and on that account, would not teach it. But then, had Moses's integrity been so severe, how came he to write a history which, my Lord thinks, is, in part at least, a fiction of his own? Did he believe that? How came he to leave the Israelites, as my Lord assures us he did, in possession of many of the superstitious opinions of Egypt? Did he believe them too? No, but they served his purpose; which was, The better governing an unruly people. Well, but his Lordship tells us, the doctrine of a future
a future state served this purpose best of all; for having
to do with a people whom a theocracy could not re-
strain, terrors of punishment, future as well as
present, eternal as well as temporary, could never
be too much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated.
No matter for that. Moses, as other men may, on a
sudden grows scrupulous; and so, together with the
maxims of common politics, throws aside the principles
of common sense; and when he had employed all the
other inventions of fraud, he boggles at this, which best
served his purpose; was most innocent in itself; and was
most important in its general, as well as particular, use.

In his Lordship's next volume, this omission comes
again upon the stage; and then we have another reason
assigned for Moses's conduct in this matter. Moses
would not teach the doctrine of "the immortality of the
soul, and of a future state, on account of the many
superstitions which this doctrine had begot in Egypt,
as we must believe, or believe that he knew nothing
of it, or assign some whimsical reason for
his omission."

We have seen before, that Moses omitted a future
state, because he did not believe it. This reason is now
out of date; and one or other of the three following is to
be assigned; either because it begot superstitions; or
because he knew nothing of it; or because he could
do without it, as the Jews were under an extraordi-
nary providence; that being what he means, by the
whimsical reason assigned [by the author of The
Divine Legation] for its omission.

Let us take him then, at his word, without expecting
however that he will stand to it, and having shewn his two
first reasons not worth a rush, leave the last established
even on his own concessions.

1. Moses, says he, omitted a future state on account
of the many superstitions, which this doctrine had
begot in Egypt. But if the omission stands upon this
principle, Moses must have omitted an infinite number
of rites and doctrines, which, Lord Bolingbroke says, he
borrowed from the Egyptians; part of which, in his
Lordship's opinion, were those very superstitions, which
this doctrine had begot; such as the notion of tutelary
deities.
deities; and part, such as arose out of those; in which number were distinction between things clean and unclean; an hereditary priesthood; sacerdotal habits; and rites of sacrifice.

2. However, he has another reason for the omission. Moses might know nothing of it. To which if I only opposed his Lordship's own words in another place (where giving us the reasons why Moses did know something of a future state, he observes, there are certain rites, which seem to allude or have a remote relation to this very doctrine) it might be deemed sufficient. But I go further, and observe, that from the very laws of Moses themselves, we have an internal evidence of his knowledge of this doctrine. Amongst the laws against Gentile divinations, there is one concerning that species of them, called by the Greeks necromancy, or invocation of the dead; which necessarily implies, in the lawgiver who forbids it, as well as in the offender who uses it, the knowledge of a future state.

3. This being the fate of his Lordship's two reasons, we are now abandoned by him, and left to follow our own inventions, and to take up with some whimsical reason for the omission; that is, to allow that, as the Jews were under an extraordinary providence, Moses in quality of lawgiver had no occasion for the doctrine of a future state.

However, his Lordship dissatisfied, as well he might, with the solutions hitherto proposed, returns again to the charge; and in his Corona operis, the book of fragments, more openly opposes the doctrine of The Divine Legation; and enlarges and expatiates upon the reason, before given, for the omission; namely, the many superstitions this doctrine had begotten in Egypt.

"One cannot see without surprize (says his Lordship) a doctrine so useful to all religion, and therefore incorporated into all the systems of Paganism, left wholly out of that of the Jews. Many probable reasons might be brought to shew, that it was an Egyptian doctrine before the Exode, and this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, so soon, at least, afterwards, by all those who were instructed like Moses, in the wisdom of that people. He transported much
much of his wisdom into the scheme of religion and
government, which he gave the Israelites; and, amongst
other things, certain rites, which may seem to allude;
or have a remote relation, to this very doctrine.
Though this doctrine therefore had not been that of
ABRAHAM, ISAAC, and JACOB, he might have adopt-
ed it with as little scruple, as he did many customs and
institutions merely Egyptian. He had to do with a
rebellious, but a superstitious, people. In the first
character, they made it necessary that he should neg-
lect nothing which might add weight to his ordinances,
and contribute to keep them in awe. In the second,
their disposition was extremely proper to receive such
a doctrine, and to be influenced by it. Shall we say,
that an hypothesis of future rewards and punish-
ments was useless among a people who lived under a
theocracy, and that the future Judge of other people
was their immediate Judge and King, who resided in
the midst of them, and who dealt out rewards and
punishments on every occasion? Why then were so
many precautions taken? Why was a solemn covenant
made with God, as with a temporal prince? Why
were so many promises and threatenings of rewards
and punishments, temporal indeed, but future and
contingent, as we find in the book of Deuteronomy;
most pathetically held out by Moses? Would there
have been any more impropriety in holding out those
of one kind than those of another, because the Supreme
Being, who disposed and ordered both, was in a par-
ticular manner present amongst them? Would an
addition to the catalogue of rewards and punishments
more remote, but eternal, and in all respects far great-
er, have had no effect? I think neither of these
things can be said.

What shall we say then? How came it to pass, this
addition was not made? I will mention what occurs
to me, and shall not be over solicitous about the
weight that my reflexions may deserve. If the doc-
trines of the immortality of the soul and of a future
state had been revealed to Moses, that he might
teach them to the Israelites, he would have taught them
most certainly. But he did not teach them. They
were
were therefore not revealed to him. Why they were not so revealed, some pert Divine or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not presume to guess. But this I may presume to advance, that since these doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly probable that this legislator made a scruple of teaching them to the Israelites; how well soever instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to government he might think them. The superstitious and idolatrous rites of the Egyptians, like those of other nations, were founded on the polytheism and the mythology that prevailed; and were suffered to prevail, amongst the vulgar, and that made the sum of their religion. It seemed to be a point of policy to direct all these absurd opinions and practices to the service of government, instead of attempting to root them out. But then the great difference between rude and ignorant nations and such as were civilized and learned, like the Egyptians, seems to have been this, that the former had no other system of religion than these absurd opinions and practices; whereas the latter had an inward as well as an outward doctrine. There is reason to believe that natural theology and natural religion had been taught and practised in the ancient Theban dynasty; and it is probable that they continued to be an inward doctrine in the rest of Egypt, while polytheism, idolatry, and all the mysteries, all the impieties, and all the follies of magic, were the outward doctrine. Moses might be let into a knowledge of both; and under the patronage of the princess, whose foundling he was, he might be initiated into those mysteries, where the secret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded. But we cannot imagine that the children of Israel, in general, enjoyed the same privilege, nor that the masters were so lavish, to their slaves, of a favour so distinguished, and often so hard to obtain. No. The children of Israel knew nothing more than the outside of the religion of Egypt, and if the doctrine we speak of was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances in which it was dressed up and presented to vulgar belief.
belief. It would have been hard therefore to teach, or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving them an occasion the more, to recall the polytheistical fables, and practise the idolatrous rites, they had learnt during their captivity. Rites and ceremonies are often so equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are so closely connected with one doctrine that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine in some sort, to teach the rites and ceremonies, and to authorize the fables on which they are founded. Moses therefore being at liberty to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, might very well choose the latter, though he indulged the Israelites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the divine permission, as it is presumed, in several observances and customs which did not lead directly, though even they did so perhaps in consequence, to the polytheism and idolatry of Egypt.

What a Babel of bad reasoning has his Lordship here accumulated out of the rubbish of false and inconsistent principles! And all, to insult the temple of God and the fortress of Mount Sion! Sometimes, he represents Moses as a divine messenger, and distinguishes between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, unto him; and then, a future state not being revealed to Moses was the reason he did not teach it. Sometimes again, he considers him as a mere human lawgiver, acquiring all his knowledge of religion and politics from the Egyptian in whose secret learning he had been intimately instructed; and then, the reason of the omission is, lest the doctrine of a future state should have drawn the Israelites into those Egyptian superstitions, from which it was Moses's purpose to estrange them. All these inconsistencies in fact and reasoning, his Lordship delivers in the same breath, and without the least intimation of any change in his principles or opinions.

But let us follow him step by step, without troubling our heads about his real sentiments; which this view of his talents regards with indifference. It is enough that we confute all he says, whether under his own or an assumed character.
He begins with confessing, that one cannot see without surprize a doctrine so useful to all religions, and therefore incorporated into all the systems of Paganism, left wholly out of that of the Jews.

It seems then, this omission is no light or trivial matter, which may be accounted for by Moses's disbelief of the doctrine; his ignorance of it; or the imaginary mischiefs it might possibly produce. So that we may be allowed to think it deserved all the pains, the Author of The Divine Legation of Moses has bestowed upon it: whose whimsical reasoning, if it ended in a demonstration of revealed religion, sufficiently atoned for its going a little out of the way.

His Lordship proceeds to shew, in direct opposition to what he said before, that Moses could not be ignorant of the doctrine of a future state, because the Egyptians taught it: his knowledge of it (my Lord tells us) further appears from an internal circumstance, some of his rites seeming to allude, or to have a remote relation, to this very doctrine. This I observe, to his Lordship's credit. The remark is just and accurate. But we are in no want of his remote relation; I have shewn just above, that the Jewish laws against necromancy necessarily imply Moses's knowledge of the doctrine.

He then goes on to explain the advantages which, humanly speaking, the Israelites must have received from this doctrine, in the temper and circumstances with which they left Egypt. Moses, says he, had to do with a rebellious and a superstitious people. This likewise I observe to his credit: it has the same marks of sagacity and truth; and brings us to the very verge of the solution, proposed by the Author of The Divine Legation; which is, that the Israelites were indeed under an extraordinary providence, which supplied all the disadvantages of the omission. Under a common and unequal providence, religion cannot subsist without the doctrine of a future state: for religion implying a just retribution of reward and punishment, which under such a providence is not dispensed, a future state must needs subvence, to prevent the whole edifice from falling into ruin. And thus we account for the fact, which his Lordship so amply acknowledges, viz. that the doctrine of a future state.
state was most useful to all religions, and therefore incorporated into all the religions of Paganism. But where an extraordinary providence is administered, good and evil are exactly distributed; and therefore, in this circumstance, a future state is not necessary for the support of religion. It is not to be found in the Mosaic economy; yet this economy subsisted for many ages; religion therefore did not need it; or, in other words, it was supported by an extraordinary providence.

This is the argument of The Divine Legation. Let us now consider his Lordship's present attempts to evade it.

Shall we say, that an hypothesis of future rewards and punishments was useless amongst a people who lived under a theocracy, and that the future Judge of other people was their immediate Judge and King, who resided in the midst of them, and who dealt out rewards and punishments on every occasion? Why then were so many precautions taken? &c.

First, let me observe, that the precautions here objected to, are intended for an insinuation against the truth of Moses's promise of an extraordinary providence. A kind of sophism which his Lordship advances and only holds in common with the rest who have written against The Divine Legation: and which I shall here, after much forbearance on the Author's part, expose as it deserves.

Moses affirms again and again, that his people were under an extraordinary providence. He affirms it indeed, but as it is not a self-evident truth, it needs to be proved. Till then, the unbeliever is at liberty to urge any circumstance in the Jewish law or history, which may seem to bring the reality of that providence into question; the same liberty too has the believer, if, at least, he can persuade himself to make use of it; as many, so professing themselves, have done both in their writings and discoursings against The Divine Legation. Things were in this train; when the Author of that book undertook the defence of Moses: and to obviate all objections to the Legislator's credit, arising from any doubtful, or unfavourable circumstance in the law, or history of the Jews concerning this extraordinary providence, he advanced
the internal argument of the omission; an argument which necessarily inferred that extraordinary providence was in fact administered in the Jewish republic. What change did this make in the state of the case? A very great one. Unbelievers were now indeed at liberty; and believers too, if so perversely inclined, to oppose, and, as they could, to confute the argument of The Divine Legation: but by no rules of good logic could they come over again with those Scripture difficulties to Moses’s credit, which the argument of The Divine Legation had entirely obviated, and which it still continued to exclude so long as it remained unanswered. For while a demonstrated truth stands good, no difficulties arising from it, however inexplicable, can have any weight against that superior evidence. Not to admit this fundamental maxim of common sense, would be to unsettle many a physical and mathematical demonstration, as well as this moral one.

I say therefore, as things now stand, To oppose difficulties against the administration of an extraordinary providence, after that providence has been proved, and before the proof has been confuted, is the most palpable and barefaced imposition on our understanding. In which, however, his Lordship is but one of a hundred; and, indeed, the least indecent and inconsistent of the hundred; as his declared purpose is to destroy the credit and authority of the Jewish Lawgiver.

I shall not however decline to examine the weight of these objections, though they be so foolishly and sophistically obtruded.

If there was this extraordinary providence administered, says his Lordship, Why so many precautions taken? Why was a solemn covenant made with God as with a temporal prince? Why were so many promises and threatenings of rewards and punishments, temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find, in the Book of Deuteronomy, most pathetically held out by Moses? This difficulty is not hard to be resolved. We find throughout, what we believers are wont to call the History of Providence, but which his Lordship is pleased to entitle, Tales more extravagant than those of Amadis de Gaule; that God, in his moral
moral government of the world, always makes use of human means, as far as those means will go; and never interposes with his extraordinary providence, but when they will go no further. To do otherwise, would be to make an unnecessary waste of miracles; better fitted to confound our knowledge of Nature, by obscuring the harmony of order, than to manifest its Lord and Sovereign, by controlling its delegated powers. This method in God's moral government, all our ideas of wisdom seem to support. Now when He, the great Master of the Universe, had decreed to rule the Jewish people in an extraordinary way, he did not propose to supersede any of the measures of civil regimen. And this, I hope, will be esteemed a sufficient answer to—Why so many precautions taken, &c. But would you see it drawn out more at large, you may consult the Author's Remarks on the same kind of sophistry employed by Dr. Sykes against The Divine Legation.

But (says his Lordship) would the hypothesis of a future state have been useless? &c. Would there (as his Lordship goes on) have been any more impropriety in holding out those [sanctions] of one kind than those of another, because the Supreme Being, who disposed and ordered both, was in a particular manner present amongst them? Would an addition of rewards and punishments (more remote, but eternal, and in all respects far greater) to the catalogue, have had no effect? I think neither of these things can be said. His Lordship totally mistakes the drift of the Author's argument. The Divine Legation inferences no more from the fact of the omission than this; That the Jewish economy, administered by an extraordinary providence, could do without the service of the omitted doctrine; not that that doctrine, even under such a dispensation, was of no use, much less that it was improper. But then one of his followers, or, what is as good, one of the adversaries of The Divine Legation, will be ready to say, "If a future state was not improper, much more if it was of use, under an extraordinary dispensation, How came Moses not to give it?" For great and wise ends of providence, vastly countervailing the use of that doctrine, if you will believe the Author of
The Divine Legation: who, if he did not impose upon us, when he promised a third volume (as his Lordship constantly believed he did) will there explain those ends at large.

Lord Bolingbroke proceeds next to tell us, what occurs to him, concerning the reasons of the omission; and previously assures us, he is not over solicitous about their weight. This, I suppose, is to make his counters pass current: for then, as Hobbes expresses it, they become the money of fools, when we cease to be solicitous about their worth; when we try them by their colour, not their weight; their rhetoric, and not their logic. But this must be said with exception to the first, which is altogether logical, and very entertaining.

If (says his Lordship) the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state had been revealed to Moses, that he might teach them to the Israelites, he would have taught them most certainly. But he did not teach them. They were, therefore, not revealed. It is in mood and figure, you see; and, I warrant you, designed to supply what was wanting in The Divine Legation: though as the author of that book certainly believed, the doctrines were not revealed, 'tis ten to one but he thought Moses was not at liberty to teach them; unless you can suppose that his Lordship, who believed nothing of Revelation, might believe Moses to be restrained from teaching what God had not revealed to him; and yet, that the Author of The Divine Legation, who held Moses's pretensions to be true, might think him at liberty to go beyond his commission. Thus far, then, these two writers may be said to agree: but this good understanding lasts not long. His Lordship's modesty and the other's pertness soon make the breach as wide as ever.—Why they were not so revealed (says his Lordship) some pert divine or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not pretend to guess. The forwardness of the one, and the backwardness of the other, are equally well suited to their respective principles. Should his Lordship have guessed, it might have brought him to what he most dreaded, the divine original of the Jewish religion: had his adversary forborn to guess, he had betrayed his cause, and left those data unemployed.
which enabled him, I do not say to guess, but to discover, and to demonstrate the Divine Legation of Moses.

However, This his Lordship will presume to advance, that since these doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly probable, that the legislator made a scruple of teaching them to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to government he might think them.

Here, you see, he personates a believer, who holds Moses to be an inspired lawgiver: but observe, how poorly he sustains his part! Either Moses did indeed receive the law from God, or he did not. If he did not, why are we mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when nothing was revealed? If Moses did receive the law from God, why are we still worse mocked with the distinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when every thing was revealed; as well, the direction for omitting a future state, as the direction to inculcate the unity of the Godhead? Why was all this mockery, you say? For a very good purpose: it was to draw us from the true object of our inquiry, which is, what God intended by the omission, to that fantastic object, which only respects what Moses intended by it. For the intention of God supposes the mission and inspiration of a prophet; but the intention of Moses, when considered in contradistinction to God's, terminates in the human views of an ordinary lawgiver; which leads us back again to infidelity.

But he soon strips Moses of his mission, and invests him again with his civil character: and here he considers, what it was, which, under this character, might induce Moses to omit a future state; and he finds it to be, lest this doctrine should have hurt the doctrine of the unity, which it was his purpose to inculcate amongst his people, in opposition to the Egyptian polytheism.

Moses (says his Lordship) it is highly probable, made a scruple of teaching these doctrines to the Israelites, howsoever well instructed he might be in them himself, and howsoever useful to government he might think them. The people of Egypt, like all other
other nations, were polytheists, but different from all others: there was in Egypt an inward as well as outward doctrine: natural theology and natural religion were the inward doctrine; while polytheism, idolatry, and all the mysteries, all the impieties and follies of magic, were the outward doctrine. Moses was initiated into those mysteries where the secret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded.—For an accurate divider, commend me to his Lordship. In distinguishing between the inward and outward doctrines of the Egyptians, he puts all the mysteries amongst the outward: though if they had an inward, it must necessarily be part of those mysteries. But he makes amends presently (though his amends to truth is as it should be, always at the expense of a contradiction) and says, that Moses learnt the inward doctrine in the mysteries. Let this pass. He proceeds—Moses had the knowledge of both outward and inward. Not so the Israelites in general. They knew nothing more than the outside of the religion of Egypt. And if a future state was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was dressed up and presented to the vulgar belief. It would be hard therefore to teach or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving them an occasion the more to recal the polytheistical fables, and practise the idolatrous rites they had learnt during their captivity.

The Children of Israel, it seems, knew no more of a future state, than by the superstitious rites and fabulous circumstances with which it was dressed up and presented to the public belief. What then? Moses, he owns, knew more. And what hindered Moses from communicating of his knowledge to the people, when he took them under his protection, and gave them a new law and a new religion? His Lordship lets us understand that this people knew as little of the Unity; for he tells us, it was amongst the inward doctrines of the Egyptians: yet this did not hinder Moses from instructing his people in the doctrine of the Unity. What then should hinder his teaching them the inward doctrine.
of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances? He had divested religious worship of the absurdities of demi-gods and heroes; What should hinder him from divesting a future state of Charon's boat and the Elysian fields? But the notion of a future state would have recalled those fabulous circumstances which had been long connected with it. And was not religious worship, under the idea of a tutelar deity, and a temporal king, much more apt to recall the polytheism of Egypt? Yet Moses ventured upon this inconvenience, for the sake of great advantages; Why should he not venture on the other, for the sake of greater? for the doctrine of a future state is, as his Lordship confesses, even necessary both to civil and religious society. But what does he talk of the danger of giving entry to the fables and superstitions concerning the soul (superstitions, which, though learnt indeed in the Captivity, were common to all the nations of polytheism) when in other places he assures us, that Moses indulged the Israelites in the most characteristic superstitions of Egypt?

However, let us see how he supports this wise observation. Rites and ceremonies (says his Lordship) are often so equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are so closely connected with a doctrine, that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine is, in some sort, to teach the rites and ceremonies.—In some sort, is well put in, to soften the deformity of this inverted logic. His point is to shew that a superstitious rite, relating to, and dependent on, a certain doctrine, will obtrude itself whenever that doctrine is taught: and his reasoning is only calculated to prove, that where the rite is practised, the doctrine will soon follow. This may indeed be true. But then it does not hold in the reverse, that the rite follows the doctrine: because a principal may stand without its dependent; but a dependent can never subsist without its principal.

Under cover of these grotesque shapes, into which his Lordship has travestied the Jewish Lawgiver, he concludes, that Moses being at liberty to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, he might very well choose the latter—Yet
it was but at the very beginning of this paragraph that he tells us, Moses was not at liberty to teach or not to teach. His words are these, Since this doctrine was not revealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly probable that this legislator made a scruple of teaching it. But his Lordship well knows that statesmen soon get the better of their scruples; and then, by another fetch of political casuistry, find themselves more at liberty than ever.

I had observed above, that our noble discoursers, who makes Moses so scrupulous that he would on no terms afford a handle for one single superstition of Egypt to get footing among his people, has; on other occasions, charged him with introducing them by wholesale. He was sensible his inconsistency was likely to be detected, and therefore he now attempts to obviate it—Though he [Moses] indulged the Israelites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the Divine permission, as it is presumed, in several observations and customs, which did not lead directly, though even they did so perhaps in consequence, to the polytheism and idolatry of Egypt. And could the teaching the doctrine of a future state possibly do more than lead in consequence (as his Lordship elegantly expresses it) to the polytheism and idolatry of Egypt, by drawing after it those superstitious rites and fabulous circumstances which he tells us, then attended the popular notion of such a state? If, for the hardness of their hearts, they were indulged in several observances and customs, which only led in consequence to polytheism and idolatry; why, for the same hardness of heart, were they not indulged with the doctrine of a future state, which did not lead, but by a very remote consequence, to polytheism and idolatry? Especially since this hardness of heart would less bear the denial of a doctrine so alluring to the human mind, than the denial of a rite, to which habit only and old custom had given an occasional propensity. Again, those rites, indulged to the people, for the hardness of their hearts, had, in themselves, little use or tendency to advance the ends of the Jewish dispensation; but rather retarded them: whereas a future state, by his Lordship's own confession, is most useful to all religions.
and therefore incorporated into all the systems of paganism; and was particularly useful to the Israelites, who were, he says, both a rebellious and a superstitious people: dispositions, which not only made it necessary to omit nothing that might enforce obedience, but likewise facilitated the reception and supported the influence of the doctrine in question.

You have here the whole of his Lordship's boasted solution of this important circumstance of the omission. And you see how vainly he strives to elude its force. Overwhelmed, as it were, with the weight of so irresistible a power, after long wriggling to get free, he at length crawls forth; but so maimed and broken, so impotent and fretful, that all his remaining strength is in his venom. And this he now sheds in abundance over the whole Mosaic Economy. It is pronounced to be a gross imposture; and this very circumstance of the omission is given as an undoubted proof of the accusation.

"Can we be surprised then" (says his Lordship)

"that the Jews ascribed to the all-perfect Being, on various occasions, such a conduct and such laws as are inconsistent with his most obvious perfections? Can we believe such a conduct and such laws to have been his, on the word of the proudest and most lying nation in the world? Many other considerations might have their place here. But I shall confine myself to one; which I do not remember to have seen nor heard urged on one side, nor anticipated on the other. To shew, then, the more evidently, how absurd, as well as impious, it is to ascribe these Mosaical laws to God, let it be considered, that neither the people of Israel, nor their Legislator perhaps, knew any thing of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be punished. Although he might have learned this doctrine, which was not so much a secret doctrine as it may be presumed that the Unity of the Supreme God was, amongst the Egyptians. Whether he had learned both or either, or neither of them in those schools, cannot be determined: but this may be advanced with assurance; If Moses knew, that crimes, and therefore idolatry, one of the greatest, were to be
punished in another life, he deceived the people in the covenant they made, by his intervention, with God.
If he did not know it, I say it with horror, the consequence, according to the hypothesis I oppose, must be, that God deceived both him and them. In either case, a covenant or bargain was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and disobedience were not fully, nor by consequence, fairly stated. The Israelites had better things to hope, and worse to fear, than those which were expressed in it: and their whole history seems to shew how much need they had of these additional motives to restrain them from polytheism and idolatry, and to answer the assumed purposes of Divine Providence.

This argument, advanced with so much assurance, his Lordship says, he does not remember to have seen, or heard urged on one side, nor anticipated on the other. A gentle reproof, as we are to understand it, of the Author of The Divine Legation: for none but he, I think, could anticipate an objection to an argument which none but he had employed. Give me leave then to supply his defects: I am the first good-natured animadverter on him that has done so; the rest have contented themselves with their best endeavours to expose them. And as his Lordship is so generous to invite an answer to it, he shall not be disappointed.

Let it be considered (says his Lordship) that perhaps Moses knew nothing of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be punished.—Considered by whom? Not by his Lordship, or his kind readers: for his reasoning has brought them to consider the contrary. "Many probable reasons (says he) might be brought to shew, that this was an Egyptian doctrine before the exode; and this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, so soon at least afterwards, by all those who were instructed like Moses in the wisdom of that people. He transported much of this wisdom into the scheme of religion and government which he gave the Israelites: and, among other things, certain rites, which seem to allude, or have a remote relation, to this doctrine." This possibly might have recurred to his Lordship, while
he was boasting of this new and unanticipated argument; and therefore, in the tricking it up amongst his fragments, to his perhaps, he adds, by a very happy corrective, although Moses might have learnt this doctrine, which was not so much a secret doctrine, as it may be presumed that the Unity of the Supreme God was amongst the Egyptians. But he had done better to have left his contradictions uncorrected, and have trusted to the rare sagacity of his readers to find them out. He had ever an ill hand at reconciling matters; so in the case before us, in the very act of covering one contradiction, he commits another. He is here speaking of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances; perhaps says he, Moses knew nothing of another life. Which was, not so much a secret doctrine as that of the Unity. Now, Sir, turn back a moment to the long quotation given in page 249, and there you will find, that a future state, divested, of its fabulous circumstances, was as much a secret doctrine, as that of the Unity: "There is reason to believe that natural theology and natural religion were inward doctrines amongst the Egyptians. Moses might be let into a knowledge of both by being initiated into those mysteries where the secret doctrine alone was taught.

But we cannot imagine, that the children of Israel in general enjoyed the same privilege. No, they knew nothing more than the outside of the Egyptian religion: and if the doctrine we speak of [A FUTURE STATE] was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances in which it was dressed up and presented to vulgar belief."—Is not this, now, a plain declaration, that a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances, was as much a secret doctrine as the doctrine of the Unity?

But his Lordship's contradictions are the least of my concern. It is his argument I have now to do with. And this, he says, he advances with assurance. It is fit he should. Modesty would be very ill bestowed on such opinions.

He thinks he can reduce those, who hold no future state in the Jewish Economy, to the necessity of owning
that Moses; or that God himself, acted unfairly by the Israelites. How so, you ask? Because one or other of them concealed that state. And what if they did? Why then they concealed one of the actual sanctions of moral conduct, future punishment. But who told him, that this, which was no sanction of the Jewish law, was a sanction to the moral conduct of the Jewish people? Who, unless the artificial theologer? the man he most despises and decries.

And, even in artificial theology, there is nothing but the Calvinistical tenet of original sin, which gives the least countenance to so monstrous an opinion; every thing in the Gospel, every thing in the natural theology, explains against it. Jesus, indeed, to prove that the departed Israelites still existed, quotes the title God was pleased to give himself, of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and this, together with their existence, proves likewise the happiness of their condition: for the relation they are said to stand in with God, shews them to be of his kingdom. But we must remember, that the question with his Lordship is, not of reward, but punishment. Again, Jesus speaks (indeed in a parable) of the deceased rich man, as in a place of torment. But we must remember that the scene was laid at a time when the doctrine of a future state was become national. To know his sentiments on the question of subjection to an unknown sanction, we should do well to consider the following words, “The servant which knew his Lord’s will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.” Now the will of a master or sovereign, declared in his laws, always includes in it the sanctions of those laws. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews expressly distinguishes the sanction of the Jewish Law from that of the Gospel; and makes the difference to consist in this, that the one was of temporal punishments, and the other of future. He that despised Moses’ law died without mercy, under two or three witnesses. Of how much sorer punishment.

* Luke xii. 47, 48.*
suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God? Which appeal is without common sense or honesty, on supposition that the apostle held the Jews to be subject to future punishments, before that sanction was promulgated unto them. From the Gospel therefore it cannot be inferred, that the Israelites, while only following the law of Moses in which the sanction of a future state is not delivered, were liable or subject to the punishments of that state.

Let us see next, Whether natural theology, or natural religion (as his Lordship is pleased, for some reason or other, to distinguish the terms) hath taught us, that a people, living under an extraordinary providence or the immediate government of God, to whom he had given a law and revealed a religion, both supported by temporal sanctions only, could be deemed subject to those future punishments, unknown to them, which natural religion before, and revealed religion since, have discovered to be due to bad men living under a common providence.

Natural religion standeth (as has been already shewn) on this principle, "that the Governor of the Universe rewards and punishes moral agents." The length or shortness of human existence come not primarily into the idea of religion: not even into that complete idea of religion delivered by St. Paul, in his general definition of it. The religionist, says he, must believe that God is, and that he is a rewarer of those who seek him.

While God exactly distributed his rewards and punishments here, the light of nature directed men to look no further for the sanctions of his laws. But when it came to be seen, that he was not always a rewarer and a punisher here, men necessarily concluded, from his moral attributes, that he would be so, hereafter: and consequently, that this life was but a small portion of human duration. They had not yet speculated on the permanent nature of the soul; and when they did so, that consideration, which under an ordinary providence came strongly in aid of the moral argument for another life, had no tendency under the extraordinary to open to them the prospects.

* Chap. x. ver. 28, 29.
prospects of futurity: because, though they saw the soul unaffected by those causes which brought the body to destruction, yet they held it to be equally dependent on the Creator’s will; who, amongst the various means of its dissolution, of which they had no idea, had, for aught they knew, provided one or more than one for that purpose.

In this manner was a future state brought, by natural light, into religion; and from thenceforth became a necessary part of it. But, in the Jewish theocracy, God was an exact rewarder and punisher, here. Natural light therefore shewed that under such an administration, the subjects of it did not become liable to future punishments till that sanction was known amongst them.

Thus both natural and revealed religion shew, that his Lordship calumniated them, when he affirmed, that, according to the hypothesis he opposed, Moses deceived the people in the covenant they made, by his intervention, with God: or that, if Moses did not know the doctrine of a future state, then God deceived both him and them.

Should it be asked, how God will deal with wicked men thus dying under the Mosaic dispensation? give me leave to answer, in the words of Dr. Clarke, on a like occasion: He had demonstrated a self-moving substance to be immaterial, and so, not perishable like bodies. But, as this included the souls of irrational animals, it was asked “How these were to be disposed of, when they had left their respective habitations?” To which he very properly replies, “Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely wise God may, without any great difficulty, be supposed to have more ways of disposing of his creatures [I add, with perfect justice and equity, and with equal measure to all] than we are, at present, let into the secret of.” But if the Author of The Divine Legation has not promised more than he can perform (as his long delay gives us too much cause to suspect) this matter will be explained at large, in his account of the Scripture doctrine of the redemption, which, he has told us, is to have a place in his last volume.

* Octavo Tracts against Doddell and Collina, p. 103.

Nothing
Nothing now remains of this objection, but the sanction of future rewards: and I would by no means deprive the faithful Israelites of these. His Lordship therefore has this to make his best of: and, in his opinion, even an unclaimed reward is foul dealing; for he joins it with punishment, as if his consequence, against God's justice and goodness, might be equally deduced from either of them.—A covenant, says he, was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and disobedience were not fully, nor, by consequence, fairly stated. The Israelites had better things to hope, and worse to fear than those which were expressed in it. Though it be hard on a generous benefactor to be denied the right of giving more than he had promised; it is still harder on the poor debtor, that he is not at liberty to receive more. True it is, that, in this case, the conditions are not fully stated; and therefore, according to his Lordship's logic, by consequence not fairly. To strengthen this consequence, his Lordship concludes in these words—And their whole history seems to show how much need they had of these additional motives [future rewards and punishments] to restrain them from polytheism and idolatry, and to answer the assumed purposes of Divine Providence.

Whoever puts all these things together—"That Moses was himself of the race of Israel—was learned in all the wisdom of Egypt—and capable of freeing his people from their yoke—that he brought them within sight of the promised land; a fertile country, which they were to conquer and inhabit—that he instituted a system of laws, which has been the admiration of the wisest men of all ages—that he understood the doctrine of a future state, and, by his experience gained in Egypt, knew the efficacy of it in general; and, by his perfect knowledge of the rebellious and superstitious temper of his own people, could not but see how useful it was to them in particular"—Whoever, I say, puts all these things together (and all these things are amongst his Lordship's concessions) and at the same time considers, that Moses, throughout his whole system of law and religion, is entirely silent concerning a future state of rewards and punishments, will, I believe,
believe, conclude that there was something more in the omission than Lord Bolingbroke could fathom, or, at least, was willing to discover.

But let us turn from Moses's conduct (which will be elsewhere considered at large) to his Lordship's, which is our present business.

1. First, he gives us his conjectures, to account for the omission, exclusive of Moses's Divine Legation: but, as if dissatisfied with them himself (which he well might be, for they destroy one another),

2. He next attempts, you see, to prove, that the Legation could not be divine, from this very circumstance of the omission.

3. But now he will go further, and demonstrate that an extraordinary providence in general, such as is represented by Moses, and which the Author of The Divine Legation has proved, from the circumstance of the omission, was actually administered in the Jewish republic, could not possibly be administered, without destroying free-will; without making virtue servile; and without relaxing universal benevolence.

4. And lastly, to make all sure, he shuts up the account by shewing, that an extraordinary providence could answer no reasonable end or purpose.

In his first and last order of evasions, he seems to be alone; but, in the second and third, he had the pleasure of seeing many an orthodox writer against The Divine Legation (to use his Lordship's language) in confederacy with him.

I have examined his Lordship's first and second order, the third and fourth remain to be considered; it is the last refuge of his infidelity; and then, I think, I may return him back to the Author of The Divine Legation, to give us a fresh view of him; if so be he think it worth his while to defend the other principles of his book against him.

1. His first objection to the administration of an extraordinary providence, such as Moses promised to his people on the part of God, is, that it would destroy free-will. But here let me observe, that he affects to disguise the immediate object of his attack; and, in arguing against an extraordinary providence, chooses to consider it in the general,
general, as the point arises out of an imaginary dispute between him and the divines; who, he pretends, are dissatisfied with the present order of things, and require, as the terms of their acquiescence in God's government, the administration of an equal providence, here. But this obliquity in disguising the true object of his attack not being of itself sufficient to embarrass his adversaries, he further supports it by a prevarication: for it is not true, that divines are dissatisfied with the present order of things, or that they require a better. All the ground they ever gave his Lordship for imputing this scandal to them being only this assertion, "That if the present state be the whole of man's existence, then the justice of God would have more exactly dispersed good and evil here; but as he has not done so, it follows, that there will be a state of rewards and punishments hereafter."

This premised, I proceed to his first objection.—"In good earnest (says his Lordship) is a system of particular providences, in which the Supreme Being, or his angels, like his ministers to reward, and his executioners to punish, are constantly employed in the affairs of mankind, much more reasonable [than the Gods of Epicurus or the morals of Polemo]? "Would the justice of God be more manifest in such a state of things than in the present? I see no room for merit on the part of man, nor for justice on the part of God, in such a state."

His Lordship asks, whether the justice of God would be more manifest in such a state of things, where good is constantly dispensed to the virtuous, and evil to the wicked, than in the present, where good and evil happen indifferently to all men? If his Lordship, by the present state of things, includes the rectification of them in a future state, I answer, that the justice of God would not be more manifest, but equally and fully manifest in either case. If his Lordship does not include this rectification in a future state, then I answer his question by another; would the justice of the civil magistrate be more manifest, where he exactly dispenses rewards to good men, and punishment to evil, than where he suffers the cunning and the powerful to carve for themselves?

But he sees no room for merit on the part of man,
nor justice on the part of God. If he does not see, it is his own fault. It is owing to his prevaricating both with himself and his reader; to the turning his view from the Scripture-representation of an equal providence, to the iniquity of Calvinistical election, and to the partialities of fanatics concerning the favoured workings of the Spirit; and to his giving these to the reader, in its stead. How dexterously does he slide enthusiasm and predestination into the Scripture-doctrine of an equal providence!—If some men were determined to goodness by the secret workings of the Spirit, &c. Yes, indeed, if you will be so kind to allow him, that under an equal providence the will is overruled, he will be able to show you, there is an end of all merit and demerit. But this substituting artificial theology (as he calls it) in the place of Bible-theology, is his usual legerdemain. So again—I can conceive still less, that individual creatures before they have done either good or evil, nay, before their actual existence, can be the objects of predilection or aversion, of love or hatred, to God. Who, of the Gospel-divines, against whom he is here writing, would have him conceive any thing of this at all? It is the artificial theologer, the depraver, as he says, of the Gospel, who would draw him into so absurd a system. But what has this exploded theology, that abounds only in human inventions, to do with the extraordinary providence, represented in Holy Writ! To say, that this providence takes away man's merit and God's justice, is confounding all our ideas of right and wrong. Is it not the highest merit of a rational creature, to comply with that motive which has most real weight? And is not God's justice then most manifest, when the order of things present fewest difficulties and obscurities in our contemplation of it? His Lordship was plainly of these sentiments, when, arguing against God's compliance with the Jewish hardness of heart, he thought it more becoming the Master of the Universe, to bend the perverse stiffness of their wills: and, when arguing against a future state from the present good order of things, he pretends to shew, against divines and atheists in conjunction, that there is little or no irregularity in the present dispensations of Providence; at least, not so much as the world commonly
commonly imagine. And why was this paradox advanced, but from a consciousness that the more exact the present administration of God's providence appeared, the more manifest it made his justice? But now his Lordship's followers may be apt to pretend, that their master has here done no more, indeed scarce so much, at least not in so express terms, as a celebrated Prelate, in one of his discourses at the Temple; who tells us, "That an immediate and visible interposition of Providence in behalf of the righteous, and for the punishment of the wicked, would interfere with the freedom of moral agents, and not leave room for their trial." But they who object this to us, have not considered the nature of moral differences. For, as another learned Prelate well observes, *A little experience may convince us, that the same thing, at different times, is not the same.* Now if different times may make such alterations in identity, what must different men do? The thing said being by all candid interpretation to be regulated on the purpose of saying.

2. Lord Bolingbroke's second objection against an equal providence is, that it would make virtue servile—"If the good, besides the enjoyment of all that happiness which is inseparable from virtue, were exempted from all kinds of evil, and if the wicked, besides all those evils which are inseparable from vice, and those which happen to all men in the ordinary course of events, were exposed to others that the hand of God inflicted on them in an extraordinary manner, such good men would have very little merit; they would have, while they continued to be good, no other merit than that of children who are cajoled into their duty; or than that of galley-slaves who ply at the oar, because they hear and see and fear the lash of the boatswain."

If the perfection of a rational creature consists in acting according to reason; and if his merit rises in proportion as he advances in perfection; how can that state, which best secures him from acting irrationally, lessen or

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*Vol. ii. pp. 258, 259.*

† Scripture vindicated from the Misrepresentations of the Bishop of Bangor, p. 165.
take away his merit? Are the actions of the Deity of less worth, for his moral incapacity of being unjust or malignant? The motive which induces to right action is indeed more or less excellent, according to the dignity or nature of the agent: but the question here is not concerning the excellence, but the power of the motive to turn action into passion; which is the only way I can conceive of destroying merit in the subject. Now I hold, that this fancy, That motives exterior to the being on which they work, may be able to turn an agent to a patient, is one of the greatest of physical absurdities; and therefore commonly goes about disguised, in the garb of metaphysics. For while agency remains, merit subsists: the degrees of which do not depend on the less or greater force the motives have on the affections, but on the more or less reason of the choice. In a word, there is no means of taking away the merit and demerit of human actions, but by taking away agency, and making man passive, or, in other terms, a machine.

But, to expose in a more popular way the futility of this reasoning, it will be sufficient to observe that the objection holds equally against all religious sanctions whatsoever. And so indeed it was fairly urged by Lord Shaftesbury: who pretended that every motive regarding self tended to servilize virtue. Without doubt, one sort, just as much as another; a future state, just as well as an equal providence. Nay, if we were to appreciate matters very nicely, it would seem, that a future state without an equal providence (for they are always to be considered separately, as they belong to different systems) would more strongly incline the will, than an equal providence without a future state: as the value of future above present good is immensely great. But the human mind being so constituted, that the distance of a good takes off proportionally from its influence, this brings the force of the two sanctions nearer to an equality, which at length proves but this, That the objection to the merit of virtue holds against all religious sanctions whatsoever. In the use of which objection, Lord Shaftesbury was not only more ingenuous, as he urged it against them all, but more consistent, as he urged it on his doctrine of a perfect disinterestedness in our nature, whereas
A VIEW OF LORD

whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongst those who hold, that self-love and social, though coincident, are two essential principles in the human frame.

"That two consistent motions act the soul,
"And one regards itself, and one the whole."

But we might go further, and retort upon both these noble adversaries of religion, that the charge of making virtue servile affects all moral, as well as all religious sanctions; as well that, whose existence they allow, as those, which they would persuade us to be visionary; both these illustrious patrons of infidelity acknowledging that moral sanction which arises from God's making the practice of virtue our interest as well as duty. Now interest and servility is, it seems, the same thing, with these generous spirits.

His Lordship's third cavil to an equal providence is, that it would relax general benevolence.

—"But would there not be, at the same time, some further defects in this scheme? I think there would.
"It seems to me, that these good men being thus distinguished by particular providences, in their favour, from the rest of mankind, might be apt either not to contract, or to lose that general benevolence, which is a fundamental principle of the law of nature, and that public spirit, which is the life and soul of society. God has made the practice of morality our interest, as well as our duty. But men who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fell on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate: and if they relaxed in their zeal for the public good, they would relax in their virtue; for public good is the object of virtue. They might do worse, spiritual pride might infect them. They might become, in their own imaginations, the little flock, or the chosen sheep. Others have been so by the mere force of enthusiasm, without any such inducements as those which we assume, in the same case; and experience has shewn, that there are no wolves like these sheep."

The case assumed, to which his Lordship objects, and against which he pretends to argue, is that of an equal providence
prov'dence which exactly distributes good to virtue, and to vice, evil. Now the present objection to such a state is, an' please you, that this favourable distinction of good, to the virtuous man, would be apt to destroy his general benevolence and public spirit. These, in his Lordship's account, and so in mine too, are the most sublime of all virtues; and therefore, it is agreed, will be most highly rewarded: but the tendency of this favourable distinction, if you will believe him, may prove the loss of general benevolence and public spirit. As much as this shocks common sense, his Lordship has his reasons. God has made the practice of morality our interest as well as duty. But men, who find themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate.

God has made the practice of morality our interest as well as duty. Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our interest, under an equal, as well as under an unequal providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably so, in the absence of those inequalities which hinder our seeing clearly, and feeling constantly, that the practice of morality is our interest as well as duty?

—But men, who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow insensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate. What are those evils, under an equal providence, which fall on others, and from which the good man is protected? Are they not the punishments inflicted on the wicked? And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perseverance in virtue? It is therefore impossible he should grow unconcerned to those evils which his Lordship calls the common fate, when he sees his interest and his duty so closely connected, that there is no way of avoiding those evils but by persevering in virtue. But the name of common fate, which he gives unto them, detects his prevarication. He pretends to reason against an equal providence, yet slurs in upon us, in its stead, a providence which only protects good men; or rather one certain species of good men; and leaves all other to their...
COMMON FATE. But admit it possible for the good man to relax in his benevolence, and to grow insensible to the common fate: there is, in the state here assumed, a speedy means of bringing him to himself; and that is, his being no longer protected from the evils that fall on others: for when men relax in their benevolence, his Lordship tells you, they relax in their virtue: and, give me leave to tell his Lordship, that when men relax in their virtue, Providence relaxes in its protection; or, to speak more properly, the rewards of virtue are abated in proportion.

However, spiritual pride (he says) might infect the virtuous, thus protected: and this he will prove a fortiori, from the case of ENTHUSIASTS; who only imagine they have this protection, and have it not. Now, what if we should say, it is this very enthusiastic spirit itself, and not the visions of protection it is apt to raise, which is the true cause of spiritual pride? Enthusiasm is that temper of mind, in which the imagination has got the better of the judgment. In this disordered state of things, enthusiasm, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes FANATICISM: and this, in its extreme, begets the fancy of our being the peculiar favourites of heaven. Now, every one sees, that spiritual pride is the cause, and not the effect, of the disorder. For what but spiritual pride springing out of presumptive holiness, could bring the fanatic to fancy himself exalted above the common condition of the faithful? It is true, when he was got thus far, the folly which brought him hither, might carry him further; and then, all to come would be indeed the effect of his disorder. But suppose it was not the enthusiastic spirit, but the visions of protection it is apt to raise, which is the cause of spiritual pride; is there no difference between a vision and a reality? Fancy may occasion those disorders which fact may remove. This, I persuade myself, is the case here: the real communication of grace purifies those passions, and exalts them into virtues, which the strong delusion of such a state only renders more gross and violent. And here it may be worth while to take notice that his Lordship, in this objection to an extraordinary providence, from the hurt it does to general benevolence, seems to have
had the Jewish people in his eye; who, in the latter ages of their republic, were commonly charged, and perhaps truly, with want of benevolence to the rest of mankind: a fact, which, though it makes nothing for his purpose, makes very much for mine, as it furnishes me with an example to support what is here said of fanatism; an infirmity pretty general amongst the Jews of those ages. They had outlived their extraordinary providence; but not the memory, nor even the effects of it; nay, the warmer tempers were hardly brought to think it had ceased. This filled them with spiritual pride, as the elect of God; a disposition which, it is confessed, tends readily to destroy or to relax general benevolence. But what now are the natural consequences, which the actual administration of an equal providence would have on the human mind? In this case, as in the other, a warm temper, whose object was religion, would be obnoxious to the common weakness of our nature, and too apt to disgrace itself by spiritual pride: but as this is one of the vices which an equal providence is always at hand to punish, the cure would be direct and speedy. The recovered votary we will now suppose to be received again into the number of the good; and to find himself in the little flock and chosen sheep, as they are nicknamed by this noble writer. Well, but his danger is not yet over; the sense of this high prerogative of humanity might revive, in a warm temper, the still unmortified seeds of spiritual pride. Admit this to be the case; what follows? His pride revives indeed, but it is only to be again humbled: for punishment is still closely attendant on vice and folly. At length, this holy discipline, the necessary consequence of an equal providence, effectually does its work; it purifies the mind from low and selfish partialities, and adorns the will with general benevolence, public spirit, and love of all its fellow creatures.

What then could support his Lordship in so perverse a judgment concerning the state and condition of good men under an equal providence? That which supports all his other insults on religion; his sophistical change of the question. He objects to an equal providence (which religionists pretend has been administered during one period of the dispensation of grace) where good men are...
constantly rewarded, and wicked men as constantly punished; and he takes the matter of his objection from the fanatical idea of a favoured elect (which never existed but in over-heated brains) where reward and punishment are distributed, not on the proportions of merit and demerit, but on the diabolic dreams of certain eternal decrees of election and reprobation, unrelated to any human principle of justice.

But now, Sir, keep the question steadily in your eye; and his Lordship's reasoning in this paragraph will disclose such a complication of absurdities as will astonish you. You will see an equal providence, which, in and through the very act of rewarding benevolence, public spirit, and humility, becomes instrumental in producing, in those so rewarded, selfishness, neglect of the public, and spiritual pride.—

His Lordship's last objection to an extraordinary providence is, that it would not answer its end.

"I will conclude this head (says he) by observing, that we have example as well as reason for us, when we reject the hypothesis of particular providences. God was the king of the Jewish people. His presence resided amongst them, and his justice was manifested daily in rewarding and punishing by unequivocal, signal, and miraculous interpositions of his power. The effect of all was this, the people rebell'd at one time, and repented at another. Particular providences, directed by God himself immediately, upon the spot, if I may say so, had particular temporal effects only, none general nor lasting: and the people were so little satisfied with this system of government, that they deposed the Supreme Being, and insisted to have another king, and to be governed like their neighbours."

In support of this last objection, you see his Lordship was forced to throw off the mask, and fairly tell us what he aimed at; that is to say, to discredit the extraordinary providence mentioned by Moses. An equal providence, says he, will not answer its end. What is its end? Here, his prevarications bring us, as usual, to our distinctions.—When this providence is administered for the sake of particulars, its first end is to discipline us in virtue, and keep us in our duty: when administered for the
the sake of a community, its first end is to support the institution it had erected. Now his Lordship, proceeding from reason to example, gives us this of the Jewish republic, to prove that an equal or extraordinary providence does not answer one or other or both these ends.

But it is unlucky for him, that here, where he employs the example, he cannot forbear, any more than in numberless other places of his writings, to tell us that he believes nothing of the matter—How long this theocracy may be said to have continued (says he) I am quite unconcerned to know, and should be sorry to mis-spend my time in inquiring.—The example then is only an argument ad hominem. But the misfortune is, that no laws of good reasoning will admit an argument ad hominem on this question, Of the effects of a real extraordinary providence; because the nature of the effects of real providence can never be discovered by the effects of a pretended one. To say the truth, his Lordship is at present out of luck. For had he indeed believed the extraordinary providence of the Jews to be real, his own representation of the case would, on his own principles, have proved it but pretended. For it is a principle with him, that where the means do not produce the end, such means (all pretences notwithstanding) are but human inventions. It is thus he argues against the divinity of the Christian religion; which he concludes to be an imposition for its not having effected that lasting reformation of manners, which he supposes was its principal design to accomplish.

So far as to the choice of his example. He manages no better in the application of it.

We have distinguished concerning the ends of an extraordinary providence. Let us suppose now, that his Lordship takes the principal end of the Jewish theocracy to be the reformation of particulars. He refers to their history, and pretends to show they were not reformed. Now whatever other consequences may attend this supposed fact, the most obvious and glaring is this, That his Lordship, in proceeding from reason to example, has given us such an example as overturns or supersedes all his reasoning. According to his reasoning, an extraordinary providence would tie virtue and good manners so fast down.
down upon every individual, that his very will would be forced, and the merit of doing what he had it not in his power to forbear, absolutely destroyed. You would now perhaps expect his example should confirm this pretended fact? Just otherwise. His example shews his fact to be a fiction, and that men remained as bad as ever.

But I have no need of taking any artificial advantage of his Lordship's bad reasoning. For, when we see it constantly opposed to truth, it is far from being an additional discredit to it, that it is as constantly opposed to itself.

The truth indeed is, that the great and principal end of the Jewish theocracy was to keep that people a separate nation, under their own law and religion, till the coming of the Messiah; and to prepare things for his reception by preserving amongst them the doctrine of the unity. Now, to judge whether the theocracy or extraordinary providence compassed its end, we have only to consider, whether this people, to the coming of Christ, did continue a distinct nation separated from all the other tribes of mankind, and distinguished from them by the worship of the one true God. And on inquiry, we shall find, they not only did continue thus distinct and distinguished, but have so continued ever since. A singularity which has had no example amongst any other people: and is sufficient to convince us, that there must have been some amazing power in that theocracy, which could go on operating for so many ages after the extraordinary administration of it had ceased. Let us conclude therefore, that the having nothing to urge against the due efficacy of this extraordinary providence, but that, the people rebelled at one time and repented at another, and that this providence had only temporary effects, is the most ample confession of his defeat. And so much for his Lordship's exploits in ancient politics.

Let us now come a little nearer to him, and consider him in his capacity for the modern. Here his Lordship shines without a rival,

"Whether to settle peace, or to unfold
"The drift of hollow states—besides to know
"Both spiritual power and civil, what each means,
"What severs each——"
as was said, by a poet of the last age, of his turbulent friend; who if he did not serve his country better than this politician of later date, had much more to answer for, as by all accounts his talents were vastly superior.

His Lordship, however, with the best he has, proceeds to overturn the principles of the Alliance between Church and State. But the pains he had taken, and the opposition he had found from the argument of the Divine Legation, had, by the time he came upon this second adventure, so ruffled his temper and decomposed his manners, that he now breaks out in all kinds of opprobrious language, not only against the system, but even against the person of the Author.

To understand the nature of his Lordship's provocation, if at least it arose from this treatise of the Alliance, it may not be improper to say a word or two of the occasion of that book, and of the principles on which it is composed.

After the many violent convulsions our country had suffered since the reformation by the rage of religious parties (in which, at one time, liberty of conscience was oppressed; and at another, the established church overturned and desolated) it pleased Divine Providence to settle our religious rights on such fundamental principles of justice and equity, and to secure the civil peace on such maxims of wisdom and true policy, as most effectually guarded both against the return of their respective violations: and the means made use of were the giving, on proper terms of security to the national religion, a free toleration to all who dissented from the established worship. This seemed to be going as far towards perfection in religious communion, as the long distracted state of the Christian world would suffer us to indulge our hopes.

But men had not been long in possession of this blessing before they grew weary of it, and set on foot many inventions, to throw us back into our old disorders. For it is to be observed with sorrow, that this reform of the English constitution happened not to be the good work of the Church, begun in the conviction of truth, and carried on upon the principles of charity: but was

* Milton.
rather owing to the vigilance of the state; at one time, 
vaingly perhaps, anxious for the established religion *, at 
another, wisely provident for the support of civil liberty †. 
So that when succeeding dissensions in church and state 
had made this newly reformed constitution the subject of 
enquiry, the parties who managed the debate being those 
who before had both persecuted and suffered in their 
turns, the principles and tempers they brought with them 
to the discussion of the question were not such perhaps 
as were best fitted either to regulate their judgments, or 
to moderate their partialities. One side seemed to re-
gard the toleration as an evil in itself, and only a 
temporary expedient to prevent a worse; while their 
conduct shewed, they lay at watch for the first occasion 
to break in upon it. This was enough to mislead the 
other to consider the test law, which covered and 
secured the established religion, as no better than a new 
species of persecution: and having now no real injury to 
complain of, they began to take umbrage at this shadow 
of a grievance; "To have divine worship really free, they 
said, no religious profession should be attended with 
civil incapacities: a test had made that distinction 
amongst God’s worshippers: it was therefore to be 
set aside.” But every man saw (and perhaps the 
enemies of the test were not amongst the last who saw it) 
that to set aside this law, which, under a general tolera-
tion, was the only security of the established church, 
was exposing the national worship, to all the inroads of 
a sectarian rabble. This mischievous project, arising 
out of abused liberty, was at first entertained, as we may 
well suppose, by the tolerated churches only. Some of 
the more ingenuous of them adopted it out of fear, on the 
discovery of that bigoted principle in their adversaries, 
which considered toleration as only a temporary expe-
dient. And where was the wonder, if those who believed 
they had no security for what they had got, while such 
principles prevailed, should endeavour to put it out 
of the power of their adversaries to do them harm? 
Others of a more politic turn cherished it from views of 
ambition, and in hopes of sharing the emoluments of the 
established church. It was some time before any
member of the church of England joined with dissenters in their clamours against a test law, or, more properly speaking, against their own establishment. This monstrous coalition did not happen till a warm dispute on certain metaphysical questions* (if considered in one light, too sublime to become the subject of human wit; if in another, too trifling to gain the attention of reasonable men) had started new scruples concerning church subscription. And to get rid of this necessary engagement to peace, and acquiescence in the established religion, these wise and faithful ministers of the national worship were amongst the foremost to discredit it, and the busiest to trample down all its fences and securities.

Bigotry, you see, was at the bottom of the first set of principles; and fanaticism, at the top of the other. In their separate appeals to the experience of mankind, there was this remarkable difference; all ages had felt the mischiefs of religious restraint and persecution; but there was no example, either in Pagan or in Christian times, of the evils attending the want of an established religion. The fanatics, therefore, were perpetually urging their experience against persecution, secure in not having the argument retorted on them. But, in this imaginary triumph they deceived themselves; and the very want of examples was the greatest advantage the bigots had over them: who if they had no instance of the evils attending the want of an establishment, to retort upon their adversaries, it was because such want was never known: the necessity of a national religion for the support of society, being so indispensable, that men even in the wildest times, the sworn enemies of religious establishments, and leagued together for their destruction, were no sooner become able to effect their purpose, than they found, in beginning to new-model the state, which they had subdued by the superiority of their arms, that there was even a necessity of supporting an established church. Of this, we have a remarkable example in the independent republic, and in the protectorship of Oliver; both of which, under their several usurpations, were forced to erect presbytery, the religion they most
To proceed; the distempers of the state still further contributed to inflame those of the church: and, on the accession of the present royal line to the throne, a long, a famous, and a regular dispute concerning the powers, bounds, and limits of the two societies, was begun and carried on by two parties of churchmen. But as the several disputants had reciprocally assigned too much, and allowed too little to the two societies, and had erected their arguments on one common fallacy; the maintainers of an establishment supported a test-law on such reasoning as destroyed a toleration; and the defenders of religious liberty argued against the justice of that security on such principles as concluded equally against a national church.

In this ferment, and in this embroiled condition, the Author of The Alliance between Church and State found the sentiments of men concerning religious liberty and establishments, when he proposed his theory to their consideration: a theory calculated to vindicate our present happy constitution on a principle of right, by adjusting the precise bounds of either society; by shewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their union: and from thence, by natural and necessary consequence, inducing, on the one hand, an established religion, with all its rights and privileges, secured by a test law; and on the other, a full and free toleration to all who dissent from the national worship.

He first shewed the use of religion to society, from the experience and practice of all ages: he inquired from whence the use arose, and found it to be from certain original defects in the very essence and plan of civil society. He went on to the nature of religion; and shewed how, and for what causes, it constituted a society: and then, from the natures of the two societies, he collected, that the object of the civil is only the body and its interests; and the object of the religious, only the soul. Hence he concluded, that both societies are sovereign and independent; because they arise not out of one another; and because, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can never meet to clash; the sameness of original, or the sameness of administration, being the only causes which
which can bring one, of two distinct societies, into natural subjection to the other.

To apply religion therefore to the service of civil society, in the best manner it is capable of being applied, he shewed it was necessary that the two societies should unite: for each being sovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying the service of religion in any solid or effectual manner. But no such union could arise but from free compact and convention. And free convention is never likely to happen, unless each society has its mutual motives, and mutual advantages. The Author, therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the two societies, explained what those motives and advantages were. Whence it appeared that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the two societies; thus united, with the civil magistrate at their head, were indeed those very rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find established and enjoyed under our present happy constitution in church and state: the result of this was, that an established church and a free toleration, are made perfectly to agree by the medium of a test law. This law therefore the Author, in the last place, proceeded to vindicate, on the same general principles of the law of nature and nations.

You have here, Sir, a true though short analysis of The Alliance between Church and State; with the principles on which the theory is conducted.

Let us now consider the account his Lordship has been pleased to give of it. I shall take him paragraph by paragraph, in his native disorder, as he lies: and for the same reason that I followed a different method in confuting his arguments against the moral attributes, which I chose to methodize and digest. For when a disorderly writer is tolerably clear, you may make him still clearer, and shew his arguments to advantage, by bringing them into order. But when such a one is beyond remedy cloudy and confused, as our noble writer is here where he reasons against the book of the Alliance, this assistance would be suspicious: for the reader might come to fancy that as well the obscurity as the order were of the answerer's making. Therefore the safest as well as fairest way, in this case, is to take the writer as you find him. The
The obscurities in thought and expression will be then seen to be his own; and nothing can be objected to his adversary, but a few repetitions, which in this method of answering can never be avoided.

His Lordship preludes his attack upon the book and the author with this curious narrative:

"I have heard of a sermon preached by one Doctor Senior, a Fellow of Trinity College, in Cambridge, before King Charles the Second, at Newmarket, in the days of passive obedience and non-resistance, and afterwards printed. His text was taken from the 14th, 15th, and 16th verses of the fourth chap. of Exodus, or some of them; wherein God directs Moses to take Aaron the Levite, because he knew that Aaron could speak well to the people, and joins them together in commission, that they might assist one another mutually; that Aaron might be instead of a mouth to Moses, and that Moses might be instead of God to Aaron. What other applications the good Doctor made of these texts, I know not. But I am informed by Mr. Lewis, who has read the sermon, that he established on them a supposed Alliance between the Church and the State; or rather between the Church and the King. By this alliance the well-spoken Levite was to instil passive obedience to the king, in the minds of the people, and to insist on it, as on a law of God; the king, on the other hand, was to be the nursing father of the church, to support her authority, to preserve, at least, if not increase, her immunities, and to keep her in the full possession of all the advantages she claimed. The church performed her part, and had a right, by virtue of this alliance, if the king did not perform his, to teach this doctrine no longer, and to resume her independence on the state and on him. This was the purport of the sermon, at least: and Warburton took his hint, possibly, from it, and turned it to serve his purpose; that is, to lay down the same principles and to banter mankind if he could, by not drawing directly, and avowedly, from them the same conclusion. Dr. Senior's authority is, no doubt, as good in this case, as that of Dr. Marca, or..."
even of Bossuet. The first, a time-serving priest, interested, and a great flatterer, if ever there was one, and who made no scruple to explain away whatsoever he had found himself obliged to say in favour of the state. The latter was as wise, if not as cunning, as learned, and a much better man, though not so much in the favour of Mr. Warburton, who gave them characters in his assuming style, without knowing any thing of them; and who has the impertinence to pronounce of the greatest scholar, the greatest divine, and the greatest orator of his age, that he was a good sensible man. He was all I have said of him: but he was an ecclesiastic, and a subject of France.

As to this account of Dr. Senior, I scarce know what to make of it, or what credit it deserves: for he who will falsify a book in every body's hands, will hardly be very scrupulous of what he says of a sermon, which nobody has heard of but his friend Mr. Lewis. At least if Dr. Senior was ever a man of this world, I should fancy he must be later than where his Lordship, who is no great chronologer, has placed him. He tells us it was in the days of passive obedience and non-resistance, and that the doctrine of his sermon was calculated for the service of popery and arbitrary power. May we not suppose, then, that he flourished under his Lordship's auspices, when the church was last in danger? If this were the case, his Lordship uses Dr. Senior just as he used St. Paul *, first sets him upon preaching passive obedience, and then abuses him for his pains.

But let Dr. Senior live when and where he will, he thinks it possible that Warburton might have taken the hint of the Alliance from him. Yes, just as possible as that Locke took the hint of the original compact from Filmer.

He assures us, however, that the authority of Dr. Senior is as good as that of de Marca, or even of Bossuet. The authority of Dr. Senior! For what? To support Mr. Warburton's doctrine of the Alliance.

* "By this Alliance of the Hierarchy and the Monarchy, Religion, that should support good government alone, was employed " to support good and bad government alike, as it has been " by St. Paul."
But where is it to be had? Suppose this difficulty to be got over; and Dr. Senior as ready at hand as De Marca or Bossuet, and as willing to declare against the incroachments of the church; yet the Author of the Alliance, perhaps, would not think it altogether so fit for his purpose: for he tells us, that his purpose in so frequently quoting the acknowledgments of De Marca and Bossuet, in favour of the state, was to shame those protestant divines who had contended for the independency of the church, after it became established; and even for its superiority before.

But, of these two famous Frenchmen, The first (he says) was a time-serving priest, interested, and a great flatterer—the latter was as wise if not as cunning, as learned and a much better man, though not so much in the favour of Mr. Warburton, who gave them characters, in his assuming style, without knowing anything of them, and who has the impertinence to pronounce, of the greatest scholar, the greatest divine, and the greatest orator of his age, that he was a good sensible man.

The Author of the Alliance, in the Advertisement to the last edition of his book, speaking of the French translator, has these words—"He supported them [the conclusions] all along with quotations from the two famous works of De Marca and Bossuet; the one "the wisest, and the other the most sensible divine "that nation ever produced*.

From these words, I leave you, Sir, to reflect upon the truth and ingenuity of the noble writer's representation, that Bossuet is not so much in Mr Warburton's favour as De Marca; and that Mr. Warburton has the impertinence to pronounce that Bossuet was a good sensible man. In the heavy distresses of controversy, many a writer has been found to misrepresent. But to do this out of mere wantonness and gaiety of heart, and then, on the credit of his own false quotations, to abuse and call names, is altogether in his Lordship's manner.

But you will say, perhaps, that the impertinence was not in the familiarity of the commendation, but in

* Vol. VII. p. xii. of this edition.
the choice of the topic. It may be so; and then we get
another rule of good writing from his Lordship, who has
already supplied us with so many: "That when the
authority of an author is urged in a point concerning civil
and religious rights, his learning, his divinity, and;
above all, his eloquence should be insisted on, rather than
his good sense."

All this is but a prelude to the combat. "The notion
(says this great politician) of a formal alliance
between church and state, as between two independent
distinct powers, is a very groundless and whimsical
notion. But a fraudulent or silent compact between
princes and priests became very real, as soon as an
ecclesiastical order was established." The latter part
of this period is but too true; and the theory of the
Alliance (misrepresented in the former part) was pro-
posed to remedy these mischiefs. It is this theory only;
which I shall undertake to vindicate against his Lord-
ship's objections.

If, by formal, he means (and what should he mean
else?) one actually executed in form; and supposes that
the Author of the Alliance between Church and State;
asserted the actual execution of such a one, we may, with
more justice, perhaps, apply to his Lordship what he says
of the Author, concerning De Marca and Bossuet;
That he gives a character of the book called the
Alliance, without knowing any thing of it. Give me
leave to quote the Author's own words—"From all this
it appears, that our plan of Alliance is no precarious
arbitrary hypothesis, but a theory founded in reason;
and the invariable nature of things. For having, from
the essence, collected the necessity of allying, and the
freedom of the compact; we have from the same
necessity, fairly introduced it; and from its freedom;
consequentially established every mutual term and
condition of it. So that now if the reader should ask,
where this charter or treaty of convention for the union
of the two societies, on the terms here delivered, is to
be met with? We are able to answer him. We say, it
may be found in the same archive with the famous
original compact between magistrate and people;
so much insisted on, in vindication of the common
rights
rights of subjects. Now when a sight of this compact is required of the defenders of civil liberty, they hold it sufficient to say, that it is enough for all the purposes of fact and right, that such original compact is the only legitimate foundation of civil society: that if there were no such thing formally executed, there was, virtually: that all differences between magistrate and people ought to be regulated on the supposition of such a compact; and all government reduced to the principles therein laid down; for that the happiness, of which civil society is productive, can only be attained by it, when formed on those principles. Now something like this we say of our Alliance between Church and State*.

Let this serve too, for an answer to his Lordship's insulting question in another place—"But where shall we look for the conditions of that original contract which was made between the religious and the civil society, I know not; unless we suppose them written on the back of Constantine's grant to Sylvester." Does his Lordship know where to look for the original contract which was made between the prince and people, in any place of easier access? Or will he, when at a loss, send us to the back of Constantine's grant to Sylvester; for this contract likewise?

But to proceed. If by formally, through a perverse use of words, his Lordship means only virtually, like the original compact between king and people; this indeed, the Author of the Alliance does venture to say, and not only to say, but to prove likewise.

It is true, the foundation of the proof, in his Lordship's opinion, stands upon a whimsical principle: so did the argument of the Divine Legation of Moses, from the omission of a future state†. Indeed his Lordship seems to have been as much distressed by whimsical divines, when he turned philosopher, as he was by whimsical politicians, while he continued a statesman‡. However, the whimsical principle in question is this, That the Church of Christ composes a society sovereign, and independent of the civil.

This principle, his Lordship rejects: and it must be confessed, not, as is his wont, altogether absurdly: for he who makes religion itself a phantom, can surely have little or no idea how it should become embodied.

"Neither nature nor reason (says his Lordship) could ever lead men to imagine two distinct and independent societies in the same society, This imagination was broached by ecclesiastical ambition."

A grave sentence! which to me seems equivalent to this, That neither nature nor reason could ever lead men to imagine that one was two. In this, I readily agree with him. But then the difficulty remains, how such a thing could ever come to be broached (as his Lordship says it was) by any imagination not more disordered than it usually is by ecclesiastical ambition. School-learning, indeed, might do much; for there his Lordship has fixed his theological Bedlam: but church ambition, he assures us, is of another mould; which, as it never failed, he says, to aim at, so, it never failed to obtain, immoderate wealth and exorbitant power. What then are we to think? That his Lordship meant, that neither nature nor reason could ever lead men to imagine two distinct and independent societies in the same community? for community being the genus, several societies, as the species, may, indeed, be contained in it. This, I am ready to suppose, merely for my own ease; because when his Lordship is well understood he is always more than half confuted.

In this paragraph, then, are contained these two propositions:

1. That the church does not compose a society.
2. That it does not compose a society independent and sovereign.

Let us examine his reasoning on these points as it lies in his works; for as disorderly as it lies, it is intended, I assure you, to overturn the whole theory of the Alliance.

"A religious society (says his Lordship) by which is meant, on this occasion, a clergy, is, or is not, a creature of the state. If the first, it follows, that this order no more than others, which the state has instituted for the maintenance of good government."

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government, can assume any rights, or exercise any powers, except such as the state has thought fit to attribute to it, and that the state may, and ought to keep a constant control over it, not only to prevent usurpations and abuses, but to direct the public and private influence of the clergy, in a strict conformity to the letter and spirit of the constitution; the servants of which, in a much truer sense, they are, than what they affect sometimes to call themselves, the ambassadors of God to other men. *If the last is said, if it be asserted, that the church is in any sort independent on the state, there arises from this pretension the greatest absurdity imaginable, that, I mean, of imperium in imperio; an empire of divine, in an empire of human institution.*

Thus far his Lordship, who is here reasoning against the principles laid down in the book of the Alliance. He introduces his dilemma with telling the reader, that the Author of that book has defined a religious society, to be the body of the clergy.—A religious society, by which (says he) is meant on this occasion a clergy, is, or is not, a creature of the state*

You cannot, I believe, see this assertion without some surprise, when you observe, that the Author of the Alliance has defined a religious society to be a number of religious creatures associated †. When you observe, that he makes it one of the principal cares of a religious society, to provide an order of men, to be set apart for ministering in holy things, or in other words, a clergy—"The greatest care is to have, that the acts of religious worship be preserved simple, decent, and significative. But this can be done only by providing persons set apart for this office; whose peculiar employment it shall be to preside in, direct, and superintend the acts and services of religion ‡," &c. When you observe, he makes the end of religious society to be, salvation of souls, and one of the means, the order of the clergy.—Lastly, when you observe, he

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* So again, This order of men which we call the Religious Society —And again, The Religious Society, as we have accustomed ourselves to call the Clergy.

† Alliance, pp. 55, &c. ‡ Ibid. p. 60.
BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY.

opposes the church and the clergy to each other: "It
"is unjust in the church to aim at the propagation
"of religion by force, and impertinent to aim at riches,
"honours, and powers. But what motives the clergy
"of a church might have, is nothing to the purpose
"of our inquiry. We have only to consider what the
"church had, which, as a religious society, consists
"of the whole body of the community, both laity
"and clergy.*"

In a word, the Author of the Alliance was at much
pains to prove that a religious society or church does not
mean the clergy, but the whole body of the faithful: and
this for two reasons, for the sake of truth in general, and
of his own system in particular.

1. It shocks common sense to call one order or rank
in society, by the name of the society: it is little better
than calling one of the qualities of a substance, by the
name of the substance.

2. It subverted the theory of the Alliance to make
the clergy constitute the church: for then the church
could neither be a distinct society, nor independent; both
of which it must be, to make it capable of an alliance
with the state. It could not be a distinct society; for
an order of men, as I observed just before, is the same
in politics, as a quality in physics; the one must inhere
in a society, the other in a substance: and these being
the substrata of the other, to talk of a distinct, much
more, of the independent existence of an order, or of a
quality, is the profoundest nonsense in politics and
physics. But admitting that such a church, which, like
Trinculo's kingdom, consists only of viceroys and vice-
roys over them, were capable of allying with the state,
the Author has shewn, in the place quoted above, that its
motives for allying would be such as the state could never
comply with, either in justice or policy.

Extreme necessity (to do his Lordship all the right we
can) forced him upon this bold and violent falsification of

* Ibid. pp. 101, 102. The very Popish clergy, nay De Marca
himself, that time-serving priest and great flatterer, was more honest
(as his Lordship might have seen by the quotation at the bottom
of this very page of the Alliance—Ecclesiae corpus, ex fidelium
omnia compage constitutur) than he chooses to represent
the body of the English clergy.
the doctrine of the Alliance. He saw no other way of
discrediting the opinion of an independent religious
society, than by making it believed that such a society
would be an "Imperium in imperio, an empire of
divine, in an empire of human institution;" a mischief,
against which the state is always on its guard. And if a
religious society signified the church, and the church only
the clergy, the claim to independency would imply
such an imperium. But the Author of the Alliance goes
upon other principles; he holds, that the church signifies
the whole body of the faithful; that though this society
be independent, yet, from its independency, no such
solecism in politics can arise as an imperium in imperio.
This argument, which the Author has drawn out at large,
the noble person, in the following words, misrepresents,
perverts, and attempts to overthrow.

"An imperium in imperio (says he) is in truth so
expressly contained in the very terms of the assertion,
that none of the tedious sophistical reasonings,
which have been employed for the purpose, can evade
or disguise it. One of these I will mention, because it
has a certain air of plausibility, that imposes
on many; and because, if it cannot stand a short and
fair examination, as I think it cannot, the whole edifice
of ecclesiastical independency and grandeur falls to the
ground. It has been said then, that religious and
civil societies are widely distinguished by the distinct
ends of their institutions, which imply necessarily dis-

tinct powers and a mutual independency; that the end
of the one is the salvation of souls, and that of the
other the security of temporal interests; that the state
punishes overt acts, and can punish nothing else, be-
because it can have cognizance of nothing that passes in
the mind, and does not break out into criminal actions;
but that the church employing her influence to temper
the passions, to regulate the inward dispositions, and
to prevent sins, as well as crimes, is that tribunal at
which even intentions are to be tried, and sins, that
do not ripen into crimes, nor immediately affect civil
society, are to be punished."

This, I will suppose, his Lordship intended as a fair
representation of the Author's argument for the indepen-
dency
dency of the church. But the argument, as it stands in the Alliance, is drawn from the different powers belonging to the two societies; as those powers are deduced from their different ends. But different powers implying different administrations, they create a mutual independency; and different administrations, implying an incapacity of their clashing with one another, shew plainly that such an independency can never produce an imperium in imperio. This is the natural order of the argument, as it stands in the Alliance. Let us see now, how his Lordship represents it. He begins rightly, with the different ends, viz. salvation of souls, and security of temporal interests: but, proceeding to speak of the different powers, adapted to those different ends, viz. coercion in the state, and persuasion only in the church (from whence arises a mutual independency) he mistakes the consequences of these powers, which are punishment of overt acts, and subdual of the passions; he mistakes them, I say, for the powers themselves; from which consequences indeed no independency ensues; because subdual of the passions may, in his Lordship's opinion at least, be obtained by coercive power, as well as punishment of overt acts. And if both societies have coercive power, one must needs be dependent on the other. I take notice of this mistake only to shew you, what a poor and imperfect conception his Lordship had of the argument of the Alliance. Had he told us, though in fewer words, that the Author's reasoning against the pretence of an imperium in imperio arising out of a mutual independency, was this, That the state having coercive power, and the church having none, the administration of the two societies could never clash; so as to induce the mischief of an imperium in imperio; had he told us this, I say, we should have seen, that at least he understood his adversary.

But let us consider how he goes about to answer what he so ill represents.

"Now in answer to all this (says his Lordship) we may deny, with truth and reason on our side, that the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of civil society, are so distinct as to require distinct powers, and a mutual independency. The salvation of souls
"is not the immediate end of civil society, and I wish it
was not rather the pretence, than the end of ecclesiastic-
tical policy; but if to abstain from evil and to do good
works be means of salvation, the means of salvation
are the objects of civil government. It is the duty of
princes and magistrates to promote a strict observa-
tion of the law of nature, of private and public mora-
lity, and to make those who live in subjection to them
good men, in order to make them good citizens. For
this purpose, the balance and the sword are put into
their hands, that they may measure out punishment
to every one, who injures the community, or does
wrong to his neighbour; and a rigorous punishmen of
.crimes, especially if it be accompanied with rewards
and encouragements to virtue, for both are intrusted
.to the same men", is the surest way not only to re-
form the outward behaviour, but to create an habitual
.inward disposition to the practice of virtue."

_We may_, says his Lordship, _deny that the avowed
ends of religious, and the real ends of civil society,
are so distinct_. Here he contradicts his master _Locke_.
This indeed is a small matter. I shall shew he contra-
dicts truth, and the whole system of human affairs, both
in the constitution of laws, and in the administration of
justice.—But before we come to that, there is a great
deal to be done.—_We may_, says his Lordship, _deny that
the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of
civil society, are so distinct, as to require distinct
powers and a mutual dependency_. The avowed ends,
does he say? _Avowed_ by whom? _Common sense re-
quires he should mean, avowed by those who go upon
the principles of the book of _Alliance_. But then he
_might_ have said _real_; for the avowed and the real ends
are the same: he _should_ have said _real_; for the fair use
of the proposition, and the force of the argument drawn
from it, both require this word. But by what he pre-
dicates of these avowed ends, _viz._ their not requiring

* This is said, I suppose, in opposition to what is asserted in the
book of the _Alliance_ (to shew the imperfection of the plan of civil
power) that _reward_ is not (as it is generally understood to be) one
of the sanctions of civil government, in the sense that _punishment_ is
.so. But as this is all his Lordship has to say against it, I shall
here let the matter rest between them.
distinct powers, we see, he means avowed by corrupt churchmen. (The salvation of souls (says he, immediately after) is rather the pretence than the end of ecclesiastical policy). And these ends are church uniformity for the sake of spiritual dominion. Now these avowed ends, we readily confess, cannot be obtained without coercive power of the civil kind. Here then you have his Lordship, after all his declamation against spiritual tyranny, coming at last, in the true spirit of a free-thinking politician, to profess that religious persecution and coercive power are, in the order of things, as justly and reasonably employed in matters of conscience, as in the overt acts of civil life: now though this be altogether upon principle (for what should restrain a statesman, who believes nothing of the truth of religion, and sees all the mischiefs of diversity of opinions, from attempting to bring about an outward uniformity, by force?) yet you would not have expected it in this place, where his Lordship is defending religious liberty, against the priestcraft of the Alliance: nor would you have found it, had not the distresses of controversy driven him into his native quarters, before his time. The Alliance went on this principle, that the church was a society, independent of the civil, as not having coercive power like the civil. To overturn this argument, his Lordship was forced to deny the minor, and so unawares has brought in persecution as one of the natural powers of the church. But to compass this matter neatly, and without noise, he has recourse to his old trade, the employing, under an ambiguous expression, the abuse of the thing for the thing itself.—The avowed ends of religious—the real ends of civil society. But it was so evident a truth, that the salvation of souls was the real end of religious society, and the security of temporal interests, the real end of the civil, that he must have lost his senses who could be brought to believe that coercive power was as proper to promote the first as the second; or that instruction and exhortation was as proper to promote the second as the first: one or both of which things, his assertion, that the church and state have not distinct powers, necessarily implies: to disguise this absurdity therefore for real, which fair argument
argument required, he substitutes the ambiguous word, avowed, which his bad cause required: and under this cover, he denies, that the two societies are so distinct as to require distinct powers.—Well, this however we understand; and have thoroughly canvassed. But what mean the words that follow?—And a mutual independency. The Author of the Alliance indeed had said, that the ends of the two societies were so distinct as to require distinct powers. But he was not so absurd to add—and a mutual independency; because independency was not the mean of attaining an end, like distinct powers, but a consequence of those powers: for if the powers, by which two societies are administered, be different, those societies (seeing their administrations can never clash) must needs be independent on one another. This is given only as a fresh instance of the cloudy apprehension this great statesman had of a plain argument, the argument of the Alliance, built on the first principles of law and politics.

Let me now proceed with his reasoning. He is to prove, what he had asserted, that the two societies are not so distinct as to require distinct powers. He is writing against the book, or rather against the Author, of the Alliance; who lays it down as an acknowledged truth, that the end of the religious is salvation of souls; the end of the civil, security of temporal interests. To this his Lordship replies, that salvation of souls is only the pretended end of the religious; but it is the real, though not immediate end, of the civil. And thus he has with great dexterity wiped out all distinction between the two societies. I have already detected both the fraud and the fallacy of the first part of his assertion. I come now to the other, that salvation of souls is the real, though not immediate, end of civil government. Here the meanness of his sophistry is still more apparent, than in the former part. It stands thus—“The immediate end of civil government is confessed, on all hands, to be security of temporal interests. This is done by keeping men to abstain from evil, and exciting them to good works—good works are the means of salvation—Therefore the means of salvation are the objects of civil
civil government; or, in other words, the salvation of souls is at least the real, though mediate end of civil society."

The Author of the Alliance had obviated all this paltry chicane in the following words: "Civil government, I suppose, will be allowed to have been invented for the attainment of some certain end or ends, exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction arises from the different properties of the things pretending. But amongst all those things which are apt to obtrude, or have in fact obtruded, upon men as the ends of civil government, there is but one difference in their properties, as ends: which is this, that one of these is attainable by civil society only, and all the rest are easily attained without it. The thing then with the first mentioned property must needs be that genuine end of civil society. And this is no other than security to the temporal liberty and property of man."

But his Lordship's sophism consists in the ambiguity of the word end; which either signifies the consequence or issue of a mean, simply; or, the consequence and issue, with intention and forethought. In the first sense it may be true, that salvation is the mediate end of civil society; but then it is nothing to the purpose. In the second sense it is to the purpose, but not true. The civil magistrate, all men see, had not this consequence or issue in his thoughts; as is evident from hence, that in adapting his punishments to the various species of unlawful actions, he does not proportion them to the heinousness of the offence, as estimated on the principles of natural or of revealed religion, but to their malignant influence on civil society. A plain indication, that, when he measured out punishments to offences, he had only political and not religious considerations in his view.——

But you shall hear what the Author of the Alliance has said on this subject, who had confuted his Lordship's sophism even before he had conceived it.

"We have shewn (says this writer) that it was the care of the bodies, not of the souls of men, that the

* Alliance, p. 42.

magistrate
A VIEW OF LORD [Lett. IV.

"magistrate undertook to give account of. Whatever
therefore refers to the body, is in his jurisdiction;
whatever to the soul, is not. But, and if there be that
which refers equally to both (as morals plainly do)
such thing must needs be partly within, and partly
without his province; that is, it is to be partially con-
sidered by him; his care thereto extending so far only
as it affects civil society. The other consideration of
it, namely, as it makes part of religion, being in the
hands of those, who preside in another kind of society.
Again, with regard to civil practice; if we cast our eye
on any digest of laws, we find that evil actions have
their annexed punishment denounced, not as they are
vices, i.e. not in proportion to their deviation from the
eternal rule of right; nor as they are sins, i.e. not in
proportion to their deviation from the extraordinary
revealed will of God: which two things indeed coi-
cide: but as they are crimes, i.e. in proportion to
their malignant influence on civil society. But the
view in which the state regards the practice of mora-
ity is evidently seen, in its recognition of that famous
maxim, by which penal laws in all communities are
fashioned and directed, that the severity of the
punishment must always rise in proportion
to the propensity to the crime. A maxim
evidently unjust were actions regarded by the state, as
they are in themselves only; because the Law of
Nature enjoins only in proportion to the ability of
performance; and human abilities abate in proportion
to the contrary propensities: evidently impious, were
actions regarded by the state as they refer to the will
of God, because this state-measure directly contradicts
his method and rule of punishing. But suppose the
magistrate's office to be what is here assigned, his aim
must be the suppression of crimes, or of those
actions which malignantly affect society; and then
nothing can be more reasonable than this proceeding;
for then his end must be the good of the whole, not of
particulars, but as they come within that view.
But the good of the whole being to be procured only
by the prevention of crimes, and those to which there
is the greatest propensity being of the most difficult
prevention,
"prevention, the full severity of his laws must of necessity be turned against these."

But, his Lordship goes on to inform us, What those means are which princes and magistrates employ to procure this mediate end of civil society, the salvation of souls; and they are, he says, coercive force.—For this purpose, the balance and the sword are put into their hands, that they may measure out punishment to every one, who injures the community, or does wrong to his neighbour. And a rigorous punishment of crimes, especially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, is the surest way not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an inward disposition to the practice of virtue.

Who would have expected that it should come at last to this, so contrary to his Lordship’s assertion in the case of an extraordinary providence, That a vigorous and exact distribution of rewards and punishments under the magistrate’s providence (which indeed is the only one his Lordship thinks worth a rush) should be so far from taking away merit and making virtue servile, that it is the surest way of creating an inward disposition to the practice of virtue! i.e. the surest way of making virtue free and meritorious. But there is something marvellously perverse in his Lordship’s conduct. The exact distribution of rewards and punishments by heaven makes virtue worthless and servile, though the administration of Providence be able to operate on the mind and intention, the only way, if any, of creating an 
reward disposition to the practice of virtue; that is, if making it free and meritorious. On the contrary, if you will continue to believe him, the exact distribution of rewards and punishments by the civil magistrate makes virtue free and meritorious, though the magistrate’s administration be unable to operate on the mind and intention, and influences only the outward act; which is (if any be) to make virtue worthless and servile.

But to come to the point, which these observations naturally lead to. The very means his Lordship assigns for the promotion of this imaginary end, namely coercive force for salvation of souls, entirely subverts his prin-

• Alliance, pp. 43—45.
ciple, and shews that salvation of souls could be no end of civil society, since the means are in no wise calculated to promote the end; it not being action simply, which intitles to the favour of God, but action, upon proper motives. Now with these (which result into what we call conscience), force, or coercion, is absolutely inconsistent: force may make hypocrites, but nothing but the rational convictions of religion can make men lovers of virtue.

Now if it be by such kind of reasoning as this that the whole edifice of ecclesiastical independency and grandeur may be brought to the ground (to use his Lordship's big language), church power was never worth the rearing.

To proceed. His Lordship with much gravity, tells us next, that "A clergy might co-operate with the civil magistrate very usefully, no doubt, by exhortations, reproofs, and example. This they might do as assistants to the civil magistrate, in concert with him, and in subordination to him. To what purpose therefore do they claim and affect independency on him? Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they erect a tribunal to punish intentions? The very pretence is impertinent. Would they erect it to punish where no injury is offered, nor wrong done? The design is unjust and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed. The magistrate cannot alter them. The ideas of sins are more confused and vague; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in the writings of casuists. Would they erect such a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith? Such a one is erected in some countries, under the name of the inquisition, and is justly detested in all. To what end and purpose then can spiritual courts and coercive powers attributed to the clergy serve, unless it be to make them judges and parties in their own cause, when matters of interest are concerned?"

His Lordship, it must be remembered, is here reasoning with the Author of the Alliance, against his notions of the rights of a clergy in an established church. And
the noble person’s first misrepresentation, you see, is, that amongst these rights, the claim of independency on the state during their establishment, is one; and that the coercive power exercised by them, under the alliance, is exercised as inherent in their order. To what purpose (says his Lordship) do they [the clergy] claim and affect independency on him, the civil magistrate? And again, To what end and purpose can spiritual courts, and coercive powers, attributed to the clergy, serve? And, as if this was not plain enough, in the very next page, addressing himself to Pope, he says, “Amongst all the fallacies which have been employed by churchmen, one of the most absurd has been advanced, though not invented*, by a paradoxical acquaintance of yours; and it is to maintain the independency of the church, and to suppose, at the same time, a sort of original contract between the church and state, the terms of which, every whimsical writer, even this scribbler, adjusts as he pleases.” Falsehood and ill language commonly go together. But let them go.

You shall now hear what the Author of the Alliance holds on these two points, and from his own mouth. First, as to the independency.—“Let us see next (says he) what the state gains by it [the alliance]. These advantages in a word may be comprised in its supremacy in matters ecclesiastical. The church resigning up her independency, and making the magistrate her supreme head, without whose approbation and allowance, she can administer, transact, or decree nothing†.”

Secondly, as to coercive power.—“The third and last privilege the church gains, by this alliance, is the being intrusted with a jurisdiction, inforced by coercive power‡.”

His Lordship assures us, the Author of the Alliance holds, that the independency of the church is retained in an establishment: the Author himself says, that it is given up. His Lordship assures us, the Author holds an inherent coercive power in the church; the Author

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* It was invented, it seems, by his friend Dr. Senior.
† Alliance, p. 153.
‡ Ibid. p. 145.
himself says, that coercive power is a grant of the state, during the alliance.

And here you may take notice, how greatly his Lordship has improved upon his masters, the Authors of the Rights of the Christian Church, and of the Independent Whig. They had ventured indeed to charge both these doctrines on the body of the English clergy: but as one can never be sure what an indiscreet or corrupt member of so large a body may have said, the confutation of their calumny was not so easy. His Lordship is more bold; he charges these opinions on a particular member of the established church by name: but then he is more fair, he puts it in the power of the person injured to do himself justice; for it so happens, that this person not only denies the independency of the church under an establishment, and all claim to inherent coercive power whatsoever, but has laid down principles to discredit, and rules to prevent the return of those usurpations. The Author of the Alliance has vindicated* the English clergy from the prevarications of Tindal and Gordon; it had been hard, had he found no charitable hand to vindicate him from the same calumny, when revived by this noble Lord.

As, therefore, no independency in alliance is either claimed or affected; and no inherent coercive power is attributed to the clergy; we will suppose his Lordship's simple question to be, “For what end is that tribunal, called a spiritual court, erected?” And had he been so candid to let the Author of the Alliance, to whom he directs his question, speak for himself, he had not waited for an answer. For the Author tells us, in the most conspicuous part of his book, and in great letters, that it is for reformation of manners only†. But, as if the Author had entirely left us to ourselves to conjecture how he intended to employ this spiritual tribunal, his Lordship falls a guessing: and there is no kind of absurdity, he does not propose, as favoured by his adversary, though they be such as his adversary had already exploded.

To what purpose (says his Lordship) do the clergy

* Alliance, p. 73, & seq.  
† Ibid. pp. 149, 150.
claim and affect independency on the magistrate? Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they erect a tribunal to punish intentions? The very pretence is imper-

Before I come to his Lordship's conjecture, give me leave, Sir, to say one word of the happiness of his induction. This tribunal, or this coercive power, which he makes to follow independency, is so far from being produced by it, that coercive power never comes into the church till it has given up its independency. The Author of the Alliance assigns a plain reason. "The state (says he) having, by this alliance, bestowed upon the clergy a jurisdiction with coactive power, such privilege would create an imperium in imperio, had not the "civil magistrate in return, the supremacy of the "church*."

And now, to his conjecture. Is it, says he, to punish intentions? The Author of the Alliance says, No, it is or reformation of manners only. But you understand not half his Lordship's drift, unless you consider these questions as proposed to insinuate, that the Author of the Alliance held the absurdities contained in them. So here, for instance, you are to understand that Mr. W. held his tribunal was to punish intentions. However, I will acquit his Lordship of malice; it seems to be an innocent blunder. The Author of the Alliance did indeed talk of a tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal; and, by ill luck, the noble person mistook this tribunal for a spiritual court. The Author's words are these—"The effectual correction of such evils [as arise "from the intemperance of the sensual appetites] must "be begun by moderating and subduing the passions "themselves. But this, civil laws are not understood to "prescribe, as punishing those passions only when they "proceed to act: and not rewarding the attempts to "subdue them. It must be a tribunal regarding "irregular intentions as criminal which can do this; "and that is no other than the tribunal of religion. "When this is done, a coactive power of the civil kind "may have a good effect, but not till then. And who

* Alliance, p. 154.
A VIEW OF LORD [Lett. IV.

"so proper to apply this coactive power, in such cases, " as that society, which fitted and prepared the subject " for its due reception and application?" This tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal, the Author calls the tribunal of religion (forum conscientia) and distinguishes it from that other tribunal which is invested with coactive power of the civil kind, called spiritual courts: he makes the first a preparative to the other. Yet, strange to believe! his Lordship mistook this tribunal of religion, so described and distinguished, for a spiritual court: and upbraids the Author of the Alliance for supporting a tribunal with coercive powers, to punish intentions. But we shall see more of his Lordship's acumen, as we go along.

His second charge against the principles of the Alliance is in these words—Would they erect this tribunal to punish, where no injury is offered, nor wrong done? The design is unjust and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed. The magistrate cannot alter them. The ideas of sins are more confused and vague; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in the writings of casuists.

To punish where no injury is offered nor wrong done, is his Lordship's periphrasis for the punishment of vague lust, which the Author of the Alliance makes one branch of the reformation of manners, and consequently an object of spiritual courts. But his Lordship's own opinion of the quality of vague lust, intimated in this periphrasis, is but a second consideration. His principal purpose in giving it, was to discredit the tyranny of spiritual courts, in punishing where no fault is committed. To forget his Bible is nothing: but to forget his Horace is a disgrace indeed. Now this honest Pagan reckoned the prohibition of vague lust, as one of the chief objects of civil laws;

"Fuit haec sapientia quondam
"Publica privatis secernere, sacra prophanis;
"Concubitu prohibere vago; dare jura maritis."

All this is so very extraordinary, that you will not readily believe his Lordship could design the punishment

* Alliance, pp. 94, 95.
of vague lust, by the words—punishing where no injury is offered nor wrong done; nor would I neither, did he not so clearly explain himself, in his curious distinction between crimes and sins: which, because it was occasioned by, and alludes to, a passage in the Alliance, it may not be amiss previously to transcribe that passage:

"If we cast our eye on any digest of laws, we find that evil actions have their annexed punishment denounced, not as they are vices, i.e. in proportion to their deviation from the eternal rule of right; nor as they are sins, i.e. not in proportion to their deviation from the extraordinary revealed will of God; which two things indeed coincide; but as they are crimes, i.e. in proportion to their malignant influence on civil society."

The Author of the Alliance said this, to shew that the civil magistrate does not concern himself with religion, as such. His Lordship borrows the same distinction between crimes and sins, to shew, that it is arbitrary and unjust to punish sins, as spiritual courts undertake to do: for, says he, the ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed: the ideas of sins are more confused and vague. From this, it appears, that his Lordship mistook vices, sins, and crimes, for different actions; whereas they are the same actions under different considerations:—either as they respect natural light, revealed religion, or civil laws; and so have different names imposed upon them. The ideas therefore of these three modifications of forbidden actions are all equally determinate and fixed, or all equally confused and vague. But it comes with a peculiar ill grace from his Lordship to object to the confused and vague idea of sins, since this idea is formed upon the revealed will of God in the Gospel, which, in a hundred places of his Essays, he tells us, coincides with the eternal rule of right; a rule, which he acknowledges to be the most determinate and fixed of all things.

But he says, the magistrate cannot alter the ideas of crimes, as the casuist may the idea of sins. That is, the magistrate cannot give the name of crimes to innocent actions. What should hinder him? He had two advantages above the casuist: first, coercive power:

"Alliance, p. 44."
secondly, the vague and confused measure to which crimes refer; namely, to the influence of actions on society. Matter of fact confirms this observation. Look round the world; enquire through antient and modern times, and you shall find, that the magistrate has been guilty of infinitely more abuse in ranging actions under the idea of crimes, than the casuist, in ranging actions under the idea of sins: This was not improper to be observed in answer to his Lordship’s experience, which ushers in his old sophism, ready at every turn to help him out, the abuse of the thing itself—We know, says he, by long and general experience, how the ideas of sins vary in the minds, or at least in the writings of casuists. By which it would seem, the noble Author knows as little of casuists, as of any other sort of learned men, whose characters he has treated so lordly. For corrupt casuistry does not so much consist in varying the ideas of sins, concerning which they are generally agreed, as in contriving to evade the punishment denounced against them.

His last conjecture about the use of an ecclesiastical tribunal, on the principles of the Alliance, is, that it is erected for the punishment of opinions. Would they erect, says he, such a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men’s faith? Why no, says the Author of the Alliance, in as plain terms as he can speak;—No matters of opinion come within this spiritual jurisdiction*: and he not only says it, but proves it too†. To what end and purpose then, (says his Lordship) can spiritual courts and coercive powers serve, unless it be to make the clergy judges and parties in their own cause, when matters of interest are concerned?—To what end? The Author of the Alliance has told him plainly and directly; for the reformation of manners only. But such an answer did not serve his Lordship’s turn. He will make the Author say as he would have him; or injoin him silence, and answer for him, himself. He insinuates therefore, in the last place, that the end aimed at is to determine in civil matters where the temporal interest of the clergy is concerned, and where they become judges in their own cause. Hear

* Alliance, p. 146. † Ibid. p. 146. et seq.
then what the Author of the *Alliance* says upon this head likewise; "Civil matters, which temporal courts may conveniently inspect, can never belong to an ecclesiastical jurisdiction." It hath been shewn, that this court was erected as a succedaneum to the civil, to take cognizance of such actions as the civil could not reach, or could not remedy: which shews, the state could never intend to put those things under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction that fall most conveniently under its own.

Besides, for ecclesiastical courts to ingross matters that belong to the civil jurisdiction, as it can possibly have no good use, may very possibly be attended with this evil, of inviting and encouraging the church to aim at more power than is consistent, either with her own good, or the good of the state. The great Founder of our religion said, *Who made me a judge or divider between you?* And what he would not assume to himself, he would hardly bestow upon his church: and that the state should ever intend to give her what was the peculiar right of temporal courts, is as difficult to suppose. We must conclude then, that such practice, wherever it is found, was derived not from the reasonable laws of this *alliance*, but from the authority of old papal usurpations.* Thus far the Author of the *Alliance*; where you may find a great deal more to the same purpose.

But his Lordship goes on with his confutation.—"By admitting the independency of the church on the state, the state acknowledges an original independency in the church, derived from a greater authority than her own: and the supposed terms of union may be construed to be rather concessions of the religious society to the civil, for the sake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious society. Thus religion and the church are set on the same foot: no human authority can alter one, but must receive it in the terms in which it has been revealed; and so may a good casuist prove on this hypothesis, that no human authority can measure out any conditions of establishment to the other. Thus the state becomes no better than a coordinate, but inferior power." I once met with a philosopher of deep

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*Alliance, pp. 147—149.
thought, who professed the same reverence for artificial nonsense, that the Turks pay to natural folly. His system on this point was very singular. He supposed that as in the material world there was an universal, though very subtle fire, diffused in secret through all bodies; which, by a late contrivance, might be allured or drawn out from the most innimate or lumpish matter, even from the dirty shoes of the Chronologer of Leicester, the man who makes time of eternity; so, in the intellectual; that there was a certain witty spirit, which lay dormant in the most inexplicable nonsense; and only wanted the application of some engine of analogous invention to rouse it, and set it free. Till such a one be discovered, we can but guess at his Lordship's meaning.

By admitting the independency of the church on the state (says he) the state acknowledges an original independency in the church derived from a greater authority than her own. If, by church, he means the Christian church, in general, it is confessed that its independency is derived from a greater authority than what the state claims for any of its rights. The church holding of God immediately and in an extraordinary manner; the state, only mediately, and in a common way. But what are the consequences his Lordship would deduce from thence? The first is, that then the supposed terms of union may be construed to be rather concessions of the religious society to the civil, for the sake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious society. The supposed terms are terms of alliance between two independent societies. These terms cannot, in the nature of things, be any other than mutual concessions and mutual grants. What then does he mean, by their being construed to be rather concessions of the religious society than grants of the civil? By the supposition on which his Lordship descends to reason: when the church in alliance gives up its original independency, it is without doubt a concession; because it is giving up a right; and when the state in alliance confers a coercive power on the church, this is certainly a grant; because an original independent religious society can have no inherent coercive power. However, some meaning, it is likely, his Lord-
ship had. And it seems to be this, "That if the church have an original independency, no such alliance as is supposed, could be made: for that the terms on the side of the church would not be conditional but voluntary concessions, the state having nothing to give, in return." This would be talking sense at least, though not truth. But, first to suppose the fact, that the terms of this union are mutual grants and mutual concessions, and then to deny mutual grants and mutual concessions, is giving such a form to his argument as will need a first logic to turn into sense, as much as the doctrine conveyed under it needs a first philosophy to turn into truth. Thus much however you may see; some cloudy conception his Lordship plainly had, that a society of divine original could never enter into alliance with another, only of human. When the sons of God came down amongst the daughters of men, we are told they begot giants. His Lordship betrays his apprehensions, that this coalition between the civil and religious societies would produce an issue altogether as monstrous, a kind of state Leviathan. Indeed, he charges the Author of the Alliance with being no better than a pander or procurer in this intrigue. But whatever his apprehensions were, his conception was altogether unworthy both of a philosopher and a statesman. The Author of the Alliance hath shewn from the nature of things, that religion composes an independent society: the Gospel, by divine institution, hath declared the Christian religion to be an independent society. His Lordship hath shewn, from the nature of things, that civil wants create an independent society of the civil kind: and the Law, by divine institution, hath declared the Jewish republic to be an independent civil society. Now I would ask his Lordship, if nothing hindered this civil society of divine original, from entering into leagues and conventions with all the neighbouring nations, which were not, for political reasons, excepted by name, what should hinder this religious society of divine original from entering into alliance with the state?

Another consequence his Lordship draws from an original independency in the church is, that religion and the church are set on the same foot. That is,
as I understand him, for he might have expressed himself better, the discipline of the church is as unalterable as the doctrine: the inference from which is, that the state must receive the church on the terms in which it was revealed: from whence his Lordship draws another consequence, that no human authority can measure out any conditions of establishment to the church: and, from thence another (for his Lordship's false conceptions are always attended with superstitions) that the state becomes an inferior power, or creature to the church. All these brave consequences, we see, arise out of this principle, "That, in a church of divine original, the discipline is as unalterable as the doctrine." And of the truth of this principle his Lordship is so confident, that he calls his adversary a stupid fellow for not owning it. "The stupid fellow, who advanced this paradox in English, did not see how ill the parts of it hang together, nor that if ecclesiastical government was, by divine appointment, independent of civil, no such contract as he supposes could be made. The religious society, notwithstanding their known moderation, could not have parted from that independency and superiority over the civil power, which God had given them."

It is true, this stupid fellow did not see it. And I don't well know how he should: since, on the other hand, he saw it to be impossible that any such contract as he supposes could be made, unless the church or religious society were independent of the civil. For what contract is it, which this Author supposes to have been made between church and state? He tells us, in express words, it is a mutual compact by free convention. Now the entering into a free convention is at the pleasure of the contracting parties. But parties who have this liberty, must needs be independent on one another.

Well, but he has his reason, such as it is, to confound this stupid fellow. The religious society (says he) could not have parted from that independency, and superiority, over the civil power, which God had given them. And now indeed, after much cloudy flourishing, we are come to the point; which is, whether

* Alliance, p. 86.

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A religious society can part with that independency which God, as well as the nature of things, hath bestowed upon it? This is in truth a question worth debating. But as his Lordship rarely suffers an important proposition, which he is set either upon denying or depraving, to pass through his hands without first perplexing it in the expression, with an absurdity or an equivocation, I shall be obliged, before we can pass forward, to free this from the Bolingbrokian embarrass. The religious society (says he) could not have parted from that independency and superiority over the civil power which God hath given them. Now as the Author of the Alliance contends only for the independency of the church before alliance, and as his Lordship's reasoning acknowledges that the question is only concerning independency before alliance, he must needs suppose, by adding, and superiority over the civil, that this superiority is a consequence of independency. And so, indeed, he speaks of it more plainly just before.—Thus [i.e. from the independency of the church] the state becomes no better than a coordinate, but inferior, power. Now if we judge of this matter on the principles of the law of nature and nations, superiority is so far from following independency, that it cannot consist with it. For why is religious society by nature independent (as the Author of the Alliance shews it is) but for the reason that Author gives, that it is essentially different from the civil, by having different ends and means*. But there is no ground for superiority of one person or society over another, but where some natural relation or connexion exists between them; none exists in this case; therefore a pretence of superiority on the one side, and of dependency on the other, is absurd. However, as I am verily persuaded his Lordship did not know enough of these matters even to prevaricate neatly in the point in question, I consider it as an innocent blunder, arising from the following words of the Alliance; shamefully, indeed, misunderstood.—“Such then is the nature of Christ's kingdom [i.e. the Christian church] it is essentially framed to compose a firm and lasting society; it is made such by Divine appointment, and

* Alliance, pp. 62, 63.
in order to fit it for public service, it is both by nature and institution declared sovereign, and independent of civil government, that it may adapt itself by free alliance to the various kinds of human policies.* Now sovereign in itself and independent of civil government, this great writer hath paraphrased to signify, independency and superiority over the civil.

"Thalem talento non emam Mileium: 
Nam, ad sapientiam hujus, nimirus nugator fuit."

But, to come to the question; which is, whether a religious society can part with that independency which God, as well as the nature of things, hath bestowed upon it. His Lordship determines in the negative. For if, says he, ecclesiastical government was by divine appointment independent of the civil, the religious society could not have parted with that independency which God had given them.

Man was, by divine appointment, made free and independent; therefore, according to this reasoning, he could not part with his independency, and become subject to civil laws. Hold, says his Lordship, man was made free, that he might be subject to no laws but those to which he had given his consent; and as he needed protection from laws, he had a right to part with his independency, if he could get protection upon no other terms. And is not this the very case of the religious society in question, which is only an artificial person, by nature and institution free, and standing in need of protection?

But his Lordship's assertion, you will find, bottoms at last upon this principle, that divine authority reduces all its laws to one and the same species: an error which bigots and fanatics indeed are equally fond of indulging; and has been indulged by them to the infinite disservice both of civil and of religious society; but that a philosopher and a statesman should know so little of the nature of laws, is perfectly astonishing. The first elements of his profession might have taught him, "That the authority by which a thing is commanded, "makes no alteration in the essence of the thing." Natural and positive duties retain their respective natures

* Alliance, p. 174.
in the code of religion. Natural duties are eternal; positive duties are revocable. Of these latter, some are lasting as the dispensation to which they belong; others only temporary. Of the temporary, some cease not till they are expressly revoked; others cease with the occasion that enjoined them. These last are again to be distinguished into privileges and duties; privileges may be receded from at pleasure; but duties must either be revoked, or the occasion must be plainly seen to cease.

Now the independence in question, is one of those institutions in the divine law, which ceases with the occasion; and is, besides, a privilege, which may be receded from at pleasure. Again, In the divine laws some things are enjoined to be believed as truths; others to be practised as utilities. Of utilities, some are general; others particular: the first of these are permanent and constant; the second variable. Of the first, is the church’s composing a society: of the second, is its particular form. Thus, Jesus seemed to institute an equal ministry; the apostles, episcopal government; and modern churches have chosen one or the other, as best suited to the various civil governments with which they had allied.

As Christianity was, by divine institution, a society at large, to authorize and to enable the several churches to give particular forms to ecclesiastical government; so the independence was bestowed upon it, to enable it to enter into free alliance with the state. When God himself allied the Jewish church with the state, he did not leave that religion a society at large; neither did he ordain it independent: he prescribed, in the minutest manner, the form of church government; and made it dependent on the state. But the Author of the Alliance tells his story better. "The Christian religion (says he) was not only left independent of the state, by not being united to it like the Jewish (and being so left it must needs by the law of nature be independent); but its independence was likewise secured by divine appointment, in that famous declaration of its Founder, My kingdom is not of this world; which bears this plain and obvious sense, That the kingdom of Christ, to be extended over all mankind, was not, like the kingdom of God, confined to the Jewish people, where religion
religion was incorporated with the state; and therefore, of this world, as well in the exercise of it, as in the rewards and punishments by which it was administered: but was independent of all civil communities; and therefore, neither of this world, as to the exercise of it, nor as to the rewards and punishments by which it was administered.—But whoever imagines that, from this independency by institution, the church cannot convene and unite with the state, concludes much too fast. We have observed, that this property in the kingdom of Christ was given as a mark to distinguish it from the kingdom of God, that is, it was given to shew that this religion extended to all mankind; and was not, like the Mosaic, confined to one only people. Consequently, that very reason which made it proper for the Mosaic religion to be united by divine appointment to the state, made it fit, the Christian should be left free and independent. But for what end, if not for this, To be at liberty to adapt itself to the many various kinds of civil policies, by a suitable union and alliance.—An alliance then we must conclude the Christian church was at liberty to make, notwithstanding this declared nature of Christ's kingdom. So far is indeed true, that it is debarred from entering into any such alliance with the state as may admit any legislator in Christ's kingdom but himself [that is, a power in the magistrates to alter doctrines]. But no such power is granted or usurped by the supremacy of the state *; [which extends only to discipline.]

From all this it appears, that the unalterable part of the law of Christ is the doctrine: and the only alterable part, the discipline; but it is the latter, with which society, as such, is chiefly concerned, when it enters on alliance with the church. Therefore, when his Lordship says, religion and the church being set on the same foot, no human authority can alter one, but must receive it on the terms in which it has been revealed, if he means, there can be no alteration in discipline, I have shewn he is mistaken: if he means, there can be no alteration in doctrine, he is certainly right;
and I consider his Lordship's observation as a complaint, that, by the constitution of the Christian church, the magistrate cannot tyrannize over conscience.

In the mean time we see to what little purpose this great philosopher and statesman had read his Hooker, of whom he confesses something might be learnt. Now Hooker would have shown him, that Divine authority does not reduce all its laws to one and the same species. Positive laws (says this truly great man) are either permanent or else changeable, according as the matter itself is, concerning which they were first made:

Whether God or man be the maker of them, alteration they so far forth admit, as the matter doth exact. Wherefore, to end with a general rule concerning all the laws which God hath tied men unto: those laws divine, that belong, whether naturally or supernaturally, either to men as men, or to men as they live in politque society, or to men as they are of that politque society which is the church, without any further respect had unto any such variable accident as the state of men, and of societies of men, and of the church itself in this world, is subject unto; all laws that do belong unto men, they belong for ever, yea although they be positive laws, unless, being positive, God himself which made them, alter them. The reason is, because the subject or matter of laws in general, is thus far forth constant: which matter is that for the ordering whereof, laws were instituted, and being instituted are not changeable without cause, neither can they have cause of change, when that which gave them their first institution remaineth for ever one and the same. On the other side, laws that were made for men, or societies, or churches, in regard of their being such as do not always continue, but may perhaps be clean otherwise a while after, and so may be required to be otherwise ordered than before; the laws of God himself which are of this nature, no man endowed with common sense will ever deny to be of a different constitution from the former, in respect of the one's constancy, and the mutability of the other.*

So much for this country parson. And how poorly does his Lordship figure before him with his assertion, that *divine law makes every thing, which relates to the church, equally unalterable!* Yet this noble haranguer, thus ignorant of the very first elements of law, can dictate with the authority of an oracle, and be received with the reverence due to one, concerning *civil liberty, church usurpations, a patriot king,* and the *balance of power.* But Master Hooker will tell you, how easily all this may be done without knowing more than our neighbours.

—“Thus far therefore (says he) we have endeavoured in part to open, of what nature and force laws are, according unto their several kinds: the law which God himself hath eternally set down to follow in his own works; the law which he hath made for his creatures to keep; the law of natural and necessary agents; the law which angels in heaven obey; the law wherunto, by the light of reason, men find themselves bound, in that they are men; the law which they made by composition for multitudes and politique societies of men to be guided by; the law which belongeth unto each nation; the law that concerneth the fellowship of all; and lastly, the law which God himself hath supernaturally revealed. *It might peradventure have been more popular and more plausible to vulgar fears, if this discourse had been spent in extolling the force of laws, in shewing the great necessity of them, when they are good, and in aggravating their offence by whom public laws are injuriously traduced. But forasmuch as with such kind of matter the passions of men are rather stirred one way or other, than their knowledge any way set forward unto the trial of that whereof there is doubt made, I have therefore turned aside from that beaten path, and chosen, though a less easy, yet a more profitable way, in regard of the end we propose.*”

Great names, however, are still of good use to his Lordship; for though he cannot profit by their lights, he can shine at their expence: and, having well chicaned

*Eccl. Pol. L. I. Sect. 16.*
their expressions, can afterwards convert the truths contained in them to his own use. Let me give you, out of many, one example of this kind. Hooker and Locke have been supposed to write tolerably well on the origin of civil government. Alas; nil sine Theseo. There is nothing so well done, which his Lordship cannot mend. He reproves both of them, with much solemnity, for representing mankind to themselves, like a number of savage individuals out of society, in their natural state, instead of considering them as members of families from their birth. “This (he says) has made them reason inconsistently, and on a false foundation. Inconsistently, because they sometimes acknowledge paternal government to have preceded civil, and yet reason about the institution of civil, as if men had then first assembled in any kind of society, or had been subject to any kind of rule; for to say that the law of nature was of itself such a rule, and that every one of these independent inhabitants of the earth did or might exercise justice for himself, and others on those who violated the law, was language unworthy of Mr. Locke, and unnecessary to his system. “Falsely, because it is easy to demonstrate that mankind never was in such a state.”

To say the truth, easy enough, and like demonstrating daylight: A man need only open his eyes to see that a mother does not abandon her infant as soon as she has dropt it, nor the father renounce the care of it and her. Is it possible then that Hooker, Locke, and their followers, should want to be told by his Lordship so obvious a truth. That, before civil society, mankind did not start up like mushrooms, a number of savage individuals at once, but came as they could be got, and entered as they were born, into tribes and families. Why then, you ask, did not Hooker and Locke so consider them, when they were deducing the origin of civil society? For very important reasons; and, one would think, very obvious ones.

First, because the real origin of civil society being equally shewn on either supposition, the truths which followed from it, were clearer seen, as they were less embarrassed,
embarrassed, by considering mankind before civil society, as individuals.

But this was not all. Had they considered men before civil society as ranked under tribes, the rights belonging to the heads of families, thus brought into view, though neither relative to, nor connected with, those of a civil kind, might have too much countenanced that absurd system, which derives political rule from the patriarchal; a system which, both for its absurdities and mischiefs, it was the purpose of Locke and Hooker to expose and discredit. The former therefore did judiciously, to assert, as he might do it truly (for the exercise of justice no more belonged to fathers of families, as such, than the exercise of regal prerogative); that, before the institution of civil society, every one of these independent inhabitants of the earth did, or might, exercise justice for himself and others, on those who violated the law. Yet this, his Lordship calls language unworthy of his master. Nay, so great a stranger is he to this whole matter, that he declares the representation to be unnecessary; whereas we see it was done to keep the wary from the sight of circumstances of no use to assist their judgment, and easily abused by designing men, to mislead them.

—But to proceed with our subject: His Lordship goes on against the book of the Alliance in this manner — "This imaginary contract, in short, whether well or ill made, never existed at any time, nor in any country; though, to have been real, and really authorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries where Christianity was propagated. Political societies make and alter and break their alliances, as the varying reason of state suggests. Different orders of civil government in the same society change, and with them the whole constitution of such governments, as reason or passion, the interests or the dispositions of men determine them. But a religion given by God is in its nature invariable. And therefore if a religious society with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be necessary to preserve it so, the order and constitution of such a society must be invariable too-"
too. The church must be established by the same divine authority as the religion, and be by consequence independent of the state. But nothing of this kind has been. Christ's kingdom was not of this world. He sent out his apostles to teach, and to baptize; and the utmost power he gave them, besides that of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to shake off the dust of their feet, and to protest against the infidelity of those who refused to receive them, and the Gospel they published. The apostles ordained others to accompany and to succeed them in the same office, the office of teaching and baptizing. The apostles could give no more power than they received; and no argument of right can be drawn from any thing that passed, or from any thing that these men did for the maintenance of their sect, while Christianity was a sect.

This imaginary contract (he says) never existed at any time, or in any country. If he means, a contract actually and formally executed, I have answered that already, and shewn, that the objection holds equally against the original contract between king and people; which I suppose his Lordship allows not to be so imaginary but that the prerogative of the one, and the rights of the other, ought everywhere to be regulated on the conditions of it. But you shall hear the Author of the Alliance on this matter.

*When I say that all regular policed states had an established religion, I mean no more than he would do, who, deducing civil society from its true original, should, in order to persuade men of the benefits it produces, affirm that all nations had a civil policy. For as this writer could not be supposed to mean that every one constituted a free state, on the principles of public liberty, which yet was the only society he purposed to prove was founded on truth, and productive of public good; because it is notorious, that the far greater part of civil policies are founded on different principles; or abused to different ends: so neither would I be understood to mean, when I say all nations conquered in making this union, that they all exactly discriminated.*

*Alliance, pp. 104, 105.
discriminated the natures, and fairly adjusted the
rights of both societies, on the principles here laid
down; though an establishment resulting from this
discrimination and adjustment be the only one I would
be supposed to recommend. On the contrary, I know
this union has been generally made on mistaken prin-
ciples; or, if not so, hath degenerated in length of time;
by which means the national religion in the Pagan
world hath been most commonly a slave to the state;
and in the Christian system, the state sometimes a slave
to the established church. And as it was sufficient for
that writer's purpose, that those societies, whether
good or bad, proved the sense all men had of the
benefits resulting from civil policy in general, though
they were oft mistaken in the application; so it is for
ours, that this universal concurrence in the two soci-
eties to unite, shews the sense mankind had of the
usefulness of such an union. And lastly, as that
writer's principles are not the less true on account of
the general deviation from them in forming civil
societies; so may not the plain ones of alliance here
delivered; though so few states have suffered them-
selves to be directed by them in practice; nor any
man before delivered them in speculation; especially
if, as in that case, so in this, we can derive such mis-
take and degeneracy from their causes. It would
draw me too far out of my way to explain distinctly the
causes of the mistake; and the intelligent reader, who
carefully attends to the whole of this discourse, will not
be at a loss to discover the most considerable of them;
some of which I have already hinted at; and others, I
may possibly, in the sequel of this discourse, take oc-
casion to mention. As for the degeneracy, we have
observed, that the alliance is of the nature of the
FEDERA IN-EQUALIA: now, the common issue of
such, Grotius acquaints us with, in these words:
"Interim verum est accidere plerunque, ut qui
superior est in federe, si is potentia multum
antecellat, Paulatim imperium proprio dic-
tum usurpet: praesertim si fœdus perpetuum
sit."

*De jure Belli & Pacis, Lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.
But if by never existed his Lordship means, that the mutual rights and privileges of either society, which naturally follow such an alliance, were never actually exercised and enjoyed by the two societies, his assertion is false. They are at this present actually exercised and enjoyed by the two societies, in England, under our happy constitution of church and state. And it was a principal purpose of the book of the Alliance to shew they are so, in order to realize the theory. Here again it may not be improper to give you the Author's words: "We see how unreasonable and even how impolitic our adversaries are, when in their ill humour with establishments, they choose to pick a quarrel with their own; where the national religion is on a footing exactly agreeable to the nature of a free convention between church and state, on the principles of the laws of nature and nations. A felicity they should have known, that scarce any other people on the face of the earth can boast of. In England alone the original terms of this convention are kept up to so exactly, that this account of the alliance between church and state seems rather a copy of the church and state of England, than a theory, as indeed it was, formed solely on the contemplation of nature, and the unvariable reason of things."

To make this contract (says his Lordship) real, and to be really authorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries where Christianity was professed. In plain terms, right waits to receive its nature from man's acceptance of it: or, in still plainer, right becomes wrong when rejected. How would this political aphorism of his Lordship's sound when applied to the original contract between prince and people? to make it real and to be really authorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries, where civil rule had been introduced.

But political societies (he says) make and alter and break their alliances as the varying reason of state suggests. If he would be here meant to speak of such which make these alterations justly, the same may be said of the alliance between church and state. The...
Author has shewn that, in this respect, the alliances of political societies with one another, and the alliance of the political with the religious, stand just upon the same footing. "If there be" (says the Author) "more religious societies than one at the time of convention, the state allies itself with the largest of those religious societies. It is fit the state should do so, because the larger the religious society is, where there is an equality in other points, the better enabled it will be to answer the ends of the alliance. It is scarce possible it should be otherwise, because the two societies being composed of the same individuals, the greatly prevailing religion must have a majority of its members in the assemblies of state, who will naturally prefer their own religion to any other. Hence we see the reason why the Episcopal is the established church in England; and the Presbyterian the established church in Scotland. Hence too we see the reason of what was before observed, concerning the duration of this alliance: that it is perpetual but not irrevocable: i.e. It subsists just so long as the church thereby established maintains its superiority of extent; which when it loses to any considerable degree the alliance becomes void. For the united church being then no longer able to perform its part of the convention which is formed on reciprocal conditions, the state becomes disengaged; and a new alliance is of course contracted with the now prevailing church, for the reasons which made the old. Thus formerly the alliance between the Pagan church and the empire of Rome was dissolved; and the Christian established in its place: and of late, the alliance between the Popish church and the kingdom of England was broken; and another made with the Protestant, in its stead.*

Different orders of civil government, in the same society, change (says his Lordship); and with them the whole constitution of such governments, as reason or passion, the interests or dispositions of men, determine them.—And is it not the same in church government? It is here Episcopacy; there Presbytery; and in another place Independency.

* Alliance, pp. 242—244.
But, a religion given by God is in its nature invariable. In its doctrine it is. Yes, and in its discipline likewise (says his Lordship) and thus I prove it. If a religious society with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be necessary to preserve it so, the order and constitution of such a society must be invariable too. The inference is just. But what principle of the alliance (against which his Lordship is here arguing) supposes, that one certain set of privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, is necessary to preserve a religious society in that state and condition? This theory says, religion composed a society before it had any of those privileges, immunities, and prerogatives; and will remain a society when it has lost them. For it had none of them till it came into alliance with the state, and will hold none of them longer than that alliance continues. But if, by a strange liberty of expression, his Lordship means, by privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, only church government in general, so far forth as it is a society; I own that this is necessary to preserve a religious society in the state and condition of a society: but then, give me leave to say, it does not follow from thence, that the order and constitution of such a society must be invariable too: because church government may be administered by an Episcopacy, a Presbytery, or an Independency. The specific form of church government amongst the Jews was prescribed, and therefore intended to be invariable, because Moses united the religion to the state, under the collective name of law: the specific form of church government amongst Christians was not prescribed, and therefore none seems intended to be invariably followed, because Jesus did not unite his religion to the state, but left it to particular churches to follow such as were most agreeable to the forms of those civil societies, in which they were to be established. For this purpose it was sufficient that he instituted his religion, a society, by directing the members of it to hear the church, and by appointing officers as its organs to convey its decisions. On this matter it may not be improper again to hear the Author of the Alliance, who, speaking of the Jewish and Christian churches, says, "This, both had in common, to be political societies.
by Divine appointment; but different in this, that God,
for wise ends, minutely prescribed the whole mode of
Jewish policy: and Christ, on the contrary, with the
same Divine wisdom only constituted his church a
policed society at large, and left the mode of it to
human discretion.*

Those ends, the Author thus explains, in another place.
The Jewish religion was, like the true natural, which
it ratified, essentially fitted to compose a society; and
like the Christian, of which it was the first rudiment,
made such by Divine appointment. But then unlike
the Christian, in this, that it was not left independent
of civil government, to unite with it at its pleasure, on
terms agreed upon; but was for great and wise rea-
sons at once united to it, by God himself. Which
also he was pleased to do, not by way of alliance as
between two bodies that were to continue distinct, and
might be separated, but by mutual conversion into one
another, and perfect incorporation†.

His Lordship then owns, that if the church be esta-
blished by the same Divine authority as the religion
(that is, if religion be formed into a society) it is by
consequence independent of the state. I am apt to
suspect, he here grants more than he is aware of: for it
follows from this concession, that if the Christian religion
even composes a society by nature, though not by Divine
appointment, it must be independent of the state: be-
cause the independency does not arise from the autho-
rrity which formed it, but from the nature it possesses:
and the Author of the Alliance has shewn † that religion
composes a society by natural right. His Lordship’s en-
deavour therefore to avoid the consequence of indepen-
dency, by affirming that the church was not established
by the same Divine authority as the religion, would be
to no purpose even though he could prove it. However,
let us hear how he supports his assertion.

His first argument is the declaration of Jesus himself,
that his kingdom was not of this world. The question
is, Whether Christ’s religion composes a society, and a
society independent? And his Lordship quotes a decla-
ratiou of Jesus to prove it does neither, which in the vory

* Alliance, pp. 163, 164. † ib. pp. 171, 172. † Book i. c. 5.
terms imply that it does both. For what is a kingdom but a society? And what is the not being of this world, but a declaration of independency? Indeed the Author of the Alliance employed the subject of the proposition, Christ's kingdom, to prove it was a society; and the attribute, its not being of this world, to prove, that church and state are independent of one another. For was Christ's religion a kingdom of this world, the consequence would be, that either the state is dependent on the church, or the church on the state; because, in that case, both having coercive power (as all kingdoms of this world have) a mutual independency would make that solecism in politics called, imperium in imperio: whereas, Christ's kingdom not being of this world, and his apostles, as his Lordship rightly observes, having no power (besides miracles) but that of teaching, exhorting, and protesting against infidelity, i.e. having no coercive power, there remained no pretence for its dependency on the state.

His Lordship's second argument against the independency of the church is, that Jesus sent out his apostles to teach, and to baptize; and the utmost power he gave them, besides that of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to shake off the dust of their feet, and to protest against the infidelity of those who refused to receive them, and the Gospel they published. The apostles ordained others to accompany and to succeed them in the same office of teaching and baptizing. The apostles could give no more power than they had received.

1. He is to prove that the Christian religion did not compose a society by institution. And how does he set to work? With an argument which shews it to be a society by institution, and without coercive power; the very society which the Author of the Alliance contends for. Jesus sent out his apostles—they ordained others to accompany and to succeed them. Here a society is plainly instituted; for you find officers appointed; and they provide for a succession.—The utmost power they had was to teach and baptize those who willingly received the Gospel. Here all coercive power is excluded; and that exclusion makes the society independent. What more
more may be inferred from this account (and which his Lordship should have inferred) is, that though a society was instituted, yet the particular form of church government was left to human discretion: but he could find no society of Christ’s appointment, where he saw no particular form of church government minutely marked out, as in the Mosaic dispensation. Though, had he found any such, it would, when he least suspected it, have been most to his purpose; for of such, and only of such, he might have said truly, that being given by God, it is in its nature invariable.

2. His observation, that the apostles could give no more power than they had received, insinuates that the Author of the Alliance contended for inherent coercive power in the church; which is a gross misrepresentation of his adversary, who expressly affirms that the church has no such power, while unallied; and when allied, receives it, in a very limited manner, from the state; and enjoys it no longer than the alliance continues. But these misrepresentations are things essential to his Lordship’s polemics. So again, “To pretend (says he) that the church has a right to the former [i.e. wealth and grandeur] by compact or by virtue of an alliance with the state, would be to say whatever comes uppermost in a whimsical head.” This is to insinuate, that the Author of the Alliance pretends that the wealth and grandeur of the church necessarily arises from its alliance with the state. But let him speak for himself, and you shall hear him saying the direct contrary—the acquisition of honours, riches, and power, could not be a motive for alliance. His reason is, that it would be impertinent in a church to aim at them, because they are things a church could neither use nor profit by.

His Lordship concludes this long paragraph in these words—No argument of right can be drawn from anything that passed, nor from any thing that these men [the apostles] did for the maintenance of their sect, while Christianity was a sect. His Lordship here forgets, as usual, the personage he assumes, which is that of a believer, who supposes, the apostles acted, in all

* Alliance, pp. 101, 102.
things, by the direction of their Master: consequently, an argument of right may be drawn from every thing that passed, and from all they did, in support or maintenance of their sect, while Christianity was a sect. It is true, if we suppose the apostles to be politicians like his Lordship, a sort of men who put in practice all kinds of means to support and maintain their cause or party, no argument of right can be drawn from any thing they did or said. But when God directs the actions and organs of his ministers in the propagation of religion, we know from the knowledge of his attributes, that no rights of humanity or society will be violated; and consequently, that from every such action an argument of right may be drawn.

If, indeed, his Lordship meant no more by his profound observation than this, That, from what the apostles did, to assert and maintain the independency of Christ’s religion while it remained a sect, no argument of right can be drawn to prove it must continue independent when it becomes established, I perfectly agree with him: and I have but one objection to the understanding him in so reasonable a sense, which is, that it supports the theory of the Alliance; which, I presume, was not in his Lordship’s intention. Besides, it contradicts what he so much labours to prove, That, if the independency of the church was of Divine institution, the church could not give it up, when it entered into alliance.

In a word, the whole of his Lordship’s reasoning against an alliance between church and state from the nature of a church, may be reduced to these four propositions:

1. If Christianity be not a society by Divine institution, it is no society at all.

2. If Christianity be an independent society by Divine institution, it could not give up its independency to the state.

3. If Christianity be a society by Divine institution, a certain form of church government must be explicitly prescribed.

4. If such a form be explicitly prescribed, then that form, and the discipline which belongs to it, must be as unalterable as the doctrine; which is contrary to the genius of this supposed alliance.
Now I have shewn, that every one of these four propositions is utterly void of all truth and reason. After these exploits, nothing was wanting to make his Lordship's victory complete against alliances and establishments, but to discredit that first and most famous one of all, made by Constantine. "This great revolution (says he) was effected in part by circumstances I have mentioned, and by others that favoured the growth of Christianity. The imperial authority did the rest, but did it ill; so ill, that the chief of those political views which Constantine had in making this establishment were defeated by it, and the admission of a religious society into the state, in the manner in which he admitted it, was the cause of all the ecclesiastical and theological evils that have followed from his time to ours, and that are so falsely imputed to religion itself. We may be assured, that the society co-operated with the court, to bring about a revolution so much to their advantage; and thought themselves happy enough to be dependent, not independent, on the Emperor; his instruments, not his allies, whatever appearances he might give, or suffer them to assume, in those solemn ecclesiastical farces, wherein he condescended to act, in some respects, a second part.—But while he recalled to his mind, as he did most probably, the great service religion was of to ancient Rome, he seemed to forget, that when that religion flourished, and was of so much service to the state, it was under the immediate inspection of the state. There was no council but the senate, to define doctrines, nor to regulate discipline. And men were at the head of the religious, because they were at the head of the civil administration; instead of being at the head of the latter, because they were at the head of the former.—He [Constantine] meant that this [spiritual power] should be distinct from the civil; that they should be independent of one another, and both dependent on him."

That noblest part of legislation, the adjusting the rights and privileges, and settling the bounds and limits of the two societies, his Lordship, as we said before, seems much a stranger to. Indeed, every new paragraph makes
his ignorance but the more conspicuous by his endeavouring to disguise it; as his attempts are generally made at the expense of a contradiction.

In the establishment of religion under Constantine, the church, he says, became dependent on the supreme civil magistrate. They thought themselves happy enough to be dependent, not independent, on the Emperor; his instruments, not his allies. Yet, in the same breath, he tells us, that this very Emperor was contented to act a second part to these his instruments, or, in other words, to become theirs: nay, he expressly affirms, that Christianity was on another footing in new Rome, than Paganism had been in the old: now Paganism, he tells us, was the instrument of the supreme magistrate. Christianity, then, must be an ally, not an instrument to the supreme magistrate. His Lordship says, this establishment was ill, very ill made: however that be, every body sees it is very ill represented.—It defeated all Constantine’s political views, all the good he intended. It is not unlikely. We have an example before us, in his Lordship’s Essays throughout, that his contradictions can defeat all the evil intended; this is doing something more, for malice is not so easily defeated as benevolence.

But if you ask, Why, in this account of Constantine’s establishment, the church is one while made the instrument, and another, the ally of the civil magistrate? I will tell you. His Lordship had decried the alliance both in fact and right. There never was, he says, in fact, such an alliance. To countenance this assertion, Constantine’s establishment is represented as being made on different terms; terms whereby the church became the tool and instrument of the civil magistrate. But then again, he was to shew that such an alliance was not of right, as being very mischievous to the state: this turns the tables; and then Constantine meant, that the spiritual power should be distinct from the civil, and that they should be independent of one another (for he all along misrepresents the theory of the Alliance, as making the church keep its independency after the union); indeed he says,—and both
both dependent on himself; but this was only added to soften the absurdity. To such wretched shifts do his principles ever and anon reduce him:—The religious and the civil society are independent of one another; yet the religious is dependent on the supreme magistrate; i. e. on him who represents the civil society, and is at its head.

But now let us examine the groundwork of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the embroidery of his contradictions.

He says, the church was happy enough to be dependent, not independent, on the Emperor; his instruments, not his allies. This sentence is made up of a false insinuation, and a mistaken consequence. The insinuation is, that the Author of the Alliance holds the independency of the church, on the magistrate, during an establishment. The mistaken consequence is, that if the church be dependent, it is the instrument, not the ally, of the state. But Grotius, as he is quoted in the book of the Alliance, might have set his Lordship right in this matter. "This (says the Author) is what Grotius " calls fædus inæquale. Inæquale fædus, hic intelligo " quod ex ipsa vi pactionis manentem prælationem " quandam alteri donat: hoc est ubi quis tenetur alterius " imperium ac majestatem conservare, ut potentiori " plus honoris, inferiori plus auxilii deferatur. De " Jur. B. & P. L. i. c. iii. Sect. 21." Hence, in the opinion of this great lawyer, alliance and dependence are very consistent things.

In ancient Rome (says his Lordship) there was no council, but the senate, to define doctrines, nor to regulate discipline. Now in ancient Rome it so happened, there were no doctrines to define. And as to discipline, this was regulated not by the senate, but by the colleges of the priests. When the senate imagined the necessities of state required the observance of religious rites, they sent to the priests for their directions concerning the choice and regulation of them. The senate were the masters whether they would have any celebrated; but if of that they had determined, they were tied down to

* Alliance, p. 88.  
† See Div. Leg. B. II. Sect. 6.
the rules and directions of the sacred books, as the sense of them was represented and interpreted by the priests.*

On the whole, his Lordship assures us, that Constantine established the church very ill; and so says the Author of the Alliance. Nay, which is more, he proves he did so, and explains the causes of his mistakes:

His Lordship's account of Constantine's establishment, and the Author's account of that by an alliance, stands thus,

1. **Constantine made the church his instruments, not his allies.** The Alliance makes the church the ally, and not the instrument of the civil magistrate.

2. **Constantine placed men at the head of the civil administration, because they were at the head of the religious.** The Alliance places men at the head of the religious, because they were at the head of the civil administration.

3. **Constantine did not take to himself the title of supreme head of the church under God and Christ.** The Alliance makes the supreme magistrate head of the church under God and Christ.

* When the Romans entered on a war with Philip of Macedon, Senatus decrevit (they are the words of Livy) uti consules majoribus hostis rem divinam facerent quibus Dies ipsis videretur, cum precatione ea: Quam rem, &c. He then tells us that the consuls made their report to the senate; and there we find the part their priests had in this matter—Quum pronunciassent consules; rem divinam RITE perfectam esse, et precationem admisisset Deos ARUSPICES RESPONDERE, letaque extra esse et prolationem finium, victoriamque et triumphum portendi.—L. xxxi. c. 5. But the state further ordered that the consul, to make the gods propitious, should according to old custom make a vow: and on this occasion we have a more explicit account of the share the old Pagan church had in this matter, by which we find it was not the senate, but the college of priests which regulated discipline, or, if his Lordship will have it so, defined doctrine. Civitas religiosa (says the historian) ne quid praetermitteretur, quod aliquando factum esset; ludos Jovi, donumque vovere consulem jussit. Moram voto publico Licinius pontifex maximus attulit, qui negavit ex incerta pecunia vovere debere. Si ea pecunia non posset in bellum usui esse; referunt statim debere, nec cum alia pecunia miscri. Quod nisi factum esset, votum RITE solvi non posse. Quanquam et res, et auctor movebat; tamen ad collegium pontificum referre consul jussus, si posset recte votum incertae pecuniae suisci. Posse rectiusque etiam esse, pontifices decreverunt. Vovit in eadem verba consul, praemunire maxima pontifici.—L. xxxi. c. 9.
4. Constantine gave riches and coercive power to the church, without assuming this supremacy or headship. The Alliance, when it gave riches and coercive power to the church, conferred the supremacy on the civil magistrate.

His Lordship's conclusion from this long story of Constantine is this, that "he and his successors" raised that spiritual tyranny, which was established "and grown into full strength before Charles the Great." And what could we expect less when every term in the alliance was violated or neglected? This was just as natural as that civil tyranny should grow to a head, when the terms of the original contract between prince and people had not been adverted to or observed? In a word, the mischiefs, which, his Lordship tells us, followed from Constantine's establishment, are the best recommendation of the theory of the Alliance; a theory formed, as it were, and fitted to avoid and guard against them: it has in fact done so, and rendered our present constitution of church and state the most happy and prosperous of any upon the face of the earth.

At last, as if on set purpose to recommend the theory of the Alliance, his Lordship concludes his section concerning Constantine in these words: "Thus it seems to me that the great and fundamental error, from whence so many others proceeded, and which Constantine committed in the establishment of Christianity, was this, he admitted a clergy into an establishment, on the same foot, on which this order had stood, while Christianity was the religion, and these men were the heads, the directors, the governors, and magistrates of a sect, by no authority, but that of the sect itself. He admitted them vested with this authority, which might be necessary as long as Christians made a sect apart, out of the protection of the laws; and which became unnecessary and dangerous, when Christianity had a legal establishment. — The conduct of Constantine on this occasion must needs appear extremely absurd to every one who considers the consequences it had." Can there be a greater encomium on the principles of the Alliance? The fundamental
fundamental error of Constantine’s establishment was, the suffering the church to retain its independency. The fundamental condition of establishment on the theory of alliance is, that the church gives up its independency.

After this, would you expect to hear him return again to his abuse of the alliance? “The sole intention “and sole effect of it [the theologic system of the “schools] was to establish an ecclesiastical empire, un- “der that spiritual monarch the Pope, and his spiritual “ministers the clergy. This was the effect of “that supposed alliance between the church “and state.”

Before, it was Constantine and his successors, who raised that spiritual tyranny: and it was done, he says, by means of his establishment; which suffered the church to retain its independency, and admitted it on the same foot on which it had stood while it was a sect. But now, it is the supposed alliance between church and state which raised this spiritual tyranny; an alliance which will not suffer the church to retain its independency; or admit it on the same foot on which it stood while it was a sect.

We have seen such amazing instances of his Lordship’s contradictions, as not to be surprised at the boldest of them. Sometimes, when rapt in a fit of rhetoric, he does, by his contradictions, what the man in the play did by his ingratitude, he strives to cover the monstrous bulk of them, by a proportionable size of words; sometimes again, to show his utter contempt of the public, he chooses to follow the advice there given; to let them go naked, that men may see them the better.—But, when he masks his double face, the falsification of the theory of the Alliance always affords him the best play. He constantly takes it for granted or avouches it for a fact, throughout his whole argument against the book; that the Author contends for and maintains the independency of the church on the state, under an establishment. This brings Constantine’s establishment, and the establishment on the principles of the Alliance, pretty much to the same thing; so that the mischiefs ascribed to one, may be safely transferred to the other.
And here, Sir, in conclusion, the odd fortune of this book of the Alliance is worth your notice. It had been writ against by many nameless scribblers, before his Lordship: and two very capital crimes had been objected to it: the one was, That it makes the church a creature of the civil magistrate; the other, That it makes the civil magistrate a creature of the church. Some insisted on the first of these charges, some on the second. But to prevent its escaping, one furious fellow, in a thing called a Comment on the Alliance, roundly insisted upon both. So that his Lordship, whose care is for the state, and the Dissenting Answerers, who are as anxious for the church, will come in but for halves in the full merit of this illustrious commentator.

I have now, Sir, given you, as I promised, a view of his Lordship's political talents. The Author whom I have defended against him, is no further my concern than as he afforded me the occasion. Nor is there any reason he should grow vain of the superior distinction of being picked out to be immolated, as it were, to the first philosophy. For let me tell him, that as I defended him for want of a better, so his Lordship abused him because he could not find a worse. He had personally injured and affronted his Lordship. And to these insolencies, the following words allude, where his Lordship takes leave of his friend, in the last volume of his never-dying works: "You have, I know, at your elbow a very foul-mouthed and very trifling critic, who will endeavour to impose upon you on this occasion, as he did on a former. He will tell you, again, that I contradict myself, &c. But if the dogmatic pedant should make this objection, be pleased to give him this answer," &c.

This, the curious will readily perceive, smells of the anecdote. As the secret has been communicated to me by a good hand, I shall not scruple to lay it before you. It may serve at least to entertain you, in the quality of farce to this serious piece.

Mr. Pope had permitted Lord Bolingbroke to be considered by the public, as his philosopher and guide: and in their conversations concerning the impious complaints against Providence on account of the unequal
unequal distribution of things natural and moral in the present system, they agreed that such objections might be well evaded on the Platonic principle of the best. This encouraged the Poet to philosophise: and the fruits of his speculations we have in the celebrated Essay on Man. In which, if you will take his Lordship's word, or indeed, attend to his argument, you will find that Pope was so far from putting his prose into verse (as has been invidiously suggested) that he has put Pope's verse into prose.—They agreed, as we observed, in the principle of the best. And Mr. Pope thought they had agreed in the question, to which this principle was to be applied. But time has since shewn that they differed very widely. The Essay on Man is a real vindication of Providence, against libertines and atheists. The Essays on the first Philosophy are a pretended vindication of Providence against an imaginary confederacy between divines and atheists. The Poet directs his argument against atheists and libertines in support of religion;—The Philosopher, against divines, in support of naturalism. But though his Lordship thought fit to keep this a secret from his friend, as well as from the public; yet he took so friendly a share in the prodigious success of the Essay on Man, that he could not forbear making the Poet, then alive and at his devotion, the frequent topic of his ridicule amongst their common acquaintance, as a man who understood nothing of his own principles, nor saw to what they naturally tended. For the truth of this instance of his Lordship's virtuous emulation, I appeal to a right honourable Gentleman now living.

While things were in this state, M. de Crousaz wrote some malignant and absurd remarks on the Essay on Man; accusing it of Spinozism, Naturalism, and all the heretical -isms in the Bigot's dictionary. These remarks by great chance fell into the hands of the Author of the Divine Legation. And mere indignation at an ill-natured caviller put him upon writing a defence of the first epistle. Which being well received by the public, he was induced to defend the rest on the same principles of natural and revealed religion, against this blundering Swiss philosopher; frequently indeed misled by a very faithless translation of the Essay into French verse.
Mr. Pope, who was naturally on the side of religion, embraced the sense given to the Essay by his new Commentator, with the utmost pleasure and satisfaction; as appears by the letters he wrote on that occasion. You will hardly suppose, his Lordship took the same delight in them. He saw his pupil reasoned out of his bands; he saw (what was worse) the Essay republished with a Defence, which put the Poem on the side of religion, and the Poet out of the necessity of supporting himself on his Lordship’s system, when he should condescend to impart it to him; and (what was worst of all) he saw a great number of lines appear, which out of complaisance had been struck out of the MS. and which, at the Commentator’s request, being now restored to their places, no longer left the religious sentiments of the Poet equivocal.

It was his chagrin at these changes which occasioned his Lordship (when he new modelled the introductory Letter to his Essays addressed to Mr. Pope) to end it in this manner: “I cannot conclude my discourse on this occasion better than by putting you in mind of a passage you quoted to me once with great applause from a sermon of Forster, and to this effect, ‘Where mystery begins, religion ends.’ The apothegm pleased me much, and I was glad to hear such a truth from any pulpit, since it shews an inclination at least to purify Christianity from the leaven of artificial theology; which consists principally in making things that are very plain, mysterious; and in pretending to make things that are impenetrably mysterious, very plain. If you continue still of the same mind, I shall have no excuse to make to you, for what I have written, and shall write. Our opinions coincide. If you have changed your mind, think again, and examine further. You will find it is the modest, not the presumptuous enquirer, who makes a real and safe progress in the discovery of divine truths. One follows nature and nature’s God; that is, he follows God in his works, and in his word; nor presumes to go further, by metaphysical and theological commentaries of his own invention, than the two texts, if I may use this expression, carry him very evidently.—They who have done otherwise, have been
"either ENTHUSIASTS OR KNAVES." But, alas! this kind admonition came too late. Mr. Pope had now got a better guide than either Forster or his Lordship. I mean, Mr. Locke; who, in the conclusion of his first letter to Bishop Stillingfleet, had taught the Poet to answer thus, "I know not any thing more disingenuous, than not publicly to own a conviction one has received, concerning any thing erroneous in what one has printed; nor can there, I think, be a greater offence against mankind than to propagate a falsehood, wherein one is convinced; especially in a matter wherein men are highly concerned not to be misled. The holy scripture is to me, and always will be, the constant guide of my assent: and I shall always hearken to it, as containing infallible truth, relating to things of the highest concernment. And I wish I could say there were no mysteries in it. I acknowledge there are, to me, and I fear always will be. But where I want the evidence of things, there yet is ground enough for me to believe, because God has said it: and I shall presently condemn and quit any opinion of mine, as soon as I am shewn that it is contrary to any revelation in the holy Scripture."

But the Author of The Divine Legation soon after committed a much greater offence against his Lordship's philosophic dignity. And to this, the following words, quoted above, more particularly allude: You have, I know, at your elbow, a very foul-mouthed and a very trifling Critic, who will endeavour to impose upon you on this occasion, as he did on a former.

About the year 1742, a little before Lord Bolingbroke's return to England, this Critic was with Mr. Pope at T. who shewed him a printed book of Letters on the Study and Use of History, and desired his opinion of it. It was the first volume of the work since published under that name. Mr. W. on turning over the book, told him his thoughts of it with great ingenuity. What he said to Mr. Pope of the main subject is not material: but of the digression concerning the authenticity of the Old Testament, he told his friend very frankly, that the Author's arguments, poor as they were, were all borrowed from *Locke's Works, vol. i. p. 405.*
other writers; and had been often confuted to the full satisfaction of the learned world: that the Author of these Letters, whoever he was, had mistaken some of those reasonings; had misrepresented others; and had added such mistakes of his own, as must discredit him with the learned, and dishonour him with all honest men: that therefore, as he understood the Author was his friend, he could not do him better service than advise him to strike out this digression, a digression that had nothing to do with his subject, and would set half his readers against the work, which, without this occasion of scandal, would have much ado to make head against the other half, whenever it should appear. Mr. Pope said, his friend (whose name he kept secret) was the most candid of all writers; and that he the Author of The Divine Legation could not do him a greater pleasure than to tell him his thoughts with all freedom on this occasion. He urged this so warmly, that his friend complied, and, as they were then alone, scribbled over half a dozen sheets of paper before he rose from the table, where they were then sitting. Mr. Pope read what was written: and, as he had a wonderful partiality for those he loved, approved of them: and to convince his friend (the Scribbler, as my Lord rightly calls him) that he did so, he took up the printed volume, and crossed out the whole digression. The remarks were written, as you may well suppose, with all the civility Mr. W. was likely to use to a friend, Mr. Pope appeared so much to reverence: but the word prevarication, or something like it, shanced, it seems, to escape his pen. The papers were sent to Paris; and received with unparalleled indignation. Little broke out; but something did: and Mr. Pope found he had not paid his court by this officious piece of service. However, with regard to the writer of the papers, all was carried, when his Lordship came over, with singular complaisance; such as men use when their design is to draw on those whose homage they propose to gain. In the mean time, his Lordship was meditating and compiling an angry, and elaborate answer to this private, laasty, and impertinent, though well-meant, scribble: and it was as much as they could do, who had most influence over him, to prevail with him at length to him
it. For the truth of all this, I might appeal to a noble
person, one of the greatest characters of this, or indeed of
any age; who being much courted by his Lordship (for
superior virtue will force homage from the most unlike)
was for some time able, and at all times most desirous,
of restraining the extravagance of that first philosophy,
which he detested and despised.

The event has since shewn, that it had been happy for
his Lordship’s reputation, had the advice to strike out the
digression been approved. For it is this which first
sunk him in the popular opinion; and made men over-
look the merit of the very best of all his compositions.

Mr. Pope, however, was still flattered and caressed.
And the vengeance treasured up against him for the im-
piety of erasing those sacred pages, did not break out till
the Poet’s death: then indeed it came forth with redoubled
vehemence, and on the most ridiculous pretence. Pope
had, as his Lordship pretended, unknown to him, printed
an edition of the Patriot Prince, or Patriot King, (for
it had two titles, as his Lordship’s various occasions
required) a very innocent thing, which might have been
proclaimed by the common crier, without giving the least
umbrage or offence. To say the truth, it was a mere
school-declamation, which, in great pomp of words, in-
forms us of this secret, That if a Prince could but
once be brought to love his country, he would always
act for the good of it. As extraordinary as this dis-
covery appears, there was much odd practice employed
to give a colour of necessity for the publishing it. How-
ever, published it was, and the memory of Pope traduced
in so cruel, so scandalous a manner, that the reader is
suffered to conclude, even Curll himself could not have
acted a more infamous or rascally part: for it must be
owned, his Lordship has dealt one equal measure to his
country, his religion, and his friend. And for
what was all this outrage? To speak the worst of the
offence, for one of those private offices of indiscreet good
will, which generous men are always ready to forgive,
even when they see themselves most incommode by it.

The public stood amazed. And those who had any
regard for the Poet’s memory, waited with impatience to
see, which of his old friends would rescue it from his
Lordship’s
Lordship's talons. Contempt, I suppose, of so cruel a treatment, kept them all silent. However, the same contempt at length provoked an anonymous writer to publish a letter to the Editor of the Patriot King; for his Lordship had divided himself into the two personages of Editor and Author. This letter, written with all the respect due to his rank and character, he thought fit to ascribe to the Author of The Divine Legation; so that you need not wonder if it exposed the suspected writer to all his Lordship's rage, and to all the ribaldry of his sycophants; of which, some, that was said to pass through this great man's hands, was in language bad enough to disgrace even gaols and garrets.

This, Sir, is the anecdote I promised you. And now I shall release you from so tedious a subject. I have completed my View of his Lordship's Philosophy; which I chose to address to you in compliance with his challenge; who appeals, for the truth of all he advances from artificial theology and school-learning, to the breast of the plain honest man,

"Slave to no sect, who takes no private road,
"But looks through nature up to nature's God;"

Him whose heart is filled with the love of God and man
To this tribunal he appeals; and to this I have now brought him. What he will gain by it, you, whom he has made his judge, must now tell us. I greatly suspect that of all his principles, one only is likely to escape your censure: and with this, as I would part with him upon good terms, I shall conclude: it breaks out unexpectedly from amidst the corruption of party politics; and in all likelihood was ingendered by them—Some men there are, the pests of society I think them, who pretend a great regard to religion in general, but who take every opportunity of declaiming publickly against that system of religion, or at least against that church establishment, which is received in Britain*. I am, &c.

* Dissertation on Parties, 8vo. edit.
REMARKS
ON
MR. DAVID HUME’S ESSAY
ON
"THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION*.”

Remark I.

THE purpose of this Essay is to establish NATURALISM on the ruins of RELIGION; of which, whether under Paganism and Polytheism, or under Revelation and the doctrine of the Unity, Mr. Hume professes to give the NATURAL HISTORY.

And here let me observe it to his honour, that, though he be not yet got to THEISM, he is however on the advance and approaching to the borders of it; having been in the dregs of Atheism when he wrote his Epicurean arguments against the being of a God. Sometime or other he may come to his senses. A few animadversions on the Essay before us may help him forwards. The thing is full of curiosities; and the very title-page, as I observed, demands our attention. It is called,

"THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION."

You ask, why he chuses to give it this title. Would not the Moral history of Meteors be full as sensible as the Natural history of Religion? Without doubt. Indeed had he given the history of what he himself would pass upon us for the only true Religion, namely, NATURALISM, or the belief of a God, the Creator and Physical Preserver, but not Moral Governor of the world; the title of Natural would have fitted it well, because all morality is excluded from the idea.

* See the Introductory Discourse to this Edition of Bishop Blackwood’s Works, Vol. i. pp. 65 to 69.—Ed.
But this great philosopher is never without his reasons. It is to insinuate, that what the world calls religion, of which he undertakes to give the history, is not founded in the judgment, but in the passions only. However, the expression labours miserably, as it does through all his profound lucubrations. And where is the wonder that he, who disdains to think in the mode of common sense, should be unable to express himself in the proprieties of common language?

As every inquiry which regards religion (says that respectable personage) is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular which challenge our principal attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature. page 1.

Here, we see, he aims at a distinction. And what he aims at is not hard to find. The question is, whether he has hit the mark. I am afraid not. And then the discovery of his aim is only the detection of his ignorance. In a word, it is a distinction without a difference.

If man be rightly defined a rational animal, then his nature, or what our philosopher calls human nature, must be a rational nature. But if so, a foundation in reason and an origin in human nature are not two different predicates, but one and the same, only in different expressions. Do I say, therefore, that our philosopher had no meaning, because he was unable to express any? Far be that from the reverence due to this rectifier of prejudices. My objection at present is not to his theology but his logic. By origin in human nature he meant, origin in the fancy or the passions.—For that religion, which has the origin, here designed, is what the world calls religion; and this he resolves into fanaticism or superstition: as that religion which has its foundation in reason is what the world calls naturalism, the religion of philosophers like himself, and which he endeavours in this Essay to establish.

In his third section, at the 16th page, he makes unknown causes the origin of what men call religion, that religion which his History pretends to investigate.—"These unknown causes," he says, "become the constant object of our hope and fear; and while the
passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers, on which we have so entire a dependence.” He then goes on to acquaint us with the original of these unknown causes.

Could men anatomize nature, according to the most probable, at least the most intelligible, philosophy, they would find, that these causes are nothing but the particular fabric and structure of the minute parts of their own bodies and of external objects; and that, by a regular and constant machinery, all the events are produced, about which they are so much concerned. But this philosophy exceeds the comprehension of the ignorant multitude.” p. 17.

Here we see the original of these unknown causes is nothing but the result of matter and motion. And again, “The vulgar, that is, indeed, all mankind, a few excepted, being ignorant and un instructed, never elevate their contemplation to the heavens, or penetrate by their disquisitions into the secret structure of vegetable or animal bodies; so as to discover a supreme mind or original providence, which bestowed order on every part of nature. They consider these admirable works in a more confined and selfish view; and finding their own happiness and misery to depend on the secret influence and unforeseen concurrence of external objects, they regard with perpetual attention the unknown causes, which govern all these natural events, and distribute pleasure and pain, good and ill, by their powerful, but silent operation. The unknown causes are still appealed to, at every emergence; and in this general appearance or confused image, are the perpetual objects of human hopes and fears, wishes and apprehensions. By degrees, the active imagination of men, uneasy in this abstract conception of objects, about which it is incessantly employed, begins to render them more particular, and to clothe them in shapes more suitable to its natural comprehension. It represents them to be sensible, intelligent beings, like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and sacrifices. Hence
"The Origin of Religion: and hence the origin of idolatry or polytheism." pp. 54, 55.

The few excepted out of the whole race of mankind are, we see, our philosopher and his gang, with their pedlar's ware of matter and motion, who penetrate by their disquisitions into the secret structure of vegetable and animal bodies, to extract, like the naturalist in Gulliver, sunbeams out of cucumbers; just as wise a project as this of raising religion out of the intrigues of matter and motion.

All this shews how desirous our Essayist was of not being misunderstood: as meaning any thing else than naturalism (or the belief of a Creator and Physical Preserver, but not Moral Governor) by the religion he would recommend in the place of that phantom, whose physical, or rather metaphysical, history, he is writing. For this phantom of a religion, which acknowledges a moral governor, arises, he tells us, from our ignorance of the result of matter and motion, caballing in the minute parts of vegetable and animal bodies.

The sum then of all he teaches is this; that that religion, of which he professes himself a follower, and which has its foundation in reason, is naturalism; and, that that religion which all mankind follow, a few excepted, and of which he undertakes to give a natural history, is nothing but superstition and fanaticism, having its origin in human nature; that is, in the imagination and the passions only.

Remark II.—This fully justifies the censure, which has been passed upon him for his History of Great Britain; namely, that he owned no religion but what might be resolved into superstition of fanaticism; having represented the established episcopal church, and the tolerated presbyterian form, under the names and the ideas of superstition and fanaticism. Indeed (to do him justice) though with much offence, yet without much malignity and contrary to his intention. For he ingenuously enough confessed, that he gave his History that attic seasoning for no other end than to fit it to the palate of a very polite people; whose virtues having only reached him at a distance, had, as is usual, been much exaggerated.
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aggerated. To make amends, however, for this false step, he thought proper to give an ample apology for his conduct towards the close of the second volume of his History. And this containing something more than an insinuation that he believed, what his Natural History of Religion shews he does not believe, namely, the truth of Christianity, I shall take leave, without any suspicion of being thought to go out of my way, to consider it paragraph by paragraph.

This sophism, says he, of arguing from the abuse of any thing, against the use of it, is one of the grossest, and at the same time the most common to which men are subject. The history of all ages, and none more than that of the period which is our subject, offers us examples of the abuse of religion; and we have not been sparing in this volume, more than in the former, to remark them. But whoever would from thence draw an inference to the disadvantage of religion in general, would argue very rashly and erroneously.

Thus he begins his apology; and would not every reader of him naturally believe that he was quoting the words of an animadverter upon him, in reproof of this very sophistry; which he was going to answer? For who was it, that had been drawing this inference to the disadvantage of religion, but our wise historian himself; who had acknowledged no religion but one or other of these specieses, superstition or fanaticism; and had done his best to shew of what infinite mischief both of them were to society? The reader may believe what he pleases (and if he be a reader of Mr. Hume, he will find exercise enough for his faith); but, this sage observation is our historian's own. And the pleasantery of it is, you are obliquely requested to consider it as a reproof, not of his own malice, but of the folly of his readers, who understood their historian to be in earnest when he gave this picture of the religion of his country; whereas they had read him to little purpose, if they did not see him to be in the number of those who throw about them firebrands and death, and then say, am I not in jest? However, to be fair, I am ready to excuse his readers in this (perhaps they can be excused in little else), for it is not to be

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disguised that their master does indeed make the abuses of religion and religion itself to be one and the same thing. All things considered, therefore, I cannot but take this introduction to his apology to be the pleading guilty with the insolent air of an accuser, and, under the circumstances of a convict, talking the language of his judge.

However, though in his first volume of History he neither spoke of, nor supposed any other religion than what might be comprised either under superstition or fanaticism, yet here, in the second, he does indeed bring us acquainted with another, and defines it thus: The proper office of religion is to reform men's lives, to purify their hearts, to enforce all moral duties, and to secure obedience to the laws of the civil magistrate. Now, was Mr. David Hume only playing the philosopher, I should take this to be no more than the definition of a mere moral mode, known by the name of a divine philosophy in the mind; something fluctuating in the brain of these virtuosi, and ennobled with the title of natural religion: but as he is writing history, and the History of Great Britain, where the religion of Jesus, as he has since learnt, is yet professed, I can hardly persuade myself that he can mean any other, than a religion whose abode is in the heart, and which expatiates into virtuous practice; and is therefore indeed capable of performing all these good things he speaks of. But why, then, when he had heard so much of those bugbear counterfeits, superstition and fanaticism, was there not one word slipped in, in recommendation of this reforming religion? One word, in mere charity, for the honour of his dear country? That strangers at least (for he writes at large, and for all mankind) might not suspect, if ever indeed there was a true religion amongst us, that these impostors and counterfeits had driven her quite away. Well; be not too hasty. To this he has an admirable answer; and you shall have it in his own words—While it [i.e. the true species of religion which he had just defined] pursues these salutary purposes, its operations, though infinitely valuable, are secret and silent, and seldom come under the cognizance of history. The adulterate species of it alone, which inflames faction,
tion, animates sedition, and prompts rebellion, distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, and is the great source of revolutions and public convulsions. The historian therefore has scarce any occasion to mention any other kind of religion, and he may maintain the highest regard for true piety, even while he exposes all the abuses of the false.

So it seems, that what reforms men's lives, purifies their hearts, enforces moral duties, and secures obedience to the laws of the civil magistrate, is not worth a wise historian's notice. If it were, he gives a very cogent reason why he should bring it to the notice of his readers likewise, for he tells us that the effects of this are secret and silent. Should not the historian therefore lend a tongue to this powerful but modest directress of human life, and bring her in all her lustre into our acquaintance? But she seldom comes under the cognizance of history. More shame for these false masters of the ceremonies who so scandalously abuse their office.

Then it is, the historian shines when he celebrates that adulterate species of religion, which inflames faction, animates sedition, and prompts rebellion: for then it is that to these public mischiefs he may add his own, and under the cover of the adulterate species inculcate to the people that all religion is either superstition or fanaticism.

If this was not his purpose, and he had no other design than to write sober history, how could it ever enter into his head, that it was not at least equally his business to explain to us what that thing is which makes society happy, as what that is which makes it wretched and miserable? But from the honest man let us turn to the able writer; for in that light too he seems to have failed. It appears to me a matter of much greater importance that we should be brought acquainted with true religion and its blessings, than with the false and all its mischiefs: because how shall we be able to avoid the latter, under our ignorance of the former, without running into the opposite extreme, and professing no religion at all? Now, though this perhaps is what our historian would be at, yet he has found, by experience, his readers are not so ready to follow as he is to lead.
Had our historian only consulted the dignity of his subject, in this too he would have found a great difference; or if he could not, a great example at least was before his eyes, to have pointed out that difference: Lord Bacon, in his History of Henry VII. This, which in many respects is a model for this kind of writing, is much larger and more precise in the account of those laws by which Henry laid the foundation of a flourishing and happy kingdom, than of the insurrections and rebellions which disturbed his own reign. Had he taken our Author’s route, and incurred the censure so justly due to it, I apprehend he had made a very foolish figure both amongst his contemporaries and posterity, by an apology of this kind. The proper office of laws is to reform men’s lives, to inforce all moral duties, and to secure obedience to the civil magistrate; but while they pursue their salutary purposes, their operations, though infinitely valuable, are secret and silent, and seldom come under the cognizance of history. Lawless rage alone, which inflames faction, animates sedition, and prompts rebellion, is what distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, and is the proper province of the historian. Suppose this great historian, and he too was a philosopher, had executed what he once projected, the history of his illustrious mistress, are we to believe that because Walsingham’s salutary operations were done in secrecy and in silence, that there he would let them have lain, as not coming under the cognizance of history, and only busied himself in a circumstantial detail of the rogueries and turbulencies of the sons of Loyola? Would he not have gained more honour to himself, and procured more benefit to his reader, by revealing and explaining all the wheels and movements of that political machine, from which, as from the urn of a demi-god, flowed abundance and felicity on his country, than by unravelling the intrigues of the Jesuits, which spread sedition, rebellion, and murders, all around them?

But to see how differently men’s heads are framed, even amongst great historians. Tacitus laments bitterly that his fortune had thrown him in an age, when there was nothing to write of but these horrors, faction, seditions,
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tions; public convulsions and revolutions. "Opus aggredior optimum casibus, atrox præliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace sævum: quatuor principes ferro interempti: tria bella civilia, plura externa, ad plerumque permixta." Our Christian historian riots in these calamities; and thinks that what inflames faction, animates sedition, prompts rebellion, and distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, is the only thing becoming the dignity of history.

In a word, the offence he gave was for calling the Christian religion, superstition and fanaticism. He says, it was false religion, not the true, which he thus qualifies. He is asked, then, how he came to say so much of the false, and nothing of the true? His answer is, That the true does every thing in secrecy and silence. The greater occasion therefore was there for him to reveal this noble mystery; for he tells us that both its aims and operations are infinitely valuable. If therefore he be for keeping it hid, like a court-secret, or if, in his own words, it comes not under his cognizance, we must conclude, that either he knows little of the matter, or that he believes less.

In conclusion, his own apology has reduced him to this dilemma. If he says, he intends the definition of religion here given for the definition of the Christian, how came he to comprise all religion, as he does in the first volume of his History, under the names of superstition and fanaticism? He there mentions no other species; and so great a philosopher could not be guilty of an imperfect enumeration: If he says, he means natural religion by his definition; he only fixes the charge against him the more strongly, namely, irreverence and contempt of Revelation.

Remark III.—But from his Civil let us return to his Natural History; and see how he supports his thesis. He does it by something between history and argument. He calls it both: and some perhaps will think it neither.

The belief of one God, the physical preserver but not moral governor of the universe, is, what we have shewn our philosopher dignifies with the title of the primary principles of genuine theism and religion. Now, if the belief
belief of one God, a moral governor, was prior in time to polytheism, it will follow, that naturalism or the belief of one God, a physical preserver only, is not genuine theism and religion. Because in his endeavour to prove polytheism the first in time, he has shewn the inability of mere uninstructed man to rise up to this knowledge, on the first essay of his reason; the consequence of which is, that if the infant world had this knowledge, it must have been taught them by revelation, and whatever is so taught, must be true.

But it is become the general opinion (which, though it has been a long while a growing, our philosopher hopes very speedily to eradicate) that a belief of one God, the moral governor, was the first religion; induced thereto by the express assertion of an ancient book confessedly of as good authority as any other record of very remote antiquity.

Our philosopher's business therefore is to disprove the fact. And how do you think he sets about it? You see there are but two ways. Either to prove a priori, and from the nature of things, that polytheism must be before theism; and then indeed he may reject history and record: or else a posteriori, and from antient testimony; in which case, it will be incumbent on him to refute and set aside that celebrated record which expressly tells us, theism was the first. Our honest philosopher does neither. He insists chiefly on antient testimony, but is as silent concerning the Bible, as if no such book had ever been written.

Lord Bolingbroke before him had employed this very medium of the priority of polytheism to theism, to inforce the same conclusion, namely, naturalism; but knowing better how to reason, and being perhaps at that moment less disposed to insult common sense in so prodigate a manner, he labours all he can to depreciate the authority of the Bible. But our North British philosopher despises his reader too much to stand upon punctilios with him; he roundly affirms that all antiquity is on his side; and, as if Moses had no human authority because he allows him no divine, he will not condescend so much as to do him the honour, he has done Sanchoniathon, of quoting him,
him, though it was in order to confute him. But you shall hear his own words, because his egregious dishonesty has led him into as ridiculous an absurdity.

"As far as writing or history teaches, mankind, in antient times, appear universally to have been polytheists. Shall we assert, that, in more antient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science, men entertained the principles of pure theism: that is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth: but fell into error, as soon as they acquired learning and politeness." p. 4.

Shall we assert, says he. Why, nobody ever asserted that theism was before polytheism, but those who gave credit to their Bible. And those who did so can easily evade his difficulty, that it is not natural to think that before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science, men entertained the principles of pure theism; because this Bible tells us, that the first man did not gain the principles of pure theism by a knowledge of letters or the discovery of any art or science, but by revelation. But this man, who had run into unlucky mistakes before concerning the state of religion in South Britain, believed in good earnest that we had burnt our Bibles, and that therefore it would be less generous to insult its ashes, than to bury them in silence. This, I think, can only account for that virtuous assurance where he says, that as far as writing or history reaches, mankind in antient times appear universally to have been polytheists. And what system do you think it is, of the origin of mankind, which he espouses, instead of the Mosaic, to prove that polytheism was the first religion? No other, I will assure you, than the old Egyptian nonsense, which attempts to teach that men first started up like mushrooms. In a word, the men, on whose principles this wonderful logician argues, never questioned the truth of his thesis. To them therefore all this bustle of a discovery is ridiculous and impertinent. And those who dispute the first with him, the religionists, he leaves in possession of all their arguments. So they laugh at it as an idle dream, raised on the absurdest of the atheistic principles, the Epicurean.
To this ridicule, the reader sees, our philosopher exposes himself, even if we believe him to be here speaking of pure theism, in the proper sense of the words; that is, of the belief of a God, the moral governor of the world. But ridicule may not be all which this mighty theist deserves. For what, if our philosopher should mean by his pure and genuine theism, to which he denies a priority of being, his favourite naturalism? I should not be surprised if he did: it is but running his usual philosophic course, from knavery to nonsense.

The reader, as he goes along, will see abundant reason for this charge. An Essay, then, so devoid of all manly sense, and even plausibility of reasoning, can afford a remark no other opportunity of entertaining the public with him, than that of drawing the picture of some of his characteristic features, some of the predominant qualities, of which he is made up. I shall therefore present the public with a few specimens of his philosophical virtues, his reasoning, his consistency, his candour, and his modesty; and all these promiscuously, as they rise in the natural disorder of his Essay.

Remark IV.—“Convulsions in nature, says he, “disorders, prodigies, miracles, though the most opposite to the plan of a wise superintendent, impress mankind with the strongest sentiments of religion; the causes of events seeming then the most unknown and unaccountable.” p. 44.

Our philosopher forgets himself. He owns and admits the plan of a wise superintendent; this plan is essential to his naturalism. He owns and admits the actual existence of convulsions in nature, disorders, and prodigies; for these conform to his great principle of experience, his only rule of credit, and which therefore should be his rule of right. Yet these convulsions, disorders, prodigies, are, he tells us, most opposite to the plan of a wise superintendent. Which in plain English is neither more nor less than, “That a wise superintendent crosses and defeats his own plan.”

You ask, how he fell into this absurdity? Very naturally. He was betrayed into it by his childish prejudice to miracles: which happening to cross a hurt imagination, while he was in the neighbourhood of prodigies, as
mountains and giants always met together in the encoun-
ters of Don Quixote, he would not let them pass without
carrying with them some mark of his resentment. And
having shewn, in a book written for that good purpose,
that miracles were most opposite to the plan of a
wise superintendent, he was not content to brand mira-
cles alone with this infamy, but (so dangerous it is to be
found in ill company) he charges the same villany, on
convulsions in nature, disorders, and prodigies, things
in themselves very innocent, and by old experience known
to have existed.

Thus a laudable zeal against his capital enemy, mira-
cles, happening to be ill placed, this great philosophic
detection of one of the prime master-wheels of superstition
labours with immovable nonsense.

Remark V.—But now I have mentioned our Author's
aversion to miracles, it may not be improper just to take
notice, in passing, of that capital argument, which he and
Lord Bolingbroke have borrowed from Spinoza against
them. "It is, that they are incredible, because con-
trary to all experience, and to the established course
of nature."

But is not this an admirable argument? A circum-
stance is urged against the reality of miracles, which must
necessarily attend miracles, if there ever were any: their
essence consisting in their being effects produced con-
trary to the common course of nature; and their end in
their being effects contrary to experience. For could
they be esteemed the immediate work of the Lord of
Nature, if they did not control nature? Or, could they
be esteemed the extraordinary declaration of his will, if
not contrary to our experience of the common course of
nature?

Remark VI.—There is a strange perversity in the
arrangement of our Author's philosophical ideas, occasion-
ed by the vain affectation of singularity.

Nothing hath been more uncontroverted, either in
ancient or modern times, than that the notion of the
Unity, amongst the Pagans, arose from their philosophers.
No says this penetrating sage, it came from the people:
and that by the most natural progress in the world. "Men's exaggerated praises and compliments still swell their ideas upon them; and elevating their deities to the utmost bounds of perfection, at last beget the attributes of unity and infinity, simplicity and spirituality." p. 55.

"The people sure, the people are the sight."

Turn this people to the south, and you see them fall down before dogs and cats and monkeys. Place them to the north, and they worship stocks and stones. But give them once an eastern aspect, and they shoot out into praise and panegyríc, which presently produces a first Cause. It is pity but we could leave them here in quiet possession of their glory. It is not my fault that we cannot. Our philosopher seems to be oppressed with his own discovery. Though the people night, in this manner, find out the first Cause, yet he is sensible they knew not what to do with it, when they had it. They would not leave their false gods for the true; they could not bring both to a good understanding; they had neither skill nor address to associate them together; and the true God was neither to be praised or panegyrised into an alliance with the false. What was to be done? Some philosophic fetch, much above the people, was, as he rightly observes, necessary to complete the system of paganism. This the philosophers performed, and finished all with a master-stroke.

"Such refined ideas, being somewhat disproportioned to vulgar comprehension, remain not long in their original purity; but require to be supported by the notion of inferior mediators or subordinate agents, which interpose between mankind and their supreme deity. These demi-gods or middle beings, partaking more of human nature, and being more familiar to us, become the chief objects of devotion, and gradually recal that idolatry, which has been formerly banished by the ardent prayers and panegyrics of timorous indigent mortals." pp. 55, 56.

Thus the vulgar, you see, in their high flights of praise and panegyric, rose up to the discovery of a first Cause; while...
while a set of wiser men are called in to restore the mob
of middle deities to their pristine honours: and this, to
suit the objects of worship to vulgar comprehension.

Now shallow men, like you or me, would say, why all
this bustle and the bandying about of an unjointed system?
Why did not one set of workmen undertake the whole?
Or, if there were need of coadjutors, how came the parties
to act in so preposterous a manner, that the people as-
sumed to themselves what belonged to the philosophers,
the discovery of the first Cause; and the philosophers,
undertook what belonged to the people, the discovery of
demi-gods and middle beings? Or, will he say, that
the people did both? Discovered the Unity in their
blind, timorous and indigent state, and, when they were
so well informed, struck out, in a lucky moment, their
gross system of polytheism?

He may say what he will; but nobody shall persuade
me but that an Author, who makes so great a figure him-
self in the various walks of philosophy, would have given
the honour of the whole to his own profession; could it
have been done without dimming and impairing, in so
capital a manner, the illustrious character of an original
thinker.

Remark VII.—“The Getes (says our historian)
affirmed Zamolxis their deity to be the only true god;
and asserted the worship of all other nations to be ad-
dressed to fictions and chimaeras.” p. 53.

This assertion contradicts all antiquity, as well as the
very nature and genius of paganism itself. But what of
that? It served an honest purpose: the purpose to which
all his patriot endeavours tend, the discredit of Revelation.
And on such an occasion a gratuitous assertion costs him
nothing.

Now it hath been deemed one characteristic mark of
favourable distinction in behalf of Revelation; that the
Jews affirmed the God of Israel to be the only true
God; and asserted the worship of all other nations
to be addressed to mere fictions and chimaeras. So far
was well. But then he should have taken care not to
contradict himself so very soon afterwards; where speak-
ing of the universal genius of paganism, he tells us,
“Idolatry is attended with this evident advantage, that

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by limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it
naturally admits the gods of other sects and nations to
a share of divinity, and renders all the various deities,
as well as rites, ceremonies or traditions, compatible
with each other." p. 58.

But as this observation was not his own, being stolen
from a late writer on the history of paganism, it is no
wonder he should so easily forget it.

REMARK VIII.—But the paragraph (from which the
last quotation is borrowed) will afford us further matter
of speculation. It contains a detailed comparison between
the advantages and disadvantages of IDOLATRY and
THEISM; and thus the account is stated:

"Polytheism or idolatrous worship, being founded
entirely in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great in-
convenience, that any practice or opinion, however
barbarous or corrupted, may be authorized by it; and
full scope is left for knavery to impose on credulity, till
morals and humanity be expelled from the religious
systems of mankind. At the same time, idolatry is
attended with this evident advantage, that, by
limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it natu-
"rally admits the gods of other sects and nations to a
"share of divinity, and renders all the various deities, as
"well as rites, ceremonies, or traditions, compatible with
"each other. Theism is opposite both in its advantages
"and disadvantages." pp. 58, 59.

The advantages and disadvantages of polytheism are,
we see, such as arise from the nature and essence of
idolatry. Would you not expect, that the advantages and
disadvantages of theism should have the same relation to
their subject? Good logic seems to require it. But
what of that, if his cause requires other management?
He scruples not therefore to tell us in the same page,
that the disadvantages here mentioned as arising from
theism, come not from the nature but the abuse of it—
"They arise, says he, from the vices and prejudices of
"mankind."

REMARK IX.—Still we are detained on the same
spot; which is so fruitful of curiosities, that there is no
suffering from it. He is speaking of the absurdities or
mischiefs, I cannot well say which, that arise from Revelation. And one, or perhaps both of these he intends to infer from the following observation:

"While one sole object of devotion is acknowledged, the worship of other deities is regarded as absurd and impious. Nay, this unity of objects seems naturally to require the unity of faith and ceremonies, and furnishes pretending men with a pretext for representing their adversaries as profane, and the subjects of divine, as well as human vengeance," pag. 59.

The calumnious insinuation, in this passage, about the origin of persecution (the abuse, and not the reasonable consequence of a true principle) is below any body's notice. What I quote it for is a curious observation, though made but on the bye—that the unity of object seems naturally to require the unity of faith and ceremonies.

Unity of object, says he, seems to require unity of faith. I am apt to think it does. For if the object of belief be single, the belief can scarce be double: unless by a drunkenness of the understanding, like that which doubles the objects of sense. But then, that unity of object as naturally requires unity of ceremony, is not so clear. Unity of faith is necessary, because truth, which is the general object of faith, is but one. But whoever affirmed, before our Author, that unity of ceremony was necessary? Ceremony is only an expression of duty; and duty may be expressed a thousand different ways. Unity of civil obedience under the same government is necessary. But is unity of civil obedience to the same governor, equally necessary?

But in the brain of this paradoxical philosopher, faith and ceremonies seem to have changed places. We see here how he has exalted ceremonies. You shall see next how he degrades faith.

He assures us, that "the Egyptian religion, though so absurd, yet bore so great a resemblance to the Jewish, that the antient writers, even of the greatest genius, were not able to observe any difference between them," in proof of which he quotes Tacitus and Suetonius: and then adds, "These wise Heathens, " observing
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"observing something in the general air and genius and spirit of the two religions to be the same, esteemed the differences of their dogmas too frivolous to deserve any attention."—pp. 76, 77.

These wise Heathens were shrewd observers. But what then becomes of the wisdom of a much greater man, our philosopher himself? who hath assured us, that the general air and genius and spirit of the two religions were so far from being the same, that they were totally different. For speaking of Revelation and paganism, or of theism and polytheism, he found this remarkable difference in the air and genius and spirit of the two religions, that "Idolatry has this evident advantage over theism, that by limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it naturally admits the gods of other sects and nations to a share of divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies, or traditions, compatible with each other."—Whereas in theism, "While one sole object of devotion is acknowledged, the worship of other deities is regarded as absurd and impious." Nay he tells us in the same place, "that theism is opposite to polytheism, both in its advantages and disadvantages." pp. 58, 59.

In short, in that section nothing is alike: in the section before us every thing is the same. So various in wisdom is antient and modern infidelity! However, a difference between the Jewish and Egyptian religion, he owns, there was. But it was a difference only in dogmas too frivolous to deserve attention; being indeed nothing more than this, whether mankind should fall down, before a dog, a cat, or a monkey, or whether he should worship the God of the Universe. From this curious specimen of our Author's ideas concerning faith and ceremonies, we cannot but conclude, that he has set up for a writer against religion, before he had learned his Catechism.

Remark X.—"Machiavel observes, says our great philosopher and divine, that the doctrines of the Christian religion [meaning the Catholic, for he knew no other] which recommended only passive courage and suffering, had subdued the spirit of mankind, and fitted them for slavery and subjection. And this observa-
tion would certainly be just, were there not many other circumstances in human society, which control the genius and character of a religion.” pp. 66, 67.

Machiavel, says he, meant the Catholic religion. That is, he meant the Roman Catholic, in contradistinction to the Gospel. Machiavel meant no such thing. If he had, the super-subtile Italian had wrote like this rambling North-Briton. For it is not the Catholic religion, so distinguished, but the Gospel itself, which gave libertine men the pretence of saying, that it subdued the spirit of mankind, and fitted them for slavery and subjection. But here a sudden qualm comes over our philosopher. He was ashamed of saying this of the Gospel. And well he might. For, though he says, the observation is certainly just, there never was a ranker calumny. The Gospel recommends no such thing as passive courage and suffering, either with regard to the domestic invaders of our civil rights, or to the foreign enemies of our country: and there are but one or two illiterate and fanatic sects, of very small extent, in the whole Christian world, who have so understood and abused the Gospel. The only passive courage and suffering it recommends is to particulars, whose consciences civil society hath iniquitously violated. Now, if instead of this passive courage and suffering the Gospel had recommended to its private followers to fly to arms and repel the force of the civil magistrate, when he abused his authority, in suppressing truth and the rights of conscience, what tragical exclamations would these very men have raised against the factious spirit of Christianity! Indeed, to our Author’s shame be it spoken, the very contrary of all this is the truth. The effects of the Gospel are most salutary to human society: for by encouraging inquiry, and by inspiring a spirit of liberty in religious matters, it naturally inclines its followers to carry the same dispositions into civil.

Remark XI.—But this honest man can allow himself, on all occasions, to calumniate the religion of his country: sometimes openly and grossly; but oftener, as in the following instance, in the oblique way of insinuation only.

“Were there a religion (and we may suspect Maho-
metanism of this inconsistence) which sometimes
"painted the Deity in the most sublime colours, as the creator of heaven and earth; sometimes degraded him nearly to a level with human creatures in his powers and faculties; while at the same time it ascribed to him suitable infirmities, passions and partialities of the moral kind: that religion, after it was extinct, would also be cited as an instance of those contradictions, which arise from the gross, vulgar, natural conceptions of mankind, opposed to their continual propensity towards flattery and exaggeration. Nothing indeed would prove more strongly the divine origin of any religion, than to find (and happily this is the case with Christianity) that it is free from a contradiction so incidental to human nature." pp. 49, 50.

We see what the man would be at, through all his disguises. And, no doubt, he would be much mortified, if we did not; though the discovery, we make, is only this, That, of all the slanders against Revelation, this before us is the tritest, the dirtiest, and most worn in the drudgery of free-thinking. Not but it may pass with his friends. And they have my free leave to make their best of it. What I quote it for, is only to shew the rancour of heart which possesses this unhappy man, and which could induce him to employ an insinuation against the Jewish and Christian religions; not only of no weight in itself, but of none, I will venture to say, even in his own opinion.

Remark XII.—"The learned, philosophical Varro (says our no less learned and philosophical naturalist) discoursing of religion, pretends not to deliver any thing beyond probabilities and appearances: such was his good sense and moderation! But the passionate, the zealous Augustin insults the noble Roman on his scepticism and reserve, and professes the most thorough belief and assurance. A Heathen poet, however, contemporary with the saint, absurdly esteems the religious system of the latter, so false, that even the credulity of children, he says, could not engage them to believe it." pp. 80, 81.

From the fact, as here delivered, we learn, that the Pagans insulted the Christians, and the Christians the Pagans, for the supposed absurdity of each other's system. Agreed. And what then? Were their several systems equally
equally absurd? This is what he would insinuate, or his observation is impertinent. Yet does not Mr. David Hume insult the religionists, as absurd? They, him, as ten times more absurd? Will he say, that he and they have equal reason? But what, in the mean time, becomes of naturalism? We must conclude then, that it is possible, one party may be in the right, and the other in the wrong. The consequence is, that his approbation of Varro, and his censure of Augustin, is temerarious and unjust. For what hinders but that Augustin's thorough belief and assurance might be full as reasonable when he defended Christianity, as Varro's not venturing beyond probabilities and appearances, when he apologized for Paganism? Had our modern philosopher, who has a much worse cause than Varro's to defend, but imitated Varro's moderation, which he commends, instead of Augustin's thorough assurance, which he condemns, his reader perhaps would have thought better both of his sense and honesty.—O, but for his honesty and impartial indifference between Christianity and Paganism, he has given us such a convincing proof in this very instance, that he ought ever hereafter to go scot-free. We have observed, that he has praised Varro and condemned Augustin: but to shew—Tros Rutulusse fuat—he tells us honestly—that a Heathen poet, however, contemporary with the saint, absurdly esteem the religious system of the latter [i.e. Christianity] so false, that even the credulity of children, he says, could not engage them to believe it. Now here, where he has been at the expense of so much fair dealing, he ought to be indulged in rewarding himself for it, which he has done in this modest insinuation, that Christianity was so false and nauseous, that even children could not be brought to swallow it.

He may talk what he pleases of the absurdity of poets. But while one Philosopher lives, I defy all the poets of antient or modern date to equal him either in absurdity or fiction. The Poet, he here abuses, is Claudius Rutulus Numatianus. He tells you, how this poet reviles Christianity: and quotes the poem, the book, and the page. Would you suspect all this to be a flam, and not one word of truth, from beginning to end? Yet so
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It is. Rutulius is speaking of a Jew, by name and title; and the rites of Judaism, as they distinguish that religion from all other, are the subject of his satire. The whole passage is as follows:

"Namque loci querulus curam Judæus agebat; Humanis animal dissociale cibis.
"Vexatos frutices, pulsatas imputat algas, Damnique libitæ grandia clamat aequ.
"Reddimus obscœnæ convincia debita genti, Quæ genitale caput propudiosa metit:
"Radix stultitiae, cui frigida sabbata cordi; Sed cor frigidius religione sua est.
"Septima quæque dies turpi damnata veterno, Tanquam lassati mollis imago Dei.
"Cetera mendacis deliramenta catastæ, Nec pueros omnes credere posse reor."

The Pagan writers indeed frequently confound the two sects of Judaism and Christianity, with one another. But here there is not the least room for that poor subterfuge. Rutulius speaks of Judaism by name: and to shew that he understood his subject, he reviles it for these very rites, which are peculiar to Judaism; namely, the distinction between clean and unclean meats, circumcision, and the sabbath. Yet, if you will believe this honest man, Rutulius represents Christianity as so false, that even the credulity of children could not engage them to believe it. And why should you not believe him? He is a philosopher, a follower of truth, and a virtuous man: one (as he says of himself) whose errors should be excused, on account of the candour and sincerity which accompanies them.

Remark XIII.—"If ever there was a nation or a time (says our philosopher) in which the public religion lost all authority over mankind, we might expect that infidelity in Rome, during the Ciceronian age, would openly have erected its throne, and that Cicero himself, in every speech and action, would have been its most declared abettor. But, it appears, that, what ever sceptical liberties that great man might use, in his
writings or in philosophical conversation: he yet avoided, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of Deism and Profaneness. Even in his own family, and to his wife Tereutia, whom he highly trusted, he was willing to appear a devout religionist; and there remains a letter, address to her, in which he seriously desires her to offer a sacrifice to Apollo and Esculapius, in gratitude for the recovery of his health.” pp. 81, 82.

Here he seems to commend Cicero (for his vanity, perverseness, and love of paradox, make him always think at large, and write at random) on a topic which exposes his own wicked practice, namely, Cicero’s care, in the common conduct of life, to set the people an example of reverence for the established religion. But whether this was said in praise or dispraise of that noble Roman, it matters not, since presently after he contradicts his own account, and assures us, that the same Cicero was so far from avoiding, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of Deism and Profaneness, that he made no scruple in a public court of judicature, of teaching the doctrine of a future state, as a most ridiculous fable, to which nobody would give any attention. p. 91. And this without the least care of reconciling Cicero, to himself; or his own contradictory observations, to his reader.

Remark XIV.—But he treats whole bodies of men no better than particulars. “We may observe (says he) that, notwithstanding the dogmatical, imperious style of all superstition, the conviction of the religionists, in all ages, is more affected than real, and scarce ever approaches, in any degree, to that solid belief and persuasion, which governs us in the common affairs of life. Men dare not avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts, which they entertain on such subjects: they make a merit of implicit faith; and disguise to themselves their real infidelity, by the strongest asseverations and most positive bigotry. But nature is too hard for all their endeavours, and suffers not the obscure, glimmering light, afforded in those shadowy regions, to equal the strong impressions, made by common sense and by experience. The usual course
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"of men's conduct belies their words, and shews, that the assent in these matters is some unaccountable operation of the mind betwixt disbelief and conviction, but approaching much nearer the former than the latter." p. 83.

This is superlatively modest. When the religionist says that an infidel writer (like this man), in order to skreen himself from the resentment of the law, says one thing and thinks another, there is no end of the clamours raised against uncharitable churchmen. But Mr. David Hume may say all this and more of religionists, and yet preserve his character of a philosopher and a friend of truth. But infidelity owed him a shame, and he presently unsays it all; and confesses that religionists are so far from being tossed about in doubt and unbelief, that nothing is more constant than the course of even the wisest and most experienced of them, invariably steady to the point of faith. For after having said a great deal to shew that Socrates and Xenophon did in reality give credit to augurs and omens, he concludes thus, "It is for the same reason, I maintain, that Newton, Locke, Clarke, &c. being Arians or Socinians, were very sincere, in the creed they pro- fessed: and I always oppose this argument to some libertines, who will needs have it, that it was impossible but that these great philosophers must have been hypocrites." p. 91.

Our modest philosopher had employed the 83d page of this wonderful Essay, to prove that, notwithstanding the dogmatical imperious style of all superstition, yet religionists are hypocrites, their conviction in all ages being more affected than real: and a great deal more trash to the same purpose. Yet here in the 91st page he maintains against libertines, that these religionists are very sincere, and no hypocrites. Nay, in spite, as it were, to his 83d page, he affirms that he always opposes this argument to libertines.

But are you to think, he talks thus wantonly, for no other end than to shew his contempt of the reader? By no means. For though this be, sometimes, motive sufficient for our paradoxical gentleman to contradict, yet we must needs think there was some important occasion which
which induced him thus to give the lie to himself. He had it in his choice (for what hindered him, when unrestrained by the considerations of truth or falsehood?) to represent the religionists as either knaves or fools. But this did not content his noble passion for mischief. He would have them both. Unluckily this could not be done without a contradiction. To make them knaves, he was to shew they professed one thing, and believed another: To make them fools, they were to be represented as steadily and sincerely believing all things. The contradiction, we see, was unavoidable: but how he came so needlessly to saddle himself with the lie—I always, says he, oppose this argument to libertines—I confess surpasses my comprehension.

Well, having floundered so shamefully, he is for recovering himself; and therefore steps into the gap, between these two extremes, a moderating tenet; and so leaves all religionists, both antient and modern, in a kind of middle state, between knaves and fools. His concurring tenet, is this—"In the mean time it is obvious, that the empire of all religious faith over the understanding is wavering and uncertain; subject to all varieties of humour, and dependent on the present incidents, which strike the imagination. The difference is only in the degrees. An Ancient will place a stroke of impicity and one of superstition alternately through a whole discourse: A Modern often thinks in the same way, though he may be more guarded in his expressions." pp. 86, 87.

I am so tired with his contradictions, that I shall let this passage go unexamined upon that head, notwithstanding it looks so askant both to the right and left, and agrees neither with the thorough hypocrisy, nor the sincere belief, of the two passages it is brought to reconcile. But, as it stands alone, I may be allowed to ask, Why is the modern Christian more guarded in his expressions, than the ancient Pagan? Does not human nature always operate alike in the like circumstances? If therefore, in this modern superstition, called Christianity, men are more consistent in the profession of their belief, than in that antient superstition, called Paganism, does not this shew that the circumstances were not alike?
alike? And what other difference in circumstances could there be, if not this, that Christianity having a rational foundation, its professors stood steady and unmoved, and Paganism only fluctuating in the fancy and unsupported by the understanding, communicated the same inconstancy and variableness to its followers?

O, but says our philosopher, I will not allow that steadiness to be more than pretended, *A modern often thinks in the same way, [i.e. inconstantly], though he may be more guarded in his expressions.* How prejudiced! what pretence has he to suppose it an inconstancy, only guarded in the expression, when the very uniformity of the profession excludes all data whereon to ground his suspicion that the belief is only pretended?

He must take it then for granted (as without doubt he does) that Christianity has no more reasonable foundation than Paganism. No need, will he say, of that at present. The fashion, the fashion, does all. An unsteadiness in religion is discrreditable in these modern times: hence the guarded expression.

Well, admit it to be so. What, I pray you, made unsteadiness in religion now discrreditable, which was creditable in former times, but this, that Christianity has now the support of, at least, plausible arguments, which Paganism never had?

**Remark XV.**—In comparing the two religions, Paganism and Christianity, our philosopher finds that the former is to be preferred to the latter, both in its reasonableness and in its benevolent spirit.

"Upon the whole, the greatest and most observable differences betwixt a traditional, mythological religion, and a systematical, scholastic one, are two:

- The former is often more reasonable, as consisting only of a multitude of stories, which, however groundless, imply no express absurdity and demonstrative contradiction; and sits also so easy and light on men's minds, that though it may be as universally received, it makes no such deep impression on the affections and understanding." pp. 92, 93.

The reasonableness, we see, is resolved into this, that you cannot reduce the professors of paganism to an express contradiction, and that the profession sits mighty.
NATURAL HIST. OF RELIGION. 367

mighty light and easy on men's minds. As to the first property of paganism, its incapacity of being reduced to a contradiction, this it has in common with nonsense, which is likewise incapable of suffering the same disgrace. And this will account too for its second property, the sitting so light and easy on the minds of men. For nothing takes less hold of the mind than nonsense, or so little disturbs its tranquillity, while we have the discretion to take it for what it is. To this he will tell you, you mistake his aim, if you think it was to credit paganism; the comparison was made only to discredit Christianity, by insinuating that its dogmas are contradictory, and its sanctions oppressive.

As to the superior benevolence in the spirit of paganism, this is made out as follows:

"Lucian observes, that a young man, who reads the history of the gods in Homer or Hesiod, and finds their factions, wars, injustice, incest, adultery, and other immoralities so highly celebrated, is much surprised afterwards, when he comes into the world, to observe, that punishments are by law inflicted on the same actions, which he had been taught to ascribe to superior beings. The contradiction is still perhaps stronger betwixt the representations given us by some latter religions and our natural ideas of generosity, lenity, impartiality, and justice; and in proportion to the multiplied terrors of these religions, the barbarous conceptions of the Divinity are multiplied upon us."

pp. 98, 99.

The Di majorum Gentium, as we learn from their history, were, "a rabble of tyrants, pathics, and adulterers, whores, vagabonds, thieves, and murderers." Yet, gracious Heaven! a philosopher of North Britain, in the reign of George the Second, has dared to tell us, with very little disguise, that the barbarous conceptions of the Divinity, multiplied upon us by Christianity, are still more contradictory to our natural ideas of generosity, lenity, impartiality, and justice.

But here his modesty seemed to labour a little; and he is for casting part of the odium of this diabolical insinuation

from himself upon another. "But in order, says he, to "shew more evidently, that it is possible for a religion "to represent the Divinity in a still more immoral, una-"miable light than the antient, we shall cite a long pas-"sage from an author of taste and imagination, "who was surely no enemy of Christianity." p. 99. You will suspect him to be just on the point of playing you a trick, when you hear him talk of his authority, as an author of taste and imagination, when the subject requires that the voucher for it should have a clear judgment and strong understanding. After all, there was no occasion for this slight of hand. The trick, I speak of, is to be played, as you will find, not by this man of taste, but by our philosopher himself. His voucher, the Chevalier Ramsey, is perfectly innocent of all our philosopher brings him to attest.

The words just quoted plainly imply, that in the opinion of this man of taste, Revelation, or the Jewish and Christian religion, as delivered in the Bible, represents the Divinity in a still more immoral and unamiable light than the antient.—It is possible, says he, for a religion—which, I think, implies the religion itself, and not the superstitious followers, much less the professed enemies of it. Turn now to the long passage, which this man of truth has quoted in his 100th page, and you will find that this immoral and unamiable light in which the Divinity is represented, is not the representation of the religion itself, but of its false friends and open enemies. "What strange ideas (says "the Chevalier Ramsey) would an Indian or a Chinese "philosopher have of our holy religion, if they judged "by the schemes given of it by our modern free-"thinkers and pharisaical doctors of all "sects? According to the odious and too vulgar system "of these incredulous scoffers and credulous "scribblers, the God of the Jews is a most cruel, un-"just, partial, and fantastic being.—To accomplish the "partial, barbarous decree of predestination and repro-"bation, God abandoned all nations to darkness, ido-

This turns out ridiculous enough. The Chevalier Ramsey is brought to prove, that the Bible represents the
the Divinity in a more immoral and unamiable light than Paganism; and the Chevalier Ramsey turns the tables on him, and proves that they are only such as our philosopher himself, and his crew, who so represent the Divinity.

Well, but say you, the Chevalier Ramsey is made by our philosopher to consider the representation as the representation of Revelation, whoever made it. The man of truth's words are these—To shew more evidently that it is possible for a religion to represent, &c. we shall cite a long passage from an author, who was surely no enemy to Christianity. Why were these last words added but to insinuate that the representation, however disadvantageous, was yet owned to be a true one; unwillingly, perhaps, as he was a friend of Christianity, but from the mere force of evidence. Whereas turn but your eyes upon the long passage, and you will find that the representatives, the freethinkers and pharisaical doctors, are heartily censured by the Chevalier for thus disfiguring and dishonouring Revelation. His concluding words are, "Thus the incredulous freethinkers, the Judaizing Christians, and the fatalistic doctors, have disfigured and dishonoured the sublime mysteries of our holy faith; thus they have confounded the nature of good and evil; transformed the most monstrous passions into divine attributes, and surpassed the pagans in blasphemy, by ascribing to the eternal nature as perfections, what makes the horridest crimes among men."

The sum is this. The man of truth calls upon the man of taste to prove that the Jewish and Christian religions, as they lie in the Bible, represent the Divinity in a more immoral and unamiable light than Paganism. And the man of taste bears evidence, that it is not the Bible, but the man of truth and his crew, who give this representation of the Divinity: a representation which surpasses indeed the very pagans, in blasphemy.

Remark XVI.—We now come to his account of the origin of that religion, of which, meaning superstition, he pretends to give a natural history.
"The primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious fear of future events; and what ideas will naturally be entertained of invisible unknown powers, while men lie under dismal apprehensions of any kind, may easily be conceived. Every image of vengeance, severity, cruelty, and malice, must occur, and augment the ghastliness and horror which oppresses the amazed religionist. A panic having once seized the mind, the active fancy still farther multiplies the objects of terror; while that profound darkness, or, what is worse, that glimmering light, with which we are environed, represents the spectres of Divinity under the most dreadful appearances imaginable. And no idea of perverse wickedness can be framed, which those terrified devotees do not readily, without scruple, apply to their deity.

"This appears the natural state of religion, when surveyed in one light. But if we consider, on the other hand, that spirit of praise and eulogy, which necessarily has place in all religions, and which is the consequence of these very terrors, we must expect a quite contrary system of theology to prevail. Every virtue, every excellence must be ascribed to the Divinity, and no exaggeration be esteemed sufficient to reach those perfections with which he is endowed. Whatever strains of panegyrical can be invented are immediately embraced, without consulting any arguments or phenomena. And it is esteemed a sufficient confirmation of them, that they give us more magnificent ideas of the divine object of our worship and adoration.

"Here therefore is a kind of contradiction betwixt the different principles of human nature, which enter into religion. Our natural terrors present the notion of a devilish and malicious deity: our propensity to praise leads us to acknowledge an excellent and divine. And the influence of these opposite principles are various, according to the different situation of the human understanding," pp. 94, 95.

Thus has this wretched man misrepresented and calumniated those two simple principles, which under the guidance of natural light led the people to a Deity, and kept him always in sight, namely, fear, and love. A
man less maliciously disposed to abuse and slander human nature, would have fairly told us, that fear kept the religionist from evil, as a thing offensive to the Deity; and that love inclined him to virtuous practice, as most acceptable to the divine nature. No, says this accuser of his kind, fear presented the religionist with the notion of a devilish and malicious deity: and love exaggerated the perfections of the deity, without consulting any arguments or phenomena: i.e. arguments or phenomena, which might have convinced him that they were exaggerations. Whereas the truth of the case is merely this, whenever simple nature did not work by fear and love, to avoid evil and to follow good, but instead of that to invent a fantastic, or a diabolic deity, the impediment was accidental, occasioned by the intervention of some unhappy circumstance foreign to the natural workings of the human mind.

Remark XVII.—"It is remarked by Xenophon " (says our philosopher) in praise of Socrates, that that "philosopher assented not to the vulgar opinion, "which supposed the gods to know some things, and be "ignorant of others: He maintained that they knew "every thing which was done, said, or even thought. "But this was a strain of philosophy much above the "conception of his countrymen." p. 96.

This is pleasant. It is but in the foregoing page he assures us, that not only the vulgar of Greece, but the vulgar of all the world, knew that their gods were ignorant of nothing. His words are these. If we consider that spirit of praise and eulogy, which necessarily has place in all religions, we shall find that every virtue, every excellence must be ascribed to the Divinity, and no exaggerations be esteemed sufficient to reach those perfections, with which he is endowed. Now is not omniscience a perfection? And was not the spirit of exaggeration, which never thought it said enough, able to reach the idea of knowing all things? How happened it then that this exaggerating mob of religionists wanted a Socrates to tell them, that the gods not only knew some things, but all things? But the man has got his readers, and he uses them as they deserve.
REMARKS ON HUME'S

REMARK XVIII.—But now for a discovery indeed:

"As men further exalt the idea of their Divinity; it is

"often their notion of his power and knowledge

"only, not of his goodness, which is improved.

"On the contrary, in proportion to the supposed extent

"of his science and authority, their terrors naturally

"augment," p. 97.

This is hard. Common sense seems to tell us so much

of our common nature, that the spirit of love, which is

ever for exciting further and further the idea of its

object is chiefly delighted in dwelling on the goodness

of that object: as fear is most conversant in the divine

attributes of power and knowledge. But this sublime

philosopher has discovered, that both we and nature are

mistaken; and that, as men further exalt the idea of

their Divinity, it is often their notion of power and

knowledge, not of his goodness, that is improved.

And his kind reader might be disposed perhaps to take

his word, but that he sees it contradicts, in express

terms, what he had said but two or three pages before:

Where he as magisterially assures us, that a spirit of

praise and eulogy makes men ascribe every virtue,

every excellence to the Deity, and to exaggerate

tem all: Therefore, I should suppose, goodness,

along with the rest.

REMARK XIX.—After all these feats, he will now

account how it happens that religionists are so generally

disposed to prefer rites and positive institutions to mora-
lity and natural duties. And the secret is revealed in

this manner:

"Perhaps, the following account may be received as

a true solution of the difficulty. The duties, which a

man performs as a friend or parent, seem merely or-
ing to his benefactor or children, nor can he be want-
ing to these duties, without breaking through all the

ties of nature and morality. A strong inclination may

prompt him to the performance: A sentiment of order

and moral beauty joins its force to these natural ties:

And the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his

duty, without any effort or endeavour. Even with

regard to the virtues, which are more austere, and

more founded on reflection, such as public spirit, filial
"duty, temperance, or integrity; the moral obligation, "in our apprehension, removes all pretence to religious "merit; and the virtuous conduct is esteemed no more "than what we owe to society and to ourselves. In all "this, a superstitious man finds nothing, which he has "properly performed for the sake of his Deity, or which "can peculiarly recommend him to the divine favour "and protection. He considers not, that the most ge- "nuine method of serving the Divinity is by promoting "the happiness of his creatures. He still looks out for "some more immediate service of the Supreme Being, "in order to allay those terrors, with which he is "haunted." pp. 106, 107.

It is to be lamented that but just before he had proved all this fine reasoning not worth a rush, where he con-
fesses that there are popular religions, in which it is expressly declared that nothing but morality can gain the divine favour. p. 104. For, if those who prefer rites to moral duties, are yet taught by their religion that nothing but morality can gain the divine favour, it is plain, his solution can have no place, which is, that superstitious men give that unjust preference, because they can find nothing in morality which can peculiarly re-
commend them to the divine favour. Had he not therefore done better, as in the former instance of the genius of Paganism, to have stolen his solution? He has not boggled at greater matters. And a philosopher, who deserves no quarter from him, might have saved his credit, and been pillaged with advantage.

"Next to the knowledge of one God, says this ex-
cellent man, a clear knowledge of their duty was "wanting to mankind. This part of knowledge, though "cultivated with some care by some of the heathen "philosophers, yet got little footing amongst the people. "The priests made it not their business to teach men "virtue. If they were diligent in their observations "and ceremonies; punctual in their feasts and solemn-
ities, and the tricks of religion; the holy tribe assured "them, the gods were pleased, and they looked no "farther. Few went to the schools of the philosophers "to be instructed in their duties, and to know what was "good and evil in their actions. The priests sold the
"better penny-worths, and therefore had all their "custom. Lustrations and processions were much "easier than a clean conscience, and a steady course "of virtue; and an expiatory sacrifice, that atoned "for the want of it, was much more convenient than "a steady course of virtue."

This is the solution of a philosopher indeed; clear, simple, manly, rational, and striking conviction in every word; unlike the refined and fantastic nonsense of a writer of paradoxes.

But then don't imagine that our author was not aware of this solution. No, he despised it because it was so reasonable. For he thinks to obviate it by saying, "That "it is not satisfactory to allege that the practice "of morality is more difficult than that of superstition; and is therefore rejected." p. 105. But how does he make out this point? Why, by giving us to understand that the four Lents of the Muscovites, and the austerities of some Roman Catholics, appear more disagreeable than meekness and benevolence. Let him say, as Mr. Locke does, honestly—than a steady course of virtue. And we shall better judge whether these austerities be indeed more difficult than such a morality.

Remark XX.—Well, but he makes ample amends for the slight here shown "of steady virtue." For, as a supplement to his account of this mysterious phenomenon, "We may add, says he, that even after the commission of crimes, there arise remorses and secret horrors, which give no rest to the mind, but make it have recourse to religious rites and ceremonies, as expiations of its offences. Whatever weakens or disorders the internal frame, promotes the interests of superstition: And nothing is more destructive to them than a manly steady virtue, which either preserves us from disastrous melancholy accidents, or teaches us to bear them." pp. 109, 110.

We may add, says he, That he may say safely whatever he pleases; who has a public to deal with so easily bubbled into the opinion of his being a philosopher.—Which makes me the more wonder at the trouble his

friends gave him, of refining his natural history from the grosser pieces of atheism, before it was presented to the world. But this public, it seems, was become a little squeamish, having been so lately overdosed by the quackery of Bolingbroke.

**Nothing, says our philosopher, is more destructive to the interest of superstition, than a manly steady virtue:** which in plainer English is, "None will be so free from superstition as the most hardened rogue." For the fact, from which he deduces this proposition, is this, *That after the commission of crimes, there arise remorse and secret horrors, which make men have recourse to expiatory rites. These remorse, by weakening and disordering the internal frame, promote superstition.* Now the contrary state of this internal frame can be no other than such as enables us to bear the retrospect of our rogueeries without remorse and horror; this he calls a manly steady virtue. Do I wrong him? Let his friends judge. Had he meant, by manly steady virtue, what common moralists so call, he must have told us, that this virtue produced in the offender, reparation of injuries and amendment of life; things, in reality, most destructive to the interests of superstition: Whereas the manly steady virtue of our philosopher does no more, by his own confession, than either preserve us from disastrous melancholy accidents [i.e. keep us from hanging ourselves] or teaches us to bear them [i.e. to recall to memory our past crimes without remorse].

And this, hardened roguery, and nothing but hardened roguery, is capable of achieving. Or, will he, to save himself from this atrocious charge, say, that by a manly steady virtue he meant such a virtue as prevents the commission of crimes? This had been to the purpose. But let him then shew us how this meaning is to be gathered from his expression. To say the least, if, in excess of candour, one must suppose him to have meant well, no well-meaning philosopher ever expressed himself so wretchedly.

**Remark XXI.—**I have given a specimen of his philosophic virtues, his reasoning, his consistency, his knowledge, his truth, his candour, and his modesty, as
they promiscuously appear in the Natural History of Religion. I have hunted him from track to track.—And now what thick cover, do you suppose, has he chosen to skreen himself from the public contempt? He takes shelter in the dark umbrage of scepticism.—These are his concluding words:

"The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment, appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarce be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and, opposing one species of superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy."

Thus, we see, his last effort is to defend his dogmatical nonsense with scepticism still more nonsensical. Nor to this, neither, darcs he trust himself; but presently meditates an escape, as he calls it, by setting the religionists a quarrelling: without which, he frankly owns, that deliberate doubt could scarce be upheld. For the sake of this beloved object, deliberate doubt, there is no mischief he is not ready to commit, even to the unhinging the national religion, and unloosing all the hold it has on the minds of the people. And all this for the selfish and unnatural lust of escaping from right reason and common sense, into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy. But here we have earthed him; rolled up in the scoria of a dogmatist and sceptic, run down together. He has been long taken for a philosopher: and so perhaps he may be found—like Aristotle's statue in the block—

"Then take him to develop, if you can,
And hew the block off, and get out the man."

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REMARKS

ON

NEAL'S

"HISTORY OF THE PURITANS;"

ENTERED IN AN EDITION OF THAT WORK
IN THE LIBRARY AT DURHAM.

1765.
Extract from a Letter of the Bishop of Gloucester, [Dr. Warburton] to me, Feb. 26, 1765. R. W.*

--- "Neal's History of the Puritans, in three volumes, now in the Library at Durham, which in one of my residences I took home to my house, and, at breakfast-time, filled the margins quite through; which I think to be a full confession of all his false facts and partial representations."

REMARKS
ON
NEAL'S HISTORY.


CHAP. III. p. 89. You have the word, &c.—This is to lie, under the cover of truth. Can any body in his senses believe that when the only contention between the two parties was, Who had the word; that the more powerful would yield it up to their adversaries?—Without all doubt, some protestant member, in the heat of dispute, said, We have the word; upon which the prolocutor insultingly answers—But we have the sword—without thinking any one would be so foolish as to join the two propositions into one, and then give it to the prolocutor.

Ch. iv. p. 178. Yet Fuller, &c. who had the liberty of perusing.—But did he peruse them?

P. 186. (Fox) had no preferment, &c.—This is a mistake; for he was installed in the third prebend of Durham, October 14, 1572, Pilkington being then Bishop, who had much the same sentiments with Fox, but held it not long, Bellamy succeeding to the same stall, October 31, 1573.

P. 191. Because his [Bucer's] head was not square.
—I think his head was out of square.

P. 192. The grand question, "Whether they should desert their ministry, or comply."—What then? must they needs be more in the right in this trifling question, than they were in that important one of religious liberty, in which the author thinks, and truly, that they were all wrong? Dr. Horn, &c.

and this was very consistent.
REMARKS ON NEAL'S

P. 194. Till [the habits] are sent to hell, &c.—If they came from hell, they certainly were not indifferent; but the devil has better merchandize for souls, than this gear, pharisaical purity and spiritual pride.

Our first reformers ascribed no holiness, &c.—Who ascribes any holiness or virtue to them now, I pray? Decency, indeed, they do, and that is enough to justify their use.

P. 231. "Each party blamed the other."—The Church of England doubtless was right in exacting conformity to their terms of communion. Then it was, they became offenders, when they denied a toleration to those who would not accept their terms of communion: for their refusal proceeding from an opinion (however weak and foolish) that the terms were sinful, they had a right to worship God in their own way; and the crime of schism, if they were guilty of it, they were to answer for to God only, who was the only judge how far the sincerity of their erroneous conscience rendered them excusable.

P. 240. Natural right, &c.—With what face could the author speak of the natural right every man has to judge for himself, as one of the heads of controversy between the Puritans and Conformists, when his whole History shews that this was a truth unknown to either party; and that, as the Conformists persecuted because they thought themselves in the right, so the Puritans insisted on their Christian liberty, because they were in the right: not because all sects (whether in the right or wrong) have a title to it; in which foundation only true Christian liberty rises.

Ch. v. p. 243. "Prove that."—They might easily have proved that every particular church has this authority, because it is of the essence of a religious society, as such; and when the state unites with, and establishes, any particular church, then the civil magistrate, as head of the church, has this power.

P. 294. "And it may have settled them."—Can there be a stronger proof than this, of Christ's not instituting a discipline for the church, as Moses did for the synagogue, That he left the matter to particular churches to institute, such as each thought most convenient?
HISTORY OF THE PURITANS.

Ch. vi. p. 365. The Bishop of London, &c.—This is in unfair charge, which runs through the History. The exacting conformity of the ministry of any church, by the governors of that church, is no persecution: indeed, the doing more than simply expelling them from the communion is so; much more the not permitting them to worship God in their own way, as a separate sect.—Whether the terms of communion or conformity were not too narrow, is another question.

P. 369. Mr. Stubbs' right hand, &c.—This was infinitely more cruel than all the ears under Charles the First; whether we consider the punishment, the crime, or the man.

P. 369. Jan. 10. The Commons voted, &c.—If this was only a fast for themselves, there was nothing in it contrary to law and equity; but, if they enjoined it to be observed without doors, it was a violation of all order and good government, as well as law.

P. 372. Satyrical pamphlets, &c.—Without doubt, the punishment was much too severe for the offence: but a fair and impartial historian would have spoken in much severer terms of such satirical pamphlets as Martin Mar-Prelate, &c. &c. for these are the pamphlets he alludes to.

P. 374. Men that act on principles, &c.—It is just the same with men who act upon passion and prejudice, for the poet says truly,

"Obstinacy's ne'er so stiff
As when 'tis in a wrong belief."

P. 380. Influence on the next generation, &c.—It had, as is seen from the overthrow of the constitution both in church and state by the generation so influenced.

P. 381. In defiance of the laws, &c.—Were the Jesuits more faulty in acting in defiance of the laws, than the Puritans? I think not—They had both the same plea, conscience; and both the same provocation, persecution.

P. 386. The Bishops will be a distinct, &c.—The Puritans were even with them, and to the Jus divinum of Episcopacy, opposed the Jus divinum of Presbytery, which was the making each other Antichristian.

P. 389. It seemed a little hard, &c.—That is, It is hard that the dispensers of poison should be hanged.
for going on obstinately in mischief, because he who compounded the poison was on his repentance par-
doned.—But thus does party and prejudice speak on
all occasions.

Ch. vii. p. 405. "Professed reverence for the esta-
blished church."—When the Puritans write against the
Bishops, [p. 403] they call the established church an
hierarchy, that never obtained till the approach of Antic-
christ. Yet here to the council profess to reverence it,
and see no necessity of separating from the unity
of it.

P. 459. "But now if the whole," &c.—The very
nature of the supremacy (placed in the sovereign in a
state, where the legislative power is shared between the
sovereign and the states) hath in time brought the supre-
mcy to that equitable condition the author speaks of.

P. 464. "He erected a kind of Judicatory."—
The Archbishop [p. 396] publishes articles, which, be-
cause they were not under the Great Seal, though by the
Queen's direction, the author pronounces against law—
because against the Puritans. Here the Bishop of
Lichfield, without the Queen's direction, erects a kind
of Judicatory, which he reckons to be agreeable to law—
because in favour of the Puritans.

P. 466. "The writer of Hooker's Life," &c.—It was
disingenuous to quote the quaint trash of a fantastical
life-writer, as he knew the words, thus separate, would
be understood in a sense the life-writer never meant,
namely, that Mr. Hooker was only a tool or creature of
the Archbishop: whereas that immortal man spoke no
language but that of truth, and dictated by conscience.

P. 470. "Mr. Hooker concludes," &c.—This answer
of his is one of the greatest master-pieces for purity and
elegance of language, eloquence, and dignity of discourse,
clearness and strength of reasoning, that ever was written.

P. 481. This Bill offered to the House was such an
insolent mutinous action in the Puritan ministers, that
one would wonder a writer of this author's good sense
could mention them without censure, much more that
he should do it with commendation. It was no wonder
the Queen should except from a general pardon men so
ready to oppose authority. A bill for toleration for
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themselves had been just and reasonable, and perhaps, in the temper of the House of Commons in their favour, they had succeeded—but a bill to establish themselves, and impose their discipline upon others, was an insufferable insolence. But it proceeded from that wretched principle, which the author would conceal in his friends, but is always ready, on every occasion, to exclaim against in his adversaries; namely, "that error is not to be tolerated, without the guilt of partaking in other men's sins."

P. 482. "To prove his doctrine of Popery," &c.—This is the general fault of controversial Divines, and has been so in every age since the apostolic times. In combating one extreme, they run into another; and, while they are opposing their enemies on the right hand, give advantages to those on their left. This is often the mishap even of the more cautious, who are combating honestly for what they think the truth. Others, who are fighting only for their party, their reputation, and advancement, act like mere engineers, who never inquire whose ground it is they stand upon, while they are erecting a battery against their enemies.

P. 483. "For relief."—What relief? Toleration? No: an establishment. To this the author would say, all they first wanted, was to be let alone and not persecuted. Yes, but it was to bring in their discipline by degrees; 1st, to quarrel with surplices and square caps, then to cavil at the Common Prayer, and lastly to condemn Episcopacy. All this time, indeed, they were for continuing in the church. But what was this, but aiming to establish their discipline, on the ruins of the Episcopal church? Had they, on their first persecution, left the church, we had seen all they desired was toleration: but persevering to continue in it to reform it, it is plain they wanted an establishment.

P. 488. "It has been easy at this time," &c.—Was it not distressing the government and the hierarchy, to revile them in the bitterest language, on the eve of an invasion from Spain, when the only security that government had was the people's love, and consequently attachment to church and state? Did not these pamphlets abate the people's love and reverence for both,
in which they were told that the government was unjust
and tyrannical; and the hierarchy, Antichristian?

P. 491. "They assumed no authority," &c.—What
is meant by this? They assumed no authority. Did not
they expel from their society all who would not observe
their decrees? Yes. But they exercised no coercive
power. How could they? This belongs only to the civil
state, and is derived from thence to the established church
only. Why, this is not what they would be at. They
were for being the established church. This is the
reason why they were for *wiping off* the calumny of
schism, by communicating, as they pretended, with the
church, which this author makes a matter of great merit
in them.

P. 495. "It will then follow."—This is a very pitiful
sofism, as may be seen by only changing names. If
priests by God's ordinance are superior governors
over the deacons, it will follow that her Majesty is not
supreme governor over the deacons.

P. 496. "But this is a quite different thing to say,"
&c.—It is not a different thing, as Hooker has shewn,
who has proved that a difference in the legislature makes
no difference in the essence of things.

P. 498. "Most of the Clergy," &c.—This is most
true. The great Hooker was not only against, but laid
down principles that have entirely subverted it, and all
pretences to a divine unalterable right in any form of
church government whatsoever. Yet, strange to say, his
book was so unavoidable a confutation of Puritanical
principles, which by the way claimed their Presbytery as
of divine right, that the churchmen took the advantage
of the successes of their champion, and now began to
claim a divine right for Episcopacy on the strength of
that very book, that subverted all pretences to every
species of divine right whatsoever.

Ch. viii. p. 508. "Mr. Udall," &c.—This is unworthy
a candid historian, or an honest man. Udall, we see,
p. 519, did not suffer death (which in common English
signifies dying by the hand of the executioner), but died
in prison; he says, indeed, heart-broken: but there is
as much difference between an historian's pronouncing
a man heart-broken, and actual breaking on a wheel, as
between a priest's pronouncing an excommunicate damned, and actual damnation.

P. 574. Remarks.—In one part of these remarks, he appears not to have understood Hooker; in another, he draws consequences which do not follow from Hooker's principles; and in the third he argues against church power from the abuse of it.

P. 575. "Must I then," &c.—He either mistakes or misrepresents Hooker. What that great author affirms is this, that whoever is born in a church where the true doctrine of Christ is taught and professed, is obliged to submit to those laws of the society, without which no society can subsist. Just as he who is born in a civil society, founded on the principles of natural liberty, is bound to submit to those laws of the society, without which civil society cannot subsist.

P. 575. "But all those of Rome."—How so? Does it follow, that, because I have a right to the use of a power, I have a right to the abuse of it? The church of Rome, that of England, and every other Christian church of one denomination, may as a society make laws of order and discipline. The church of Rome abuses this right—therefore the church of England shall not use it.

P. 579. "Blow up their liberties."—Blow up a fool's head. This proceeded from the natural perversity of the populace, which will always oppose authority, when they can with safety, even though they deprive themselves of all their other satisfactions.

P. 581. "Articles."—I would fain know how these men could speak worse of the evil being himself. How deplorable are the infirmities of human nature! See here the feverish state of a puritanical conscience. These men could set church and state in a flame for surplice caps, surplices, and the cross in baptism; while they swallowed, and even contended for, these horrible decrees; the frightful and disordered dreams of a crude, sour-tempered, persecuting bigot, who counterworks his Creator, and makes God alter man's image, and chooses the worst model he can find, himself.

Ibid. The Puritans, by Dr. Reynolds in the name of the brethren at the Hampton Court conference, desired
that these godly articles might be inserted among the thirty-nine. See p. 15, 2d. vol.

P. 583. This went upon the true puritan principle, that whatever was popish was false.

P. 584. Their case was indeed more sad than their historian intended to suggest. It was the common infirmity of churchmen to persecute, when in power; but to persecute as the Puritans here did, while under oppression, shews the extreme depravity of the heart.

P. 584. "Lambeth articles."—There is something very spiteful in this, not to be content to abuse Lambeth for passing doctrines contrary to theirs, but to abuse them for espousing their favourite decrees. But Lambeth, like Rome, can do nothing right.

P. 587. "With hypocrites."—Notwithstanding this protestation, it appears as clear as the day, from Harsnet's detection, that this affair was a vile imposture, and as fairly charged on the Puritan Divines, as a like imposture, carrying on at the same time, and detected by the same able writer, in the popish quarter, was fairly chargeable on the mass-priests.

P. 589. "Of those that have."—This weak speech an able historian should not have quoted, for the sake of his party. They were indicted as acting against law, not against the Gospel; and the judge, if a good lawyer, was qualified to try them, let his knowledge in divinity be what it would—the rest the legislature was to answer.

Ibid: "The foundations of discipline."—i.e., Were not disposed to overturn the constitution of the church. We see by this what was aimed at, an establishment, not a toleration. There was too much pretence therefore to treat them as seditious subjects.

P. 594. "Erastian principles."—It is true that Erastus's famous book De Excommunicatione was purchased by Whitgift of Erastus's widow in Germany, and put by him to the press in London, under fictitious names of the place and printer. This Selden discovered, and has published the discovery in his book De Synedriis. Had the author known this, it had been a fine ornament to his history.
Pref. p. x. "To which it is exposed."—The author has here, and in his preface to the former volume, confounded together two things very distinct and different, a test for the security of the establishment, and the sacramental test, enjoined for that purpose. I think a test absolutely necessary for the security of the established religion, where there are diversities of sects in the state; and I think the sacramental test the very worst that could have been chosen for that purpose, because it is both evaded and profaned.

P. xi. "And penalties for not doing it."—Most certainly.

Ch. i. p. 3. "In the years 1581 and 1590."—A fair historian would here have acquainted us with the villainous and tyrannical usage of the kirk of Scotland to their King, of which the Scotch historians of that time are full; and by which we should have seen the high provocation they had given him, and how natural it was for him to return their usage, when he had once emancipated himself from them: The King himself hints at this, p. 19.

P. 19. "Pray let that alone."—Sancho Pancha never made a better speech, nor more to the purpose, during his government.

P. 78. "Which he prophesied."—How would the historian have us understand this? As a true prophecy to be fulfilled, or a false prophet confuted?

Ch. ii. p. 101. "No certain proof of it."—This is abominable. There was no proof at all. He was suspected indeed to have been poisoned, nobody knows by whom, because no prince dies untimely without that suspicion.

P. 107. "Received in their room."—It could never be a bad exchange which set aside the nine horrid articles of Lambeth.

Ibid. "A national reformation."—In other words, when the Puritans had long laboured in vain for an establishment, they would now be thankful for a toleration.
They had no just pretence to the first, and it was unjust to deny them the latter: But he who asks too much is often in danger of losing his due.

P. 115. "Unexceptionable manner."—But our historian forgets to tell us what Mr. Hales said upon the sum of things; i. e. when he had heard the great Episcopius make his celebrated defence, he, from that moment, bade John Calvin good night.

P. 118. "Nothing here than Scripture, reason, and fathers."—This was said ironically.

P. 120. "Turned their task-masters out of the kingdom."—Soon after they used their interest to this purpose, and I believe they began to use it as soon as ever they got it.

P. 121. "Raised up by this treatise."—Where was the storm, except in this fanciful author's standish, when Selden taught the clergy to raise their parsonage-barns on the sure foundation of law; which before they had foolishly placed upon crutches, the feeble prop of an imaginary divine right?

P. 125. "Two religions established by law."—This is a mistake, and the fancy of two established religions in one state, an absurdity. The case was this: part of the Bohemians before the Reformation held the necessity of communicating under both kinds; these were the Hussites. This privilege was granted them; and these were called the sub utrāque, and the rest sub unā. But these were not two religions, but one only—administering a single rite differently. After the Reformation, the Hussites became Protestants, i. e. of a different religion from the sub unā part; but then they were no longer an established church, but a tolerated one only.

P. 126. "Rejoiced at this providence."—Just such a providence as the long Parliament depriving Charles the First of his crown, and setting up a republic.

P. 144. "Lost both his crown and life."—This is an utter calumny: a coalition of the two churches was never in the King's thoughts; happy for him, if he never had worse; what he aimed at, was arbitrary power. Had he given his Parliaments satisfaction in that point, he might have reduced the Puritans to a lower condition, that
than ever they were in, in the time of Elizabeth. The
cry of popery was the address of those who were only
struggling for civil liberty, as believing (in which they
were mistaken) that the real danger of civil liberty was
not of force enough to draw in the people to their side,
without possessing them with fears from the imaginary
danger of popery.

P. 147. "Harsnet."—Was a man of the greatest
learning and parts of his time.

P. 148. "To the mother* than to the Son† of God."

* This is a vile perversion of facts. Gondamer's
words were more devotion to the mother, than the son;
meaning Buckingham's mother, who carried on the traffic
of preferments for her son, and consequently had a much
greater levée. So this, we see, was a mere profane
joke of Gondamer's, speaking of court corruption under
the terms of religion. Now here comes an historian,
who by adding the words, of God, makes Gondamer
give testimony to the growth of popery. But could he
really believe that one Episcopal clergyman of this time
ever prayed to the mother of God?

† Of God, should be erased. The mother meant,
was Buckingham's, who, being a violent Papist, and yet
having the disposal of preferments, gave Gondamer
hopes of the re-establishment of popery by advancing its
friends.

Ibid. "Upon their principles."—If he means the
principles which Laud followed in the administration of
church affairs, it is nothing to the purpose. If he means
the principles Laud advanced in that conference, he
knows not what he says; they were unanswerable.

P. 149. "Selden says of the clergy of these times."
Here is another of the historian's arts. Selden speaks
of the Puritan clergy: Yet by the terms here used, the
reader would naturally imagine that Selden spoke of the
Episcopal clergy.

Ch. iii. p. 150. "Attorney General Noy."—Could
a fair historian have any more omitted telling his reader
that Noy was a great lawyer, than, if he spoke of Bacon,
to acknowledge his great talents for philosophy?

cc 3
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P. 178. "More likely, &c. reputation depended."—Too absurd to be confuted. The circumstance of sending home the Queen's domestics might have shewn him the folly of his conjecture. Buckingham makes a war to disgust the Parliament, and sends home the Queen's domestics to please them.

P. 185. "Accessory to all the abominations of poverty."—From so silly a sophism, so gravely delivered, I conclude, Usher was not that great man, he has been represented.

Ch. iv. p. 209. "And reverend aspect."—Here the historian was much at a loss for his Confessor's good qualities, while he is forced to take up with his grave and reverend aspect.

P. 232. "Should be cancelled."—Had Laud done nothing worse, than to prosecute this factious and illegal scheme, he might have passed both for a good subject and a prudent prelate.

Ch. v. p. 257. "Filled with so much learning," &c.—It is written also with much wit and humour, which Lord Clarendon calls levity. It might be so in a subject of importance: but on so trifling a question, wit and humour was in its place. But is it not something odd, that this historian should represent it as a trifling question, after he had made surplices, hoods, and square caps, a matter of such importance, that the whole kingdom was to be set in a flame, rather than to comply with them?

P. 272. "That God would forgive Queen Elizabeth her sins."—This is an unfair representation—They were the sins of persecuting the holy discipline which he prayed for the remission of; and that reflecting on her administration was the thing which gave offence.

P. 289. "I can do no more."—Had he been content to do nothing, the church had stood. Suppose him to have been an honest man and sincere, which I think must be granted, it will follow that he knew nothing of the constitution either of civil or religious society; and was as poor a churchman as he was a politician.

P. 290. "Awakening preachers—wild notes,"—i. e. A mad fanatic, who will always draw the people after
after him. We have at present of these bull-fitches without number, and their wild notes are as awakening as ever.

P. 295. "Bp. Williams retired to his diocese."—This prosecution must give every one a very bad idea of Laud's heart and temper. You might resolve his high acts of power in the state into reverence and gratitude to his master; his tyranny in the church to his zeal for, and love of, what he called religion: but the outrageous prosecution of these two men can be resolved into nothing, but envy and revenge: and actions like these they were which occasioned all that bitter, but indeed just exclamation against the bishops, in the speeches of Lord Falkland and Lord Digby.

P. 303. "Franciscus de Clarâ."—His real name was Christopher Davenport. He published an exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles in the most favourable sense. But it pleased not either party. It was put into the Index Expurgatorius by the Spanish inquisition, and would have been condemned at Rome, had not the King and Archbishop Laud pressed Penzani, the pope's agent in London, to stop the prosecution. Popish Ch. Hist. vol. iii. p. 104, in V. Div.

Ch. vi. p. 387. "Bp. Hatfield's tomb, which had been erected 25 years."—250 it should have been.

Ch. viii. p. 429. "More a jingle of words than strength of argument."—If Grinstein's argument be a jingle of words, as the historian confesses, how should Selden's, which was delivered to expose the other, be a jingle of words too? Every one sees it is a thorough confusion. And whenever a jingle of words is designedly set in a light to be exposed, by making an argument out of them of the same form, they are no longer a jingle of words, but a conveyance of sense. The truth is, as to Grinstein's argument, the fallacy lies here, in supposing every thing of the Jus Divinum was questionable in a bishop; and out of question in an archbishop; whereas they both had in them the Jus Divinum of Presbyters; and therefore, as superintendents of other presbyters, they might suspend them. The fallacy of Selden's reply lies in this, that it supposes that Convocations and Parl-
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P. 431. "Archives of Oxford."—If this were worth notice, the historian should have added that Bradshaw's broad-brimmed hat is to be met with in the same place.

P. 434. "Goodman himself was not executed."—Whose fault was this? He was remitted to the pleasure of the House, and they would not order his execution. The truth of the matter was this: each party was desirous of throwing the odium of Goodman's execution on the other; so between both the man escaped. In the mean time how prejudiced is the representation of our historian!

P. 436. "A right to do by virtue of a clause."—To talk of the Legislature's having a right to do a thing by virtue of a clause in an Act of Parliament, is nonsense. The Legislature which makes the Act, is supposed never to die. So it is just the same as to say the judge has a right to interpret the law, by virtue of his own declaration affirming he had that right. So that if an attainted was a thing agreeable to natural justice, the Legislature needed no clause to enable them to pass it; if it was not agreeable to natural justice, no clause or declaration of their own could make it so.

Ch. ix. p. 438. "This [Lord Strafford's] letter was but a feint."—It is affirmed by Carte (in his Life of the Earl of Ormond, and with some shew of reason) that this was a forged letter, to induce the King's consent.

Ch. x. p. 504. "But though the King," &c.—These insinuations against the King are certainly very unjust and groundless.

P. 505. "That the English Court admitted," &c.—If he meant by the English Court, the King, he is scandalously uncharitable.

P. 510. "That the King was willingly ignorant," &c.—This is a villainous accusation, destitute of all proof and likelihood. The poor King had follies and crimes of state enough to answer for, without loading him with so injurious and groundless a calumny. As to
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The favour the King afterwards shewed the Irish rebels, and his entry into treaty with them, it was in his distresses to recruit his army, to make head against the overbearing power of the Parliament; in which he acted as became one in his station, though it was foolish and unmanly in him to deny it.

P. 512. "At the motion of Lord Digby."—Why are we told this but to mislead us? A year ago, before the King had made full satisfaction for his misgovernment, such a remonstrance was seasonable: now he had made full satisfaction, it was factious and seditious. And that their very purpose was not to secure what they had got for the service of the old constitution, but to pave the way for a new, was plain from their printing and publishing their remonstrance, before the King could prepare his answer.

Ibid. "When the prospect of an agreement," &c. —i. e. When this unhappy accident afforded the demagogues in Parliament an opportunity of widening the breach between the King and Parliament. Otherwise this was a natural means for their uniting more firmly than ever.

P. 527. "Not that the House can be charged, &c. for the very next day."—The notorious falsehood of this assertion cannot better be exposed, or shewn in a more contemptible light, than by the reason given of the assertion; for the very next day, &c. They have been charged by all mankind with encouraging the tumults; but nobody ever charged them with accusing publicly, that they did encourage them: and this is all that their precious historian clears them of, by his for the very next day.

P. 532. "Null without the Peers."—Foolish—on the hypothesis (though a false one) there are three estates, Lords Spiritual, and Temporal, and Commons. Two of them sit in one house, and compose one body: the third sit in one house, and compose another body. The Lords Spiritual are excluded; they remonstrate, and say, a force being put upon a part of that body, the acts of the other part are void. This is good reasoning on the hypothesis. But the hypothesis is false. The Bishops
do not make a distinct estate, but are part of the general Baronage which composes the House of Lords. However, our historian reasons on the hypothesis, and says, that the Commons might as well pretend that the Lords proceedings were void without them, as that the Bishops should pretend so. What, do the Commons, like the Bishops, make up one body with the Lords, on which the Bishop's argument is founded? Do they not sit and act as a distinct body? \textit{Risum teneatis}?

P. 532. "Occasion the dissolution of the Parliament."—If the King hoped so, he was fit for Bedlam too: but every body, but these poor-spirited historians, see, that all the King could possibly hope from it, was, the getting the Bishops restored to their right.

P. 534. "Because by the same rule."—That is to say, by the same rule that I pluck out a rotten tooth, I may pull out the whole set. This is only said to expose the historian's foolish reasoning. As to the action itself, it was the most unparalleled folly that ever was committed.

P. 535. "Mr. Echard with great probability," &c.
—A charge against the Papists has always great probability with this historian. It is a known uncontroverted fact, that the advice was Digby's; nay the historian confirms it by observing, that on its ill success Digby immediately withdrew out of the kingdom. Yet in the same breath he tells us, it is more probable it was a project of the Queen and her cabal of Papists; and this on the authority of that poor scribbler, Echard. They neither of them knew that at this time the Queen was almost frightened out of her wits, for fear of an impeachment; was actually projecting her escape; and was incapable of any vigorous council, intent only on her own safety; to effect which, she gave up Strafford to the slaughter, by that poor and ungrateful postscript she persuaded the King to add to his letter to the Lords.

P. 536. "To leave Whitehall."—When a man runs away from his own house, it is a plain proof, I think, that he could stay no longer in it with safety. It is confessed the people were on the side of the Parliament. In
such a situation, we see how commodious it was for that body to pretend fears; it was the attaching the people more closely to them. But for the King, in this situation, to pretend fears, was acting the part of an idiot; for as all love of Majesty was gone, and the people restrained only by the apprehensions of its power, for the King to shew by pretended fear that he had no power, was removing the only barrier to their rage and insult. We must needs conclude therefore that the King's were real, and not pretended.

P. 540. "The hand of God was against them," &c.
The Puritans have a strange kind of logic. A seat in the civil Legislature for the Bishops the Puritans deemed an abuse. They are now deprived of their seat, which, in the sense of the Puritans, was bringing them nearer to the primitive standard. Yet this blessing (for such an one it was, if it brought them nearer to the practice of the purest times) must be reckoned, by these very Puritans, the hand of God in judgment for their sins. A puritan gossip met a churchwoman, her neighbour, one morning in the streets of Exeter. Hark you, neighbour, says the first, do you hear the news? Merchant such an one is, a bankrupt, and merchant such an one, the churchman, loses ten thousand pounds by the break; there is God's judgment for you; the merchant was ever a great scoffer at the conventicle.—And is this all you have heard? said the other.—Yes.—Why then you have heard but half the news. Mercer such an one of your religion has lost fifteen hundred pounds by this break.—I must confess, replied the first, a severe trial.

Ch. xi. p. 544. "Resolutions of the Councils at Windsor, I leave with the reader."—The judicious reader will laugh at our historian for referring this question to his determination. The Parliament was not now acting on the principles of Grotius' book De Jure, but on those of Machiavel's, called the Prince, where every thing is just, that is profitable.

P. 550. "The whole controversy."—It is very evident, these suppositions (demonstrable as they are) this impartial historian is by no means willing we should make, by his illusory expression in the first of them.
where he says, the King left his Parliament, and would act no longer in concert with them. If by leaving he means deserting, as he would have the reader understand it, it is false: and if, by not acting in concert, he means that he refused doing his part in the Legislature, that is false likewise. If by leaving, he only meant removing from them to a distance, the King had reason; he was drove away by the tumults. If by not acting in concert, he meant not doing every thing the Parliament commanded, the King had reason here, too; for they would have stripped him of his whole prerogative.

P. 551. "In the opinion of the Lords and Commons." Here is some mistake. The historian is here appealing to his reader’s opinion (not the opinion of the Lords and Commons), and telling us what conclusions the reader should make from his own opinions. So, if the reader thinks the constitution was entire, that the laws were sufficient to secure us against popery and slavery, he was to conclude the King’s arguments strong. But if the two Houses declared that the King had deserted them, &c. what then? Why then we are to conclude that the two Houses are in the right: not the more for their declaration, I promise you. But such a reasoner is this Historian. He does not know how to state the opposite parts of his proposition.

P. 567. "His Majesty had his ambiguities."—Here was no ambiguity. The King understood by foreign aids what certainly the Parliament meant, foreign troops. Are arms and ammunition, bought with the crown jewels of England, what in English we signify by the words, foreign aids? But now there is neither end nor measure to this historian’s prejudices, and false representations.

P. 569. "And feeling apprehension."—The truth is, these poor people felt, as Sancho Pancha saw, by hearsay. The pulpit incendiaries had usurped all the people’s faculties, and assumed the right of judging for them.

P. 563. "Power of the keys to themselves."—And wisely too. They had seen this power impiously abused by the prelates; and they had no inclination to see a prelate
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Prelate in every parish, more imperious, more cruel, and more ignorant, than the very worst of Laud's bishops:—

However, throughout the whole usurpation, the Presbyterian was the established religion to all intents and purposes.

P. 586. "Deserted the House of Commons," &c.—

When a man is listed into a party, you may always know him by his badge. Speaking of those who left the House of Commons and retired to the King, NEAL always uses the party-word deserted, which implies the betraying their trust. So indeed the Parliament called it; but an historian's using it is taking for granted the thing in dispute; namely, whether leaving the House at this time, and going to the King, was betraying their trust or preserving their allegiance. I consider the author here, (as you see, by the defence of himself in his Review, he would be considered, nay complains of his adversary for not considering them, that is to say) as an historian, not as a Puritan. See p. 5, of the Review.

P. 588. "Massacre of Ireland."—What sense is there in this comparison, if you do not suppose the author to insinuate, that in the civil war in England, as in the massacre of Ireland, all the Protestant blood was shed on one side, and unjustly and cruelly? and what honesty is there in the comparison, if you do?

P. 596. "Parliament had the better men?"—To all these testimonies I think it sufficient to oppose that of Oliver Cromwell, in his speech to his Parliament, who speaks of it to them by way of appeal as a thing they very well knew, That the Presbyterian armies of the Parliament, before the self-denying ordinance, were chiefly made up of decayed serving-men, broken tapsters, and men without any sense of religion: and that it was his business to inspire that spirit of religion into his troops on the reform, to oppose to the principles of honour in the King's troops, made up of gentlemen. And Oliver was a man who understood what he said, and knew what he did: it is true, fanaticism was called religion by Oliver, just as cant is called religion by our historian.

P. 597. "Great scarcity of preachers of a learned education."—This sure is no compliment to the good
good old cause, to have the learned against it. But, to make amends, for want of acquired knowledge, they abounded in inspired.

P. 600. "Comparing the learning of the Puritan Divines," &c.—Our historian had owned just before, p. 597, that there were but few among them of a learned education. He had better have stuck to his word.—Selden, Lightfoot, Cudworth, Pococke, Whichcot, &c. can with no propriety be called of the party: the most that can be said of them is, that they submitted to the power.

P. 615. "In which the kingdom is inflamed."—I believe all parties are agreed that if a mistaken King, of good faith, had made that full reparation for his misconduct, which Charles the First did, before the having recourse to arms, the Parliament ought to have acquiesced in peace with what they had got for the people. But Charles was a man of ill faith; and thence another question arises, Whether he was to be trusted? But here we must begin to distinguish. It was one thing, whether those particulars, who had personally offended the King, in the manner by which they extorted this amends from him; and another, whether the public, on all the principles of civil government, ought not to have sate down satisfied.—I think particulars could not safely take his word; and that the public could not honestly refuse it. You will say, then, the leaders in Parliament were justified in their mistrust. Here, again, we must distinguish. Had they been private men only, we should not dispute it. But they bore another character; they were representatives of the public, and should therefore have acted in that capacity.


"Review of the principal facts in the first volume."

P. 5. "Dress up Mr. Neal in the habit of a Puritan."—An atrocious injury, without doubt! Mr. Neal is only an historian. It puts one in mind of the trumpeter,
trumpeter, who, being seized by his enemy in the rout of his own party, cried out for mercy, as being only a trumpeter. The more rogue you, cried the honest veteran, who set other people together by the ears, and will not fight yourself!

Appendix, p. 83. "With writers of these times."
The Author of the Vindication having been a Dissenter.

Pref. to 3d Vol. p. vii. "This obscure clergyman."
This is a very just reproof.

Ch. ii. p. 62. "More decency and respect."—Without doubt he would.—He had infinitely more esteem for the learning of the Episcopal clergy, though perhaps no more love for their persons.

P. 80. "Religious part of the nation."—i. e. the Puritan, for puritanism and religion are convertible terms with this historian.

Ibid. "Though it appears."—Why for this very reason it was not to be justified, because it was a force upon the conscience of these Episcopal Divines of greatest figure.

P. 93. "From Geneva."—Deodati, the Prince of Divinity there, returned a very temperate answer, no way inconsistent with the re-establishment of Episcopacy.

W. Hayes, MS. in Library, N* 28, M. G. Glass.

P. 102. "The interest of Dr. Cheynel."—Cheynel's villainous book, wherein he gives an account of his treatment of Chillingworth, is yet extant; and it confirms Lord Clarendon's accusation. Locke read it, and speaks of it in the harshest terms, but not more severely than it deserves.

Ch. iii. p. 107. "Base and mutinous motion."—There is no circumstance that bears harder on the King's conduct than this. It is not to be conceived that these men, who hazarded all to support the King's right, could advise him to any thing base in a mutinous manner. I doubt therefore that this is too strong a proof that nothing less than arbitrary government would heartily satisfy him.

Ch. iv. p. 164. "Not inconsistent with public peace."—What! is not the declaiming against human literature,
literature, crying down magistracy, talking of a fifth-monarchy, inconsistent with the public peace?

P. 166. "My wishes are."—It is apparent, from many circumstances in the young man’s conduct, that he had his eye upon the crown, matters being gone too far for the King and Parliament ever to agree.

Ch. v. p. 247. "More a man of business than letters."—Just the contrary. He did not understand business at all, as fully appears from the historian’s account of his civil administration, and was a great master of religious controversy.

P. 253. "Admirable argument to induce the Prince to put the sword into the King’s hands."—This is a foolish declamation. The subject here was Ireland, not the militia. The King is charged with breaking his promise to leave the Irish war to the Parliament. His answer is to this effect, and I think very pertinent—"It is true, I made this promise, but it was when the Parliament was my friend, not my enemy. They might be then intrusted with my quarrel; but it would be madness to think they now can. To prevent therefore their making a treaty with the Irish, and in their distresses bringing over the troops against me, I have treated with them, and have brought over the troops against them." This was speaking like a wise and able Prince.

P. 258. "Episcopacy jure divino."—The Marquis of Hertford seems to have read Hooker to more advantage than the King his master; who fancied that great man contended for the jus divinum of Episcopacy in his E. P. in which he has been followed by many Divines since.

P. 263. "Were not these reasonable requests."—The historian mistakes Lord Clarendon, who is not here telling us, what the Parliament were able, but only what they were willing to do. Their hands were tied, not by the Scotch Covenant, but by the Scotch assistance, which they could not keep without adhering to the Covenant.

P. 265. "His Majesty’s senile attachment to her imperious dictates."—Never was the observation of
HISTORY OF THE PURITANS.

the King’s unhappy attachment, made in a worse place. His honour required him not to give up his friends; and his religion, viz. the true principles of Christianity, to take off the penal laws from peaceable Papists; and common humanity called upon him to favour those who had served him at the hazard of their lives and fortunes.

P. 260. “The Earl by his Majesty’s commission yielded,” &c.—The Earl exceeded his commission, which is known to every body.

Ch. vi. p. 270. “Taking themselves to an easier and quieter life.”—I don’t know what any one could say worse of these pretended ministers of Christ, the Puritans, than what is here confessed. They set out in the office of trumpeters of rebellion, being chaplains to the regiments of Essex’s army. As soon as they had gained their end, which was dispossessing the Episcopal beneficed clergy, they nested themselves in their warm parsonages, and left the Parliament soldiers a prey to those they themselves most hated, the independent fanatic lay-preachers.

Ch. vii. p. 360. “An unjust and malicious aspersion.”—The historian, before he said this, should have seen whether he could answer these two questions in the affirmative.—Would the English have paid the arrears without the person of the King?—Would the Scots have given up the King, if they could have had the arrears without?

Ch. viii. p. 408. “Not only abandoned and renounced these senile doctrines, but have,” &c.—To know whether the Presbyterians have indeed abandoned their persecuting principles, we should see them under an establishment. It is no wonder that a tolerated sect should espouse those principles of Christian liberty, which support their toleration. Now the Scotch Presbyterians are established, and we find they still adhere to the old principle of intolerance.

Ch. x. p. 493. “Selden.”—What has Selden here to do with Ministers, Puritans, and Persecutors?

P. 495. “Keep a weekly fast.”—These were glorious Saints, that fought and preached for the King’s destruction; and then fasted and prayed for his preservation.
vation, when they had brought him to the foot of the scaffold.

P. 407. "And not being willing to apply," &c. They had applied to the Protector, and received such an answer as they desired. A deputation of the London Divines went to him to complain, that the Cavalier Episcopal Clergy got their congregations from them, and debauched the faithful from their ministers. Have they so? said the Protector: I will take an order with them; and made a motion, as if he was going to say something to the captain of the guards; when turning short. But hold, said he, after what manner do the Cavaliers debauch your people? By preaching, replied the ministers. Then preach back again, said this able statesman; and let them to their own reflections.

P. 527. "And virtuous morals."—How could he say that these officers, who, he owns, were high enthusiasts, were yet men of sober and virtuous morals, when they all acted (as almost all enthusiasts do) on this maxim—that the end sanctifies the means, and that the elect (of which number they reckoned themselves chief) are above ordinances?

P. 530. "Published a protestation."—And yet these very secluded members had voted the bishops guilty of high treason for protesting in the same manner, when under the like force.

Ibid. "Oliver Cromwell was in doubt."—And is this historian indeed so simple as to think Oliver Cromwell was really in doubt?

P. 545. "As strong and convincing as any thing of this nature possibly can be."—There is full as strong evidence on the other side; all of which this honest historian conceals—evidence of the King's bed-chamber, who swear they saw the progress of it—saw the King write it—heard him speak of it as his—and transcribed parts of it for him. It appears by the wretched false taste of composition in Gauden's other writings, and by his unchaste language, that he was utterly incapable of writing this book. Again, consider what credit was to be given to Gauden's assertion of his authorship. He confesses himself a falsary and an impostor, who imposed a spurious book on the public in the King's name.
Was not a man so shameless, capable of telling this to be
for a bishoprick, which he was soliciting on the pretended
merit of this work? As to Walker, it is agreed that
Gauden told him that he [Gauden] was the author of
the book, and that he saw it in Gauden's handwriting,
which is well accounted for by a servant, a tithe-gatherer
of Gauden, who swears that Gauden borrowed the book
of one of the King's friends (to whom it was communi-
cated by the King for their judgments) to transcribe
that he [Gauden] sat up all night to transcribe it, and
that he [the tithe-gatherer] sat up with him to snuff his
candles, and mend his fire. It is agreed that Charles II.
and the Duke of York believed, on the word of Gauden,
when he solicited his reward, that he [Gauden] wrote it.
But then this forwarded their prejudices: and what they
believed, Lord Clarendon would believe too. On the
whole, it is so far from being certain, as this historian
pretends, that the book is spurious, that it is the most
uncertain matter I ever took the pains to examine. There
is strong evidence on both sides; but I think the strongest
and most unexceptionable is on that which gives it to
the King.

P. 549. "This unrighteous charge."—The Presby-
terians subdued and imprisoned the King. This is agreed
on all hands: Then the Independents, getting uppermost,
took the King from them, and were determined to mur-
der him. They would have had the Presbyterians join
with them in this murder, of which they [the Indepen-
dents] were to have all the profit, and the Presbyterians
only a share in the odium. Besides, they mortally hated
the Independents for opposing their two darling points,
the divine right of Presbytery, and the use of force
in religious matters. Was it likely that in these cir-
cumstances the Presbyterians should join with the Inde-
pendents in the odious project? And had they not a
wonderful deal of merit in opposing it? But had these
Independents been ready to set up their idol of Presby-
tery, and on their own terms, on condition of joining
with them in the murder; I ask then, whether it is
likely they would have stood out? Those who have read
only this history of them, will have little reason to
think they would. Those who were capable of punishing
Arians with death, were capable of doing any wickedness for the cause of God.

P. 551. "Who had the greatest hand in' it of all."—There is doubtless a great deal of truth in all this. No party of men, as a religious body, further than as they were united by one common enthusiasm, were the actors in this tragedy, (see what Burnet says below). But who prepared the entertainment, and was at the expence of the exhibition, is another question.
A LETTER
FROM
AN AUTHOR,
TO
A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT;
CONCERNING
LITERARY PROPERTY.

1747.

SIR,

It seemeth to me an odd circumstance, that, amidst the justest and safest establishment of property, which the best form of government is capable of procuring, there should yet be one species of it belonging to an order of men, who have been generally esteemed the greatest ornament, and, certainly, are not the least support of civil policy, to which little or no regard hath been hitherto paid. I mean, the right of property in authors to their works. And surely if there be degrees of right, that of authors seemeth to have the advantage over most others; their property being, in the truest sense, their own, as acquired by a long and painful exercise of that very faculty which denominateth us men; And

... The following information, communicated by a friend, may be acceptable to the reader.

R. W.

The question, discussed in this letter, came afterwards before the Court of King's Bench in the case of Millar versus Taylor: And, on Feb. 7, 1769, that Court gave judgment in favour of the perpetual and exclusive right of an Author, by the common law, to print and publish his own works. The question was revived in the case of Donaldson versus Becker; which came before the Court of Chancery. The Lord Chancellor decreed in conformity to the opinion of the Court of King's Bench. But, upon an appeal from this decree, it was reversed by the House of Lords on the 22d of February, 1774.
And if there be degrees of security for its enjoyment, here again they appear to have the fairest claim, as fortune hath been long in confederacy with ignorance, to stop up their way to every other kind of acquisition.

History indeed informeth us, that there was a time, when men in public stations thought it the duty of their office to encourage letters; and when those rewards which the wisdom of the Legislature had established for the learned in that profession deemed more immediately useful to society, were carefully distributed amongst the most deserving. While this system lasted, Authors had the less occasion to be anxious about literary property; which was, perhaps, the reason why the settlement of it was so long neglected, that at length it became a question, whether they had any property at all.

But this fond regard to learning being only an indulgence to its infant age; a favour, which, in these happy times of its maturity, many reasons of state have induced the public wisdom to withdraw; Letters are now left, like Virtue, to be their own reward: We may surely then be permitted to expect that so slender a protection should, at least, be well secured from rapine and depreciation.

Yet so great is the vulgar prejudice, against an Author's property, that when, at any time, attempts have been made to support it, against the most flagrant acts of robbery and injustice, it was never thought prudent to demand the public protection as a right, but to supplicate it as a grace: and this, too, in order to engage a favourable attention, conveyed under every insinuating circumstance of address; such as promoting the paper manufactury at home; or augmenting the revenue, by that which is imported from abroad.

The grounds of this prejudice are various. It hath been partly owing to the complaints of unsuccessful writers against booksellers, for not bringing their works to a second edition; and partly, to the complaints of little readers against successful ones, for a contrary cause; which, to the great damage of the purchasers of the first edition, they have fraudulently improved a second. For the proprietor professing to sell only his paper and print, and not the doctrine conveyed by it; the purchaser, who has nothing else for his money, never reckons with
with good reason) his improvement for any thing. So that when a second edition lessens the price of the first, he very naturally thinks himself tricked of his money.

Another ground of prejudice, is the unfair advantage made of the author's property, by booksellers: which, if true, would be just as good a reason for refusing him the public protection, as it would be to turn all those estates upon the common, which one of your Peter Walters has out at nurse. For why should it be expected of an author, and of no one else, to become sage before he be entrusted with his own? Let him but share in the common security, and he will soon learn the value of property, and how to use it like his neighbours. As it is, we need not wonder, he should be disposed to part with that, for little, which he is unable to preserve but at great hazard and expense.

A third ground of prejudice is the odious sound of the word monopoly. But this is taking the thing in question for granted, viz. that an author hath no right of property: for a monopoly is an exclusive privilege by grant of doing that, which all men have a claim to do; not an exclusive right by nature of enjoying what no one else has a claim to. So that to make this a monopoly, is making a proprietor and a monopolist the same.

A fourth ground of prejudice is the favourite sound of liberty, in these times commonly used for licentiousness, and apparently so on this occasion. For liberty signifies the power of doing what one will with one's own; which is the right we here contend for: and licentiousness the doing what we will with another man's; which is the wrong we seek to redress. So that, as sure as licentiousness destroys liberty, so certain is it, that the protection of the right in question adds strength and vigour to it.

But it is not my design to defend the use men make of property; but to vindicate the right they have in it. For were it not for these prejudices, could we easily think that a printseller or engraver should be able to obtain that for his baubles, which learning hath so long sued for in vain? I shall therefore go to the bottom of them; and as they all support themselves on the false
false logic here detected; *the taking the thing in question for granted*, I shall shew, that an author has an undoubted right of property in his works.

Things susceptible of property must have these two essential conditions; that they be *useful* to mankind; and that they be capable of having their possession *ascertained*. Without the *first*, society will not be obliged to take the *right* under its protection; and, without the *second*, it will never venture upon the trouble.

Of these, some are *movable*, as goods; some *immoveable*, as lands: and they become property either by first occupancy, or by *improvement*.

Of *movables*, some are things *natural*; others, things *artificial*. Property in the first is gained by occupancy; in the latter, by improvement.

Movable property, arising from improvement, is of two sorts; the product of the *hand*, and of the *mind*; as an *utensil* made; a *book* composed. For that the product of the *mind* is as well capable of becoming property, as that of the *hand*, is evident from hence, that it hath in it those two essential conditions, which, by the allowance of all writers of laws, make things susceptible of property; namely, *common utility*, and a capacity of having its possession *ascertained*.

Both these sort of things, therefore, being capable of property, we are next to consider, as they are so different in their natures, whether there be not as great a difference in the *extension of their rights*.

In the *first* case, then, it is agreed, that property in the product of the hand, as in an *utensil*, is confined to the individual thing made; which, if the proprietor thinks not fit to hide, others may make the like in imitation of it; and thereby acquire the same property in their *manual work*, which he hath done in his.

But, in the *other* case of property in the product of the mind, as in a *book* composed, it is *not confined to the original MS.* but extends to the *doctrine contained in* it; which is, indeed, the true and peculiar property in a *book*. The necessary consequence of which is, that the owner hath an exclusive right of transcribing or *printing* it for gain or profit.

This
This difference, in these two sorts of property, arises from an equal difference in the things: as will appear by considering the different nature of the works; and the different views of the operators.

With regard to the nature of the work: an utensil; and a book only considered as a composition of paper, and ink drawn out in artificial characters, are both works of the hand; and, as such, the property is confined to the individual thing. But a book considered merely in this light, is considered inadequately and unjustly; the complete idea of a book being such a composition as is here spoken of, together with a doctrine contained. But under this idea it assumes another nature, and becomes a work of the mind. We have proved a work of the mind to be susceptible of property, like that of the hand. Now if the property in a book be confined to the individual volume, here is a work of the mind executed without any property annexed: the property in the individual volume, arising from its being merely the work of the hand. A doctrine absurd in speculation; as it is making manual and mental operation one and the same, which are two distinct and different things: and unjust in practice, as it depriveth the owner of a right annexed by nature to his labour. Again, in the utensil made, the principal expense is in the materials employed; which, whoever furnisheth, reasonably acquires a property in the thing made, though made by imitation. On the contrary, in a book composed, the principal expence is in the form given: which as the original maker only can supply, it is but reasonable, how greatly soever the copies of his work may be multiplied, that they be multiplied to his own exclusive profit.

Let us next consider it, with regard to the different views of the operators. He who makes an utensil, in imitation of another he sees made, must necessarily work with the same ideas the original operator had, and so fully acquires a property in the work of his own hands. But the most learned book in the world may be copied by one who hath no ideas at all. What pretence, then, hath such a one to property, in a work of the mind, who hath employed, in copying it, only the labour of the hand?
hand; and which tends but to make his theft the more
impudent: as he steals what he doth not understand?—
Again, in an utensil made, the framer of it hath plainly
no regard to any one's benefit but his own: and he
must finish it before it can be fitted for his use. His
end, then, being obtained in that individual piece of
work, it is but reasonable his property should there
terminate. In a mental work, the thing turns the other
way. Here the contriver may himself enjoy all the fruit
of his discoveries without drawing them out scholastically
in form. When he doth this, it is but candid to suppose
that it is done for the benefit of others. Can any thing
therefore, be more just than that he should be owned and
protected in a property, which he hath not merely ac-
quired to himself, but which is generously objective to
the benefit of others?

In a word, to insist once again upon what hath been
said.—If an author have only a property in his individual
manuscript, he hath, truly speaking, no property in his
book, at all; that is, as his book is a work of the mind,
which, in this case, still lies in common. The conse-
quence is, (as appears from the explanation of property
given above,) that no property ariseth from a thing
susceptible of property: nay, which is still more ab-
surd, from a thing actually become property, as being
attended with all those essential conditions from whence
property ariseth. To deny an author, therefore, or his
assigns, an exclusive privilege to print and vend his own
work, seemeth to be a violation of one of the most fun-
gamental rights of civil society.

But here let it be observed, that, in our division of
artificial movables, into the two sorts, of manual and
mental, we purposely omitted a third, of a complicated
nature, which holds of both the other in common; as
reserving it for this place, to support and illustrate what
hath been said above of the two more simple kinds: and
that is, of mechanic engines. Now these partaking so
essentially of the nature of manual works, the maker
hath no perfect right of property in the invention:—
for, like a common utensil, it must be finished before it
can be of use to himself; like that, its materials are its
principal expense; and like that, a successful imitator
must.
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must work with the ideas of the first inventor: which are all reasons why the property should terminate in the individual machine. Yet because the operation of the mind is so intimately concerned in the construction of these works, their powers being effected and regulated by the right application of geometric science, all states have concurred in giving the inventors of them a licence of monopoly, for a term of years, as on a claim of right. Now the reason of this, we say, can be explained only on the principles here advanced, that the constructor of a piece of mechanism hath his property confined to the individual thing made; and the composer of a scholastic work hath his, extended to the ideal discourse itself. And a mathematical machine holding of the nature of both, but more essentially of the former, there was no way of adjusting and satisfying an imperfect right but by such a grant as is here mentioned.

But it is no unfrequent practice for the claimants of a perfect right to apply to the magistrate, or Legislature, for the better security of an acquired property, in the same manner that claimants of an imperfect right do to acquire property: sometimes, to the one for a licence; and sometimes, to the other for an Act of Parliament. Yet from thence to conclude, that the claimants of a perfect right have, by such application, waved or given up their claim; or that the magistrate or Legislature have, by their licences or acts of exclusive privilege for a certain time, either abridged or superseded that claim, appears, to me, the highest absurdity; as it will, I am persuaded, to others, on reflecting upon the plain and obvious reasons why the petitioners seek this additional security, for the enjoyment of a natural right; and why the magistrate and Legislature grant it only for a certain term of years.

In the common administration of justice, the way, in use, to restrain the invasion of property, is to oblige the offender to repair the damages sustained. Now such is the nature of the property in question, that it may be long invaded before the sufferer can discover the offender; so that such a one having a fair chance not to be detected; and if detected, a certainty of refunding only what he hath unjustly gained; bad men will have but little encouragement to invade their neighbours' property.
property. Therefore, to counteract this undue temptation, it was natural for such proprietors, in their own defence, to apply to the state for additional and accumulative penalties against the invaders of their right. In which, they act but as the State itself doth for the security of Government in general; when, for the support of that natural allegiance, which all men owe to the society under which they choose to live, and whereby they are protected, it addeth, by positive laws, the additional sanction of oaths, and other solemn engagements.

Now if the State, in this case, can never be supposed to have waved or superseded its natural claim to allegiance, and to rest it solely on the oaths taken, or the engagements made; what reason have we to think that the subject, in his turn, when he applies to the State for protection, in the instance in question, should give up or impeach his natural right, while his only purpose is to seek additional security for the enjoyment of it?

This leadeth us to our second question, Why the Magistrate and Legislature restrain this additional sanction to a certain term of years. And the reason is evident. The petitioners neither require more; nor doth the State need, that more is needed. The great temptation to invade this property, being while the demand for it is great and frequent; which is, generally, on the first publication of a book, and some few years afterwards. While this demand continueth, the proprietor hath need of all additional sanctions, to oppose to the force of the temptation: But when, in course of years, the demand abateth; and, with it, the temptation; the common legal security of natural rights is then sufficient to keep offenders in order.

However, as clear and undoubted a property as this is by nature, and the common principles of society, it cannot be denied, but that the Legislature may abridge, suspend, or abrogate it within its own jurisdiction, as it is accustomed to do with several other the like rights, for the sake of the whole. But, then, it must be done by express declaration and decree; implication, inference, or any mere lax-consequence, or even a mistake of judgment in the Legislature, going on a supposition that there was no natural right where indeed there was, would
be, simply, insufficient to abrogate it. And the reason is plain, because the believing a thing to be no natural right, do not infer a judgment, that the enjoyment of it as such, would be hurtful to the Society; which judgment is the only cause of the Legislature's abridging or abrogating a natural right.

This was necessary to premise, in order to set a case in its true light, which hath, above all others, encouraged the invasion of property; though the Act, from whence it arises, was solely contrived to prevent that invasion. I mean the Act of the Eighth of Queen Anne; which ignorance and knavery have concurred to represent as a restrictive, and not accumulative law; and consequently, to suppose it the sole foundation, instead of an additional support, of literary property. It is intitled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning; in which an exclusive right of property, under certain conditions, is secured, by particular penalties, to authors, and book-sellers claiming under them, for the term of one and twenty years.

Now in this Act, we are so far from finding any declaration to abridge, suspend, or abrogate this natural right (which, as we say, would be indeed sufficient to dissolve it) or any expression intimating the opinion of the Legislature against its existence (which, as we say, would not be sufficient); that, on the contrary, there is in the preamble of it, an expression plainly declarative of their opinion, that authors had a right, prior to this Act; and, towards the conclusion, a proviso, which leaves the question of the right, free from, and undetermined by, what is, in this statute, enacted concerning property.

The expression is this,—Whereas Printers, Book-sellers, and other Persons, have of late frequently taken the Liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing, or causing to be printed, reprinted, and published, Books, and other Writings, without the Consent of the Authors or PROPRIETORS of such Books or Writings, to their very great Detriment, and too-often to the Ruin of them and their Families, &c.—Now, could the injured parties, here mentioned, be proprietors of that in which they had no property?
Or did the Legislature, in a law for the regulation of so momentous a branch of what was deemed and claimed as property, use the terms of the subject in question inaccurately or unstily? If it were possible to think so of a British Legislature, the supposition would be excluded here; because, not only the expression, but the sentiment, necessarily supposes that they used the word proprietors in its strict and and exact signification: it being a representation of the bad effects from the liberty taken of printing and reprinting books, without the consent of the authors, or their assigns.

The proviso, in the conclusion, is in these words——

Provided that nothing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, either to PREJUDICE or CONFIRM any RIGHT that the said Universities, or any of them, or any PERSON or PERSONS have, or claim to have, to the PRINTING or REPRINTING any Book or Copy already printed or HEREAFTER TO BE PRINTED.—Now, though it may be easily granted, that one purpose of this proviso was to leave undecided all claims, or pretences of claim, to exclusive printing, from patents, licenses, &c. yet the large wording of it appears to have a particular aim at obviating such misconstruction of the Statute, as if the additional temporary security, thereby given, either implied that there was no right of property before, or else abrogated what it found. And the having these two things in its intention, viz. the natural right, and that which is founded on patents; seems to be the reason of its saying that it neither prejudiced nor confirmed. It being unjust to prejudice a plain natural right; and inexpedient to confirm an unexamined claim by patent. For what the Legislature’s sense was of this natural right, appears from what hath been observed of their use of the word proprietors, in the preamble.

But lastly, in cases where the sense of the Legislature is uncertain or obscure, there the interpretation of the supreme Magistrates of Justice hath been always deemed to have the force of a legal decision. And this decision hath been made in favour of property, on the Act in question. For, in the High Court of Chancery, actions for damages have been sustained, where the action for
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Forfeiture and penalties on this statute was not competent in any other Court: Which shews, that that great Magistrate did not consider this Act as a restrictive, but as an accumulative law. It being a rule, that positive correcory laws are to be strictly interpreted. For in every civil society, experience shews, that the subject, in many cases, must be put under restraint, with regard to things, in themselves lawful, merely because of the bad consequences, to the public, by the abuse of liberty. But in all such restrictive laws, right reason, at the same time, forbids these laws to be extended, in the smallest particular, beyond the letter of the Act. To do otherwise would be abridging liberty, without authority of law, which is the same thing with private violence. This plainly shews the judgment of the High Court of Chancery to be, that there was a right of property previous to the Statute; which the Statute had neither abrogated nor abridged; and, on that right, the action was sustained, where the action for forfeiture and penalties was not competent. For an additional security of property, made for the benefit, and at the request of the proprietors, can never be deemed to exclude them from having recourse, at pleasure, to that legal remedy, which, on the common principles of a Court of Equity, they had a claim to, prior to the grant of such additional security.

All this laid together, it seems abundantly evident, that no right is taken away by this Act, which authors, or their assigns, had before the making of it. And consequently that it is no restrictive, but an accumulative law, brought in aid of a natural right, whose reality I have here endeavoured to support.

But now, Sir. when I consider to whom I have addressed these reflections, I find myself in the foolish situation of that old Greek Sophist, who would needs enter in Hannibal with a lecture on the art of war. And if my impertinence escape his censure, I shall be indebted only to your distinguished character of politeness, and general candour, as well as to your known partiality and friendship for the Author: For I have ventured to give my thoughts on a question of law, before One, to
 whose superior eminence in that profession, we see joined a force of reason and splendor of eloquence, which make truth reverenced by those it detects; and justice amiable even to those it punishes. But where should an author turn, if not to him who hath, on all occasions, so generously lent his ministry to the support and protection of letters, whenever they have been reduced to apply to justice for relief; and to whose successful patronage they are principally indebted for that share of security which they, at present, enjoy? For (to conclude my application to you, in behalf of learning, with the words of your favourite Author) "Non causidicum nescio quem, neque proclamatorem, aut rabulum conquerimus; sed eum virum qui primum sit ejus artis antistes: Qui scelus fraudemque nocentis possit dicendo subjicere odio cивium, supplicioque constringere; idemque ingenii præsidio, innocentiam judiciorum pœna liberare; idemque languentem labentemque populum aut ad deces excitare, aut ab errore deducere, aut inflammare in improbos, aut incitatam in bonos, mitigare."

I am, &c.
LITERARY PROPERTY.

Forfeiture and penalties on this statute was not competent in any other Court: Which shews, that that great Magistrate did not consider this Act as a restrictive, but as an accumulative law. It being a rule, that positive corrective laws are to be strictly interpreted. For in every civil society, experience shews, that the subject, in many cases, must be put under restraint with regard to things in themselves lawful, merely because of the bad consequences, to the public, by the abuse of liberty. But in all such restrictive laws, right reason, at the same time, forbids these laws to be extended, in the smallest particular, beyond the letter of the Act. To do otherwise would be abridging liberty, without authority of law, which is the same thing with private violence. This plainly shews the judgment of the High Court of Chancery to be, that there was a right of property previous to the Statute; which the Statute had neither abrogated nor abridged; and, on that right, the action was sustained, where the action for forfeiture and penalties was not competent. For an additional security of property, made for the benefit, and at the request of the proprietors, can never be deemed to exclude them from having recourse, at pleasure, to that legal remedy, which, on the common principles of a Court of Equity, they had a claim to, prior to the grant of such additional security.

All this laid together, it seems abundantly evident, that no right is taken away by this Act, which authors, or their assigns, had before the making of it. And consequently that it is no restrictive, but an accumulative law, brought in aid of a natural right, whose reality I have here endeavoured to support.

But now, Sir, when I consider to whom I have addressed these reflections, I find myself in the foolish situation of that old Greek Sophist, who would needs entertain Hannibal with a lecture on the art of war. And if my impertinence escape his censure, I shall be indebted only to your distinguished character of politeness, and general candour, as well as to your known partiality and friendship for the Author: For I have ventured to give my thoughts on a question of law, before One, to
IN the "Discourse," prefixed to the first volume, the Reader has seen Bishop Nurd's high commendation of these Letters; and his promise to gratify the Public, "in due time," with a larger collection, out of his correspondence with our Author:—This Collection has since appeared, under the title of Letters from a late-Eminent Prelate to one of his Friends; and by a communication of the date 1750, we learn, that Bishop Warburton thought Dr. Middleton's talents "appeared no where to more advantage" than in the Letter which begins this Appendix.—Ed.
LETTERS

BETWEEN

DR. MIDDLETON AND MR. WARBURTON.

DR. MIDDLETON TO MR. WARBURTON.

SIR,

Dorchester, Sept. 11. 1736.

YOUR Candour, I hope, has already prevented me in suggesting some favourable excuse for my long silence. The truth, which is always the best apology, is that I was absent from Cambridge, when your letter arrived there; and though it was transmitted to me at this place, yet it found me in no condition to answer it, either to your satisfaction or my own. I am here unprovided of Tully’s Works, and without the help of my papers to furnish any hints to me on the subject; spending my time suitably to the taste and temptations of the country, in cards at home, and sports abroad; yet I could not longer defer to pay my thanks at least for the great entertainment, that it gave me; with promise of further payment, as soon as I am able.

The point that you undertook to make good concerning Tully, is, that he did not believe a future state. In proof of which you maintain, that in his Epistles only, of all his Works, we are to look for his real sentiments.

This, though supported by you very ingeniously, is not, I own, agreeable to the notion that I had formed from my general acquaintance with his writings; and as I have not yet had leisure to make it the subject of a particular enquiry, so at present I can only give my loose and indigested thoughts on the matter, which I shall do very freely, and in the method that you have sketched out to me.

You assign four reasons of the difficulty of discover-
ing Tully's opinions on the important questions of philosophy. 1. The character of the ancient philosophy in general: 2. The manner in which the Romans received the Greek philosophy: 3. The nature of that philosophy, which Tully espoused: 4. The peculiar character of the man.

1. By the first, you mean the double doctrine of the old masters; the external, and internal; the one for the vulgar, the other for the adept. But whatever effect this had in Greece, where that way of teaching seems to have been dropp'd, long before Tully; it certainly had none in Rome, or at least in Tully's writings: The end and purpose of which was to explain to his countrymen, in the most perspicuous manner, whatever the ancients had taught on every article, either of speculative or practical knowledge.

2. The Romans, you say, were far from the humour of the Greeks; and did not regard the doctrine of the sect, that they espoused, as a rule of life, but a kind of furniture only for their rhetoric schools. But I see no ground for this distinction; if there was any between them, the Greeks were certainly the more disputatious, and, agreeably to St. Paul's character of them, more curious and fond of every thing new. Cato, you see, from the testimony, that you produce, made the Stoical doctrine his rule of living; and though he is laughed at for it by Cicero, yet not for making philosophy his rule, but that particular philosophy, which was incompatible with common life.

There is a letter from Tully to Trebatius, upon his turning Epicurean; in which he rallies him for his new principles, which must necessarily spoil the lawyer, as breaking through all the old forms of securing faith and property amongst men: and concludes that if he was serious in the change, he was sorry for it; if to make his court only to Pansa, he excused it. (Fam. 1. 7. 12.) This shews, that the choice of a sect was not thought a thing indifferent, but supposed to operate in life and manners. If then, as Tully says, a great part took up their philosophy disputandi causa, non ita vivendi; yet this was not the thing generally intended by it, but on the contrary what was generally thought blameable. Nor
was it peculiar to the Romans, any more than to the
Greeks, or to any other people, not to live up to the
rule, that they professed; just as we see it now in the
case of religion, which a great part in all countries con-
tend for very warmly, yet practise very coldly.

3. You make the nature of Tully’s philosophy
another source of difficulty in finding out his real sen-
timents. His philosophy was of the Academy; and
whether of the old or the new, much the same. But
when you call it perfectly sceptical, you seem to con-
found it with a different sect, whose distinguishing
character was to doubt of every thing: Whereas the
principle of the Academy was only to suspend their
assent, till by examining all sides of a question, they
could discover the probable. For in speculative enqui-
ries they disclaimed all certainty; and thought nothing
so unworthy of a philosopher, as a rash assent, and the
embracing for true what he did not comprehend. They
imagined truth and falsehood to be so mixt and blended
by nature, that it was extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to separate them entirely; that probability was
the utmost, that human wit could arrive at. This there-
fore they made their rule, both of thinking and acting.
What the other sects affirmed with assurance, they made
it their task to confute or shew to be uncertain; taking
from each still what they liked, and following it, with
this difference only; that what the others called true,
they called probable.

This, of all others, was the most rational way of phi-
osophizing; subjecting them to no master, no system of
opinions; but leaving a liberty to chuse, after a free en-
quiry, whatever was found most agreeable to reason and
nature. But what is there in this to create difficulty in
discovering a man’s opinions, whenever he thinks fit to
declare them? It might create, perhaps, some diffidence in
declaring them; and a disposition, to confute rather what
others assert, than to assert any thing of his own: But
their rule still was as certain and consistent as of any
other sect; and when persuaded of any opinion, they
pursued it as regularly, and explained as freely as any of
the rest.

4. But the embarrass, you say, is completed by the
peculiar character of the man; which you consider in three different capacities, of the orator, the statesman, the philosopher; and contend, that he not only contradicts in one, what he affirms in another, but is inconsistent with himself, even when he speaks from one and the same person: Yet, from the best attention that I have been able to pay to his history, I find in him but one general, consistent, glorious character, of a great and good man, acting and speaking on all occasions, what the greatest prudence with the greatest virtue would suggest.

As an orator, it was his business to enforce, with all the power of eloquence, whatever he thought serviceable to his client, and useful to the cause that he was defending. Of this part he acquitted himself with glory; and tells us himself, what the nature of the thing would tell as for him, that we are not to expect his real sentiments.

As a statesman, the case is still the same. In his harangues to the people, he gives a different account, you observe, of the same fact, from what he had done in the Senate; that is, he adapts his style and arguments to the different genius of each assembly; to engage them both the more effectually to promote the measures, that he was then pursuing.

As a philosopher; if we join the character of an Academic, we shall find him equally consistent. For I cannot help agreeing with Bentley, in taking this for the key of his philosophical writings, as much as I do with you, in your fixing the time of his changing the Academy. This was the philosophy, that he professed through life; and to which he professes himself indebted for all his success in it: And this clue will lead us through that labyrinth of contradictions, which you seem to discover in his works.

In his Book of Divination, you say, he combats all Augury; but in his Book of Laws declares for it; in a manner too serious to suspect him of juggling. Yet all the matter is, that in the one he acts the philosopher; in the other the statesman: In his Treatise on Divination, he asserts and establishes it in the first book, in the person of his brother, by all the arguments, that
can be brought for it; and refutes them all in the second, in his own person. This is the true spirit of the Academy; after examining both sides, to reject what has nothing solid in it. Yet in his Treatise on Laws, he recommends Augury; and no wonder: for though he laughed at it as a philosopher; he had a great opinion of it as a politician: And always speaks of the invention of its ceremonies, and the making them part of the civil constitution, as an instance of the greatest wisdom and prudence in their ancestors. For it was wholly agreeable to that scheme of policy, which he constantly pursued from the beginning to the end of life; of throwing the chief influence and balance of power in state matters into the hands of the better sort.

Again you take notice, that in his Book on the Nature of the Gods, he reflects on those, as too curious or impertinent, who were calling upon him on all occasions to declare his own opinion: Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt, quam necesse est. (l. 1. § 5.) yet in his Academic Questions, he swears that he always speaks what he thinks: Jurarem . . . . me et ardere studio veri reperiendi, et ea sentire, quae dicercm. (l. 4. § 10.) In the first of these Works, he professes only to collect what the old Philosophers had taught; and, according to the method of the Academy, to combat the opinion of one sect, with that of another, without declaring his own: So that the difficulty of discovering it is not owing here, as you intimate, to any obscurity in delivering it; but to his not delivering it at all. But in the Academic Questions, as far as I can understand the passage without the context to assist me, he does not swear, as you render it, that he always speaks what he thinks, but only, that he thinks what he is there speaking: And if so, it confirms what I have been saying of the Academy, and its being the true key of his sentiments.

But you assert, that his sentiments are not to be collected from any of his writings, that were designed for the public, which include all but his Letters, because, in all his writings of that kind, he affected an obscurity. This is the first time that I have ever seen the character of obscure applied to Tully’s writ-
tings: Surely no man’s style was ever further removed from it, or more remarkably shining and perspicuous, than his. But the whole charge of obscurity, and all the contrast of sentiments found in different parts of his works, may easily be solved, by considering only the different circumstances, in which they were delivered. By attending to this, we shall find his very contradictions to be consistencies, and nothing else but what was prudent and proper to be said by one and the same man acting the different parts of the orator, the statesman, the philosopher.

To come then at last to the principal point in question; the discovery of his real thoughts concerning a future state, which are to be collected only, you say, from his Epistles. And so far I agree, that in familiar letters we may expect to find him more open, and undisguised, and as far as he touches any subject, treating it with less reserve, than in works designed for the public. Yet all his letters, as you allow, are not of this sort: In many of them it was his business to say, not so much what was true, as what would please. But let us see what he has actually said in the testimonies, that you have produced from them. In a letter to Atticus, (l. 4. 10.) Sed de illa ambulatione, fore videret, aut si qui est, qui curen, deus. To Torquatlus, (Ep. Fam. l. 6. 3.) Sed hac consolatione lec est: Illa gravior, qua te uti spero, ego certe utor: Nec dum ero, angar utraque, cum omni vacem culpa: Et si non ero, sensu omnino carebo. Again, (ib. 4.) Deinde quod mihi ad consolationem commune tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum vitae, non ab ea republica avellar, qua carendum esse doleam, præsertim, cum id sine ullo sensu futurum sit. To Toranius, (ib. 21.) Cum consilio profici nihil possit, una ratio videtur, quicquid evenerit, ferre moderate, præsertim, cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum.—Nothing, you say, can be more express than these passages, against a future state: And that Tully speaks in them his real sentiments, there is not the least room to doubt. They were letters of consolation to his friends, when he himself, by reason of the ill state of public affairs, most wanted consolation.
As to the first of these passages, you allow it to be a compliment to the philosophy of his friend Atticus, who was an Epicurean: and why is it not so too in the rest? In the first to Torquatus; as in that to Atticus, the case is put hypothetically, si non ero; and the very use of such a topic in consolation, implies, that these friends also were Epicureans, and that he was administering comfort from their philosophy, not his own, as likely to have the more weight with them; or arguing, as we say, ad hominem, not expressing his real sentiments.

But as this is only conjectural, and, as some may think, contrary to fact; let us try what other defence can be made, and what use in this case of our key of the Academy. Though I have often reflected on these passages, yet my notion has always been, that Tully did believe a future state. The whole turn of his writings, and the tenor of his life, shew it: he lived expecting it, and always, so as to deserve it; and declares it to be a favourite opinion; which, though possibly an error, he was resolved to indulge. But we must remember still, that he was an Academic; that is, that he believed it only to be probable; and as probability necessarily admits the degrees of more and less, so it admits a variety likewise in the stability of our persuasion: and as Tully himself says, on another occasion, quis autem est, tanta quidem de re, quin varie secum ipse disputet? In a melancholy hour, when the spirits are low, and the mind under a dejection, an argument appears in a very different light; objections acquire strength; and what humours the present chagrin, finds the readiest admission. These passages were evidently of this kind, written in his desponding moments; and, as you say, when he himself most wanted consolation. And if we allow them therefore to express what he really thought at the time, yet they prove nothing more, than that he sometimes doubted of what he generally believed; consistently with the character and principles of an Academic, who embraced no opinions as certain.

Thus, Sir, I have given you my free thoughts on what you were so good as to communicate with regard to Tully: I will not be answerable for the exactness of them; they are such only as my recollection could furnish without
without the help of Tully's Works to refresh, or any testimonies to support them. But as I reserve the more exact consideration of this argument to the part of Tully's life, which was the most employed on philosophy, under Caesar's tyranny, so I shall be obliged to you for imparting any further thoughts on the subject, either to confirm or confute what I have here offered; and if any occasion of books or friends should invite you again this winter to Cambridge, where I propose to be about Michaelmas, I beg you to be assured, that no man will be more ready to serve you in any manner there, or better pleased to enjoy as much of your company as your time and other friends will allow to,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Conyers Middleton.

P. S. I should be glad to hear that your great Work goes on successfully; and as a sure omen of satisfying others, that you find more and more satisfaction from it yourself. When I was last in London, I met with a little piece, written with the same view and on the same plan with yours: an anonymous Letter from Geneva, evincing the divine mission of Moses, from the institution of the sabbatic year. The author sets out, like you, from this single postulatum, that Moses was a consummate lawgiver: and shews, that he could never have injoined a law so whimsical, impolitic, and hazardous; exposing the people to certain famine, as oft as the preceding or following year proved barren; if He, who has all nature at command, had not warranted the success of it. The letter is ingenious and sprightly, and dresses out, in a variety of colours, the absurdity of the institution, on the supposition of its being human. It is in French, and published in Bibliothèque Germanique, tom. 30.

But will not this gaiety of censuring the Law be found too adventurous, and expose your postulatum itself: to some hazard? Especially when there is a fact, generally allowed by the learned, that seems to overturn all this specious reasoning at once; viz. that this law of the sabbatic year was never observed. For this, I am
be objected, with some shew of reason, that Moses had charged himself with the issue of events too delicate, and beyond his reach, and imprudently injoined what use and experience showed to be impracticable.

I am apprehensive likewise, that your Work will not stand wholly clear of objections: your scheme, as I take it, is to shew, that so able a man as Moses could not possibly have omitted the doctrine of a future state, thought so necessary to government by all other legislators, had he not done it by the express direction of the Deity; and that under the miraculous dispensations of the theocracy, he could neither want it himself for the enforcing a respect to his laws, nor yet the people for the encouragement of their obedience. But what was the consequence? Why the people were perpetually apostatizing either to the superstitions of Egypt, or the idolatries of Canaan; and tired with the load of their ceremonies, wholly dropp'd them at last, and sunk into all kinds of vice and profaneness; till the Prophets, in order to revive and preserve a sense of religion amongst them, began to preach up the rational duties of morality, and insinuate the doctrine of a future state.

As in the other case, then, some may be apt to say, that Moses had instituted what could not be practised without ruin to the state; so in this, that he had overlooked what could not be omitted without ruin to religion.

I have taken the liberty to propose these hints, that, if you think them of weight, you may be better prepared to obviate them; if not, may proceed the more securely by seeing reason to slight them. As for myself, I can safely swear with Tully, that I have a most ardent desire to find out the truth: but as I have generally been disappointed in my enquiries, and more successful in finding what is false than what is true, so I begin, like him too, to grow a mere Academic, humbly content to take up with the probable. Whatever you have to offer me of this kind, I shall thankfully embrace; and though I expect as much from you, as I do from any man, yet in the arduous subject, on which you are engaged, I dare not venture to raise my expectations any higher.
MR. WARBURTON’S ANSWER.

SIR,

I RECEIVED the favour of your’s from Dorchester, and the best return I can make for it will be to reply to it in the same free and friendly manner.

Before I give you my thoughts on each head wherein we differ, I would premise one word on the subject in general. In the third Book of my Defence of Moses I shall shew, that a future state of rewards and punishments (not a future existence merely, such as a resolution of the soul into the anima mundi, or any other mode of simple being) was not credited by any sect of philosophy in Greece, though taught by almost all. I think I prove this by the clearest passages in antiquity. I go farther, and shew, not only that they did not, but that they could not believe it; because there was one common principle held by all, which overturned the notion of a future state of rewards and punishments. As this principle was metaphysical, and as, at the same time, it is owned they held several moral ones, which led naturally to the belief of future rewards and punishments; I shew, in the last place, that it was the general custom of the philosophers to be swayed, in their speculative conclusions, rather by their metaphysical principles than their moral. This seemed enough for my purpose. But the great character of Cicero, who transferred the Greek philosophy to Rome, and, as you justly observe, explained to his countrymen, in the most perspicuous manner, whatever the antients had taught in every article; whether of speculative or practical knowledge, made it proper to examine his sentiments on this point. And though it might be fairly enough concluded, that he must believe with his masters, especially as he held with them that general principle I speak of above, yet two reasons induced me to give the short dissertation I sent you. The one was, that the common prejudice runs the other way, contracted from several passages in his works, delivered exoterically or under a foreign character. The other reason was, that my notion of the manner in which
the Romans received the Greek philosophy seemed; at first sight, to weaken my conclusion of Tully's believing with his masters; so that it was proper to shew, that that notion might be turned the other way, to the support of the conclusion.

I shall now consider your objections to the four points I go upon, in the Dissertation I sent you.

1. Against what I urged concerning the double doctrine, you say, whatever effect this had in Greece, where that way of teaching seems to have been dropp'd long before Tully, it certainly had none in Rome. — The double doctrine I take to have been of the essence of the Greek philosophy, and therefore inseparable from it. For the fact, I appeal to the writings of the later Stoics and Platonists that are come down to us, and to the testimonies of Clemens Alex. Origen, Synesius, Salust the philosopher, Apuleius, and many others: — That the Academics practised it, we have Tully's own word, in a fragment preserved by St. Austin, "Mox fuit Academicis occultandi sententiam suam nec eam cuiquam nisi qui secum ad senectutem usque vixisse sent aperiendi." That the Stoics at Rome used it, I think, Seneca's Works clearly shew; and that the Academics of that place did the same, may be seen by a quotation below, from Ac. Qu. I. 4. c. 18. Nor is this mode of teaching, which so constantly occurs in antient authors, ever spoken of as a thing disused or become obsolete. You add — or at least in Tully's writings; the end and purpose of which was, to explain to his countrymen in the most perspicuous manner whatever the antients had taught, &c. Now because this was indeed the end of most of his philosophic writings, I conclude they were of that kind which (to use Tully's own words) were "populariter scriptum, quod audirent appellabant;" and consequently, that, from such, his real sentiments were not to be gathered. Why the distinction is not ostentatiously used in those writings, is plain: it is agreed that the use of the double doctrine was to hide some things from the vulgar, which were reserved for the adepts; but this end would have been defeated by laying the mysterious means open to all.
2. To my notion of the different manner in which the Romans espoused a philosophic sect, from what was the practice of the Greeks, you reply—You see no ground for the distinction. If there was any between them, the Greeks were certainly the more disputatious, &c.; But I do not make a disputatious humour a mark of no close adherence to a set of opinions. On the contrary, daily experience informs us, that no men are so disputatious as bigots, whether in philosophy or religion: and bigots of the first kind, the Greeks were above all other men. But when, on the authority of Tully, I said, that the Romans used the Greek philosophy to assist them in their disputations, I urged the fact as a proof, that they did not embrace, as true, all the opinions of the sect they espoused: by which I meant, that these several philosophies, as studies of humanity, (and this is Tully’s own expression) enabled them to invent readily, and reason justly: not on the points of that philosophy only, from whence the principles or method was taken, that on any subject in civil life. And this I am persuaded is what Tully meant.

You go on—Cato, you see, from the testimony you produce, made the Stoical doctrine his rule of living. By this it would seem as if you supposed I made no exception to the manner in which, I say, the Romans entered themselves into a sect. But my words must be restrained to Tully’s magna pars, who is my authority for the assertion. You add—And though he is taught at for it by Cicero, yet not for making philosophy his rule, but that particular philosophy which was incompatible with common life. I very readily own, that these words of Tully, taken alone, look very much that way; and the disputandi causa seems as if the observation was confined to Stoicism, for that sect had so entirely engrossed the Dialectics, that the followers of Zeno were more commonly called Dialectici than Stoici. So Galen is generally called Dialecticus. Notwithstanding this, it plainly appears, I think, from the context, that the sense I gave the passage is the true one—Cicero introduces his observation on Cato’s singularity, in this manner—“Quoniam non est nobis habenda...” habenda...
"Habenda, aut cum imperita multitudine, aut in aliquo conventu agrestium, audaciis paullo de studiis humanitatis, quae & mihi & vobis nota & justa sunt, disputabo." Here he declares, his intention is not to give his thoughts on the Stoical philosophy in particular (though that furnished the occasion) but on the Greek philosophy in general, de studiis humanitatis. He then runs through the Stoical paradoxes, and concludes, "Haec homo ingeniosissimus, M. C.—arripuit," &c.—But had it been his intention to confine his observation to the Stoics, he must have said hanc, not haec; especially when he says it was taken up disputandi causa; for haec refers to the foregoing paradoxes, which had no use in the art of disputation; that was the province of their metaphysics.

On the whole, it appears that the words in question were spoken of the Greek philosophy in general: and as Cicero laughed at those who took it up vivendi, we must conclude, he espoused it disputandi causa. If you doubt this, I can give you Tully's own word for it in this very oration. "Fatebor, enim, Cato, me quoque in adolescentia, diffusum ingenio meo, quæssisse adjuvmenta doctrine." Which, in other words, is, I myself espoused a Grecian sect disputandi causa. And this is full enough for the purpose of my discourse, where it is only given as one of the causes of the difficulty in coming at Tully's real sentiments.

3. I make the nature of Tully's sect of philosophy another cause. But you say, when I call the way of the Academy perfectly sceptical, I seem to confound it with a different sect, whose distinguishing character was to doubt of every thing. If that was the character of the sect you hint at, I am afraid the Academy will be found to agree but too well with it. But admitting I had confounded the two sects, I do no more than what the antients did before me. Sextus Empiricus, a perfect master of this point, if ever there was any, says (in his Pyrrhon. Hypot. i. i. c. 33.) that some of the antients held the Academicians and Sceptics to be one and the same, φησιν γε οι τινες δι' ην ἀκαδημαίου φιλοσοφίαν ει αὐτὴ εις την Ἑρμήν. And though Sextus denies they were exactly the same; because, though both agreed that truth could
not be found, yet the Academics held there was a difference in those things which preceded to it; yet at last he owns that Arcesilas and Pyrrho had one common philosophy. "O mi! τι Αρκεσίλαος, ώ τε μετὰ Ακαδημίας εἴλατα εἶναι προσακυ καὶ αρχηγον, παντὸς μοι δοξα τῆς Πύρρονος κοινωνίαν λογις, ώς μιαν εἰςερχόντων τῆς κατ’ αὐτὸν αγωγήν καὶ τῶν πρεσβύτων. A. Gellius, too, assures us, that the difference between the two sects amounted to just nothing. "Vetus autem quastio & a multis Scriptis-ribus Graecis tractata est, in quid, & quantum, Pyrrhonios & Academicos Philosophos intersit.—"Utrique enim ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΙ, ερωτασι, αποφασισ, dicunt, quoniam utrique nihil affirmant, nihilque comprehendi putant—differre tamen inter sese—"vel maxime propter exsternati sunt Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse decerni quasi decretum: Pyrrhoni ne id quidem ullo pacto videri verum dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur.” L. 11. c. 5.

However, when I said the Academy was perfectly sceptical, I meant in their principles of philosophising, rather than in the conduct of their argumentation: the remark in the first sense being to my purpose, in the other, not. Academics and Sceptics agreed in these principles, “That nothing could be known, and that every thing was to be disputed, without delivering their own sentiments at all.” The conclusion the Sceptics drew from hence, was, that nothing was to be asser ted to, but the mind kept in an eternal suspense. The Academics, indeed, concluded that the probable, when it was found, should be asser ted to; but till then, they were to go on with the Sceptics questioning, disputing, and contradicting. And in fact they did thus go on, without ever finding the probable in any thing, further than what was necessary to furnish them with arms for disputing against every thing. This, indeed, was a contradiction in their scheme; but scepticism is ever destructive of itself. The mischief was, that having allowed the probable thus far, it induced strangers to think better of them than they deserved; that is, to think they were consistent. This I take to be the true secret of all the intrigues of the Academy; which Tully himself enables us to unravel.—That nothing could be known, or so much as perceived,
perceived, we have his word. "Opinionibus & Institutis omnia teneri: nihil veritatis reliqui: deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. Itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum. Sed omnia latere censebatur in occulto. Neque esse quidquam quod cerni aut intelligi possit: Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque affirmare quemquam, neque "assertione approbare." Ac. Qu. l. 1. c. 12.—That every thing was to be disputed, without interfering with their own sentiments, he likewise makes the character of the Academy. "Carneades vero multo uestius iisdem de rebus loquebatur: non quo aperiret sententiam suam (hic enim mos patris Academice Adversari semper omnibus in disputando) sed, &c. de Orat. l. 1. c. 18. Again—Proprium sit Academice judicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare quae simillima veri videantur, conferre causas, & quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere nulla adhibita sua "authoritate judicium audientium reliquere integrum & liberum." De Divin. l. 2. From hence it appears, that this probable, which, you say, they pursued as regularly, and explained as freely as any of the rest, was not any thing that related to their assent or approba-
tion, but only what afforded matter for disputing plausibly: it was not a probable to sway their judgments, but to inforce their reasoning. And what was this but being perfectly sceptical? Lastly, we have the testimony of Lucullus, that though the Academices pretended their end was to find the probable, yet, like the Sceptics, they held their mind in eternal suspense, and continued going on disputing against every thing, without ever finding the probable in any thing, so far as to determine their judg-
ments—Resitat illud, quod dicunt veri inveniendi causa contra omnia dici oportere & pro omnibus, volo igitur videre quid invenirent? Non solemus, inquit, ostendere. Acad. Qu. l. 4. c. 18. If this answer was not founded on the double doctrine, it will be hard to say what it drives at.—Quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? Hut cor celatis quasi turpe aliquid, vestrum senten-tiam. These mysteries could be nothing but the scept-
icism of the Academy; of which, I think, Lucullus Vol. XII.
truly says, confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos judicio. privat approbatione.

From all this I would draw these two inferences. That the genius of this philosophy makes it very difficult to discover the real opinions of its professors; and consequently that Dr. Bentley was mistaken in supposing this to be the key to come at Tully's. The other is, that Tully was not so great a sceptic as his sect might be supposed to make him; which I infer, as well from the manner in which the Romans professed the Greek philosophy, as from some express declarations in his writings. If I had thought him so, it would be absurd to pretend, as I have done, to find his real sentiments; yet I think, the principles of that sect sufficiently influenced him to justify my first inference.

4. When I urged Cicero's inconsistencies and contradicitions, as an orator, a statesman, and a teacher of the Greek philosophy, it was not to shew that he acted either a weak or an unfair part (from which you have very well defended him) but that his employment and course of life habituated him to dissemble his opinions. From which it might be fairly collected, that his real sentiments were not to be discovered in these parts of his writings; and consequently, that whatever he there says in favour of a future state was not to be objected to my conclusion. This I took to be to the purpose, as I could then urge the passages in the Epistles with their due force.

To my quotation from Tully, Ac. Qu. l. 4. c. 20. Jurarem, &c. you say,—as far as I can understand the passage, without the context to assist me, he does not swear, as you render it, that he always speaks what he thinks; but only that he thinks what he is there speaking. To determine this point, it is, as you hint, necessary to have recourse to the context. Lucullus had been declaiming very tragically against the Academy: part of his accusation is given above. When Tully enters on its defence, he thinks it necessary to premise something concerning himself. Aggrediar igitur, says he, si paeca ante, quasi de Fama mea dixero. He then declares, that had he embraced the Academy out of vanity, or love of contradiction, it had not only reflected
on his sense, but on his honour. *Itaque nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatio* ne id facere, quod cum de *republica disceptatur fieri interdum solet: Jurarem per Jovem Deosque Penates, me & ardere studio veri reperientes, & ea sentire quae dicere. From hence I gather, that though the question here be of the *Academic* philosophy, and of *Cicero*, as an *Academic* yet as he tells us he is now to vindicate himself in a point in which his honour was concerned, the protestation is general, and concerns his constant turn of mind, which always inclined him, he says, to speak his sentiments.

Another observation I would make, is, that *Tully* here seems to be sensible that *Lucullus* had but too much reason for his charge against the Academics. Why else does he disjoin his case from theirs, and take a way to secure himself, whatever became of his sect?

You conclude this point thus—*And if so, it confirms what I have been saying of the Academy; and of its being the true key of his sentiments.* When I observed that the Academy was not the true key of Tully's sentiments, it was not because my conclusion, concerning his opinion of a future state, was at all influenced by the truth or falsehood of that remark; but only because I thought it true. For it is certain, that in all his writings, he has never once affirmed, *in the person of an Academic*, that the doctrine of a future state was most probable.

To my observation, That *Tully*, in all the writings which he designed for the public, affected an obscenity, you reply,—*this is the first time that I have ever seen the character of obscure applied to Tully's writings: Sure no man's style was ever further removed from it, or more remarkably shining and perspicuous than his.* By this it would seem as if you understood me to mean, "That *Tully expressed* the sentiments he delivered, obscurely." So far from that, I think with you, that his style is clear and shining in a supreme degree. I meant (and the subject I was upon confined me to that meaning, if I would not talk impertinently) he affected to obscure his real sentiments. This, I thought, I was warranted to say; not only from his obscurity on the point in question, *but from the complaint of his contemporaries*; who,
we find, Nat. Deor. 1. 1. c. 5. were at a loss to know his real sentiments. Now this obscurity is very consistent with the utmost clearness and perspicuity of style; as appears from his own reply to this complaint. For if the reader's ignorance of his real sentiments in any degree hindered them from understanding his works, as it must have done had it arose from a cloudy and embarrassed expression, he never could have condemned (as he does) their curiosity as idle and impertinent—*qui autem re-quirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt, quam necesse est.*

You justly call the principal point in question the consideration of his Letters. Here I shall be very short. I apprehend, this sort of language, which he so often uses in them,—*mortem quam etiam beati contenternre debeamus, propere quaod nullum sensum esset habiture.*—*Nec enim dum ero angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa: Etsi non ero sensu omnino carebo—præsertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum.*—I say. I apprehend this to be the very language of the Epicureans; and is best interpreted by his favourite poet, Lucretius, who likewise uses it as an antidote against the fear of death.—

*Scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum, Accidere omnino poterit Sensumque movere.*

You think that Tully did believe a future state, and that the whole turn of his writings shews it. But you say,—*In a melancholy hour, when the spirits are low, and the mind under a dejection, an argument appears in a very different light; objections acquire strength; and what humours the present chagrin, finds the readiest admission. These passages were evidently of this kind, written in his desponding moments, and, as you say, when he himself most wanted consolation.*

To this give me leave to reply, It is allowed that a desponding temper, like that of Cicero's, would in a melancholy hour be always inclined to suspect the worst. But to what is its suspicion confined? Without doubt to the issue of that very affair which occasioned the distress. A melancholy hour would have just the contrary influence on his other cogitations. And this is the wise disposition of nature; that the less support the mind has persuaded itself,
itself, it shall find, in one quarter, the more it endeavours to make it up, in an abundance of hope from another. So that, unless Cicero was made differently from all other men, one may venture to say, his hopes of future good (had philosophy permitted him to entertain any hopes at all) would have risen in proportion to his fears of the present.

I come to your P.S. in which I find myself obliged to you for your kind enquiries into the progress of my Work. I have nothing to apprehend in discredit to the method of it, but the application of that method to cases which will not bear it. The instance you give me of the tract on the Sabbathic year is one of these cases. I suppose an internal proof can never be drawn from thence of the divinity of the Mosaic mission; though for reasons different from yours: For I reckon, that this particular institution might be well accounted for, even on the supposition of mere human legislation. For all agree, that Moses’s main end was the abolition of idolatry, and preservation of the Unity. The institution of the Sabbath is shewn by Spencer and others to be, of all the ceremonial, the very rite most conducive to this end. So that it seemed to be fit, nay necessary, that the principal rite, conducive to the principal end, should be very well secured. Hence the Sabbath was supported by a Sabbathic year; and further strengthened by a year of Jubilee. As to the civil consequences of a Sabbathic year; a relaxation from culture, in the proportion it required, must be extremely useful to such a soil as Judea, which, to preserve its fertility, required a remission of at least one year in seven. A partial rest, of the several parts, in rotation, had, indeed, been the eligible way, had nothing else been to be considered. But, on this, no Sabbathic rite could have been founded. So that a total and periodic cessation from culture was necessary. But then, by a wise provision in other parts of the institution, Moses obviated the inconveniences that sometimes arise from a total rest. To speak only of that which forbad commerce with strangers (and, for the same end, viz. to prevent idolatry) from whence would follow their having greater stores of corn than could be consumed.
sumed. And the Sabbath year being fixed, and the event of it foreseen, they had warning and ability to lay in supplies for that defect. To this, if we add, that, though, in the Sabbath year, they did not enjoy the fruits of culture, yet, what came without, they were at liberty to use, we must I think conclude, that a wise legislator, who found use in a Sabbath year, for the advancement of his ends, would venture to institute it, though he had no expectation of a miraculous supply; as the natural consequences were so little to be dreaded.

There is but one solid objection, humanly speaking, to this institution, that I know of; which is this, that, when the Jews fell under a foreign dominion, their masters made them pay tribute on the Sabbath year. And this indeed was a heavy oppression. But it reflects not at all on the wisdom of the lawgiver. For if Moses had, as he pretended, a divine character, foreign dominion was a punishment for idolatry; and these circumstances made that dominion a punishment in the degree it was intended. But if Moses was a mere human lawgiver, it had been impertinent to have provided for this case; because, from his knowledge of the world, he would have concluded, that such foreign dominion must have been the dissolution of his republic, and, consequently, attended with a speedy obliteration of its rites.

Having cleared up this matter, and disengaged it from all relation to mine, I proceed to consider what it is that sticks with you in my case, and hinders you from giving me that full assent to my opinions, which I should be always ambitious of gaining.

You think, some may be apt to say that in this matter of a future state, Moses had overlooked what could not be omitted without ruin to religion; for the consequence of his omission was this, the people were perpetually apostatizing, either to the superstitions of Egypt, or the idolatries of Canaan: And tired with the load of their ceremonies, wholly dropped them at lust; and sunk into all kinds of vice and profaneness; till the prophets, in order to revive and preserve a sense of religion amongst them, began to preach up the rational duties of morality, and insinuate the doctrine of a future state.
You think, it may be said, Moses had overlooked what could not be omitted without ruin of religion. But, whatever other conclusion may be drawn from your premises, I think I have obviated and excluded this, by shewing that my adversaries the Deists have, with full consent, allowed, that Moses was a consummate law-giver. And, but upon that principle, indeed, they could never, with any plausibility, deny Moses a foreign, that is, a divine assistance. Now the chief part of legislation is perfectly to understand the various effects religion has on mankind. But as the concession of our adversaries is a very slippery security; and, at best, the resting on it is often only arguing ad hominem, by which nothing can be shewn but the inconsistency of those with whom we have to deal, I have secured their concession by the inforcement of many instances, which shew Moses's great skill in legislation; and make it very improbable that so great a master in his art should blunder so strangely in the very first principle of it; a principle that chiefly distinguished the school he came from.

But you say, The people were perpetually apostatizing either to the superstitions of Egypt, or the idolatries of Canaan. It is certain they were. But this makes nothing for your inference, unless it could be shewn, that they sought a future state in those superstitions, as a support for religion. But this was by no means the case. You yourself give another, and indeed the true reason; they were tired with the load of their ceremonies. And no wonder, for they were chaste and severe, and in that, rather than in their number, different from the ceremonies of their neighbours, which were performed with all the jollity, and lubricity, that a profligate people were capable of inventing.

If we suppose the omission of a future state inclined them to this defection from the law of Moses, one of these two effects must have followed, which did not: Were they vicious and debauched, they would have sunk into irreligion, and rejected the doctrine of Providence; were they virtuous, they would have borrowed the doctrine of a future state from their neighbours, and nothing more than what depended on it. And I say not this at random. For though, at the time in question, this was
not the case of the Jewish people, either to be virtuous, or under the ordinary dispensation of Providence; yet there was a time, during the Jewish Commonwealth, when these two circumstances met together; and, at that precise time, they did what I here suppose, in such circumstances, they must needs do; that is, borrow of their Pagan neighbours this doctrine of a future state, and no more. I conclude, therefore, that, whatever it was which occasioned their frequent apostasy, it could not be the omission of the doctrine of a future state, because we find no connexion between the supposed cause and effect.

You go on and say,—And tired with the load of their ceremonies, wholly dropped them at last, and sunk into all kinds of vice and profaneness, till the prophets, in order to revive and preserve a sense of religion amongst them, began to preach up the rational doctrines of morality, and insinuate the doctrine of a future state.

I presume this cannot be the exact case, even from your own representation. For if they had wholly dropped the ceremonies at the time of the coming of the prophets, these, who profess the intent of their mission to be the re-establishment of the law of Moses, should have begun their preaching with the necessity of observing the ceremonics: Whereas they did, as you say, and as the Bible assures us, begin with preaching up the rational duties of morality. This seems to shew, that the Jews rather stuck to their ceremonies, to the violation of the duties of morality, than that they had wholly dropped them. And Scripture warrants this conclusion, To what purpose (says God by the prophet Isaiah) is the multitude of your sacrifices? I am full of your burnt-offerings, and I delight not in the blood of bulls or of lambs. Bring no more vain oblations. Incense is an abomination to me. The new moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies I cannot away with. Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth. This looks like a very strict adherence to their ceremonies. Here we see, the fastidious, the loathing, comes from God, and not from the people. From whence I would beg leave to observe, that though
we can, from the circumstances above mentioned, see the reason why the prophets should preach up righteousness, in preference to ceremonies, when these had got the upper hand; yet, without looking further, we can never account for it, why God is brought in, speaking with so much contempt and hatred of a law of his own giving. We cannot, I say, account for this, without admitting the common notions of theology, which teach that it was to prepare the people for a new dispensation. And if we consider how much more and more the people grew besotten with their ceremonies even to the coming of Christ, we shall perhaps be induced to think well of this explanation.

You add, in the last place,—And insinuate the doctrine of a future state. You must suppose this was done to supply Moses's omission of it, or it makes nothing for your purpose. But, if this were the intention, it was very preposterously executed.

1. Because it was, as you yourself confess, only an insinuation. And it was the practice (and indeed the necessity of the thing speaks it) for all lawgivers, when they employed this sanction of a future state, to inculcate it, not by insinuation, but in the most open and explicit manner.

2. Because this insinuation of the prophets was so extremely obscure, that, when afterwards the leaders of the Jewish people saw indeed a necessity of introducing the doctrine, they found so little in the prophets to build upon, that they rested the revelation of it solely on tradition.

3. But it is still more evident from what follows, that the doctrine of a future state was not insinuated for the end you suppose: there was a period in the Jewish state, as is here hinted at, and will be proved at large in my book, when the governors of it found it necessary to supply this omission. But how did they do it? Not by dark insinuations like their predecessors, but in the plainest and most express manner, like the Gentile lawgivers. And lest it should be thought, that the suppliation of the omission now did in any wise derogate from the perfection of the Mosaic scheme, I shew, that this was done at that precise time when God had withdrawn his extraordinary
extraordinary providence. Nor was this rabbinical doctrine, of a future state, any revelation from God, but composed of parts picked up from amongst their Pagan neighbours, varnished over indeed with the authority of those dark prophetic insinuations. Which appears, as from many other particulars, so especially from this, that it was founded on the Pythagoric Metempsychosis, which at this time was the general mode of the Pagan future state.

On the whole then it appears, that no good account can be given of the conduct of the prophets, in this matter of insinuation, if their end was what you suppose. But take in the scheme of a new dispensation, and all becomes clear and full of wisdom. For a future state, taught by revelation, is not immediately founded on the same principle with that taught by natural religion. The latter stands immediately on this principle, That God is just, and will give to every one according to his works; therefore, if the distribution of good and evil be not made here, it will be hereafter. But the future state of revelation stands only mediately on this, and immediately on its being a restoration to a lost inheritance, purchased by a Redeemer. Now, though the other mode of a future state might be taught clearly and explicitly at any time, yet, it is evident, that this could not be preached up till the time of that restoration and redemption. The Redeemer and his work must be coeval, and go hand in hand. Accordingly, we find, that when the prophets gave dark insinuations of the Redeemer, they gave dark insinuations of redemption, at the same time: but more, they could not do. And this, I presume, is a reasonable account of their conduct in their insinuating (as you rightly say they did) the doctrine of a future state.

You have now, Sir, my thoughts on your objection, which, acute and learned as it is (and it is so in a high degree) is yet, by what I can see, founded in that paradoxism of non causa pro causa.

To deal ingenuously with you, I think the frequent relapses of the Jews into idolatry has something, at first view, very shocking on the revelation-scheme. But then I think the objection which may be raised, on this circumstance,
cumstance, holds rather against my conclusion directly, than, as you put it, by the medium of my premises. As thus,—"If the Jews were, indeed, under an extra-
"ordinary providence, how could they possibly relapse
"so often into idolatry? That relapse implying a re-
"jection of the truth of the religion delivered to them
"by Moses." Now though this has the appearance of weight, yet I suspect it receives it all from the influence which a set of mere modern ideas has upon us. To
embrace a new religion and to condemn the old of falsehood, are actions so inseparable, and go so constantly together, that the union seems founded in the nature of things. But, in truth, the association is accidental and arbitrary: and more than that, unknown to the antients, as I have hinted at in the third part of my book of the Alliance: now, if this observation be well founded, it will be no diminution to its credit, that it is capable of being applied to the solution of more difficulties than one. The antient Pagans, possessed with the notion of local deities, to whom the several parts of the earth were divided into shares, readily credited the truth of one another's revelations, and as readily, on any sinister accident, went over to one another's religion. And though the Jewish law obviated and condemned this principle of intercom-

nunity, it was no wonder that a people bred up under that universal prejudice, and who had several institutions, which, by prejudiced minds, might be thought to look that way, should be apt to go into such visiors. That they did, I will venture to say their whole history shews; as in many other particulars, so in this, that in their fre-
quent defections they did not lay aside the Mosaic worship, but only polluted and corrupted it by a large mixture of Pagan rites.

If then it be allowed, that the Jews, when they fell into idolatry, did not reject the Jewish religion as a false pretence to revelation, all the force of the objection vanishes. And I have observed above what strong temp-
tations a vicious people had to neglect such a religion as that of Moses, for such a one as that of Canaan.

Newark, Sept. 20, I am, &c.

1736.

W. WARBURTON.
LETTERS*

BETWEEN

DR. LOWTH AND DR. WARBURTON.

LETTER I.

TO THE REV. DR. WARBURTON.

DEAR SIR,

Winchester, Sept. 9, 1756.

Our good friends Dr. C. and Mr. S. have agreeably to your desire communicated to me some particulars of the conversation, which you have lately had with them relating to me: from which I collect, that you think you have reason to be offended with me on account of some things which I have said in my Prelections on the subject of the book of Job, which you look upon as aimed against you; and that you expect that I should explain myself on this head. I am much obliged to you for the regard which you have been pleased to express for me, and for your candid and generous manner of dealing with me on this occasion: and I shall endeavour to return it by dealing as fairly and as openly with you.

The reasons for my treating of the book of Job in the manner which I have done, lest they should be mistaken; I have there given; and that I might not give offence, have prefaced those Lectures with an apology, which was perhaps unnecessary. Having examined and considered the subject as well as I was able, I found myself obliged to differ in opinion from several writers of great authority in the Republic of Letters; such as Grotius, Le Clerc,

* These Letters (first published by Dr. Lowth) shew the grounds of that misunderstanding which had taken place between the writers of them in 1756; and the amicable manner in which it was composed. For the revival of it in 1766, see the Discourse prefixed to the first volume of this Edition.
Bishop Hare, yourself, and many others: It was not my business, and much less was it my desire, to enter into a formal dispute with any one; all I had to do was, to declare in a few words my own sentiments, and to explain my hypothesis, so far as to make myself understood, when I came to treat of the subject; which it was absolutely necessary for me to treat of, as being a principal and essential part of my plan. I thought the book of Job the most antient extant, that it had no relation to the affairs of the Israelites, that it was neither allegorical nor properly dramatic; in all which I disagreed not only with you, but with one, or other, or all of the authors above-mentioned, and a hundred others, whom I need not name to you now, nor was it at all more necessary for me to name them then. You seem to think I ought to have quoted you, or referred to your book: and a friend of yours charges me with writing against you, and being afraid of you. Your friend is mistaken in both these particulars; and the ground of your complaint I cannot possibly comprehend. Why should I single out you, and attack you for opinions, which were common to you with twenty other authors of note? Would this have been a mark of respect to you? Would it not rather have argued a busy and a litigious spirit in me? There were several living writers of great learning and eminence, who stood just in the same situation with regard to me, that you did. What should I have done? Should I have agreed with you all? That was impossible. Should I have complimented you all, or should I have contended with you all? To have done either would have been equally unnecessary and impertinent. I have never heard, that any of those gentlemen have been offended with me, for acting with respect to them just in the same manner as I have done with respect to you.

But you too it seems think, that I have written against you; that is, that I have aimed at you in particular, and attacked opinions that are peculiarly yours. I have upon this occasion taken a review of your Dissertation, and of my own Lectures, and cannot find upon what it is that you ground this charge. I have marked the passages in the latter which seemed most likely to have given
given you umbrage, and beg you would give yourself the trouble to turn to them. P. 312. *Nunquam in dubium, &c.* this cannot possibly be understood of you, being plainly restrained to those who conclude, that if the poem be parabolical, therefore the story is fictitious: the absurdity of which you yourself expose. In p. 319, I refer to the dispute on the text supposed to relate to the resurrection; to the Bishop of London, Dr. Hodges, &c. I believe, I had not you then in my thoughts: however, if I had, I see nothing that should offend you or any one. P. 320, observe, that I speak of the opinion, that the poem is dramatic, as what has for some time almost universally prevailed among the learned. Beside, I do not see how the question, whether the poem be strictly dramatic or not, at all affects your main argument. So that this discourse upon the whole cannot be supposed to be directed particularly against you. In the next page I point out more particularly the authors whom I have in view, by using their own expressions: *loquuntur enim, &c.* To give you full satisfaction here, and at the same time to save you and myself the trouble of a multitude of references, I beg leave to refer you only to two short passages: Bishop Hare’s note at the end of the CVIIth Psalm; and Calmet’s Preface to Job, about the middle, the paragraph begins with, *Mais sans nier,* &c. where you will find enough to account for every thing I have there said, and even for every expression which I have used. If there are any other passages which offend you as meant of you particularly, I assure you most sincerely that they have escaped my notice; be so good as to point them out to me, and I will endeavour to give you further satisfaction.

Upon the whole, I did not mean to offend, neither do I think I have given any cause of offence. The subject lay at least as much in my way, as it did in yours: I had as good a right to pursue my subject, and to deliver my sentiments with freedom, as you had. I could not have spoken upon it at all without dissenting from you in conjunction with many others, and I don’t know how I could have signified my dissent more inoffensively. I cannot have misrepresented your particular notions, for
I never intended to represent them at all, nor had I any thing to do with them. Nay, as far as I can recollect, I verily believe, that at the time when I wrote those Lectures I had not your book before me; so far was it from my intention to cavil at your Dissertation. In a word, my Lectures, and every expression in them, might have stood just as they do now, though your Dissertation on Job had never been written.

I beg the continuance of that regard and esteem, which you have been so kind as to express towards me; I will not now tell you how highly I shall prize it: your friend above-mentioned, the author of the Dissertation on the Delicacy of Friendship, has stopped my mouth, and makes me very cautious of saying any thing that may be construed into flattery or fear of you. I call him your friend, because I suppose he pretends to be so; what your opinion of him is, I cannot tell; but I think you owe him little thanks for his pains. He has at least shewn more zeal than discretion in the undertaking, and more malevolent wit than good sense or honest intention in the performance; the manifest tendency of which is to sow strife, and to foment discord; and its natural effect, if it has any, must be to lessen the number of those, who wish well to you and your designs: and I say so much of it in order to assure you, that it will not have that effect with me.

As to my opinions, if they stand at all in your way, and if you should think them worthy of your notice, I ask not your favour for them: you will treat them as you shall think your own cause and the cause of truth requires. I do not as yet see any reason to depart from them; but am not so fond of them, as to be inclined to enter into a dispute with any one in defence of them. I shall be offended with no man merely for differing from me in sentiment upon any subject; much less upon points so very doubtful, and upon which no two persons, out of all that examine and judge for themselves, either ever have agreed, or probably ever will perfectly agree. As to the manner in which you shall treat them, I leave it entirely to your own consideration; I shall be very little concerned about it. If you use me otherwise than I deserve,
LETTERS BETWEEN DR. LOWTH

your own character will suffer, and not mine. Lay aside all regard to me upon this occasion; but respect yourself and the public.

I am, Dear Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
R. LOWTH.

LETTER II.

TO THE REV. DR. LOWTH.

DEAR SIR, Prior Park, [Sept.] 17, 1756.

I had, this day, the favour of your letter of the 9th, and think myself much obliged to our two brethren for this good office, which I hope will have the desired effect: And to promote it, all I can, I will follow your example in the frankness and openness of this éclaircissement.

My complaint was not for your differing from me; nor yet for your manner of expressing that difference; but for, what I conceived to be, a misrepresenting me.—You yourself shall be judge. P. 64—non eo quod permanere post mortem animos non crederent, quod doctis quibusdam placuit; sed—You won’t deny that I am here meant. Yet you might have understood by my book, that I hold, “that the early, as well as later, Jews believed the permanency of the soul; only, having nothing, in their Law, of a state of future rewards and punishments, the early Jews had no interesting reflections concerning that permanency, and paid no attention to it.

P. 65—neque eos hac in parte vel minimum sacri codices adjuvere; haud quia hanc us cognitionem invidet Divina Revelatio, sed quia—Was it not invidious, to insinuate that I had represented divine Revelation as envying or grudging the Jews this blessing? when I had shown the reason to be, that it did not belong to their Economy; not for that strange reason, quia humana mentis condition eam omnino non recipiat, but because the doctrine of life and immortality was reserved for another
another teacher. I call your reason, a strange one, because the most ignorant and unlettered are capable of comprehending all that Christianity teaches concerning this matter. But I apprehend, in the words I here allude to, you entirely mistake the question you was upon—Qualis itaque ab animis a corpore sejunctis vita viveretur, quis eorum locus, forma, conditio. Hebræi juxta cum caeteris mortalis in summum ignorantiam versabantur. For the question was not, Whether the rest of mankind had juster notions of the state and condition of the soul in a state of separation; but whether they had not the rational belief of a future state of rewards and punishments in general, which the Jews wanted. It is this also, which is the proper subject for poetic ornament, (the thing you are upon) not the metaphysic truth of things, which is too meagre for this entertainment (as you may see by the 6th B. of Virgil); as well as too abstracted for the condition of the human mind.

P. 321.—Cum Poema Jobi pro vero ac legitimo Dramate cujusmodi sunt Græcorum Tragœdiae minime haberi posse contenderem—Had the reflection ended here, I could not possibly have guessed whom you had in your eye: Because, I believe, no critic on this side the Cape of Good Hope ever said or thought, the book of Job to be of the species of the Greek Drama. But when I read the following words—Hoc autem ut cone- damus, vix erit satis; sunt qui majus quiddam postulare videntur. Locuntur enim de rerum constitutione, de catastrophe dramatis, Θεων αυτο μυχαριων induci dicit—iisdem certe vocibus utuntur, &c. When I read this, I say, I could no longer doubt, that I only was meant; because I speak of all these things: and of the God from the machine, no one could speak but me; because no one else, in their interpretations of the book of Job, contended for the thing understood by it. You seem yourself to have been sensible that this needed a softening, by your corrective,—iisdem certe vocibus utuntur. Perhaps though, you may think, that my applying the terms of the Greek stage, to this book, fairly inferred that I supposed the writing to be of the same species. If so, give me leave to observe, I could do no other, though I thought it of a different species. Whoever...
goes about to shew that a work is of such or such a genus, if he would write intelligibly he cannot avoid using the terms of that species of it, which is best known or understood. Thus when I say, religion composes a society, and, in my account of the nature of this society, I make use of the words, magistrates, laws, sanctions (words which properly belong to civil society) am I to be understood as holding, that religion is of that species, called civil society, or that it is of the genus only of society? But to prove, you are disposed to do as much honour to the book of Job as any man, you conclude, by shewing, that the book has not all the artifice of the Greek drama; yet the composer was capable of giving it that advantage.—Profecto qui reputat, &c. is nunquam poterit sine summa admiratione intueri tali arte seculis natum poema, tam pulcherre inventum, tam solerter dispositum, tam perfecte expletum, tam singulari exempli; quod similitudinem atque imaginem quandam dramatis statim arripuit, unde non difficile fuisse ad ipsum absoluti operis exemplar ascendere, &c. Which would put one in mind of the religious caution of good Sir R. Blackmore, who, in his paraphrase of this famous book, assures us, that though he will not positively affirm, that Job actually washed his feet in butter, yet he makes it plainly out, that Job's dairy afforded butter enough for that purpose.

And now, Sir, reflect a little without prejudice: and ask yourself, whether these passages bear the least mark of good, or even of indifferent will, towards me; though I should allow (as I am very ready to do) that you had no formed intention of misrepresenting me.

If you should say, your design was that they should neither bear the marks of good, or of evil will, towards me (this neutrality being all, as your letter seems to hint, I had to expect of you) then let me go on to a passage or two, which seem to speak your disposition still stronger.

P. 312.—nimirum carmen hoc in Israelitarum solatium compositum fuisse, eorumque res aliquo modo adumbrare; quam ipsum esse vannissimum arbitror: cum morum rituum, rerum Israelitarum nulla vestigia, nullam speciem, aut umbram reperio. I dare appeal to your ingenuity, that I must needs be here meant. And will your
your politeness allow you to say, that the vestiges was civil; or your modesty, that the nulla vestigia was decent, when I believe most competent readers are agreed, that there are infinitely more and stronger marks that the affairs under the Theocracy are alluded to, than that Augustus is shadowed under Virgil’s hero. Nor can I well reconcile this dogmatical sentence with what you say in your letter, of the so doubtful nature of the question we are divided about, where you attempt to shew how little reason I have to be offended with those who differ from me.

Again you say, Nunquam in dubium vocata fuisse historie [Jobi] veritas, nisi allegoriarum conquistoribus tantum placuissent sue fictiones, ut nihil amplexi vellent quod non umbratile esset & commentitium. Now I will readily allow, that if, by these allegorisers you mean those who annihilate the literal sense, you could not mean me; because, as you observe, I have exposed their folly. But would it have been more than justice, when you used such general expressions, to have distinguished my allegory from theirs? Again, If it should be asked, Why so much unwillingness to have the book of Job an allegory, and so much readiness to admit Solomon’s Song to be an entire allegory? Could you give a better reason than this, that the latter opinion is established orthodoxy, and the former, yet, a paradox? But, a word in your ear! Can you possibly be serious in saying, of Solomon’s Song, omnino esse allegoricum? I pay you a compliment in this question; though I made it only to shew you, that I treat you in the freedom and confidence of a friendly altercation.

To proceed with your letter. The general turn of it is to shew me, that I am unreasonable in expecting common civilities from you, in a book where I lay so much in your way. Now give me leave to think, you seem neither rightly to understand yourself, nor me. My services to religion and society seem to intitle me to common respect, when my opinions are controverted and decried, from every man of letters, engaged in the same cause, where no personal animosities have intervened. To neglect this, is not knowing the world: to decline it, must be from fear of giving offence. If therefore the Author
of the Delicacy of Friendship; thought, a writer of so much caution and reserve, might be as backward to give offence to me, as to others, and for the same prudential reasons, he was very excusable, in his conjecture.

But you tell me, you are not afraid of me; and you affect to tell me so, again and again. All I will say to this is, that whoever injures me may not, at the long run, have reason to applaud his situation. But no man need be afraid of him he has not injured. And I am very ready to believe, that it is a consciousness of that, which makes you so brave. For my own part, I am not fond of resenting that, as an injury, which was never intended.

You speak your sentiments of the author and the pamphlet on the Delicacy of Friendship: allow me to tell you mine. You make it a kind of question, whether he be my friend. This is natural. Your notion of the commerce, amongst learned men, in letters, may make you a little dazzled with such a friendship, in the commerce of life. The author, (if I know who was the author, for the pamphlet was published before I had so much as heard of the contents) is a man of very superior talents, of genius, learning, and virtue; indeed a principal ornament of the age he lives in: so that was I to wish a blessing to the man I was most obliged to, I could not wish him a greater than the friendship of such a person. And I not only hold myself highly honoured, and obliged to him, for this mark of his goodwill towards me, but think the discourse very serviceable to men of letters, if they would condescend to make a proper use of it. He tries, in the finest irony in the world, to shame them out of that detestable turn of mind, which, either out of a low envy is unwilling to give merit its due, or out of mean and base apprehensions, dare not do it, for fear of its being unacceptable to their superiors; and it was impossible for him to have chosen a properer object of his satire than the man he has chosen. The only thing blamable, and which, by the way, is the only real ground of offence, is his extravagant commendation of me. And if the generosity and immoderate warmth of a friendly heart will not excuse him (as it would be a wonder if so unexperienced a thing, should) I know myself so well, as to be conscious, he has nothing better to urge.
To draw to a conclusion. You say, I am at liberty to pursue my own measures, if your opinions stand at all in my way. I will assure you, they do not. If I had any purpose of examining them, it was only while I thought myself injuriously treated. You assure me I was not. The negligence of it, I can very well bear.

However, you advise me to respect myself and the public. How ready I am to follow it, you may understand by my past conduct. Can more respect be shewn the public, by an author, than by never giving any thing to them but what he deemed of high importance to the interests of religion and society? And can juster respect be shewn to myself, than, when I have been attacked, in the most injurious manner, by above a hundred scribblers of all ranks and professions, never to commit myself with above two or three? not to mention that principal respect to one's self, the never beginning a literary altercation with any man.

It would answer no end to tell you, what I thought of the author of the Hebrew Poetry, before I saw him. But this I may say, that I was never more surprised when I did see him, than to find him of so amiable and gentle manners, of so modest, sensible, and disengaged a deportment. It would not have displeased me to find myself ill used by pedants and bigots; but it grieved me to think, I had any thing to explain, with such a man.

You have here, Dear Sir, a faithful picture of my mind; frank but honest; and, if plain, yet generous; above all, a lover of truth and good men: not the most forbearing when I think myself ill treated; but ready to be reconciled by the least shadow of a satisfaction.

Such as I am, I am at your service; that is,

Your faithful and very obedient servant,

W. W.

LETTER III.

TO THE REV. DR. W.

DEAR SIR,

Winchester, Oct. 6, 1756.

I am in the first place to return you my sincere thanks for the candour of your sentiments and expressions with regard to me in several parts of the letter with which I...
LETTERS BETWEEN DR. LOWTH

As favoured: for your readiness to allow that I had no
formed intention of misrepresenting you; to believe that
I was conscious I had not injured you; to admit of the
least shadow of a satisfaction; and (if I do not flatter my
wishes by interpreting your words too much in my favour)
even to honour me with your friendship. Your remain-
ing still unsatisfied with my expressions, though you ab-
sole me of any ill intention, is a circumstance that makes
your present disposition towards me but the more obliging:
and I should make but an ill return to it, unless I used
my best endeavours to give you perfect satisfaction.
This task therefore I resume very willingly, and with full
confidence of succeeding in it.

I was not informed that your complaint extended to
any part of my book beside the Lectures on Job; so could
not think of looking after any other passages that might
be liable to suspicion. But you begin with p. 64, &c.
As you have totally mistaken my design throughout this
passage, and many of my expressions, the readiest way
to satisfy you with regard to it, will be to ascertain my
meaning. My purpose was to shew, that the sacred
poets, in describing the state of the dead, make use of
sensible images taken from their manner of sepulture;
and to give the reasons why they describe it in this
manner, and in this only; namely, because the subject is
really inexplicable in any other way; because we have
no idea of the metaphysical nature of the soul, of its
form, situation, and manner of existence in a separate
state; because, from the nature of the human faculties,
the inspired writers could have no advantage above
others in this case; and because they had no systematical
metaphysics to help them out, and to enable them to
talk themselves and others, as the modern philosophers
do, into a persuasion that they really know something of
the matter. These I say were the reasons for their in-
variably expressing themselves in this way; not that they
wanted the knowledge of the permanency of the soul after
death, as certain learned persons have held.—So much
for the course of my reasoning in general: now for my
particular expressions. "Quali's itaque—haud, quia
hanc cognitionem his invideret Divina Revelatid, sed." &c.
hanc cognitionem, minimum, qualis sit eminis a corpore
sejuncta
séjunctis vita viueretur, quis, &c. not the general knowledge of a future state, the plain doctrine of life and immortality; but the particular knowledge of the essence of the soul, its manner of existence in a separate state, its place, form, and condition. I had said but just before, that the Vates Sacri, the inspired writers, were possess'd of the belief of the immortality of the soul, and of the resurrection of the body: here I say that the Hebrews in general, inspired writers and all, were in the same case, with all other mortals, and wholly destitute of this knowledge; that is, not surely of the immortality, but of the metaphysical nature of the soul. I never spoke of Divine Revelation's grudging the former to any: nor of the latter, as if it could be a blessing to any. Be so good now as to review this passage fairly, and see if I am chargeable with the absurd reasoning, the mistaking the question, the misrepresentations, and invidious reflections upon you, which you impute to me. I have said, that the inspired writers (and observe that I confine it to them all along) believed the immortality of the soul; tho' certain learned persons have denied, that they did believe it: are you one of those learned persons? have you not declared your sentiments upon that head, and in the affirmative, that the inspired writers had the knowledge and belief of a future state? have not you proved, that Moses knew the immortality of the soul, and that it is deductible from his writings? that the prophets gave strong intimations of it, and gradually revealed it: how then could you possibly suppose, that you were here meant? Have I said one word of the national belief of the Jews, or of a future state's being contained in, or making a part of the Mosaic dispensation; of its being or not being a sanction of their law, or any thing else, which could lead you away so totally out of sight of my meaning? Have I expressed myself vaguely, inaccurately, obscurely? I think, I have not; at least I profess 'tis beyond my ability to do it better in a language not familiar to me. Did not you rather read it with prejudice, with an unreasonable jealousy and suspicion, that determined you to take offence, whether it was given or no? But enough of this, I hope. I shall only add, in order to be as explicit with you as possible, that the author whom I
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principally had in view was Le Clerc; see his Comment. Index ad Hagiogr. in voco Immortalitas.

You insist upon the passage p. 321, as meant of you, and of you only; "because you speak of the things there mentioned; and of the God from the Machine no one could speak but you; because no one else, in their interpretations of the Book of Job, contended for the thing understood by it." Now I had not only intimated to you before, that if my only design had been to destroy your hypothesis, I should have bestowed my pains to little purpose, by urging an argument that could not affect it; for allowing Job to be, as I contend, not a just drama, but a mere dialogue, your allegory, as far as I can see, stands just where it did before: but moreover, to give you full satisfaction on this head, I had referred you to two short passages, in which alone you might have found enough to account for every expression I have there used. By your not being satisfied, I conclude that you have not looked on those passages to which I referred you; perhaps you had not the books at hand. I will therefore transcribe them for you. I shall add no more upon this article, and shall expect to hear no more of it from you.

Calmet, Preface sur Job; he is recounting the sentiments of several writers:—"Il s'est trouvé plusieurs Ecrivains qui ont doute de la verité de l'histoire qu'il contient. Ils traitent de parables & d'allegories tout ce qui y est rapporté. Ils veulent que Job, & c. soient de noins feints & empruniez; que tout ce reçit soit fait à plaisir;—une piece de poesie;—non ce qui etoit en effet, mais ce qui pouvait être. Pour appuyer cette opinion on releve le merveilleux—de cette histoire. Un Prince puissant, heureux, & c. (a short account of the subject)—

Dieu entre dans cette dispute, paraît dans un tourbillon, comme l'on dit: Deus e machina; J'judge en faveur de Job, condamne ses amis, & rebatit le premier dans tout ses biens. Quoi de plus semblable que tout cela à une Tragedie? Les Actes, les Scénes, les Personnages, le Dénouement, le Merveilleux, tous les Châractères, y sont admirablement bien observez. Les trois premiers chapitres sont comme le Prelude de la pièce. Ils en expliquent le sujet; ils sont connoitres des personnages. Le premier Acte commence au chap. iii. & finit au chap. iv.
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Le second Acte commence au ch. xv. & finit au ch. xxii.,
Le 3ème Acte commence au ch. xxii. & finit au ch. xxx.
C'est en cet endroit qui Dieu se fait voir, & fournit le
Denouement de la Tragedie.” — Bishop Hare, note on
Ps. cvii. 40: “Liceat hic obiter observare librum istum,
(Jobi) non modo metro, ut Psalmos, scriptum esse, sed,
ocertissime Dramas sacrum esse; quod cum alius argu-
mentis, tum hoc maxime constat; quod si totum librum,
in septem æquales partes dividis, quatuor implent Jobus
& tres anici ejus, primis caputibus connumeratis, quintam
Jobus solus, sextam Elihuus, septimam Deus.” (He must
mean that these seven parts were strictly speaking seven.
Acts; else how is this the strongest argument, or indeed
any argument at all, of its being a drama?) “Elihuus
Dei causam in se recipit; —Deus vero ipse tandem
introducitur; —ut incestitissimo Dramati kalaseon tandem
felix obtingat.”

P. 312. Here you think I am wanting in decency and
civility with regard to you; and charge me with talking
dogmatically. I had but just before, in the paragraph
immediately preceding, desired to be understood as pro-
posing what I had to say, non quiæ comperta ac plane
percepta, sed in opinione posita; and p. 294, had pro-
fessed, that upon this subject I should rather give the
opinions of others than my own. And here I deliver it
as my opinion, in which as you well know I only follow
many authors generally esteemed to be as competent
judges in this case as any whatever, that the allegorical
interpretation of Job is entirely groundless, or, if you
please, false: for that for my part I cannot find any
traces in it of the manners, rites, or affairs of the Is-
raelites. You say, “you believe most competent readers
are agreed, that there are infinitely more and stronger
marks that the affairs under the Theocracy are alluded
to, than that Augustus is shadowed under Virgil’s hero.
A very modest recounting of presumptive votes in your
favour truly! I am as fully persuaded as I can be upon,
any such point, that there neither is, was, or ever will
be, I do not say such an agreement of most competent
readers, but any one competent reader in the world of
this opinion; nor can I believe that, with all the prejudice
of hypothesis possessing you, you can upon recollection,
possibly
possibly think so yourself.—But as for my expressions which you object to; if you had used the same upon a like occasion in your writings, I believe they never would have been selected as remarkably deficient in point of civility and decency, nor as the most flagrant instance to be found there of the dogmatical.

The next passage in the same page you give up, and allow that it could not be meant of you; but think that I ought to have distinguished your allegory from that of others. I should rather have restrained it, by my expression, as well as by the circumstances, to those whom it only concerned: I should have said quibusdam allegoriam conquisitoribus; and I will correct it so, if ever I have an opportunity. As to my admitting Solomon’s Song to be an allegory, at the same time that I denied Job to be such; it was, I assure you, neither out of perverseness with regard to you, nor for fear of appearing unorthodox. I think there is a material difference between the two cases: if you deny Job to be an allegory, I see no ill consequence; it stands just where it did: but if you deny that Solomon’s Song is an allegory, you must exclude it from the Canon of Holy Scripture; for it holds its place there by no other tenure. You may laugh at me, but I am really in earnest in saying, that I am inclined to think Solomon’s Song to be altogether allegorical; I have given my reasons for it; and do not yet think the difficulties that stand in the way of the allegorical interpretation equal to that of supposing, that Ezra, or whoever they were that settled the Canon of Scripture, would ever have admitted a loose and profane poem into the number and rank of their sacred and inspired writings.

You are pleased to say, “that the general turn of my letter is to shew you, that you are unreasonable in expecting common civilities from me, in a book where you lay so much in my way.” Give me leave to state my design, as I imagine more justly: it was to shew you, that you did not lie so much in my way, as to have made it either necessary, or proper, or indeed not even extremely impertinent, for me to have entered into a dispute with you. If I had really, as you say, neglected paying you common respect, or declined it for fear of giving offence,
you might easily have suggested to yourself a proper plea for the prudence and justness of my conduct. To profit by the experience of others, is the best use one can make of knowledge of the world: the experiment of paying you a proper respect on a like occasion had not succeeded well with others; a sufficient reason why I should not try it again. For instance, and it is a case in point; the learned and ingenious Dr. Grey gave an edition of Job, and in his preface had occasion to speak of the several prevailing opinions concerning the design of the book; he found himself obliged to dissent from you; he expressed his dissent in a decent manner; he treated you with candour, civility, and respect. What was the consequence? you were highly offended; you looked upon him as an enemy, marked him as an object of your resentment, and treated him in a manner equally unworthy of him and yourself. After this you ought not to wonder, if no writer on Job should care to have any thing to say to you.

To have done with Job: I cannot help noting another passage of mine upon that subject, which you have introduced for no other purpose but to pervert and ridicule it. I am manifestly speaking p. 326, of an improvement that might have been made in process of time and by a succession of writers; as was the case with the Greeks, whose advances in this way I observe were very slow: you dexterously slip in the composer, as if I had said that he was capable of making it himself; and then laugh at me for an absurdity of which you are the author. I mention this as another instance to shew, that you did not read me with that candour and equity which is every writer's due. I suppose some friend of yours, who in the immoderate warmth of his affection resolves to keep you to himself by setting you at variance with the rest of the world, had prejudiced you against me, by informing you that I had treated you with disrespect. In consequence of which, you read my book through with the same spirit, which you have shewn in your gloss upon the parts produced in your letter; and I need not be surprised to find, that you thought the Author, as well as the book, made up of perverseness, absurdity, and nonsense.

You
You guess the true reason of my not being afraid of you, and I will give you the reason, why I told you so. After what your friend had published to the world, and what you had said yourself (for your demand of an explanation was attended with a sort of denunciation of your resentment, in case of a refusal, or an unsatisfactory account of myself) I thought it incumbent upon me to tell you explicitly, and to repeat it, that I was not to be frightened. I should not have thought of setting forth my bravery, if I had not first been called a coward, and accordingly looked upon as one that was to be aved by menaces.

I have now considered all your complaints; and since we are upon the business of expostulation, and as I hope for the last time, you must give me leave in my turn to make my own. It is not in behalf of myself, but of one for whom I am much more concerned, that is, my father. In your Julian you bring a heavy charge against him of uncharitableness. I have several objections to the whole passage, which I shall propose to you as distinctly as I can.

I. In charging him so severely, you do not quote his words; or so much as say, when or where these uncharitable reflections were made; so that not one in a hundred perhaps of your readers will know, where to find what he has said, and so be able to examine, whether you have charged him justly or not.

II. You say, that these reflections stand in the place of a confutation; whereas the confutation precedes them. Mr. L. charges Basnage with wilfully suppressing the unexceptionable evidence of an honest contemporary Heathen, Ammian. Marcellus: which is as much to the purpose in one line, and will go as far towards invalidating his judgment upon the case, as all that criticism which you have displayed through so many pages.

III. You misrepresent what he has said: I must set before you his words; “sed profecto, ut observat Is. Vossius, “nullus religio Christiana insensiores habet hostes, quam ipsos Christianos.” aut saltem qui nomine tenus Christiani videri volunt: quales sunt Tam. Faber, Iao. Tollius, alique istius Commatis Critici. The words quales
quales sunt plainly relate to those only, qui nomine tenus Christiani videri volunt; and neither of these clauses includes Basnage. If Mr. L. had intended to include him, he ought to have said, quales sunt ipse Basnagius, Tan. Faber, &c. or quales etiam sunt T. Faber, &c. or rather he could not have used at all with any propriety those words of Vossius, who speaks of sincere Christians doing disservice to the cause of Christianity: (De Sibyl. Orac. cap. xi.) Mr. L. accordingly censures Basnage, as a Christian and a real friend, for his indiscretion and perverse opposition in this particular case; for a conduct which you allow to be most provoking, and such as cannot but give offence to every sober reader. His censure upon him is carried no further than the words of Vossius, and really amounts to no more than what you have bestowed on him yourself. Your remarks on what Mr. L. has said, relate to Basnage only: Faber and Tollius you leave to shift for themselves; and they were not either of them Ministers of the Gospel: so that your laboured amplification, by which you do all you can to aggravate the charge of uncharitableness, falls entirely to the ground, as being built only on your own uncharitable misrepresentation.

IV. It would have been more generous and just in you to have acknowledged yourself indebted to Mr. L. for the application of the meteoric appearance of crosses from Casaubon's Adversaria to this subject; which, when it appeared in your more popular volume, was received with applause, as new and very ingenious; an applause which, as you could not but know, belonged to him.

I flatter myself that you will acknowledge the truth of these remarks; and expect, that when you give a new edition of your Julian, you will do Mr. L. common justice by rectifying all the above particulars.

You conclude your letter with saying something of me and of yourself. What you say of me is much more than I deserve; but you qualify it by intimating, that you found me the very reverse of my book. Let us even compound the matter between the book and the Author: abate a good deal of one side and of the other, and I shall be satisfied. What you say of yourself, of your
designs and your disposition, I most readily believe to be true: and assure yourself, that I always have been, and shall be, as ready to acknowledge upon all proper occasions the superiority of your genius, your learning, and your abilities. I do but join with many other sincere well-wishers to you, in regretting that you have not something more of the spirit of toleration in literary matters; that you are so hasty in taking up your resentments, and that you treat such as differ from you in so severe and so contumacious a manner.

For myself as a member of the Commonwealth of Letters, I am a true lover of peace and quietness, of mutual freedom, candour, and benevolence. I detest and I despise the squabbles that are perpetually arising from the jealousy and peevishness of the genus irritabile Scriptorum. I am a stanch republican and a zealous protestant in literature, nor will ever bear with a perpetual dictator, or an infallible Pope, whose decrees are to be submitted to without appeal, and to be received with implicit assent. Manuscipc inimica tyrannic. My favourite principle is the liberty of prophesying, and I will maintain it with my last breath.

With regard to you in particular, depend upon my sincerity when I assure you, that I shall not only always honour you as a man of the first rank in letters, but shall be heartily disposed to cultivate your acquaintance, and to merit your good opinion; shall be glad of every opportunity of enjoying the pleasure and profit of your conversation; and most willing to enter into as near an intercourse with you as you shall be pleased to permit, as a neighbour, a member of the same society, and a friend.

I am, with great truth and respect,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient and

Faithful humble servant,

R. L.
LETTER IV.

TO THE REV. DR. L.

DEAR SIR,


I have this moment received the favour of your long letter of the 6th, it having been sent me hither from Prior Park.

I had a great deal to say to the contents. In some places you have shewn I was mistaken, in others you have convinced me I was not. And if you have shewn me I have here and there mistaken your meaning, I have my revenge very amply, if I could take any pleasure in it; in seeing you are as totally mistaken in my moral character. But you have shut my mouth for ever on the subject of your letter; by the information you impart to me in the conclusion, namely, that the Mr. L. who sent a few notes to Reading the Editor of the Ecclesiastical Historians, was your father. I had not the least suspicion of it, when I pretended to take your usage of me unkindly in your Prelections. Had I known that, I should not only have forbore complaining, but have applauded your piety. The injurer of your father’s memory (and such you took me to be, as appears by what you say here) deserved no quarter from you. And this but gives me one reason more to esteem you. And that I may not continue worse in your esteem than I deserve, give me leave to tell you I am no plagiarist of your father’s observations. By an odd fancy to a strange unequal writer, I had read Meric Casaubon’s writings thro’ and thro’. And I had finished my book of Julian, and it was half printed off, when Dr. Jorten wrote me word of this note of Mr. L’s. This is a point of honour in which I am particularly delicate. I will venture to boast again to you in this, that I believe no author was ever more averse to take to himself any thing that belonged to another. However, I owe so much to your piety, which is really edifying, as to strike out that note against your father, the very first opportunity. It is to this likewise, that I am ready to sacrifice every disgust that some parts of your
your last might be naturally supposed to give me; as where you leave the question between us, and dictate to me like a tutor or pedagogue on my general conduct towards others; in which it is not to be supposed you could be acquainted with the whole of the case, or know my particular provocations, as in the case of Grey. I have said to the world, (and they ought to believe me or disprove me) that I had treated no man roughly, who had not first fallen upon me. But I thought it both below me, and impertinent in itself, to acquaint the public with the particulars. In a word, I repeat it once again, that my using your father with disrespect amply justified you for every thing I complained of. But (for all I said there, and when I said it) I honoured his memory as one of the most learned persons of a better age, if he was, as I suppose he might be, the author of the Comments, &c. And be assured, I esteem it not amongst the least of his services to the public, that he produced you with the rest of his works. I accept with all cordiality the offer of your friendship. You know the worst of me, and perhaps have given credit to a great deal more than the worst, I mean the calumnies of my enemies; for the future you are to believe only as you find.

I am, Dear Sir,

Your very faithful and

Affectionate humble servant,

W. W.

P. S. I am here in waiting. I mention it to you from a selfish view. Regis of this month is dying. What should hinder your stepping into his place? it would surely be the easier, for there are now three or four vacancies amongst the Chaplains by deaths and removals, and it would be an acquisition to me to have you in this month.
LETTER V.

TO THE REV. DR. W.

DEAR SIR,

Winchester, Oct. 14, 1756.

I CANNOT omit the first opportunity of acknowledging the favour of your very obliging letter, which is just now come to my hands.

I was unwilling to open my complaint to you relating to my father, till I had, as I thought, totally removed the foundation of your exceptions against me. You allow, that I had no reason to go out of my way and to pay you any particular compliment; and you must give me leave still to aver, that on the other hand I have not, upon that or any other account, gone out of my way with design to reflect upon you. To what I have already offered upon this head, I might add that the argument and substance of the Thirty-second and Thirty-third Lectures, which seem chiefly to give you disgust, were drawn up to the same effect, as they now appear, some years before your Julian was published; as I could prove to you incontestably, if required, by the original papers, and by the testimony of the Bishops of Oxford, Rochester, and Norwich, and several other learned friends, whom I consulted upon my whole plan. I simply pursued my plan, and differed from you no otherwise than I did from many other eminent writers, against whom I could have no prejudice. I thought there was no need of being tender in delivering one's opinion upon a subject of such doubtful disputation as Job: nulli gravis est percussus Achilles. However, since it has happened contrary to my expectation, in return for your very obliging concession in regard to my father, I will very readily endeavour to soften or alter any expressions which still offend you, and which you will mark to me as such, as far as I can do it consistently with my general thesis. In excuse for what may offend you in my last, I might allege, that I have said nothing but what some passages in your letter gave me, not only a fair opportunity, but a right to say:—but I am unwilling to resume this subject, and take

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much more pleasure in returning you my sincerest thanks for your very obliging expressions of all sorts. Those of your Postscript are particularly so in every respect; and the reason you are so kind as to give for your mentioning the thing, would really be a great inducement to me to think of it. But my ambition is at an end; and otherwise an attendance of this sort would be extremely inconvenient to me in my present situation.

I write this in a very great hurry, as you may well imagine, when I tell you, I am preparing to remove with my family to Durham the beginning of next week. I hope I shall there have frequent opportunities of improving the friendship which you so generously offer me, and which I shall highly esteem; and of demonstrating in every way which lies in my power the sincerity with which I am,

Dear Sir, your most faithful
And affectionate humble servant,

R. L.

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