DISCOURSES
UPON
Cornelius Tacitus.

Written in Italian by the
Learned Marqueffe
Virgilio Malvezzi.

Dedicated
To the Serenissimo Ferdinando
the second Great Duke of
Tuscany.

And Translated into English, by
Sir Richard Baker, Knight.

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1642.
TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM

Lord Viscount Say, and Seale,
Master of his Highnesse Court of Wards
and Liveries, and one of his Majesties most
Honourable Privy Counsell.

Most Honoured Lord,

Should not have the boldnesse to present
this booke unto your Lordship, if (besides
the great service I owe you) the Argument of
the Booke did not invite me to it: for con-
sisting of Politique Discourses and consider-
ations of State; it is most fit to be pre-
ented to Counsellours of State; amongst
which I knew not whom better to pre-
sent it to, then to your Lordship: and no

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The Epistle Dedicatory.

lest the Argument of the Booke, the Authour thereof invites me to it; for being a learned Lord of Italy, none more fit to entertaine him then some learned Lord of England; of which number this Kingdome affordeth none more eminent then your Lordship: I must not speake so much as I think, for offending the modesty of your eare; but I may boldly speake so much as all the world sees; that nature and Art have joyned together, to make you perfect in your place, which is to be a faithfull Counsellour to the King, and a loving Patriot to your Countrey: for both which, if I should not my selfe acknowledge an obligation to you, I might worthily be thought, unworthy to be accounted, which I specially desire to be,

Your Lordships humble

and devoted servant,

Richard Whitaker.
TO THE SERENISSIMO
FERDINAND the second, great Duke of
TUSCANY, my most gracious Lord.

Seeing to nothing I am more bound, then to serve your Highness: I cannot consequently have any greater desire then to be accounted your servant: that as the benefits which our House continually receiveth, are publicly knowne; so the marks of my devotion may publicly appeare; which after dedicating my selfe to your Highness, I cannot better manifest, then by offering these Discourses, which are so farre unequall to your greatnesse, and to what I ow you, that it may well appeare to be rather done for confession of my debt, then for satisfaction of that obligation, which as it can onely receive abatement from your commands, so commands comming from so great a Prince, will have force againe to make it the greater. Vouchsafe then to honour me with commanding me, thereby to make me the more obliged: and be pleased to accept these weake labours, with looking upon the value which your Heroicall Name gives them. And upon the weight which my devotion puts upon them, with which I wish to your Highnesse all those felicities, which as you give manifest prooves to merit, so by the divine goodness you shall happily obtaine: And to I present you the most humble Reverence,

Of Your Highnesse most devoted servant,

VIRGILIO MALVEZZI.
To the Reader.

That yong men may be good writers, in the Politicks: and why Cornelius Tacitus gives so great contentment to them that read him.

N. antiquis est sapientia, & in multo tempore prudentia. If it be true, as true indeed it is, which the holy Text by the mouth of Job intimates, that only old men are wise, certainly it is in nothing more true, then in things which belong to action. Whereupon the Queene of Saba hearing the most wise Salomon, although by the answers he gave to her questions, she found he was deeply seene in the secrets of Philosophy, and in the mysteries of Divinity, yet she made no shew of wondering at it: but when she found him endowed with no lesse excellency in things belonging to action, then she brake forth into words of astonishment. Major est sapientia & opera tua, quam rumor quem audivi. Beati viri tui & beati servi tui, qui stant coram te semper, & audiant sapientiam tuam. Shewing thereby, that it is no great marvell, for a yong man to be excellent in things of contemplation: the marvell is, if he be excellent in matters of action: seeing these require onely, sharpnesse of wit, which easily grows in verdant spirits; these, soundnesse of judgement, which getts not maturity but by long experience: and for this cause Aristotle excluded yong men from active Philosophy: and a regard also to this had the Author of the Tryviall saying, That young men may be good Mathematicians, but not good Philosophers. I therefore may justly be
be taxed with over-great boldness, to take upon me to speake in matters of Action, being so yong a man as I am, when it were fitter I should stand to learne of others, then to put my selfe forward to be a Teacher. And for this (as St. Gregory well observes) our Lord Christ, in his childhood, though he had taugh and confounded the Doctours, yet by all meanes would have his mother finde him hearkning to them, so to learne of them. The consideration of this would have stayed me from undertaking such a worke, were it not that I detest so much the name of idlenesse, that for avoiding of that, I rather venture to incurre the blame of too great boldnesse. Publishing these my discourses, which in one course of the Sunne have had their beginning, encrease and finifhing; and God grant, that in the same yeere, after the order of nature, they have not alfo their decrease, and abolifhing; and that in coming to the light, they beginne not (like their Authours) from darkness, and then tarry in darkness still. Yet it is true, that I have wares now, to defend my selfe from such calumniations. And first, as to this particular objection, that yong men are not fit for action; we must know, that all action is preceded by contemplation, which is the action of the mind and understanding, seeing a thing cannot be in the will, till it be first in the understanding; according to that well knowne rule, Nihil volitum quod non sit præcognitum. As for example, before it be determined to strike battell, it is deliberated in counsell, which is nothing else, but to contemplate whether the action be good or bad. And this Sallust sheweth us, where he saith, Nam & priusquam incipias consulto; & ubi consultiueris, nature facto opus est. And therefore to execute and doe a thing well, it is needfull to have gotten a habit in the action, which habit growing from many acts often iterated, requires an experience which cannot be had without length of time, and oftentimes, not without a temper in the affections. Now for contemplating an action, there need not so many things.
things; but as he that is to execute a thing, cannot doe it well if he have not the habit; and the habit he cannot have but by doing many acts: so be that is to contemplate an action that is to be done, must necessarily have a knowledge of that action, which we may call a habit of the understanding; and if that arise from many acts iterated, this also is produced by many acts contemplated; and produced it cannot be, if there be not a knowledge of the things that have happened in the World; and such knowledge cannot be had, without reading of Histories, seeing a young man by reading of Histories, can come to know more, then a man of a hundred yeeres old; because the one hath but seen and heard the accidents only of his owne time, the other hath read all the principal things that have beene done from the beginning of the World to the present time. I conclude then, that in those things wherein contemplation and action belong both to the same; in those ordinarily a young man cannot be fit; but where contemplation is not joined with action, there he may be most fit. And therefore one that hath read Histories ought not to be blamed if he take upon him to write of things belonging to action, seeing affection cannot hinder him from speaking the truth, nor want of experience from finding it out. And this opinion of mine is no way differing from that of Aristotle: who saith, That yong men are no good bearers of morall Philosophy, because action and contemplation in morall Philosophy are not distinct, but joyned together; and therefore said that he who contemplates well, and operates otherwise, cannot have the name of a good morallist: so as, Aristotle excludes not a young man, as one that cannot contemplate well, but as one that cannot operate well, by reason of impediment of affection and want of habit. As to that other objection, that yong men should always stand to heare and learne of others: I suppose I shall be excused by any that have observed in Plato, that they sufficiently reappeare profust by speaking, who while in speaking they
To the Reader.

they shew their ignorance, give occasion to others to correct them: and this also is my desire, so as the correction come from the hand of Socrates. Besides, I am not without hope of commendation for my judgement, if not in the form at least in the matter; if not in the composition, at least in the choice. Rather indeed, seeing an ill-favoured Image, is yet well valued, if wrought in a Diamond: I am out of doubt, that these my Discourses shall be valued by reason of the Author, from whom I take their matter; Cornelius Tacitus, an Author so famous, and so highly esteemed through all the World, and especially in these our times; and the matter such, that I am enforced to seek out the causes whereof in truth there may be found many: part taken from the things he relates; part, from the manner of his relating them. The things he relates are actions of Princes, and from thence the first benefit we take, is that we learn many profitable things, as living in an age, where all the World is governed Princes. Where in other times, as when in Italy there were many Common-wealths; we see, that expert Politicians, laying aside Tacitus, gave themselves to write Discourses upon Livy, who will always be more esteemed of by men that live in a Common-wealth: as he, that seeing the waies how Rome came to be a free State, and how it grew great, will be a means of learning many excellent instructions. But now that we are under Princes, there is no doubt, but the greatest content will be, to learn things of this nature; as the conditions of Princes, the cunning of Courtiers, and such like. All this Tacitus expresseth, where he makes comparison between the Histories of others, and his Annals. Igitur ut olim plebe valida vel cum Patres pollenent, nascenda vulgi natura, & quibus modis temperanter haberetur, senatusque & optimatum ingenia qui maxime perdidicerant, callidi temporum, & sapientes credebantur; sic converso statu, neque alia rerum quam si unus imperit, haec conquiri tradique in rem fuerit, quia pauci
pauci prudentia, honesta ab deterioribus, utilia ab nocis, dicernunt, plures aliorum eventis docentur. Secondly, the continual slaughters of principal Senators, the fall of Courtiers, the violent deaths of Princes, and such like; are things, from which the first delight we can take, is this, to know how much we are bound to our Lord God, that we are borne in so much better times, secure of our lives, of our goods and honours. This delight Cornelius Tacitus had, when considering with himself, the difference, that was betweene the times of those Emperours of whom he writ, and the times of Trajan and Norva, he said, Rara temporum felicitate, ubi sentire quae velis, & quæ sentias dicere licet. Another is, that finding their tragical accidents, they worke in us the like effect, as a Tragedy is wont to doe: which is to purge, (as one calls it) the affections of terror and compassion: as it happens in a soildier, who being used to see wounded, and dead men, is never moved by any accident, either to pity or affrighting. He therefore that shall read in Tacitus, so many deaths, banishments, imprisonments, and other cruelties, will never for every light occasion, be either moved with terror or with compassion. Or else, as others conceive, these accidents moving us to terror or pity, will purge our minds from such passions: as for example, when we read, that Nero through lust and cruelty, came to a miserable end; this by terrifying us, will make us resolve, to the end we may not incure the like misery, to keepe our selves from the like qualities. And this effect Tacitus made account his Annals would worke in us, as he writes, Exequifententias haud institui nisi insignes, per honorem, aut notabiliter decore, quod præcipuum munus Annalium reror, ne virtutes silentur, ut que pravis dictis facileque ex posteritate & infamia metus sit. To these may be added, that speaking of bad Princes he can doe no lesse then alwaies to blame them: a thing which (as in another place I shall shew) not only makes the Writer be held for truer, but makes the Readers pleasure be the greater, as taking it for a praise to himselfe, to be free from those vices.
To the Reader.

Tacitus faith, Obrectatio & livor pronis auribus accipiuntur. And thus much concerning the pleasure that is taken from the things he relates. Then concerning the pleasure that is taken from his manner of writing: it consists first in his Lucanick style, which is so much more pleasing then the Aesopick, as clean Wine is then that which is mingled with water.

Secondly, it gives great satisfaction, not to lose time in reading many lines, with little instruction. Thirdly, his very obscurity is pleasing to who so ever by labouring about it, finds out the true meaning: for then he counts it an issue of his own braine, and taking occasion from those sentences, to goe further then the thing he reads, and that without being deceived, he takes the like pleasure as men are wont to take from hearing metaphors, finding the meaning of him that uses them.

But because Tacitus in saying, that his Annals have little pleasure in them, Ceterum ut profutura, ita minimum oblatationis afferunt, she was to be contrary to this my opinion: It is therefore to be knowne, that for so much as concerns the present, there may two kinds of pleasure be taken from a thing; one of the senses, another of the understanding: as we may say in Musicke, there are two pleasures may be taken: one from the goodness of the notes that sing, another from the goodness of the songes that are sung: The first is taken by the sense of hearing, whereof the sound is object, the second is taken by the understanding, which finding the Composers running together, and helping of discords, takes great delight. The first pleasure is common to all that have ears: the second of such one only is understand it. The like happens also in painting, where one kind of pleasure is taken from the daintiness of the colours, and the beauty of the picture: and another, that is taken from the due placing of the parts, and resemblance of the Muskel: and of this, the pleasure is so much the greater, in that it cannot be taken but by one of understanding, who therefore takes delight in anotheres counting, because by it he discovers his owne.
To the Reader.

owne. Thus when Tacitus faith, that his Annals are little pleasing; be meant, in the pleasure which is taken by the sense: and this appears plainly, by the words he addeth, where giving the reason, why other Histories are more pleasing than this, he saith, Nam situs Gentium, varietates Praetoriorum: Clari Ducum exitus, retinent ac redintegrant legentium animos. This difference of pleasure, Seneca expressed, when he said, that Virgil affords one kind of pleasure, being read by a Humanist: and another, being read by a Philosopher. I conclude then, that Tacitus is an Author exceeding pleasing especially to those, who studying the Histories with understanding, little care whether the Latin be as good as that of Cæsar.

It remains to advise the Reader of this story. Discourses, that finding Hebrew or Greek Texts cited in Latin, he may be pleased to conceive it did, to avoid summing the Latine with allegatives: setting of they had been brought in the fore said Tongue, they must have been again translated for their sakes that understand those Tongues. I should, I think, have done more conformable to customs; if I had cited them in Italian rather than in Latin: but this also I conceive, that, I might not take away the force of those, in which the words bear in that Language.

Lastly, I will not blame those, who finding some scarce to be abusive blaming: because he that shall deal so with the said vices. Discourses, will find himself, some dear occasion in his opinion: for whom he thinketh, to differ from me, he will directly agree with me: seeing I have printed them to no other end, but to make my self a knowne instrument of the Seremi times, the Grand Dialogues, know of his humane nature, will be pleased to accept that little, which a scrivener able to present unto him. With all humility, then the Author of Book, may be the work of understanding now but to shew the Authors of Books, the work of men but malign us more: That I leave to every man's liberty: This, I cannot to be defended, may be is not express'd of his own wisdom.
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The first Discourse.

The Almighty God, understanding and comprehending himselfe infinitely; in as much as the understanding himselfe, proceeding from himselfe, returns into himselfe: joyneth together by an admirable circulation, the beginning with the end.

The Angelicall spirits as they have a twofold contemplation, so they cause a twofold motion: For by contemplating of God, their owne knowledge returning in an acknowledgement of its originall: they move the Heavens circularly, in a like motion to that of the first mover, from East to West: and by contemplating of themselves, they cause another circular motion contrary to the former, from West to East. And
The first Discourse.

Seeing all mortall things are influenced by the motions and light of the Heavens. It followes necessarily, that they all follow the heavenly influences with moving in a circle. What marvell then, if the government of the City of Rome, (as here in few words is delivered by Tacitus) have had its circular motion; passing from a regall government, begun by Romulus; to a popular or free estate under Brutus; and from that, to an Aristocraticall government under Pompey, Caesar and Caesar: under Lepidus, Animus, and Augustus; and then at last, with a wonderfull circulation returning againe to a government Monarchicall, as it was at first. Whereupon the Prophet Ezekiel, not without great mystery, shewing us in his first vision, four beasts, which in the opinion of many, are figures of the four Empire of the World; he sets before every one of them a wheele; to intimate in what a circulation they are turned about. And this circulation or alteration, though I cannot say, it is inalterable; yet I may truely say, it is so naturall, that even Aristotle himselfe, discoursing upon the passages of Rule and Dominion; foresees and observes that as a Philosopher; which Tacitus as an Historian, relates here of Rome. Et ob hoc forsan Rex ab initio repertus est; quod difficile erat a viros plures excellentes virtute reperiri, praesertim cum tum civitates parvae forent. So Tacitus here, Urbem Romanam principio Reges habuerat. Aristotle goes on, Sed cum postea contingentem, ut plures parvi virtute reperirentur, non amplius tolerarent Regem; sed commune quidam quaerentes, respublicas constituisse. So Tacitus here, Libertatem Lucius Brutus instituit. Aristotle proceeds, Cum vero deteriores subi, lucrum subi quererent, ex gubernatione remuneratione; cum hinc potentiam exortam seisse, credendum est: Honorabunt enim Divitias. So here we see, from whence the power came which Pompey, Caesar and Caesar had; and from whence also the Trimvirates of Augustus. Aristotle againe, Ex his verb
in Tyrannides transiere. So Tacitus here, Lepidus atque Antonii arma in Augustin cessere.

But for as much as Aristotle shews, that from the end of one circulation another begins; while pursuing this Argument, he faith, Ex Tyrannis nurse ad Plebem, he that will consider in Rome, those forms of government, which for their small continuance, I have omitted; shall find plainly, that even in those also, there hath been a manifest circulation: For after the Regall under Romulus; it came to be a free eftate under Brutus; from that, to be a government of a few under the decemviri: lastly, to be in the hand of a tyrant, under Appius Claudius; after whose death she recovered againe her liberty; and then passing under the Power of a few, settled at last in a Tyranny under Augustus: and if there hapned afterward no new circulation, the reasons thereof shall be shewed in another discourse.

But conceiving it to be the fittest course for examining of these revolutions, to proceed by shewing the causes of them; thereby to make men the better see that the events of former times have not been casuall, and hapned by chance; and also the better be able to prevent the like accidents that may hereafter happen, I will therefore make my beginning at the Power Regall; with which, it ought not to seem strange, that Rome at first was governed; seeing it hath been the like in the foundings almost of all Cities: as both Safo witnesseth, Initio Initio Reges; num in terris; Nomine Imperii id primum fuit: and Justin, Principio rerum Gentium, Nationumque Imperium; antea Reges erant: and also Aristotle, Fuerat enim antiqua civitatim gubernatio paucorum & Regis: and besides these, there are many examples in the holy Scripture, that shew it, to have been so: Cain, before the flood, was founder of the first City, that ever was in the World: and he, as S. Austin writes, was a King; as also his sucklers, likewise after the flood,
The first Discourse.

The great City Babylon was scarce built, when Nimrod, (as the Scripture faith) Capit esse Potens in terra.

There being therefore no doubt of the case: having so many and great authorities to confirm it; the next thing is, to search out the causes; amongst which, the first may be taken from the first founding. For Cities are sometimes founded by one alone; and he a Private man; as Rome, by Romulus: sometimes by one alone, but he a Lord of other Cities, as Constantinople by Constantine: oftentimes by many joyning together; and those many, either all of one Country; who for shunning of danger, assemble themselves into one City: as the Athenians did at Athens: or else such as quite leave and forsake their ancient habitations; which may happen, either in time of peace; when men are forced by the great overswarming of people to seek new dwellings; as the French did, when they built Milan: or else in time of warre; when men flying from a Country wafted; retire themselves into fresh places: and this may happen, under some one that is Head or Chieftaine; or without Head: without a Head, as Venice, under a Head, as Lavinium, Padova, and Athens: the first built by Aeneas: the second, by Antenor; the third, by Thesee.

Now a City which is built by one alone, whether he be a Private man, or a King; is no sooner founded, but it comes presently to be under a Power Regall: Those againe that are built by many joyning together: whether it be, that they fly, by reason of warre; or whether it be, that in peace, to enlarge themselves, they seek new countries: These also fall presently under the power Regall; because these things cannot well be done; but where there is a superiour, that is Head; as Milan did under Bellovisus; Padua under Antenor; Lavinium under Aeneas; and Athens under Thesee.

But if a City happen to be built by many that are equals
The first Discourse.

equals and have no chiefe amongst them : in this case
only, it may be that Cities have not their beginning
under Kings : of which, there may be many occasions.
First, when the end was not first publicke to build a
City ; but rather for private commodity ; where men
might place their persons and goods in safety : which
in other places by reason of warres they could not do;
and in case of such danger, many building houses, now
one and then another ; have thereby made as it were a
Village, and at last a City. Which having beene built
insensibly and by fits, is therefore not governed by
Regall power ; which it would have been, if it had
been built at once by a number of people united to-
gether : a thing impossible to happen, where there is
not a Head : as Plato in his Dialogue of Lawes hath
learnedly taught. And therefore Venice having
beene founded in the forefaid manner ; hath beene
able to begin ; is and will be able to maintaine it
else a free City ; there concurring together with the
wisedome of him that built it ; the valor of him that
governes it. Secondly, this may happen thorough the
condition of those, who without a Head joyne toge-
ther to the founding of new Cities, for if they be pious
and religious ; of quiet dispositions, not greedy of
command, and such as have had their education in a
Common-wealth, where they have learned rather to
content themselves with equality ; then to aspire to
soveraignty : there is no doubt but they will rather set
up a free citate, then a Regall ; as it was at the foun-
ding of Venice. Thirdly, it may happen by reason of
their weakenesse who were the founders ; amongst
whom there being none fit or worthy to be a King,
ye are all Commanders. For this reason (though
falsely) Tarquinius speaking to the Thoscans and Ve-
centanes, would have it, that the City of Rome was be-
come a Republique : Se Regem augente bello, Romanum
Imperium.
Oftbediverrformetofgovernmemt |
| | Ititudine&- Infiitutione&magisferebamtabalijsgubernari:
| | andthiscertainely Livie meant when he faid, 
| | that if the Regall; the Common-wealth had 
| | eoquenutriendoperduxit,utbomamfrugemlibertatis, maturis 
| | this,maybetakenfromthedifficultytofindemany 
| | in the firftfoundingofaCity, thatorableand 
| | Citybeingthen,(asLuciusFlorn*fàth)inhischild 
| | ffures3aadthereforehadneedoffuchaschoolmafter 
| | fe;i,qiiianemo'UnusfatisdignusRegnovifusfit,partes 
| | Regnirapuiffe.

These are the occasions by which it happens, that sometimes Cities in their beginnings are not governed by Kings: but because it is a thing that seldom hapens, yet may well say; that the first reason, why the greatest 
part of Cities, in their beginnings, are governed by Kings, is,their founding: which without a head, can ill 
be done. A second reason we may take from the Inhabitants, who in the beginning being but few; are apt 
to tolerate the Regall Power: an instruction that A- 
ristotle gives; Propter paucitatem enim hominum, non ete 
magnus numerus mediocrum; itaque pauci eunessent, mul-
titude & Institutione; magis ferebant ab alius gubernari: and this certainly Livie meant when he said; that if Brutus had deposed any of the first Kings, while the multitude was yet unfit to bare any other govern-
ment then the Regall; the Common-wealth had 
thereby been Endangered. Diffipate res nondum aduiae 
Disordia forent, quas fovit tranquilla moderatio Imperii, 
conuestriondo perdixit, ut bonam frugem libertatis, maturis 
jare viribus ferre posset. A third reason and like unto 
this, may be taken from the difficulty to finde many 
in the firftfounding of a City, that are of ability and 
fit to governe: for which reason perhaps, Aristotle faith, 
Rex ab Initio repertus est, quae difficile erat, viros planes 
excellendi fortuna reperiri. And fo much the more, the 
City, being then, (as Lucius Florn faith) in her childhood; and consequently, wanton and given to plea-
tures; and therefore had need of such a schoolmaster 
as a King is, to keep them in awe; whom liberty else 
would soone corrupt. And to this purpose it is that 
Livie speaks, and that of the liberty of Rome. Quid ethia 
shurnus fuit, stilla Pistoriorn conveneruntique plebs transspex 
exsue populi, sub stela Inviolati Templi, aut libertatem

ant
that Rōme had.

ant certam imprudentem adeptam, seduis Regionum, agitari,
capta effer Tribunitis PROCELLIS. No man therefore ought
to marvel, that our Lord God, in the time of the Mo-
saicall Law, never gave to the Hebrews a Common-
wealth, as long as either immediately by himselfe; or
else by the meanes of Kings or Judges; he governed
them in feare, under severe lawes; whereof when men
came to be more perfect, he abated the rigour; as
Saint Austin excellently expresseth, sayng, 'Den He-
braeis diversa pro qualitate temporis, imposuit Praecepta;
exant enim sub lege quasi puere sub Pedagogo inclusi: and
therefore Saint Paul faith, 'Sub lege custodiae in
Christo, nutrientes non tanquam parvulos sub rigore & Disoi-
plina. The last reason is, because a City in its Begin-
ning hath need of Lawes, which may better be given
by one alone, then by a multitude; whereof Aristotle
gives the reason, 'Quia Vnum nasci sunt & paucos facile
est quam multos qui vellet sentiant, & profint leges condere,
& jus constituer.

Now having shewed, that not without just cause, the
City of Rōme was in its beginning governed by Romu-
lus: it will not be amisse, to examine the scition of
the City, and therein to shew the Founders wisdome
in the building it. First therefore the site of a City,
(according to Aristotle) ought neither to be too re-
 mote from the sea; nor yet too near it: to the end, that
by too much remotenes, it be not deprived of many
commodities, which the Sea is wont to bring in; and by
too great neerenesse, it be not expos'd to the danger of
suddaine assaults. Secondly, It ought to be in a good
aire; as the thing, which of all other, can most annoy
us; being continually, not onely about us, but taken
into us. Thirdly, it ought to be in a place of plenty;
without which, there can never accrue any greatnesse
to a City. Fourthly, it ought to be in a place, ease for
carriage and bringing in of commodities. Fiftly and
lastly,
lastly, it ought to be in a place of advantage for assaulting its neighbours: and difficult it self to be assaulted. Now that Rome was situated according to these rules of Aristotle, is related by Livie, where he faith:

Non fine causa, Dii hominesque hunc urbi condenda locum dederunt, saluberrimos colles; here he shewes the goodness of the ayre: Flumen optimum quo ex Mediterraneis locis fruges advehantur. Here, he shewes the facility of carriage, either by Land or Water. Mare vicinum ad commoditates; nec expositum nimia, proxinitate ad pericula classinum exteriorum Nationum: Here he shewes the nearness to the sea in respect of profit: and a remoteness, in respect of danger. Italic Medium ad Incrementum urbis natur unice: Here he shewes the difficulty for being assaulted, by people farre off, being in the midst of Italy; and by people neere hand, by reason of its own strength. We may therefore conclude: that a City built to grow great, cannot possibly have a more excellent situation, (according to Aristotle) then Rome had.

Libertatem Lucius Brutus Instituit.

How the City of Rome came from being governed by Kings, to be a free State; and what the difference is betwixt a beginning and a cause.

The second Discourse:

Having shew'd the causes for which the City of Rome, was in her first beginning governed by Kings: I conceive it to be no lesse necessary, to make inquiry how it hapned, that leaving that kind of government, it came under Brutus, to be a free State: and seeing, of the causes that may be allledged, (setting them
The second Discourse.

...some are Philosophical, and some Politicall; these consisting in the things done; those in the order of number, and influences of the Heavens; I say first, speaking as a Politician; There are many of opinion, that this alteration of government in Rome, was caused by the ravishing of Lucretia, by Sextus Tarquinius: which opinion Aristotle seems not much to decline; while speaking of the causes, by which Monarchies and States come to be changed, he omits not to name for one, the lust and lasciviousness of the Prince: which (as he shews by many examples) have been the cause of change in all kinds of Commonwealthe and Monarchies. Others may say, that this change of government in Rome, proceeded from this, that Tarquinius had taken away all authority from the Senators; and had by devises procured the utter abolishing of the Senate; which also was the cause, that the Monarchy of Rome, passed afterwards from the house of the Cæsars, into that of Galba. The cause likewise of the change in Syracuse, from a Monarchy to a popular State; when Hieronymus not following the steps of his grandfather Hieron; divested the Senate of all authority; and was therefore by conspirators most miserably slaine. For as the stomack, which is the seat of natural heat; as long as it hath in it any little nourishment, leaves the body in peace and quiet; but if it be altogether without, it then draws nourishment from the head, and thereby oftentimes destroys the body: so if the Senate have but some little authority left it, it then rests satisfied and contented; but if it be wholly deprived of all authority, it then turns head upon their head, and falls upon the Prince; and oftentimes becomes the ruine of the City. And even this is one reason, that Octavianus Augustus, after the death of Cæsar, was able to continue in his Empire; because he left to the Senate, part of that...
that authority which Caesar had before abolished; at least had plotted to abolish.

By the examples hitherto brought, I conceive it may be gathered, that these were the true Politicalcauses, why the City of Rome, changed its regall government, to a free State; but because to say but this, would be to confound beginnings with causes; it is necessary to expatiate a little; that so returning backe, I may leave no man incapable of this truth.

We must therefore know, that between a beginning and a cause, there is great difference; not speaking of them either Philosophically, or Theologically; although in each of them, it might easily be shewed. In Theologie; because the Father, is the beginning of the Sonne; and the Father and the Sonne, the beginning of the Holy Ghost; yet neither the Father is cause of the Sonne, nor the Father and Sonne cause of the Holy Ghost, as Thomas Aquinas doth learnedly demonstrate. In Philosophy; seeing Aristotle in his Physicks; and in his books of Generation and Corruption, shews manifest difference, between beginnings and causes. But because Aristotle in distinguishing the, takes the not alwaies in the sense that we take them; and oftentimes also confounds them; as in his Metaphysics; where he shewes that a cause and a beginning, are as Ens and Unam; which are convertible one with the other; and in another place affirms, that all causes are beginnings: and in Divinity likewise the Grecian Fathers mingle oftentimes in the Person of the Trinity, the causes with the beginnings: as Saint Gregory Nazianzen and others; we therefore in this place, will forbear to speak of them, either Philosophically, or Theologically; but will frame our Discourse, by way of actions; shewing into how great errors those men have runne, who confound causes with beginnings; a thing which Tacitus is not guilty of, who in
his History saying; Struæbat jam fortuna in diversa parte terrarum initia causas Imperii; shewes plainly he knew that a cause and a beginning were not both one thing.

We may therefore take causes to be those that are in the understanding; beginnings, those by whose means, that which is in the understanding is put in execution. And so a cause comes to be, the first in the intention; and the last in execution; a beginning, the last in the intention; and the first, in execution.

This, Polybius well understood where he faith, Causa omnibus in rebus prima sunt; Principia vero ultima causarum: quidem ita existimo, Principia dici Primas omnium actiones in rebus quae judicata ac deliberata sunt; causas vero quæ judiciunm deliberationemque precedent. And thereupon excellently well he faith, That the cause of the second warre of the Carthaginians with the Romans, was the indignation of Amilcar Hannibal father: who, though he were not overcome by Land of his enemies the Romans, yet the Carthaginian Forces being put to the worse by them, he thought it his best course to make peace, and to lay downe Armes for the present, reserving in his mind a perpetuall indignation; which encreased afterward by their threatening of warre, at such time as the Carthaginians distracted with other discords, and thereby not able to withstand them, lost Sardinia. Whereupon, Amilcar incensed with a newindignation, had an intention to make warre upon them, many yeeres before Hannibal passed into Italy. These were the causes of the warre: but the beginnings of it were afterward the siege of Saguntum: and Hannibals passing over the River Hiber. So you see, the beginnings were not at the same time; but were long before preceded by the causes.

To returne now to our purpose, concerning the alteration of States: it is seldom seen, that the cause and the beginning happen both at one time. The
The cause that moved Caesar, to change the State in Rome; was an impatience of equality; which being borne and bred with him, was hastened in him, by the threatening of his enemies, pressling him to give over his Consulship, and to give an account of what he had done; a thing of great difficulty and danger in Commonwealths, as was seen in the case of Scipio, of Furio Camillus, and others. But the beginning was his passing over the river Rubicon. So likewise the change which the Israelites made in the time of Samuel, from Judges to Kings; had a beginning diverse from the cause; there being in their hearts sometime before a desire of Kings, through an impatience of liberty, (as writers hold,) which afterward took beginning from the injustice of the sons of Samuel.

The cause then that Rome came to be a free State, was Romulus; and the Citizens growing to perfection. Romulus, because he being sole King, made such lawes and ordinances in the State, that shewed he had more regard to prepare the Romans for liberty, then to establish the Monarchy to his successors: seeing he referred to himselfe no other authority but to assemble the Senat; nor other charge but to command the Army in time of warre. It may be said then, that either Romulus shewed but small signe of wisdom, to make ordinances contrary to himselfe; whereof being afterward aware, he meant with a greater error, to take from the Senat that authority, which being now established, was soone after, the cause of his death. Or we may say, and better, that Romulus as having no children, had no desire to leave Rome under a Regall government; and the City having none in it, but imperfect men, he had no power to leave it a free State; untilly by being governed first by one alone, they should learn to be able of themselves to hold that, which to come to know, they needed first, to be guided by.
by a King, just as swimming masters use to doe; who bear a hand over them they teach, untill such time as they grow able to governe themselves; and then they leave them at their owne liberty. This made Tyberius (as Dion reports) praise Augustus so much: though not without flattery: saying, he had imitated those Physitians, who barring their Patient, the ordering of his own body; they first restore the Body to health, before they allow him the ordering of it. Informed, that after the death of Romulus, the people not yet grown to perfection, there was not one man that once spake of liberty; but all agreed to desire a King. Regem tamen omnes volebant (faith Livy) libertatis dulcedine nundinum experta. It was not thus at the time of the Tarquins; for the people being then grown to perfection, there was in the City good store of Common wealths men; fitter to governe, then to be governed. And so came up this government most agreeable to nature; which is (as the Philosopher faith) that he be commander of others who is wiser then others: And therefore Numa Pompilius needed no guard to safeguard his life; seeing governments that are natural, are a guard to themselves. From hence it was, that our Lord God, the first time he gave a King, (as the holy Scripture faith) Non erat simile in Israel; meaning to shew, that he is not worthy to be ruler over others, who is not wiser then others. There being then in those times; such excellent men in the City of Rome, as ought rather to give them to take lawes from the Tarquines; they had in them, an ardent desire, to obtaine that liberty in possession, which they had now prevented with merit. And therefore it appeares, that Junius Brutus, even from his youth, had this intention: for going with the sonnes of Tarquin to the Oracle, to aske which of them should be Lord of Rome, and the Oracle answering; he that first should kiss his mother.
he presently kissed the Earth; and yet he knew not then, that Tarquin should ravish his wife Lucretia. Now if this injury onely had bee the motive to Brutus, certainly then, as the injury came from a particular person; so the revenge should rather have been taken upon that particular person, then upon the power Regall; and yet we see the contrary happened: for Brutus in the oath which he caus'd his confederates to take, made this one part, not to suffer any to reign; not onely not the Tarquines, but not any other person whatsoever. Nec illos nec alium quemquam regnare Rome passurum. A manifest argument, that he had more desire, to abrogate the regall Power, then to vindicate the adultery. So much more, as the conspirators addressed themselves against the dignity rather then against the life of the offender. The caufe then of this alteration in the state of Rome, was the Citizens spirits being grown to such perfection, that they could no longer tolerate Kings: and this no sooner then they were arrived at such perfection. In signe whereof, I consider amongst so many Kings as Rome had; how onely Tully Ostitius, the predecessor of Tarquinius superbos, had the intention to make it a free state, which certainly had taken effect, if his death had not prevented it. Actum moderatum Imperium, tamen quia Unius esset, deponent eum in animo habuisse, mi scelus liberande patriae consilia agitante interemisset. Which because we cannot atribute to the onely goodnesse of Tullus; seeing Numa Pompilius, a better man perhaps then he, never had any such thought: we must needs say, that Numa seeing the Citizens unfit for a republieke, set them in a way to that perfection, to which arrived under Tullus. It should be an easie matter, for such Citizens to conserve that liberty, which under a good Prince they had received. And here experience shewes that, which Aristotle speaking naturally, knew well in matters politike;
ticke; for assigning the cause, why Power regall changeth oftentimes to a free State, he alledged no other reason, but the passing from imperfection to perfection: saying thus, Sedecum postea contingeret; ut pluribus partibus reperirentur; non amplius toleraret Regem; sed commune quiddam querentes, respublicas constituire.

Moreover, that the ordinances of Romulus had not been sufficient, if without there had not concurred a perfection in the Citizens; will be easily conceived, if we consider the case of Moses who was blamed by Jethro for ruling himself alone: I do not believe it was for that he did not judge well; or for that, he tooke too great paines; but rather, for that he shewed not to be more intensive to strengthen his owne power, then to prepare for others the good way; of which this was the chiefest foundation; Ut non alter ratio constet quam si notus reddatur. And therefore, he appointed them a Senate, which by their authority, might serve to set the people in a way to know their owne good; shewing them the way, with which being once acquainted, he might leave them afterward to walk in it of themselves: in such sort, that Moses no lesse then Romulus directed the Israelites the way to liberty; but they, never attaining to know the way, as never comming (T. speaketh not in matters of Religion) to that perfection, to which the Romans attained: as these could not endure Kings; so those had no will to live in liberty; for although they met with the same cause, extrinsecall; yet they had not the same cause, intrinsicall; which Moses well knew, when perceiving his death to approach; he made his prayer to God, that he would provide them a leader, to the end, that as sheep not knowing the way, if it be not shewed them by the shepheard, they might be by him directed. PROVIDEAT Ramanus Deus spiritum, non vicitatis, homini...
The second Discourse.

...qui sit super multitudinem hanc; ut possit suire & introsiunt eos, vel introducere, ut sit fore oves sine duabus.

And he that will more plainly see their imperfection, let him consider, that in the long absence of Moses, they never demanded any other leader; there being none amongst them fit to govern them: but only desired, that Aaron would make some Gods. Fac est enim Deus quinque precedant. Whereupon for all the many beginnings the Israelites had, from which they might have taken occasion, to erect a Commonwealth; yet they never did it: because as causes be not sufficient, if with them there concurre not beginnings; so beginnings are of no force, if they come not accompanied with causes; and causes avail not neither, if they be not good. The death of Caesar was a beginning from which a Commonwealth might have been erected; but because it was grounded upon a cause that was not political, proceeding rather from the hatred and spleene against the Prince, then upon any mature judgement, or judicious counsel; it was not therefore fit, to bring them to a be free State. So when the Senatours killed Romulus; they had by that a beginning of liberty: but it hapning upon the same occasion, as that of Caesar, they hardly had so much braine to agree among themselves to choose a King. So as when there concurre not causes, beginnings oftentimes are left unpursued; that I cannot but say, if Lucretia had been ravished by Romulus; yet Rome for all that had never gotten liberty. It behoves therefore to take great heed, when there be occasions first, not to give the least cause of a beginning: and therefore the Israelites, being moved to demand a King, upon a very good occasion, namely their unhappiness to suffer liberty by, they resolve for a beginning a most weak: cause, namely the old age of Samuel; and yet for all he could due, in showing them the burdens of tyranny, selling...
them as a Prophet, that instead of a King, they should have a tyrant; he could never perswade them to leave demanding a King. And therefore David, after his great sinne, knowing he had given the people great cause to rebell, avoided all occasions, from which they might take never so weake a beginning; and for this cause forbore to punish Joab, though provoked to it by just indignation; and left the revenge of it, to his successor. Whereupon we may beleive, that Tarquinius Superbus, and his sonne shewed little discretion, seeing so many worthy men desirous of liberty; that they would give them occasion of beginning it: The one by taking away all authority from the Senat; and other, and that more hainously, by ravishing Lucretia: considering that the insolency of the sonnes, makes alwaies the Prince himselfe odious, as Guicciardine relates of John Bentivoglio. And hereof we have a like example in the holy Scripture, of Hemor Hevæus Prince of the Sichemites; who left his Kingdome, thorough the ravishment his sonne Sichem committed upon Dynæ the daughter of Jacob and Lea: whereof the holy text in Genesis saith; Egressa est autem Dynæ filia Leæ ut videret mulieres regionis illius; quam cum vidisset Sichen filius Hemor Hevæi, Princeps terre illius, adas movit eam, & rapuit, & dormivit cum illa; & opprimens virgines: and in the end of the Chapter, Arreptis duo filii Jacob Simeon & Levi, patris Dynæ, gladiis; Ingressi sunt urbem confideuntur: Inter se etique omnibus masculis Emor & Sichen pariter non eaverunt; & depopulati sunt urbem in ulterior sumpserunt. Thus the cause which gave the Romans occasion of a beginning, if we consider it of the sonnes part, may be conceived to be this; that he was the first; that had ancestors in such height of greatness; a thing that commonly puffs up men, and makes them proud; as Galba, said speaking of Nero, Si ante scelus Nero quae longe Caesarum seris turnentem; and therefore
The second Discourse.

The first that arrive to any heighth of greatnesse, they alwaies endeavor to shunne contempt; but their successors, while they give themselves to pleasures, in that very time, they make themselves contemptible; and give occasion to others to oppresse them. Which Aristotle expressly teacheth us, where he faith, *Plerique eorum qui Dominationes adepti sunt, eas usque ad extremum conservaverunt; sed qui ab illis susceperunt, confestim ut ita dixerim, perierunt omnes; in voluptatibus enim viventes efficitur facile contemnedi; ac multas perhibent occasiones opprimendi sui.* This was the very cauſe of altering the Principality of the Acheans (as Polybius relates) for that Principality having had beginning in the vertues of Tifamenes, the fonne of Orestes; it had ending in the vices of the successors of Ligius, Postea vero moleste ferre Regnum exerperunt, quia filii ligii non jam legtime, sed per Tyrannidem Provinciam gubernarent.

And this is so true, as both Aristotle affirmes, and is confirmed by experience; that the first purchasers of a power, doe for the most part maintaine it; and that in their successors it commonly vanishe; that I cannot choose but make a little digression, to shew the reasons of it. The first is, because they who acquire any thing with labour, account and love it as an issue of their owne: and therefore use as much diligence in keeping it, as they tooke paines in getting it; from whence it is, as Plato intimates, that those men are commonly the greatest lovers of riches, who by their owne industry have been the getters: and therefore our Lord God in *Eſay,* promising infinite contentments and exaltations to his people, in giving the reason of this so great happiness; he faith, *Dominabitur sui qui fecit te.* A second reason, and perhaps a better is, because they who first acquire an estate, must needs doe it by way of some eminency; either of subtilety, or wit, or force, or such like; wherein excelling others,
The second Discourse.

they shew themselves in that kind, to be more vertuous then others, as Aristote in the first of his Politicks faith; that to overcome, is not without vertue; and seeing Empires are easily kept by those arts, by which they are acquired, Nam Imperium facile in artibus retinetur, (faith Salus) quibus a principio partum est; it will be an easie matter, for him that hath acquired it, seeing he must necessarily acquire it by way of vertue, by the same way to maintaine it. Whereas his successors very seldom succeed him in vertue; and easily loose that, for the getting whereof, they have taken no paines. A third reason is, because he who riseth first to a power, contents himselfe with every little authority; as Aristote faith, Contigit autem hoc maxime, post mutationes rerum publicarum: Non enim statim mutantur; sed contenti sunt ab initio homines, parva concessio potentiae: Whereupon it ought not to seem strange; but rather it is ascribed to the Prince, for a great favour, that which oftentimes he grants for his owne security; and all that, wherein one hath more power then others, yet arrogates no more to himselfe then others; is received of subjects, as so much given them. Where the successors commonly have more pride and lesse vertue, then their predecessours: and think not themselves Princes, if they raise not their owne authority by deprassing of others; as Hieronymus did in Syracusa; and as Jeroboam when he said, Cessate eos minimis digitus meus, dorso patris mei. And this is so much more disastfull to subjects, to see themselves more restrained by him, that hath lesse worthinesse; that it seemes to invite them to conspiracies; as to the one, and the other of those before mentioned, it happened. A fourth and last reason is, because those men who come newly to a power, are commonly suspiscious of loosing it againe; and therefore doubting their owne children, they are contented to see them plunger...
The second Discourse.

...vices; and estranged from the love of the subjects; whereupon, they coming afterward to the Principality, cannot choose but run a hazard.

But to returne from whence I digressed; the cause why Tarquinius used such cruelty to the Senate, which made them so much desire liberty; was in my opinion, because Ancus Martius was preferred before him; and therupon conceiving great indignation against the Senators & people; & coming afterward to the government; he meant to be revenged upon the with bridling them a little. And such men should never be made Emperours, as from whom there can be nothing expected, but effects of cruelty. An instruction which Cornelius Tacitus gives us; while discoursing of the causes, why the Romans speaking of a successor to Augustus by reason of his approaching death, would not have Agrippa Posthumus, mentions this as the chiefe, Trucem Agrippam & Ignominia accensum: For Tiberius being preferred before him in the lifetime of Augustus; and having suffered banishment in the land of Pianos; he was full of spleene and indignation; which no doubt he would have shewed, if he had ever come to be Emperour. For this very cause also Otho misliked the election which Galba made; and was doubtfull of Piso; Ingenio trucem, & longo exilio efferatum.

The Beginning then of the change of government in Rome, to speake as a Politician, was the lasciviousnesse of Lucius Tarquin; and the pride of his father: but the causes were, the ordinances of Romulus, and the perfection of the Citizens.

But to speake of the causes as a Philosopher; we may assigne two; answerable to that which Aristotle relates to have been the opinion of Plato; one from the influence of the Heavens, the other from numbers. As for the first of these; by reason of the uncertainty of the yeares, and perhaps of the Art, I take not upon
The third Discourse.

upon me, with any probability to discourse; and therefore passing to the other, which is number: Plato faith, that the number of seven, hath great operation in the changes of Commonwealths, which may first be observed in the Commonwealth of our body; wherein from seven to seven there is a continual change; and there want not examples hereof in all kinds of government; as we may see in Esay in Jeromy, in Daniel in Saint Matthew, in the Monarchy of Cain, &c. in so many other places; that we must needs beleev this number to beare a great sware in changes generally, as by others before me hath been observed; yet considering it as to my purpose, it hath not perhaps by any been observed but now by myself, that to the forefaid causes of the change of government in Rome, this of the number of seven may also be added, seeing after seven Kings, (as every one knowes) it came to be a free state; yet I mean not that numbers can enforce, but onely incline, as instruments of that Almighty God, who Omnis posuit in munere, pondere & Mensura.

A Parallell between the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus against Cæsar; and that of Lucius Brutus against Tarquin: whereby we may see why the one brought in libertie; the other, tyranny.

Having shewed Rome at last came to be a free state, by means of the conspiracy of Lucius Brutus against the Tarquines; I conceive it necessary to examine, why the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus against Cæsar, having been moved with the same intention, yet wrought not the same effect; and no better way
The third Discourse.

Way to come to know it, then by comparing them together.

Many things are wont to concurre in favour of an action; whereof some are antecedents, and give it as it were birth; other are concomitant, and give it nourishment; others againe are subseuent, and procure it strength.

The action of Brutus in killing Tarquin, was aided by the three foresaid things, to make Rome a free state: First the ordinances of Romulus, which tended rather to bring in liberty, then to preserve a Monarchy: then the aptnesse of the Cittizens, who now grown fit of themselves to governe, could no longer endure, to be governed by others; and lastly the insolvency and proud tyranny of Tarquin, so extremely distaftfull to all the Citizens. Thus Romulus set them in a way; the perfection of the Cittizens made them fit; and the insolvency of the Tarquines made them desirous. Now if we looke upon the action of Marcus Brutus in killing Cæsar; we shall finde there were all the three caufes too; but because they were contrary, they therefore brought forth a contrary effect. The first was the domination of Cinna, of Sulla, of Pompey and of Marcus Cossins: who set the City in a way, and made it plyant to tolerate Monarchy. The second was the imperfection of the Cittizens, which was growne so great, that where Rome had sometimes been a City much honoured for vertue; it was now become through evill custome, most abominable. Thirdly, there concurred the great clemency and goodness of Cæsar; with which he had gotten and tied unto him the hearts of the people; so as, instead of the ordinances of Romulus, to set them in a way of liberty; there proceeded here the waies of Marius and others, to lead them into servitude. Instead of perfection of the Cittizens, which made them fit to live a free people, there con-
concourred here imperfection, which made them good
for nothing but to live in bondage; and where in the
one there concourred the cruelty and Pride of the Tar-
quines, to make them desitie liberty; in the other, there
concourred the affability and clemency of Cæsar, to
make them content with servitude.

Now againe if we come to speake of the causes con-
comitant, there were three things concourred in ayd
of the conspiracy against the Tarquins. First, the rav-
ishing of Lucretia; sufficient of it selfe, as a publique
injury, to cause a publique insurrection. And there-
fore Virginins speaking against Appius Claudius, who
would have ravished his daughter, said to the people,
with a purpose to set them in commotion; *Illis enim
quaque filiae, foroxes, conjugese; sed quo impositions; et, eo
offraturum fore, aliquae colantium datum datum illis
cavende, similis injurie. Secondly, the just indignation
of Lucius Brutus against Tarquinius. Thirdly, his ac-
quainting the people with his intention: letting them
know the causes that moved him; and so, they having
a part in the conspiracy, could not choose but ap-
prove it; and having a part in the danger, not choo-
se but maintaine it. Thus the adultery committed with
Lucretia, gave a color to the conspiracy; the just indigna-
tion of Lucius Brutus, set a gloss upon the Author;
the communicating it to the people, made them a
party in the cause, and facilitated the action. Now in
the fact of Marcus Brutus against Cæsar, there concour-
ced the many favours and graces which the Prince had
alwaies shewed to all; the many benefits which Marcus
Brutus had received, the murder committed in the Se-
ate, without the peoples knowledge; and where
the ravishing of Lucretia, gave a color to the banish-
ing of the Tarquins; the favor of Cæsar discovered
the ill intention of the conspirators; and where in the
one, the offence done to Lucius Brutus, set a gloss of
praise.
praise upon the author: in the other, the benefits bestowed by Caesar, set a blot of ignominy upon Marcus Brutus, and made him hatefull to all the people: and where the Commons being made partakers of the conspiracy against the Tarquins, conceived it was done for the publicke good; here the Commons knowing nothing of the matter, conceived it was done for private profit. Lastly, if we looke to the things subsequent; we shall also in them finde great contrariety. For after the death of the Tarquins, first, there followed an easing the people of taxations; and a maintaining them in plenty, to the end they might taste the benefit of liberty; secondly, they put to death those Noblemen, that had been adherents to the Tarquins; to the end they might be made sure for making innovation. Thirdly, they extinguished the whole race of the Tarquins, to the end they might be out of feare, of the States ever comming to any of them againe. And thus they secured themselves from the people, from the Nobility, and from the blood Royall. Now after the death of Caesar, all things were cleane contrary: First, where in that case, the benefit of liberty was made appeare to the people: Here Antonius with a most eloquent Oration, reading Caesar's Will, wherein he had given a great Donative to the people; made them sensible, how much more it would be for their profit to have a Prince. Secondly, where in that case, the partakers were all put to death; here, they were all left living. Thirdly, where in that case, there were Armies levied against the line of the Tarquins; to the end, they might never be able to recover the government: here, Armies were levied in ayd of Augustus, to the end, he might more easilly make himselfe Prince. Let no man therefore marvell, if where the intention was equall, yet the success was not equall; by reason of the difference, and inequality
The fourth Discourse.

I have omitted in this discourse some other differences, that were between these two conspiracies; meaning to speake of them in another place.

Pompeii Cralisique Potentia cito in Cælarem, Lepidi atque Antoniara in Augustum celfere.

That the power of a few cannot consist in any number better then in three.

The fourth Discourse.

The Common-wealth of Rome, leaving the government of one, and passing by the number of two, where it stayed a while under Marius and Sylla; settled at last in the number of three: the first time under Cæsar, Crassus, and Pompey; the second time, under Anthony, Lepidus and Augustus. Which how much better it was, then to have stayed in two; everyone may know, that will but consider, either Philosophically, or Theologically, or Politically, what great force there is in the number of three, for the conservation and union of things. Indeed Aristotle had no better way to shew the necessity of the Materia Prima, then this; seeing there being a forme and a privation which are two; it was never possible they should be united together, but in a third: in which, and by which they might be conjoincd. Also the school of Tho·phrasius, contented not it selfe, to deliver for Principles, Radicall moysture, and Naturall heate; knowing, that two alone are destructive; but he added a third: that is, salt and cold, and dry: to the end, that with cold he might associate Radicall moysture; and
with the dry, Natural heat; and consequently make a perfect union of the three, that is Salt, Sulphur, and Mercury. It is therefore no marvell, if Divines also make a Trinity in the Deity, not only a Father and a Sonne, but also a Holy Ghost: who (as many of them say) unites the Father with the Sonne; and it is very convenient, that from that Essence which is one, there should come three, a child of unity. Againe, if we examine it Politically why three should be conservative; we shall finde it manifest of it selfe; because if one of the three should aspire to be sole Prince; presently the other two would joyn and oppose, and utterly frustrate his designe. And if two of the three should grow at variance, the third would either by interposing reconcile them; or standing neuter, as onely a looker on, they would grow friends of themselves; for feare lest the other should reap the benefit of their victory. And therefore Aristotle found fault with Plato for making a Commonwealth to consist of only Prince and People, and consequently of only two forms: saying it had been much better, to have made it to consist of three; which yet to many seems a Paradox; because as multiplying of good, makes a more good; so multiplying of evil, makes always a more evil. And why then would he rather have three corruptitions then two? for no other cause as I conceive, but that he would plainly shew he knew the number of three to be conservative; and the number of two, destructive; there being nothing that more ruines Cities, then to be divided into two without a third; as Aristotle in many places shews, and praising that City for the best, which is full of middling sorts of men; for no other cause, but because there are in it the three; that is, rich, poore, and of a middling rauke; and shews that where these are not, it is impossible a City should continue. To come then to a Monarchy, it was of necessity,
cefsity, that the number of three should be destroyed; and to destroy three. It was of necessity, either by en-
creasing it to bring it to three; or by abluting it; so to bring it to two; just as the apostate Læsfer, would have done to divide and destroy the heavenly Monar-
chy: when leaving the circumference founded upon the divine Center, he framed another higher Circle founded upon the center of himselfe, bringing the one to two; which because it could not continue, he was therefore cast into Hell: where seeking again to destroy the Divine Monarchy, by bringing it to two, he persuaded Eve to eat the forbidden fruit. We may say then, that as long as the number of three stood firm in Caesius, Caesar, and Pompey, so long the government came not to be a Monarchy; but as soon as Caesius died, and that the number came from three to two, there presently grew dissenion between Cesai and Pompey, till Caesar at last made himself sole Emperor. Likewise in the Triumvirate of Augustus, none of them was so hardy as once to sithe: but Lepidas being gone out of the three, there fell discord between Mark Anthony and Augustus; who by the death of the other, remained sole Emperor. It is therefore no marvell that the Jews, seeing the government of Judges was to come to two, under the sons of Samuel, demanded a King; considering that two and four which proceeds from the same root; to aslead a child of the devil; then three and one which is the root of it, is the child of God. And therefore: God blessed not the second day; and in the creation, the Holy Ghost by the mouth of Moses, makes mention of three things; the Heaven, the Earth, and the waters. Which perhaps moved Plato in his Timæus, to make three Elements, three and one being union; two and four, dis-union.
The fifth Discourse.

Cuncta Discordiis civilibus seffa, nomine Principis subimperium accepit.

Of what kind of Discord the Author intends to speake.

The fifth Discourse:

Being by occasion of this passage, of necessity to speake of discords; and oftentimes to commend them, though with some distinction: I cannot omit to explain my meaning; which is, that where I affirm, discords fit to be fomented; I mean always amongst the enemies of the Christian faith; amongst whom discords are of such benefit, that the Prophet Abacuck in express terms saith: Fluvios sondes terra; which S. Hierome expounding saith, Reges terrae adversum populum tuum dimicantes dividies & disperses. For in holy Scripture, by Rivers oftentimes are meant Kings: because as rivers watering the fields in fit time and place, make them fruitful; or otherwise with unmeasurable overflowing, destroy them: so Kings with the sweetness of justice, increase; or otherwise, with unmeasurable cruelty, overthrow the Kingdom. The Prophet therefore desires, that the Princes of the Earth may be divided, meaning such Princes, as make a God of earthly things; to the end, that by such division, they may more easily be overthrown: there being nothing more hurtfull, not only to the good, but even to the wicked themselves, then the concord of the wicked. As S. Austin declares it, where he saith, Sicut multum nocet discordia inter bonos; ita valida dolendum est, quando mali pacifice vivunt; quando vero discordant, tune mundus aliquae temp. tranquillatur: Non igitur concordia malorum contraea est concordiae bonorum;
From these words it may be clearly gathered, that it is as great a good to put discord between the wicked, as to preserve union between the good: and therefore Abraham in his Sacrifice, divided the Goat and the Ram, but the Turtle-dove and the Pigeon he divided not: of which Saint Austin speaking faith; that by this, the Holy Ghost would intimate, that carnall men should be divided between themselves: but good and spiritual men should be kept in unity: of whom the Prophet Esay speaking, after he had said, *Et fluent ad eum omnes gentes* he addes, *Non exercetisur ultra ad prelium:* as if he would say, that between the good, there shall be alwaies peace. And therefore the Dove returning into the Arke, brought in her mouth an Olive branch; to shew, that the peace between good men ought to be perpetuall: as the leaves of the Olive which are never dry; or as the Oyle which gets by time, not leffe perfection, but more purity. Let peace therefore be kept amongst the good, and let discord be raised amongst the wicked; imitating the discretion of Phystions, who divide and cut off corrupt members: but preserve and keep united, the found. Whereupon our Lord God in S. Matthew, hath left written: *Non veni mittere pacem, sed gladium:* which place S. Chrysostome expounding, faith: *Quia videlicet precipua singularisque Pax turca prestatur:* quando quod tabo vel sanie corruptum est absconditur, atque projectur, quando faetosa & improba pars repellitur aut omnino defruitur: sic corte celsius terra conjungi potest. Nam & medicus hoc mordoriam corpus conservat facile: si quod reducit ad sanitatem non potest, ceciderit atque abjecerit, & militia Dux ad solvendam militiam conspirationem, alterum in alterum vincitat. So did God in the Tower of Babel: So did S. Paul in the conspiracy.
The fixth Diſcourſe.

piracy plotted against him; and this may suffice for declaration of my meaning.

Now as to our purpose; seeing discords may be divided into internall, & externall: Internall, between Citizens of the same City; External, between one City & another; because it is a subject no lesse large then difficult; I will divide it into foure discourses: In the first, I wil handle whether an external war with the enemies of the Christian faith, be the best meanes to hinder internall discords amongst Christians. In the second, in what manner, and at what time discords should be raised with the enemies of our faith, for our most advantage. The third shall shew, what discords they are, that serve to uphold the formes of states. In the last I will shew, that by reason of our imperfection, there is necessary a certain discord which may be called a Concord.

Whether an externall warre with the enemies of the faith, be the best meanes to hinder internall discords among Christians.

The fixth Diſcourſe.

Aristotle in his Politicks seemes to thinke, that fear may be a great meanes to uphold Commonwealths; where he faith, "Conſervantur autem Respublicae non solum ex eo, quia procul sunt a periculis, sed etiam interdum, quia propinquae sunt; homines enim formidantes, vigilantius intendunt ad reipublicae custodiam. Itaque oportet eam, qui reipublicam saluam esse volunt, formidines quasi dam quàse noceant neque dispersant, quàsi nocturnam quandam custodi- diam reipublicae observationem. Whereupon, many are perswaded, that a farreame warre is the onely meanes to maintaine peace at home. And Sallust having an eye to this, faith, "Mens hostilia in bonis artibus civitatem re-
And the Romans as long as they had Carthage for an opposite, were free all that while from civil war; and therefore Scipio Nasica, accounted the wisest man of his time, and such chosen by the City, to have the keeping of the Mother of the Gods in his house; as the Oracle had commanded; gave counsel that by no means Carthage should be destroyed, Timens infirmam animam (faith S. Auffin) hossten securitatem: & tanquam pupillis pueribus, tutoeum necessarium videns esse Terorem: and in a manner, with the same words hath Livy intimated the same conceit, Disciplina est custos infirmitatis, qua inter validiores optime Timor continet. And therefore the Athenians (as Plato relates) never attained to greater perfection, than when the Persians assailed Greece. But yet this Rule, as many other in the Politicks, though it be sometimes good; yet is not to be trusted always and in general; for a Politician in this case must doe as a Physician: apply to one complexion one medicine; and to another, a divers; and oftentimes to the same Patient, in diversities of diseases, diversities of medicines: and more then this, to the same Patient in the same disease, apply diverse medicines according to diversity of times. And therefore Vindiciarius the Physician (as S. Austin relates) having given a medicine to a sick friend of his, at that time it healed him; but after some yeares the same man falling again into the same disease, and using, without further counsel of his Physician, the former medicine, it did him no good; whereat marvelling and asking Vindiciarius the cause, he answered, Quod non intellexerat avidevit ills est: jam non huius se suffisse, suhervent: and the reason is, because we must not so much consider, that the person which useth the medicine is the same; as that the time is diverse: and if the diversity of time be of so great moment; of what moment is the diversity of individuals? We may therefore conclude with Aristotle in many
The sixth Discourse.

many places of his Ethicks; that in things belonging to particulars, there cannot be given any Rule universal.

I will therefore distinguish men, and consequently Cities; seeing Cities are nothing else, but a communion of men assembled together to live well, as the Philosopher defines them: afterward, I will divide the times: and lastly, the forms of states.

Of men, some are quiet, some turbulent, some addicted to Merchandize, some to study: so of Cities, whether by any power of the Ayre, or of the influence of the starres, some one is full of sharpe wits, fit for merchandizing; others of stout spirits, fit for Armes: some have ordinances which lead them in a way of peace; others, of warre: sometimes they are both by nature and art of so strong a situation, that in regard of their difficulty to be assaulted, they are altogether careless of Military profession.

In this last case, it will be an easie matter to maintain peace at home, to which they are either called by nature, or aided by art; and especially if the inhabitants shall give themselves to such exercises, which keepe men from dissentions. But if the Citizens be of stout natures and imperfect, (I mean not in essence; for I well know by divinity, that every creature, in its essence is perfect,) it will then be necessary there should be feare: and this S. Austin meant when he said, Infirma animis hostem securitatem: and there is good reason for it; for if they feare to be overcome of an Enemy, they will strive to overcome their own will; and take for a matter, the feare of vertue. And therefore our Lord God, when he gave Josua the Land of Promise; as he had promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: yet he destroyed not all enemies, but left a part of the Land in the power of the Philistines: and others, mentioned in the Booke of Josua; and this he did, as knowing
knowing that the Imperfection of that people, whom the Holy Ghost by the mouth of Moses, calle Geneathora servita, could not better be upheld and kept, then by the fear of enemies. And this the Holy Ghost expressed likewise in the book of Judges; where speaking of those Nations which remained in the Land of Promise, he faith, He surn Genes, que eredituit Dominum up erudire in eis Israelam. It is therefore no marvel, that our Lord God, knowing the weakness of Adam, as soon as he saw him fall into the imperfection of sin; to the end he should not commit the like error again, presently put him in the midst of discords and enmities, when he said to the serpent, Inimicitias posuerit inter se & adversas, & sannum similes & sannae illius: and for this cause it is, that he hath left to the Catholique Church so great adversaries, as himself expresseth in S. Matthew; In signe whereof, he would not suffer the servants to pull up the Tares, but would have them to be let to grow with the Corne; least plucking up the one, they should with all root out the other. Now for those Cities, where the Citizens are given to merchandise, they by all means ought to shun warre, as being things of very different nature, to stand in the shadow writing Bills of account; and to endure heat and cold, fighting in the field; as S. Thomas teacheth us where he faith, Est atque Negotiatione non conflustatur quantum immersum exercitio Militaris; Negotiatoris anima cum ingram colunt, a laboribus viscerem; & dum francum delitius, mollescunt animo; & corpora redempturus debitis ad laborem Militares inepta.

But if Cities be formed with Lawes, that they have better meanes to make resistance in warre, then to conserve themselves in Peace; in this case, it will be necessary to have warre with forraine Nations; to maintain Peace in their own Nation; otherwise it will run as a manifest hazzard, to be ruined, as it happened...
pened to the Laecademonians, of whom Aristotel faith. 
Ad partem enim virtutis; iota ordinatio illarum legum contenda, scilicet Bellicam; hac antem milit ad victoriam consequendam; itaque sube erant bellum gerentes; peribatur vero, verum potitus; quoniam nec othin agere, nec unaquam aliquod exterore seiebat præhabilis, quam rem Militarem. 

And therefore the City of Rome which was formed by Laws and Ordinances, to enlarge itself, and grow greater by warre; no sooner laid down Armes with Enemies, but it tooke them up with friends; that having none at last with whom to contend, it contended with itselfe; and became overthrown by its own forces. And therefore Livy faith, Nulla magna civitas digna scire poetae, si foris homen non habet, domi inventos praelaude corpora ab externis causis tanta videntur, sed his ipsa viribus omniarum. But if they have Laws and Ordinances to live in peace, their best course is to hold them to peace.

The second division we brought before, was of times; which may be divided into two: One, wherein warre hath been but of late; the other, where in peace hath been long: If peace hath been long, why should we take any other course, and not continue peace still? But if our case be the former, it will then be necessary to mainaine at least some face of warre; because as all habits whether of body or mind, are hard to be left; so spirits once grown fierce with warre, when they want means to exercise their fierceness upon enemies with honour, will hardly be kept from using it upon friends though with shame. Thus it fell out (that I may keep me to Tacitus) amongst the Suevi, the Cheruscis, people of Germany; who after the departure of the Romans, being secure from foreign enemies, they then, out of the custome of waging warre, and desire of glory, turned their Armes upon their friends at home; and therefore Tacitus faith, Sed
The sixth Discourse.

Suci praeludebantur auxilium adversus Cheruscos oran-
ter; nam dicitur Romanorum, ac suoci externa mem, gens
adjudicun, & suaemulatione Glorie, arma in se werte-
quant. So the Romans most stout and warlike from the
time of Scipio Nasica until the birth of our Saviour,
being in a manner quiet abroad, were in continual
warre at home; and the peace which they came to at
last was under a Prince; whereas Tacitus faith, Pax
quidem, sed euncta: because it was under Au-
gustus, who finding the City tyred with discords, made
himselfe sole Lord; whereupon S. Austin speaking of
these times faith, Eaque libido dominandi que inter alia
vidit, genus, humanis inmoderatior inrerat Populo Romano
postquam in pacis potioribus virtus, obtitos fatigatofque
et eros eiam, etiam secutius oppressit. And this of may be
rendered many causes: the first is, because in Cities used
long to warre, the people, at least great part having
no other occupation, give themselves to be soldiers;
and if they faile of that employment, they must neces-
arily either sterve for want of victuals, or else stirre up
discards and seditions; that so under one side or oth-
er, they may get a living. Et ex civili prælio (faith
Tacitus) Spem majorum præteriorum. Not being possible,
that soldiers accustomed to gaine by warre, should
be content with peace, as Dion excellently observed
in Caesar; and therefore Livy faith, Mercenarii militis
preia militiae Caesaris in Paces, agit ferchau. Whereupon
Salomon, seeing that the greater part of his people hav-
ing in David's time been accustomed to continual
warre, and had not any other trade of living, would
of necessity be forced to die for hunger: he therefore
though now in peace, would not disband them, but
kept them still in Armes; as it is written in the Booke
of the Kings: knowing there is nothing, that sooner
makes men Rebell, then to have their Trade taken
from them, by which they gaine their living: and
The sixth Discourse.

therefore when S. Paul spake of destroying the Temple of Diana in Ephesus; those Silver-smithes who lived by making such Images, presently rose up in Armes, and were ready to have killed him. So also it was, when S. Paul heaved the woman possessed; because Magnum questum faciebat Domino suo: from hence it is; that it will alwaies be impossible to break the Uffocchi, from using pyracy; seeing they have no other trade, by which to live. The second caufe may be taken from the Nobility; who will easily be moved to raife discords in time of peace; by reason of a habit, which as it is produced by many Acts iterated, so it necessarily produceth iterated acts, and also by reason of that desire of greatnesse, which alwaies accompanies the Nobility; and againe, by reason of the skorn it takes at equality, and much more at servitude: which is so much harder to be endured, as superiours, in peace are harder to be dealt with. Revocante Nobilitate (faith Tacitus) cur in pace durius servitium?

Having now divided Cities and Times; it remaines, that we divide the formes of States: which as to our purpose are of three sorts; Monarchy, Optimacy, and Popular. The Common-wealth of the Optimates, either hath under it many Cities and Kingdomes, as Rome and Carthage had; and at this day, Venice hath; or they have but some few Cities, as the Athenians, the Spartans and others: or lastly, they have but only one City; as Pisa in times past: and Lucca, and many free Cities at this present. The first forme of Common-wealth, which is that which hath Kingdomes under it; either it useth to wage warre with its own Armes, as the Romans; or with forraine Armes, as the Carthaginians: if it use and be able to wage warre with its own Forces, then either we speake of warre farre off, as of the Romans with the Carthaginians; or of warre in their own state, as of the Romans with the Thul-
can. If the case be of warre farre off, waged with their own Forces, this will be the Treacle of civil discord. First, because those that are likely to move them, may under colour of honours, be sent to the warres abroad; and spirits that are warlike, are willing enough of themselves to goe where there is fighting, though without any such colour. Thus it was with the Romans, (as Livy relates) who sending forth the hottest spirits of their youth to the warres abroad, they in the mean time remained quiet in Roma. Consules equitiæ ex urbè juvenite, tranquilliorem cæteram turbam fecerunt. And even by this way, not onely all feare of civil discord will be take away; which onely proceeds from unquiet spirits; but also all suspicion of any rebellion in the subject Cities: as well because they will be weaken both in men and money, by levying Auxiliary fouldiers: as also because they will be kept in aw by an Army in the field. But it must be here observed, that they make not then too dangerous a warre, where their whole Forces must be employed, for then the subject people will be apt to rebell; as the Tuscanes, who seeing the Romans busied in a warre with their whole Forces, they then fell to rebell.

Now if we speake of a warre neere home, either it is some flight warre, or else some warre of moment. If but a flight warre, it ought to be nourished with all endeavour; as the Romans did with the Genouese, making use of that warre, as of a Military schoole; but if it be a warre of moment, and neere the State, it ought to be avoyded by all means possible. The reason is, because the Cities that are subject to a Common-wealth, doe all with an ill will beare their yoak: in confirmation whereof, Tacitus faith, Neque Provinciæ illum rerum statum abnuebant. As long as Hanniball made his warre farre off from Rome, although he obtained many victories, yet not so much as any one Castle; (as Polybius...
Polybius relates, rebelled against Rome: but when he got his victory, at Trasimeene, and by consequence, not farre from Rome, all at once rebelled: and yet for all the overthrows they had had in Sicily, in the same Land, and at Sea, they never made the least signe of revolt: The like happened to the Venetians, after the overthrow they received at Geradada. It is therefore no marvell, that Agathocles being besieged in Syracuse, and not able to endure the siege; when by reason of his tyranny everyone rebelled against him: No marvell I say, that not able to endure the warre in his own state, he removed it to the Carthaginians in Africa: as knowing, that Cities subject to Commonwealths, doe with an evil will endure their yoke; and his enterprise tooke effect as he desired. These Commonwealths therefore, by all means possible ought to shun a warre, neere home.

But where the custome is to wage warre with forrainte Armes, there all kind of warre, whether neere home, or farre off, is to be shunned. Because mercenary Armes are inftable, licentious, and for the most part, either they never finish a warre; or once finished, they cannot be gotten away againe, without destroying and making spoile in the Countrey. Or else with mutinies put the Cities in danger. It was a good invention, which Glisco Generall of the Carthaginian Army in Africa used; after the warre was ended, with the Romans; for knowing the ill condition of a mercenary Army, he thought to send the souldiers home; so Carthage, by little and little: in such sort, that the first might be gotten home to their own houses, before the others should recover the City: a judicious conceit, but which seldom takes effect, because oftentimes the souldiers perceive it, and will not be divided; as it happened with the Switzers in times past: and sometimes, though they be divided; yet it hath no good
issue: as it happened to the Carthaginians, whose Cities all at once rebelled; and Carthage it selfe was not farre from loosing. And in truth, they then perceived, how dangerous a thing it is, to wage warre with mercenary forces; whereupon for this cause, when Scipio afterward came into Africk; they knowing themselves to be no matches for the Romans, to be able to wage warre at their owne home, \textit{Sam plebem imbellem in urbe (faith Livy) Imbellem in agris esse, mercede parari auxilia}. These Commonwealths therefore ought rather to keep themselves from discord, by employing their Cittizens in merchandising, in governments and Offices, and by not suffering the quiet spirits to grow turbulent, nor the turbulent to stay in Cities, where the people ought to be kept without Armes: Imitating herein, the Carthaginians rather then the Romans.

Now if we come to speake of those Commonwealths, that have but few, or but one City under them; in this case they ought by all possible means to seek to preserve peace, as the Switzers, the Lucchesi, and such others do, being very obnoxious for such, to become a prey to the more potent, as it hath alwaies happened to the Athenians, to the Lacedemonians, and the Genouesefi. From hence it is, that the King of France, to preserve the Commonwealth of the Switzers, hath alwaies procured to quench that fire, which some have endeavoured to kindle for their ruine. And if any object, that the Commonwealth of Rome, when it was yet but little, not only maintained it selfe, but grew greater by the means of warre; I answer, that in that time the States in Italy were not great, as now they are; and from hence may be drawn a reason, why the Athenians, and the Lacedemonians were never able to get further then their first bounds, without endangering their state; and Rome was able to make it
The fixth Discourse.

it selfe Lord of a great part of the World; and it is, because the one were environed with two mighty adver-

taries; the other, with many, but weake ones.

Lastly, to give a generall rule; all those Common-

wealths whose ordinances tend rather to conserva-

tion then augmentation; ought to use any other means
to keep themselves from discords at home; rather then

warre.

It remaines to speak of a Kingdome, which is either

settled and naturall; or else dangerous and new: if we

speake of that which is naturall, I account that to live

in peace as well abroad as at home, is both necessary

and easie, especially in our times, wherein Cities and

Kingdomes are without the least blemish of tyranny,

all governed by Princes just and pious: and this the

rather ought to be done, because in peace, the wits of

men are cultivated; their manners refined, good Arts

flourish, merchandising is lesse dangerous, and plenty

of all things easilie maintained. And therefore in *Esay

it is said, Conflabunt gladios suis in vomeribus; which means

nothing else, but that peace causeth the earth to be

manured, and riches easilie to be encreased. Where-

upon the Ancients sayned, that the God of riches was

nursed by peace.

Now to Kingdomes that are new, and not well set-

led, every thing is dangerous, whether it be of peace

or warre; but warre, perhaps lesse; as bringing with it

but one danger: which is, that the Army being in the

hand of a Generall, the Empire seemes to be in his

power. As *Tiberius doubted, that *Germanicus potius

vellet accipere quam expectare Imperium. But then it

brings with it many benefits, not only in favour of the

Prince, but of the subjects also. On the Princes behalfe,
because he by sending forth to the warres, the most

potent and stout spirits, may himselfe in the meane
time remaine secure at home. And therefore King

Ferdinand
Ferdinand kept always some little warre abroad, to the end the Nobility should not mutiny in Spaine. And Henry the second had counsell given him to keep the French busyed in some warre, to the end they might not mutiny in France. And this rule ought always to be observed, where the people have not lost their stoutnesse of courage. On the Subjects behalf, because while such stout spirits live in peace; they are apt to seeke, as having no other meanes, their owne security, by the death of the Citizens. And this Tacitus meanes, where in the first of his Histories he saith, Sub Tyberio & Caio & Claudio tanti num pauci adversa perimum. Againe, it is well that cruel men, such as tyrants use to be, to the end they may leave the Citizens in peace, should have warre with strangers abroad, upon whom to wracke their cruelty. From whence it comes, that this race of men is more cruel in their age, then in their youth: and therefore oftentimes in the holy Scripture are likened to Lyons; which, as Aristotle relates, in their old age enter into Cities and make spoile of people: and this proceeds (saith he) because thorough weaknesse of body, and defect of teeth, not being able in the fields to follow the chase after beasts; they enter into Cities, and prey upon men: so tyrants, when weakened with age, they can no longer quench their thirst of blood upon enemies in warre: they then for exercise of their cruelty fall upon their friends in peace. So did Herod the great, and many others, of whom Histories are full.

But to returne to our purpose: peace after warre is much more dangerous; because leisure gives time to think, thinking takes notice of subjection; and stoutnesse gotten in warre, breeds a desire to free themselves by any bad way whatsoever. In regard of this, Salomon comming to be in Peace, after a long warre with his father had, made many warlike expeditions as
appears in the Book of Kings: and to this it seems David exhorts, where in the Epithalamium he made, he faith, Accingere gladio tuo super somnum potentiissime. Where it is to be noted, that Fæmur oftentimes is taken for pleasures: as though he would say, Couple Arms with pleasures; stand not slumbering in idleness; so many writers interpret it: and perhaps in regard of this, Augustus would never be without some little warre in Germany; rather for these reasons, quam cupidine proferendi. Imperiuum vel istud ob premium. And Tyberius upon the same ground, was well pleased that troubles should rise in the Eastern parts; Ceterum, faith Tacitus, Tyberio haud ingratum accident; turbari res orientis; ut in specie Germanicum, suetis legionibus abstraheret; novis signis Provinciis impositum, dolo simul et casibus objectaret.

Lastly, a Popular State ought alwaies to procure peace; for if there be warre, either the people goe forth to fight; and then the Nobles in the mean time, will have meanes to change the state; or else the Noble men goe, and then having an Army in their hand, they are able to make alterations at their pleasure. Whereupon Isocrates in his oration of peace faith, that a popular state is strengthened by peace, and by warre, ruined.

But having shewed in this my discourse, that to many Common-wealths it is not good to have warre: to the end I may not dissent from that place in Aristotle alleged in the beginning, I now say, that Aristotle commends not feare as a thing fit alwaies, but sometimes; and doth not specify what kind of feare it is he meanes. For understanding whereof, we must know, that Commonwealths oftentimes are endangered by too much security: as the City of Rome ranne headlong into hazard, for want of fearing. Which useth to happen from two occasions: one from the inveterate-
The fixt Diſcourſe: 43

necfe of the danger: the other, from the greatneffe
and power of them that are offended Rome at the time
when it was freed from the tyrannies of Tarquinius was
not great; and being neceſs to danger, it stood in
feare; being grown fùpicious partly for the fathers
name called Superbus; and partly for the founes House
built higher then ordinary (weal canes God knows;) But when the City was growne into greatneſs, and
forgot the danger by reafon of inveterate enmity; then
left feare, and afforded fuch beginnings, that gave
Cesar advantage, to bring it in subjection; So the Flo-
rentines extinguished the name of liberty in 523, and
ufed great diligence at the beginning to prevent re-
bellion; as standing in feare, as well for the freshneffe
of the offence, as for the smallneffe of their Forces: but
after fome yeeres, Florence being grown greatere, and
the offence through time forgotten, they began to
leave feare; and as not fearing rebelled under Charles
the eighth, which was in a manner the ruine of Florence.

Seeing then when Cities are without feare, they live
without fore-fight: it is profitable for Common-
wealths (as Arifotle in that text faith) that fome fuch
accident fhould happen, as may teach them the danger
of security: and therefore the Rachiensfr (as Polybius
relates) while they lived, Indifcriminately, ifpeeting
nothing; they were upon the point of loyling their
City to the Slavonians; but having repelled them; it
was afterward a great good unto them, as that which
made them f tand in feare: Ut per is tllum in hic n e
periculo fuerant & urbem Patrios lures & prudentiam
fortitudinem nihil male perpeffe, in postern prudence
fui, relinquiturorum. And in truth, if we consider the ac-
cident which of late yeares happened to Venice, the
prudence with which those Senatours managed that
diforder, and the good ordinances made for preven-
ting the like hereafter: we cannot but fay with Aris-
fole.
The sixth Discourse.

that the accident proved to the City of Venice, of great benefit. Lastly, I conclude, that they who will not be in warre actually; at least let them make a shew to be in it potentially; 

Ostendite modo bellum & pacem habeatis; videant vos paratos ad vim, jus ipsi remittent: and therefore Augustus was never without an Army, upon the frontiers of enemy Nations; and Salomon also did the like.

Thus it stands sufficiently proved, when externall discords, or to say better, forraigne warrs are profitable: that is, speaking of men and Cities, if they be turbulent and imperfect, and have laws tending to warre; to such, they are profitable, or rather necessary. But if their lawes be tending to peace; or if the people be mild and gentle, and by reason of their strong situation, accustomed to peace, or merchandising; in this case, there is no inconvenience, but they may live quietly and without warre. Then as concerning times, we have shewed, that in times when warre hath been lately, it will doe well; but not so, when there hath been long peace. Then as concerning states we have proved that Common-wealths that are potent, and able to wage warre with their own Forces, shall doe well to maintaine a warre farre off, but not neere home. But if they be not able to wage warre without forraigne Forces, they shall then do well to embroyle themselves with no warre at all, either neere or farre off. And as for Commonwealths, that are but petty ones and of small power; it is best for them, to looke to their own safety. Then for Kingdomes that are well settled, we have liked well of peace: for them that are dangerous, of warre. Lastly, that a popular state take care how to live.
Thefeventh Diſcourſe.

What is the fairest tyme to proceed in the discords with enemies of the faith.

Thefeventh Diſcourſe:

His sentence of Tacitus standing good, Conſilia diſcordis civilibus fessa, nomine Principis sub Imperium acceptit: many grew to beleéeve, that because discords made the way easie for Augustus to make himſelfe Emperor of Rome, therefore every one may easily make advantage of the diſſentions of others. But because they neither consider the diversity of perſons, nor diſtinguish the tymes, nor are acquainted with the causes: they therefore oftentimes deceive themselves, determining these things absolutely and in grosse, which are not to be admitted but with diſtinction. To find out therefore the truth in this matter, indeed weighty and worthy of consideration, I say, that discords may be either internall between Citizens, or externall between Cities of one Province: if between Citizens, then sometimes they are between Nobles and Nobles, oftentimes between Nobles and Plebeians, and many times between Plebeians and Plebeians. If they be between Cities, it happeneth that sometimes they be equall, sometimes unequall; likewife he that aspires to be a Lord, either is a stranger, or Citizen: if a stranger, either he is stronger then the others, or weaker; and either he hath intelligence, or hath none: if a Citizen, either he is chieſe of a faction, or not.

These heads I shall endeavour to examine; begining with the stranger; who by civill discords aspires to make himſelfe Lord; understanding by civill discords, not those only which are between Citizens of the fame City, but between divers Cities of the fame Province.
Province, as *Plato* understands them, where he faith, that if Græcians contended with Græcians, it was a sedition, and not a warre; shewing plainly, that such a one ought to be called a civil discord.

I say then, (to returne to my purpose) that such stranger, either hath intelligence with one part of the Citizens, or he hath not; if he have intelligence, then is the time: so did *Germanicus*, when he assaulted the *Catti*, a people in Germany; *Nam spes inceperat dissidere hostem in Segestein, et Arminium*: whereupon, having Segeste on his side, it was an easie matter to prosper in his enterprise, and of such cases Histories are full.

But if this stranger have no intelligence, either it is in the beginning of the discords, or when they are inveterate: and thereby one or other of the sides, wasted and spent; if it be the beginning, it will do no hurt, but good: so it happened to the Tuscaus, and the Veientanes; so to the Athenians, while *Agis* approached their walls; so to the Sabines, and the Preneftines against the Romans. Of whom *Livy* faith, *Nam in spe ventum erat, discordia intestina Rem Romanam dissolvipotse*. But in truth it was but ill advised of them; and in such a manner, as while they sought the death of the sick Roman state; they applied a medicine that restored it to health. Whereupon *Livy* inferres, *Sed externus Timor maximum concordiae vinculum, quamvis insessos suspexitque jungbat inter se animos*. And therefore *Aristotle* faith, *Cogit enim in unum communis metus; stiam eos qui primum erant inimiciissimi*. And this will the rather happen, if they be enemies naturally; either through long warres between them; or else through diversitie of Ayre; which consequently produceth diversitie of temperatures: from whence ariseth diversitie of customes; and these would rather die a thousand deaths, then come to be in subjection to their enemies. Whereupon it was seen in the beginning of *Charles the fifth*;
The fates in Diocletian's Muryce,

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Erymce:

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broughtstheirArmyuponSpaine,astăprefentlythe

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takeana:courte,(twinąłwsiesagainstinfidés)

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themwaficheinfelves;

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wormewhichghawesinwoodinſuchfort,thattafter-

wardsitiscaslybroken;fo discordsshouldberemoci-

tedinemies countries; that afterward more callly

theymaybeovercome; but yet slaying time; thatthef

woodbefirstconsumed,thatso at one blowitmaybe

beinę:

Inregardwhereof, David faith, Quest infer-

ivæmum,que omena et interfert, impetiv

no: in as much, as having by little and little, and by

secret waies weakned his enemies, he afterwards easily

as wormeatenwoodbroke them at one blow.Where-

upon I conceive, that the Romans are therefore by

the Holy Ghost, called a Womne in Jonas; where he

faith, Et parasit Deus Vermes; ascensu talibus: in Graec-

mum; Ea persecut haedcrans, Ex marinis: this place be

meant, (as Robert Abbot with many other writers inter-

prest it) of the destruction of Jerusalem, by the Ro-

mans under the Empire of hispefish, who having pre-

pared a siege against Hierusalem; and understanding

there were discords risen amongst them, he delayed

the enterprise, Obsticio omne Hierusalem difficulty; et saepe

modi civitatum: disturbia facit: Unde consumptas deflectit,

quorum omnem Romanorum: and after a while, assaulting the

City, he destroyed it. I observe moreover in that

Chapter of Jonas, that the saine came not first upon

the Prophets head; but the worm that dried up the

gourd; so also we must dry up our adversaries with

discords, and then set upon them with our Armies.

This Coriolanus meant, when he appointed his soldie-

ers to spoile the fields of the Plebeians; but to leave

the
The seventh Discourse.

The fields of the Senate's untouched; which he did not do for any hatred to the people, but out of a further reach, by this means to foment their discords.

The importance of this, the ancient Romans knew well; who after the first war in Sicily, seeing the Carthaginians, I may say their natural enemies, in a great fear, through the revolt of the Cities of Africa, and the rebellion of their own Army, yet never for this made war upon them; which would rather have brought concord to their enemies, than victory to themselves: but letting them tire and weary themselves with their own discords, they then set upon them so wearied, and without shedding of blood made themselves Lords of all Sardinia with an increase of Tribute.

But in case they would not stay so long till the enemy might tire out himself: they should then do well to bring with them in their Army, some person of the blood, and that hath pretension in the state; but yet so, as to do it without forcing. When Charles the eighth had intention to make war upon Bajazet the great Turk, because he knew how vain a thing it were to believe that a Kingdom in Religion, in customs and in language different, should receive him; he therefore took with him the brother of Bajazet: and the like did Situles King of the Thracians; and Osman Basha by the commandment of Amurath, going to destroy the King of the Tartars, took with him Isban brother of that King; and it succeeded well, whereupon (as Argentore relates) Lewis the eleventh stood in feare of the league, only because they brought his brother along with them. But if the discords be inveterate and the Citizens through them grown weak, it is then alwaies time to affaile them; and there can be no doubt of victory. Thus Greece was easily overcome by any stranger that tooke this opportunity.

And
And thus much concerning discords of Citizens between themselves, or of Cities that are under one Lord; in which it is sufficiently shewed, how a stranger ought to carry himselfe. Now we will shew, what course he ought to take, with other Provinces or Cities that are in discord between themselves. These Cities then are either of equal force, or of unequall; if of equal, then ought he to foment both sides; and thereby they coming at last to be unequall, he shall then take part with the weaker side; but yet so, as not to weaken himselfe: as Grecius in Justin teacheth us, who aiding the Babylonians against Cyrus, he so much weakened his own Army, that after the taking of Babylon, he also himselfe was easily overcomen. And therefore he saith, Ibi fortuna prioris predicti (that is of Babylon) percutiit, et Graeci exercitus nullam negotio sudecit. The matter therefore must be so carried, that if the contrary side happen to be conquerour, yet you may be able to mainaine the warre your selfe: if conquered, it will then be easie for you to make your selfe Lord both of the one and the other. For it is not fit, when a man may have need of his money and his Forces in defense of himselfe, that he should rashly waft them in the service of another. Such was the counsell (as Thucydides relates) that Nicias gave the Athenians, while he dissuaded them from the warre in Sicily; there being no discretion, to uncloath ones selfe, to cloath another. Which is so true, that it is written by the Holy Ghoft in Ezekiel, while speaking of the foure beasts, he saith, Sub firmamento antiqui penae cornem recte alterius ad alterum: and this as S. Gregory interpreth it, intends to expresse the ayd that is due from a man to his neighbour. It follows after, Unques quidque de absum alis velabat, corpus sumus; to shew, that for ayding of others, it is not fit to dismantle our selves.

To return to our purpose, in that we spake of be-
fore; that is, what way is to be held in aiding the weaker side: a better example cannot be given then that of Philip, King of Macedonia, who seeing the Cities of Greece at variance between themselves, he fomented the weaker side; and after he had wearied the one and the other, he brought them both under his Dominion. [Philippus Rex Macedonum (faith, justice) libertati omnium insidias, dum contentiones civitatum alit, auxilium inferiorem servando, uti pariter victoresque subjiciat Regiam servitutem coegit. According to this advice, Ferdinand King of Spain fomented so well the discord between Francis King of France and him of Aragon; that weakening the one, and oppressing the other, he made himselfe Lord of the Kingdom of Naples; without wasting of either soldiers or money; a Kingdom gotten before by the King of France with so much blood. This also many Writers attribute to the Venetians, who calling Lewis the twelfth into Italy, hoped by this means to make themselves Lords of many Cities in Lombardy and Romagna, with this conceit, Lewis il Moro, called in Charles the eighth King of France; but this man endangered himselfe unhappily; and the other were not far from absolute ruine. Upon occasion whereof, I cannot omit to shew their errour, who make doubt, that a third man should enjoy the benefit of their victory, and what remedy there is for it: Secondly, how it happened that Ludovico Sforza by raising discord between the King of France and them of Aragon, lost his state; when Philip by raising discord between the Græcians, and also Ferdinand King of Spain, got so much by it. Concerning the first, there cannot be a better counsell be given, to two, who striving together, have a third looking on, to set upon the winner, then to persuade them to peace; or else juridically to hear their differences: but because, this feldome or never hath place amongst Princes; and...
warre oftentimes for many occasions either cannot or will not be avoyded: therefore I cannot better deliver my opinion, then by shewing the example of Miltius, who being upon the point of striking battell with Tullus Hostilius, and knowing that which side soever was victor, must needs (not having to fight with sheep) exceedingly weaken itself with loss of soldiers; whereby the Tuscanes who were equal in forces to the one and the other: and by this loss of men should remain the stronger, might take occasion to draw the victory of the conquering side to themselves: he invited Tullus Hostilius to a parley: and with these reasons persuaded him to put the fortune of the victory upon a few, that not only the victor might be out of danger, but might also have it in his power, to oppress the Tuscanes, which proposition Tullus accepted; and though there be many that blame him for it; yet I think, they mean it in some other case, because it is not likely, that a warlike spirit as Tullus was, if he had not certainly known the manifest danger of falling to be a prey to the other, would ever have consented to such a duell; which in the case of another, is never without blame, being a thing unworthy of a valorous Captaine, to lay the fortune of many upon a few; but as this case was, I find no other error in Tullus Hostilius, but that he would hazard the whole Army upon three men; but if the condition had been, to fight with one squadron of Foot, and another of Horse, I could not then but have commended it: and the reason is, because by such a fight it would plainly have appeared, which of them in a set battell would have had the victorie, there concurring in it, the skill of the Captaine; and part of all parts of the Army, which have the same proportion with one another, as the whole hath with the whole; according to the vulgar rule, Eadem est ratio summae, que est partis ad partem.
But in the case of Tullus, one of the Armies might be inferior to the other, in Horse and Foot and Captains: and yet have three braver men in any of the kinds in it, then the other.

Concerning the second Point, Ludovico Sforza did well, not securing himself, in the State of Milan, to move the King of France: but he did not well afterward, to move him against the Aragonese; for he ought (at least if he could; and if he could not, he should not then have meddled in it at all) to have made use of the King, as atayd in peace, but not as a Captaine in warre: and so was the counsell which Phanes the Elegian gave: that they should call in Antiochus and make use of him as an Empire, but not as a Captaine: Phanes (faith Livy), Reconciliorum pacis, G-disceptatorum de sinqua in convitseris cum populo Romano effunt, uerdam potius. Antiochus venit: sed quam dux bello. And therefore Ludovico Sforza had not done ill to call in the King of France: as for his purpose to make himselfe free Lord of Milan, if it had been in his power to make him returne againe: but seeing the case required to make use of him in warre, now it was his ruine: because to seek to rise by the discords of others, is not a work for an inferiour, but either for an equall, or a greater. Whereupon to Philip King of Macedon, and to Ferdinando King of Spaine, it proved well; but to Lodowick Sforza, it brought utter ruine; and to the Venetians exceeding danger; although he with indiscernition set forward his own destruction; these, with judgement, freed themselves from the danger. And therefore in the forefaid case, he that is inferior in Forces ought to seek always rather to extinguish, then to kindle fire. Asmuth, the great Taeke was minded to make warre upon the King of Polemis; between whom lay the state of Petrusco Princk of Pogdaria; and he, as a wise man, knowing the damage he might sustaine, ei-
The seventh Discourse.

ther by having his Countrey wafted with the Great Turkes Army; or after the warre ended, by wholly loosing it, as lying in the mouth of the Polack; he so treated with them, that he made them friends. But many Cities in Italy, not observing this rule, whilst they fomented discord between Pyrrhus and the Romans; remained, after the warre ended, a prey to the Romans. So the French, when Hannibal came into Italy, perceived though too late, they had expos'd their Countrey as a Prey to his Army. So the Etolians calling in Antiochus to make warre upon the Romans, were themselves the first a prey to the Romans, as it had been foretold them. But although we have shewed by the example of Crefus, that it is not good in discord, so to ayd one side; as to weaken oneselfe: yet is not this rule to be observed, where one is so much too strong, that the other without great ayd is not able to withstand: because in this case to abandon a friend, would be a strengthening of the enemy; as the Corfuans in Thucydides excellently shewed, in the Oration they made to the Athenians, whereupon the Rhegini fearing the Army of Pyrrhus King of the Epirots; the Romans came with great Forces to their ayd; but the end was, they became Lords over them. Which they of Corfu, not observing in the discords of Durax, and denying them ayd, were cause that they yeelded themselves to the Corinthians, and consequently encreased the Forces of their enemies. But Germanicus carried himselfe with great judgement in ayding Segestes; knowing, if Segestes were overthrown, his faction would joyne it self with Arminius; and consequently the Forces of his enemy be encreased. This the Campans declared, demanding ayd of Rome; Si defenditis, vestri; si deseritis, Samnitum erimus. Capwan ergo & Campanian omnem vestri, an Samnutum viribus accedere malitia, deliberate. So as this is a lesson which men should

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earne,
learne, to give present assistance to their friends that need it; otherwise they cannot avoid being a prey to others; and this is delivered by S. Matthew in a Parable; where they not coming that were invited to the marriage, others were called that stood in the streets.

It is therefore to be observed, when we make other men’s case our own, that our power be more then theirs: because else, either they will be hindred from getting victroy; or getting victroy be kept from being masters of the victroy; it is not therefore for Princes or Cities that are weak, to make warre; which are to call in one more powerfull then themselves to their ayd; for by this, they doe but procure a stronger enemy. The Campani oppressed by the Samnites, put themselves into the hands of the Romans, and so encreased their Forces: and for this cause perhaps it is, that Lucca continues a Commonwealth.

Having shewed, that we ought with all our Forces, to ayd the weaker side; when of it selfe it is not able to subist: it is to be observed, that in doing it, we make not shew of such preparation, as may make our friends suspicious of us: which Phillip King of Spaine not observing; whilst under pretence of ayding the King of Scots against the Queen of England; he prepared so great a Fleet, that the Scots might easily perceive, that Fleet was not meant for resisting of England; but for making himselfe Lord of Scotland. Into this errour also the Athenians ranne; who under colour of ayding the Catanese against the Syracusans, meant to make themselves Lords of Sicily, and therefore came with so great an Army (as Justin faith) Ut is terrori essent in quorum auxilia mittebantur: whereupon they failed of their purpose, by reason it was easie for the Lacedemonians, to put a suspition of this into the Sicilians heads. And therefore Vitiges being within Ra-
venna, besieged by Belsarius, and hearing by the Emb-
assadours of the King of Austrasia, that he offered to
ayd him with fifty thousand French; astonished at so
great a succour, put himselfe into the hands of fusi-
niah. Therefore weake Cities ought not to go in quest
after warre; because they are like, either to be over-
come of their enemies; or to be in servitude to their
friends; seeing they who call to their ayd a greater
power then their owne, may be said to leane upon the
point of a Speare, or upon a broken Reed; upon
which, he that leanes, is like to find rather death then
ayd. And therefore our Lord God, speaking in E&sy to
his people, who had called the Egyptians to their
ayd, Ecce considis super baculum armudinem, contrasum
stitum, super Egyptiam: cui si innoxu fuerit bona, intrabit
in manum ejus; & persorabit eam; sic Pharaon Rex Egypti
omnia qui confiduit in eo. Which Aratus Head of the
Acheans knowing, refuſed to receiving the ayd of Anti-
gonus. Verebat in enim si forte Rex victoria poetric, Cleomene
ac Lacedemoniiis superatis ad extremum aliquid novi contra
Republicam Acheorum tantum infectare. And if these Cities find
a necessity to make warre for their owne defence, or
otherwise, and that not able of themselves, it behoves
them to call in, others to their ayd: they shall then
do well, to call in more then one; so the Pisans did a-
gainst the Florentines, who ayded by the Venetians,
by Lodovico Sforza, by the Genoue, and by the Senefl,
go long time dallying, and kept them all off from
getting to be Lords over them.

I cannot omit to advertife; when one gives ayd to
another, and the case stands so, that their Forces being
joyneyed, they are able to refift, or else not: that in this
case, he ought to come with all his Forces; that is one
refift not, the other may: and in this was the error of
the Campani, in ayding the Sedicin, who therefore were
both of them ruined. Campani magis noem ad praefuudum
sociorum
The seventh Discourse.

...sociorum quam vires, cion attulissent: fluentes luxm obdura-
tis ujus armorum in Sidicino pulsi agro, in sede molem
omnen belli vertarent: and if the Romans had not a-
ded them, they had been in manifest hazzard of de-
struction. And therefore I cannot commend the
course which the Athenians tooke in a battell of the
Corfuans with the Corinthians; in which having
brought a squadron of Galleys in ayd of the Corfuans,
they gave order, not to come into the fight, untill
they should see them routed; there is no doubt, but
that if the Athenians had come in to fight in the be-
inning of the battell, the Corfuans had got the vi-
ctory: but staying, as their commiʃion was, and not
giving ayd to their friends in time; they added re-
putation to their enemies, and leſſened their own For-
ces; so as either they should not have offered their ayd
at all; or they should have given it in the beginning.

Let us now come to a Citizen that aspires to make
himſelfe Lord of his own Countrey, being held by
infidels; in which, if the discord be between the No-
bles and the Plebeians, it is a hard matter to compaʃe:
yet in this case, it is better heſhould make himſelfe
head of the people; who have both more will and
power then the Nobles, as being a greater number;
and though they be of inferiour ranke to the great
ones: yet it is with them as with Buls; who suffer themselves to be mastered, because they know not their
owne strength. Which Manlius well knowing, spea-
kong to the people faid, Quonſq; tandem ignorabitis vires
vestras? It happens also for want of judgement, and
scarcity of money; but all these things are helpt by
making some great man Head, that is wise and rich;
the people being like ſheep where one leaps, the other
follows. And this Moʃes knew, when being told
by God, of his own death, he prayed him to provide
his people a Leader, that they might not be as ſheeppe
without
without a shepherd, No servile care or toil distorts the people; therefore are more able, and more able, if they have a Head.

It remains to shew, that the people are more willing, and more easily persuaded to raise a Plebeian to the Principality, than one of the Nobility: First, by reason of the hopes which every one naturally hath of new things, specially the common people; therefore Sallust faith, Sed omnino haec in plura servatione recta studia Catilina increpa probabat. Secondly, because the people envies not the inequality of Honours, but the inequality of Riches; and this is the reason why it was never seen, at least very seldom, that one Noble man helps to raise another Noble man to the Principality: and this Aristotle knew when he said, Nam multitudine quidem graviter fort inequalitatem patrimoniorum, praesertim in honorem equalitatem. Whence it is no marvel, if after the death of Romulus, the Nobles found no way to make a King; and if it had not been for the people, it had scarce been ever done. And Livy speaking of this faith, Esaegisitur aliquid capit placet, Si nemo alteri concedere in annum inducet. It is therefore best, the discord being between the Plebeians and the Nobles; (I mean always as I said before, as far as may be done with a good conscience,) to make himself Head of the people; which yet is not without great danger, and very fallacious, as I shall shew in another discourse upon those words, Et adjure Polium Tributio jure contentae. If the discord be between Nobles and Nobles, then he that would make himself Prince, either is head of one part, or not; if not, he ought then to procure the concord of them that are Heads; because their discord will be a cause, he can have but one side in his aid; and that but weakly, neither where, if they be made friends, by this means; they will both of them remaine, as it were, obliged to him's
and perhaps will doe it the more, because they cannot but thinke it a great matter, for one man to hinder the proceeding of their enemies, who will therefore afterwards without any other regard, runne headlong to ayd him, not caring what he be. This my opinion will be sufficiently proved by the example of Cæsar; who seeing Pompey and Crassus at variance, wrought so with them, that he made them friends; as knowing, that to his purpose, for making himselfe Prince, this discord of theirs would be a great impediment. But if he be head of a Faction, then is the time to make himselfe Lord securely; because having halfe the Nobility of his side, if he can withall get the favour of the people, he will undoubtedly be able to get the Empire. And so is this place of Tacitus, of which we speake, to be understood; that Augustus in the diffentions of the Pompeians and the Cæsareans, of whom he was Head, made himselfe protector of the people: that there were diffentions between them, is seen by that he saith, Cum et discordis civilibus Jesse; nee Cæsareis partibus nisi Cæsar Dux reliquit: and that he had made the people his friend; is knowne by those words, Et a suendum Pleben, Tribunitis jurce contentum.

The summe of all I have saide, is this: If a stranger in a civill discord, seeke to make himselfe Lord: (I meane by civill, that which is between Cities and Persons that are under the same Dominion) if he have intelligence with them; either it is in the beginning, and then he shall not stirre, but rather be a means of concord; especially betweene those that are naturally enemies; between whom it behoves him to somet discord: to the end, that being weakened, his way may be easie; or else assaulting them with Armes, be sure to have in his Army one of the blood, but yet without power; although in another discourse I shall shew that this is a weakness: or else it is, when discords
are inveterate; and consequently the Citizens wasted; 
& then every thing is like well enough to succeed. We 
have also shewed, that a stranger who seekes to get the 
Dominion of Cities, which are at warre under divers 
Lords; ought to somet the discord, if they be of e-
quall power, so farre as that they may come to be un-
equal, and then to make part with the weaker, yet no 
further, then only that they may be able to resist their 
enemies; either being so well, that they may be not so 
great, as to weaken him that gives it; an enemy, when 
without excessive, & if they cannot prosecute the 
warre, & that there be danger, lest they fall into 
their enemies handes, or for themselves be made in 
his own enemys; but all in such sort, that he give no 
cause to suspicion to his friends. I have said also, that it 
is no small skill to foment discord, & that no man 
ought to make use of a great power, for his interest in 
war but only in peace; when he is not of force sufficient 
to be able to send it away againe. And it is for those 
that lie between greater Princes that are so variances; 
let them, as Lorenzo de Medici did, use means to make 
them friends. Weake Cities, in my opinion, should 
ever intricatethemselves in any warres, and where 
there are two, that stand in fear of a third; if they 
will follow my counsell, they shall never lead forth all 
their Forces. Now if he be a Citizen, who in the dis-
cords of the City, seekes to make himselfe Lord of 
let him know it will be hard to compass, when the 
discord is between the Nobility and the people; but in this case, the best way is, if he can, to make himselfe 
Head of the Commons. If againe the discord be 
between the people amongst themselves, it is then almost 
impossible, but easily, when it is between Nobles and 
Nobles; especially if he be Head of one faction, and is 
not then to stand neutral.
What Discords conserve States, and what corrupt them.

The eighth Discourse:

Thus then we see, that of those three distinctions, there is one proper for conserving the Prince; that is, the discord between the Nobility and the Commons; as sufficiently hath been shewed. Now the state of the Optimates (to return to our purpose) is easily preferred, so long as there groweth no discord between Nobles and Nobles: because, as we have said before, the dissensions of the Nobility rest upon two Heads; whereas the one soone prevailing over the other, brings it within his power to make himselfe sole Lord; so much the rather, because in a State of Optimates there is alwaies discord between the Nobility and the Commons; and so much, that the people ill brooking the Senate, will rather be willing to have a King. We must therefore know, that in a State of Optimates, as the dissension between Nobles and Nobles, is very hurtfull; so that between the Nobility and the People, is very profitable; and greatly fortifies and upholds it; so long as there concurr, or with it, discord between the Nobles. The reason is, because the people being at variance with the Nobles, it will be a cause, that they standing united, will not incurre the danger before spoken of. This we see, the Romans after the expulsion of the Tarquins, continued easily in their government; because in that time, there was perpetual discord between the Nobility and the People. In which discords when the people came to be oppressed, the Nobles fell into Factions, and then the City in a few years came to be a Monarchy.
Of concordant discord; and how it ought to be managed, for the good of Cities.

The ninth Discourse.

There is nothing more profitable for the concord and good government of a City, then a discord between the parts: a City being a body composed of many parts, as our body is of the four Elements. And as in this, if it be well organized; in such sort, that all the four Elements be in a due proportion, there will then need no discord to maintain it; there being none that seekes its own destruction: and therefore it sweetly enjoys a quiet rest: so in a City, there will be no unquietness, if all the parts be equal; I mean not equal, simply; for it were not fit, that all in a City should be equal in dignity and riches: being necessary, some should be rich and some poor: but equal in such manner as it is in the body, whose good consists in this, that all the members be equal: for there are two kinds of good, (as saith S. Thomas) one, the good of the whole; and the other, of the parts: and likewise two natures; one universal, the other particular: the good of the whole consists in the entirety, and in the distinction of the parts: and therefore it is better for a man, to have a Head, Feet, Hands, and the other members, then that all should be Head: but the good of the part, should be more good and perfect, if it could attain to the degree and perfection of the superior part: and therefore the Foot should be more noble, if it were a Head; but the body should not be more perfect, if it wanted a Foot: so in a City it is fit, there should be Plebeians; and the equality that is required, ought to be Geometricall!
and not Arithmetical; and where this is, a City shall not need diffusion, to make it be well governed; but because, as Galen in his Method, speaking of bodies that are in health, simpliciter, and absolutely, faith, This symmetry of humours consisting In Puncto is very hardly found; and found impossible to be kept: as also Hippocrates speaketh of those bodies, that are in the height of healthfulness, Neque enim in melius virit, nec quam in simpliciter valent; religiosus sit us in determinatione delinatione; so a City, is either never found in such a symmetry of parts; or if at any time found, never long continues. And therefore Tacitus speaking of such a composition faith, Londariis faciliter quadratur aequi: sed si eocium, intra duas angulos, potest. 

but it is of necessity, that in the body, there be predominant either cold or heat; or dry or moist: if cold be predominant, there is heat to oppose it; if dry, the moist: so in a Commonwealth, all things must be reduced to equality; for not only they which overtop others, but they all that are in misery, are dangerous: in like manner, as it happens in buildings, which come to decay, as well by stones that stand too farre out; as by those, that stand too farre in: and therefore the Mason alwayes measures the walls and fits the stones; not by cutting them away, but by setting them in the right place; and thus our Lord God would have it be done in his holy Church; and therefore when Ezekiel saw it in the top of a mountaine, he stayed not long, but there came a man of mettall like brasse: Et Euliebibus libris in manu suis: the Septuagint read it, Fisimiae libris in manu suis: where S. Gregory interprets it, after my meaning; and Aristotle also knowing this, gives occasion, when one part in a City is oppressed, and another oppreßeth; that then the Magistrates should relieve the part oppressed, and reduce them to equality. There
There are three things that may bear sway in a City; either the power Regall, or that of the Nobles, or the Authority of the People: if the Regall Power be predominant, then the people who are many, must oppose it; because one and many are contraries: and perhaps for this it is that Plato faith, that a Common Wealth should be framed of two ingredients; a people, and a King; because the people alone being many, may be a bridle to the King; and the King alone to the people. If the Nobility be predominant, then the people, as being directly contrary to the Nobility, must be opposed against it: whereupon, as we said before, as long as the City of Rome used this opposition, it could never be destroyed by the Nobility: In this regard, Sulpitius called a squadron of the youth, the Senators’ Treacle, as opposed against them.

If the people be predominant, then the Nobility must be set against them; and as when cold is predominant in a body, if another cold should be set to strive with it, it would instantly, Ipso facto, destroy the body: So when the people is predominant, if the people should be set against them; or when the Nobility is predominant, the Nobility should oppose it; the Common Wealth presently would go to wrack; as it fell out in Rome. But not only, when the like is opposed against the like, both a body and a Commonwealth may be ruined; but as well also if a contrary be opposed, and not in a due manner: and therefore Galen faith, that contraries may be of three sorts: that is, Greater, lesser, and equal. It is a greater contrary, when to a distemper hot in two degrees, a remedy is applied cold in three degrees: a lesser contrary is, when to a distemper hot in two degrees, a remedy is applied cold in one degree; the equal is, when to equal heat, equal cold is opposed; which being so, faith Galen, the cure of a distemper must not be by a greater
greater contrary; because this not only takes away the distemper, but introduceth the contrary: as if to a distemper, hot as two; a remedy be applied, cold as three; this indeed will take away the heate, but then in place of it, bring in a distemper cold in one degree. Neither also is a cure to be made with a lesser contrary, because this would not reach to take away the distemper: but the cure must be made by an equal, which cannot introduce a contrary, but only reduce the distemper to a due proportion. And thus is it to be done in Cities: for if the people grown two degrees above their ranke, should have the Nobility opposed in three degrees: this would not only take away the predominancy of the people, but would bring the Nobility one degree out of just proportion: and the contrary will happen, if it should be lesse: and therefore in the Common-wealth of Rome, as long as the people were able to counterpease the power of the Nobles; although it were in discord, yet it continued and kept it selfe free: but after the death of Tiberius and Caes Gracchus, when this contrary became unable to withstand the Nobility, the Commonwealth presently was endangered; as well for the inability of the peoples opposition, as for that it gave occasion to raise discord amongst the Nobles. That the contrary in this case was not fit and able, Salust sheweth where he faith; Ceterum Nobilitatis faction magna pollebat; Plebis via soluta atque in multitudinem dispersa, minus poterat. Besides the Nobles themselves opposed not well, in opposing Sylla to Caius and worse, in opposing Augustus to Anthony: because as the opposition the people made was too weake, so the opposition of the Nobility was too strong; and was therefore the ruine of the Commonwealth. That contrary therefore which with discord shalbe opposed to him, that exceeds proportion, ought to be such, as to have no greater power, nor
other end, but only to reduce the other to his due place; but yet with waites befitting a Christian: for I like not that course of Tarquinus Superbus, which he intimated by cutting off the heads of the Poppies (an invention used by many, and related also by Aristotle.) For in the commonwealth of the body, what worse evil, then the gout in the feet or hands? yet to heal it, I never saw the foot or the hand cut off; but purgations applied to bring them to their natural temper. Being in all evils better to oppose the beginning, then be forced to cut off the part, by letting it run to a Gangrene or Convulsion. For as this oftentimes brings death to the whole body; so in a Commonwealth, the dismembering of a Citizen that is grown out of order, is occasion oftentimes of the ruine of the State; as it fell out in Caesar.

I am to advertize, that I intend not to put division between men and men, but between men and the actions of men; for as the first is extremely ill, so the second is as good. And therefore the Prophet saith, Nonne qui oderunt te Domine Oderam; et super inimicos tuos tabescbam; and of this kind of hate, Christ spake when he said, Non veni mittere pacem, sed gladium in terra. Whereupon it being an evil action, for one to exceed his degree and thereby seek to oppress the City; it ought to be hated; and to seek to bring him to proportion; but that done, the hate then must be laid aside; and therefore all the holy Fathers agree, that to know what hatred is good, and what bad, there is no better way then this, to looke if the action ceasing for which they hate, they also cease to hate; otherwise it appears, they hated the person, and not the action. Secondly, it must be observed, when I shew, that for Cities to be well governed, it is necessary there should be discord: I mean not that kind of discord which is destructive; a discord in the whole; but that which is
a discord in a part, and in the whole, a concord: in like manner, as the Heavens turning with one motion from East to West; and with another from West to East, they are discordant in the parts; but in conservation of the whole concordant. So not without a great mystery of nature, that is of God; the Planets by whose influence he governs earthly things, are by their Maker so placed in the heavenly Orbes, that one contrary stands neighbour to another: to the end, that with an harmonious discord, they may have a concordant influence, for the good of the Universe. From hence it is, that Jupiter is next to Saturne; because Saturne being old and dry, an unfortunate Planet, it was necessary he should be allayed with the goodnesse of Jupiter, who with heat and moisture, in an admirable manner opposeth him. So unfortunate Mars is tempered with fortunate Venus, (to speake in the termes of Astrologers) who allaieth the malignity of Mars, in such manner, as we see oftentimes, the choler of a man, to be mitigated with the sweetnesse of a woman. In like fort (to descend lower) if the Elements were not discordant, there would arise no alteration, and consequently no generation: so if the parts in Musicke were not discordant, there would be no harmony. The parts therefore are discordant; the Heavens, discordant; the Planets, discordant; and all for conservation of the Universe. Whereupon, and it is the doctrine of Aristotle, as from the contrariety and discord of the Elements, ariseth the peace of the Universe; so from the opposition in the parts of a City, (I speake in the sense I said before) there ariseth the conservation of the whole. Which perhaps Plato meant, when by the mouth of Socrates he said, that the profit of a City consists not in concord.
The tenth Discourse.

Sed veteris Republicanae Prospera vel Adversa claris Scriptoribus memorata sunt: tempore Augusti non defuerit decorum ingenia; donec gloriante aratione descrerrentur Tiberii Caisiae et Claudii, olim Nepos et florentibus ipsis, ut memorabilissima odios composita sunt.

How hard and dangerous a matter it is to write Histories: when the best time is to finde writers: and which of them deserve most credit.

The words of Tacitus above-cited, give me occasion of two discourses; one, concerning the writing of Histories: the other, concerning Flattery. Concerning the first, I intend to shew the difficulty it brings with it; what danger Historians undergo: of whom it is safest to write; and in what time. As for the difficulty, it may grow either in regard of him that reads, and is not interested: or from him that reads, being interested; or lastly from the time, in which one writes. Beginning then with the general, that is, of him who reads, and is not interested: there is no doubt, but the Historian with such a one, will finde some difficulty; to be thought a true writer. Seeing he must necessarily relatations; either worthy of praise, or worthy of blame: if of blame, it is attributed to malice; if of praise, it is received with envy: because Tacitus didu saith in the person of Pericles, in the oration he made to the people of Athens, at the funereal pompe of those, that were slain in warre. The praises of the dead, if they be heard by friends, must seeme enough; if by strangers, so long as they go no further then possibility: they are receiv'd with patience.
ence; but if they passe that bound, they are then as fabulous, either scoffed at, or else envied. This case, Salust translated out of Theoclyides, where he saith, Ar
dum videtur: Res gestas scribere; prime quia, si in egre
exaquadam sint; Dein quia plerique, que, delicia, prehenderis, malevolentia et invidia dicta putant, ubi de magna virtute atque gloria bonorum memorat; quæ si quisque facil
cile fatu putet, aquanimo accipit; supra, vel ini, dicta pro falsis ducit. It is therefore true, that between these two extremes, that writer shall alwaies be more believed, and be held in better account, who in blaming shall discover the vices and defects of others: then they who in praising, shall make their virtues too resplendent; because a reader, takes blame, in it selfe for a praise; if at least he have not himselfe those vices for which one is blamed; and praise he takes for blame; if he find not those virtues, for which the Historian extols him. Besides, to blame being alwaies with danger; and to praise, rather with benefit; he who blamieth, will be alwaies taken for a man free and sincere; and he that praieth for a flatterer. To this perhaps Tacitus had an eye, when he said, Obtrepatias & levor praebet, nisi accipitur; quippe Adulationis fudum crenem servat
patria; malevolitati falsa specie libertatis inse.

The second difficulty is caused by persons interes
ted, which are either Princes, or Common-wealths: if Princes, either they are vertuous, or vittuous: if vittous, let the History be written either of his life, or of any others that is like his, it will be taken, as if by rela
ting the faults of others openly, his own faults secre
tly be cast in his face. This by Tacitus is learnedly ex
presseed, where he saith, Reperies qui ob similandum
marum, aliena maleficia sibi objecturi patent. So likewise if the vertues of some other Prince; or of his owne an
cestours shall be praised; he will take it, as an upbry
ning to him his owne vices; and thereupon be moved
to
to indignation and envy: and for default of virtue in himself, will with avill will, hear the praises of another. Eiam gloria (inde Tacitus) ad virtutem inferius habit; as animas ex propinqua diversa argument. Which our Lord God meaning to shew by the mouth of Tacitus faith, Filii boni ministrarum Domini Israel Templum, ut confidunt ab inquisitionibus sibi, et metianur fabricarum, et in conspectu omnibus qui secernit. And S. Gregory expounding this place, faith that the Temple of God is then shewed in confusion, when the actions of a just man are shewed to a wicked; and our Lord God, to shew that wicked men cannot abide to heare the life of good men spoken of, faith, Ut videt templum, he faith not, Ut videat templum, meaning to shew, as S. Gregory expounds it, Sponte sua considerare debent, rectorem operum suorum: These therefore with an evil will, heare the praises of others; which Tacitus knowing, forborne to write the life of Agricola, a good man, in the time of wicked Emperours, but stayed till Trajan's time, as having seen manifest examples, of many writers, that lost their owne lives, without any benefit to those of whom they write, by being themselves slaine, and their bookes burnt, while under wicked Princes; they would publish their histories of such persons: and therefore he faith, Legimus cum Africum Rustico, Patris Traiani, Herennius Severianus, Priscus Hestior diuisus inediti effert, et capitale suis, quae in ipsa sua nata, auctores sed in libris suis seviam autorem nominamus: But greater danger an Historian entretains, if under a wicked Prince, he dare write his history, because, either conceiting his vices, he shewes himselfe a manifest flatterer, and no wise Historian; who without truth, (as Polybius faith) is a man without eyes; or else writing the truth, he shalbin no doing, make his owne grave.

But say, he writes under a good Prince; either he must
must relate the actions of the Prince himselfe, or of his house; if of himselfe living, the Historian can never awoyd suspition: and it is not enough to say, that under such praiseworthy Princes, there will be no need, to part from truth, because there are few men that doe not conceive their owne actions to be greater then they are, or at least that desire not, others should think of them so: whereupon, when they find, that an Historian relates them not, in such a height as they conceive, or desire that others should; no doubt, they will think he blames them as not sufficiently praising them.

Now if under a vertuous Prince, they write the History of his family, there growes another difficulty of great moment; which is, that a great part of the Cities and Provinces having beene sometime Commonwealths, & from Commonwealths become Kingdomes; seldom without shedding the blood of the Citizens, and oftentimes of the Princes: the relating these things under a Prince, now Lord of the City, whether he be good or bad, is dangerous: first, on the part of the Citizens, who reading the death of their ancestors; or their greatnesse in the time when it was a Commonwealth: by the one, they are stirred up to hate, by the other to desire: and taking into their consideration, that greatness in which they were, and those injuries which they suffered; because they cannot revenge these, nor regaine those, but by the death of the Prince, they are oftentimes drawne to make cruel conspiracies. Secondly, on the part of the Prince, who in reading such Histories, seeing continually before his eyes, those Citizens, whose fathers either killed or at least conspired against his ancestors; seeing he cannot beleive they should love him; he will hardly be induced to love them, knowing wel, that things which are tolerated, by force, when occasion
cation happens to remove that force, will never be tolerated.

To this may be added another difficulty, on the part of the Citizens: who love not to hear the disgraces of their ancestors related in Histories; and are thereby moved to indignation: this Tacitus meant, where he saith, At unda torius quod Tiburio, regnante, passionis sed insaniae subiere, Pateri inaneunt. And oftentimes Tacitus himself forbears to speak of such; as he did of those who suffered disgraces under Nera, of whom he saith, Quo satio perfusus in nominatim tradam. Majoribus corum tribudendum puto.

Again to relate the wars, which these Princes or their Ancestors had with others; how dangerous it is. Crescensius Cordus may be an example; who for praising Brutus and Cassius, was forced miserably to end his life, as the said Tacitus relates. It is true, this used not to happen, but under wicked Princes, as Tiburio was. For Augustus, as the said Tacitus relates; made rather a jest, then took indignation at any such things: and thus much concerning a Prince.

Now in writing Histories under a Commonwealth, there appear again a thousand difficulties: First, if he make relation of their beginnings, he shall make himself odious to all in general, and to every one in particular. To all in general, because all things having but weak beginnings, men like rather to hear the History of the Commonwealth, in its virility, then in the weakness of its infancy. To particulars, because hearing relation made of the beginnings of their Houses, which commonly are they mean, but cannot read such Histories with any patience; at least, not with liking; and therefore in some Cities, such writings have not been admitted. This conceit Titus Livius expresseth in the life; where he saith, Ex legentium studiis, & vanitate (speaking of himself) who wrote the beginning of
The tenth Discourse.

Moreover, if they write of wars; not onely they incurre the same danger we spake of before, under a Prince; in too much praising those, with whom the warre hath been held: but besides, in this kind, it is easier to offend in a Commonwealth, which consists of many; then in a Kingdome, which consisteth but of one. Whereupon, it seemes to be more easie to write the truth of one alone, then of many; but withall more dangerous, because the hatred of private Citizens may be shunned; but the hatred which comes from the publik person of the Prince, and reacheth to life and goods, are impossible to be shunned.

It is therefore dangerous to write under a Prince, whether he be good or bad; and whether the History be of the Princes own actions, or of his ancestors; and whether in foraine warre, or in warre at home. And it is dangerous likewise to write under Commonwealths; not onely to write of their beginnings, but in other times also.

It remaines to shew, whether it be more easie, to find Historians under a Kingdome, or under a Commonwealth.

The Prince may be a tyrant, and living; the Commonwealth may be corrupt, and continue: and while it continues, hardly will any Citizen, out of love of his Countrey, be drawne to disclose those things, which ought to be kept secret; and as little whilst a Tyrant lives, will any man register his disorders for feare. Whereupon not without cause, the most wise Salomon in his Proverbs faith, Nomen impiorum putrescit, not Putrescit; because in the time present, his stinch is not smelt; or to say better, none will be so bold, as to discover
cover it; and if in the one, or the other, an Historian be found so hardy, as to write, he will certainly flatter. And therefore Tacitus faith, Tiberii Calique ac Neronia re florintibus ipsius ob metum falsis.

Also Historians take no care of those that come after, but consider onely their owne interest: and knowing how much trouble they endure, that in such times can but live, when they hold their peace; they are out of heart for writing of Histories, and though they should have a will to do it, yet they could have no meanes, as not being informed of publike affaires, which being done onely by the Prince; and out of his Element, he neither understands them, nor meddles in them, nor regards them: all which, Tacitus tooke into consideration, when he said, Postquam bellatsum apud Actium, atq. omnem potestatem ad unum conferri pacis intersuit; magna illa ingenta cessere; simul veritas pluribus modis fracta; primum inseditiae, republicae ut alione; mox libidinem assentendi, atque se fuit Odio adversus Dominantes; ita neutri cura posteritatis, inter interfere & obnoxios.

But if this tyrant Prince be dead, and the tyranny altered: also if a corrupt Commonwealth shall be abolished, and in place of it, shall come a Prince; in this case, there will not want Historians, but yet not without some doubt of truth. On the part of the Commonwealth now abolished, by reason of flattering the new Prince; on the part of the Prince now dead, by reason of the hatred that is borne to a tyrant; and to this Tacitus had an eye, when he said, Postquam occidere fort, recentibus odio compositae sunt: laying in another place, that Historians who write of tyrants, write many things through hatred, which are not true.

If lastly we speake of writing Histories under a well-governed Commonwealth, or under a Prince that is a Monarch; in this case, it will be easie to find writers good store: and therefore Tacitus faith, Sed videris...
Well we ref, he speaks of the firt yeeres of Augustus, which were indeed his best: and therefore our Tacitus writing only the latter time of Augustus, which was his worst, and consequently more hard to find Writers that had written truly. So also did Aeciaus, who writing the History of Solomon, omitted the beginning of his reign, as being the best, and began at his declining. According then to Tacitus, there will be writers good store, both under a Commonwealth, that is well governed; and under a Prince, that is well disposed: but in my opinion more under the good Prince.

First, because of the greater profit, for a Prince will take more notice of a Writer that relates particular actions; then a Commonwealth will do for relating universal: and here is to be noted, a difference between the Records of a Prince, and of a Commonwealth. The Records of a Commonwealth extensive (give me leave to use this word) being in my opinion less then of a Prince, the reason is, because as it is in the Proverb, He that serves the publike, serves no body; for the benefit being received of none as proper, is little regarded, and therefore little recompened of the publike; whereas we see Joseph received a greater recompence for the benefit he did to Pharaoh, then, ever we read, given by any Commonwealth. But extensive, I hold it more profitable to serve under a Commonwealth, because the memory of a benefit done to a Prince, as being a particular person, dies with him; but the memory of a benefit done to a City, continues as long as the City continues; and not
not only towards him that did it, but to his posterity also: whereof we have a clear example in the fore-
said Joseph; who intensively was rewarded by King
Pharaoh, beyond measure, being more King than Pharaoh
himself. But extensively, it proved more hurt than
benefit, his successors being put to slavery by him,
whose grandfather with all his people, Joseph had pre-
served before from famine. This reason by me al-
ded, is written by the Holy Ghost in Exodus, where he
faith, Surretct in terra Rex novus, super Egyptum, qui
ignorabat Joseph, & ait ad populum suum; Ecce populus
Israel multus & fortior nobis est; Venite, sapienter optrima-
mus eum. And therefore, (as I shall shew in another
place) men more esteeming a present profit, then a
future, will be moved rather to write of a Prince, then of
a Commonwealth.

Secondly, by reason of lesse danger, because an Hi-
storian in praying a Prince, hath nothing else to think
of; and being indeed a good Prince; he may praise
him truly; and therefore Tacitus discoursing of such
Princes, breaks out into these words, Rara temporum
felicitate, ubi sentire quae velit, & quae sentias dico liceat.
But in a Common-wealth (as I said before) it is impos-
sible to write so, but that amongst so many, some or
other will be blamed; and oftentimes the Hate that
grows from one, proves more hurtfull, than the love
of all the rest proves beneficial; because these hold
themselves not much obliged, as counting it but their
due; the other conceive an irreconcilable hate, as
counting it a wrong.

Thirdly, Historians will more willingly write the
deeds of a Prince, then of a City; because men take
more pleasure to praise such as are above their own
rank; envy, as every one knowes, being properly
amongst equals: and therefore in Common-wealths,
every one lookes rather to be praised himselfe, then to
praise others; whereupon Sallust, not without cause, lamenting the scarcity of Writers that Rome had, saith, *non populo Romanorum quam ex copia fuit, (that is of Writers) qui praedecessoribus nosse commodum erat; Ingenium nemo sine corpore exercerbat; Optimus quaeque facere quam dicere, sua ab aliis benefica laudari, quam ipse aliorum narrare nollet.* And thus much concerning the person of whom, and of whom an Historian writes.

Now concerning the time, there may be given three kinds of Historians: some, who relate things hapned in their owne time; some, things done time past; and others, things to be done in time to come. They who relate the Accidents of time past, without having had any former relation, are called Prophets: as Moses writing of the Creation of the World; so many who have written of things to come, are called Historians; as Esay, who hath written as well of our Church; as if he had written of things past; *Ita enim Universa Christi Ecclesiæ mystera prosequiust, ut non putes eum de futuro vaticinari, sed de præterito Historiam texere.*

But leaving those who write with such Authority, that of their truth there can be no doubt, our discourse shall be of the other; and because (as we have said) many write of the times past; others, of their owne times: and of these, some are such as have beene present at the things they relate; and others have them onely by relation: there being great difficulty in all the three, it is requisite, that together with the difficulty, we should also examine, which of them is most worthy to be credited.

They then who relate things which themselves have seene done, may easilie be drawne to vary from the truth; as moved with passions, sometimes of hate, sometimes of envy, and sometimes againe of love; and therefore Plutarch counts it a businesse of great difficulty.
The tenth Discourse.

culty: and this perhaps Livy means, when speaking of such Writers, he saith, *Et si non sectere à vero; solici-
tum tamen officere possint.* And Polybius to give the grea-
ter authority to his History, labours to shew that the story of the first warre of the Romans with the Car-
thagenians, written by Fabius Pictor a Roman, and by Philo a Carthagienian, was by those Authors, each of
them in favour of his owne Country, stuffed with lies. And indeed it is not unlike, but they might vary from
the truth, yet out of no corrupt affection; but
that each of them writ as he believed, though not
as it was; seeing things to which men are affected, seem
always, in the good, greater; and lesse, in the evil;
according to that rule of Aristotle, *Intus existens prohibet
Extraneum:* and therefore to an eye, looking through
a greene Glasse, every thing seemes greene. So to the
palate offended with choler, every thing tafts bitter:
and therefore David made his prayer to God, to keep
him as the Apple of his eye, *Custodi me Domine ut pupil-
لام oculi:* which as it hath in it no colour, and there-
fore sees things as they are; so he desired to be without
affections, that he might know the truth of things.
Whereupon it appeares, we may conclude, that they
who write of their owne times, and have not the ver-
tue of the apple of the eye; may easily vary from the
truth; not onely by malice, but sometimes also by ign-
orance; it being impossible, that a man should be an
eye-witnesse of all he writes; and should be present at
all Actions and Counsels in such manner, as not to
need the information of others; and even those who
are present at any action, do seldom of them agree
in the relation.

On the other side, it appeares there is more cre-
dit to be given to an Historian that writes of his owne
time, and of those things at which he hath himselfe
been present, then to others; seeing they are forced to

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stand to that which is left them by the ancients, either written in History, or preserved in memory, as Plutarch well observes. And because it is seldom, but there is more then one Writer of the same History: and for him that will relate them, he must necessarily make use of those, who have formerly given the information: it is an easy matter, in such a number of writings, for an Historian to be confounded; and be able but as a blind man, to give advertisement of things, whereof he is himselfe to be advertised. Besides, those first writings or memories of which this Historian makes use: they also, may have been written, out of affection.

Lastly, there are not wanting reasons to prove, that he who writes a History of his own time; though he have them but by relation, is the more worthy of credit; because in such, the difficulties that are found in the others, are abated; seeing, by not having been present, and had no part in the actions they relate; they are also void of those affections, which make Historians speake lesse truth: and by writing of their owne time, they are not tied to stand to the booke of others, who never agree with one another. And therefore the holy fathers, from this difficulty have drawne an Argument to prove the truth of the Gospell; because four Writers agree in all points. Neither by this example is my opinion abated, but rather strengthned; it being necessary, that to make foure men write agreeingly in all things, there must be one onely to instruct them all, which is the Holy Ghost.

But neither is this kind of Historians without difficulty; rather as I conceive, in greater then any other: as partaking himselfe alone of all those difficulties, which we in the two first observed; because although he be not present at the things, yet he is present at the time; and this hath force to stifre affection even in those
The tenth Discourse.

those that are not neere the time, as every one finds by experience in himselfe. Secondly, he who gives the information, may be moved by some passion himselfe; and then he will the lesse care for writing a lie, when he hath his intent, and the blame anothers. Thirdly, if he take more then one to give him information; he will fall into the same difficulties, as he that writes Histories of the times past: seeing it is seldome scene, that two agree in their relation; and oftentimes, one alone is contrary to himselfe.

And thus there is difficulty we see in all manner of times, and of Writers; whether they write of the time past, or of their own times; and whether they write by relation from others, or as eye-witnesses themselves.

For resolution, we may conclude, that more credit is to be given to those things, which are related by Historians that have beene eye-witnesses of things done in their own time, so long as the Writers be honest men. Whereupon we give more credit to the Histories of Argentone, relating accidents, at which he was himselfe present, then we doe to Jovinus, who write by relation from others when himselfe perhaps was all the while at his Bishopricke. Yet I say not, that Jovinus is not worthy of credit; seeing it is not my profession to lay blame upon any. This Argentone hath made us know this difference, while enterlacing the Histories of Lewis the eleventh with those of England; he useth much cunning to make us believe him: as one that was not present at the things done: and therefore for the most part, names the persons who gave him information; that from the greatness and credit of his informers, he might winne credit to his owne writings. And this was the very case of S. Luke, who writing in his Gospel the life of our Saviour; because he had not himselfe beene present, therefore to procure himselfe credit, at his very beginning he faith, he had
The tenth Discourse.

had it by relation from persons that were present. Si-
cut tradidierunt nobis, qui ab initio ipsi viderunt, & mini-
stri fuerunt sermonis: but when he was to write the Acts of the Apostles, at which he had been present; then without making any promise or proem, he begins with saying, Primum quidem sermonem feci omnibus. O Theophilus: and this for no other cause, but because he knew, how much a history hath more credit, when things are written by one that hath seen them. It is no marvell then, that S. John, for gaining himselfe credit faith, Ego vidi, & testimonium perhibui, quia hic est filius Dei. And therefore it was God's will, that the Apostles should bear witness of him, Et vos testificame de me, quoniam ab initio mecum estis. And S. Peter in the Acts, when he would perswade the resurrection of Christ to be believed, faith, Quid simul edimus & bibimus cum illo. Whereupon S. Chrysostome, considering why S. John names himselfe, where he faith, Sequebatur autem Petrus, & alius Discipulus, gives the reason in these words, Et sui memoriae coactus est, ut intelligas ea, ceteris diligentius, quae in Principis aula facta sunt narrata, ut pote quia aderat.

As for the objection made before, it is plainly cleared, if the Writer be an honest man. For in a good Historian, there are two things required; an ability, and a will: and one of these parts he that writes of things himselfe hath seen, hath certaine in him more then others; which is, that he is more able to write the truth, then any other; and as for the will to doe it, it cannot be wanting in him, if he be honest: and if he be not honest, then no doubt another that writes of times past may be worthy of more credit then he.
Concerning flattery, there have been discourses
morally written, by infinite writers; and in such
manner, that they have given cause rather to admire
them, then left any place to add any thing unto
them. I therefore, as I use to do, will handle it as a Po-
litician, briefly, and yet perhaps in such a way, as hath
not been done by any: Shewing first, that Princes
themselves are the cause of flatterers. Secondly, how
many kinds of flatterers there are. Thirdly, in what
the essence of flattery consists. And lastly, which of
them are hurtful to Cities.

Concerning the first, it is in common experience,
that flatterers are the ruin of Princes; and yet it is
easiest to shew that Princes are themselves the forgers
of this their ruin because if they were furnished with
virtue and goodness, flatterers could find no matter
in them to work upon; and so, either there would
be no flattery at all, or at least not hurtful. And
therefore those wise virgins who stood waiting for
the Bridegroom by night, having Oyle for them-
selves; which in the Scripture is often taken for praise.
Oleum effusum non nemo tuum: as Lyra interprets it, they
needed not procure from others the Oyle of flattery.
Ut Oleum peccator in non iungentur capitis mentis: so as Prin-
ces themselves being the cause of flattery, and not the
Subjects: all the fault of it, ought, so be laid upon
them.
whereupon it is no marvell, that in the Acts, while Herod making an oration to the people, was flattered of them, calling his voice the voice of a God; suddenly an Angell stroke him, and he was eaten up of worms. Statuio autem die, Herodes induitus vestiti Regio & sedens super Tribunal, concionabatur ad Illos: populus autem clamabat, vox Dei: statim autem illum per-cussit Angelus Domini: what fault was it in Herod, that the people applauded him, calling his voice, the voice of God? and yet he was stroke, and not the People. We may say then, that our Lord God by this example would shew, that Princes themselves are more cause of the peoples flattery, then the subjects are; which, as a Penne, writes such things, as he that moves it draws: of which, it is but the instrument, and no efficient cause.

Before I come to the other two heads; that is, how many kinds of flattery there are; and which of them be hurtfull to a City: I am forced to premise a little doctrine, of which I shall have use, in the explication of the one and the other.

We must therefore know, that flattery is a moral action: one of its contraries being friendship, which is a moral vertue; and because contraries, (as witnesseth the Philosopher) are all under the same genus; as white and blacke under colour; therefore flattery also must be under the genus of moral actions: of which there are many so bad, that nothing can make them good, as adulterie, and such like. This opinion was held by the master of the sentences; by the authority of S. Austin, where he faith, Bonum est continentia, malum est luxuria, inter utrumque indifferens, ambulare; capitis naribusque purgamenta projicere, spuitis rheumata jacere, hoc nec bonum, nec malum est; sicrere enim feceris, sicrere non feceris, nec juisitiam habeas, nec injustitiam. Thirdly, an action may in his owne nature be good; yet so as by meanes, it may
may become bad: as to fast, to pray, to sacrifice, and the like. Qui unum deum vult, Deo sacrificium offerit (saith S. Austin) idem facit, ac filium in conspectu patris Pietatem. Lastly, an action may be given which of its own nature is bad; and yet by some other cause, may become good. Murder is a wicked thing, yet Elias in killing the false Prophets did a good work, and shewed himself zealous of the honour of God.

Those actions then which are subject to alteration, may receive it from three things: first, from the object; a carnall act performed with a wife, is good; but if with another mans wife, is wicked. Secondly, from the circumstance: the Sacrifice which Saul made, because it wanted the due circumstances, was not accepted of God. Thirdly, it may receive this alteration from the end; that is, from the intention: but because the end may comprehend under it, both the object and the circumstances; therefore we must know, that it may be considered three ways: First, as it is an object, that terminates the act; and then it is called an intrinsicall end. Secondly, as it happens to some act, as a circumstance. Thirdly, as it is in nature of a cause, and then it is called, Cujus gratia: when therefore we say, that an action may receive goodness or badness, from the end; we mean it the third way.

The action in which flattery consists, is such as may receive alteration, from the intention, or from the object; or from the circumstances. What action of its owne nature more adulatory, than to seigne ones selfe crook-backt, with one that is crook-backt; as Platos schollers did? or to stammer with one that is stammering, as Aristotles did? or to seigne himselfe wry-neckt, with one that is so, as the Courtiers of Alexander the great did? or to seigne ones selfe poore blind, with one that is poore blind, as the flatterers of Dionysius did? It is indeed the greatest kind of flattery (as Plutarch accounts
count it) that can be; and yet these and the like actions, Saint Paul did, as he writes himself, with the Jewes, he feigned himself a Jew; with those that are weake, to be weake: and in short, with all, he feigned himself all. *Et facius: sum Judaeus quam Judaeus; ut Judaeos lucrare iis qui sub lege sunt, quasi sub lege essent; cum ipse non esset sub lege; ut eos qui sub lege erant lucrisacerem; iis qui sine lege erant, tanquam sine lege essent; cum sine lege Dies non essent; sed in lege essent Christi, ut lucrisacerem eos qui sine lege erant: facius sum infirmus infirmus; ut infirmos lucrisacerem: omnibus omnis facius sum, ut omnes facerem salvos. See here, that act, which of its owne nature, was most adulatory, being used by S. Paul, became vertuous and beneficial; and the reason of this can proceed from nothing, but from the intention; because as those other were moved, with their proper interest; So S. Paul was moved with the zeal of God. Ut Judaeos lucraret, ut eos qui sub lege erant lucrisacerem, ut omnes facerem salvos. For there cannot a better way be found, to reduce men to the right way, then to counterfeit to be such as they are: And even so, doe many Physitians use to doe; who oftentimes having a patient troubled with a melancholike humour in the braine; in such sort, as that they think theirseves to be earthen Pots: they also feine themselves to be such, to the end, that they taking meat, their patient also by their example may take meat, and not die with hunger; out of a conceit that earthen pots could not eate. And in this manner oftentimes they heale their patients; and feigning themselves to be sooles, have cured them of folly. Thus also did S. Paul, who circumcised Timothy, with a purpose to take away circumcision; whereof Saint Chrysostome speaking, faith, Vida opus, circumcidit, ut circumcisionem tolleret. Not without cause therefore did Marcus Tullius blame Cato, that would not flatter
flatter the people with counterfeiting their fashions, thereby to get the Consulship; and have freed his Country from the imminent tyranny of Julius Cæsar. And the rather, it being a thing commended of God himselfe, Cum perverso perversus: that is, with wicked men, one must feigne himselfe wicked, to reduce them to goodness.

This Act, which in S. Paul received alteration from the end, may also in the contrary receive alteration from the circumstance; and was used therefore by S. Peter, who when he went to Antiochia, was hindred by S. Paul himselfe, Et in faciem restitution quis reprehensibilis erat: although the Act of S. Peter was the same, and done with the same intention that S. Paul was; yet by reason of one circumstance, which was, that by his example, the Gentiles were drawne to Judaife, he deserved reprehension.

To come then to the second head, which is, how many kinds of flattery there are: I say first, there may be an Act of its owne nature exceeding good, and yet be apt to become a flattering Act: as, to praise a man for something he hath done, to the end he may with more boldnesse reprove him afterward, is a good Act: and therefore S. Paul knowing that the Corinthians, for the love they bore to certaine persons, were fallen into schisme, at first, he praifeth them, where he saith, Gratias ago Deo meo, semper pro vobis in gratia Dei, qua data est vobis in Christo Jesus; quia in omnibus divites facti estis in illo, in omni verbo et in omni scientia, sicut testimonium Christi confirmatum est in vobis, ita ut nihil defit vobis impulsus gratie: certainly a greater praise then this, he could not possibly give; but he addes afterward, Observo vos frateres per nomen Dominii nostri Jesu Christi ut id ipsum dicatis omnes, et non sint in vobis schismata; see here, after his praising them, how sharply he reprehends them. The contrary happens when one praising a man,
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A man, speaketh the truth, but with an ill intention, for it is then true flattery: and such a Prince should never endure to heare. And therefore S. Paul, passing with many others by a place, where stood a maid posessed with a devill; and hearing himselfe praised by that devill for a servant of God, he made him hold his peace, driving him out of the mayds body. Factum est antem emtibus nobis ad orationem, puellam quandam habentem spiritum Pythoneum obturare nobis; que quseum magnum prestabat Dominis suis; Divinando, hae subsecuta Paulum & nos, clamabant dicens: si ti homines servi Dei excelfi sunt, qui anmiitant vos viam salutis: boc antem faciebat multis diebus; dolens autem Paulus, & conversus spiritui, dixit: præcipio tibi in nomine Jesu Christi, exire ab ea, & exit eadem hora. There is no doubt, but the devill in praising Saint Paul and his companions said the truth; but because he did it not with a good intent, but to the end, that another time he might tell a lie, and be believed; therefore S. Paul made him goe forth of the maids body. And so ought it to be done to those, who sometimes speake the truth; but to the end, that another time they may more securely flatter. That such kind of praising is flattery, may easily be proved. For either it must proceed from friendship, or from mildnesse, or else from flattery. But it proceeds not from friendship, because a friend never praifeth out of interest; nor it proceeds not from mildnesse, because he by Aristotle is defined to be mild, who exceeds in his praises to give contentment; and difference him by this from a flatterer, who praifeth for his owne interest. So as we truely and upon good ground take this to be flattery; the rather being defined by S. Chrysostome, Adulatio est quando quadam volit quisquis, non propter quse colere soperet, sed ad capandum terrae; where this word Colit stands in place of the Genus; as being common both to a friend, and to him that is mild: and these
these words *Ad captandum terram*, stand in place of the difference; in which the essence of flattery consists.

Secondly, there may be an action, which of its own nature, is neither good nor bad, but from divers causes may receive a diverse forme. And it is where virtue is indeed and truly in a Prince, but is increased and made greater in the praising it. The liberality that was in *Tiberius* being celebrated by the Senators more then was cause; not to the end, he should increase it for the publike good; but to the end, to make him privately the more their friend, was flattery, which could not be so called, if it had been done for the publike good. And therefore when *Metellus* was extolled for the great valour and prowess he had shewed in managing the warre; because it was done to the end, he should continue, and hold on his course, as he did, was no flattery, but a good act, and so recorded by Historians.

Thirdly, there may be an act, of its owne nature bad and flattering; yet capable to become good from the intention; and it is when a Prince is praised for those vertues and conditions which are not in him, but which should be in him, so long as he is not guilty of the contrary vices.

Fourthly and lastly, there may be an act, I will not say, essentially flattering; but which seldom and very hardly can change its nature; and it is, when a Prince is praised for a vertue, being stayned with the contrary vice; as to call one mercifull, that is cruel...

It remaines to shew, which of these kinds is hurtfull to a Prince, and consequently to the subjects. Concerning the first, seeing flattery consists of two things; an action, and an intention; as being an action, it is tran- scient; as being an intention, it is imminent; as being an action, it is good; as an intention bad; lastly, as an action it is founded in the merite of the Prince, in
The eleventh Discourse.

which a passage away, as an intention, it is founded in the ill quality of the actor, in whom it remains; so as it cannot be hurtful to the Prince but by accident, when it is done, as to make an introduction, but hurtful to him that utters it; who thereby shews himself a wicked man, and an interested flatterer. For there is this difference between moral acts and works artificially, as Aristotle faith, that works of art passe away in the matter, and remain not in the workmanship, but acts of virtue remaining in our selves, require a goodness in the actor, which is of small importance in works artificially. But although in this, there appeare no great hurt, yet it will be alwaies good to imitate S. Paul, in discarding such persons: or rather to imitate our Lord Christ, who being flattered of the devil, (as Theophilus interprets it) when in Saint Lucy, he said, *Sciotequifs, fane* ille Dei: he instantly rebuked him, *Et increpavit illum diem, ob mittens eum.*

The second way that may either hurt, or profit a Prince, is taken from the object; for this praise is about an object, either good or bad: I mean, he whose virtues are extolled, is either vertuous and just as Metellus was, or vicious and wicked as Tiberius was. In the first case, it doth well, and was therefore very profitable to the Commonwealth: but in the second case, I like it not; in regard whereof, S. Gregory faith, *Injus et sapientia ab hominibus putatur.*

The third way is a little more difficult; yet as it is easier to be known, and hard to be done, so it can do but small hurt, to a City or a Prince. For if he shall believe there is such an opinion had of him, he will endeavour, so to carry himself, that his actions may answer that opinion; if not, to attain to that for which he is praised, at least to hide the contrary. And
for this perhaps Varro (as S. Austin relates) said, that it is profitable for a City, to flatter Princes, with making them believe, they are Sons of the Gods; because finding such an opinion had of them, either they will believe themselves to be such indeed; or at least believing themselves to be accounted such, they will endeavour to do nothing, that may be unworthy of Sons of the Gods. Nevertheless, (to return to our purpose) this way also receives goodness from the object; seeing, if we deal with bad Princes, it is no good course, to make them think, those virtues to be in them, where-of they have not any sparke; because, either they will believe that they are such; and then will never endeavour to be such; or at least, finding there is such an opinion had of them, they will content themselves with having the name. But on the other side, if we have to doe with a good Prince, it cannot be but very profitable; seeing although he should not believe himselfe to be such, nor had in such account; yet finding such virtue to be univerfally praised, he would for meriting the praise, apply himselfe to it: and much more, if he believe such an opinion to be had of him, for fearing of going lesse. Therefore S. Austin faith, Gratias agimus tibi uberes, quod nos laudas tanquam tales sumus: magnopere enim mortaris ut tales esse cupiamus. With this intention he conceives in another Epiftle, that Cicero praised Cæfar for clemency, Talem esse ostendebat Principem qualem illum fallaciter predicabat. So as from this kind of flattery, there will grow no hurt, but rather good: and the more, if the flatterer meaning to praise a Prince for something that is not in him, he praise him not for some vice; for this would rather provoke him to anger, to heare those vices attributed to him of which he is not guilty: and which are so much better known, as they are lesse like.

The last way also may be either good or bad. The
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Senate of Rome understanding that Macrinus, the most cruel man in the World, was chosen Emperor, presently determined to give him the name of Pius; which was not done without great judgment and mystery; & it did some good (though he accepted not the name) to mitigate in some part his cruelty. But contrariwise, when Nero afterward having killed his mother, and an infinite number of Senators, found himself applauded, and the name of a valiant man given him; it drowned him altogether in a flood of vices. Sequel in omnes libidines effudit: and a little after, Postquam cuncta secern pro egressis accipi videt, exturbat Octavianam, and so following. From these two contrary, at least unlike effects; I am moved to search out the reason, why the one of them, should be profitable rather than hurtful; and the other be the ruine of so many Citizens? To which I say, that this Act may receive alteration, either from the circumstance, or from the object. From the circumstance, seeing this praise may either be given for a vertue, farre different and contrary to a vice with which the Prince is tainted; or it may be given for a vertue, which is neere to that vice. If in the first case, we call one that is cruel, mercifull; as it is easy to be knowne; so it will doe more good then hurt; because this is rather a modest admonishing the Prince, then an impudent praising of his vices; but in the second case, to call one that is cruel, and a murtherer of his Senators and Citizens, by the name of a valiant man, and a freer of his Countrey; as it is a flattery hard to be knowne; so it is both to Prince and City most pernicious. Of the first sort, was the case of Macrinus: of the second, that of Nero. As concerning the object, he whom we praise for a vertue, either is stained before, being Prince, with the contrary vice, as Nero was: or else he comes but newly to be Prince, as Macrinus did; if he were stayned before, it can doe no good, al-
though the praise be for a virtue most remote from the vice; but if he come but newly to be Prince, it may then doe some good.

I will not omit (though this be not the proper place for it) to advertise, that a flatterer is a person, of whom a Prince ought to stand in feare; seeing two sorts of men may be his ruin: either, they that are too free; who using their freeness in praising their Lord, must needs give him cause to be afraid; or else they, that are too wary, who concealing their thoughts, are apt to make conspiracies; and the flatterer being of this sort, a concealour of his thoughts, gives the Prince just cause to seare him. And therefore Tiberius an understanding man, neither liked those that flattered too much, nor those that spake too freely; unde Augustus & hebraica Oratio, (sae Tacitus) sub Principe qui libertatem metuebat, adulationem oderat. And in another place, speaking of flattery, he saith, Que, moribus corruptis perinde auxps si nulla, & ubi Nimio est.

Postquam Bruto & Caio coesis, nulla jam publica arma Pompeius apud Siciliam oppressus, exutoque Lepido, interfecto Antonio, ne Julianis quidem partibus mihi Caesar Dux reliquius, posito triumviri nomine, consulam scerens & ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio

Jure contentum, ubi Militem donis ; Populum annos, cunctos dulcedine ostii pellexit.

What things helpe Augustus to the Empire, and what means he used to maintaine it.

The twelfth Discourse.

Cornelius Tacitus not only in these words, but also in a good part of the first Book, entreating of Augustus, labourst to shew what means he used to attaine the
The twelfth Discourse.

the Empire; and what to uphold him, having attained it. And my meaning is to follow his course, and punctually to examine all things: dividing my Discourse into two parts: the first, to shew the ways which Augustus used to attain the Empire; the second, the ways by which he maintained it.

The ordinary ways, as experience and men teach us, to come to a Principality, are either by fortune, or by vertue, or by wickednesse, or by craft, or by election; or lastly by succession.

Augustus then came to the Empire by fortune, which holpe him three ways: the first, that when Brutus and Cassius, who were his enemies, were dead; and that Lepidus and Antonius, his partners in greatness, were extinguished, he only remained of the Cæsarian faction: and therefore Tacitus speaking in what manner fortune ayded him, faith, Postquam Bruto Cassio catis; nulla jam publica arma, Pompeius apud Sicilian oppressus; exuto Lepido, Interfecto Antonio, ne Julianis quidem partibus nisi Caesar Dux reliquus: and so following.

This onely ayd of fortune, is the ablest way to raise one to a Principality: and therefore Pericles, (as Plutarch in his life relates) by this onely means became Prince of Athens, Postquam Aristides vita ce unfit, Themistocles exulatus abit, Cimonem bella, plerique cistra Græciam detinueret, ibidemum Pericles populo se dedid.

But this alone did not serve Augustus, but fortune in another manner gave him assistance: for the stoutest Citizens, being part banished, and part slaine in batailes, it was an easie matter to attain the Empire without any let. This second ayd of fortune, Tacitus expresseth, where he faith, Insurgere paulatim, munia Senatus, Magistratum legumque in se trahere; nullo adversante, cum ferocissimi peraces, aut proscriptione cecidissent. Not lesse apt then the first, is this ayd, to make a change in States; seeing the people of Tarantum, only because
because the greater part of the Nobility were dead in warre, was easily able to change the state; whereupon Aristotle faith, Continetur vero quando quidem id, (the change of the State) per fortunam, velut apud Tarquinium, cannis superatis pratis, & Lapiigeallows Nobilitatis magni partem anneffent.

But fortune not content with this neither gave Augustus another ayd also, to make himselfe Emperour: which was, that he found the Common-wealth wearied with discords, and the Provinces oppressed by Magistrates; which Tacitus describing faith, Contus discordis civilibus fessus; nomine Principis sub Imperium acceptit: and of the Provinces he adds, Nuper Provinciae illum verum statum abunnabunt, suffecto Senatus populique Imperio, and that which followeth.

This way was the onely caufe that brought Vitellius to be Lord of Milan; and Bentivoli to be Lord of Bologna.

Yet fortune by all these waies had not power her selfe alone, to bring Augustus to the Empire; though (as we have shewed) each of them of it selfe were apt to doe it; but secondarily there concurred with them his own valour, which he shewed in so many batailles; and lastly, in that Navall fight; by means whereof he came to be Emperour. And although this alone had beene sufficient to bring him to the Empire, as was seen in Vitellius; who by getting the victorie onely in one bataille against Otho made himselfe the Lord of Rome; yet Augustus, besides fortune and his owne venue, brought himselfe forward by desere, as having enlarged the Roman Empire, Mari Oceano, head undatus longinquus fiprum Imperium; by this way have many come to be Princes, as Statamius, and others. And Aristotle himselfe approves it, where he faith, Deedere ubi beneficia acceptit Reper Cremerie; Which Saint Thomas expounding faith, Vel quiu pugnavit domum inimicorum.
But besides fortune, virtue, and merit, Augustus brought himself forward by wickedness and perfidiousness also, which ayed him two ways: First, by making use of those arms to oppress his Country, which he had received to defend it, _Arma que in Antoniæ seque contra Romanæ publicam versa_: and indeed, there cannot be a greater wickedness, then when benefits are turned against him of whom they are received: and therefore our Lord God, meaning by the mouth of Esay, to shew the ungratefulness & wickedness of the Hebrew people, faith, _Filios ematrivi, & exaltavi_, _ipsi autem separunt me_; Where the Chaldee paraphræse faith, _Tulis te aurome, atque de Argento meo, quæ dedi tibi, & fecisti tibi Imagines Masculinas_. This way was also followed by Hiero the Syracusan, who employed that Army to oppose the Commonwealth, which he had received to defend it.

But neither did this wickedness of Augustus serve his turne, in committing so many murthers, as Tacitus describes where the faith, _Pietatem erga parentem & tempora republ. e obtentuis sumptam_. And againe, _Cassii & Brontorun exitus paterum inimicitia datos; deceptos post Antoniam Tarentinæ, Brundusioque sedere; et nuptiis soarinus ille cum, subdole affirmatis poenas mortis exolvi sese._ But not only this wickedness, with so many other causes spoken of before, concurred; though this alone were enough to bring a man to a Kingdom, as it did Aga, thocles the Sicilian, and Cleomenet the Spartan and many others; a way unworthy to be imitated, not only of Christians, but even of Barbarians. But besides all these, that which ayed Augustus was craft and policy, for being called in by his owne Citizens, and they divided into Commons and Nobility; _The Comment by reason of oppression by the great ones; the Nobles by reason of common dissension_, desired rather to have
have a king and be safe; then to have liberty, and be in danger: So as Augustus, Ad munendum plebem, took upon him the dignity of a tribune; and to be aided by the Nobility, advanced them in honours and riches, who Novis ex rebus auti, tutæ et presentia, quam vetera & periculosa nullo. For safety is so sweet a thing, that the people liked better of servitude with safety, than of liberty with danger. And therefore the Israelites finding that the Canaanites were a valiant Nation, were ready rather to turne backe into Egypt and be slaves; then to stay in Canaan and be in danger. As it happened also in Exodus, when they saw Pharaoh coming, Nunquid non erant Sepulchra in Egypto, quando se-debamus super ollas carninam? And therefore the Romans having driven out the Kings, doubted left the the people, if the Tarquins should make warre upon Rome, would not to resolve, rather to receive the tyrant againe, and live in peace; then continue in liberty, and be still in danger. Nee hostes modo timebant (faith Livy) sed hostes met ipsos eives, ne Romana plebs, metu perculsa, receptis in urbem regibus, vel cum servitute pacem acciperet. And here is to be noted, that men will alwaies be more moved with private interest, then with publicke profit; and that every one had rather be a slave and rich, then to be free and poore. Whereof I will bring one example out of Dio: Caesar having before him the Army of Scipio; caused Letters to be carried into the enemies Tents, wherein he friendly promised the Souldiers honours and riches, and to the Coun-trymen, to save their goods untouched; and by this means, he drew them all to come to his side: on the contrary, Scipio also being forced to use the same device of sending Letters into Cæsar's Camp, perswaded them to be of his side, in defence and for the good of the Commonwealth; putting them in mind, of the great benefit of liberty: for all which perswasions, there was not
not a man that would offer to go from Caesar; whereby we may plainly see, that ordinarily men preferre profit before honesty. And where it may be objected, that people infinite times make insurrections only for their liberty: it is easily answered, if we consider that under that name of liberty, they always thinke, or are made beleev, there is great profit to be had: and therefore they desire liberty, not as an end, but as a means to another end.

But to returne to our purpose; besides so many causes alleged, concurring in favour of Augustus; this of election also is to be added: that he was chosen by the Senate, by the people, and by the Souldiers; by which meanes infinite others have obtained the Roman Empire: and so it happened amongst the Graecians, so the Pope, so the Kings of Polan, so the Emperour in our times, by this meanes onely of being elected, attaine their Principalities.

Lastly, it may be also said, that he came to be Emperour by succession, as being the next of kin to Caesar; to whom by right of succession, besides his being made his heire by his Will, the Empire belonged.

We may then say, that Augustus came to be Emperour, neither by fortune, nor by wickednesse, nor by policy, nor by merit, nor by election, nor by succession, but by all of them together; seeing each of these, (as I have before shewed) being apt of it selfe to raise a man to the Empire, certainly all of them concurring in Augustus could not choose but effect it.

And thus much for his attaining the Empire; now for holding it, thus gotten: we say, that an Empire may be held, either from the Nobility, or from the people, or from the Souldiers; and that either by love or by force. With the people it is held by procuring of plenty, and that the poore be not wronged by the rich; there being nothing that makes a Prince more beloved.
beloved of the people, than to keep them safe from
the insolence of great men. And therefore the Holy
Ghoft meaning to shew the cause, why all Nations
should serve that King, faith, Omnes Gentes servirent ei,
quia liberavit populum a potente: and a little after, Et
honorabile Nomen eorum coram illo. S. Hierome reads it, Ex
pretiosus erit sanguis eorum coram illo, That is, they shall
hold the honour of the King in great account, and
shall not leave unpunished whosoever shall imbue
their hands in his blood; as was seen in the conspiracy
against Cæsar. This therefore Augustus knowing, tooke
upon him the power of a Tribune, Et ad tuendum ple-
bem Tribunitio jure contentum: and suffered them not to
be in want, knowing that safety without plenty is
little esteemed: and therefore he faith, Populum
amnum.

Now for Noble men, they are of two sorts; stout,
and timorous. In the stout, there is no trusting, being
men that extremely skorne a servile condition; and
consequently extremely hate a tyrant. And therefore
it was necessary, Augustus should send such into banish-
ment or to the wars; and they once dead, he then
remained secure and without feare of any new hatred.
To the timorous and quiet are to be given honours;
for a Gentleman hath no other end, but honour: and
of these, the Prince ought to make use in peace; and
as for warre he need not feare them: therefore Tacitus
faith, Ceteri Nobilium quanto quis servitio promptior opibus
& honoribus extolluntur: ac Novis ex rebus ausi, tuta &
præsentia quam vetera & periculo sa mallet. Where it is
to be observed, that by ceteri he means, those onely
that were not stout; there following, without any
words between, Cum ferocissimi per acies aut proscriptione
cecidissent.

Augustus then did well, to advance many of the
Noble men, above the others; & especially those, that
shewed
The thirteenth Discourse.

They showed themselves most ready to do him service. First, to the end, that such example might draw others to the like servitude, thereby to gaine the like honour. Secondly, to the end that seeing honours attained to under a Prince, which could never have beene attained in a Common-wealth, they might the better be contented with such a State; and therefore Aristotle amongst the means for conserving a Kingdom, forgets not to speake of this, where he faith, Atque eos quos qui suntu in re honorabiliter se gessint honores; ita ut non existimemus magnos se magis honorari in civitate degentibus potissi. Thirdly, Augustus did well, to advance many great ones above others, because as where equality is, a Kingdom there is hardly raised, and liberty easily maintained: so where there is inequality, a Kingdom there is easily preserved: and therefore a Prince is to be commended, that removeth many from equality; to the end there may be seen a certaine proportion, and not one to be unequall, and all the rest equall. The reason of this, in my opinion, is, because when onely one is seen unequall, all the rest will have a desire to reduce him to equality, and by some means or other to rid him away; but when there are many unequals, the inferiours not only will never be moved to conspire against the Prince, because they should never by this means come to equality: but also they will not suffer any other to doe it, resting satisfied in this, that as themselves have many unequals, their superiours; so those have the Prince unequall, and their superiour: and in this at least they shall be equall, that they are all of them inferiour to one.

But because obedience is hardly found, especially in new states, if there be not force concurring; whereupon the Throne of Salomon, which by Writers is taken for obedience, was compassed about with twelve Lyons; seeing they who desire to be obeyed, ought together
together with generosity, have force also to make
them be obeyed; and therefore the holy Ghost in the
mouth of Solomon faith, Sicut Turris David, collum tuum;
quæ ædificata est cum propagulis; mille clypeï pendent ex
easæm armiture fortium. This Tower hath so many de-
fences, because it is put for a figure of obedience; mean-
ting to shew, that they who desire to preserve obe-
dience, have need of all sorts of Arms to defend it: for
these causes, Augustus knowing this, and having an
Army in his hand, able to make him be obeyed by
force, if need should be, he made the Soldiers sure to
him, by donatives of which they are most greedy:
whereupon it may be said, that Augustus maintained
his Empire, neither by the Nobility, nor by the peo-
ple, nor by the Soldiers; neither by love, nor yet by
force, but by all of them together.

Et ad tuendam plebem Tribunitio Iure
contentum, ubi Militem donis, Populum annona,
cunctos dulcedine oti pellexit.

How Princes may get the people's love: how a private man
ought to make use of the people's favour; and what part
it hath in bestowing the Empire.

As safety is not enough to give the people satisfaction, if it be not accompanied with plenty;
and therefore the Israelites, though they lived safe
under their leader Moses, yet when plenty failed, they
desired against the servitude of Pharaoh: so neither
doth plenty give satisfaction, if it be not accompanied
with peace, as was plainly seen in that people; for
when those men returned whom Japhna had sent into
the
the Land of Promise, to make known the fruitfulneffe
of the Countrey, yet when they heard there were in it
great store of Gyants, onely for this, they liked better
to stay in the Wildernesse in peace, then to goe to
a Land flowing with Milke and Honey with warre; the
desire of living quietly prevailing more with them,
than the enjoying of plenty.

Three things then are required in a people, to make
then absolutely happy: safety from being oppressed
by those at home; peace with those abroad; and plenty.
Whereupon our Lord God meaning to shew the
happinesse in which his people should live, expresseth
these three things by the mouth of his Prophet Ethan,
where he saith, Sedebit populus meus in plenitudine pacis,
here is peace: in Tabernaculis fiduciae, here is safety: In
requisite opulentia, here is plenty. Such a like happinnesse
Tacitus shewes that Rome had; or to say better, the
people of Rome under the Dominion of Augustus;
where he saith, Et aeternam plebem Tribunitione contentum:
see here, by making himselfe protector of the
people, he made them safe from oppression at home:
Ubipopulum Annona, see here, plenty: Cunctos dulcedine atis pellexit, see here, the safety from forraine enemie,
which is peace; for by the word Otium in this
place (as I shall shew in another discourse) he meanes
nothing else but peace.

But because many gather from this place, seeing Augustus
obtained and maintained his Empire by the
love of the people, that therefore this is the true way,
for all others to rise from a privit man to be a Prince;
and the rather because a place in Aristotle confirmed by
many examples seem to concurr in this opinion, where he saith, Ex professo antiquorum Tyrannorum plu-
rimis populos dominiosus fudit sine iuri; I shall be forced
in discoursing of this matter, to proceed with diffi-
cution, as finding many places directly contrary to this;
and
The thirteenth Discourse.

and particularly in the forefaid Tacitus, who in another place shewes, that the peoples favour is rather a ruine than a fortune to great men; where in the third of his Annals he faith, Breves & Insanctos Romanes populi amores.

I say then, that he who is in the peoples favour, either he hath a mind to make himselfe Prince, or he hath not: if he have no such mind, he shall doe better to avoyd those demonstrations with safety, which without any benefit makes him ruine into danger; seeing a good intention is not sufficient, where it is equally dangerous, to have such imputation, whether wrongfully or juftly, as Tacitus well faith, Si obiectiantur etiam insontibus, périculośa: because Princes, as foone as they fee the peoples favour enclinig to another, presently have him in suspition; and therefore David began to be hated of Saul, as foone as he knew the people loved him: whereupon in the booke of the Kings, the holy Spirit faith, Postuque eum Saul, supra viris belli, & acceptus erat in oculis Universi populi, maxime; in conspectu sanctuosum Saul: and a little after, Non relictis ergo oculis, Saul respiciebat David, a die illa & deinceps.

Likewise when the myfyticall David, Christ, was seene to the Jewes, to enter triumphantly into Hierusalem on Palme-funday, with great applause of the people, they presently began to conspire against him: The like hapned to Germanicus, whose cafe was much like that of Aristobulus; both of them being gracious with the people, young men of goodly presence, both; both of them next to the Crowne; under most cruell tyrants, Herod the great, and Tiberius Nero; both of them for the same causes put to death by fraud: one bewailed counterfetly of Herod; the other, feignedly of Nero; by whom in truth they came to their deaths. Of these then, it may be said, Breves & insanctos populi amores.
The thirteenth Discourse.

But if he that is in the people's favour, have an intention, to make himselfe Prince, we must then distinguish, for either the people's favour towards him grows out of a discontentment towards the Prince; or it comes out of anger arising from some sudden accident: if in the first case, he that will make use of their favour, if he be able to hide it, which is a difficult thing, shall doe well to wait for some good occasion: seeing he may assure himselfe, that as discontentment increaseth by little and little, and is nourished in minds once discontented, to it is hard, or rather impossible, it should vanish on a sudden: and therefore if he stay for a good beginning, where there hath preceded a good occasion, as I have shewed in another discourse, there can be no doubt of having good success.

Princes therefore must take heed, they give the people no such occasions which are so much more dangerous, as they are lesse violent: because in such cases men are not moved with every light wind; but waiting for a fit opportunity, they then shew their minds when they see they have power to doe it, with the ruine of the Prince. And there needs no other proofe of this, than the examples of the Aragonesi, and of Ludogico Moro. But if the people be moved to ayd him, out of choler, this, as it is lesse dangerous for the Prince, to to him that would make use of it, it is more difficult: First, because when the beginnings are not preceded by fit occasions, as hath been shewed in the like cases, it seldome takes any good effect: And therefore when the people would have risen against Tiberius, openly out of choler, because he had taken from them that small authority they had; this insurrection not being preceded by mature judgement, there was none would take upon him to be Head, and so the enterprize came to nothing. Secondly, because the occasion which is founded upon choler, will noe cease,
The thirteenth Discourse.

cease, and is never able to continue; and as it growes coole, makes men repent them of what they had done. And you cannot lay, that having provoked the Prince with choler, there is now a necessity to follow that Head for feare; with whom, partaking in fault, they partake alio in fortune; for this is directly the overthrow of the businesse, because having provoked the Prince, and with their insurrection, and knowing they may please him againe with killing their Head, they will easily be drawne to murder him. Nevertheless, he that will make use of the people's favour, resorting to any honour, which he thinks is his due, let him give them no time to thinke of the matter, but once perfwaded, let him suddenly venture. Don Antonio of Portugal, finding he had the people's favour, instantly without delaying any time, made use of it, and it took effect. So Bardiuns called in by the Parthians, that would drive out Gotarze, went about it with all suddenness; and having gotten possession, knowing the inconstancy of that people, he suddenly fortified all the principal places of the Countrey. It is therefore no marvell, that Caius Caius gave counsell to seize upon the Kingdom suddenly, knowing the Parthians to be fickle and inconstant; and this suddenness ought the rather to be used, because for the most part, a people in insurrections is drawn to do things, which though good, yet are repugnant to their Genius: and therefore if time be given them, they soone perceive their error, and thereupon repent, and put presently their repentance in execution. The Souldiers of Nero's guard, were with great cunning perfwaded to give their consent to his death; but when they had time given them to perceive their error, they suddenly turned to take revenge, and it took effect. Miles Ubanus longo Caesarem Sacramento imputat, et invenit, dum Neronem aures magna & impulsa quam tenui mediis tradidit.
Another example we have in the second of Tacitus his Annals; where speaking of Vonone, whom Tiberius at their desire had sent to the Parthians, he faith, that at first they received him with great applause, *Et accipere barbari Lætantes prouit ferme ad nova imperia*; but those people thinking afterward of the matter, though he were a King of good conditions, and profitable for them, yet, because he came from the Emperour of Rome, and consequently contrary to the *Genius* of that Nation, they first repented them, and afterward expelled him. Mox subiit pudor degeneravisse Parthos petitus alio ex orbe Regem; and that which followeth. This then may passe for a general rule, alwaies when either through eloquence, or threatening, or reward, or any other cunning, a man is induced to doe a thing against his *genius*, seeing it depends upon his will, it is like to last no longer then he hath time to thinke upon it: and therefore the best course in such cases, is so to manage the businesse, that having once perswaded him, it be not left in his power to repent, as Bardamus did, by fortifying himself presently. So Jehu, who in the life of Joram, was accepted King by Gods appointment, seeing the good inclination of the people towards him, and knowing that if he gave them time he should never perswade them to set upon their naturall Lord, he went instantly to find out Joram, and slew him. This reason is taken into consideration by Abulensis, where he faith, *Quia tenuis vigor Jehu erat in hoc, quod populus concorditer adjuvare illum volebas: si tamen differret opus ad aliquam tempus, forte animi viorum capererent, et nollent insurgere contra Dominum suum antiquam*. But the contrary of this being done by Julius Campitolumus, and Spurius Emilius in Livy, both the one and the other were forsaken of the people, and they runne themselves into no small danger. For the people indeed are never
never able to continue long in dissensions; having trades which they must necessarily follow to get their living; which Aristotle considering, is of the mind, that there cannot be a better kind of people in a City, then that which consists of Husbandmen; because being forced to attend their occupation, they are not able to stay long in seditions. He therefore that will make use of the people, for the purpose aforesaid, let him dispatch it, and doe it so speedily, that they may have no time given to repent them.

I cannot omit here to examine the reason, why the people oftentimes doe good actions upon the sudden, and such as upon mature deliberation they would not doe; and forbearing for brevities sake, certaine reasons which every one of himselfe may easily conceive, I only say, that this proceeds from the weakness of their understanding; It being their custome, either to doe nothing that is good; or else to doe it upon the sudden; because as Aristotle faith, All weake things come soon to their accomplishiment and height; seeing nature, which is moved by the intelligences, and by God, bestowes little time upon the growth of base things, as is seen in Pompions, and other Herbs of small moment. Another reason may be taken from the said Aristotle, who speaking of the Ancients who made the first principles contraries, faith, Quae est veritatis ipsa coacta; whereas S. Thomas learnedly shews, that as a stone of his owne nature descends downward, and fire ascends upward; so the understanding naturally follows the better apperance; and therefore weake understandings, if they doe at any time any good thing, they must doe it naturally, and consequently upon the sudden; for if they have time to thinke upon it, then the counsell which they give, or the action which they doe, will be no longer natural but Artificial; and therefore weake understandings are not perfected by delibe-
deliberation, but rather confounded, and by this means would oftentimes goe astray. This then is the Philosophicall and Real reason, why many having done something that is good, doe afterward by thinking upon it, and deliberating, spoyle and overthrow it.

For resolution therefore, and to make the fore-alleged passages to agree, I say, that the people are not the whole cause of raising one to a Royalty, but only concurre as a cause in part; neither yet the people together with the Nobility, sufficient to make an alteration, where there are Souldiers; and therefore not without cause Tacitus faith, Breves & infausios populi Romani amores: because the City of Rome was never without Prætorian Souldiers. Of this there is a plaine example, in the whole siege of Nola, in Livy; and to speake of our owne times, in Verona, where the people having a mind to rise in favour of the Venetians, yet because the souldiers of the King of France and of the Emperour were within it, they were not able to doe any thing of moment. We may therefore conclude, that the people alone can never be an absolute meanes to raife a man to a Principality, if it be not upon a suddaine, and that there be no Souldiers in the place; for against them there is no good to be done, although they should have the Nobility to assist them: but the people together with the souldiers, may easily raife one to the Empire, and when Tacitus faith, Breves & infausios populi Romani amores, he means it of the people alone; but in this present place, he speaks of the people and souldiers together; which plainly appeares, because having said, Et at tumiandam plebem Tribunitio jure contentum, he addes, Ubi militem donis: shewing he well knew, that together with the people, the souldiers must concurre. And Aristotle differes not from Tacitus, nor yet from my opinion, but rather
rather confirms both the one and the other: seeing, where he gives a reason, how it happened, that in ancient times the favourites of the people came to be Lords, he faith, that the same man who was powerfull with the people, was also Leader of the Army; and so, had both people and soldiers of his side. And addes withall, that whosoever of late time hath attempted any thing, relying only upon the people, hath never brought his purpose to any good passe: A manifest argument, that the people concurre as a cause in part, if the soldiers joyne with them: Verus quisem temporebus (faith he) quando idem erat potens in populo ex Bello, Dux, Popularis Respublica in Tyrannidem mutabatur, & profecto antiquorum Tyrannorum plurimi ex popularibus hominibus facili sunt: causa autem cur tum fierent, non autem munus, illa est, quod qui tum in populo maxime poterat, ex his erat qui bello praeficirebantur.

Ubi Militem donis.

How the Donatives which are given to soldiers are profitable to raise a man, and to maintain him in the Empire: and when it is that Military discipline is corrupted by them.

The fourteenth Discourse:

Here are two things chiefly that move men to follow the warres; Acquiring of honour, and augmentation of ritches; and both these are in Donatives: for Donatives, as to the thing it selfe, is an augmentation of wealth; and comming from the Princes hand, as a testimony of the soldiers valour, they are an augmentation of Honour. It is therefore no marvel that Augustus, not only at his entrance into the Empire, but even from his childhood, used with Donatives to winne the soldiers...
The fourteenth Discourse.

diers love, seeing they are able to corrupt the wíjest and best men; as our Lord God in Exodus hath left written, Nec accipies munera que etiam excelsant prudentes, & subvertunt verba justorum. Whereupon not without cause, S. John in the Apocalypse, calls them by the name of Witchcraft, where speaking of Rome under the figure of Babylon he faith, Quia mercatores tu erant Principes terræ, quia in beneficis tuis erraverunt omnes Gentes. Where S. John intends to shew, according to the opinion of some, that Rome by means of gifts, as it were with sorcery, had drawn the greatest part of the world, to the adoration of Idols. Tiberius therefore knowing what power there is in them, when Junius Gallus had moved in the Senat, that Gifts and Honours should be bestowed upon the soldiers of his Guard, he sharply reproved him (faith Tacitus) veluti coram rogitans, quid illi cum militibus esset, quos neque dixit Imperatoris, neque Premia ab Imperatore accipere posset.

Yet the introduction of Donatives was to the Commonwealth of Rome of exceeding great damage. First, they have been, (as I shall shew in fit place) in great part the cause, why the City of Rome, freed once from tyranny by Lucius Brutus, was never afterward able, being oppressed by the House of the Caesars, to recover its liberty; the Donatives having put the election into the soldiers hands, and they, not to lose so great a gaine, would alwaies rather have an Empeour for their private profit, than a Commonwealth for the publike benefit. Secondly, because having an Army in their hand, on which the election and safety of the Empeours depended, as men greedy of money, they were moved to stand for him who offered most, in such sort, that at last they came to set it, at who gives more: and because as Aristotle in his Politicks well observes, when Honours are bestowed in a City, in regard of riches, it is an easie matter for every Plebeian to be-
It is therefore a clear case, that these Donatives were the mine of the City of Rome; from whence also may be inferred, that they were hurtful to the Prince, whose profit depended upon the welfare of the City. But because the contrary happens where tyrants govern, I shall be forced to examine, whether the introduction of Donatives were for the Emperours benefit, or no. Many approve the affirmative part, as moved not only by the said place of Tacitus, where he sheweth, they were to Augustus a special helpe; but by the example also of Cæsar, who by this means, both obtained and maintained the Empire. And it availes not to say, that he was there slaine, because seeing one mans indignation was enough to make a Prince be murthered; the difference that may be taken from the ones well, and the others ill governing, for conserving the Empire, ought not to be taken from a violent death, but rather that death being revenged, and the antient successours replaced in their states: I see not, how there can be a greater signe, of proceeding with judgement for his owne security, being able even after his death, with his only name, to procure his revenge, and to settle the Empire in his owne family; a hard matter oftentimes for the best Princes to obtain, who yet have the favour of God, to die a natural death. This example therefore, (to omit many others, of which Histories are full) is an evident proofe, that Donatives to the Souldiers, were profitable to the Roman Emperours, not only to attaine the Empire, but also to maintaine them in it. Nevertheless, for the Negative part, there want not examples to the contrary, not only of Otho, but of infinite other Emperours, who by giving excessive Donatives, lost the Empire.
For resolution, we must proceed with distinction; either he that comes to the Empire, is the first that brought in Donatives, as Caesar the Dictator; and Octavian Augustus were; and then not only they help to attain, but also to maintain the Empire; and therefore Tacitus intimates it as a praise to Augustus, where he saith, Ubi Militem Donis; or else he is not the first, but finds it a custom brought in before, and then as it may be a good means to attain the Empire; so it is a certain ruin for maintaining it. The reason of this difference is, because the soldiers not being accustomed to receive Donatives; the first time it is given to them, they acknowledge it as a gift of the Prince's bounty, and account themselves obliged for it; and more than so, not knowing whether they should receive the like from others, they endeavour to uphold him in the Empire; hoping hereafter to have those things by merit, which the Prince at this time hath given them of courtesy. But if they have been accustomed to have Donatives, and it hath been a use amongst them, then, where in the first, they acknowledged them the only bounty of the Prince, and received them as gifts of grace; now accounting them as debt, they take them as rewards of due, which if it be denied them, it then causeth an implacable hatred against the Prince, and at last, his ruin; and if it be granted them, yet this encreaseth not the soldiers' love, who count not themselves behold'ning to the Prince for them, but as fellows accustomed to have money without pains, they spend it frolickly, and that spent, they expect new Donatives; which if a Prince may satisfy a while, yet he cannot hold out to do so long, but that at last he must be fain to deny them; and when this happens, they presently fall to choose a new Emperor of whom they may receive it; and this hath been in Rome, the ruin and death of many, as everyone may read and
and fee. We may therefore conclude, that Donatives to the soldiers are very profitable to all for attaining the Empire, but that the introduction of Donatives for them that were not the first, is very pernicious for maintaining them in it. And Galba having already attained the Empire, and knowing this, openly made it known, that he meant to give no more Donatives to the soldiers, as resolved to take away so great an abuse, Accesit Galba vox, pro Republica, honesta, ipsi ances; legi a se Militem, non emi, but it had an unhappy issue: First, because (as I have shewed in another Discourse) the Soldiers were against their genius induced to abandon Nero; and therefore it had been fit, with the same cunning to have held them in, and not have suffered them to be conscious of their error. Miles Urbano longo Cesarum Sacramentum inbutus, & ad destinandum Neronem, arte magis & impulsi, quam si ingenio traductus, postquam nase duri Donatium sub nomine Galba, and that which follows. Secondly, having gotten no reputation amongst the soldiers, and by reason of his age, being apt to be contemned, he should rather, with liberality have gotten their love, than through covetousness have procured their hate. Non enim ad hanc formam (faith Tucidus, to not giving Donatives to Soldiers) Cetera erat; inequalum, senem; and that which follows. Thirdly, if he would not give Donatives himself; yet at least, he should have taken order, that no other in his prejudice, should have given them; which, because he did not doe, he therefore with his avarice was by Otho's liberality easily oppressed. Quibus Galba, apud Otho num epularetur, cohorti excubias agenti, virum centenos munus divide ret, quâ velut publicam largitionem Otho securioribus apud singulos premiis, intendebat, adeo animosus corruptor ut Cocceio Proculo speculatori de parte finium cum vicino am- bigenti, universum vicini agrum sua pecunia emptum, done
dederit per secondiam Prefepti. Fourthly, to take away a custome so inveterate, he should have contented himselfe in the beginning; with onely moderating it; especially, seeing he might have obtained his purpose, with any small donative, Constat putuisse conciliari animos (faith Tacitus) quantum sequique parcit senis liberalitate; nuncit antiquus vigor, & nimia severitas, cui jam parer non fimus. By which words we may plainly see, that Tacitus blames not his severity, but the excessiveness of it; whereupon Vespasian who knew as much as Galba knew, tooke a better course, and had his intent. For moderating only the donatives of the soouldiers, he left them not altogether without hope of having some; & by this meanes, he preserved himselfe in the Empire, and yet corrupted not the soouldiers: Ne Vespasianus quidem plus civilis bello obtinuit, quam alii in pace, egregie firmis adversus militarem largitionem, et que exercitu meliore.

If any should now enquire, whether donatives to the soouldiers corrupt Military Discipline, or no? I would briefly Answer, That rewards uphold it, but that donatives corrupt it: and the reason is, because donatives being such as are given without cause, the soouldier may alwaies by the same right demand them; and whilst he stands waiting for this ayd, from the Prince, he becomes idle and good for nothing. But rewards given for some notable service, cannot but for such service be demanded, and that soouldiers should endeavour to do such services, is a matter of great profit to Military discipline. And therefore Caesar, with Rewards, made his soouldiers more valorous, and Otho, with donatives corrupted them.
The fifteenth Discourse.

Populum Annona.

How much it importa a Prince for getting the peoples love, to maintaine plenty, by what meanes scarcity happens, and how it may be helpt, and how a Prince may make good use of it.

The fifteenth Discourse,

Above all things for winning the peoples love, a Prince must take care there may be plenty; in regard whereof, Cæsar ordained two Ædiles, whose employment was onely to this purpose. Also Augustus knowing of how great importance this is, (as Tacitus relates) amongst other secrets of his government, had alwaies a great jealoufie of Egypt, from whence all the Corne for maintenance of plenty in Rome, came; and indeed both the one and the other understood it rightly, because, as the want thereof is apt to cause insurrections amongst the people, as was often seen amongst the Israelites against Moses, who if God had not mightily protected him, had oftentimes for this onely been in manifest danger: so on the contrary, the onely plenty of things is enough of it selfe to raise a man to the Empire; As was seen at Rome, when the City was so opprest with a dearth, that the Citizens chose rather to die in the water of Tiber, than to stay upon the Land, and be starved with hunger. And he that will see an example of this, may consider how our Lord Jesus Christ, having fed a multitude that followed him in the Wilderneffe, he had presently the acclamations to be a King, or a Prophet, Illi ergo hujus (saith S. John) cum vidisset quod Jesus fecerat signum, (that is of the bread and fish he gave them) dixit, hujus vna hic est veræ Prophetæ qui venturus est nueue;
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being able to maintain his people in plenty, by reading, Jeſus ergocum cognovisset, quiaventurensent ut rapere
tem, & facerent eum Regem, fuit interim in montem; but they another time, desiring to eate, asked him bread, Domine semper das nobis panem hunc; and he at that time denying to give them temporall bread, the multitude, which before when he gave them meat, had called him a Prophet, and would have had him for their King, now they call him a Carpenters fonne, for no other cause, but because he denied them corporal bread, when he meant to set them at Gods owne Table: Munimrabant ergo Judæi die illo, quia dixisset ego sum panis vivens, qui de Calo descendit, & dicebant nonne hic est filius Joſeph cuius nos novimus patrem & matrem? Whereupon as S. Chryſoſtome obſerves, in making mention of the miracles and stupendious Acts of Mōyses, they omitted all other, though farre more marvellous, and mentioned onely that of Manna, Patres nostri manducaverunt Manna in deserto.

A Prince therefore must of necessity, either maintain plenty, or else leave his Principality, and specially one that comes newly to the Empire, as Augustus did. And therefore Efay, Propheſying of one whom the Iſraelites should require to accept the Kingdome, shewes that if they knew him not able to maintain plenty, they shou’d not accept him, In domo mea non est panis moliti constiture me Regem super vos. Being assured, he could never hold his Principality with shearth, as it hapned to Promethus King of the Scythians, who not being able to maintain his people in plenty, by reason the Land was overflowed with the River Aquila, he was cast into Prifon; and because Herčules turned that River into the Sea, and made the Country fruitfull, the fable came up, that an Eagle devoured the liver of Promethus, and that Herčules freed him.
The fifteenth Discourse.

Having shewed, that Augustus in the beginning of his reign, wonne the people to him by procuring of plenty, it will be necessary to shew, how dearth happen, and by what means they may be helpe, and how farre the Prince is faulty in them.

A dearth may happen first, from the barrenness of the soile, as it happened to the Israelites in the Wilderness.

Secondly, it may happen, for want of Husbandmen to till the ground, which if it were tilled, would be very sufficient and have to spare, as in times past, it happened in Mesopotamia, and in our time would often happen in the Sea coasts of Siena, if the care of the Serenissimo the great Duke did not supply the want of Husbandmen.

Thirdly, it may happen through abundance of people, and smallness of Territory, as in ancient time it would have happened at Rome, and would in our time at Florence, if the one had not then had the Countries of Egypt and Sicilie for a Granary, and the other had not now a gracious and provident Prince for a purveyor.

Fourthly, it may happen through the sterility of the season, and of the yeere, as particularly this yeere 1621.

Fifthly, many times there are Husbandmen and land enough to till, but is not tilled, either by reason of warre, or for some other cause, as it happened at Rome not long after the banishment of the Tarquins; the people (as Livy relates) by reason of dissentions with the Senate, refusing to till their grounds, in such sort that they wanted not much of dying for hunger.

Lastly, it happens oftentimes, either by reason of a siege, as in Hierusalem, where mothers did eate their owne children; or through incursions of enemies, as in Athens all the time of the civil warre.
And although in none of these cases, any just blame can be laid upon the Prince, yet it is his part to use all means, with money, diligence and power, to make resistance against fortune, nature, and all accidents whatsoever.

In the first case, I shall not need to trouble myself to shew, how a dearth may be helpt in desart places; seeing he might well be accounted a man without brain, that would build a City, in a Countrey altogether barren: and though it were so with the Israelites, yet their Tabernacles were for passage and not for habitation.

If it should happen in the second case, that is for want of men, where there is Land sufficient; here the Prince must induce men to marry, and draw in strangers to dwell in the Countrey; the first will take effect, if the course of Lycurgus be observed, who seeking to make the City of Sparta populous, allowed great exemptions to them that begot children, or else if disburrning them of taxes, (as the Duke of Parma at this day doth in his State of Castro) he shall give occasion, that gathering wealth, they may endeavour to have children to whom to leave it; and by this course, he shall be able to draw strangers also to come and live there. For men run willingly even with danger of their lives, where they see there is certaine & present profit to be had, never having a thought of a future and uncertaine death. Wherof we have example in the State of Milan, where in some places the ayre is so unwholsome, that few of the inhabitants ever come to be forty yeeres old; yet in these places, men growing rich, although they see this example daily before their eyes, yet they choose rather to dwell there, than in other places of wholesome ayre. Another course also may be taken, for this inconvenience, by drawing thither, a forraigne Nation, as Antiochus did, who causing two thousand
A thousand families of Jews to come and dwell in the Countries of Mesopotamia and Babylon; (as Josephus relates) assigned them Land to till; and places where to build, and then exempting them for ten years from tribute, he lastly gave order, they should have so much Corn given them, as might serve them to live, till their own should be reaped.

And lastly, those who dwell in such ayres, and in such Countries, should indeed, have no other burthen laid upon them, but only the burthen of bringing up their children. *Pauperes satis stipendiis panderi (‘faith Livy) est liberos educent.* But nothing prevails so much to make a place populous, as the Prince living there; and so Tullus Hostilius did; and we have experience of it at Petigliano, where whilst the Orsini that were Lords of it, kept their residence, it was infinitely fuller of people than it is at this day, under the Serenissimo the great Duke of Tuscany, though governed by him, with admirable justice and clemency; of so great importance is the presence of their natural Lord, that many times men had rather have a tyrant, that should live amongst them, than a good Prince, that should be farre of.

Another way is nowadays used by Princes for popling such places, and it is, by confining some petty deliquents thither; because, if they live, they increase the number of the inhabitants; and if they die, the Prince receives no losse by it. This invention whether good or bad, is yet most laucient; and we have an example of it in Tatius himselfe, *Aetiam & de factis Egyopiis Indicisque pellendis, subhaque Patriam Caelatae, ut quattuor millia libertini generis, or superstitionis instar, quos Ithones et asin insulam Sardiniam vexaverunt, apud quos dii locorum, & ob gravitatem nullam transiguntia dant rem.*

If the defect grow in the third case, that is, from insuffi-
of Territory, where the people are many, the remedy here used, hath been to send forth Colonies; so Pericles did, to help a dearth that was at Athens. In this case Plutarch in the life of Numa, gives a counsell, which is, that in such a City, care must be taken that Trades be in account, and that idle persons be punished; but the best course of all will be, that the Prince spare no cost to fetch Corn, where it may be best had: so a thousand times did Tiberius, and so Nero, who not regarding the great charge he had been at by Sea, nor the great loss he had in Tyber, with infinite expenses, provided that the price of Corn might not be raised.

This course was notably followed, by the Serenissimo Cosimo, second great Duke of Tuscany, who by the way of Livorno, and other places, procured at his infinite charges, a perfect plenty; and sometimes out of his own purse, hath kept of Almes six thousand persons. I forbear to say, that many yeeres together, he spent of his own, to keep down the price of Corn, above a hundred thousand crownes; An act that exceeds any act whatsoever of the Ancients, seeing that which moved them, was their owne interest, and matter of state; but that which moved him, was only the office of a Prince, and the zeal of a Christian.

In the fourtth case, provision will be made from other Countries, by such waies as have been shewed.

In the other two cases, where dearth may happen by reason of wares, caused by sieges, and by incursion of enemies, the Commonwealths of the Swizzers, have found out an excellent way, who in places under ground, have in store for many yeares, all things belonging to victuals, and also to Trades; which course, with great prudence, the Commonwealth of Lucca hath taken to imitate.

But above all, the Prince must take heed, that he be not himselfe a cause of the dearth, by making merchandise,
chandife, and by engrossing others to doe it, for then the fault will be laid upon the Prince, and the Subjects will have just cause to complaint. Likewise, that when the people are in want, he continue not feasting, and feed upon dainties, as shewing to take little care of his Subjects misery; a thing most petitiuous to Princes, who should always take such part as the people doe, thereby to encourage them the more contentedly to behold their labours. This in the old Testament, our Lord God teacheth us, who when the Israelites were in the Wildernesse, and like Shepheardes dwellt in Tabernacles, he also would dwell in Tabernacles himselfe: afterward when changing their course, they entred into warre under their Judges and Kings, and their Army used Tents; he also would then dwell in Tents too; and when David desired to build him a Temple, he would not suffer him, until such time, as there being peace under Solomon, every one might dwell in his own house, and then he was contented to have a house also built for him: All this is expressed in the Booke of Kings, where he saith: Habet eis in domo ex dias illas qua educi filios Israel deserta Aegypti, sigue in diem bunc, sed ambulabunt in Tabernaculo; & in Tentorio per cuncta loca, que transibit in omnibus filiis Israel. But because this course was not imitated by Augustus, who when the people died in the streets for hunger, himselfe made a sumptuous banquet, where! (as Suetonius relates) the guests fete in form of Gods and Goddesses, and he in shape of Apollo, the people infinitely dislaught it, and was moved to great indignation. Auxit canem rumorem, summa tunc in civitatis generis, de fames, ac clamatunque postridie est, frumentum omne Deos comedisse.

But if he shall be no occasion of the deearth, and much lesse shew himselfe to rejoynce at it, he may then convert it to his owne profit, either by getting of money
money, or encreasing his authority, or otherwise, by
winning the love of his people. 

Pharao King of Egypt, by means of a dearth and Joseph's counsell became
Lord of all Egypt. 

\[\text{emphaticus: fuggitoi possessiones suas; pra magnitudine sanis, subjectum esse Pharaoni, \& cujus populos suas; autissimae terminis Egypti; resque ad extremos fines opus; which purchase was not distastfull to the people, for the cause aforesaid: but rather they accounted themselves obliged to the King for it; saying, Salus nostri in munera est, restituit turgidum Dominum nostrum]; \]

\[\text{et serviens Regi. Whereupon I conclude, that when a great famine was in Rome, and the Senators had fetched Corne from Sicile, then had been a fit time to take the authority from the people, which they had usurped. This; Coriolanus in Livy well knew, whose conceit yet was not approved of others; not because it was not sufficient being used with less violence, to take away that authority, but because it was not sufficient to maintaine it; seeing the Senators having a purpose to augment the Common-wealth, and consequently to make use of the peoples Armes, they might conceive, that those Magistrates who had left their authority in time of dearth, would afterward, the dearth ceasing, resume it againe by force.}

A dearth then thus managed, will be a means to get the Prince, both authority and riches, and the love also of his Subjects. 

As we see in Herod the great, who being a Prince, the most hated of his people that ever any was; yet onely by relieving them with Corne, in a time of dearth; he made himselfe beloved, oblied, and freed from a thousand dangers.
The sixteenth Discourse.

Cunctos dulcedine otii pellext:

What kind of ease it is that Tacitus speaks of, and how it may be reconciled with some places in other Authors.

The sixteenth Discourse:

In these words Cornelius Tacitus shews us, that Augustus, by means of procuring ease, got himselfe the love of all men. And because, he, as a new Prince, ought rather to have sought how to maintain himselfe in his Empire; then how with his own danger to procure delights to his Subjects; it seems, he might for this be reproved, there being a precept of Aristotle in his Politicks, where teaching the true way that a Prince ought to take, for maintaining him in his State, he persuades this specially, not to keep the people in ease, and gives us for example the Kings of Egypt, who to the end their people should not stand idle, caused so many Pyramids, and Mausoleums to be built, as Pissistratus the tyrant built the Olympus, and Polycrates a thousand Fabricks about Samos: Hæc enim omnia (faith Aristotle) fuerunt instituta ad otium & quietem populi tendam, ut illi quotidians molestissimi occupati, vaceat non possett ad consilia contra tyrannos insinuandia. And there is reason for it, as is said in Ecclesiasticans, Cibaria & Virga Omn Asino, Panis & Disciplina & opus servum, operatur in disciplina & quies citatem, jugum illorum curvat collum, & servum inclinat operaciones assequatur servum malo vel tortura, & compedes, mitte illum in operationem ne vacet, multam enim malitium doceas ostentas. And so much more might Augustus be blamed for it, seeing (as we have shewed before) he maintained the people in plenty; and now if to plenty be added ease, it cannot
choose but be the ruine of any City whatsoever. Her first iniquitas Sodome, (faith Ezekiel) Abundantia pars et oit.

And againe, because this case assignd by Tacitus came prestly after a warre, his fault may be the more, there being a passage of Aristotle in his Politicks, where he faith, That the Lacedemonians passing from warre to ease, incured great danger.

Thirdly, there is a place in Livy also, that croseth this of Tacitus, where he faith, that Tarquinius Priscus, after his fight with the Latines returning to Rome in peace, kept the people in continuall and laborious exercises; of which Livy faith, Majore inda uniusse Paris opera in basius quain quantas mule geferat bella, ut non quaese
tiam populus domo effe quantva hic suffert.

To reconcile then these four Texts, it must be shewed, that neither of them is repugnant to another, but that all of them agree together. First, I distinguishe ease, which, as to our purpose, is of two kinds; ease, which is a desisting from any action at all; and ease, which is contrary to warre; because warre being a violent action, those soldiers which are in peace, although they have other exercises, yet are said to be at ease; seeing desisting from warre, they desist from that violent action, which is proper to them. In this sense Aristotle once tooke ease, where speaking of the Lacedemonians, he faith, Splendorum enim veluti ferrum, per pacem amittitur; causa hujus est legis postior, quia non suavis quisquis in oculo statu posset.

By means of this distinction, this place of Tacitus is reconciled with the first place out of Aristotle; seeing Tacitus by ease here, means not an ease contrary to all action, for Augustus both with sports and playes, and buildings, held the people in continuall work; insomuch that he could boast, he had made Rome a City of Marble, which he found but of Brick; but he meant it
it of that case which is contrary to warre. And this is plainly scene, because having said before, Cumta discordia civilibus fesse, he presently comes in with this very word, Cumta discordia omni pellexit. Thus Aristotle agrees with him exceeding well, in that Text where he likes the people should be held in action but not in warre: and indeed in such actions, as debase men, and are worse then cahle. So dealt Pharaoh with the Israelites, putting them to make Brice, and other most base workes. Whereupon it is said in Exodus, Proposuit itaque eis Magistros opera, ut affligere cœr, operibus; and a little after, Oderant filios Israel Aegypti, & affligebant eos, & insidientes eis, atque ad amaritudinem perducens bant vitam eorum, operibus duris latu & lateria, omnique famulatu.

But to this resolution, that place of Livy before cited is most contrary, where speaking of Tarquinius Priscus, he shews, that returning from the wars, he held the people in hard and cruel labours. For answer whereunto we must distinguish, that the Princes are either in terms of getting more, or else, but of keeping that they have already gotten; if to get more, then it is necessary to hold the people in hard labours, to the end they may not lose courage, and be imbaed in their spirits. And therefore no marvell that Tarquinius Priscus teacheth us to hold the people in hard labours, seeing the Romans at that time had no other end, but to enlarge their Empire. But if the Prince have no ayme at augmentation by new acquests and lands not so much in feare of externall enemies, as of friends at home, he then ought to let the people enjoy a negotive ease, of buildings, and playes, and such like things. And this made Augustinus take this course, because he aymed not at all, at any amplifying of his Empire, as from many places in Tacitus may be gathered, and particularly from that place where in
the first of his Annals he faith, *Bellam ea tempestare mutue*; *nisi adversas Germanias, abscondas potius injuriae, ob amissum cum Prisco Valo exercitionem, quam cupidissime preferebili Imperio.* And in another place where he faith, *Consilium coercendi intra terminos Imperium,* whereby we see, he was minded rather to restrain, then to enlarge the Empire.

Lastly, it remains to reconcile that other place of *Aristotle* in the second of his Politicks, where by the example of the Lacedemonians; he shewes, that after warre, to be left to live at ease, is a dangerous thing.

For Resolution whereof, I say, that the passing from warre to ease, is then dangerous, when men returne from a short warre, and in which they have had the better; because they that get victories, by reason of the pride which victory brings with it, are apt in Cities, to raise commotions. So it fell out amongst the Lacedemonians, and so a thousand times it hath been like to fall out amongst the Romans, whereof, in the whole first decem of *Livy* we may see examples. But when men come from a warre bloody and long; then they love and are glad of peace. Whereupon in our case the Romans coming from an infinity of civill warres, in which to winne was no better than to lose; and being now weary, as is gathered by the words, *Cuncta discordiae ebulibus fessa,* they became not only devisous, but apt also to tollerate ease.

It is now sufficiently proved, that *Tacitus,* or to say better, *Augustus* is no way discordant either from the precepts of *Aristotle,* or from the examples of *Livy,* but that with great judgment, he undeavoured to win every one with ease.

Lastly, it is necessary to reconcile *Tacitus* with himselfe, who in this place praieth ease, and yet afterward examining the causes of the tumults in Germany, he faith, *Habebantur perissum,* as though ease were the cause
cause of those rebellions. To which I briefly say, there
is great difference between the case that is in a City,
and the case that is of soldiers in warre; because the
end of a City, is to live in peace, whereof the case spo-
ken of before is a companion; but the chief end of
soldiers at the warres, is to fight, to which case is con-
trary and an enemy: and so the soldier with case, and
the Citizen by warre, are deprived of their ends, and
consequently in short time runnd into danger.

Neque Provinciae illum rerum statum
abnuebant, superstes Senatus Populique Imperio ob
certamina Potentum, & avaritiam Magistratuum:
invalido legum auxilio, que vi, ambitu, postremo
pecunia turbabantur.

That Cities subject to another City, better like the govern-
ment of a King, than of a Commonwealth, and that every
City would gladly have their Lord to live amongst them.

The seventeenth Discourse:

O rnelius Tacitus in these words makes us know,
that the Provinces subject to the people of Rome,
liked better the government of a King, than of a Com-
monwealth, as it happens generally to all Cities that
are subject to another: So Guicciardino relates of Cre-
mona, that it liked better to be under the King of
France, than to be governed by the Commonwealth
of Venice. And hereof we have a manifest example in
Pisa, which being sold by Gabriel Maria Visconti, to the
Commonwealth of Florence, there was scarce one Ci-
tizen that would tarry in it. But more than in any o-
ther, we may see the truth of this, in the Lycians, who
having tried what it was to live under a King, and un-
der
of the Commonwealth, they called the servitude of that, in comparison of this, liberty. Neque miserabilis legis, quam cum crudelitatem Rhodiæorum quibus ab Pontico Cornelio attribuitur, quam eos sub diuturna tiochi, eos Regiam servitutem, collatam cum praesenti statu, praecipue libertatem visum: Non publico tantum, sed privato imperio, sed singulorum injustis part servitutum.

Of these points we will speak, first, in particular of Rome, then in general, and give the reasons; Lastly, we will shew, that every city would we glad to be under a particular Prince, and one that should dwell amongst them.

Concerning the first, all those changes of State, which come from a worse, must needs be welcome; from whence it is, that after the expulsion of the Tarquins, liberty was so pleasing, *Et ut latior esset (saith Livy) proximi Regis superbia fecit.* That in our case, the Commonwealth was corrupted even to the worst degree, is sufficiently expressed by Tacitus in the forelaid words. First, by reason of the discord of the great ones; one of which factions there was a necessity to follow, and that overcome, all then remained at the discretion of the other. Secondly, by occasion of the Magistrates, who sought rather to satisfy their avarice with money, than to take care for the executing of justice. Thirdly, because the laws had now no more place, as being easily corrupted by force and money. Just cause therefore had the Provinces, to be glad of the government of Augustus.

But because this liking of a subject City, to be rather under a Prince than under a Commonwealth, (as we have said before,) is a common liking of all Provinces and Cities that are under another, it will be necessary to search out the reason, why it is so. And for a first reason, a certain politician brings this, because Commonwealths are more durable than Kingdoms;
and being more durable, there is less hope to shake off their servitude, and are therefore the more hated. Secondly, because Common-wealths having no other care, but to make themselves greater, and others less; they endeavour only to weaken the subject Cities, and to strengthen their own body, a thing which Princes care not to doe: and for this, he brings the example of the Samnites, who as long as they were of themselves, maintained warre with the Romans a hundred yeeres; a manifest signe, they were then a strong people; but afterwards falling in subjection to Rome, they became most weake, and of no force.

But because the first of these reasons is false, and the second follows no lesse in Kingdomes than in Common-wealths, (with leave of so great a man,) I have conceived perhaps a better reason, and it is, because the Provinces and Cities having been at warre, and by reason of the warre, grown to hate one another, and that hatred in proceed of time become natural, as it was between the Romans and the Carthaginians, between the Pisanes and the Florentines, and others; it happens, that being overcome, they are held in subjection by their naturall enemies; which subjection is so much the more distastfull, as it is between persons that are equall: and from hence it is, that so gladely men seek to shake off the yoke. So many times did Pisa, for Spain with the Romans, who doubting the like of Greece, as knowing by their continuall rebellions, that they ill brooked their subjection to the Common-wealth of Rome, they destroyed many Cities, and at last Corinth.

But if it happen that this Common-wealth fall into the hand of a Prince, there is no doubt but the other Cities and Provinces will be glad of principal reason is, because where these serv'd, and those ruled, before with inequality, now under a Prince, they both serve equally;
The seventeenth Discourse.

equally; and coming to be commanded, by persons much their superiours, the Dominion is so much leffe hated, as the person is greater that commands; and therefore we see, that Pis a which under a Commonwealth was alwaies in rebellion, now that it is under a Prince, hath lived, and doth live, and is like to live, in most quiet peace; it is true indeed, there concurses the graciousnesse of the Prince that sweetens all things. Another manifest example we have in the Roman Histories; and it is, that Spaine, as long as the City of Rome was a Commonwealth, was continually in rebellion; nor could ever be quieted, till the said City came into the hand of a Prince under Augustus. I omit the example of the Philistines, who never left warring with the Israelites, from the first day (I may say) they entered into the Land of Promise, until they were setled in a Regall government under David.

To come to the third head: not onely Cities and Provinces cannot abide to be under the rule of a Commonwealth; but neither doe they like to be under a Prince that is a stranger, and that dwells not amongst them; which Prince may either be of different customes and language, as the King of Spaine to Naples and Milan; or of the same customes and language, but of divers Provinces, as the King of France to Burgundy and Britaine; or else of the same Province, the same tongue, and the same customes, as many Princes of Italy, to many Cities.

In the first case, they are not well brooked, but tolerated with an ill will: First, by reason of the difference of customes, which is able to make a Prince odious, though he be not a stranger: whereupon Tacitus speaking of Venice, given to the Parthians to be their King, declares that because he was of different customes from the Parthians, though of better than theirs,
their; he was with his own expelle the Kingdome.

Accedebat designantes & ipsa diversus a Majorem insti-
turas, unde venisti, cessit eorum cura, quatenus per annos
decresses; sesse stumine, saesifque ego paesis epulas, in-
ridebatque & Greci Comitess, de Villissemantensilium atum
clausa, sed prompti adites, obvià comitans, ignote Parthis
britatas, novus vita, & quia ipsa majoribus aliena perinde
odium prætis arque honestas. For the very same reason,
the Gothis took it ill, that Amalasance caused Argo-
taricis to be brought up in the Roman customes, al-
though they were better than their own. And there-
fore Isabele Queen of Spaine, by her last Will, left Fer-
dinand her Husband to be Governor of Castile, for so
long time, until Philip who was to succeed, being a
stranger, might learne the customes of the Spaniards.
And for this cause, the Jewes at the coming of the
Maccias, were troubled together with Herod, and liked
better to be in subjection to one of their owne cu-
stomes, though a stranger as Herod was, than to the
Maccias that was of different, though better customes;
although they knew by the words of Moses, Prophe-
siam suscitabit Dominus de medio fratrum iornam, that he
should be their owne Countreyman, of which S. Chry-
sostome gives the reason, Eternus quiis turbati, quia injusti
non possunt gaudere de adventu justi.

Secondly, because difference of Language is a most
odious thing; and this out of his singular providence
God foreseeing, and meaning to hinder Nembrots en-
terprise, to make himselfe a Monarch, he confounded
the Tongues, and thereby easily gave a stop to their
proceeding. On the contrary, when our Lord meant
that his Apostles should make some fruit of their la-
bours, he would not have them preach in a strange
Tongue, and therefore gave to every one of them, all
Tongues, that so more easily they might draw men to
receive the Faith. And the Romans knowing, what
advantage
advantage there is in this, compelled all their subjects, when they spake in the Senate, to speak in the Roman tongue. And Rabsaces, knowing of how great importance, the likeness of Language is, to win the love of the people, to the end the Israelites might the longer receive the government of Senacherib, though Sobna the Jew, out of a contrary end, prayed him to speak in the Syriack tongue, Locunque lingua Syriaca ad servos stnos; yet he an understanding man (as is written in Esay) clamavit Lingua Judaica; whereupon Esay, in another place, shewing the hate and fear, which the City of Hierusalem had of the King of the Assyrians; amongst other causes, names their differing in language, Populum impudentem non videbis, populum altissimos, ita ut non possis intelligere desertinum linguæ ejus.

Thirdly, when to difference of custumes and language, there is added remoteness, it will add no doubt a great degree of distastefulness. First, because they will be more obnoxious to the dangers of warre. And therefore the Tribe of Dan, seeing Lais to be farre off from Sydon, which had then the government, attempted to bring it in subjection, and it tooke effect. And that this was the cause that moved them, may be gathered from words in the Booke of Judges; Esentes igitur quinque viri venerunt Lais, videmtique populum habitantem in ea absqueullo timore, juxta consuetudinem Sydioniorum securum & quietum, nullo eis penitus resistente, magnanimum opum & procul a Sydone, aliqua cunctis hominibus seperatum. And that by this meanes, they easily made themselves Masters of it, is written also a little after, where he faith, Sexcenti autem viri tulerunt sacerdotem, & que supra diximus, veneruntque ad Lais ad populum quietcens & securum, & percurse sunt eos in orre gladii, ubemque incendio tradidissent; nullo penitus ferente presidium, Eo quod procul habitarent a Sydone. So it happened to the Saguntines, who being farre
farre remote from the Romans, their confedepates were
destroyed before they could be asisted. And therefore
the Armenians standing in doubt of this, put them-
selves into the hands of Midrakthes, and revolted from
the Romans. So the people of Sovia desired to live
under the government of the Parthians, as being neere
unto them, and neighbouring upon them. Secondly,
because people that are farre off, must of necessity be
governed by a Deputy, who by reason of the Prince
remoteness must have great authority given him, and
consequently may at his pleasure, contrary to the
Princes meaning, play the tyrant over them. For all
those things that have motion from another, and a
motion of their own besides, how much they are leffe
neere to the first moyer, so much they are more able
to move their owne way. From hence it is, that the
Moone, being of all the Planets, the farthest off from
the Primus mobile, is moved faster in her owne motion,
and slower in the diurnall motion, than any of the
other. The contrary whereof is seen in Saturne, which
being neere to the Primus mobile, hath the slowest mo-
tion, and makes the least resistance.

Yet in the second and third case, they will more
easily be tolerated; although as well in this as in that,
there is a generall rule, that seems to gresse it; which
is, that every City would gladly have a Prince that
should be resident amongst them, and also be a native
of their City. That one of the same Nation, and City is
most acceptable, is plainly seen, because the people for
the most part waves justice, and regards not so much
the generall, good, to choose the worthiest; as their
private benefit, to choose the neerest. And therefore the
Prophet Esay faith, Apprehendet unum in fraterum sem
Domesticon patris sui, & dicas vestimentum tibi est,
Princeps sedereso. Where S. Thomas observes well, that
every one seeks to make him King, that is neerest, and
not
not him that is best. Indeed this respect of nece
notless is of speciall force; as we may see in David, who being
chosen King, was followed only by the Tribe of Judah.
Sola autem domus Juda sequebatur David. So Abimelech
was more willingly received of the Sichemites, then
the Tonnes of Jeroboam, when he laid unto them, Simul
considerate quid Os vestrum & Caro vestra sum. They
were all presently moved to say to him, Frater nostrēs.
The Milanese exposed themselves to a thousand dan-
gers, out of a desire they had, to be governed rather
by one of the Sforze, then by the King of Spain or
France. And the Faentines chose rather a bastard of
Milanese, then to be under the Church. So the Arme-
nians (as is said before) subjected themselves to Mi-
thridates, and revolted from the Romans. Finally, we
have a notable example of this, in the life of Aratus, to
whom it was imputed as a great fault, that he would
rather call to his ayd, Philip King of Macedon, then put
his Cities into the hands of Cleomenes a Spartan. Quod
fe omnino (faith Plutarch) Cleomenes injustus fuerit, atque
Tyrannicus, tamen Heraclidarum genere, patria Spartanum
fuisset, & quidem iis qui rationem aliquan Græcia Nobilita-
tis haberent, Spartanorum obscurissimum potius, quam pri-
num inter Macedonas Ducem deligendum fuisse. Where-
upon our Lord God, meaning to give the man Regall
power over the woman, to the end it might be tole-
rated with more contentment, made her of a ribbe of
Adam. And to conclude, in Deuteronomy, he comman-
ded his people, they should not choose a stranger to
be their King.

But because this my opinion is full of difficulty, see-
ing oftimes a City desires to be governed rather by
a stranger then by one of their owne Citizens, it will
be necessary to use distinccion; either it is the first time
a Kingdome is erected, or else they have been used to
Regall power before; if it be the first time, they will
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then rather choose to serve a stranger, then one of their own Citizens: First, because knowing the Citizens beginning they are apt to scorn him. So it fell out with the Israelites, the first time they had a King, for being most desirous to see who it should be, when they saw it was Saul, they scorned him: Nunc salvi are non poterit tise? & desiderent eum. Secondly, it happens often by reason of factions that are in the City; for such desire rather to be governed by a stranger, as a man indifferent, then by a Citizen that is an enemy. Seeing such a one coming to the government, would certainly fill the City with blood and slaughter. Whereupon Livy faith, Cum pars qua domesticia certamine inferior sit, externo potius se applicet quam civi cedat. A third reason is drawne from envy; for an envious man endeavours alwaies to obscure the worthinesse of his Countrymen, as lying more in envious way then a stranger, whereof S. Hierome faith, Propenodum naturale est semper, cives civibus invidere; invidia autem est, tristitia de aliena excellencia, ut est proprii boni diminutio. Bonum autem absentia non diminiit nostra, quia non conferit eis, Ideo non invidemus, bona autem presentia conferunt bonis nostris, & comparatione excellentiae eorum, ostenditur parum esse bonum nostrum, & hoc est illud Diminu. And of this we have the example of our Lord Christ, who being persecuted by his Countrymen, was invited by Abagarus a forraine Prince, that would have made him in part King with him in his City. A third reason may be this, that Countrymen know a man from his infancy, when there is yet no virtue in him, and thereupon consider him but as such a one still; where strangers that come not to know a man but in his perfection, cannot, nor know not how to consider him other then as such. So the said S. Hierome faith, Quia cives non considerant, presentia vires operas, sed fragilitates condantur Infantiæ. It is therefore no marvell, that the
Florentines chose rather, to be governed by a Frenchman, than by one of their own Citizens. Our Lord God, knowing how difficult a thing it is, to choose at the first time, one's own Countryman to be Prince; in the old law, to the end the Israelites having a desire to have a King, and not yielding one to another, might not subject themselves to a stranger, he made a law; they should choose none to be their King, but only an Israelite, *Non poteris alterius generis hominem in Regem facere, quod non sit frater tuis.* But because he knew, it would be a hard matter for them to agree upon the choice at the first time, he therefore made that election himself, *Eum constitues quem Dominus Deus tuis eleges de medio fratrum tuorum.* And when lastly he came to choose him, to the end he might be least envied, he took a course, that causeth least envy, and that was by Lot. But if the people have been accustomed before to a Regall subjection, in this case they will rather like to be governed by one of their own Countrey then a stranger; and so much the more, if some of his family have beene Governour before; there being then no place for either envy, feare, or for equality. It is therefore no marvell, that Caesar was but ill beloved, and was slaine, and that Augustus lived quietly, and had the love of all men, seeing Caesar raised his House from equality; and Augustus found it in superiority, in which the Dictator had left it: whereupon when I consider how it happened, that our Lord God would at the first time make a King by election, and afterward would have it to goe by succession in David; I cannot conceive a better reason than this, that he knew after the first time, the election of a King would be without difficulty.

In this particular, let every one be of what opinion he please; but for this other point, I do not think it will be denied me, that all Cities and Provinces like better
better to be governed by a particular Prince, that dwells amongst them, then by any other how great soever he be. For this cause it was, that the Spaniards were not well pleased when Charles the fifth was made Emperor; and were ready to rise, because they feared he would leave dwelling in Spain, and make his residence in Germany. This desire was the cause, that the Persians to have a King in their owne Province, set up Cyrus against Astyages, who resided in Media; and out of this desire the Brittaines covenanted with the King of France, that his eldest sonne comming to the Crown, his second sonne should be Duke of Britaine; whereof there can be no other reason, but the desire to have a particular Prince, that should dwell amongst them, as being indeed of speciall benefit to the people. First, because living amongst them, he spends those Revenues in the Country which he draws from the Countrey. Secondly, because of the greater care the Prince hath of them; and because of the peoples nearness to their Lords care, to whom they can present their suits in their own persons, without wasting themselves in journeys, and lying at Innes. Lastly, because if the Prince being Lord of many Provinces, reside in one of them; the other must be faine to be governed by Deputies of that Province. The Emperours of Rome residing in Italy, governed all the Provinces by Italians; a thing most distastfull to all the people; because to one that is not grieved to be subject to a Prince that is a stranger, yet it grieves him to be governed by men of a Province that is a stranger, as many people that are content to be subject to the King of Bohemia, yet refuse to be subject to the Kingdome of Bohemia. And the King of France, after many times losing Genoa by this means, at last he resolved to govern it by Genoese. So in Milan he made Triuntio Governour, wherein though he erred; yet the error
The seventeenth Discourse.

was in the Individual, and not in the Species; as putting the government into his hand, that was Head of a Faction. But if the Prince be resident in the Province, though he be a Stranger, yet with better liking he will be tolerated; because such commonly not only govern the places where they reside, but all other places subject to them, by Citizens of that Country where they reside. The King of Spain, residing in Spain, governs all his Subject Kingdoms by Spaniards, a thing which not only wins love to the Prince, but profit also to the Province. To this may be added, that those people shall alwayes receive more favours, who are neere to the Fountaine from whence those favours come, then they shall doe that are further off; seeing, (as S. Thomas learnedly observes) how much a thing is neerer to its beginning, so much it partakes more of the effects of that beginning. And for this cause Dionysius Areopagitus saith, that the Angels as being neerer to God than men are, do therefore partake more of the divine goodnesse then men do.

I cannot omit to advise, that all the difficulties before spoken of, are easilly allayed, after the first heats are once past, so oft as there is found a prudence and graciousnesse in the Prince, which is indeed of marvellous great moment, as was seen in the Romans, who though they hated strangers, and were resolved to have no Stranger be their King; yet when Numa (a Stranger) was propounded to them; in regard of his eminent vertue, they accepted of him. Whereof Livy saith, Romani veteres peregrinum Regem afferentibus, et a litera, Audito nomine Numa, patres Romanorum numquam inclinaro opus ad Sabinos, Rege inde sumpto, vitabatsum, tamen inquit se quisquis, hic factiones fine alienam, sed demum Patrum ut civium quemquem preterferre, utraque auth ad ipsum omnes Nume Pontepio Reginum suberendum decernunt. Whereupon it is no marvell, if
at this day many Provinces and Cities, whereof some have a Prince that lives farre off; and some, a Prince that is a stranger, of customes and language different; yet they all live in great contentment, only thorough the just government of him that rules them. I desire therefore that this discourse of mine may be received, as of the times past, my purpose being to search out the reasons of things have formerly happened; and not expressly or tacitely to taxe any Prince, Commonwealth or City, nor so much as any particular person: For above all things, I abhorre flandering, and specially of those to whom as superiors I owe Reverence.

Caeterum Augustus subsidia dominationi Claudium Marcellum fororis filium admodum adolescentem: Pontificatu & curulis Edilitate Marcum Agrippam ignobilem loco, bonum Militia, & victoriae focium geminatis consulatibus exulit, mox defuncto Marcello generum sumptis, Tiberium Neronem & Claudium Drustum privignos Imperatoriis nominibus auxit.

What meanes Princes may use with safety to set them in a way, that are to succeed them in the government.

The eighteenth Discourse,

It is plainly seen, that Augustus to the end the Senatours nor any other, should ever hope to reduce Rome to its ancient forme of government, held this for a speciall Maxime of State, to advance his nearest kinred; and to set some one of them in the way for managing the Empire, that so making him privy to all affaires, making him known to the louldiers, making him beloved of the people; and lastly, making him

N 3 favoured
favoured of the Senate: both he after his death might have his way made to come to the Empire; and on the contrary no hope might be left for any to attempt anything against the life of the Prince, being propped up with so many Pillars. And therefore, Ut pluribus munificentis in fine, he raised Marcellus; he advanced Marcus Agrippa; and after them, Tiberius Nero, Claudius Drusus, Caius and Lucius sons of Agrippa; and lastly, would have Tiberius to adopt Germanicus and Drusus to be his successors. And accordingly, Tiberius advanced to the Consulship, and other honours, Germanicus and Drusus; and after them Caius Caesar. Whereupon by the example of such great men, this course perhaps may be thought worthy of imitation, as well for securing ones selfe from danger, as also for lessening in part the but then of those great labours, which, so great a dignity brings with it: so much the more as we have in Cornelius Tacitus, a manifest example of Sejanus, who by no other meanes was stopped in his course, but onely by the number of successors Tiberius had ordained; and this stopping, as in conspiracies it useth, was cause at last, that the Prince discovered all his practices. But because of the other side, the desire of rule blinds the minds of the most inward and domestick friends. It seems to be no safe course for a Prince, whilst he lives himselfe, to give any great authority to successors. For Invidia Regni (as Livy faith) etiam inter Dominicos insidias omnium atque infestas facit. Artaxerxes caused his sonne to be elected King, but this served not his sonnes turne, who thereupon would have killed his father. So Absolon meant to do, and when with safety he might have expected the Kingdom, after the death of his old father David, he would rather with wickednessse prevent it, and run headlong into ruine, Quod multos atiam bonus pessimum dedit, (faith Tacitus upon another occasion) quis pretia que tarda.
tardacum fecuritate prematura; vel cum exitis properant.
And therefore Selim being assumed into part of the
Empire, by his father Bajafet, could not stay to expect
it with peace; but fought by the death of his father,
to make him his sole Lord. And the like intention
had Mustaphis towards Sultan Solyman; and thereby lost
his life. Finally, this advancing of his succesflours, had
but ill-lucke with Augustus; for Tiberius (as is com-
monly conceived) caused him to be poysoned; and
with Tiberius it proved not much better, who also to-
wards the end of his life; had the kindnesse of Caius
Ceasar, to help him to his death. For resolution, it
may be said, that where a State is quiet, accustomed to
pass by succession, in children legitimate; there it is
in no wise fit, to take them into part of the Empire,
there being no cause, with ones owne danger, to take
away hopes where there are none; or to secke for
props where no part threatens ruine. But on the other
side, when the State is in danger; not accustomed to
live under a Prince, and is apt to rebellions; in such
case, it may doe well, to call him that is to succeed,
to be a cosfort in the Empire. To this purporfe it seems
the example tends; which Tacitus relates of Augustus:
he caused Tiberius to be called Filius, to shew he was
his succesflor; Colleca Imperii, to enter him in managing
affaires; Consors Tribunitiae Potestatis, to make him gra-
cious with the people; Omnique per exercitus ostentatur,
to make him beloved, and knowne to the soldiers.

Nevertheless having considered a little better of
this matter, I have altered my opinion, concerning the
laff; and as to the example of Augustus, though it
proved well for his succesflor; to bring him to the
Empire, yet it proved but ill for his owne person; for
by this means, he became as it were a servant to Tibe-
ris, who finally caused him by his owne wife to be
poysoned.
I therefore conceived, the better course would be, to advance the managing of the Empire; not one alone, but many; because, by this means, not only he shall make himself secure from those of the City; but from those also of his own Family. This lesson I learn from Aristotle in his Politicks, where he faith, Communis vero custodia omnibus Dominations minus est; nominem num pro cætoris magnam facere, sed plures, nam se invicem exsodint: being an excellent remedy against the insatiable cesse of men, to afford them some one, upon whom they may vent their ambition, without turning it against the Prince. For this cause perhaps, the ancients invented the name of fortune; to the end, that men falling into any great disaster, should not turn their anger against God, but lay the fault upon the false Deity of fortune. And in truth there is none hath more need to make use of this invention than Princes; because naturally, men seeking to rise above their degree; when they have another like to themselves, they may turn their practices against him, and not attempt any thing against the Prince, as they would doe, if they had not some upon whom to work, and vent their ambition. This good fortune happened to Tiberius, for when Sejanus would rise above his degree, first he had Drusus against whom to turn him; and afterward the sonnes of Germanicus, in oppressing of whom, he lost so much time, that all his practices came to be discovered. To this opinion of mine, the course of Augustus was not contrary, but it seems he followed it as long as he was able; seeing Tacitus relates, that he advanced not Marcellus alone, but together with him Marcus Agrippa; and when Marcellus died, he left not Agrippa alone, but joyned with him Tiberius Nero, and Claudius Drusus; and when Drusus died, he yet left not Tiberius alone, but brought forward Caius and Lucius: and although when both these died,
died, he left Tiberius alone: yet it cannot be said, he did well in doing so: and therefore Tacitus maketh an excuse for him, that he did it by reason of age, Nune senem Augustum adeo devinzerat, ut nepotem etnectum Agrippa Posthumum in insulam Planasiam projecteret: in which if he had done well, Tacitus had not needed to make his excuse: and even Augustus himself perceived at last his error: as he that alwayes held it for a maxime of State, not to have onely one, but many upon whom to cast, Ut pluribus munimentis insistere: whereupon at last, the poore old man opening his eyes, and seeking to provide for it in a time, when he had done better to dissemble it, having overslipt his time so long, he made shew to call Agrippa Posthumus home, Es inde spem fore (faith Tacitus) ut penatibus avi rodulereur. And the making that shew was a hastener of his death. Alfo Philip after he had put Demetrius to death, he perceived his error to let Persius stay alone: whereupon he meant to bring in his familiar friend Antigonus, for a counterpoise, giving out, he should succeed him in the Kingdom, but was prevented by death. Therefore Tiberius also considering this, advanced not Germanicus alone, but Drusus with him, Sequentiorem rebuter, utroque filio legiones obtinente: knowing well, it would be impossible they should ever joyne together in any attempt against him. Quia arduum est difficile est, orem iloci concordiam & potentiam esse: whereupon he was secure he should alwayes have them of his side. And when Germanicus died, he left not Drusus alone, but brought in Sejanus, whereof Drusus infinite times complained, Crebro querens Incolunti filio adjutori Imperii, autem vocatos. And when Drusus was dead, and Sejanus left alone, Tiberius was then in no small danger; which he perceiving, had determined to bring in Nero sonne of Germanicus; but afterward being secured of the fall of Sejanus, he put him to death; and then Gaia Caesar remained.
The eighteenth Discourse.

remained alone. Whereupon Tiberius finding himselfe in the same straight, in which Augustus was when Tiberius was left alone; although he knew the danger, and that it was no safety for him, that all favour should be cast upon one; yet being old, and ill-beloved of all, having thoroughly considered, what course he might best take to secure himselfe from Caius Cæsar; he could finde none, as I conceive, but such as would rather be a course to hasten his death; and therefore in that case he shewed himselfe much wiser then Augustus: and although Cornelius Tacitus attribute it to another matter, where he faith, Consilium cui impar erat fato permisit: which was to make choice of another suffectour; yet I, without taxing his opinion, would thinke that he forbore this new election, lest coming to the ears of Caius Cæsar, it might put him upon some practife to procure his death, as he himselfe had done before to Augustus; and the rather as knowing himselfe to be exceeding weake, Reputante Tiberio publicam sibi odium, extremam statum, magisque fame quam vi stare res suas.

But because Augustus and Tiberius knew well, how much it imported, to have more suffectours then one: yet each of them was brought at last to have but one, and could not helpe it: it will be fit to thinke upon some way, how a Prince that is brought to such a straight, may both enter such a suffectour in affairs of State, and yet secure himselfe from domestick dangers. As for the entering him, and setting him in a way; it will be easily done, by putting him into those steps, which himselfe, passed to attaine the Empire: and by this way, the House of Austria at this day maintaines itselfe in the Empire. An instruction of Augustus, and afterward followed by Tiberius, who comming to the Empire by means of the Tribuachip, they also used to make their suffectours Tribunes. Id summi fastigii vocabulum.
TragenſDiwa.

I43

CabuluuAuguſturreperit, ne Regis aut diſtatoris nomen ad-
sumerat, at tamen appellatione aliqua extra imperia pre-
minerat. Marcius deinde Agrippa socius ejus postfatus,
qui definitus Tiberium Neronem delegit, me successor in inserto
sedit: sic cohiberi praecas aliorum sper rebatur, semel mo-
defixe Neronis ex sua magnitudine siebat, quo tune exemplo
Tiberius Drusum suum rei movet. The difficulty then
consists only in securing himself against his succes-
sor, being too potent; and the best way, that I can
learn out of Histories is this; not to suffer him toge-
ther with the dignity, to get the love and affection of
the Subjects. This Auguſtus put in execution, until he
was blinded by his wives intreaties. For when he de-
demanded the Tribuneship for Tiberius, under colour of
excusing him, he laid open all his ill conditions, there-
by to make him odious. Etenim Auguſtus pauci ante an-
nis, ciam Tiberio Tribunitem postfatum a Patribus suos
potinuere, quamquam honora oratione quaedam de habitu cul-
tuque et infintis ejus secerat, que velut excusingando explo-
braret. To what end should Auguſtus demand honours
for Tiberius, and himself dishonour him? but only
to this, that as by means of the dignity which could
not be denied him, he meant to settle in him the suc-
cession, so by means of making known his vices, he
meant to make him odious; and thereby secure him-
selves, that he might never be able through the peoples
favour, to contrive any plot against him. Tiberius also
made use of this course, and therefore caused Drusus
to be present alwaies at the sports of the Gladi-
tours; to the end, that by shewing himself delighted
with the sight of blood, he might be known to be of
a cruell and bloody disposition, and consequently be
of all men hated. Wherupon Tacitus discoursing
upon the reasons, why Tiberius himselfe would not be
present at them; amongst other, he mentions this,
where he saith, Non crediderim ad ostentandum se virtutem
moven-
The eighteenth Discourse.

Another time, when Tiberius saw Germanicus and Drusus contesting with the Senate, he wonderfully joyed at it; as well because their contention was about disparaging a Law, as because of the hate they incurred by it. Letabatur Tiberius, cum inter filios ejus & leger Senatus disceptaret.

Having commended the course, for a Prince to devise more then one successor, by whom to be supported, there must care be taken to hold the balance even between them, otherwise he shall expose himself to manifest danger; in regard whereof, Augustus never brought Tiberius openly forward until such time as he was left alone; Drusus ex privignis erat, illuc cumque vergeret, and that which followeth. So Tiberius as long as Germanicus lived, used them with great equality; but after Germanicus death, he then discovered his love to Drusus. Tiberius Drusum summa rei admovert; incohari Germanico, integrum inter Duos Indicium.

But because it is a most difficult thing, to observe this equality, and to carry an even hand, as that which was in Christ accounted a matter of admiration, that he so carried himself toward his Apostles, that they could never know which of them he favoured most, every one thinking himself to be the man, whereupon they often contended which of them should be the greatest; it is fit to consider, to which side the Prince ought rather to incline.

For resolution whereof, I conceive, that a Prince (as indeed he can doe no lesse) shall doe well to favour the weaker party, for by means of his favour he shall make him stronger then the other; and yet shall not need to doubt him, as being of himselfe the weaker. So did Tiberius, who if ever he shewed any sparke of partiality, it was to Drusus.

Nam
That old men are apt to be carried away by women, and of what age a Prince should be.

The nineteenth Discourse.

The old age of Augustus (as we may conjecture by these two Texts, which for more convenience I have joyned together) brought forth in the City of Rome, many evil effects. First, by suffering himself to be ruled by his wife Livia, who with no small subtility persuaded him to discard Agrippa Posthumus, and to leave Tiberius Nero his successor in the Empire. Secondly, because through old age, he was no longer able to govern the City, his family, or himself.

By occasion then of the first, we will examine, whether it be true, that old men are apt and easie to be led away by women; and finding it to be so, we will shew the reason: and by occasion of the second, it will be fit to examine, at what age a Prince is fittest to govern.

Concerning the first, there will need no great labour to shew by examples and by reason, that the wives of old men may obtain of them whatsoever they desire. Adonias the sonne of David had made himselfe King in his father's life; and by reason of age, as being the eldest, it was his due; as Solomon himselfe confessed, whilst denying a favour, which his mother
in behalfe of Adonis requested of him, he said, \textit{Ipse enim est frater meus major me} ; yet how easly did Bersabee persuade her old husband David to put by Adoniah, and to make her sonne Salomon his successour ? whereof the holy Scripture in the Booke of Kings faith, \textit{Ingressa est itaque Bersabee ad regem in cubiculo, Rex autem semenat nimis.} And seeing the holy Scriptures have never a word that hath not some mystery in it, we may well gather by these words \textit{Rex autem semenat nimis,} were written to intimate, that the suite of Bersabee was much facilitated by the old age of David. Another example in the booke of Kings we have of Salomon, who in his old age was so led away by his Concubines, that most perfidiously leaving the true worship of God, he set up Images, built Altars and Temples unto Idols, whereof the holy Spirit in the said Booke gives the reason saying, \textit{Salomon being now growne old, was easily drawne away by women, Cumque jam esset senex, depravatum est core ejus per mulieres.} 

The effect then is manifest: it remains that we shew the cause why this should happen in old men, and not in yong. And first, it may be attributed to length of time: for as a stone, though never so hard, is mollified and broken by often falling of water, so the long suites of women accompanied with their dalliances and allurements, are able to penetrate the hardest heart: and therefore Job faith, \textit{Lapides excavant aqua, & alluvione paulatim terra consumitur;} whereof Saint Gregory makes the like interpretation, as I doe here of the example of Salomon, \textit{Videamus qualiter lapides excavant aqua, & alluvione paulatim terra consumitur.} Salomon quippe inmoderato usu, & que affiduitate mulierum ad hoc perdutur esset, ut qui primum Templum Deo construuerat affiduitate libidinis etiam perfidia substrançe, Idolis construeret Templo non nimiss. Sicque factum est, ut ab affiduo carnis petulantia,
The nineteenth Discourse.

petitiones, quae ad mentis persidium perveniret. Quid itaque alius quam aque excavavit lapidem? Ó alluvione paulatim terrae consumpta est; quia surrepente paulatim infusione crecati, terra cordis illius ad consumptum defluxit.

A second cause is; because in old age by reason of weakness, the virtue of resisting feminine allurements failes, which in youth by reason of vigour are easily refil'd. This cause Cajetan means, when speaking of Salomon he saith, Quamvis nullius junctis fuerint Salomoni Juventis, non tamen diverterunt a luxuriae ad cultum Deorum, sed in Senecute paulatim emollitse est animus ejus, crescente amore, & deficiente virtute.

A third cause I would alledge myself, and it is, That all love is founded upon some interest, either good or bad: and seeing that of women can never be founded upon vertue, by reason of the incapacity of that sex; it happens oftentimes to be founded either upon beauty or upon profit: For in women commonly there are two desires; or to say better, two affections: one of rule, the other of lust; and when these faile, then also their love ceaseth. From hence it is, that seeing an old man, can never beleue (unlesse age hath taken away his braines) that women can love him for beauty; it follows necessarily, he must beleue they love him for profit; of which if there be no hope, neither can he hope, they will ever love him. And therefore when he knows he cannot satisfie their affection one way, by reason of the weakness of his age, he must of necessity seeks to satisfie it the other way, and consequently agrees to all their desires. And therefore no marvell ifTacitus say, that Augustus grown old, was led away by women.

Concerning the second point; before we come to examine which is the best age in a Prince; for governing his people, we must take notice, that in men there are foure ages: old age, childhood, youth, and confi...
The nineteenth Discourse.

The reason of this is, because in a Governor, there are four things required: the first is knowledge and prudence, whereupon Solomon considering himself to be but a child, prayed not to God for riches or honor, nor yet for long life, but for Wisdom to be able to judge rightly, saying, *Ego autem sum pueros Principes, &c.* The reason of this is, because in a Governor, there are four things required: the first is knowledge and prudence, whereupon Solomon considering himself to be but a child, prayed not to God for riches or honor, nor yet for long life, but for Wisdom to be able to judge rightly, saying, *Ego autem sum pueros Principes, &c.*

The reason of this is, because in a Governor, there are four things required: the first is knowledge and prudence, whereupon Solomon considering himself to be but a child, prayed not to God for riches or honor, nor yet for long life, but for Wisdom to be able to judge rightly, saying, *Ego autem sum pueros Principes, &c.*
Cities goe to wrocke, and easilly be destroyed, as Esoy faith, Omnes beſte agrì venite ad devo randum, Univerā beſte salus. (f) bules. ejus recte omnes.

The second thing required in a Prince is fortitude; to be able to bridde the people, and to beare the weight of the Scepter. And therefore Salomon in Ecclesias ticus faith, Noli quere re feri judex nisi waleas virtute strumpere iniquitates. ne forte extimeses facit Potens, & ponas scanda lum in agitevernas. And Job speaking of the burthen that lies upon Princes shoulders, faith, Sub quo curvante tur que portant orbem, which S. Gregory upon that other placcié of Job, Ecc. Gigantes gemmu des sub aquis, expounds saying, Genero sub aquis meæs nothing else, but to be oppreßed with the weight of Subjects, taking waters for people, as the Angel in the Apocalypse delivers, Aque multa, populi mult.; Whereupon not without great mystery our Lord God, meaning to make Peter Prince of the people, he called him first to walke upon the water.

Thirdly, Princes ought more to regard the common good of their subjects; then their owne private profit; that they may not be like those, of whom the Prophet Sophony speaketh, Judices ejus lupi vestere, non relinqueant in Mane: but like to the Apostle Paul, who faith, Non quero que vestra sunt, sed vos.

Fourthly, there is required Experience, Quo non est tentatus quis scit? Faith Salomon in Ecclesiasticus; Es qui non est expertus parva recognoscit. And therefore the Ancients have a fable, that Phaeton having taken upon him to guide the Horses of the Sunne, was thowne downe headlong. In as much then, as a child through defect of age, can neither have knowledge, nor experience; and thorough weaknesse of body, can neither be strong nor constant; and finally, thorough time spent in pleasures, will more regard his owne interest; then the people; there can be no doubt of his unfitnesse.
The nineteenth Discourse.

... to govern others, who without doubt is not well able to governe himselfe.

The other age contrary to this, is old age; in which as a thing most odious, men commonly are subject to contempt: *Ipse atus Galba* (faith Tacitus) & *Irrisio sed fastidio erat*. And a little after, *Pecarium sibi Imperi•um, & brevi transisturum*. But besides their being contemned, oftentimes they governe ill, because (as Aristotle writes in his Politicks) *Habet etiam intellectus suum senesceunt*, that the understanding also hath its old age; seeing by weaknesse of naturall heate, and want of radical moisture, they generate naughty blood, from which consequentely arise naughty spirits, which passing to the Heart, and from the Heart distributed to the senses, makes them they can but ill performe their office. And therefore in old men, we see the senses are alwaies weakened, as the Philosopher faith, *Omnis quaestra intellectio orium habet à sensis; the understanding making use of the senses to understand by: insonue, that they being grown old, it may reasonably be said, the understanding is growne old: whereupon Livy meaning to shew, that *Carillas* though growne old, was yet able to governe, faith, He had all his senses perfect, *Sed vegetum ingenium in avide pos hostages vigebat virebatque integris sensibus*.

A Prince therefore should not be old, as well because such are apt to be contemned; as because, becoming a child againe, he will governe ill: whereupon not without cause, *Tacitus* speaking of *Augustus*, faith, *Postquam præcessit jam senectu, nemo corpore satigebatur*; and that which followeth. And *Galba* knowing this, and meaning to helpe these inconvenientes of old age, he adopted *Piso*, saying, *Et audita adoptionis definam wideri senex, quod mihi munus objectitur*. And our Lord God meaning to furnish his Captaine *Moses*, with all the parts required in a Prince; to the end
end, that through old age, he might not be contemned, nor through want of understanding come to govern ill; suffered not his senses, nor yet his flesh to grow old with yeeres, but preserved them in a flourishing state, Now caligovernat osculi ejus, faith the Scripture, and this opinion all Writers follow.

It remains, to shew, which is the fitter age, of youth, or the consistente age: for Resolution whereof, I say briefly, that if a Prince be to attend the warres, it is then better he should be yong; as well for the labours of the body, as for the vigour of blood, which growne cold in old men, were never able to performe those things, which are required in a warriour. Whereupon we see, that many great Captaines, who in their youth have done admirable acts, in their old age, have lost many advantages, through weakness of spirit; as it happened to Metellus, in the warre against Sertorius in Spaine, (as Plutarch relates.) And therefore Moses shewed great judgement, who amongst the Elders he had chosen, having two yong men, Eldad and Medad, he caused them to stay in the Army; shewing thereby, that in matters of warre they should be yong men. And our Lord God meaning to ayd the Maccabees in a battaile against their enemies appeared in the forme of a yong man upon a white Horse.

But if we speake of Princes, that are to judge the people in peace; in this case, the age that inclines to old age, is certainly fittest; in signe whereof our Lord God who in the Canticles, as being a Bridegroome appeared in forme of a yong man, Come ejus fusc clara palmarum, signa quass Coryny, when afterwards he appears as a King and Judge of Daniel, and in the Apocalypse, he comes described with gray haires, Capus autem ejus & Capilli erant candidi, tanquam luna alba, & tanquam Nix; and this is for as much, as for the most part is wont to happen.
But because the contrary of this is often seen, that some men in his youth govern much better than in his age; I cannot omit in this place to advertize, that canities or whiteness, by age, consists not so much in haires or in yeers, as in the whiteness of the thoughts: whereupon, in the Canticles, the Bridegroome faith to the Bride, Vulnere cisti cor meum, in uno oculorum taurum, & in uno erine colli tui, and S. Luke, Sed capillis vestri numerati sunt; and S. Gregory upon Job, expounding that place of Deuteronomy, Levitæ tenentur radere pilos carnis suae: expounds it, id est, cogitationes superfluis.

He then shall be accounted old, and to have gray haires, that is full of white thoughts: whereupon Solomon faith, Senecius venerabilis est, non diurna, neque annorum numero computata, canit autem sunt sensus hominis & asas Senecius, vita immaculata. When our Lord God would have Moses to choose persons that should assist him in judging the people, he said not, Choose out seventy old men; but, seventy whom thou knowest to be old: where it plainly appeares, that he speakes not of the old age of the body, for that every one is able to know; but of the old age of the mind, and so S. Gregory expounds it in those words, Congregati mihi septuaginta viros Israel quos tu nosis quod Senes populi sunt. While he faith, In quibus senioribus, quid aliud quid senecius cordis requiritur, cum tale jubentur eligi, quod senes esse sciuntur et enim senecibus in eis corporis quaerentur a tantis scire poterant, a quattuor vici: dum vero dicunt, quos tu nosis, quod senes populi sunt, profecto licet, quod senecius mentis non corporis eligenda sunt. For an old man that is gray, by reason of yeers may be a child in regard of conditions; and therefore Esay faith, Puor centum annorum maritatur; whereupon it followes not; to say, a Prince is young, therefore he will governe ill; a Prince is old, therefore he will governe well; because it oftentimes happens, that the same man, is in youth, old;
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old; and in age, young; as Solomon who, in his youth governed divinely well; both himselfe and his state, but afterwards in his old age, he overthrows himselfe, and consequently his subjects. So Nero in the beginning of his youth, governed with so great prudence, that he is rather to be imitated, then that he can be surpassed: but in process of time, he so perfidiously carried himselfe, that sparing neither his schoolmasters, nor his mother, nor finally himselfe, he cast himselfe, and (as much as he could) the state into absolute ruine.

It will not then be from our purpose, to search out the reason, how it happens that many in their youth govern well; and in their old age, become cruel; and throw themselves headlong into vices. First then, I say, it happens by reason of age, which (as we have showed before) of it's owne nature, causeth contempt; and the Prince doubting this, and thinking to remedy it with cruelty, plungeth himselfe in it, to shew there is value in him: so did Tiberius who in his youth endeavoured by all means to hide his acts of cruelty; but in his old age, changing opinion, he was never well, but when he was talking of them, and when he could say something to make it appeare, that he was cruel; for no other cause, but that he thought this the onely way to keep him from contempt: Whereupon, if the Senators had known this reason, they would never have maruell'd to heare him recite his acts, & the death of his nephew Drusus: and although Tacitus ascribe this to his great confidence, they say, Penestrabat pavor, & admiratio callidum olim & tegendis celentibus obscurum, sa confidens: observisse, ut perversum dicere: quamvis, ofterdet minus in sub verbisbus: Controversie: inter servorum extrema...
Secondly, this is wont to happen, because in the beginning men are not secure in their states, and therefore seeks by good means to make themselves secure; but once secured, they then yield themselves wholly to be governed by sense: and therefore David when he had vanquish’d his enemies, and made himselfe secure in his Kingdom, he then committed the adultery with Bersabee, and the slaughter of Urias, whereof S. Bernard speaking faith, Sapiens David, Sapiens Salomon fuit, sed blandientibus nimirum secundis rebus, alter ex parte, alter ex toto desipit.

Thirdly, because a Prince in old age, hath either gotten him a good name or a bad: if a good, then conceiving that whatsoever he doth, can never take away the good name already gotten, he easily runneth into vices; if bad, then despairing in so short a time, as being now old, to remove that bad name, he thinkes it all one what he doth; and thereupon contemning fame, would be content the World might end with himselfe. So did Herod the great, who gave order that as soone as himselfe should be dead, a great number of Noblemen, that were then prisoners should be slaine. And Nero was contented it should be thought, that he grieved for nothing so much, as that he had not the whole World in his hand, inclosed in a glasse, that he might cast it to the ground whensoever he should die. But if a Prince be yong, although he have gotten the name of a cruel man, yet hoping in time he may redeeme it and get a better, he will not easily plunge himselfe in vices.

Fourthly, this is wont to happen, when Princes are but of little judgment; because as when of themselves they are prudent, they alwaies governe better in the third age; so when of themselves they want discretion, they govern better in their youth, then afterward; seeing in that age, it is no disgrace to suffer themselves...
The nineteenth Discourse.

...to be guided by men of ability; as was seen in Nero, who in his youth was contented to be advised, and to follow the counsel of Seneca, Burrhus and Corbulo, but coming to a riper age, either they take a liberty no longer to regard the advice of good Counsellors, or else they count it a shame to be a Prince upon props: or lastly they are instigated by others, through hate they bear to the greatness of those able Counsellors. All these things concurred in Nero: for first he rejected the reverence of his schoolmasters, sequi in omnes libidines effudit: and then there wanted not instigators, who told him it was a shame, Certes finitam Neronis puerritiam, & robur juventae adeisse, exueret Magistrum, satia amplis Doctoribus instructus Majoribus suis. So as, having no braine himselfe, nor hearkning to them that had, he came in a short time to utter ruine. So the Emperour Constantinus Seffus, was contented at first to be ruled by his mother Irene, but growing elder, he cast her off, and came to be starke naught. And Rabbi Salomon faith, that as long as Nathan the Prophet, who was Salomons schoolmaster lived, Salomon tooke no strange woman to be his wife: and this opinion is followed by Abulensis.

Domi Res tranquillae: eadem Magistratuum vocabula.

That to maintain and suffer Magistrates to continue, although without authority, is a matter of great moment.

The twentieth Discourse.

I Have alwaies heard it resolved, that when a City changeth from being a Common-wealth, to be a Kingdome, it should doe well, to leave if not the same authority,
authority, yet at least the same Magistrates. And the
same I have found written in all Politician Authours;
and for authority, they allledge this place of Tacitus,
Eadem Magistratum vocabula: where he shewes, that
Augustus changed all things in Rome, but only the
name of Magistrates: and they give this reason, that
seeing it is only a bare name, much in show, and little
in substance, the Prince can lose nothing of his owne
Right by it; and yet by this means he shall be sure
to get the love of his people, who are seduced with such
vanity.

This opinion, held, written and observed of every
one, contains in it two things: one, that as to the
Prince, the leaving of Magistrates is of great profit:
the other, that as to the Subject it is a mere vanity, and
serves only to puff up the people.

Although this opinion be general and entered in
such sort into mens conceits, that there seemes to be
no contending against it; yet it may be lawfull for me
to deliver what I thinke of it; seeing I seek to be
believed, by any other strength, then by that of rea-
son. I say then, I could never come to know, that this
leaving the name of Magistrates, is any weakness, but
have always accounted it a matter of great moment;
for proofe whereof, we must know, that as all other
kinds of state, so a Commonwealth also consists of two
things; that is, of matter, and of forme. In a Monar-
chy, the forme is the Prince; and the City is the mat-
ter. In a Commonwealth, the forme is the Magistrate
that rules; and the thing that is ruled is the matter.
From hence it is, that when these two things doe not
meet and joyne together, a City cannot be said to be
free: whereupon, if it should be without any Prince,
and should withall be without any Magistrates, it
could not be called a Commonwealth. The Armenians
after the death of Ariobarzanes, being unwilling to
serve
serve his successors, remained without any Lord; but having no forme of a Commonwealth, they were never the more free. Whereof Tacitus speaking, shewed he knew that well, which I said before, where he faith, Ariobarzana morte fortuita absumptae, Haremen ejus hand toleraverem, tentauque feminse imperio, cui nomen Erato; eaque brevi pulsa, incerti solutique E magis sine Domino quam in libertate, profugum Viconem in Regnum accipiant. If then the Prince taking away the matter, which is the City, shall leave the forme, which are the Magistrates, he shall give not onely a vaine contentment, as those men say, but also a great hope to recover liberty: of which they should be out of hope if the Prince, together with the authority, should also take away the Magistrates; seeing although they should be without a Prince, yet they should be near the nearer for being in liberty, but rather would never be quiet, untill they had a King againe, as it fell out with the Armenians: and if they should agree to have a Commonwealth, it would never be durable; as was seen in Florence, after a driving out of Petrus de Medici: and therefore the Romans had great fortune to find a forme made to their hands; for the Kings being expelled, they had then nothing else to do, but onely in their stead, to make two Consuls. This thing both Romans and Tarquinius, Caesar and Nero knew to be of great moment, who endeavoured all they could to extinguish the Senate. And indeed those Provinces, that have been without Magistrates, have never been able to come to liberty, as was seen in the Assyrians, and is at this day seen in the Persians, and in the Turks, and others. For it is an easie matter for an image of waxe, if it be broken, to be renued againe, so long as the forme by which it was framed remains entire; seeing with one onely action, the new forme will be taken away, and the old will be introduced: but if together
The twentieth Discourse.

with the Image, the Image also should be taken away; it would then be very hard to return it to the old form, as requiring two actions, one to break the Image that is of new, and the other, to renew the Image that was before.

Moreover, this only appearance of Magistrates, besides that it facilitates the recovery of liberty, causeth also a desire of liberty, which if it do none other hurt, at least it puts them in mind of a Commonwealth; a thing to Princes most pernicious. And lastly, it gives occasion to the principal men to assemble together without suspicion; and therefore, if I be not deceived, Julius Agricola told Tacitus oftimes, that the taking away these appearances of liberty, had been very useful for hindring the rebellions of the Irish. Saepe exaudivi, legentem qua oris auxiliis debellari obtinerique. Ibernae passa. Idque etiam adversus Britanniam professurus, si Romana unque arma, or velut est confessis libertas, talaratur.

Thus in my opinion it is sufficiently proved, that to leave the names of Magistrates, although without authority, is not a puffing up, or a vanity that blinds the people; but indeed a matter of great moment, for regaining of liberty. Yet I blame not Princes that take this course, and especially those that are at this day, who having no doubt of their people, ought to allow them, not only the names of Magistrates, but also Magistrates with some authority; and as little doe I like, that a man comming new to a Kingdom, should take this course; only I put them in mind, that all they who have gone about to extingeuish Magistrates, have either been slain or banished, except one Cleomenes.

Tiberium
That Tiberius was part good, and part bad. How it happened that he fell not into dangers as Nero did. Whether it be good to be brought up in the Prince's House: and finally, how their secret vices may be known.

The one and twentieth Discourse.

Acitus discoursing of the successors of Augustus, whilst he laies open the virtues and vices of Tiberiunshewes us also, the capacity and incapacity that was in him for succession in the Empire: his capacity was first, by reason of his ripenesse in age; being such as in our former discourse we required in a Prince, then his ability in Military affaires; and the long experience he had, being brought up in Augustus his house, and employed continually in State business; and seeing Princes ought to be able both to govern the people in peace, and to rule them in warre, I know not any man could be fitter for the Empire then Tiberius.

On the other side, Tiberius was proud, cruell, and lascivious; and seeing a Prince ought to governe with mildrness, to have care of the subjects lives; and above all, rather to defend their honour, then oppresse it: there is no doubt, but Tiberius was more uncapable of such a dignity then any other; because as being proud,
he could never be pleasing in his government: and as being cruel, he was readier to destroy his subjects than to preserve them: and lastly, as being lascivious, he was likelier to dishonour hisCitizens, than to do them honour: and thus, as there were in him all those virtues that make a Prince admirable; so there were in him all those vices that make a state miserable. And because for the most part, the good is overborne and suppressed by the bad; we may justly say, that Tiberius was altogether incapable of the Empire, his experience being obscured by his pride; his valour in warre, by his cruelty in Peace; and lastly his ripeness in yeers, by his greenness in lustfulness.

Tiberius yet together with his many vices, had also some virtues, and therefore was not wholly good, but part good; nor wholly wicked, but part wicked: and this is the cause why he continued peaceably in his Empire, which Nero did not, because Nero had many vices, and never a virtue; Tiberius though he had many vices, yet withall he had some virtues; and a vice can never hold out long, if it be not founded upon some virtue. A lascivious man, if he have not some temperance, will never live ten daies to an end: a thief, if he use not some meane in his robbing, but will be stealing day and night, secretly and openly, he will quickly make his own Gallowes. Therefore Saint Chrysostome faith, Talis est natura mali, ut non consistat nisi viri tus cuipiam admiscatur. Nam mala non habent naturam, ut ex sepossint subsistere; nisi Paulum aliquid a virtutibus ceperint. And Aristotle having an eye to this, where teaching the way how to maintaine a tyranny, faith, that a tyrant ought at least to be part good, and part bad, Insuper moribus talis esse, ut recte se habeat ad virtutem, vel seminbous quidem sit, et minimus sed semimalus. This was one of the causes why Nero being cruel, ruined himselfe, and Tiberius being cruel, kept himselfe
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them do it, that make it their profession. And seeing this delight cannot be taken without being intelligent of the Arts, therefore this opinion of Philip seems not much different from my opinion; that a Prince, if it be possible, should know all Arts and Sciences, but not practice them. Nero, completed verses, and finding it a profession not fit for a Prince, he gave it over. Sed colibet vires (faith Martial speaking of him ingeniumque pudor. Seeing then Nero was virtuous and excellent in those kinds of Arts and Sciences, in which it is not for a Prince to be too conversant; we may justly lay, that he was vicious in vertue, a thing which easily happens to those that are too greedy of getting knowledge. Whereupon Tacitus commended Agrigola, that he could bridle this greediness, Retinuiique quod est difficillimum, ex sapientia modum. For this desire to know more then is fit, is neither Politically, nor Morally, nor Theologically good, Quernadmodum omnium rerum (faith Seneca) se literam etiam intemperantia laborat.  And S. Paul, Noli sperne plus quam, sperne oporem, sed sperre ad sobrietatem. That which Tacitus calls, To hold a mean, in studies, Seneca calls, to be temperate; and S. Paul, to be sober.

It comes into my mind, now that we are in this digression, to give another reason, why Tiberius maintained himselfe in the Empire, and Nero perished in it: and it is, that Nero deserved fame, and Tiberius much esteemed it. And if a Divine should object, that the contemning of fame in this world, is a necessary vertue in all good men; I would answer, as it is true, that to contemn worldly fame, is one of the best things a Christian can doe; so it is one of the worst things a Heathen or a wicked man can doe; because there will be no vice or villany, which he will not dare to doe, if he regard not fame; as was scene in Nero, who not regarding fame, left no wickednesse unattempted.
But to return to our purpose, and principal intent, which is, to shew the meaning of that place in Tacitus, upon which we have undertaken to discourse; I say, that many from that text, make it a rule, that one who hath been brought up in the princes house should not be made Prince, because of Tacitus his saying, 

_Hunc primum ab infantia educatum Regnatur_, and their reason is, because in such places he learns to be proud and insolent.

First, I doe not thinke, that Tacitus mislikes a successor should be brought up in the princes house, neither that he makes it a cause of pride absolutely; because not only it is commendable, but in a manner necessary, that princes should be brought in their houses to whom they are to succeed; seeing that though a Prince be of the same state, and of the same blood Royall which ought to succeed in the crown, yet if he should be brought any where but in his owne house, it would be cause enough to make him odious to all his subjects. And therefore Tacitus faith of Vonone, that although he were of the blood Royall of the Parthians, yet because he had beene brought up in Rome, his subjects would not endure him. _Quamvis Gentis Arsacidarum ut externum aspernabatur_.

They therefore deceive themselves, who favouring either brothers or sons of the great Turk, have a hope to settle them in the Ottoman Empire: for though they be of the blood Royall, yet they will alwayes be accounted strangers, and therupon rejected. Whereof dominially we have heard and seene examples, no other good having ever come off it, but that which shewed the Christian piety of those princes, who in zeal to God, have given shelter to such persons.

Secondly, he being commonly of an intolerable carriage, who from a servant comes to be a master, as well...
well, because he passeth from one extreme to another; as because, no be a servant, abaseth the spirit; as was seen in Tigranes, of whom Tacitus faith, that he therefore lost his Kingdom, Cum advenit Tigranes a Nerone ad capessendum Imperium dilectus, Cappadocum ex Nobilitate, Regis Archelai nepos, sed quod dimostrit apud urbem fuerat usque ad servilem patientiam dimissus, neque consentia acceptus. And therefore our Lord God, would not that his Captain and Leader of the Israelites, Moses, should be as others were, a servant to Pharaoh, but would have him bred and brought up in the Kings house; and for this it was, that the Parthians expelled Vonone, Simancipium Caesaris, tot per annos servitutem perpessum, Parthis Imperiæ.

Thirdly, because being in some part raised above equality, as they are, who live in Princes houses, they are with less envy of the subjects, taken to be their Prince. Whereupon Servius, although (as some thinke) he was the sonne of a bondwoman; yet because he had been brought up in the Princes house, he was accepted for King. The Lacedemonians also, when they wanted a King, they tooke Laconicus, onely because he had been brought up in the Kings house.

Fourthly, because in such places, there is no doubt but they may better learne how to governe, and be set in a way of managing affairs: and therefore Dion in the life of Adrian, would have a speciall regard to be had of this, in choosing a Prince; and our Lord God, meaning to fit David, for being a King, made him in Saul's lifetime, to goe to live in the Kings Palace; to the end, he might learne the customes of a King; and be made to know the degree, before he tooke it; where if suddenly upon Saul's finne, he had been made King, he should have come unknown to all the people.

It is not therefore to be found fault withall, that he
he who is to rule others, should be brought up in his house that rules; neither in my opinion had Tacitus any such meanings, or to say better, he whose words Tacitus reports.

For they do not simply and absolutely finde faults with Tiberius his education in Augustus his house, neither yet, that he had so great dignities and honours conferred upon him; for these did rather prepare him to govern well, then to make him proud; but the faults they find is this, that in his youth, and whilst he lived in the Princes house, he was raised to so many and to such a number of Offices. The fault therefore was not, that he was brought up in the Princes house, but that he had so many offices and honours bestowed upon him; and this neither not so much, as the unseasonableness of them. And therefore Tacitus faith not simply, Congestos consulatus & honores, but Congestos juvenem consulatus. Which is very manifest, for seeing Tiberius had also in his mature age, great offices and honours, Tacitus must needs be understood to speake of those which he received in his youth, apt to make men grow proud, as in another place he excellently shewes, in the person of Tiberius; for the sons of Germanicus being much honoured by the Pontifex, who in his prayers to their Gods, made mention of them together with Tiberius, he forbade him saying; that yong men grow proud by receiving honours before their time. Movis ne quis in postorum mobiles adolescentiam animos, prematuris honoribus ad superbum exotet. And thus much concerning his pride.

Secondly, Tacitus taxeth Tiberius with cruelty, which though he endeavoured all he could to hide, yet he could not keepe it from appearing. From whence we may know, there cannot be a worse nature, nor a worse Prince, then he who having in him the vice of cruelty, strives for some ends to hide it, seeing having once
The one and twentieth Discourse.

Once gotten his intent, with heaping upon himselfe much hatred, he after makes his greedinesse of blood appeare the more, by flushing it out all at once, (at least if he doe not as Cleomenes did) and where if he had not hidde his vice, every one might have knowne, upon what to worke, and consequently few should have needed to feare. Now that he hides it, and men cannot penetrate into the Princes mind, it gives occasion for all in generall to feare. The Senators therefore of Rome, seeing Otho dissemble his vices, were much displeased at it: Otho interim (faith Tacitus) contra fere omnium, non delicias, neque desidia torpescere; dilata voluptates, diffimulata luxuria; Or cuncta ad decorum Imperii composita; rogue plus formidinis afferent, false virtutes, Or vita, reditura. Yet it is to be understood of those who dissemble, but for a certaine time, as Otho would have done, and as Nero did; but if we aske, which is the better Prince, of him that being cruell desires to use his cruelty courtly, or he, that is openly cruell, I hold directly, that this is the worse; for, using his cruelty openly, either he knowes not his vice, or he cares not what men say of him: if he regard not what men say of him, there cannot a worse thing be; if he know not his vice, he comes to be a cruell foole; where he that hides it, shews that both he knowes his vice, and also desires a good report: whereupon it follows he cannot so often put his cruelty in execution; for then he should be a more foole then the other, to thinke that an act often repeated, should never be perceived; and if any one object that this must needs be the worse, as joyning to the vice of cruelty, the vice of craft: I answer, that this mans government will be so much better, as it is lesse distastfull, to be governed by one that is crafty, then by one that is a foole: whereupon the Senators of Rome never feared Tiberius so much, as when they saw him give over his dissembling: and there-
therefore Taritus in another place faith, Punctualitas praeceptor, & admiravit caelum suum & regiditas sedentiorum, eo confidentia venisse, ut tamquam clausoris paritibus, ostenderet nuptem, sub verberibus Centurionis inter servorum idus, extrema vites almenta frustra orantem. But it is so hard a matter to hide a vice that is natural; and to hide it so, as that no signe of it may appeare; that almost all they, who have had a purpose to dissemble, in short time have been discovered. So it happened to Philip, so to the Emperor Domitian, so to Sylla, to Tiberius and to Nero; and finally, to Theodotus King of the Ostrogoths: being a thing impossible, though there be a habit gotten of dissembling, to cover a vice that is natural. In regard whereof Plutarch faith of Philip, Infita a natura vita aderciitum habitum viscerum; paulum foris superlibrumurmt, & ingenium Regis deterre. Whereupon our Lord God in S. Matthew, meaning to teach us to know such kind of men, faith, we must observe well their deeds, Attendite a falsis Prophetis quibus veniant ad vos in vestimentis Ovium: and to shew us the way how to know them, it follows, A frustris rerum cognoscet eos, where Theophylact adds, Nam igitur ad tempus simulamen, successa tamen temporis producuntur. I will not forbear to bring another pregnant way, which Galen teacheth us, to come to the knowledge of these dissimulations, who faith, that if a vertue be natural, as (for example) mildnesse, whether the provocations be great or little, yet they will not move a man to choller; but in all occasions, he will shew himselfe constant; but if it be feined, then perhaps in light occasions, he may hide it; but in great, it will violently break out and shew it selfe: and therefore Taritus meaning to shew the dissimulation of Tiberius with these words, Multa indicia favicie, quamquam premitur eos horum, where this word Empere shews, that not upon light, but upon great occasions, it discovered it selfe with
with violence. Thirdly Tacitus blames Tiberius for luxury, of which head, I intend to speak in the following discourse.

Ne quis quidem annis, quibus Rhodi specie
Secellus exulem egerit, aliquid quam Iram &
Simulationem, & secretas libidines meditantum.

How much it importa a Prince to be chast.

The two and twentieth Discourse.

Luxury is a much greater vice, then cruelty; this taking away the life only of the subjects, that the honour: and chastity on the contrary, is so profitable both to the acquiring, and to the conserving a Dominion, that every one (though of an ill nature, and a worse intention) that aspireth to a Principality, will yet take care, if not to be chaste, yet at least to seem so, and to hide his vice of lust untill he have attained and bettled in the Empire. Whereupon Daniel speaking of Antichrist, faith, Deum patrum suorum non reputabit, & erit in concupiscentia suminarum: which place is translated in these words, Et concupiscetia mulierum non subjacet. Writers therefore interpret, that Antichrist knowing of what importance chastity is for getting a Kingdom, will counterfeit himself to be so; thereby to get himselfe love, and to bring him forward, and finally to make him Emperor. But after he hath once gotten the Empire, he will then no longer hide his filthy concupiscence, but making himselfe a prey to vices, will shew himselfe to be truly their child.

This profit Tiberius Nepos the, and therefore strove all he could to hide his lust, Et secrum libidinos meditatum:
The two and twentieth Discourse.

Taketh; but when he had once gotten whither he aspired, and had set sure footing in the Empire, he then suffered himself to fall headlong into all kinds of vices. It is not therefore enough, to counterfeit to be such, before a man comes to his greatness, as that wicked one did, and as this impious one will do; but a Prince must truly, both in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end not onely shew to be, but be in truth and sincerely free from lust: first, for zeal to God, and then for his owne good and the States; on his owne behalf, because there is nothing that more ruins a Prince, then to be abject, base, and despised: Nothing that more upholds him, then Majesty, Gravity, and Reverence; and because Princes that are given to lust can never have any of these respects; It is therefore necessary they should keep themselves chaste. In consideration of this, David after his adultery committed with Berosbee, taking notice of his error, prayed to God and said, Reddemi bietiam salutari tui, & spiritu Principalis confirmavit me. As though he should say, O Lord God, I forgot that I was a King and a Prince, through the concupiscence of the flesh, into which most miserably I am fallen; I humbly pray thee, that from henceforward, thou wouldst confirm in me the spirit of chastity, that so I may returne to be a King & a Prince: and this is so true, that by the figure Antonomasia, chastity is called Gravity, and Majesty; and therefore S. Paul writing to Titus faith, In omnibus teipsius prebe exemplum bonus operum; In doctrina, in integritate, in gravitate. S. Hierome in his Comment upon that place, instead of gravitate, reads castitate; for the same word, which in Greeke signifies Gravity and Majesty, signifies also Chastity: and therefore, as Gravity and Majesty are necessary for a Prince, without which he should not be a Prince; so Chastity also is no lesse necessary: and as it is impossible that Majesty and lust should
The two and twentieth Discourse.

should be in company together; *Non bene conveniunt, nec in una sedes moratur; Majestas & virtus;* so it is impossible that Majesty and chastity should not be together; which one or all itself is able to make Princes be reverend. Which S. Paul in the aforesaid Epistle shews, where he faith, *Ut quies adversa est: Reverentia, nihil habens malum dicere nobis.* Seeing chastity is reverenced even of her enemies.

On the part of the Subjects, there is no doubt but the chastity of the Prince, is of great consequence for their good: First, in regard of his example, seeing Cities, and consequently the Citizens, alter as they see the Prince alter: and therefore when Dionysius the Tyrant, sent for Plato to teach him Geometry, all the City and Palace was presently full of dust, every one seeking with all diligence to be a Geometrician. And Saint John in the Apocalypse, meaning to express the changes, which are made in Cities, through the change that is in Princes, describes one and the same horse, to be sometimes red, sometimes white, and sometimes blacke, which happened by the diversity of their riders, according to whom it changed colour. By the horse, (as the greater part of Writers say) is signified the Empire of Rome; and by those that rode upon it, the Emperours; according to whose vices the Empire changed, and in nothing more than through chastity; seeing the Prince may by violence violate the honour of his Subjects, if he be not chaste. In which regard S. Paul faith, *Orationes fieri, pro Regibus, & pro omnibus qui in sublimitate sunt constituti, ut terram vitam agamus in omnipeitate & castitate.* Where he plainly shews, that the chastity of the Subjects depends upon the chastity of the Prince, while he faith, let us Pray for Kings, to the end we may live chastly.

Chastity therefore is profitable for the Subjects, and
The three and twentieth Discourse.

and necessary for him that will rise to honour; in signe perhaps whereof, S. John in the Apocalyp, makes the Virgins appeare on the top of the Mount: as though he would say, that chastpersons can easiliest rise to great degrees, who in the Scripture oftentimes are figured by Mountaines. Let Princes therefore be faire from lust: and as (according to the opinion of Hugo the Cardinall) they have the Name of God in common to them with Virgins: so also let them have chastity in common to them with Virgins, but yet in such a manner as Princes are able to have it; for so they shall the better discharge their Office, to the honour and glory of God: which is the thing above all they ought to have before their eyes.

Accedere Matrem muliebri Impotentia, servienda Feminar.

How and when the government of women is odious.

The three and twentieth Discourse.

For declaration of this place of Tacitus, where he seems to make it an odious thing to be governed by women: we will first shew, in what things it is, that womens Dominion over men is odious; and then, what Authority Princes should allow women in the government.

To begin with the first: I lay, that women may beare rule three waies; the first, themselves alone directly. Secondly, themselves alone indirectly. Thirdly, themselves together with their sons, husbands, or other men.

The first way of bearing rule, that is, directly, and properly consists in the acts of jurisdiction, as in judging:
The three and twentieth Discourse.

ing; to which there being required great knowledge, great prudence, and inflexibility: it is not possible, that women, by reason of the weakness of their understanding, can in any degree be fit; and therefore in the law, there is a prohibition against that Sex. And indeed there is no example found to the contrary, but only that of Debora, who in the old Testament is numbered among the Judges; and judged the people of Israel; with so great prudence, that she hath left of her self an eternal memory. But yet this case can be no barre to our assertion; seeing it may easily be answered, that Debora gave not judgement of her owne braine, but gave answers to questions in manner of a Propheteesse, saying only that which was revealed to her by God.

The second way of bearing rule, less proper and indireци, is nothing else, but to have a power to comand; which by accident also may happen to women, who being daughters of Princes, may succeed their fathers in the State. Although the power of commanding may seem proper to the man, and no way common with women; yet seeing the possessing of riches, is equally common to the man, and to the woman: and that it oftentimes happens that the jurisdiction follows the riches, and the thing possessed; it may also happen, that as the woman is partaker of the riches, so she may be also of the jurisdiction to them annexed.

A third way, is to command in company with men; and themselves, not have the command alone; as many times, Wives with their Husbands, Mothers with their Sonnes, and Grandmothers with their Nephews; which oftentimes may be, and oftentimes is, but whether well or ill, shall be shewed hereafter.

It is therefore clear, that a woman cannot bear rule directly and properly; that is, in that kind of ruling which is called judging; but yet may in that which
is said to be commending; and especially in the third way, with sons and other men.

As to the second point, whether the Dominion of women be odious, or no; we may distinguish it thus: either we speak of women alone, and by themselves; or else of women accompanied with men. If we take it the first way, there is nothing more odious, nothing more abhorred of men, than to be commanded by a woman; as being a thing repugnant to reason: contrary to God's commandment, and most contrary to the law of nature. Our Lord God said to the woman, Sub·viri potes·tatem eris. Aristotle faith, that naturally the more perfect bears rule over the more imperfect, and the better over the worse: whereupon the woman (as Aristotle in a thousand places witnesseth) being more imperfect than the man, and being by Pythagoras placed in the number of evils, and man of good; it would certainly be a monster in nature, that the perfect should be servant to the imperfect, the good to the evil; and especially that sex being (I say not always, but for the most part) void of prudence and of valour; full of pride; and fuller of lust; and consequently most unfit to govern: of whom Tacitus faith, Non solum imparem laboribus sexum, sed si licentia adsit, sexum, ambiciosum, potestatis avidam. The government therefore of women, when they rule alone, not only is odious, but is also most miserably administered: neither can the example of Deborah (whereof I spake before) be justly objected; but rather I may my selfe make use of that example, in confirmation of my own assertion; for if she governed well, it was because she was a Prophetsesse; and if her government were not odious; it was because a man commanded: for our Lord God; being willing the Israelites should be ruled by a woman; and knowing that by reason of their natural imbecillities, they are not fit to rule, he infor
The three and twentieth Discourse.

fed into Deborah a Propheticall spirit, and meaning she should be received without distast, knowing how distastfull a thing it is to men to be governed by women, he appointed her Barak for a companion in the government; to the end, that commandig by his assistance, it might not be thought as of herself alone, the command of a woman.

I will here forbear to speake of infinite Kingdoms and States, that by the government of women have been utterly overthrown, of which all ancient and moderne Histories are full; as well for that it is a thing so well knowne, as for that it is not much to our purpose. For when Tacitus faith, Serviendum feminæ, he meanes not, that a woman should command alone, either as Judge or as Princeesse; but he meanes the third way, together with men, seeing he speakes of Livia, who having beene the cause of Tiberius his coming to the Crowne: it might be doubted, whether she also were not to governe, as well as he. That which we are to examine is this, what authority ought to be given in such cases, by men to women; and whether their government in this sort be odious or no? For answer whereto, we must proceed with distinguishing, either we speake of States not well setled, where the men are stout and warlike; or else of States, that live quietly and in peace, and are governed by a Prince secure. If we be in the first case, I am absolutely of opinion, that the Dominion of women is most odious; and therefore Semiramis, as knowing this, durst not venture to take upon her the Empire, openly; Hæ (faith Justin) nec inimatuo puero insa tradere Imperium, nec inopiam palam tractare; nec in aetate gestibus vir patienter uni vero, medium foemina paritum. And the reason of this is nothing else, but that those Subjects being stout and warlike, would never have consented to be governed by her, if they had knowne her at first to
be a woman. Which we may well thinke, seing with these very subjectes, it was enough for Sardanapalus that he had but the like nesse of a woman, to make him despised, and afterward be slaine. *Indignatus rali feminin* (faith Justin in the person of Artabanus) *sanctum vivorum subjectum; tradantique lanam ferrum G r armorum portantes parere.* And this is the case, which Tacitus means when he faith *Servandum feminin*; shewing, it would be odious in a warlike people, as the Romans were, and dangerous in a new Prince as Tiberius was, to governe in company of a woman.

Now if we aske, what authority should be given to women in such cases, I say, they should not be sufferd to enter meddle in matters of judgement, nor of the state, themselves alone; not so much for their incapacity, as for the contempt they are apt to fall into, though they should governe never so well. And therefore the Roman Emperour Alexander, a man most just, and furnishd with all the qualities of a good Prince: yet because he suffered his mother to meddle in matters of State, though she did it with great prudence and justice, he fell in short time into contempt, and finally of the Souldiers was miserably slaine. In truth a singular example to shew, that warlike minds can never endure the government of women, and that their honour is the Princes disparagement; which Tiberius (a wise man) knew, and could say, *Moderandos foeminarum honores:* and Tacitus, no lesse wise then he, gives the reason of it saying, *Muliebre faugium in sui diminutionem accipient.*

Yet they must not altogether be left without honour, but some authority it is fit they should have, especially such as are the cause of the Princes comming to the Empire. And therefore the wise Salomon, who through the good means of his mother Bersabee with old David, was assumed to the Royall dignity; not only
only honoured her exceedingly, but would have her sit with him upon his Throne; as is written in the Booke of Kings, Venit ergo Bersabee ad Regem Salomonem, ut loqueretur ei pro Adonias. & surrexit Rex in occasione ejus, adoravitque eam, & sedid super Thronum suum, positusque est Thronus matris Regis, quae sedid ad dextarem ejus. But yet I cannot finde, in holy Scripture, that ever she gave judgement, or spake in counsell, or gave audience in affaires at any time. The authority and honour therefore that is to be allowd to women, in States that are not secure, ought not to be immediately in themselves, but by assistance of their husbands. And this counsell David gave to Salomon, in the Psalm 146:5, speaking to his Bride, where he faith, Filiae Tyri in muneribus, vultum tuum deprecabuntur: Where he faith not te, but vultum tuum, that is, thy husband; meant by the word countenance, as Theodoret and S. Basil interpret it. He then that is to be referred to, and to be luced unto, must be the man, and not the woman; and the honours that are done to the women, ought to passe by the way of their husbands: and therefore it is said in Esay, Tantummodo in vocetur nomen tuum super nos. This course Tiberius tooke most notably, who when his mother made any suite in his name, he presently granted it; and more then so, he many times at the suite of Livia required those things of the Senat, which without blushing he could not have asked; but when it was moved to give her honours immediately without passing by the means of Tiberius, he then presently opposed it, saying, Moderandos famarinum honores.

But if we speake of those Princes that live securely in peace, and are well setled in their states, as at this day many are in Italy; then, either those women that should governe together with the men, are in judgement and understanding fit for it, or else they are altogether
The three and twentie and Discourse.

The three and twentie Discourse.

together unfit: if unfit, it may then be enough for them to looke to matters at home, and Domesticall affairs; but if fit, I cannot then thinke any thing more just, or more convenient, or more profitable to a Prince, then to call such women of his blood, to beare a part of the burthen of government; both because by their experience and prudence they may assist the Prince as much as any other; and also because by reason of their owne interest, and the singular affection they beare to their husbands, their sonses or nephews; there can be none found, that with more sincerity and faithfulness, and without any by-respects, will help them to beare so great a burthen, as a Kingdome is; and so much more, as they are alwaies like to be partakers as well of the dangers, as of the profits of the Prince. A thing which is not found in strangers, and such as are mercenary, whose profit oftentimes lookes another way, and is divided from the Princes profit. Whereupon S. Bernard, upon that place of Esay, Pater filius votam faciet veritatem: faith, Non revelans servo veritas, quia servus nescit quid faciat Dominus ejus; sed nec Mercenarius rapitur ad contemplandum veritatem, quia propriam querit utilitatem. And therefore Augustus a most wise Prince, had often conference with Livia, Numa Pompilius with Ageria, Cyrus with Assasia, Tarquinius with Tanaquil, and Justinian with his wife Theodotia. Princes therefore ought not to despise the counsels of women of their blood; but to hold them in great account; whereof, in my opinion there is in Genesis a Golden Text: Sara having spoken to Abraham to send away Agar and Ismael, it seemes he was not very willing to give credit to the words of a woman; which God knowing, said unto him, Omnia que dixerit tibi Sara, audi vocem ejus. Moreover, when our Lord God made the woman, he said, Faciamus eis Adjutorium semita fobi: and why then should we seeke after
after other helpers; and not take those who are made of purpose for our aid? According to this my opinion was decided the controversy in Tacitus between Drusus Messalina and Cecina; where it was concluded, that in governments which stand in danger, it is not fit to bring in women; but very fit, in governments that are peaceable and secure. In which I say more, that a Prince who is young, cannot do better, then not only to be counselled (a thing in part also fit, where States are dangerous) but to suffer himself also to be governed by women. Tiberius King of the Ostrogoths, in the beginning of his Reign, carried himself with great moderation, as long as he agreed with his wife, but when he left to follow her advice, he filled with injustice all his Kingdom. The Emperor Constantius Severus, never governed well, but when he suffered his mother Irene to direct him. And Salomon never ran into disorderly courses, as long as his mother Bersabe lived; of whom he scorned not to be taught, as himselfe in the Proverbs faith, Filiae sui patris mei, tenellus & Unigenitus coram matre mea, & docebat me atque diecebat; suscipiat verba mea cor summum, custodi præcepta mea, & vives. And therefore S. Chrysostome upon S. John faith, Nihil potius muliere bona ad inquitum, & informandum virum, quodemque voluerit, neque tam leniter amicos, nec magistros patiatur, ut conget enumerentemque atque conscientem, habet enim voluptatem quandam admonitio uxoriae; omniumque amant cui consulti; multis poissim affere viros affres, & inimiques per axememites redditos & mansuetos. Who knows not, that Tiberius never plunged himselfe so much into all kinds of wickednesse, as after his mothers death? And the reason which all men alledge to prove women unfit for government, is of no force; of force I know in general, but that in particular, women should not be as fit as men, I hold it a great folly to thinke, having
myselfe, although but yong, not onely found written in Histories, but scene in experience, many women able to have governed the whole World: and to these the frailty of their sexe, is to farre from being a hinderance, that rather they are worthy of the more praise, for overcoming natural defects, with supply of vertue.

Vix dum ingreſsus Illyricum Tiberius, properis matris litteris excitur, neque satis compertum est, spirantem adhuc Augustum apud urbem Nolam, an examinem repererit, acribus namque custodiis domum & vias sese perat Livia, latique interdum nuni vulgabantur, donec provis quæ tempus monebat, simul excelsiſſe Augustum, & rerum potiri

Neronem, eadem fama detulit.

That at one and the same time, to make knowne the death of the Prince, and the assumption of the successor, is a thing very profitable for States that stand in danger.

The foure and twentieth Discourse.

There is nothing makes me more beleev, that Tiberius had given order to his mother to poison Augustus, then his very being far off from Rome, at the time of his death; an invention followed by all those, who by such meanes have taken away the life of great personages. So did Piso, after he had (as is said) poyſoned Germanicus: so did Lodovick Sforza, who knowing that his Nephew had taken poyſon, and could not long be living, he would not stay in Milan, but went to Piacenza to the King of France. The caufe, as I thinke, why they do so, is to the end the World may not suspect they had any hand in their deaths; and although, they cannot but thinke, that men of understanding
standing will suspect them the more; yet this is nothing to the Prince, who seeks but to avoid the heat of the people, who without any judgment are carried through love or hatred, to do such things, as men of judgement would never doe.

Tiberius was then in Slavonia, when his mother sent him word of Augustus his sickness; who (as may be thought) was dead before Tiberius came to Nola; yet he oftentimes gave forth, he had good hope of his speedy recovery; and this he continued so long, till he might be provided of things needfull for accomplishing his purpose; and that done, he at one and the same time, with one and the same voice, made known the death of Augustus, and his owne assumption to the Empire.

We have in Tacitus another example very like to this, of Agrippina the mother of Nero, who upon certaine words she heard Claudius utter in his Wine, that he meant to give the Empire to Britannicus, she poisons him; and being dead, she gave out there was good hope of his amendment, untill she had made ready all things needfull for making Nero Emperor. The words of Tacitus are these, Vocabatur interim Senator, votaque pro incolunitate Principis Consilium & Sacerdotes munus habereant, cum jam examinis vestibus fomentis obtegeretur, dum res ferma Neronis Imperio componuntur. Jam Agrippina velut dolore vesta, & solatia conquirens, tenere amplexus Britannicum, verum Paterni oris efficiem appellare, ac varis artibus demorari, ne cubiculo egrediretur. Antoniam quoque & Octaviam sorores ejus attinxit, & cumque aditus custodius clauserat, crebroque vulgabat, ire in melius valetudinem Principis, quæ miles bona in sese agent, tempusque propter eum ex monitis Chalceorum attentaret. Tunc medio die, erte ante Idus Ociobris, foribus Palatii repente deductis, Comitante Burrho Nero egreditur. I have related these words of Tacitus at large (as not able at this
The foure and twentieth Discourse.

this time to discourse upon them: ) to the end, that every one may see, what devices Agrippina used at the death of Claudius to bring Nero to the Empire. The very like course to this, was taken by Servius Tullus, in company of Tanaquill the wife of Tarquinus Priscus, who seeing her husband wounded so dangerously, that he was upon the point to die, she shut the Court gates, and gave out that the wound was but light; and that in a few daies they should see the Prince abroad, but that in the meantime, he had commanded Servius Tullus to take his charge, and to be obeyed as himselfe in person; by this device, Servius getting possession of the Royall authority, was able in few daies to settle himselfe in the Empire, that it was an easie matter, at one and the same time, to make known that Tarquinus was dead, and that himselfe was Emperour. Which fact Livy relating, faith, Servius cune trabea & licitori-bus prodit, ac sede Regia sedens, alia decernit, de alis consulturnus se esse Regem simulat, itaque per aliquos dies, cun jam expirasset Tarquiniius celata morte, per speciem aliorum fungendae vicis, sua opes firmavit, tum dum palam faetis; ex compositione in Regia orta, Servius presidio firmavit munitionum, primium injustis populis, voluntate Patriae Regnavit. Alfo Arius Aper, after he had secretly in a litter slaine Numerianus the sonne of the Emperour Caius, gave out in the Army enquiring where he was, that for an infirmity in his eyes, he kept him out of the wind; intending first to accomodate his owne designes, and then to publish Numerianus his death; and if his plot succeeded not, that was long of other occasions. It is therefore no marvell, that Tiberius following the course of Servius, was able to attain his end, as well as Servius especially having many things to help him, which to the other were wanting.

This therefore is an excellent way, secure and worthy of imitation, in Kingdomes that are not well setled;
settled, and where the people are desirous of change: for to suffer no Interregnum, but in one and the same time, to make knowne the death of the one, and the assumption of the other, is the onely means to hinder innovations. The reason of this, in my opinion is, because as Waxe is more apt to take a forme, when it is without any, then when it hath a forme before, seeming in the first case there needs but one action, which is to imprint a new forme; where in the second case, there need two: first to take away the old forme, and then to bring in a new, which certainly is double as difficult: and therefore a certaine Philosopher, would be doubly payed, when he tooke one to teach, that had been taught before, because he must take double paines: first, to remove the false Images imprinted in the fantasie; and then to bring in the true: so a City (to returne to our purpose) being a matter that cannot consist without a forme; it will be more easie to bring in it a new forme, if it have none before, then if it have; and therefore if Tiberius had made knowne the death of Augustus, before his owne assumption to the Empire, the City had remained without a form, & consequently with small difficulty, either the Senate or the people, or the fouldiers might have brought in another: but comming at one and the same time, to know both the one and the other, the Empire seemed rather to change Prince, then forme. Our Lord God knew the Israelites to be a people, Dura serviciis, apt to rebell, and desirous of innovations; and therefore he called Moses up to the Mount, to the end they might not know of his death, before they knew Joshua the sonne of Nun to be his successor. We may therefore conclude, that this course of Tiberius is not to be blamed, especially taken to a pious end.
Primum facinus Novi Principatus fuit Pothumi Agrippæ cedes, quem ignarum Inermem; quamvis firmatus animo Centurio ægre confecit. Nihil de ea Re Tiberius apud Senatum different: Patris Iusta dissimulabat, quibus praepriptis Tribuno custodiaz adposito, ne contaretur Agrippam morte adscicete quandoque ipsi supremæ diei expeliisset.

That those men who posse the state of another, are but in a dangerous condition, as long as any of the former Lord's line remain alive: and what course is to be taken to free themselves from such danger.

The five and twentieth Discourse.

Tiberius apprehended, he could never live securely in the Empire, if he made not away Agrippa. For he being of the line of Augustus, and nearer to the Crowne then himselfe, a fierce man and of beastly conditions, would alwaies be a refuge to the boldiers and people of Rome, whenever they should fall into distaft of their Prince: and the rather for that he being a violent man, and without judgement, would never have stood upon danger, but not fearing death itselfe, would have ventured upon any occasion: And these are the men, who though but private men, are to be feared of all: and therefore Pomponius stood in feare of Titus Manlius; Et quad hand minus timendum erat (faith Livy) solide ferocem viribus suis cernere.

This course of Tiberius hath for the most part beene followed by all Princes and Commonwelaths in the changes of State, whenfrom one line it passeth to another, the newe alwaies extinguishing the old, as though without this course, they were never able to live.
live in peace. So the Romans, as long as the race of the Tarquins continued, were never without warre. And this is one of the causes I alleged, why the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus against Cæsar, had not so good successe, as the conspiracy of Lucius Brutus against the Tarquins; because in this, they destroyed not only the line of the Tarquins, but all those that were of the name: where in that of Cæsar, they only cut downe the tree, but left the roote behind; from which sprung up Augustus, who receiving nourishment and ayd from those very men that had killed his unkle, in a short time he grew to be so great a Tree, that he crushed them to pieces, that went about to cut him downe. For this very cause, in Egypt, in Cappadocia, in Soria, in Macedonia, and in Bythinia, they often changed their Kings, because they tooke no care to extinguish the line of the former Lords, but onely to get their places. And therefore Bardamus in Tacitus is justly blamed, who instead of extinguishing Gotarze the former Lord, stood loosing his time, in besieging the City.

But these and a thousand other examples, (which for brevity I omit) it may be held for a maxime of State, that whosoever gets a Kingdome from another, he ought to root out the whole line of him that was Lord before.

But this rule cannot be thus left, without some asperion of impiety: and therefore, for resolution, I think best to distinguish; because if we speake of a Christian Prince, that hath gotten the state of another, who is enemy of the faith, he may justly doe as best pleaseth him, by any way whatsoever to take them away, that can pretend to the State; yet not so neither, unless he find them so obstinate in their sect, that there is no possible means to remove them from their error; and so much our Lord God himselfe, by the mouth of
The five and twentieth Discourse.

The Prophet Samuel, appointed Saul to do to Amalech,
Nunc ergo vade & percutte Amalech, & demolire Universa ejus, non parcas eti non concupis cas ex rebus ipsius:
aliquid, sed interfice a viro suo ad inamere, & parvulum atque Laclentem.

But if we speake of a Christian Prince, that by force
gets possession of a State, from one of the same faith:
let him never goe about to destroy the line of him that
possessed it before; for, besides that it is a thing un-
worthy of a Christian; it seemes to me, to be rather
their invention, who meaning to live wickedly, would
be glad to have no bridle; for if a Prince shall carry
himselfe lovingly towards his Subjects, using them as
children, and not as servants, he need not be afraid
of any whomsoever. For this cause, the Senatours of
Rome, having driven out the Tarquins, had more care
to governe the City, as fathers, then to extinguish the
line of him that had been Lord, which was indeed in-
comparably more for their good: as in the second
booke of the fift Decad of Livy, every one may see.

Rather, many times it is better to bestow honours
upon them, from whom a state is taken, and to leave
them a part, thereby to retaine the rest more securely.
So did Cyrus, who having taken Lydia, and displaceth
Creceu, who was Lord of it before, he left him at least
a part of his patrimony, and gave him a City to be his
owne. And indeed if he had done otherwise, he might
easily have lost all: therefore Justin faith, Creceu &
vita, & patrimonii partis & urbis Barce concessa sunt; in
qua est non Regiam vitam, tamen proximum Majestati
Regis degerit. And then shewes the benefit that comes
by it, where he faith, Has Clementio non minus Victori,
quand viato uti futi: quippe ex Universa Gracia, cognito
quod illam Creceu bellum offer, auxilia velit ad Commune
extinguendum incendium constabat. Tantus Creceu amor
apud omnem urbem creu, ut paffurus Cyrus grave bella Gracie

fuierit,
If the King of France had done thus, when Ferdinand of Aragon would have yeelded up the Kingdom of Naples to him, if he would have left him but Lord of Calabria, perhaps he had not lost both the one and the other: and in truth, it had been his best way to have done so, at least for so long time, till he might have made himselfe sure and firm in the Kingdom of Naples: and then for the other, he might have taken it from him againe at any time. So did David, who tooke away halfe of the substance which Saul had given to Mephibosheth; and gave it to his servant Siba, for a doubt he had, lest he should desire: his fathers Kingdom. This interpretation Procopius made of it, when he said, "Ut substantiam minueris, utiam ipsius deiceret, ne Regnum affectaret, atiam enim illum quis adversus Dominum summum mendacium diceret, quem punire potius debetur, nequaquam participem cum suo fecisset."

Alexander the Great, when he waged warre with Kings farre off from Macedonia, he not only when he had overcome them, never sought to extinguish their line; but which is more strange, to them from whom he had taken a Kingdom, he restored the same Kingdom againe. A great act of Magnanimity, and which may and ought to be used, in the like case to that of Alexander Magnus; that is, when Countries farre remote from the Seate of the Kingdom, and in customes, lawes, habit and language very different, are easily overcome; and so much the rather, when the warre is waged, more for desire of glory, then for getting of ground; seeing it is alwaies better, to seeke to hold that by a way of clemency, which by a way of force can never be held.

But in case it be feared, lest leaving the former Prince, in the Countries taken from him, he should practice to make a revolution, he may then have states given
given him to govern in other places: So Syrus did, who having overcome the Medes, and deprived Aftyages of his Kingdome, he would not leave him in Media, and yet would not deal hardly with him neither, but he made him Governour of Hyrcania, and although Justin say, it was done, because Aftyages himself had no mind to returne to the Medes; yet to my understanding, it is more likely, that Syrus did it fearing, lest he who had procured his nephews death, to bring himself to the Kingdome, being now deprived of it, would never be quiet, when any fit occasion should be offered to him:

Another way there is, which others have used, and it is, to keepe such about themselves, and to hold them in esteem of Kings: so Herod the great had begun to doe with Ariobarzus, and with Hyrcanes, but the crueltie of his nature made him fall at last, to take the same course that others doe. This counsell therefore, was much better followed by David, who leaving Sauls patrimony to Mephibothes the sonne of Jonathan, he held him alwaies about himselfe in great honour, and all succeeded exceeding well.

And in case all these courses seeme to be difficult; either, thorough the undanted spirit of him that was Lord before, or by reason of the extraordinary affection the people heare him; in this case, the best course is, to send them into banishment for some long time, as the Pope did in Bologna.

But to returne to our purpose: Tiberius not without cause stood in feare of Agrippa, which is plainely to be seen by this, that not onely Agrippa, but one onely servant forging and taken upon him his name, was like to have railed no small insurrection in the people and Senators of Rome; and because Tiberius could not put this Agrippa to death, without incurring an exceeding blot of crueltie, he therefore had recourse
course, to that remedy so much used by Princes; which
was to feigne that Augustus had commanded it. So also
did the Emperour Adrian, who would have it beleed,
that all the murthers he committed were done
by his predecessours command; which not only a-
bates the hatred and name of being cruell, but con-
verts it also into piety, as done for executing the will
of the dead. And yet in this there would be no blame,
if such murthers were committed out of zeale of ju-
stice, out of which zeale, David being willing that
Joab should be punished for two murthers, and Semei
for the injury he had done him; to take away the ha-
tred, that for this might fall upon Salomon, he com-
manded him at the time of his death to doe it; to the
end, that he afterward putting it in execution, might
seem rather (as in this indeed he was) a just King, and a
pious executour of the will of his deceased father, then
a cruell Prince.

But because Ludovico Moro, taking to him that state,
which belonged not to him, by means of his Nephews
death, hath much resemblance to Tiberius; I am will-
ing to shew it a little more cleerely; by a Parallell.
Augustus being dead, Tiberius succeeded in the Empire,
and caused Agrippa Posthumus to be putt to death, to
whom the succession of right belonged. Ludovico Moro
succeeded in the Dutchy of Milan, and caused (as it is
beleeved) John Galeozzo, the true heire, to whom that
Dutchy of right belonged, to be putt to death. Tiberius
doubted, that because Augustus was gone to visit Ag-
rippa, he would appoint him to be Emperour. Lud-
ovico Moro feared, that because Charles the eighth was
gone to visit John Galeozzo, he would make him Duke
of Milan. Tiberius would have it beleed, that he was
elected by the Senate, and not through the wicked-
neffe and plots of his mother Livia. Ludovico Moro
would have it beleed, that he was made Duke of
Milan by the people, for the good of the state, and not through his own villania. Tiberius made a show, as though he were unwilling to take upon him the Empire, Mero also dissembled the like. In one onely thing they differed, that to the one it proved safety; to the other, ruine; and it is, that where Tiberius as soone as he came to the Empire, he presently put Agrippa to death; Ludovico stayed so long from putting his nephew to death, that he was forced, for putting it in execution to call in the King of France, to his manifest and utter ruine.

“A Parallell betweene Tiberius and Salomon.

The six and twentieth Discourse.

Seeing in these Discourses, and particularly in the next before, we have spoken of Tiberius, and brought also many examples of Salomon, I have thought it no unfit curiosity, to compare them together. Tiberius was borne of Livia, who was taken by Augustus from Nero. Salomon was borne of Bersabee, who was taken by David from Urias. Bersabee was with child; (although by David’) when he took her to wife; Livia also was with child; when she went to be married to Augustus. Augustus had many neere of kinne to whom to leave the Empire, as Agrippa for one. David had his sonne Adoniah, to whom by right of age, as being the elder, the Kingdome belonged. Finally, Augustus growne old, at the suit of Livia, appointed Tiberius to be his heire: and David growne old, at the persuasions of Bersabee, ordained Salomon to succeed him. Salomon being come to the Crown, killed Adoniah to whom the right of it belonged: Tiberius being come to the Empire, caused Agrippa to be put to death, who
was rightfull heire of the Empire: Both the one and the other governed with great judgement in the beginning; but at last, Salomon loosing Bersabee, and Tiberius, Livia; both the one and the other plunged themselves into all kinds of lustfulnesse. Whereupon there rebelled against Tiberius, Sejannus the dearest servant he had: and against Salomon, Jeroboam the most inward friend he had. Tiberius used to speake darkly: Salomon also used the like speaking, as may be seen by his Parables and Proverbs.

Nuntianti Centurioni ut mos Militiae: factum esse quod imperasset, neque imperasse se, & rationem facti reddendam apud Senatum, respondit. Quod postquam Sallustius Crispus particeps Secretorum (is ad Tribunum miserat codicillos) comperit; ineptius ne suas subderetus, juxta periculo soficata feu vera promeret, monuit Liviam, ne arcana domus, &c.

*That it is a dangerous thing to obey Princes in services of cruelty and tyranny.*

The seven and twentieth Discourse.

Sallust had taken order, and provided all due means for putting Agrippa Posthumus to death, by the commandement of Tiberius; but he desirous to shew he had no hand in the fact, denied to the Centurion who was the executioner of it, that it was done by any command of his; saying, that for what he had done, he must give account, not to him, but to the Senat. Which Sallust seeing, and doubting least the mischief might fall upon his head; Veritus (as Justin faith, speaking in the person of Arpagus in the like case) ne illam infantis necati ubi non, quam si patre natumisset, a ministro exigeret: he began to connell Livia, Ne arcana
Domus, ne confìlate amicorù, ministèria militum vulnerability.

The conceit of Tiberius was good, that he would have, (as I imagine) the Centurion go to the Senate to tell them, he had executed the Commandement of Augustus about the death of Agrippa; but yet that of Sallust likes me better: because there is no likelihood it would ever be beleived, that Augustus appointed the death of a Nephew, for security of a son in law: seeing as he could get nothing by it, so he might loose much; because the Prince shewing he cared not to have his death known, there is no doubt but men would talke of it with more boldnesse: from which talke, there oftentimes grow ill affections against the Prince; whereas, if Tiberius had passed it (as he did) in silence, it would not have come to many mens cares, & they that should have heard it, would have kept it secret, as knowing how dangerous a thing it is, to discover & talk of that which Princes would have to be concealed. Besides, if he made it be told in the Senate, he did by such feigning more incense the minds of all men; seeing doing it, without telling it, he had used but force, but telling it withall, he used craft; and because it grieves inferiours more, when they are overcome by craft, then when they are oppressed by force: consequently, they would have taken greater indignation for the death of Agrippa, if to the force there had been added this craft, to make the Senate beleive such tales, as one would not looke should be beleived of Children. And therefore we see the Romane Nobility tooke it ill at Neroes hands, that he would goe about to make them beleive, that the shipwrack of his mother was a thing happened by chance; and that she had sent Agerinus to kill him, which were all but foolish devises, to cover his most nefarious fault. Yet I say not, if Tiberius had used that cunning before spoken of, that he had been ere the more in danger by it; seeing they who understand
stand these tricks, are men of braine, who as they have judgment whereby they discerne such subtilties of the Prince; to by the same judgment they know how to hide them, by making a shew that they believe them. And upon such men it is that the people, (the Princes onely feare) cast their eyes, and believe verily all that to be true, which they see wise men make a shew to believe; as one that lookes only upon the barke of things, discernes not that which is true, from that which is feigned; whereof, we have an example in Tacitus, in the fore-alleged case of Nero, in which, although the chiefemen had taken distaste to be mocked with those foolish inventions of Nero, yet they all made shew to believe it when it was told them. Miro tanem certamine Procerum, decernuntur supplicationes, apud omnia Pulvinaria. Herod was much afraid, if he should cause Saint John to be beheaded, leaft the people would make some insurrection; whereupon he found this tricke, to bind himselfe by oath; thereby to make the people believe, that it was against his will he put him to death, but that he was tied by oath; and it succeeded well with him, for the chiefemen, both out of interest and out of feare made shew to believe him; and the people believed him indeed; yet in this present case, when together with securing themselves from the people, they may also avoyd the distaste of the Senate; this opinion of Sallust likes me better.

But be it how it will, this is a cleere case, which we may gather from this place, that those Officers who have served their Lords, and been their instruments in cruel and tyrannicall executions, have come themselves at last, for the most part to a miserable end. And this happens for divers reasons. First, because oftentimes they surfeit of them, and knowing their owne villanies, in which many times they
they goe so farre, that Neque peccata neque Remedia pati possint, as Livy faith, they feele themselves torne in conscience, which is alwaies gnawing, Sicut vestimentum sic comedet eos vermis, & sic lanæ, sic devorabit eos tinea; a misery which for the most part happens to tyrants. And this Plato teacheth us, as Tacitus speaking of Tiberius relates, Adeo Facinora atque flagitia sua ipsque quaque in supplicium vertere. Neque frustra Praestantissimus sapientia (that is Plato) firmare solius est, si recondatur Tyrannorum mentes, posse aspiri lanians & ictus; quando in corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultiis animus dilucratatur. As was seen also in Nero, who after he had killed his mother, was continually affrighted in his mind, as fearing the wagging of every leafe. And Alphonhus of Aragon had alwaies apparitions before his eyes, where he thought he saw those Lords, whom he had put to death. So the King Theodoricus, having put Boetius and Symmachus to death, when the head of a great Fish was served to his table, he thought he saw the head of Symmachus threatening him; wherewith affrighted, he cast himselfe upon his bed, and died. So Poets finde, that Orestes having killed his mother, was tormented by the Furies: whereupon the Ancients, seeing these tyrants standing alwaies in continuall terrour, Sonitus terroris semper in auribus illius; & cum pax sit, ille insidias sufficatatur: have conceived that such men were frighted with the Ghosts of those whom they had killed. Seeing therefore these Princes cannot hinder a thing done, from being done; they desire at least to have them taken away, who having beene their instruments, doe with their presence refresh the memory of the villanies they have commited: So Tacitus faith, speaking of Anicetus whom Nero imployed to kill his mother. Leo post admissum seelus gratia, dein gravidire odio, quia graviorum facinorum ministri, exprombrante afficincatur. And therefore
The seven and twentieth Discourse.

fore Tiberius used often to rid away those servants, who in such villanies he had employed. And that his cruelty might not want work, in their places he supplied their others; which Tacitus relates where he saith, Sceletum ministros ut preverti ab aliis nolebat, ita oblatis in caudam operam recentibus, veteres & pergraves affixit.

Secondly, they oftentimes put to death such servants; specially whom they have employed in murdering any of the blood of the blood of the blood of the blood, and the reason is, lest having now imbrued their hands in blood, they should not sistle to murder them too. So Perseus put him to death, who had been his instrument in killing Demetrin; so Otho all those who had been his ministers in killing of Calba:

Thirdly, this happens sometimes for securing of Princes, that their villanies may not be known: for when they have done them, and can find no other way to hide them, they then lay another upon them; as David did, who to cover his adultery, committed a murder; and therefore they put all those to death, who have any hand, or have any knowledge of their faults: so did Bessiamus the sonne of Severus, who having caused his brother Geta to be killed, caused also Leius that had been his Counsellour, and all other that were acquainted with it, to be slain. Perseus also standing in fear of the Roman Army, appointed Nices to cast all his Treasure into the Sea; and Andronicles, to burne the Navy: but afterward, being sensible of his cowardice in shewing such fear, and ashamed of it; to the end it might not be knowne, he caused both of them to be put to death.

Fourthly, it often happens that such servants runne a hazzard, because a Prince having used them, in the executing a thousand cruelties and tyrannies, through which they come to be odious to all the City; he hopes that by putting those servants to death, the odiousnesse
odonousness shall be turned upon them: as whereby
the subjects shall be made believe, that those cruelties
were committed without their consent. So Valentinus
used to doe, who having implored Remiro d'Orco, with
great cruelty to extinguish the factions of Romagna;
after most tyrannically, he had made himselfe Lord of
it, and had obtained his purpose; not without bringing
upon himselfe the infinite hatred of all his subjects;
at last he cut in pieces that miserable minister of his, to
the end, the hatred of his subjects might be turned
upon him: and the like did Tiberius to Sejanus, and of
such examples Histories are full. Rather indeed, tyr-
nants ingrosse to themselves such fellowes, to the end,
that when the scores of seditions shall be cast up, they
may excuse themselves, and make the people wreck
their anger upon the servant.
Fifthly, such servants runne a hazzard; because the
foundation upon which they build their Lords favour
is soone ended: the cause of their favour, being onely
the hatred that is borne to another, which ceaseth as
soone as he is dead; and consequently the affection
ceaseth, which was borne for putting the murther in
execution: so much Tacitus intimates, speaking of
Plancina, who after the hatred to Germanicus was en-
ded, was herselfe in danger, Ubi odium & Gratia desit,
jus valuit.
But these waies never bring forth any good effect
to a Prince: Firſt, because it is falle, that they can ever
cancell the remembrance of such villanies out of their
minds; seeing their owne conscience is too great a
witness against them. Whereupon, although our
Lord God, (as Theodoret faith) tooke away the life of
that sonne of David, which was borne in the adultery
with Bersabe, that it might not remaine a shame to
him, for the finne he had committed, Virgo erat, Saturnus
argumentum sceleria ac iniquitas, pri or Regis qui erat, &
S 2

Pro-
Propheta, curam gerens Dominus, non ftint eum visere: yet it served not to remove the gnawing of his conscience: as he faith, Peccatum moenia coram me est semper. Secondly, this is no sufficient way to keep their crimes from being knowne: Nihil occultum quod non reverberet, neque coopertum, quod non sciat. And if it be not knowne at other times, at least it shall not be hidden at the day of judgement. Thirdly, it is no fit way to make the people beleive, that the cruelties executed by servants, were done without the Princes consent; and although it have sometimes succeeded well, yet this hath not beene because the people beleaved it, but (as I said before, upon the place of Justin) because when the people cannot wrake their anger upon the Prince, they will for the present upon his ministers, and afterward when time serves, upon the Prince himselfe: as it happened to Valentinus. Sometimes also, the people make a shew to beleive, that the villanies committed, were done without the Princes consent; to the end, that to preserve this good opinion of himselfe, he may, after the death of such ministers, give over his cruelty: and lastly, it saves them not from being slaine; for if they be not by them, they are by others, and oftentimes by themselves, as it happened to Otho.

This way therefore doth no good at all, and is the worst wicked course that can be imagined, being nothing but a meerely multiplying of villanies. It is true, if a Prince should employ a servant to kill a delinquent, and so both of them should juridically deserve death; in this case, he should commit no errour, in putting also the servant to death; but herein, he should imitate our Lord God, who oftentimes makes use of the wicked to punish the wicked; and they once punished, he then as a loving father, having corrected his child, casts the rod which was the instrument of correction, into the fire; and more then this, he oftentimes
The seven and twentieth Discourse.

Sometimes punisheth those whom he hath used for executing his anger, *Vae Assur; virga furoris mei, & baculus ipse est*, saith the truth in the mouth of Esay. So our Lord God made use of the King of the Assyrians, and of his Army, to punish the people of Israel, for their sines; and that done, he punished also the Assyrians themselves, in such sort that he destroyed them all. There is no doubt but our Lord God did it all with exceeding great justice and providence, punishing justly those Assyrians, who besides their being a most pernicious people, they fell upon the Israelites (as Theodore expounds it) not for any zeal of executing God's justice, but onely for the hatred they bore to that Nation.

To returne to our purpose, I conclude that Sallust had an excellent braine, not to suffer the cause to be brought before the Senate, which if it had beene there agitatet, and Tiberius not discover himselfe, all the mischief would have lighted upon him, and they would have beene revenged upon the servant, when upon the Prince they could not. So it happened to Piso, who having beene employed by Tiberius to kill Germanicus, and the cause brought before the Senate; Tiberius shifted it off from himselfe, and it fell to Piso's lot to suffer for it. Not without cause therefore did Sallust: *Monuit Liviam, ne arcana domus, ne consilia amicorum, ministeria militum vulgaris.*

Monuimt
That Princes ought not to reveal the secrets of their State;
and how it happens, that oftentimes men are drawn to
speak some things which ought to be concealed.

The eighth and twentieth Discourse.

All States, whether they be Commonwealths or
Kingdomes, have certain foundations, or as
we call them secrets, by which they governe them-
selves, both for conservation and augmentation. And
therefore they endeavour in such sort to conceal
them, that they may not be knowne to any but their
succesflours. So did Augustus, in giving instructions to
Tiberius; so did David, acquainting Salomon with them
at the time of his death: so finally did Charles the fifth,
teaching them to Philip the second when he renoun-
ced the Empire: for if these secrets by which they go-
verne, should be publiquely knowne, it would be a
great advantage against them, for loosing their states.
And therefore Sosibius, understanding that Cleomenes
the Spartan, was informed of all the most inward
secrets of Ptolomey, would not suffer him to goe out of
Egypt, for feare (as Plutarch relates) he should raise
some sharpe warre in that Kingdome, whereupon
finally he put him to death. We may see also, that the
Romans never were in greater danger to be over-
throwne, then when by Coriolanus, their owne Citizen,
& consequently acquainted with all their secrets, they
were assaulted. This præcept was so well observed by
the ancient Romane Commonwealth, that though we

Monuit Liviam ne arcana domus, ne
consilia amicorum, ministeria militum
vulgantur.
have all the Histories of those times, yet to this day we
know not, otherwise then by some conjecture, by
what means it was, that they maintained their govern-
ment, and augmented it.

Justly therefore did Sallust advise, Ne arcana domus
vulgarentur: that is, that those secrets of State, upon
which the Empire is founded; should not be made
knowne to any but to the Prince. And Salomon in his
Proverbs observes as much where he saith, Caenum sur-
sum, terra deorsum, & cor Regis inscrutabile.

But because oftentimes men overshoothe themselves,
in discovering the secrets of their mind, it shall be our
worke in this Discourse, to shew what policies are
wont to be used to make men reveale their secrets;
and then, what remedy there is for it, which consists
indeed in onely the knowing them, as it is in snares,
which if they be knowne, are easely avoyded.

Secrets then are either discovered of ones owne
accord, or else one is drawn to discover them, by some
other. The first case may happen by many occasions:
First, out of a certaine vanity, that is commonly in all
men, to shew they are privy to the secrets of Princes;
and this is most seene in women and yong men: and
thus the conspiracy of Catiline came to be discovered.
Secondly, it may happen through drunkennesse, which
is apt to disclose any secret, how great soever, as it
happens at feafts. And therefore Salomon would not
have Kings to drinke Wine, Noli regibus O Lannuel, noli
regibus dare vinum, quia nullum secretum est, ubi regnat
Ebrietas: there being this nature in Wine, that it
makes those things be laid open, which should be hid-
den: as we see in Noe, who no sooner drunke Wine,
but he laid open those parts, which he should have
hidden. And this is one reason why the Ancients pain-
ted Bacchus naked; thereby to intiate that Wine
discloses secrets. Thirdly, it happens oftentimes
through hatred and indignation, which they, to whom secrets are imparted, conceive against the Prince: whereupon, they knowing the danger of this, as soone as they find they have discontented one in whom they had confidence, either they poison him, or some way or other bring him to his end. So dealt Ptolomy (as we said before) with Clemenes; certainly a most wicked course. Fourthly, secrets oftentimes are disclosed out of hope of reward; so did Elvidius the freedman of Scevinus, who acquainted Nero with a conspiracy against him, only out of hope to be well rewarded. Nam cum secum servilis animus præmiæ perfidiae reprehensus. Lastly, this happens sometimes through fear of punishment. And therefore Cifrone (as Philip Cominæus relates) when he saw himselfe carried to die, would then reveal to the Duke of Burgundy, the treason which the Count of Campobasso had plotted against him. And thus much concerning the revealing of secrets of one's own accord. And though it may seem to be in our owne power to hold our peace, (as Tacitus faith) Si tani in nostra potestate esset, oblivisci, quam tacere; yet many times a man is allured, and in a manner forced to discover his mind; a thing which may many waies be done. First, by Rhetoricke and Eloquence, which moving the affections, and stirring up the peccant humour of him whose secrets we desire to know, he without perceiving it, is easily transported, to reveal what ever is in his breast. This cunning was used by Sejanus against Nero, and against Agrippina also, when Agrippina quoque proximi iniciebantur pravis sermonibus tunidos spiritus perfimulare. Whereupon, it is no marvell, that Latiaris finding the peccant humour of Sabins, easly drew him to tell him at full his discontentment. Igitur Latiaris jacere fortuitos primum sermones (feeling him first a farre of;) mox laudare Constantium, quod non ut ceteri floresvis damus amicus, afferret.
The eigbiht and twentie th Discourse.

deservisset, simul honora de Germanico, Agrippinani unde-
rans differebat. Another way the foresaid Latiaris used,
and it was to seine a confidence, with making Sabin-
us beleeeve, he was his true friend, and pretending to
be of his mind, in those dangerous things which he
would not have communicated to another, tique ser-
mones tanquam vetita misceffent, speciem arste amicitiae
facere. And this is an easie way, by entrusting some se-
cret to a man, whose mind we desire to know, as Ta-
citus plainly expresseth, where he faith, Nihil corum
Vitellianos saluebat, crebris ut in Civili transfugiis & ex-
ploratores cura diversa sciscitandi, sua non occultabant.
Thirdly, men are oftentimes drawne to discover se-
crets, by being asked upon a suddaine, because the
understanding operating naturally, and not having
time to operate with art, must needs either answer that
which is the truth, or be silent and say nothing, or
lastly intangle it selfe. Whereupon Tiberius who
loved none of his qualities better then his dissimula-
tion; yet being asked upon the suddaine could not
hide the displeasure he had taken against Afinius Gal-
lus, of whom, perculsus improvisa interrogatone pand-
num reticuit. As likewise interrogations often mul-
tiplied, confound secrets in the mind, and therefore
Tiberius in the death of Piso, Crebrisque Interrogationsi-
bus exquirit, qualem Piso diem suprernum noltemaque exegi-
sset atque illo pleraque sapienter, quadam inconfultins re-
spondentem. The same way also he us'd with Syllamus,
who Creberrime Interrogabatur. Fourthly, oftentimes
men of themselves, and against their will discover se-
crets, either by their voyce, or by some motion not
usual, or by some cast of their eyes, and other exte-
riour signes, by which the secrets of the heart are often
discovered: Tiberius knowing this, to the end he might
not make appeare the secret contentment he tooke
at the death of Germanicus, would not shew himselfe
in
in publique: Tiberius atque Augustae publice abstinuere, inferius Majestate sua ratis iis pulano lamentantur, anae omnium oculis viduitum errorum servitibus, falsi intelligerentur. By this way the conspiracy of Scevinus came to be known, Simul affuentibus solito Convivium initium servorum charissimi libertate, & alii pecunia donati, atque ipse nostros, magnae cogitationis manifestae erat, quamvis lаsiti atuis vagis sermonibus simularet. Fifthly, it is easy to draw a secret from one's mouth, by asking him, not with doubtful, but affirmative words; thereby seeming to know that, which he desires to know: so dealt our Lord God with Eve, who to the end she should not deny her sinne, omitted as a thing knowne, that which he would have had her to confesse, saying, Quare hoc fecisti? and so not enquiring of the fact, he asked of the cause: and this he did (faith Ablenfis) not for any need he had to use this way, for knowing the truth, but only for instructing of us.

These then are the waies by which secrets often-times, are voluntarily and of one's owne accord disclosed; either out of vanity, or through drunkenesse, or through batredd, or for hope of reward, or for feare of punishment; and sometimes also a man is drawn to disclose secrets, by Art, that is, by moving the affections, and by finding out the peccant humour, and by entrusting his owne secrets, or by asking questions upon a sudden, or by reiterating interrogations, or by meanes of some motions and actions of the body; or lastly, by feigning to know it already.

Princes therefore must be well advised, to whom they impart these secrets; that they intrust them not to such, as may afterward voluntarily discover them; and servants to whom they are imparted, must be very vigilant, that they be not drawne from them by any cunning.

But although ordinarily, and for the most part, secrecy
The eight and twentieth Discourse.

Secrecy be a commendable thing, yet not commendable in all things; seeing to hold one's peace, or to deny in some cases, is not only unprofitable, but pernicious, as making some act or accident, to be more and with worse circumstances published, which would not be if it were confessed freely. Into this error fell Vitellius. In humane modum etiam Vitellius apud milites dixerat, pratorianos super exauitoratos insecutus, a quibus falsos rumores dispersi, nec ullam civilis bellii metus afferet ablati, suppresse Vespaesianti nomine, & vagis per urbeem militaribus, quis sermones populi coercerent, id praecipium alimentum same erat. And in another place, of the same Vitellius, he saith, Fraetis apud Cremonam rebus, multos clades occidunt, auta dissimulatione, remedia potius malorum, quam mala differret. Quisque Confidenti, consultantique supererant, its aures viresque, eumque contrario, leta omnibus, fingeret, falsis ingravescat. Mirum apud ipsum de bello silentium. Prohibitus per civitatem sermones, ecque plures, ac si liceras vera narraturi, quia verebantur, atrociae vulgaverant. More wisely did Galba carry himself, when, Ne dissimulat sedisio in majus credentur; utro affererat quartam & duo decies firmam legionem, pacius seditionis aversus, non ulter verba ac voces errasse, et brevi in officio fore. But yet, if one would desire to have some accident to be kept secret and concealed, there is no better way, then immediately and by himself to give out false rumours, and to spread reports contrary to the truth, as Scipio did, to whom when Ambassadors came from Syphax, he fearing least by concealing their message, the army would grow jealous, and suspect something, suddenly called them to counsel, where with a cheerful countenance he told them that Syphax had sent to solicit him to come into Africke: and although the truth was, that he sent rather a threatening message; yet his readiness and resolution prevailed so farre, that the Army did verily believe it to be as he said. And thus
it ought to be done as often as the discovery of a secret may be hurtfull, as it was in this case; but when concealing may be prejudicial, as it was with Vitellius, a contrary course must then be taken.

Monuit Liviam ne arcana Domus.

How Princes should make use of Counsell.

The nine and twentieth Discourse.

By occasion of Sallust, who without being required by any, put forward himselfe to give Livia counsell, either I cannot, or I like not to forbear the delivering my owne opinion, or that at least, which best likes me, concerning the counsellling of Princes. Where, I will first shew how necessary it is for Princes to have counsell. Secondly, the waies that are used in it. And lastly, delivering my owne opinion, I will (as my custome is) endeavour to prove it, with reason, and with Authorities. And beginning with the first, I say, that nothing is to Princes more necessary, then to be counsell'd; whereupon David, though as being a Prophet himselfe, he had no need of another Prophet, yet our Lord God, gave to him as to a Prophet-King, another Prophet to be his Counsellour. And therefore not without mystery, it is said in Ecclesiasticus, (as a certaine Writer observes:) \textit{Surrexit Nathan Propheta in diebus David:} as though by these words \textit{In diebus David:} he would intimate, the need that Princes have of Counsellours. Also Moses, though himselfe most wise, yet followed the counsell of Jethro: and Solomon was not without counsellours; and even God himselfe, when he made man, by saying, \textit{Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram,} would seeme to take counsell;
no doubt for our instruction, that we should do nothing without counsel. And David speaking of our Lord God said, Glorificatur in conflictio sanctiorum, Magnus & terribilis super omnes qui in circuitu ejus sunt. And our Lord Jesus Christ, to shew of how great importance counsel is, to counsel himselfe, as in Saint John where he saith, Unde eminus panem? and in another place, Quid sibi videtur Simon, Reges terrae a quibus accipiam Tributum vel censum, & filius suus, an ab alienis? and Peter answered, Ab alienis. Also the Apostles, though instructed by the Holy Ghost, yet oftentimes made use of counsel; as Saint Paul, who went as farre as Hierusalem, to take counsel of Saint Peter and Saint John. It is then most evident, and which none is so blind but sees, that all men have need of counsel, whether they be learned or ignorant; yet with this distinction, that the Learned make most benefit, and have least need; the ignorant have most need, and make least benefit.

But as it is necessary for a Prince to have counsel, so it is hard for a Writer to shew the way he is to hold in being counselled, as being a thing in ancient time very diversly used, and with great variety observed.

The first way hath beene to take no counsel at all, but to doe all things of his owne head; so did Charles the eighth, and many others. And this they doe, as conceiving, that to ask counsel of another, shewes want of judgment in ones selfe; and that by this means a Prince makes himselfe inferior to him that gives him counsel, then which there is nothing to Princes more distastfull.

Others doubting to commit some errour, by doing all things of themselves, and for the reasons aforesaid, not willing to be counselled by others, have therefore neither taken any counsel of others, nor yet done any thing of their owne head: which quality, Writers attribute
attribute to the Emperor Maximilian, who refusing to be counselled by any, used to give out what it was he went about; and then listened to hear, whether it were liked of, or no; and if it were, he then put it in execution; if not, he would then alter it of himself. But in truth, this was no good way, nor fit to be followed, because while he sought to avoid disparagement, by shewing himself to be less judicious than others, he fell into that which disparaged him more, by shewing himself to be mutable and inconstant. Which being once known, every one could then tell, not only how to counsel him, but also how to reprehend him, nothing being worse, than to subject oneself to the disputings of the common people. And Emilius knowing this, while he was passing with his Fleet to Larissa, and hearing that this course was much murmured at by his followers, he called the Rhodians to him, and demanded of them, whether the Haven of Patara, were of capacity to hold his whole Fleet, and they answering, no; he thereupon took occasion to return, and not to go thither; and this he did, to the end, that altering his course upon so good a colour, they that had murmured, might not take heart to give him counsel.

Others have used another way quite contrary to the first, and I doubt is at this day more used than is fit; and it is, to give care and hear what every one saith, and to take any man's counsel, that will give it; which thing (be it spoken with others leave) seemes to me, not only to be subject to confusion, but also to contempt; because every one will then pretend to counsel the Prince, who hearing continually such diversity of opinions, must needs be confounded in himselfe, and despised of others: whereupon in the Histories of Tacitus, when it was debated to send Embassadors to Venice, Elpidius Priscus was of mind,
that men of great wisedome and judgement should
be sent, who might helpe the Prince, with good ad-
vices; but Marcellus Epirius was of another mind, as
knowing it to be a most dis tastefull thing, to give a
Prince counsell without being required. Whereup-
on although Plato commend Cyrus for giving leave to
any of his subjects to speake his opinion in any thing
that was to be done; yet to me it seemes a thing dan-
gerous for him that gives it, and more for him that
takes it. And therefore Claudius hearkning once to
counsell in this manner, was confounded, not know-
ing what he should doe, turning himselfe sometimes
to one mans counsell, and sometimes to anothers, Ipse
modo huc, modo illuc, ut quernque suadentium audierat: and
at last finding his errour, he called a counsell.
A Prince therefore in my opinion, ought alwaies
to have about him a Band of experienced men;
In quibus sit veritas, & qui oderint avaritiam; by truth
is meant wisedome, which (according to the Philo-
opher) is nothing else but a knowledge of the truth;
and by covetousnesse are understood all vices; be-
cause as the Scripture faith, Avaritia est Principium
omnium malorum: if then they have wisedome, they
will be able to give counsell; and if they be free from
vice, they will give it. but yet, I hold it not fit, that
at their owne pleasure; without being called by the
Prince, they should fall a counselling; which perhaps
Sallust knowing, was the cause he durst not give Ti-
berius counsell, about the death of Agrippa, Sed mo-
nuit Liviam, ne arcana domus; consilia amicorum; mini-
steria militum vulgarentur: an arrogancy not sufferable
in a servant, to presume to give his master counsell,
without being called. And who knows but this pre-
sumption in Sallust, might be the cause of his fall? Me-
ting he was out of the Princes favour before he died, as
Tacitus relates. Amasias being reproved by the Prophet
Answere,
answered, Nunquid Consiliaries regis erat by which it appeares, that those Kings used not to be counselleed but by their Counsellours.

But if it be arrogancy in a servant to give counsell not being asked, it as is much indiscretion in a Prince, not to aske it. This is that I would have Princes to doe, have alwaies about them a Band of choice counsellours, to aske their advice in all his affaires: So did Nerva, so Salomon teacheth to doe, when in his Proverbs, he faith, Gloria regum est investigare sermonem; that is, a Prince ought not to stand expecting he should be counselleed, but rather it is fit he should go and seek after counsell.

After a Prince hath heard the opinions of his counsellours, it may be doubted whether he ought to deliver his owne opinion; and when, and in what manner he should doe it. As farre as I can judge, I thinke it not fit he should deliver his owne, either first or last, or in the midst. For if he doe it first, all the rest will presently consent; and if he doe it last, every one will come about to his opinion: as it happened to Henry the third, who (as Historians relate) deliberating about the death of the Duke of Guise, called foure to counsell, of whom when two had spoken their opinions, the King had scarcely heard them out when he delivered his owne, cleane contrary to theirs: whereupon the two that were to speake after, presently fell to be of the Kings opinion; and the two that had spoken before, retracting their former advice, consented to that the King had determined; which determination was the ruine afterwards of France, and of the King himselfe. So in Spaine, when it was deliberated about making peace between Henry the fourth King of France, and the King of Spaine; after II Moro had spoken, and the Kings sonne being present replied the contrary, all the rest came
came presently to be of his opinion: Whereupon, not without great judgement, Cæius Piso in Tacitus, when Tiberius would deliver his opinion in a certain cause, said, Qui loco censitis Caesar, si post omnes, vereor ne imprudentes dissentiam, si primum habebo quod sequar. Therefore Tiberius another time commanded Drusus that he should be the first to deliver his opinion.

The Prince therefore should be silent, and finding his Counsellours of different opinions, let them debate the matter between themselves, that he may see who gives the best reasons; so he shall avoid contempt, by not suffering himself to be counselled, without asking it; and he shall not be flattered, if concealing his own opinion, the truth is made manifest, by letting them debate it between themselves; and lastly, he shall shew himself more learned and more wise than the other; if of himself without any others direction intervening, he shall determine the matter. All these things (in my opinion) are comprised in that place of Ecclesiasticus, Audita censers finit, 
quærens; how can he be still, that asks and heareth? but only as I have explained it; to ask counsel in all things, to heare counsel; and in hearing them to be silent; and after, of himself to determine as reason adviseth. In this regard the ancient Poets feigned that Jupiter took counsel to be his wife, meaning to shew, that it is necessary for Princes to be counselled, and after, that his wife being great with child, he swallowed her up; and became himself great with child in his head, and at the due time was delivered of Pallas, which is wisdome, to shew that counsel would be ruminated in the mind, and that a Prince ought not to suffer his counsellours to be delivered themselves; but ought by swallowing them up, to make that to be his own issue which was anothers.

That a Prince ought to determine of himself, and
ought not to determine of himselfe; that is, determin
mine with counsell is the best, of those that are
given him, and so not of himselfe; seeing the coun
sels are other mens: and yet of himselfe, seeing the
determination proceeds from his owne judgement:
I conceive, it is sufficiently expressed in the booke of
the Kings, where Salomon saith, Dabis ergo servo tuo cor
docile; having said before, Da mihi sapientiam. For
explanation of which passage, we must know, that
understanding can have no knowledge of things, but
such as either it invents of it selfe, or learns of oth
ers. To the finding them of it selfe, is required a
sharpenesse of wit, and being found, a judgement to
choose the good, and refuse the bad: and lastly, a
memory to retaine that which is imprinted. To the
learning them of others, is required a perspicacity,
which is all one with docility, & makes the understand
ing apt to apprehend those things which are taught
by others. There is required also judgement, to dis
cerne good things from bad; and lastly, a memory to
retaine them. So as the memory is as the matter of
the one and the other, the judgement as the Form
of them both, and perspicacity and acutenesse are as
the differences. Salomon desires Wisedome, but not
with acutenesse to invent things; that is wisedone
which consists in the sharpenesse of wit, but he desires
wisedone together with docilenesse; that is, wisedome
and perspicacity, which is all one with docileness:
perspicacity, to be able to understand rightly
the opinions and reasons of his counsellours; and
wisedome, that is judgement, to be able to diserne
the good from the bad. Salomon therefore shews that
a Prince ought not to care for inventing of his owne
head, but to content himselfe with having docilenes
se, to understand things invented by others; and
wisedome to know the truth, and to diserne the
good
good from the bad. And therefore he saith well, *Da mebi sapientiam*: and after, *Dabis ergo servo tuo teneur deudie*: Where we must observe, that though he saith, The Heart, and not the Understanding, yet he meaneth the same thing; seeing those facultys, which Galen attributes to the understanding, many others attribute to the heart; and in holy Scripture it selfe, the heart oftentimes is put for the understanding: as in Esay it is said, *Exspecta tor populi hujus, & untes ejus agravet, & oculos ejus clande, me forte videant oculis suis, & auribus suis audiant, & corde suo intelligent.*

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**Neve Tiberius vim Principatus resolueret, cuncta ad Senatum vocando. Eam conditionem esse Imperandi, ut non aliter ratio contexit, quam si uni reddatur.**

*How Princes ought to make use of Magistrates and Officers.*

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**The thirtieth Discourse.**

Sallust counsels Tiberius, to take heed that he remit not so many causes to the Senatours, as thereby to weaken his owne sovereignty, there being nothing so proper to a Prince, as to be sole Commander. A counsell worthy to be well considered, by occasion whereof, it will be fit to discours: First, how Princes ought to order the remitting of causes to the Senate, or to other Officers, and then whether they should take the administration of all things into their own hands.

It seemes a thing impossible, that one man alone
can by himself be able to judge all causes, which Jethro Moses, father in law considering, and seeing him to take the reckonings of all the people of Israel, without assistance of any; and wondering at it, he said, Ultra vires was est, negotium; Sola illud non potes sustinere.

For Resolution then, either we speake of giving Authority to a Senate, or else of committing causes to other Officers. If we speake of the Senate, either the causes are great and weighty, or else but of small moment. If they be great, then ought the Prince to reserve them for himselfe to determine: if slight, and of small value, he may doe well to remit them to the Senate, that so he may please them with a shew of liberty, without any prejudice to himselfe. This Tiberius well understood; and therefore when the subject Provinces made suit for the continuance of certaine Franchises, he remitted them to the Senate; to the end, that being matters of small moment, the Senate might determine of them as they pleased; which Tacitus expresseth where he saith, Tiberius vix Principatus sibi firmans imaginem antiquitatis Senatorii praebet.

Secondly, the affaires that are handled, are either such, as deservre reward and grace; or else such as are odious, and deserve punishment and censure. If they be such as deserve reward, the Prince ought to determine of them himselfe: but if they be odious and deserve punishment, he ought then to shift them off from himselfe and leave them to the Senate; or if he cannot to the Senate, at least to other Officers. Honores autem (saith Aristotle), saltem, tribure debet; pecunias & animadversiones per alios infligere, per Magistratus videlicet & per judicia. So Simonides in Xenophon adviseth Hiero: Io Maccenas in Dio, Augustus. Our Lord God when he punisheth he doth it by the ministry.
fery of others, Immisions per Angulos malos: whatof Saint Chrysostome speaking faith, Ignor quando forere oportet, per sepsum hoc facit, ita filumuisit in salutem generis Humani, & iterum: tunc inquit, dicas Angeli, congregare sociantes iniquitatem, & propiciis in Caino, de justis vero dictis, non sic; sed qui vis suscipitus, suscriptus, & iterum, ligata illius manus & pedes, & mittite in tenebras exteriorum: vide illis servos qui ministrant, quando autem beneficis opus est, sepsum Benefactorem vocat. Venite Benedisci Patri mi, percipite preparatum vobis regnum, quando loquentem cum Abraham, ipse adef Vitamin in Sodoma abundum, servos mittit, & iterum: euge servus bona & fidelis, supra paucu fuisse fidelis, supra unda te confitiam; & tunc ipse beneficis; illum autem malum, non ipse, sed servis legent. By this, you may see, that a Prince ought to have no hand in punishements, but leave all such distasteful things to Officers.

It was handled in the Senate to take order for restraining of luxury, which was now grown exceeding, and beyond all measure; and because there was scarce a man in the whole City free from this vice, it was a thing exceeding distasteful, as Tacitus shewes, where he saith, Nec ignoro in convivio & circulis inveni ipsa, & modum poscis, sed si quis legem sanctam, parnas indicat, iidem illi civitatem verti: sibi dissumo cuique excitium parare, neminem criminem exoptamin clamitabant. Tiberius therefore finding of what nature the cause was, would not determine it selfe, but cast it upon the Senate, as Tacitus in his person saith, Si quis ex Magistratibus tantam angustiam vel servitatem pollicitur, ut in obviam quest, bene & laudo, & exonerati laborum meorum partem fater, sit actuare critia volunt, dein cuin gloriam ejus visa adepti sunt, simul tates faciant, ac unde relinquant, Credita P.C. est quaque non esse officionis avidum: Which the Senate perceiving,
In this point, there is no Kingdom better governed, than that of France, which leaves all matters to the Parliament, that might any way make the King distasteful; and matters of most importance, the King himself in his Privy Counsels determines. And thus much for giving Authority, and remitting causes to the Senate.

Now if we speake, how a Prince ought to serve him selfe, of his Officers; I say generally, that the lesse he doth by their ministry, the better; whom he should use as instruments to execute, and not as principals to deliberate. For betweene the governing reason, and the things that are governed, there may intervene another reason, two waies: one, when it supplies some thing which was wanting in the governing reason: for example, If it have not ordered and provided all things, but left some to be ordered by the inferior reason, which it takes notwithstanding by means of the superiour reason providing: and in this manner, the inferior reason is a means, and intervenes as a reason to the disposition of the government. Secondly, the inferior reason may be a meane in the government, as a servant, and not as reason: that is, that the principall reason, dispose all things how small and particular soever; and then give the execution to the inferior reason, as to a servant. In the first way our Lord God did not serve him selfe, of the inferior reason; for he provided every thing, great, small, universall and particular: but in the second way he serves himselfe in the government of humane reason; yet not as humane but as ministeriall. And this is the doctrine of Cajetane: whereupon if it be true that Kings are called Gods, Ego dixi Dii eftis, & filii Excelsi omnes; then ought they
they as farre as they are able, to imitate the Great Maker and Governor of all things: that is, to determine all things they are able to determine; and leave the execution to their Officers. But if a Prince shall leave it to his ministers, to determine, and provide things necessary for the state; he shall not then make use of his ministers, as ministers; but rather as of reason, which is nothing else, but as of King.

Let a Prince therefore leave to his ministers, such things as are proper for ministers; and such as for their smallness, need not the understanding of a Prince; and though he be able to doe such things of himselfe, yet by all means let him leave the care of them to his ministers; for therefore in the Scripture we see all things of small moment were done by Angels: it was an Angel that appeared to Agar, they were Angels that destroyed the Tower of Babel, Angels that burnt Sodom, an Angel that shewed the way to Eleazar: but great things were alwaies done by God himselfe, as the delivering of the Hebrewes out of Egypt, the giving the Land of Promise, to Abraham, Isack, and Jacob: and the reason why our Lord God would doe thus, (say Writers) was, to the end, lest if the Hebrewes had received such great benefits from Angels, they might have thought, that all their good came from them, and consequently have adored them as Gods. So likewise, if a Prince shall suffer his ministers to bestow great things upon the people, they will be ready to take the minister for Prince, as from whose hand they receive all favours. Our Lord Jesus Christ, going to raise Lazarus, was able no doubt, of himselfe, to remove the stone from the grave, seeing he was able to raise one that had been four days dead; but because it was so small a matter, he would not doe it himselfe, but said to the Jewes, Tollite bunc lapidem, when of Saint Austin
Austin faith, Sed quis ab hominibus fieri poterat, hominis facer præcepit: quæ autem Divinæ virtutis erant, sua potentia demonstravit. So also, a Prince ought to commit such things to servants, which are proper for servants; and doe such things himeselfe, as are proper for a Prince.

And yet to this opinion of mine, the counsell of Jethro is no way discordant: for though I grant, that a Prince cannot doe all things of himselfe; yet I deny not but he may doe all things of himselfe, that are of importance: for so we may finde did Moses, if the words be well considered, Con stipul ex eis Tribunos & Centuriones & Quinquagenarios, & decanos, quæ judicent populum omni tempore; quicquid autem majus fuerit, referant ad te, & ipsi minora tantum Indicent. See here, how Jethro shews plainly, that a Prince ought to doe all things himselfe, that are of weight; which is so true, that if he doe otherwise, he shall shew himselfe not only ignorant and irresolute, but by preferring his servants, shall give them occasion, from getting authority, to get into the Kingdom it selfe, and set him at naught; seeing there is no readier way to make oneselfe King, then by drawing all busineses of the Kingdom into his hand. And therefore Sejanus knowing this to be the onely means for attaining the Empire to which he aspired, used many devices to worke himselfe into affaires; so much, that at last he got Tiberius to goe live in the Countrey; to the end that the Emperour being out of Rome, all matters might passe through his hands alone. And indeed Tiberius was by this very neere to have lost at once both life and reputation; but that perceiving at last his errour, he would ever after, not onely dispatch busineses hiseraelfe, when he was in health, but even when he lay dying.

The like art and cunning was practised by Assan Beglerbey
Beglerby of Greece, and prime Favorite of Amurath the Great Turke, who perswaded him not to stirre out of the Seraglio, making him beleve, there were plots laid to kill him if he came abroad; which, Amurath silitily believed, and kept himselfe up close, leaving Assan in the meane time to manage all affaires alone, whereby he had a faire field to play the tyrant at his pleasure; and the State had soon been ruined, and with the State the Prince, if Amurath at last perceiving his error, had not gone out of the Seraglio, and provided in time for all things necessary. No man knew this better, then Lewis the eleventh, King of France, a Prince no lesse judicious then valiant, in peace and warre admirable; who tooke so much pleasure to dispatch affaires of his Kingdom himselfe, that it may be truely said, he died dispatching businesse.

Many opposing this opinion, alledge, that Princes are not Hackney men nor Porters, to kill themselves with labour: but (with reverence I speake it) I yet hold, that either Princes must leave their States, or else must be content to labour for the subjects good. In figure of this it is, that in Esay the Regall power is laid upon the shoulders, where he faith, Dabo clavem domus David super hibernium ejus. Likewise in the old law, besides the twelve precious stones, wherein were written the names of the twelve Tribes, which the high Priest bore in his Rational upon his breast; there were also in two stones, engraved six names apiece, which by Gods appointment he caried upon his shoulders: by which was intimated, that it is not sufficient to have the subjects in his breast; that is, to love them: but he must also carry them upon his shoulders, that is, endure any labour for their good. And for this onely cause perhaps, a Prince in Deuteronomy is likened to an Oxe, that
Thirtieth Discourse.

should not be dainty and given to rest; but apt to labour, and to carry the yoake upon his shoulders.

Two things remaine to be advertized: the one, that when I say, a Prince ought to doe all principall things himselfe, I meane not things of the Law, which consist in the judicall part, where onely particular things and of private interest are handled; and have nothing to doe with the maine of the state; but I meane it in the deliberative part, where publique matters of the Kingdome are handled, and such businesses, in which consists the foundation of the state: and therefore with good reason is by Aristoteles preferred for the judicall part.

Secondly and lastly I advertize, that this my discourse is not meant of Princes that are unfit; for as those Princes that are judicious, cannot doe worse, then to suffer themselves to be ruled by their ministers; so those that are of little judgement cannot doe better then to doe all things by faithfull and prudent ministers, as Nero in his beginning did under Burrhus; Seneca and Corbulo, men fit to have ruled the whole World; and whom as long as he employed, his state was so managed, that justly a wise Emperor said; no Prince, how judicious and wise soever, could possibly governe better then Nero at his beginning did: but as soone as he left to be ruled by those worthy men, it may as truely be said, no Prince how foo-lish and wicked soever, could possibly governe worse then Nero did.
Nam Tiberius cuncta per Consules incipiebat, tanquam vetere Reipublica, & ambiguus Imperandi.

Why Tiberius made a show he would not be Emperor, and that to make Princes discover things they would have concealed, is dangerous.

The one and thirtieth Discourse:

Tiberius after the death of Augustus, as though he were doubtfull to take upon him the Empire, as a burthen too heavy for his shoulders, made a shew he would restore it to the Commonwealth, Se in partem onerum vocatam a Divo Augusto, experiendo didicisse, quam arduum, quam subjiciendum fortuna, Regendi cuncta onus. But to the Praetorian soildiers, he gave watchwords as Emperor, sigillum Praetoris cohortibus ut imperator dederat. Lastly, he made it be spread in the Army, that he was already elected Emperor by the Senate. Dabat & fama, ut vocatus electusque potius a Republica videretur, quam per uxori ambixm, & senilis adoptione irrepsisse. And because these were three waies, all of them (in my opinion) used with great mystery, I will search into them a little narrowly.

First then, Tiberius made a shew he would restore liberty, whereof one reason Tacitus alledge, where he saith, Postea cognitum est, ad introspicendas Rerum voluntates, inducidam dubitationem: as though he would say, He was moved to doe thus, thereby to see whether the chiefemen either desired liberty, or otherwise disfafted his Dominion; to the end, that
comming to know every ones mind, he might worke his owne ends, and security accordingly.

This reason, if Tacitus bring it as a popular reason, may passe; but if he bring it as the true intention of the Prince, it is very unlikely, as not at all suiting with Tiberius subtilty: and if it be Tacitus his owne invention, it comes farre short of his great wit. For two kinds of Noblemen may be considered in the Senate: The one, of men eminent for judgement and valour; the other, of men little experienced, and leff witted. If Tiberius had any doubt or feare, it could be of none but of those eminent men: for, as for them, either they will never dare to attempt anything against the Prince; or if they attempt, never succeed. And for this it is we said before, that Augustus had great lucke to finde the City full of such men, Cum feroicitatibus parcies, aut procriptione co-

sidissent. I say then, that if any were moved to lay himselfe open and discovr his mind, upon Caesars words, It must needs be, they were of those of little judgement; because men, I say not of great, but of any meanere understanding, would never be brought to beleev, that a man so greedy of the Empire, and that by plots and wiles had procured his owne mothers death, and the death of Augustus himselfe; would after attaining it with so much labour relinquish it againe, and restore them to liberty. So that, if Tiberius by this meanses did discovr the mind of any Senator, it must needs be of those, of whom as he could justly have no seare; so it should be absurd, without any benefit to take revenge. For this caufe, Marcus Lepidus gave counsell in the Senate, that Luto-

rimus should not be put to death, Vita Lutorii in integro est, quantoque servatus in periculum Republicae, neque inter-

fectus in exemplum ibit. Studia illi in plena avocanda; ita inania & fluxa sint. Nec quidquam grave se ferimn
It is not therefore likely, that Tiberius a man so wise, and of so great judgement, would ever be moved upon such slight grounds, to cover his intention; we must therefore look out some other reason, that may be more likely.

There were two things, of which Tiberius might be afraid: First, of the Senate, lest not brooking his government, they should rise in arms against him; secondly, of Germanicus, lest having a powerful army in his hand, and with all the favour of the people, he should with a little danger, prevent a succession that was uncertain. To meete therefore with both these difficulties, he feigned in the Senate and with the people, that he was unwilling to be Emperor; to the end, that if the Senatori should make any demonstration against him, the people might believe they were not moved to it for the publick good, but only for their private hatred; seeing to seeke to kill a Prince that would restore liberty; is a signe they love not liberty.

I would therefore construe it, that when Tacitus said, Ut intetiieres Procerum mentes; he meant, that Tiberius, before he declared himselfe to accept the Empire, desired to see first, whether any in the Senate made any opposition, that so (as I have said before) by using the name of liberty, he might the better prevent such mischief; and the rather, as not having omitted any other essentiall things, for strengthening of himselfe, as I shall shew hereafter.

The second reason, why Tiberius was moved to such feigning, is set downe by Tacitus in those words, Causa præcipua ex formidinis ne Germanicus in eum manus tot legiones, inimicae sociorum auxilia, minus apud populum favor, habebat Imperium quam expectare nollet: Tacitus
Tacitus then saith, that Tiberius feigned to be unwilling to accept the Empire, because he doubted Germanicus would pretend unto it: in truth, he that should take these words in an ordinary sense, must needs make it one of the poorest reasons that can be given; for what hath the not accepting the Empire to doe with Germanicus? rather instead of helping him, it would be his greatest hurt, seeing the irresolution of Tiberius might encourage Germanicus to attempt many things which he would not have done, if he had knowne him to be Emperour, and Tiberius himselfe; being aware of this, writ Letters to the Armies, as being Emperour already; Literas ad exercitus tanquam adepto Principatu misit. And if any shall say, that he spake in such terms, because he was ashamed to call himselfe by a name, which might easily be taken from him, I say, that this would have beene a most dangerous vanity, because I conceive that Tiberius seeing the love of the people to Germanicus proceeded onely from a hope they had, (as Tacitus in another place shews) that if he came to the Empire, he would restore the government to the Commonwealth: he knew, that by making them the same offer, he should both diminish the peoples love to Germanicus, and also abate his owne hatred, which the name of a Prince brings with it; and yet by this not deprive himselfe of that authority which should strengthen him. From hence it is, that to the soldiers he gave the signe of being Emperour; as well because, if occasion were they should defend him; as also because he knew they loved a Prince better then a Commonwealth, under which they are deprive of Donatives, and driven out of the City. Whereupon he might doubt that if they should find Tiberius unwilling to accept the Empire, and so feare the restoring of liberty, they should there-
thereupon he moved to choose another Emperor. Afinius Gallus finding Tiberius at this ward, to make him speak plainly, whether he meant to be Emperor, or no, asked him what part of the Empire it was he desired, making as though he believed really that he meant not to be sole Emperor, a thing which brought him to his ruine; seeing Princes speak many things which yet they would not have others to take as they are spoken. Caesar was by some called King; and though he were well pleased with it; yet he laid, he would not be called King, but Caesar; and yet when the Tribunes upon these words of his, prohibited any to call him King, he tooke it in so ill part, that from that time forward, he put them out of office. The reason of this is, because they who take these courses, it seems would either put the Prince to a necessity, of losing his authority, or else to lay open his intentions, which is a thing most odious. Whereupon another time, Tiberius complaining, he thought himselfe not secure: Afinius Gallus pressed him to tell of whom it was he stood in feare, promising they should be all put out of their offices; and he Eo acris accepit, recludit quæ preme-ret. The same Gallus at another time, as it were seeking how to make the Prince offended with him, gave counsell, that Magistrates should be new chosen every five yeeres; and that the Legats of Provinces, who had not yet been Praetors, should by having such legation, be the next admitted to the Praetorship, and that the Prince should be tied every yeere to name twelve Candidates: which counsell no doubt did Altius penetrare, & arca Imperii tentandi, seeing it restrained the Princes authority, and limited it to a certaine time, and to a determinate number; and priviledged the Legats of Legions to attaine to
to the Praetorship without other election or dependance upon him, which much distasted Tiberus: and therefore, pretending that this counsell of Gallus, tended onely to inlarge his owne authority, he refused it. To be short, when Princes are not willing to be understood, it is fit to make shew of not understanding them; it being a dangerous matter, to enter into the search of Princes secrets: Abdi- tos Principis sensus, & siquid occultius parat exquirere, illictum, ances, nec idem affaquare.

Nusquam
Nufquam Contabundus nisi cum in senatu loquebatur; causae præcipuae ex formidine, nec Germanicus in Cujus manu tota legiones, Immensa fociorum auxilia; minus apud populum favor, habere Imperium quam expectare mellet.

What course a Prince should take to secure himself from Generals of Armies: and what course Generals should take to secure themselves from the Prince; and from a Common-wealth.

The two and thirtieth discourse.

Tiberius beginning to suspect Germanicus, that having the love of the Army, he would rather take the Empyre, then expect it; We by occasion of this, will first discourse of the doubt, which a Prince, or a Common-wealth may have, to stand subject to Generals of Armies; Secondly, of the danger such Generals stand in, of falling into the suspicion of them they serve; by which oftentimes is caused their death; and how they should carry themselves to avoid it.

Concerning the first; there is no doubt, but a General having once gotten Reputation, oftentimes puts the Prince whom he serves in danger: which commonly happens; First, because they are not rewarded according to their merit; as it happened to Ferdinand King of Spaine, who having never rewarded the great Captain, might well fear he would take it in scorn; and thereupon seeks to right himself; by procuring to himself the state. Secondly, it may happen by reason of the insolencies; which victory commonly brings with it; as it happened to the Thebans, who having made Philip of Macedon, their General; he, after the victory taken,
The two and thirtieth Discourse.

gotten, tooke away their liberty. Thirdly, It may happen thorough suspicion; which the Common-wealth or Princes take of them that serve them; which suspicion once perceived by the Generall; he must necessarily put another in danger, to secure himselfe; because to seeke to justifie himselfe in such suspicions, is for the most part, in vaine; as may be seene, under a Prince, in Corbulo; and under a Common-wealth, in Scipio Africanus. The very same happened to the Romans, who threatening Caesar, about bringing in his account of managing the Army; and shewing a suspicion they had of him; were cause, that he took his feare of theirs, for a beginning to make himselfe Lord of Rome; which, when no foraigne Force was able to bring it into servitude, was by their owne forces easily oppressed.

I am perswaded the danger is so manifeft, which Common-wealths, or Princes incure by occasion of Generalls; that every one knowing it sufficiently of himselfe, will never look I should stay to prove it, either by Examples or by reasons; and especially seeing there are few Histories, that are not full of such accidents.

But having said, that this danger proceeds from three occasions; It is necessary to examine every one of them. Concerning the first, which was the ingratitude of the Prince: It will be easie to remedy that, by recompensing him that serves; for by this means, hee shall have no cause, to seeke to have all by force; when he may have a part with love. It is true, a Prince in rewarding such, should not doe it, by giving them Cities orgoods; in the places where they have waged warre; for either they are Conquerours of the whole Country; and then by possesing goods there, they will take occasion after the victory, to make themselves the Lords; or else not conquering the whole Country; the contrary part will still be growing: and then they, not to loose the reward given them, will either proceed slowly in the warre; or
else turne to that side that hath the better. This Guicciardine attributes to Prospero, and Fabritius Colonna; who having beene rewarded by the King of France, with Dukedomes, and Castles in the Kingdome of Naples; when they saw the Aragonian side get the better; they went and tooke pay of Ferdinand. Therefore Princes shall do well, to reward them in other states, where they have not warred; and where their reputation is not in Fame: and thus I have knowne it many times done in our time. Also they shall doe well, not to put them into choller; although faultie perhaps in other things: so long as it is not in matters essentiaall, and proper to their places. So did David with Iob; bearing with many Insolencies and murtheres committed by him; to the end he should not fall into choller, and make Insurrection.

Concerning the suspition, which the Prince may shew to have of a Generall; and which is wont to be followed with rebellion; It will be an easie matter to remedy that, if the Prince will not fall to suspect for trifles; which is the quality of base persons; as Icocrates intimates in his Eunaporas; or else, if suspecting him, he conceal his suspition, till hee remove him from the Army; So did Domitian with Agricola; So did Iverius with Germanicus who removing him out of Germany, sent him into Africk with Cneius Piso. And this, the Queene Teuta (in Polybius) not observing, was cause that Demetrius her Generall in Slavonia, understanding that the Queene was by his Adversaries incensst against him, and fearing her Indignation; he sent to Rome to deliver into their hands, the Citie, the Army; and all he had under his charge.

The third cause alleadged before, was the pride and reputation which victory brings with it: for remedy whereof in particular, and of the rest in generall: there have bene advertisements given by many, in divers manners.
The first way is, for a Prince to goe himselfe in person; and for a Common-wealth to send thither, their Principall Magistrate; so the Turke in times past, hath used to doe; to goe himselfe in person; So the Common-wealth of Rome used to doe; sending forth the Consul or Dictator. But in truth, in this way, the Remedy seemes to mee, more dangerous then the evil, because if the Prince goe himselfe in person; hee must be sure to have always the victory; for otherwise if hee loose, hee will either bee slaine or taken prisioner: If slaine, as was Charles of Burgundie, what hindereth but the victor may enter upon the State, at least make spoyle of it? If taken prisioner, as was Francis King of France, and Syphax King of Numidia; I see not, but his State will bee as much in danger; and therefore of this mans State, it was easie for Malignia to get possession: and for the other, his Reputation, and State and life were all Endangered. We may then conclude, that this way of encountring disorders, is a dangerous way.

A second way is, every yeere to change the Generall, as the Ancient Romans used to doe; and as at this day the Common-wealth of Venice, in their Maritime Navy useth to doe. But yet in this way also there may infinite disorders happen: First, if the Army chanceto mutiny, which is commonly the Correlative of an Army; In this case, a man new come, not beloved, not feared, will be little fit to appease such tumults. Secondly, they that make warre in this manner, are like to doe but little good, because the Souldiers can have no confidence in such a one; and it is the confidence in their Captaine, that for the most part, is the cause of victory. For confirmation whereof, wee may see in Livie; that the same Army, which under other Captaines was always beaten, when it came to be commanded by Furius Camillus, had alway victory: and this, by reason of the great confidence, the Souldiers had in him. Thirdly
ly there appears another danger, not inferior to any; and it is, that when a General knows he shall be changed at the years end: either he will not with any great heat begin that, which he knows he cannot finish; or else beginning it, and impatient that another should be companion of his victory, he will rashly, and precipitantly hazard both the Army and himself; which hath beene the cause, that the Romans have lost whole Armies: as it happened at Trebia against Hannibal; where Cornelius the then Consul, to the end he might have all the glory himself; unduly stroked battle with Hannibal, and was with much danger to the common-wealth, utterly defeated, of whom Livie faith: Stimulabat & tempus propinquum Comitiorum ne innovos Consules differretur; O occasio in se unum vertenda gloria!

But granting this Captaine should have made a good beginning, and have prepared a faire way for victory, yet certainly when he heares a sucessour is to come, though he precipitate not himselfe as Cornelius did; at least he will doe all he can to hinder, that another shall not reape the benefit of his labours, or otherwise will not stick to make any shamefull Peace, as Marcus Atilius did, who having beaten the Carthaginians by Sea and land; and upon the point of obtaining a compleat victory: yet when he heard another Consul was to come into Africa; to the end, the fruit of his labours should not be reaped by him, he presently fell to a Trea-trie of peace. So Scipio, one time by occasion of Tiberius Claudius, another time, of Cneus Cornelius, precipitated the victory with making peace. Ferunt postea (faith Livie) Scipionem diixisse: Tiberii Claudii primus Cupiditatem, deinde Cnei Cornelii suiisse in mora, quo minus id bellum exitio Carthaginis finiretur. There bee some, that have hindered their sucessours from victory, by overthrowing of purpose all that they themselves had well begun; such a one was Quintus Metellus, who having
The two and thirteenth Discourse.

very near subdued Spain, when he heard that Pompey the Conful, was to come in his place, he disbanded all his Souldiers, gave all his provision of victuals to the Elephants, and broke up the Army; So also in Numidia, hearing that Marius was to come his succour, he endeavoured all he could to marre the Enterprize.

Others againe, although their predecessors have done nothing to hinder them; but have endeavoured to leave them the victory, in a manner prepared; yet to the end all should be attributed to themselves, have refused to make use of the ways and cources their predecessors had used. Whereupon our Lord Christ, when he would do the Miracle of wine, he rather made use of water, a thing already created, then of any new matter; whereof Saint Chrysostome saith, It was a manifest argument, that he who made wine of water, was the same God, who had made water of nothing. Nam si ipsis Deo contrarius Opus factus esse Christus ad prorsa virtutis demonstrationem. And Saint Ambrose speaking of the first miracle, which Christ did on the Sabboth, saith; Et bene Sabbathocapitis, ut ipsum se offendere creatorem, qui Opera operibus intercesseret; & prosequeretur Opus quod ipsi jam cooperat. And thus when a Generall is changed, the Instruments also, and all other things are changed with him: and therefore Cneius Pompeius being sent Successor to Lucullus in Asia, altered all that Lucullus had done, for not only it is the nature of men, that succeeding another in any office, they will seldom follow their predecessors cources, but in this case, there is another reason for it also; to the end, It may not be thought, that getting the victory, they get it more, by their Predecessors carriage then by their owne; and therefore no marvaile, that Drusus tooke contrary cources in Germany, to those which Germanicus before him had begun. I conclude then; These Generalls to whom a successour is sent, are either
either needy of glory; or else they have gotten glory enough: if they be needy, they will then precipitate the Army and themselves to get it; as Cornelius did with Hanniball at Trebia: if they have glory enough already, they will then endeavor to make a Peace, that they may not hazard their Reputation with a success: Troubles, as Corbulo did, when he heard of one that was to come in his place. Corbulon merita par tot annos gloria, non ullis periculum faceret. But these are two oppositions, may in this place be made, which I cannot omit; & I ought not to shun: The first is, that the Romans changed their Generals every year; and yet they always got the victory, as in the first Decade of Livy may be seen. The second, that the Venetians, men of so great valour and prudence, have always taken this course, and always it hath succeeded well.

-To these reasons it is no hard matter to give an answer. And first, for that of the Romans, it may be said, that this happened through the weakness of their neighbouring Nations, with whom they had war. Secondly, and perhaps better; that although in the Roman Army, they flew yearly a New Consul: yet there were many others in the Army, who had been Generals themselves before: a thing which at this day, is not possible. Being every one thinks, none to go a private Soldier; not only if he have been a General, but if he have been but only a simple Corporal before. Thirdly, the wars they had then, were at the gates of Rome; & the word such wars, as were finished, I say not in one year, but oftentimes, in one day. But when they came to have wars far off, and that lasted long; they then suffered their Generals, to continue many years, and grow old in their places. From hence it was, that at one and the same time, having war with Hanniball in Italy; and with Asdrubal in Spain, they very often changed their Ge-
Generals in Italy, but Cneius Pompeius that was their General in Spain, they never found. So as when they had to do against Powerfull Armies, in places far off, they were then forced, to send a Scipio Africanus, or a Caesar, or some such, as knowing how much it importeth the maine of the warre, to have one sole commander.

As to the Particular of Venice, It is no miraile, that they in their Fleets at Sea, doe every yeere change their Generalls, seeing the warre, and the Generalls Office, end both at once, because actions at Sea, are begun and ended all at one time; but when they make warre by land, they change not then their Generalls every yeere, as in Histories may be seen. Lastly, in the Common-wealth of Venice, one reason there is; and in Rome there was; which makes the matter, the lesse dangerous: and it is, because that Common-wealth hath so many in Sea matters so expert and excellent, that they might easily change their Generall every day without any danger: which I cannot say ever happened to any other then to the Common-wealth of Rome, and to that of Venice; and the reason is, because in these Common-wealths, men of valour are rewarded.

A third way to secure a Prince from his Generalls of Armies, is to send Persons of trust, & of his own blood, as Tiberius did, in sending Drusus and Germanicus: but neither doth this course like me; First, because Princes have not always, of their blood, that are fit to be Generalls. Secondly, although they have, yet it seemes to me so much the more dangerous, as the Army is in a mans hand of more Power, and specially one, not far from the Crowne; and for this cause, Ludovicus Sforza, chose rather to leave the Castle of Milan, in the custodie of a stranger: who afterward betrayed it, then of his owne brother. And it availes not to say, he is a
neere kinsemman, seeing as I have else-where said, *Iuvidia Regni etiam inter Domesticos insidam omnia facit*: there being few, *qui malint expecaire quam accipere Imperium*. And therefore *Socrates* in his Oration concerning the Government of a Kingdom, faith, that a Prince should bestow the highest Honours upon those of his blood, but the soldest Honours upon those that love him. When *Vespasian* was made Emperour; his Son *Domitian* had the honour: but *Mucianus*, the Authority. *Cesar Domitianus Praetum cepit, ejus Nomen Epistolis Ediciisque prponebatur; Vis penee Mucianum*: by all means, there was care taken to order it so, that hee might not usurpe the Empire. The like course *Otho* took: *Profecto Brixellum Othone, honor Imperii penee Titianum fratrem, Vis ac Potesius penee Procolum Praefetum*. If afterward it succeeded well with *Tiberius*, it was because, *Viterque filius legiones obtinebat*.

A fourth way is, when a Generall hath gotten Reputation by some victory; then presently to remove him before hee grow too famous, and use him in the warres no more. So did *Pharao* by *Moses*; when employing him against the King of *Ethiopia*, he no sooner got the victory in a battaile, but he presently called him backe into *Egypt*. So did *Anthony* with his Captaine *Ventidius*; after he had overcome *Ptolemus*. So did the King of Spaine in calling home *Gonfalvus*. But neither doth this course like me: for either the victory will make an end of the warre, and then there will be no need of calling him home: and yet the Prince not without danger: seeing one victory alone, if it be small, will be sufficient to get the Generall a Name, and make him presume. And if that one victory end not the warre, the Prince then that takes this course, will have little will to proceed any further, for the reasons before alleadged. And if by ill luck, Fortune should chance to turne: he will be forced...
forced, with shame and danger, to send the same Generall againe; as the King of Spaine would have done, after the defeat at Ravenna, for if the French had followed the victory, which was hindered by the death of the Generall, the King of Spaine had determined to send Gonfalvo againe into Italy.

The last remedy which hath beene invented, to prevent this danger, specially in Common-wealths, is to joyn two Generalls together in the Army: So the Romans used often times to doe, So the Carthagenians, So finally the Athenians; yet I cannot satisfie myself, that this is a good way; First, because it is commonly the overthrow of the action: as was seene by the King of France, in the Kingdome of Naples, by the Duke of Urbine, and by the Cardinall of Pavia, in the Popes Army, by Marcus Varro, and by Paulus Aemilius amongst the Romans, whereof in all Histories, there are Examples.

Secondly, this way is not sufficient to take away the danger, we speake of, as was seen in Augustus, who although hee had two companions Hircius and Pansa, joyned with him, yet could not they hinder him, from getting into his hand, the Army of both the one and the other, having first by devises, put them both to death; as Tacitus intimates, where he saith; Cæsar Hircium & Pan- sa, ( five hos his illos, seu Pansae veneni pulvere effusum, five miles Hircium & mactinato doli Cæsar absueteram) utrisque copias occupavit.

Thus for a Prince to goe himselfe in person, is dangerous, to change his Generalls every yeere, is not commendable, to send one of his owne blood, not safe; to remove a Generall after getting a victory, worst of all; lastly to make more Generalls at once, than one of little benefit, and consequently, how to aoyde this danger, is very difficult. The best counsel I could give, should be that which Augustus gave to Tiberius; Consulti cura.
ercendi intra terminos Imperium, and in brevete, as much as
may be, to avoid warres: and therefore Tiberius knowing
these difficulties, although he heard of the Rebellion
of the Gryfons, yet he made no shew of it, because he
had no mind to send thither any person of reputation:
Diſsimulante Tiberio damnun, ne cuit bellum permitteret. But
because it is impossible, but that occasions of warre will
sometimes happen; I should like well, in such case, that
a Prince being doubtfull of his Generall, should goe
himselfe to be neere the Army; but not to bee in the Ar-
my; or if in the Army, yet hee should neuer expose him-
selvfe to danger unleſſe the maine of the state depended
upon it. This, Charles the fift King of France knowing,
(for which he was called Charles the wise) would
be himselfe in person in the Army; but when the ba-
tale was to be fought, he then armes a servant of his, in
his owne Armour, and by this meanes, the Army had
the benefit of the Princes presence, without the Princes
danger. Pyrrhus also put his Armour upon another,
finding how faine the Romans were to kill him. David,
as long as matters were in manifest danger, thought it
necessary to fight himselfe in person. But if the presence
of the Prince can doe no more good, or else, if having
loft a battaile, he have Forces enow to renew his Army,
in this case, a Prince should not doe well to goe in per-
son, and therefore David, in the like case, saying, Ego
diar & ego nobiscum, the people answered; Non exibus,
sve enim fugimus, non magnopere adeos denobis pertinebit;
sve media pars ceciderit de nobis, non satis curabunt, quia Tu
nos pro decem millibus computaberis. Osbo therefore
shewed little Judgement, and had ill counsell, when
deliberating about a battaile against Vitellius, he let it bee
knowne, that hee meant not to goe himselfe in person,
bearing when the maine of the businesse is at stake, the
Prince ought then to goe himselfe, because, if his Army
should be lost, he were as good be lost himselfe, as was
scene
scene in Otho; for he staying behind, and not going in person in the Army, both abated the courage, and also the number of his Souldiers. Their courage, because they lookt for him, Militibus ut Imperator pugne adesse postcentibus. Their number, because he retained many companies for his owne Guard, and though Tacitus, in that oration which Othomade, seeme to shew, he had forces enow to renewe the Army; and that he killed himselfe onely because hee would not doe the Common-wealth so much hurt, yet I cannot beleve, that a man so wicke as Otho was, would ever bee so Compassionate, and take such pity of the Common-wealth.

A Prince then ought to goe him self in person, when either the danger is such, that if the Army bee lost, the whole state is lost: or when it is such, that loosing the battaile, the Prince cannot doe better, then to dye: seeing there is no doubt, but it is a great encouragement to the Souldiers, to see their prince amongst them, as it happened in the battaile at Tarus, where the onely presence of the King, was the cause, they got the victory, whereupon, it is no mervale, that the Israelites going upon a difficult action, and hearing that our Lord God, their chiefe Prince would not goe himselfe, but would send an Angell to be their Generall; Et mittam præcursum tui Angelum, ut eiciam Chanaanæum, & Amorrhæum, & Bethæum, & Phæsaum, & Iebusæum, & interres interfluentem labè & melle, Non enim ascendam tecum, that the people hearing themselves thus vilified, made the greatest demonstrations of sorrow that could be, Audiens autem populus sermonem hunc, luxit; & nullus ex more indutus est cultu suo: so as, if the Lord God did not goe himselfe, the people could have no heart to undertake that Enterprise.

But if the state of the Prince, though that Army bee lost, be able in any sort to defend it selfe, in this case the Prince shall do well, not to goe himselfe in person; but shall
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shall set onely One Generall over the Army, and himselfe not to be farre off, but so, as in occasion of certaine victory, hee may remoue into the Army; This Joab teacheth us, when he advised David, to come into the Campe, being now in his power, to take the City of Rabbat, to the end, the glory of the Action might bee Davids, and therefore in the second of the Kings, he faith: Missit Ioab munitionem ad David, dicens, Dimicavi adversus Rabbath, & capienda est urbs aquis. Nunc igitur congregari reliquum partem populi, & obside Civitatem, & cæpe cœn; nec cum a me vestata fuerit Urbs, Nonmini neo ascribatur Victoria. Maharbal left by Hannibal to Oppugne Saguntum, left the Oppugnation in good terms: and then stayed for Hannibals comming. Strataque omnia (faith Livie) recentihs ruinis, adventu Annibalis ostendit. In this manner, a Prince shall fully secure himselfe, from any Generall, whose Reputation growing onely from the victories hee hath gotten, the Prince shall convert all that Reputation upon himselfe: and therefore Ioab said; Ne ascribatur Nonmini neo Victoria.

But if the Prince bee not willing to bee himselfe in such actions, hee may yet with his onely being neere, prevent all inconveniences, by employing one Generall still: and himselfe in no danger; imitating herein Moses, who sending Joshua against the Amalekites: would not be himselfe farre off; Egressus pugna contra Amalech, & ego stabo in vertice collis. This course was a great help to Philip the second, with the Duke of Alva. From hence it is, that as long as the Romans had warre neere home, they never doubted any Generall, of their Army, but when they had warre farre off, the Senate no more then the Prince, not being able to follow the Army, they then began to doubt, and a while after, it fell out as they doubted; as it is in daily experience, that Princes, in warre neere home, never make any
doubt of their Generalls. Moreover, if hee be not in the Army, he is sure to be safe: and this I hold to be the most principall thing that can be, because it would be much, if a Prince carrying away, (as the Proverb is) the Hide, although he should lose his whole state, and all his Army, should not be able to finde meane, to come afresh upon the enemy; as was seene in Massinissa, in Iugurtha, and in Ludovicus Moro, till he was taken prisoner: and would to God we might see no Examples of it, in our times. However, whether Princes be in the Army, or be not, they shall doe well to looke to their owne safety.

It is then cleere that a Prince should have but one Generall, and himselfe not to be farre off: as we may learene from our Lord God: who not onely is one, but in Essence, in Presence, and in Power, is in all things: and having made use of Michael the Aschan-gell, as his Generall in the first batallie, as it is written in the Apocalypis: Et Erat Angelus in Caelo, Michael & Angeli ejus prolis hauantur in Dracone, & Draeo pugnabat & Angeli ejus, & non valuerunt, neque locum invente- suus corron amplius in Caelo: Hee will make use of him also in the last, as may be gathered from Daniel: In tempore autem illo (speaking of Antichrist): Confregit Michael-ell Princeps magnus: qui fiet pro filio populi sui, & veniet tempus quale non finit ab ea, ex quo Gratias fita caperent utque ad tempus illud. And thus much concerning a Prince.

Now Common-wealths in this point have greater difficulties. There is a Politician that counsells, they should send of their owne Citizens: and he instances in Venice, who making their Generalls, Bartholomeu of Bergamo, and Nicholas Orsino Count of Pitigliano, that were strangers, they lost at Kayola in one batallie, all they had gotten with infinite labours, in eight hundred yeeres; and another time (faith he) they were faine
faine to put Carmignola (another forreigne Generall) to death. I lay no blame upon this opinion, but yet I commend rather, that common-wealths should imploy such strangers to be their Generalls, with whom, for their owne security, they may send a pair of the wisest Senatours, that they paying the Souldiers, may not suffer the Souldiers love to be cast all upon the Generall, and representing the Senat, not suffer any thing to be done without their consent. This way is at this day used: but is not new, as that which was knowne in the time of the Carthagenians, as farre as I can find by Polybius: who shewes, that Xantippus their Captaine, would not strike bataile with the Romans, until he had asked their leave, who were sent by the Carthagenian Senat. Xantippus accepta a Ducibus Carthaginensum potestate, pugnandi copiam hosibus facit. The Example of the Romans in opposition to this, is of no force; because that was an Age, not greedy of Dominion; but when it came to be so, they then too well perceived, how dangerous it was to put an Army into the hand of a Citizen, as was scene in Marius, in Sylla, in Cesar the Distraitor: in Anthony, in Augustus; and in a thousand others. So also it would have been in Pompey, if he had gotten the victory of Cesar, Pompeius occultior (said Tacitus) non melior. Secondly, it availes not to say, that the Venetians were forced to put Carmignola to death, seeing the Romans also caused Scipio, when they had banished him, to be put to death: and it was their ruine, they could not doe as much to Cesar: being a much harder matter, when a Generall is to bee put to death, to put it in execution, if he be a Citizen, then if he be a stranger, because a Citizen hath alwayes a Faction in the Senat, that will defend him: and therefore in Rome, there was never any Generall put to death, where a stranger as having none to stand for him, will easily be oppressed, as I shall shew hereafter.

Thirdly, the exam-
ple he brings of the defeat the Venetians had at Vayola, is of noe force, seeing there are none that make warre, that have not sometimes defeats; and who ever had more then the Romans? who thought their Generalls were always Citizens, yet in three Defeats they had, one at Trebia, another at Canne, and another at Thrasmene, they lost all they had, (I may say) but only the City of Rome, which Hannibal after his victory, at Canne, might have taken also, and would not. And if there were nothing else to make me be of this Opinion, yet the Example at this day, of the Common-wealth of Venice, a City full of such excellent men, would persuade me to it.

We have now shewed, the best course that Princes or Common-wealths can take, to secure themselves from their Generalls: It remains to shew, what course Generalls may take to secure themselves, from Common-wealths & Princes. And because we have said, that a Prince may doubt them, either because they have not beene rewarded, or by reason of the Glory they have gotten, or thorough Suspicion, which oftentimes Princes and Common-wealths doe vainely conceive I say.

The first of these is easily to be avoyded, if the Generall shall shew himselfe to be without interest; and not to care for anything but the honour, for by this means he shall keep the Prince from any jealousy in this behalf; and shall not precipitate himselfe into danger.

As concerning the second, of Glory, they shall doe well to imitate the Allmaines: who (as Tacitus relates) used to attribute all the praise of their great achieve- ments, wholly to their Princes. And this precept a Generall may observe, either by requiring the Prince to come, when he sees a victory is certaine, as Joab did, or if the Prince cannot come, then to cause his name to be called upon in the Army, and to erect Trophies to him; and therefore Germanicus knowing this, after he had subdued many Nations of Germany, in the Title he pub-
lifted of them, made mention onely of the Prince: and of him selfe said nothing at all. Debellatis inter Rhenum Ablinque nationibus, exercitium Tiberii Caesaris, ea Monuments Marti & Augusto sacra visse. De semibildidit, metu inviae, am natus Conscientiam factis satis esse; and indeed there is nothing more pernicious to Generals, then to ascribe victories to themselves. This was it, that brought Saul to hate David, in his victory of the Philistine Gyant: and it is indeed a great Vanity, where there are manifest deeds, to puff them up with words. It was many times said to our Lord Christ, Demonium habes, and he answered; Demonium non habeo; another time, when he had healed a blind man, and it was said unto him Demonium habes, he made no answer at all, because the worke he had done, answered for him, that he had not a devill; where therefore there are great worke, it is needless to add words.

The greatest difficulty of a General, is to keepe himselfe from being suspected, for this hath beene theundoing of an infinite number of worthy Captaines; amongst whom, speaking of Princes, was Corbulo: One of the greatest fouldiers, the Romans ever had; and speaking of Commonwealths, Paullus Vitelli, a famous Captaine of his time, who onely upon suspition, was by the Commonwealth of Florence, beheaded.

A generall then may incurre danger, in two things, in suspition, and in death; To prevent suspition, I see cannot doe better, then to use severity in the Army; following the example of Hanniball rather then of Scipio, and therefore Corbulo in his Beginning, while he used Discipline, incurre no danger. To this may be added, that which we spake of before, which is, to shunne all vaine glory, but because it is sometimes impossible, not to incurre suspition; the best instruction I can give in this point, is to advertise, in which of the two Services, is the greater danger.
I lay then, that strangers shall run more hazard, by serving a Common-wealth, than by serving a Prince; and subjects shall run more danger, by serving a Prince, than by serving a Common-wealth; an example whereof, we have given in Paulus Vitelli; who being a stranger, and serving a Common-wealth, lost his life. This made Xantippus, who was general of the Common-wealth of Carthage; as loone as he had gotten one glorious victory against the Romans, to leave the Army, and returne home. The reason of this distinction, is in my opinion, plain, because Generalls under a Prince: either they have friends to defend them, or they have not: if they have not, then they lie open to calumny without any defense; if they have, then will the danger be the greater; because the Princes suspension will be the greater, to see them have such friends and adherents in the City; where if the Generall be a stranger; there can bee had of him no such suspension. Now, if it bee in a Common-wealth; the stranger having few adherents will bee little defended from the blows of calumnies: where the Citizen having his faction to protect and assist him, will easily aveyd the danger, at least of life. And this is the reason Polybius brings; why Xantippus, after the victory he had gotten, left the Army: where he faith, Nam procla multa facinora, & res a quocunque egregiè gestæ, magnam plerumque invidiam, & graves Calumnias confolare solent, quibus Civès quidem affiniœm, & amicorum multitudine freti, facile resistunt. hospis vero omnès praefidii expertes; ut roq; malo quam celerèm contunduntur. And where under a Prince, to have Citizens to defend him, is a dangerous thing; the suspension increasing with the defense; under a Common-wealth, it is a benefit, to have part of those, to take his part, that may deliberate; and therefore in the Common-wealth of Rome; when they have not been able to answer the Accusation; yet they have been able to scape death; in such sort, that for any misadventures, in
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in batailles, or for any suspicion of the people or of the Senate; I never could see any that incurred danger: where under a Prince, there may bee found a thousand examples.

Above all, Generalls must take heed, they take not courses, against the nature of him they serve; for in so doing, they may bee sure, they shall never bee well thought of for what they doe; and besides, with their owne danger, they shall breed a jealousie in them they serve. This had happened to Albianus at Geradada; if he had not beene taken Prisoner; because being in the service of a Common-wealth, so advised and wary in all their affaires, bee by giving bataille to precipitantly, showed he knew not; at least, observed not the nature of them he served. And therefore Corbulo (as Tacitus relates) venturing upon hazardous attempts, under Claudius a timorous Prince; not onely was blamed for it; but was faine, with little honour to himselfe, and much Jealousie of the Prince, to leave the Army, and with- draw himselfe: Corbulo semina rebellionis praebebat; ut laeta apud plerisque, ita apud quantum Simistra fama. Corbolem concitavit; adversus in Republicam causam, cum prospo- re egisset; formidationem paci; virum insignem & ignavo Principi praegressum. Ideo Claudius adeo novam in Germanias vom prohibuit; ut referri præsidia ei Rheum Iuberet.

Dabat & Famae, ut Vocatus Electusque potius a Republicavideretur; quum per uxorum ambitum; & senili adoptione irrepsiisse.

Of Succession and Election.

The three and thirtieth Discourse.

By occasion, that Tiberius would rather have it bee thought he was chosen Emperour, by the Senat, than by
by Augustus; we think it fit to examine these points; when Election is good, and when succession; and lastly, which of them is the better.

To begin with the last; because upon this, the other depend; there are many of opinion, that Election is the better; which (they say) may be proved by Examples & by reasons. By examples, because of all the many Emperours that Rome had, if any were ever good; they were those, that came in by Election: and if we look into the holy Scripture; we shall finde, that the Judges came no sooner to be by succession, but they ended in the sons of Samuel; and the Regall Dignity at one as it came to be by succession, presently became a Tyranny, beginning in Solomon; and increasing in Roboam, who were not Elected, as Saul and David were. Then againe by reason, it may be proved; because Election is in our owne power: where succession is in the power of Fortune, which, though it may sometimes give a good Prince, yet it cannot continue to doe it so long, but that at last (as Aristotle observes) It will give a bad, who alone is enough to overthrow all the good, his Predecessours had done. To this may be added, that successors are always full of domineering pride, which makes them beleive, they are greater then ever their Ancestours were; and having had no part, nor labour in acquiring the Kingdome, they little care for conserving the Kingdome; and lastly, having honour and glory enough; they trouble not themselves for getting of more; where he that comes in by Election, will by the same virtues with which hee hath attained the Empyre, be able also to conserve the Empyre; and seeing hee hath perhaps but little glory by his Ancestours, he will endeavour to get glory by himselfe.

On the other side, there want not reasons to prove, that succession is the better; and the first is taken from Aristotle, who in his Politicks, speaking against Plato shewes...
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shewes: how different and much greater the love is, that is borne to things which are our own, whereupon a successor having the Kingdom as his owne, and one that is chosen, having it but as lent; it must needs be believed, that a successor is likely to make the better Governour: Men commonly not having so great care of things which they have but for terms of life; as of things in which they have inheritance; and may leave them to their Heire. To this may be added: that the conditions of those, who come newly to their greatness; (as Aristotle speaking of the Common-wealth of the Chalcedons saith) are evermore intolerable, as a Poet saith, Asperus nobilis humilicunjurgit in anima. Moreover they who come in by Election, as not having had education in the Princes house, can have but mean information of the affairs of State; where is some succeed, as no New Dignity accrueth to them, so no occasion of growing proud befalls them; and being trained up and acquainted with affairs, as they, themselves will be better able to govern; in both People, and Nobility will be willing to be governed by them; the People, as having been accustomed to obey their Fathers. The Nobility, as being farre removed from Equality: we may add further, that succession takes away all occasion of discords, which in Election, must needs fall out; and falling out, it is impossible, a person of any goodness should be chosen; or if a venoniuous person happen to be chosen, yet having been contested against, by some part of the Electours, he cannot chuse but bear them grudges, and hardly be able to govern as a King should doe.

For resolution, I say; that Election and Succession, be it good or bad, may be considered either with regard to the Prince, or with regard to the people. If to the Prince; then the question is, which of them is the more available either for his security, or for his Reputation.
Beginning then with Reputation, there can be no doubt, but it is more honour to a Prince to be elected, then to succeed: seeing this comes by Fortune, without any merit in the successor; the other comes by merit which is wholly in him that is elected. This Galba understood; when adopting Piso, he said, "Genera niissique a principibus fortuitum, nec ultra estimatur, adoptrum Iudicium integrum; et si veliseligere, Consilium monstratur."

As for security; I hold it safer to succeed, then to bee chosen, because he that is elected, is either chosen by the Prince, or by the People, or by the Senat. If by the Prince, he will want many of those graces, which make a successor secure; as the merits of his Father; which saved Salomon from utter ruin, and the being of the blood Royall, which hath beene a cause of preserving many in their states. Besides this, he will have many things in his disfavour; as, that he is newly risen up from equality, and divers other. If we speake of those that are elected by the People, I cannot deny but they will have the people of their side; but then consequently, they will have the Nobility against them; and so of the one fort, they are like to be hated; and to the other fort, obliged; and being never able to satisifie so much, as the obligation requires; in short time ther will follow, with a generall hatred, their owne particular ruine. Lastly; if he be elected by the Senat; he is like to have the people his enemy, and be sure to be himselfe a slave to the Nobility, whereupon, wee may conclude, that Election is the more Honourable; and succession the more secure.

Concerning the last point; which is, whether of the two is the more profitable to Cities; Election or Succession; I say, that if the Prince choose him, and be the Electour, either he is a good Prince, or a bad; if a good, he cannot choose but make a good choice, and consequently
The three and thirtyeth Discourse.

That being certain, and this uncertain, and therefore the Election of Antoninus, was better than the succession of Marcus Aurelius: and yet Marcus Aurelius was no less virtuous than Antoninus. But if the Prince bee bad, no doubt then, but choosing a successor, he will choose one stronger, and therefore it was thought that Augustus chose Liberius, Comparatione determina: ubi gloriam queens, as Dio and Tacitus say; and not only for getting themselves glory, as in this case, but sometimes they will doe it, out of sympathy of Conditions, in which regard, Otho speaking of Galba, who had chosen Piso, as vitious a man as himselfe, said; Acne quo saltem in succeffore Galba pes esset; accerst ab exilio, quem tristitia & avaritia sui simillimum judicabat, whereupon, in this respect, it is better a Prince should be by succession, then by Election, seeing at least, it will bee put into the hand of Fortune, and such a one like to succeed, as a better were not like to be Electcd. With this opinion of mine, agrees that which Capitolinus in the life of Messalina relates, as a Common Proverbe: sapientes electi Principes sic agunt per Imperitos electi, sic percat. If againe the Election bee made by the soldiers, as oftentimes was done at Rome, in this case likewise, succession will be better then Election: because soldiers make Election onely for their profit; and oftentimes to make the like profit, of another, they murther one as soon as they have chosen him: So faith Plutarch, in the life of Galba; Et avaritia libido inque Imperatorum Imperatum veluti Clavum Clavo expellebant; at vero palatium Caesarum donus breviarii temporis spatio quamvis Imperatoribus exceptis, militibus tamen in Scena, modo introducetibus aliquem, modo educetibus. If lastly the Election bee by the people, either they are at variance with the Nobility, or Not: if they bee at variance, no doubt they will then make choyce of a Factious person; one of a turbulent
The three and thirtieth Discourse.

The spirit, and an enemy to the Nobles; as they did in the choyce of Tribunes in Rome, at the time when there was dissention, betwenee the Nobility and the people; and though there were no discord betwenee them; yet I could never like of Election by the people, who being for the most part corrupt, and little able to discerne who is good, and who is bad, and apt to value men by riches, and not by vertue, cannot chuse but make a most unworthy choyce. Neque enim His (faith Tacitus) Judicium aut veritas. But if the Senat be at concord with the people, then no doubt, the Election will be excellent, as being made by a number of understanding men; and therefore we see, that Numa Pompilius who was thus chosen, proved one of the best Kings, the Romans ever had; there concurring in his Election, the choyce of the Senat, and consent of the people. It is true, such Election is hardly made; because few would like to Elect another to that degree, which he aymes at himselfe: And if any man should object, that it proves well in Venice, where the Election of their Duke, is always made by the Senat, I would answer (taking no notice of the kind of that Dignity) that this happens, because that Election is made by most understanding men; who ayme more at the Common-wealths profit, then at their own. But if the Senat or Magistrate, that is to make the Election, be it selfe corrupt: wee may then expect a choyce betwenee good and bad; because a very good one, they would not choose, for feare least out of his precisenesse, he should reforme many things to the undoing of the wicked; and a very bad one, they would not choose, for feare least he should be the undoing of the Kingdome. To which purpose are those words of Tacitus, Bx optimis periculum sibi, expessimis dedecus publicum metuebat.

There advertize, that neither the Reasons alleged at first, nor yet this last, are in any opposition to the Kingdome.
domes that are at this day, whereof the greatest part goes by succession: for there is great difference betweene speaking of times, in which were Tyrants, and times in which are civill Princes; who have so many Counsells, so many orders and Consultations, that it is impossible, but they must govern well. No man therefore ought to take my Discourse as a taxing of Princes in these times, but whether it be Election, or succession, I hold that way always to be best in a City, which hath formerly beene used.

Lastly for resolution of those Arguments which in the beginning were brought against Election: (Those against succession being tacitely already answered) I say, that either wee speake of choosing a private man to bee Prince; and then those difficulties will bein force; or else we speake of choosing one, who is already mounted to the height of a Prince; and then those difficulties will be laid asleep: and this we see notably observ'd at this day, in places of Election; as in creation of the pope, which can never fall upon a person, that is not first a Cardinall. It being fit, that one should first come out from Equality, before he should rise to the highest degree of superiority, and that he should first be taken into part of affaires, who is to come afterward to govern the whole. So likewise in Election of the Emperours; we see alwayes Princes of such blood to be chosen, that comming to the Empyre, they seeme not to come to any new greatness.

Tiberius therefore (to come to our purpose) having beene chosen by Augustus, that was a Tyrant, had reason to have it beleived, that he was chosen by the Senat; rather then by old Augustus, Comparatione determina, or per axotium ambitum: but if Augustus had beene an excellent King; I beleive hee would then have rather had it thought, that he was chosen by the Prince. So did Solomon, who comming to the Crowne after David, would have
The foure and thirtieth Discourse.

have it knowne, that hee was made successor by his father: *Vt notum fiat universo Populo Regem eum a Patre Declaratum.*


*Whether Tiberius did ill, in causing Augustus his will to be read; and why Augustus in the third place, made many his heirs that were his Enemies.*

One of the first things that Tiberius did in the Senator; was the causing Augustus his will to be read; where Livia and himselfe were made his heirs in the first place: In the second, his nephews; and Grand-children. In the third place: the principal men of the City; many of whom were known to be his enemies. In this, there are two things we may wonder at; one that Tiberius would have this will of Augustus to be read openly; the other, that Augustus had set many in his will, that were his Enemies.

Beginning with the first, I say; that Tiberius not belonging to Augustus by any respect of blood; but only by being his Sonne in law; to be preferred by Augustus will, before Agrippa Posthumus, that was his Nephew, to whom by Right of kinred, the Empyre belonged; It seemes that in true politick consideration, Tiberius did ill.
ill, to cause a thing so odious to be published, which he ought rather, if it had beene possible, to have hid: en: as was seene in Claudius, who by his Testament making his Sonne in Law, Nero his heire; and preferring him before Britannicus, his true and legitimate Sonne; Agrippina a little woman; after the death of Claudius, would not suffer his will to be read; least the people should mutiny; to see a sonne in Law prefered before a Sonne: Testamentum tamen hand recitatum, Ne antepositus filio privignus, Invidia & Jutitia uniquos vultures. By this example related by the same Tacitus, we must necessarily say, that one of them, either Agrippina or Tiberius did ill; or else we must be driven to shew some difference betwixt these two cases: which may be, and is in many things. First, because Britannicus was Claudius his Sonne; and Agrippa, Augustus his Nephew, but by the line of women. Secondly, because Agrippa was start off; and perhaps dead, when Augustus his will was read; Britannicus was living, and present there in Rome: and so by his presence, might have given occasion to the people, of making insurrection, which Tiberius needed not to feare: and lastly Tiberius was a man of ripe age, experienced in the warres, and conversant in affairs of state, where Nero was but a child, and had hitherto given no proue of himself at all; and besides, it caused much lesse envy, to see a Sonne in Law of so excellent qualities, preferred before a Nephew rude and foolish, and full of Indignation: then it would have done a rude Sonne in Law, prefered before a Sonne of so great expectation: and because to be made heire by the former Prince, is a great helpe for being accepted by the Subjects, as by the Example of Solomon and others, I have elsewhere shewed: Tiberius knowing, that those things would be no trouble to him, which to Nero would have been pernicious. he therefore did very wisely, and with
with great Judgement; to make it knowne to all men; that Augustus by his will had left him his heire.

The other Error which was intimated in the beginning, consists in this: that Augustus in his will, naming many of his enemies to be his heires; seemed by this as it were to encourage them to oppose those of his own blood; that so they might come to that, of which his will had given them a hope. And it would not be reasonable to say, that he was moved to doe it; (as at this day, in some places is used) as not thinking hee should dye; to the end, that they seeing themselves made his heires, might not longer be his opposites, but rather be tied to be at his service; an invention which hath no other effect, but to make him that useth it, be knowne for a man of little braine, with prejudice to his Posterity. This reason therefore is in itselfe of little strength; and squares not with Augustus, seeing his will was made in secret, and of so little strength is that Reason which Tacitus brings, in these words, Iustitia Gloriamque apud Pesseros; which is, that Augustus did it to get himselfe glory in aftertimes, as much as to say, that hee preferred publick profit, before private hatred, and that hee made no reckoning of the injuries done him; no doubt a great Glory; but yet not such, as was worthy of Augustus his Consideration.

We may say then, that Augustus not without great cunning tooketh this course, to secure both himselfe and his successour; seeing, that if any were likely to conspire against the Prince: it was those principall men whom he named in his will; whereupon by this demonstration of affection, he thought to bind their hands: because believing the Prince did truly love them, (men being apt of themselves to believe they deserve to be loved) and more, to believe those demonstrations, which being made in a last will, seeme to be farre from flattery, they could not chuse but lay away all hatred; and though
though they should be sulpitious, though aware of the
device, yet they should have no means to conspire aga-
ingst the Prince, seeing the people they might bee
sure, would be against them: as they who looking to
the apparence of things, take no notice of fictions,
and hate ungratefulnesse; and this was it, that spo-
led the conspiracy of Marcus Brutus; because the
people understood that he was adopted by Cæsar
to be his sonne, and named in his Testament; and for
him to conspire against him was such an ingratitude,
that they were easieely perswaded to take revenge; so
much is that accursed vice detested.

Non aliud Discordantis patriæ remedii-
unquam ut ab uno regeretur.

That corrupt Common-wealths have need of a Monarch
to Reform them.

The five and thirtieth Discourse.

If Agis the Spartan had knowne the foresaid reason
brought by Tacitus in excufe of Augustus, he would
certainly have attained the end he aimed at; which
was to restore his Country to the first Ordinances and
lawes that the most wise Lycurgus had made; but his
fault was, that he sought to doe that by many, which
he was to have done himselfe alone: which Cleomenes
perceiving, and advised by the wife of Agis, whom af-
fter his death he tooke to wife himselfe, and having
heard her a thousand times relate the eafe of her de-
ceased husband, he came to know, that Non aliud pa-
trie Discordantis remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur;
whereupon (though wickedly,) he put down the Ma-
gistracy of the Ephori, and easily brought the City to
such
such terrours, that within a few dayes, he was able, with-er any scare of the Citizens, to leave his Country, and got in person to the Warte: and if the City in the mean time ran a hazard; it was not by any default of Cleomenes, but for want of money, as Plutarch witnesseth, where he faith; "Quemadmodum exercitatione robur membrorum adeps Athleta, spatios temporis oppressum atque superant agiles, artificioque, ita Antigonus magnopibus construentes, hujusque bellum resicientes, destruaverit in modum superavitque Cleomenem, vix habentem, unde terruerit militibus mercedem, civibus alimenta suspexitaret: and therefore was forced to give him battaile, where if he could have stayed but onely two dayes, Antigonus must of necessity have returned back, into Macedon, and Cleomenes had remained Lord of all Greece.

It is therefore held by all Experienced Politicians, for an infallible Rule, that not onely for the founding of Common-wealths, but also for the Reforming of them; the Government of one alone is necessary; and this, Romulus knowing, (though wickedly as for the Act) killed his brother, and was cause of the death of his Compagnion. So Cleomenes (as we have said before) desiring to reform his Country of Sparta, which was at the last Cast of Ruine; no lese wickedly then Romulus, killed all those that might oppose his Power, and gave them new laws and new ordinances for reformation of the City. And not unlike to these was Hacer the Syracusan; who seeing his Country in an extreme degree of ruine, was forced to make use of those Armes to make himselfe Lord of the Country, which he had received for defence of the Country. It is therefore no marvel, that Augustus seeing Romulus full of Discords, so much degenerated from the antient lawes and customes; and so deeply plunged in a thousand kinds of wickednesse, did imitate Romulus in being the cause of his Compaignions death; did imitate Cleomenes, in putting many Schadwure to death, that
that might have opposed his greatness; and lastly did
imitate Hiero the Syracuse; in turning those Armes ag
again the Common-wealth, which he had received of
the Common-wealth, to defend it against Anthony; as
knowing well, that to rectifie the City and reduce it to
reformation, there was no other way, but only for him-
selxe to governe alone. For having a purpose to set up
an Aristocracy; he was first, (as Aristotle in his Ethicks
teacheth us) to bow the staffe the contrary way to make
it afterward [fright; and if in doing this, he used vio-
ence, it was, because it was impossible to doe it oth-
wise. And therefore Plato in his book of lawes, faith;
that it is impossible to passe from the Government of a
few, to a good Common-wealth; because it is seldom
scene, that they who are in authority, will yield to any
of their fellowes to reforme them; where Plato shewing
the difficulty of reforming a Common-wealth; shew-
eth withall, that it must be done, by reducing the go-
vernment into one mans hand. And if Augustus after-
ward, did not pursue his purpose; and left not the City
in liberty: it was, because he saw the Citizens were not
fit for it; as Galba, in the oration he made at the Adop-
ting of Piso said: Imperaturus es hominibus, qui nec totam
libertatem; nec totam Servitutem pati possunt; and for this
cause it was, that Augustus made himself sole Lord;
Non alius Discordantis passi remedium, quam ut ab uno re-
geretur; and therefore hee gave them halfe a liberty;
leaving a great authority in the Senatours; and not a lit-
tle in the people, which Tiberius afterward tooke away,
and he put them in halfe a servitude, being himselfe su-
perior in all causes. The like conceit had Galba, when
he made himselfe sole Lord of the Empire; as in the fore-
said oration, every one may see. Augustus therefore is
no more to be reproved, then Cleomenes, and Galba, and
Hiero are, and if his purpose tooke not effect, it is not to
be attributed to his fault, but to the ill fortune of his suc-

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cessour;
cessour, seeing as long as he lived himself, till he came to his decrepit age; he maintained the City in great quiet, and the whole world in Peace, *Nulla in praestens formidine, dum Augustus estat validus, seque, Domum, & Paeas sustentavit.* And if to Romulus there had succeeded Tarquinius Superbus, and to Augustus Numa Pompilius; I verily think the City of Rome had in her beginning beene ruined; and after by Augustus beene restored. And as after him the City of Rome fell to a Tyrant, and the power of the Cæsars ended in Nero, so also the Power of Romulus ended in Tarquinius Superbus, the Power of Cleomenes, in himselfe, that of Hiero, in his nephew Hieronymus, and finally, that of Galba, presently after his death, fell to a Tyrant: and all these Powers, except that only of Cleomenes, came to ruine by wicked successors. The reason, why these mens power was not able to hold out long; and to conserve their Cities in tranquillity, is by some assigned, to the accommodations, which either are so ordered, that all the parts of the City rest contented, and then it will last; or else the Accommodation is founded upon the Person, who by his authority makes it apt to continue, and then it will last no longer, then while he lives, or at most, till it fall into the hands of a wicked successor, this, in my opinion, David knew well, when in a Psalm he said, *Deus Judicium tuum Regi dabo, & Inheritiam tuam filio Regis,* as though he would say, it is not enough for the continuance of an empyre, that the first King be good; but it is necessary, his successors be good also, and then it is like to last a long time. *Et permanebit cum sole, & aeternum in Generatione & Generatione,* but because after Solomon, there followed a wicked successor, the Kingdom was in part dissolved. So the Kingdom of Romulus succeeded well with him, because there came after him Numa Pompilius, who by giving good laws, filled it with Religion, but afterwards in Tarquinius Superbus.
perbus it came to ruin. So also that of Hiero came to nothing, through a wicked succession. So the reformation which Augustus made of his Country, succeeded ill to him, because there came after him a Tiberius, a Caius, a Claudius, and lastly a Nero, who abrogating Lawes & Religion, it could not choose but come to ruin. The reformation therefore are ill founded, and never last long, that are founded upon the Authority of one, seeing the City is eternal, & the Prince mortal; but then are reformation like to continue, when they are founded upon those that receive them. Wherein, for another reason, I would help myself with a doctrine of S. Thomas, where he faith, That when a forme comes to be perfectly received of the matter, although the Agent that introduced the forme, be removed, yet the forme remains in the matter still; if Fire be introduced in Wood by another Fire, though the agent be removed, yet the Fire remains in the Wood still; but when a forme is introduced unperfectly, or to use the word of S. Thomas, Inchoative; there, if the Agent be removed, either it lasts but little, as water that is heated; or else goes wholly away with the agent, as the enlightning the aire, by the departing of the Sun. So likewise when a Prince hath perfectly introduced good Ordinances in the matter of a City; although he die himself, yet they will still remaine: but if they be introduced but unperfectly, that is, not fully established; then certainly, either they will last but little, as water heated, or with his death that introduced them, will die also, as the enlightning of the Aire.

To return to our purpose, I said before, that the City of Rome was not capable of liberty: and therefore that Augustus was not too blame, for not giving it liberty; that it was not capable, is manifest, seeing in process of time, the Empire coming into the hands of such persons as more regarded the good of their Countrey
The five and thirteenth Discourse.

Countrey, then their owne dignity; such as Trajan, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and others were: if they had knowne that it had been for the good of the City of Rome, to have had liberty, they certainly would have given it.

I have been willing to give examples of Hiero, as being indeed most like to Augustus. For he being a Citizen of Syracuse, had in his hand an Army for defence of his Countrey; and by devises cut them all in pieces that were not for his name: and afterward, with those very Armes, he made himselfe Lord of Syracuse, in which government he raised not himselfe above equality, ruling with much prudence, and content of the Subjects: as also he enlarged the Dominion of Syracuse: and lastly intended to leave it in liberty, but that he did it not; there were two impediments; the first, because the City was not fit for it: and therefore Livie faith, Syracuse que cum brevem tempus affulsit, in antiquam servitium reciderant. And in the same booke, speaking of the people of Syracuse, he faith, Augustus auctor, et superbe dominatur. Libertatem quæ mediæ est, nec sacerdore modice, nec habere scinit. A second impediment were the women, who through desire of rule, wrought so with him, that he left his Nephew Hieronymus his sucessour, a most perfidious and cruell man, and farre differing from the conditions of his unkle. Augustus likewise was a Citizen of Rome, and had in his hand an Army, for defence of his Countrey; when he put all those to death, that were able to oppose him, and then turning those very Armes against his Countrey, he made himselfe sole Lord; in which government he used great equality, shewed great prudence, enlarged the Empire, and lastly had a purpose to leave it in liberty, whereas he had often speech with Marcus and Agrippa; and if he left it not in liberty, it was long of two things: one
one, because the City was not capable of liberty. Non aliud discordantiae patriae remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur: and as Galba said of the Romans, Non totum liberatatem, nec totam servitutem pati possint. A second cause was Livie, who having besotted the old man Augustus, persuaded him to leave Tiberius his successor, a cruel man; and one that was no more of kinne to Augustus his conditions then to his blood; as Tacitus shewes where he faith; Alia Tiberi maritus vis. And thus it appeares that Augustus and Hiero were very like; but yet in one thing they had very unlike fortune; for the Empire of Augustus ended not in himselfe, but was continued in Tiberius, who also was able to elect a successor after him; but with Hiero it was not so, for his Kingdome ended in his Nephew Hieronymus, who was miserably slaine. And the reason of this, is because Tiberius in company of many vices had some vertue, (as I said before speaking of Nero) but Hieronymus, without any vertue, had all the vices of Tiberius.

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**Non aliud discordantiae patriae remedium quam ut ab uno regeretur.**

*Why the City of Rome from a Regall power under Romulus recovered liberty under Tarquinius, and from the Regall power of Augustus was never able to shake off servitude.*

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**The six and thirtieth Discourse.**

To make that be better understood, which we said before; that the City of Rome in the time of Augustus, was not fit to receive liberty; I conceive it will be a good helpe to examine the reason why from
from the Regall power of *Romanus*, it came to liberty under *Tarquinius*; and afterward from the Regall power of *Augustus*, it was never able to free itself from servitude.

The first is a general reason, and brought by all Writers: that is, the imperfection and corruption of the Citizens. For liberty, (as I shall shew in my Discourse of Optimates) requires men perfect, and not corrupt, at least so many as may be enow to make a Senate. But surely, this reason; (with leave of the many great men that allledge it) may be of some force to prove, that the City of *Rome* under *Augustus*, was not capable to receive liberty, but it is of no force to prove, that from the Regall power of *Augustus*, it might not as well recover liberty, as it had done from that of *Romulus*. Seeing the City of *Rome* was never so full of imperfect men; in the time of *Augustus*, as it was in the time of *Romulus*, when there was in it indeed a nest of the scumme of the most wicked men, that were in all *Italy*. We may say then, that both the one and the other of these Kings had an intention to set his Country in liberty, (as of both of them, in divers discourses, I have made it appeare) but neither of them in his life time, put this intention of theirs in execution. And the reason is, because when men are imperfect, and not fit to tolerate liberty, it is impossible that in the life of one Prince alone, they can be brought to perfection, in such sort, as to be made fit to receive it; but this must be wrought by the continuance of many good succeffours, who may all of them intend to prepare the Citizens for it: and because it was thus with *Romulus*, therefore after him the Romans obtained liberty; but being not so with *Augustus*, who had many wicked succeffours after him, therefore the City after him continued alwaies in most miserable servitude.
A Second reason, was the slaughter of Cæsar: which not being sufficient, to reduce Rome to liberty, was therefore sufficient to make the Regall power unalterable. For Augustus making himselfe Lord of the Em‐
pyre by force; was able by the same force to secure himselfe in it, the rather under the Excuse of Cæsar's slaught‐
er; and the corrupt times of the Common‐
wealth, which served him for Engines to put many things in execution, that fortified his Power. Pieta‐
tem erga Parentem (laith Tacitus) & tempora republi‐ca
obtenta sumpta; whereupon, the best Politicall in‐
struction, that in like cases can be given, is this; that when a Familie hath loft the authority it once had in a City; It is better to yeeld it up with love, then to
strive by force to recover it with danger: for this hath beene the cause, that many Cities relapsed under Prin‐
ces, have never after beene able to recover liberty; a relapse in all things, being always worse then the first
Evill: and of this there want not examples, if there were need to bring them.

A third reason, and of importance is, because the
Election was come into the hands of the Souldiers; who by reason of the gains they made: and of the un‐
measurable Donatives that belonged to them, at the
Coronation of Emperours; would never be brought
to give their consent for the introducing of liberty, in
which it is wont, to be the first lesson. He that labours
not shall have no pay: and so much more, as Com‐
mon‐weaths that are good, need no such guard.

Fourthly, I conceive it to be of some moment, that
after the death of Nero in whom the house of the Ce‐
sars ended; yet Rome was not then reduced to liberty:
seeing Gælba being choisen, every one of those great
ones, might begin to hope, that it might be their turne
at some time or other, to come to the Empyre; and
consequently very likely, they were not much discon‐
tented
The six and thirtieth Discourse.

tentd with that forme of Election: and so much, (in my opinion) did Galba himself express, in the speech he made to Piso, when he said, Sub Tiberio & Cæio & Clatio unius familia quasi hereditas suimus: Loco libertatia erit, quod Eligicæpimus: & finita Julionam Claudio-rumque domo, optimum quemque Adoptio Juveniet: as if he would say, Now that the line of the Cæsars is extinct, everyone may hope to attain that degree, which hope I conceive, may be the cause, that those potent men, in whose hands it is to alter states, like best of that forme, in which the first degree they can hope to attain, is that of Excessive greatness: and from hence perhaps it was, that Cæsar the Dictator, was never much troubled with the Conspiracy of Catiline, but rather excused and defended it, as less caring for the Cities liberty, then that it should come under the Power of one alone, which Power hee doubted not in time to attain to himselfe.

Fifthly, the greatness of the Romane Empire, was it self, (in my opinion) a great cause. It could never returne to liberty, because at the time of the Tarquins, being but in low estate, it was more reasonable, they should desire Equality: which in small things is easily borne: and because else, they must have passed a thousand difficulties: as the subduing of Ryvall Common-wealths, the Conquering of Enemy Princes, and the like, wherein in the time of Augustus, the City being grownegreat, & become mistress of the world; her Ryvalls spent, and all things at Peace and quiet; it was not now easie to support Equality: and therefore from that time afterward, there was no contesting but for the Empyre, and a man will easily hazard both life and reputation, where the reward that may be gotten by it, is both great and secure, but where the reward is but little, full of toyle and danger; there men are contented and glad to have company: and therefore
fore brought Rome to be a Common-wealth; whereupon we see in our times, that (Venice excepted) all other Common-wealths are of no great moment, and all this (as I conceive) very lively expressed, where he faith 3: *Vetus ac jampridem Turbrain mors potestae Cupido, cum Imperii magnitudine adolevit, erupitque. Nam rebus medicis *ēqualitas facile habeatur, sed ubi subasior orbe, & annus urbis Regibus excisit, secures open concepisse vacum sit, prima inter Patres plebemque certamina exercere. Modo turbulentii Tribuni, modo Consules praevallis, & in urbe at foro tentamentum CVDium bellorum. Mox e plebe insimia: Caesar Marsus, & nobilium se vivissimus Lucius Syri, atque armis libertatis: in Dominati non perturba: Post quas Cneius Pompeius, occulsius, non melior, & namque: potestas nisi: principatui quis situm.*

A sixth reason may be taken from the Ordinances and lawes of the Romans, which though at the first times of the Common-wealth they were good, yet in process of time they became naught, it being not possible, and indeed not fit, to make a law, that is simply and at all times good, as it happens with Physitians, who cannot prescribe meats that are simply good for all, seeing respect must bee had to temperatures, and bodys in health simpliciter, (to use Galens word) that if a meat could be found good for all diseases; that meat simply should be naught. It is necessary therefore that lawes should have conformity, with the men; and with the times, whereupon the law of Moses being given to one people, was not simply good but conteined in it many precepts, repugnant to our Christian Policy; and if any man object, that the law given by Christ our Lord in the New Testament, is simply good I answer, that this Law was not given to one particular people, but to all the whole world: *Evangelium omnium Creatorum*, faith our Lord in Saint Matthew. Note the Lukewarm Ordinances.
dinances of the Romanes, were all intended for en-
crease of Dominion, and consequently for war; where-
on it is no marvaile; if that City, having now at-
tained to Peace, and no more need of Augmentation,
but onely of Conservation, became uncapable of re-
ceiving liberty; and being bred and accustomed to
getting, having now nothing more to get, they all en-
deavoured by the same Arts to get the Empire.

Seventhly and lastly, I have drawne a reason of ex-
cellent Doctrine from Aristotle in his Philosophie, for
knowledge whereof, it is to be knowne, that living
bodies have naturally a Terme and bound beyond
which they cannot goe; as witnesseth the Philo-
pher in his Bookes of Animalls: where he faith;
Perficiendicujusque animalis certa est, magnitudo; tum ad
majus, tum ad minus, quem terminum non supergeriuntur,
ne vel majora, vel minora evadant; and in his Physicks
he faith: Quod impossibile est, carnem aut or, aut aliquid
alium, quantumcumque magnitum, aut in majus aut in mi-
nus; and finally in his Bookes de Anima he faith; Natu-
ra autem Constantium omnium Terminus est, et ratio Mag-
nitudinis & Augmenti; by which authorities it is ma-
nifef, that all Naturall things, have a certaine bound
which they cannot exceed; and this happens because
nature hath made them for their proper operations,
which they cannot execute but under a certain and de-
terminate greatnesse: seeing therefore a Common-
wealth is nothing but a body consisting of many bod-
ies, and ordained to the intent to live well; It ought
to have a due greatnesse, fit to maintaine it selfe;
which greatnesse if it exceed, it will not be able any
longer to exercise its operation, in regard whereof
Lyrie faith; Donec ad ea tempora pervenerunt, ut magni-
tudine properis Laborarent; whereupon as long as the
City of Rome stayed within its certaine bound, so long it
maintained it selfe a Common-wealth; but after it ex-
ceeded
This greatness, as then fell into the hands of Kings, and could not otherwise have subsisted. This, Taurines in the mouth of Galba meant, when he said: *Si immensum imperii Corpus stare at liburum, fine Recifit pestis, dignus eram a quo Republica inciperet.* The body then of the Common-wealth, was grown so vast and great; that it was not able to suffer liberty: for although to possess much, be commonly good: yet it is not always good for every body: as we see in wrestlers; whose Constitutions, (as witnesseth Hippocrates) have no greater Contestation, then with their owne goodness; as being full of so many good humours; that thorough the excess of them, they are not able to exercise their due operations: and therefore necessarily must either break or be evacuated. And this happens not only in bodies, but as well also in Kingdoms and Common-wealths: Trajan by subduing an infinite number of Provinces; had so enlarged the Empire, that it was come *Ad Maximam quod non*; to a pitch above the proportion of a Monarchie; and perceiving the danger of it; he had recourse to the Remedy prescribed by Hippocrates; *Quocirca statim bosman habitum solvere oparet,* and giving some of those Provinces Freedom; he Evacuated (I may say) the Empire; like to this was the counsell of Augustus (cited by us before) *Addideratque Consilium Coercendi intra terminos imperium.* Likewise in Common-wealths, I think none will deny; but that the Switzers, the free Citties, and Lucca, the only Common-wealths (after Venice) that are at this day in the world, have for no other cause held out so long, and maintained themselves to this time; but because they have not arrived to that bounds of *Maximam quod non magnitudinis,* and their little greatness hath beene their defence, and made them great. Also to the Venetians, it hath beene no small helps to preserving them in liberty; because
The fix and thirtieth Discourse.

they have not exceeded the bound, of Maximum quod Non: And therefore the Image in Daniel, as soon as it came to have a head of Gold, was struck by a stone falling from the mountaine, and cast downe to the ground. This Image, by many writers, is taken for the Empire, which having Feet of Earth, no sooner come to have Heads of Gold, but they presently fall; seeing the Circulation of this world, is founded upon Ascending and Descending, and that which is the end of Ascending, is the beginning of Descending, as Aristotle learnedly teacheth: where he speaks of a Circle; because humane powers are like to shadowes, which never continue at one stay; as Job excellently faith: Et fugit velut Umbra, & munquam in eadem statu permanet; and in another place, Elevati sunt ad modicum, & non subsistunt, where S. Gregory citing that place of the 72. Psalmes, Deieciétos dum allevarentur, and that of Saint Iames, Quæ est Vita Vestra? Vapori est ad modicum parentis, and expounding that place of the Prophet Esay, Omnibus Caro Fœmum: Carnalis Gloria dum nitet cadit; dum apud se Extollitur, repente intercepta finis terminatur. Sic manque aurum flavum in altum stipula raptur, sed cuncto concito ad Ima revocatur. Sic ad Nubila fume extollitur, sed repente in nihilum transcedendo dissipatur. Sic ab inimicis, Nebula descendendo se erigit, sed exortus hanc solis radius, ac si non fuisset, abservigat. Sic in herbarum superficie, nostrum bunnor affergitur; sed diurni Luminis subito calore siccatur. Sic spumae a quorum dulce inchoantis fluviis excitatis, ab intimis certamin prodeunt, sed eo celerius dirumpere depereunt, quo inflata citius extenduntur. Cumque exscrecent ut appareant, Crescendo peragunt, ne subsistant. I cannot bring a better example, in conformity to this Doctrine, then of Venice; which was never in any great danger: but when it was at the greatest, as drawing then neere to the bound, of Maximum quod Non; whereupon, if it had not bene for the strength of its situation, as Historians
The seven and thirtieth Discourse.

istorians say) assisted with the great Prudence of the Senatours, and with the great value of the Citizens, in defending Padua. It had utterly come to ruine. And therefore Augustus seeing, Non alius Discordantia patriæ remedium, quam ut ab uno regeretur; made himself Emperor, wherein notwithstanding Christians must not imitate him, whose duty it is, to set Religion before Country and life, and Common-wealth and all; rather suffering death, then be drawne to commit any wickednesse: and rather then imitate Augustus; follow the course of Marcus Aurelius; who though he saw his Country upon the point of loosing, and himself also, thorough the wickednesse of his Compagnion, yet he tooke all things patiently, and would not put him to death, though it was in his power to doe it. For Conclusion I say, that a Prince ought not to governo his Country by force: although force be sometimes necessary for correcting of Errors: as Sallust teacheth where he saith; Nam Viquidem Regere patriam, aut Parentes, quamquam & posses & delicta corriger; Importunum tamen est.

Comparatione Deterrima fibi Gloriam quaesivisse.

That to Elect a wicked successour, thereby to get glory to himself: is a beastly course.

The seven and thirtieth Discourse.

By that which Tacitus and Dio relate, many conceive, that Augustus made choice of Tiberius, whom he knew to be a proud and cruell man, to be his successour; to the end, that the ill conditions of Tiberius so much differing from his owne, might turne to his
The seven and thirtieth Discourse.

Glory: I cannot indeed deny; but that a worse successfour, is apt enough to make a lesse evill Predecessour be thought a good one: which Galba well knowing, speaking of Piso said; Nero a peffimo quoque desiderabitur Mibi ac tibi providendum est; ne etiam a bonis desideretur. He seeing, that if a wicked Prince, should come after Nero; his errors would be converted, to the others Glory; and this is so true, that the holy Spirit, in the mouth of Ezekiel said, that the wickednesse of the Hebrews, before the coming of our favour; made the people of Sodome and Samaria to seeme Just, which could not certainly happen, but long of the Comparision, Vivo ego dicit Dominus Deus, (these are the words of Ezekiel) quia non fecit Sodoma soror tua, ipsa, & filia ejus, fecit pecatum tuum, & filia tua, and a little after; Et Samaria Dimidium peccatorum tuorum non peccavit, sed viciisti eos, sceleribus tuis. & Injustificasti sorores tuos in omnibus abominationibus tuis, quas operata es; Ergo tu cum fundore, & porta confessioem tuae, quae viciisti sorores tuos, as peccavis tuas sceleratis agens ab eis. Injustificata eum siste. And he that would see a passaage more like to that of Tacitus; let him read those words in Jeremy, where he faith: Injustificavit animam suam aversatrici Israel, comparatione praecaviatrici Inde.

But yet this way of acquiring Glory, attributed here to Augustus, is not to be imitated, not only of Christians, but not so much as of impious Barbarians: seeing there are better and directer wayes, (I meane not, to governe well, but speake onely of a successfour) because, if they have children to succeed them in the Kingdome, there will Glory enough accrew to the father, if he give them good education; whereby they may come to prove good: This Salomon affirmes in his Proverbs where he faith, Filius sapiens latificat patrem, or as others read it, Filius sapiens Gloria patris, that is, a wife sonne is the honour and Glory of his Father,
and keeps him alive, after he is dead: and therefore it is said in Ecclesiasticks, Mortuus est pater ejus, & quae non est mortuus similis eum reliquit sibi post se, and therefore Princes need not desire, their successors should be worse than themselves, seeing they may hope for more glory by them, if they shall be better, and therefore David took great Joy to heare, that Salomon was like to be greater, then himselfe had ever beene: Sed Salomon sedet super Solium Regni, & Ingredi serviet ejus, benedixerunt Dominus regi Davide dicentes: Amplificet Deus Nomen Salomonis, super Nomen tuum, & magnificet Thronum ejus super thronum tuum: rather indeed, a wicked successor is a Prejudice to a good Prince. Therefore writers say, that Marcus Aurelius had dyed a happy man, if he have not left Commodus, his successor, for this cause, many of the Antients (as Aristotle relates) were of opinion, that Children living, might make their dead fathers unhappy: in such sort, that he who living was happy, yet could not be called happy, if after his death, he had ill luck and were unfortunate in his children.

To give therefore his successors good education, is a matter of much honour to Princes, and in case they prove not to have those virtues which are required in a Prince; he must not suffer Paternall piety to prevail with him, but wholly abandon, and utterly disinherit them of the royall dignity; (though as Aristotle faith) it be hard for a father to doe.

This Plato expressed in his Common-wealth, who ordained, that they should be Princes, who in their Nativity had Gold mingled with Earth, meaning, that if their Sonnes had together with Earth, either Iron or braffe in them, they should not then be admitted to the Kingdom. Quo propter ipsi Principibns, & Primo & quasi Deus præcepit; ut nullius esse munera curarent custodianque sufficiant, quam naturam, ut dignoscant quid.
The seven and thirteenth Discourse.

ex quatuor bis potissimum illorum animis sit immixtum; & si quis ex ipsis nascatur anexus, ant servens, nullo pacto ussoneant. sed honorem illi natura convenientem, tribuentur, interopsis vel agricolas missant: and therefore Moses was contented, that our Lord God, should choose Josiah, of another Tribe, to be his successor, rather than his own Sonne. In consideration whereof, Saint Hierome faith, Moses amicus Dei, cui facie ad faciem Deum logitum est, potuit unque sucesseores Principatum filios suos facere, & Posterio propriam relinquere dignitatem: sed extraneus de alia Tribu eligens Iesum, ut sit remus Principatum in populos non sanguinis deferendum esse, sed virtute; and this is the true way for acquiring of Glory: so much more, as it is more repugnant to Natural affection.

And if it happen that in default of children, he be to choose a stranger for his successor, what better can he do, to get himselfe glory, then to choose a person of prudence and vertue, in whom, his Judgement in chooing may appeare? and if the Prince living be good; it will encrease his glory, that he hath chosen another that is good: if bad, it will lessen his own ill name, to have chosen a good successor. So it happened to Adrianus, (as Julius Capitolinus and Spartianus relate;) because Antoninus Pius succeeding him by way of Election, and knowing that the Senat meant to burne all the Acts of Adrianus, as to whom they were deadly enemies, for the many slaughters he had committed of the Nobility, he out of his goodness, pacified the Senat: placed Adrianus amongst the Gods, and erected a Temple to his Name. Igitur nec ipse (said he) Princeps vester ero, si omnia akses in quibus est Adoptione mea, rescinditis. This Glory Galba fought after, when adopting Pisc, he said, Vis nec mea Senethus conferre plus Populo Romanum poffit; quam bonum Successorum.

Thus
Thus a Father receives honour, by a good Sonne, and Predecessours, by good successeours; whereupon, that great Oratour, who spake in praise of Philip King of Macedon, could not find any greater praise, then that of his Sonne: Hoc tibi unum sufficiat, te filium habuiisse Alexanderum.

Tacitus therefore is not to be blamed, as he, that alledged not his owne opinion; but relates it onely as the opinion of others: for as for himselfe, he shewes rather, he thought Augustus worthy to be blamed for it; and he had reason, because, though a Prince by chusing a wicked succesour, make his owne actions to seeme good; yet this is so farre from making him praiseworthy, that it brings him more dishonour, as being a concurrent cause, of all the Evill his succesour doth.

Let not men therefore blame Tacitus, at all adventure, but consider, that all that which Tacitus saith, it is not Tacitus that saith it, neither the things he relates, are they all to be imitated, no more then all those things which Moses relates, who relates a thousand villanies of the Hebrewes: seeing it is the part of Historians, to speake of all things, whether good or bad: the good, to the end we may follow them; the bad, to the end we may avoid them; and this saith Tacitus in the third of his Annalls, is the end of an Historian: Exequi sententiae, baud instinxi, nisi in signes per bonestum, aut notabili dedecore, quod praecipuum munus An- nualium rear, Nce virtutes sileantur, utque gravis Diissis Fa- tisque ex poscessitate, & Infamia metus fit.

Tiberioque
That a Prince should be both loved and feared.

The eight and thirtieth Discourse.

Tiberioque etiam in rebus quas non oc-
culeret, feu Natura, sive adfuetudine, tussenda sem-
per & obscura verba, and a little after: At Patres
quibus unus metus si intelligere viderentur, in
questus, lacrymas vota, effundi:

That a Prince should be both loved and feared.

The eight and thirtieth Discourse.

From the obscure speaking which Tiberius used, the senatours conceived no little feare, and wished, the Prince would speake in such a manner, that he might be understood.

I cannot in truth blame Princes, for speaking obscurely: seeing vulgar and too open speech abateth them, and make them vilified: the rather because I see our Lord Christ, (as Saint Matthew, and Saint Marke relate) solitus erat loqui in parabolis; and Salomon, for the most part, used to speake Riddles; whereupon, it may justly be said of Princes, who lay themselves open to all mens view, that which Salomon faith, in the Canticles: Oculi tui Columbarum, absque eo quod intrinsecus latet, that is, the eyes being beautifull of themselves, appeare more beautifull, when they are shaddowed & covered with some Feathers; and so the Discourses of Princes, will be so much the fairer, as they are in some part, covered with a little obscurity; and therefore Salomon in his Proverbs,commends much this kind of speaking, where he faith; Mala aurea in leæis Argenteis, qui loquitur verbum in tempore suo.

But because the obscure speaking of Tiberius was not to this end, butonely ut introspiceret Procerum mentes: it neither ought, nor can be praised; being in truth, the
The eight and thirtieth Discourse.

fashion of a Tyrant, and thorough which, those Principall Senatours remained full of feare, who were governed before by Augustus with so much love; upon occasion wherein, we will make this discourse, what carriage a Prince should use, to make himselfe, to bee both loved and feared.

It hath beene debated in times past, whether a Prince ought to be loved or feared of his Subjects, or whether loved and feared both at once, yet no writer hath beene found so void of Judgement, as not to know, that nothing is to a Prince more profitable, then to be loved and feared both together, but that they thinke it a very hard, and almost impossible thing they should meet together. So as many have liked, hee should rather make himselfe be loved, then be feared. I therefore will endeavour to make it appeare, that a Prince shall not doe well, to make himselfe onely to be loved. Secondly, that he shall not doe well, to make himselfe, onely to be feared; and lastly, that he ought at one and the same time, to make himselfe, be loved, and feared, both together: shewing, that not onely this is easie to be done, but impossible that a Prince should be good, if he couple not together these two Extremes.

Concerning the first, this is certaine, that if love come not accompanied with feare, the Prince in short time, will grow into contempt: which Moses understanding, who had not perhaps his equal in mildnesse, yet after, for the love hee bore the people, hee had prayed our Lord God, *Ave dele me de libro vita, ave paces populo huic* : when he came downe from the mount, hee caused many thousands of them to be cut in pieces, thereby shewing, that together with the love of the Prince, there should be severity, which begatte feare. Therefore Saint Austin faith, *Estor misericordes, pensante quantum Moses misericordia floruit* propter
The eighth and thirteenth Discourse.

propter populum, pro cujus salute petiit deleri do libro vitae; & quando iterum zelo restituidit, cum obtinusset Veniam, ait ad populum, Ponat vir gladium super femur sum, Ecce quod vitam omnium cum sua morte petist, paucorum vita cum gladio desfruxit. Intus igne amoris, & foris accensus Zelo Institutiae & severitatis; where it is plainly seen, that a Prince ought not onely to be loved, but to bee feared also: seeing love alone of it selfe, is cause of contempt; and therefore Job said: Si quando ridebam aedos, non credebat; & Lux nullus mei non cadebat in terra, that is, his Gravity was so great, that though he laughed, yet they stood with feare and reverence: where we must weigh those words; Lux nullus mei non cadebat in terra, which according to another sense, in the Hebrew, is rendered in Latin, Lucem Diltus mei non abieciebat; that is, they despised not my mirth.

So as, Fear is so necessary, that Domitian although terrible to the Senat, as governing with fear, yet after his death, he was wished for againe of all men, seeing with that fear, he kept his owne officers in awe; whereupon it happens sometimes, to bee worse for a Prince, with too much mildness, to make himselfe be loved, and therefore the Kingdom of France, under Charles the simple, and Charles the grosse, was (as an Authour writes) most miserable, on the contrary, at the end of Francis the first, it was a flourishing Kingdom, although they were milde; and he a sharpe and terrible King; afterward againe, in the time of Henry his sonne a most gentle Prince, the treasury was all wasted; Pertinax and Heliogabalus with their mildness, had brought the Empire almost to ruine, when afterward Severus Africanus, and Alexander Severus railed it up againe, with incomparable Severity. It is not therefore enough for a Prince to be loved, but hee must be feared also.

Concerning the second point, which is, that fear alone
alone is pernicious to a Prince; is easily proved: first, from that place in Genesis where Noe with his fionnes going out of the Arke, our Lord God said unto him, Tremor & Timor vestris sit super cuncta Animalia terrae: as though he would say, you must make your selves be feared of beasts, not of men. And therefore Moses comming downe from the Mount, with a hony spangledour, and finding that it made his face strike the people into feare, he covered it with a vaile; whereby he showed plainely, that a Prince ought not to make him selfe onely to be feared. This also our Lord Christ shewes, who amongst the first precepts he gave his Apostles, gave this for one, that they should carry no Rod with them; where S. Ambrose well observes, that a Prince ought to governe more with love then feare. And in another place he saith, David Rex, cum omnibus equitabat summam militiam; fortis in praelio, mansuetus in Imperio; Ideo non ceci, liu, quia carus fuist omnibus, & diligas a subiectis quam timori maluit. Timor enim temporalis tuta minus servat excubias, nescit diuturnitias custodiam. And therefore it is said in the Psalm, Memento Domine David, & omnis mansuetudinis ejus. Whereupon S. Bernard upon those words of the Canticles, Dilectus meus mihi, & ego illi qui pastatur inter Lilia, amongst those Lillies where the Spoufe feedeth, reckons gentlenesse and love, by which he reigned. Specie tua ( faith the Prophet) pulchritudine tua, intende proferre, procede & Regna.

Therefore love alone is not good, because it caueth contempt; and feare alone is not good, because it begetth hatred. This the Ancients meant to signifie, by the Fable of Jupiter, who at the Frogs desire to have a King, gave them a Blocke, and benot stirring, the Frogs despised him; whereupon Jupiter changed their King, and gave them a Storke; but he eating them up, they hated him more then they despised the other:
by this they meant to shew, that a King should not be so gentle, to have more of the blocke then of the man; nor yet so severe, as to resemble a beast, in suckling the blood of his Citizens. A Prince therefore ought to joyn the one with the other; which how easie and necessary it is, may easily be knowne, if we distingiuith feare into two kinds: one, a feare which is but a reverence, as a filiall feare is, whereof, the holy Text in Job saith, 

\[ \text{Virtuous times Denon.} \]

The other, a feare which is a terrour; and this is that feare which Adam had, when he heard the voyce of our Lord God, Adam ubi es? and he answering said, \[ \text{Vocem tuam Domine audivi, & absendime & timui, quia modus effen.} \]

Secondly, we must distingiuish of men; that some are perfect, and some unperfect; which is common also to all Cities, whether great or small.

I say then, that if the men be imperfect, it is fit to make them feare; not the filiall, but the servile feare: and therefore Esai faith, \[ \text{Sola vexatio tantum dabit intellectum audire: & absentem suorem Hierusalem.} \]

And Salomon in his Proverbs faith, \[ \text{In labiis sapientis inventur sapientia, & virga in Dorso ejus, qui indiget corde: by the Rod is meant feare; and by Ejus qui indiget corde, are meant the wicked; who are said to be without heart; as Osee the Prophet faith, Facies est Ephraim, quasi Columbia seducta, non habens cor.} \]

With these men therefore, it is fit to use a Rod of Iron to make them feare, being the onely meanes to returne the heart into its place. The Nini-vites had removed their hearts out of their proper places: and our Lord God, with his Rod, \[ \text{Ad quadraginta dierum & Nini-ve subvertit, brought them againe into their right places.} \]

Because (as Aristotle in his Physicks faith) Every thing that is made, proceeds from its like; but every thing that is borm, from its contrary. Quodlibet non fit, quodlibet; sed est suo contrario.
So to beget love, where it is not, we must not use Love; but its contrary, which is fear; and as in Generation the Contrary departs, when the thing is generated; so when Love is once generated, the fear departs whereupon Saint Bernard and Saint Anselm; Compare fear to the Needle, and love to the Thread, because the Needle brings in the thread, and having brought it in, departs away. A Prince therefore ought to make himself be feared, even with Servile fear, by the wicked.

It remains to shew, how a Prince ought to carry himself, towards men that are good and perfect, but having shewed before, that love alone begets contempt, and fear hatred, it is fit, he make himself be loved, and feared, both at one time; but not with that servile Fear, which for the most part is cause of Rebellions, as was seen at the time, when our Lord God appeared to the Israelites upon the Mount; which begetting in them a great fear, there followed a Rebellion; but with that fear, which is a virtue; For knowing of which fear, it is to be known, that fear may have two objects; the one is, some terrible mischief; the other is the Person, who hath power to doe the mischief; as Saint Thomas faith: and because our purpose is not in this place, to speake of the first object, but onely of the second; as speaking of a Prince; I say, that he may be considered, in as much, as he hath power to hurt, or in as much, as he hath will to hurt; if we consider him, in as much as he hath will to hurt, in this manner, he ought not to make himself be feared; but leave the subjects to fear him of themselves; So our Lord God would be feared, and not be feared; So Saint Paul to the Philippians faith, Cum tremore vestra, salutem operamini; See here; Saint Paul would have us to fear, not of God, that is, that God hath not a will we should be saved; for, Deus

C c
and omnes homines salvos fieri, but hee would have us to feare, least our actions be such, as to provoke our Lord God to anger. Therefore in the mouth of the Prophet Esay he faith, Feare not, Saint Paul faith, we must feare, Esay faith, wee must not feare, therefore Esay means, that we must not feare Gods will, and Saint Paul means, that we must feare our owne workes. So a Prince ought not to carry himselfe in such manner, that there be feare of his will, because his will should alwayes be for the good of his subjects; but that there be feare in the subjects, of their owne workes.

Againe, if we consider the Prince, the second way, that is, in as much as he hath power to hurt, in this sense, he ought so to carry himselfe, that his Person may be feared, because he that hath power to punish, must have (as Saint Thomas faith) such eminent authority, as can hardly be resisted, for if it may easily be resisted, it will be no cause of feare. And therefore oftentimes, though there be no feare of mischief from One eminent authority, yet the Reverence that is borne to eminency, is justly called Feare: So in Saint Luke, aceptit autem omnes timor, & magnificabant Deum. So also that place of Saint Paul is to be expounded, Reddite omnius Debita: cui Timorem, timorem; cui, vestigal, vestigal; and he that will be feared in this manner, must doe some great and wonderfull things; that men admiring them, may acknowledge his eminency above others; whereupon our Lord Christ, stoke a feare into the Jews, when they saw him doe such great miracles: Repletifant timore, dicens, quia vidimus Miraibilias: And the subjects, though good, need not be grieved to feare the Prince in this manner; this being a vertuous feare, which was in Christ also towards his father; as witnesseth Saint Thomas in the forefaid place, Amenæ, Bonaventure, Gabriel, and with them the whole Schoole of Divines. So as a Prince ought to make himselfe
himself universally to be loved, and generally to be feared: in confirmation whereof, S. Gregory faith, "Talis debet esse dispensatio Regiminis, ut his qui praebat, a se circa subditos mensura moderetur, quatenus orridens timiri debet, & iratus amari, ut eum nec nimia levititia, nec inmoderata severitas odio sit. And in another place, weighing those words of Job, Cum federe quasi Rex, circumstante exercitu, orum tamen mortem consoletur: S. Gregory exhorts a Prince to doe, as the Samaritan did, who pouted into his wound, that was hurt upon the way, Wine and Oyle, Ut per vinum mor- dendur vulnera, per oleum /aveantur: And the Psalmist faith, Virgatua; & baculus suus, ipsa me consolata sunt: The Rod serving to strike, and the staffe, to defend. This also was expressed in the Arke, in which, together with the Table of the Law, was put the Rod with the Manna; there being necessarily required for observing the Law, love and fear. In signe whereof, our Lord Christ in his transfiguration upon the Mount Tabor, appeared in the midst, between Elias, who to move men, wrought by fear, and Moses, who wrought all by love. And therefore in the Scripture, when the qualities of a Prince are spoken of, always with beauty to make him beloved, there is joined, Power, to make him be feared. Whereupon in Solomon's Epithalamium, after he had praised the Bridegome for his Beauty, Spes suis praebuit dominum; he praiseth him also for his strength; Actius, aregner gladio tuo super famum tuum Potentissime. So in Genesis in the Benediction of Juda, and in Deuteronomy, in the Benediction of Joseph: Quasi primogeniti Tauri, pulchri- tudo ejus; cornua Rhinocerontis cor- nua illius. And in the second of Kings, Saul & Jonathas susbiles & decori in vita sua, & Aquilis velociores, Leonibus fortiores. And of God himselfe, the Prophet faith, Deorem indicitus est, industrus est Dominus fortitudinem & precintit. And in
The eight and thirtieth Discourse.

The Proverbs, Fortitudo & decor indumentum ejus: and in
the 28. Psalme, Dilectus quemadmodum filius unicornium;
that is, though as beautifull, he is worthy to be loved,
yet as powerfull also he deserves to be feared.

A Prince then ought to make himselfe he feared of
wicked men, with a servile feare, and this he shall doe
if he dueely punish them for their faults; and he ought
also to make himselfe be feared of good men, with a
reverential feare: and this he shall doe, if he give
proofe of his valour, by doing great actions: (as I have
shewed before) which justly make a Prince be feared
with reverential feare. And because above all things,
he ought to procure the love of his subjects; we muft
know, that never was any Prince so good, whom some
of his subjects did not hate; nor ever any so bad, whom
some of his subjects did not love: as may be seen in
Tarquinius Superbus, whom some of the principal
youth of the City so much loved, that they made a
conspiracy in his behalfe. So Nero (as Galba witnesed)
had many that loved him; Nero a pessimo quoque desidera-
biteur. And this happens by reason of sympathy of con-
ditions; there being in all Cities, whether little or
great, some men that are warlike, and some peaceable;
some that are ignorant, and some learned; some that
are good, and some bad: whereupon seeing a Prince
must of necessity be either good or bad; war-like, or
peaceable; ignorant, or learned; it will follow, that
if he be learned, he shall be hated of the ignorant; if
he be war-like, of the peaceable; if good, of the bad.
And this is the work of contraries, whose nature being
to destroy one another, it is as impossible that one of
these should love the other, as it is impossible, that one
should love his owne destruction.

The second difficulty, which makes it hard for a
Prince to procure himselfe to be beloved, is justice;
which if it be not dueely administered, it makes a Prince
odious
odious to all good men; and if it be duely executed, 
either in civil or criminal causes, it will be an occa-
sion every yeere to get him the hate of many, and even 
of those that are good, there being few men that 
like of justice, when it goes not on their side. These 
many then, whose hatred the Prince is like every yeere 
to incure, being multiplied many yeeres; must needs 
at last make a mighty number; and from hence, (as I 
conceive) may be drawne an excellent reason how it 
happens in governments, that the first yeere for the 
most part Governours are well beloved; the second 
yeere, they are hated, and the third yeere detested: as 
every one looking into it, of himselfe may see.

Yet a Prince amidst all these difficulties, must not 
be discouraged: First, because he need not care much 
to be loved of any, but onely of the good: to which 
purpose Galba said, it needed not trouble them, to see 
Nero beloved of the wicked; but this was a matter 
that needed regard, to give no occasion, he should be 
wished for againe of the good: Nero a pessimo quoque 
defideretur: Mihi ac tibi providendum est, ne etiam a 
bonis desideretur. Secondly, the end of a Prince, is as 
of an Oratour, or of a Phyfitian, who being to intro-
duce a forme in another, and not having it in their 
power to doe it, yet they have discharged their office, 
if they have applied fit meanes to introduce it; no 
better a Phyfitian is he that heales, then he that heales 
ot; nor any better Oratour he that perswades, then 
he that perswades not; so long as they use the fittest 
meanes, he to heale, and this to perswade. So for our 
purpose, seeing love is in him that loveth, in such man-
er, as honour is in him that honoureth: a Prince 
shall have performed his charge, and done as much as 
he need to doe, as long as he hath used all fit meanes, 
to procure his subjects love, by doing good to all, by 
maintaining them in plenty, by shewing himselfe faire.
from cruelty, by defending them from their enemies: and finally, by making it appeare, that he loves them exceedingly; seeing this is a sure rule, He that will be loved, must love.

**Vnum esse Reipublicæ Corpus, atque nius animo Regendum.**

Whether an Aristocracy, or a Monarchy be the more profitable for a City.

**The nine and thirtieth Discourse.**

A Sinius Gallus having too sharply spoken to Tiberius, and finding his own etrouer, and the Princes indignation; meant with a flattering speech, to cover the one, and pacifie the other: and therefore shewed, that for an Empire to be well governed, it was necessary it should be governed by one alone. And because from this place of Tacitus many gather, that he held the government of a Monarchy to be better than that of optimates: I conceive it to be no digression from our purpose, that I shew first, according to my understanding, the truth of this question; and then declare, how this place of Tacitus must be understood. And herein, no man need to marvell, that I vary from the opinions, or to say better, from the approved opinions of many excellent men, as though I meant to vilifie them; but I desire they would take into consideration, the River of Rhenus, which although it seeme by his course, as though it meant to drown the legitimate sons of the Celti, yet indeed it exalts them; and gives a true testimony of their legitimate birth to all that see it. So it will be no small matter, if I with my weakness, can make the others worth appeare the greater.
To come then to the matter: It is commonly held, and all men almost are of opinion, that a Monarchy is the best. For proving whereof, there being two ways: one, Authority: the other, Reason. In each of these, there will not be wanting means sufficient to make it plain. In considering authority, the first that present themselves are the holy Fathers, S. Chrysostome, Justin, Athanasius, Cyprian, S. Hierome, and finally S. Thomas in many places. Secondly, come Philosophers, natural and moral: Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Plutarch, Herodotus, and finally amongst Poets, Homer.

If we come to reasons, there present themselves an infinite number: and first, if we consider profit, we shall find, (as S. Thomas saith) that a more profitable government cannot be found, than that of a Monarch; seeing the profit & welfare of that which is governed, that is, of Cities and Provinces, consists in nothing but in conserving of unity, which we call peace: at which, they who government must chiefly aim: and seeing there is no government so fit to preserve peace, as that of a King; we cannot choose but give it the name, to be the better, and the more profitable. Because peace consists in nothing but unity, which certainly is better had in one, who is by himself one, as a King is; than in those that are many, as Optimates are: as we see, a thing which is hot of itself, is a more efficient cause of heating, than that which is but hot by accident, the state of Optimates being never good, but in as much as they who govern it, approach by accident, all union, to be one.

But laying profit aside, and enquiring into consideration, which of them is most natural, who saith not, that a Monarchy is the most? seeing nature governs and moves all the parts of our bodies, by one only which is the heart: likewise the sensitive soul is governed by the rational: and Bees naturally are governed by one.
Then if we consider order, where is it more found, then in a Monarchy? where everyone is subject, but he only that rules the rest; there being no order between equals, but only between superior and inferior.

If then we consider duration and stability, this certainly is most found in the government of one alone, seeing Omne Regnum in se divisum desolabitur: and everyone knows, that division falls out more easily in an Optimacy, then in a Monarchy: as experience hath made it manifest in the Monarchy of Ninus, which continued without interruption, a thousand two hundred and ninety yeeres. If then we consider, which is furthest off from discords, we may take example in Rome, which was never without discords, but when it was under Kings.

But laying all these consideratins aside, it will be profe enough of this assertion, to consider the similitude, that is betweene the government of God, and that
that of a Monarch, because as he rules all the World, so a King rules all his subjects.

By these reasons it might be concluded, that a Monarchy, as being most profitable, most natural, most potent, most durable, most orderly, most free from discords, and finally most like to the government of God, should without comparison be better, than a State of Optimates. But seeing there are many difficulties in the question, I hope I shall have leave to examine the truth of it a little better. And where it may be discoursed of in two senses; the spiritual, and the temporal: In the spiritual, it cannot be denied, against Calvin and other heretics, but that a Monarchy is the best kind of government that can be given: and of this there needs be no disputing, being as clear as the Sunne, both by authority of Scripture, by determination of Councels, by consent of the Church, and finally by the common opinion of all the Fathers, such a Monarchy having been instituted by our Lord Christ himselfe.

But in the second case, which is, considering it in the temporal sense; I hold the Question may hold disputation, and be handled politically: where we shall not find, all the reasons that were in the former: because a King, as a King, may err a thousand times a day; but the Pope, as Pope, can never err, as being assisted by the Holy Ghost. Whereupon; as it is undoubted, that in the spiritual, there cannot a better government be then a Monarchy: so in the Temporal, every one may be left to take which side he likes best. The first question being betweene an Israelite, and an Egyptian, was consequently easilie determined by Moses; but the second betweene the Israelite, and the Israelite, was very hard to be determined. And therefore as S. Gregory Nyffen well observes, by killing the Egyptian, Moses ended that strife, but for
the strife between the two Israelites, he was never able to accord them. So the strife, which we had with Hereticke may easily be determined, by killing them with the holy Scripture, but with strifes that grow between our selves, are left to every one's free liking; and therefore very hardly can be ended.

He then that would hold an Aristocracy to be better then a Monarchy, might easily prove it by reason, and by authority. By reason, because (as S. Thomas faith excellently well) that government is the best, and the most profitable, that can best procure the unity of the Cittizens: whereupon we must necessarily confess, that an Optimacy is the best; for seeing that an unicall ruleth not but from an unicall; and that the unity of the Optimates is more unicall to that unity which is required in the people, then the unity of a Monarch is; therefore also it is more fit, and able to produce it: for, the unity of the Prince, is an unity of person, and of end: unity of person, as much as to say unity of number: as being one alone, unity of end, because all his cares are directed to one sole end, which is the good of his subjects; but the unity of the Optimates, is an unity of end, in plurality of persons, I say plurality, but not disunion; because the Optimates being many persons, cannot have unity of number, but agreeing in the end which is the good of the City, in this they are one. And the unity of subjects ought to be an unity of end, in plurality of persons: so as by this, it manifeftly appearing that the unity of the Optimates is more unicall with that of the people, then the unity of the King is; therefore consequently it must be granted, that it is more able to produce it. There being two things necessary to generation, (as Cajetan faith) first, the distinction of that which is generated, from that which generates: the second, that there be a similitude in nature, be-
tweene the one and the other, because, that which Generates intends to introduce a thing like to it selfe; and therefore (faith he) where there is more Identity and similitude in nature, betweene that which Generates and that which is generated, there the generation will be perfitter, and more easie, and from hence it comes that the Univocall generation is more excellent then the Equivocall, and therefore, seeing the Identity, betweene the unity of the Optimates, and that of the People, is more then the unity of the Prince, and that of the People; it followes, that the generation shall be more nobel, more perfit and more easie, and the more, seeing that unity of a King, which is unity of number, is rather contrary to the union we speake off, because as one in number is a denying of more parts; So unity in number, is an affirming of more parts, rather that one, which is of number, is the ruine of a City; as Aristotle prooves strongly against Plato, where he faith; Atqui constat, quod ea si procedat, ut una sit magis Civitas non erit. Est enim Civitas multitudo quaedam, secundum Naturam, quae daret sit una magis Dominus erit ex Civitate, & homo ex Domno. Vnam enim magis Dominum censemus esse quam Civitatem, & hominem unum quam Dominum; quare etiam si posset quaequam an hoc facere, tamen non esset faciendum, quia perinit Civitatem. So as, a City should not make it selfe one in number, but in discipline, as the said Aristotle faith, Oportet cum Civitas sit multitudo, per Disciplinam communem facere. And although, to shew that the unity of a King is better, then that of Optimates; It might be said, that the unity of number shewes Perfection; God being one by reason of Perfection: and many holding, that in every sort of Angells, there is one chief; as that which concerns their Perfection; yet I could easily answer with Saint Thomas: that one as it implies Negation, addes nothing to the
Perfection of being; and if we take one as excluding other things, and as in its formal sense, it signifies to be alone and solitary: This of itself expresseth no Perfection, but rather many times imperfection, because in God, the being alone by Essence, proceeds from Perfection; but if he should be one in Person, it should be an imperfection. So as one, if you take it for solitary; signifies not so much Perfection, as imperfection.

But if we come to consider the Naturalnes of this government; we cannot then have a better thing, to make it manifest, then the government of our body, which according to the doctrine of Plato, with the consent of Aristotle, is governed by nature Aristocratically, with three faculties, The Sensitive, the Animal, and the Vital; the sensitive consisting in the Braine, which is the Beginning of all the sinewes; the vital, in the heart, the beginning of all the Arteries; The Animal in the Liver, the Fountain of all the veins, whereupon every member containing Arteries, Nerves and veines, they consequently are governed by three, by the liver, by the heart, and by the braine; and therefore that Doctrine of the heart, which is brought in opposition, is false, which Aristotle in his works of Physick, hath many times confuted. And their Reason, to say a house is governed by one alone, is of no force: which rather is a reason that makes for us, seeing that, as nature, amongst things that are unequall, as those in a house are, hath ordained the Government of one alone, so betwixt those that are Equall, as it is in a City, there should be an Optimacy, which by Aristotle in the first of his Politicks, is plainly Intimated. Neither is it of any force to say, that Bees naturally are governed by one alone, or that the sensitive soule is governed by the Rational; or that a Flock is guided by one Shepheard, seeing the King of the Bees (as Pliny said)
The nine and thirtieth Discourse.

Pliny faith) is much greater then any of the other bees, & the rational faculty is so much more noble then the sensitive that hardly there can be assigned any proportion: & finally, the sheepeheard is so beyond comparison superiour to the flock, that it is most reasonable & indeed most natural; hee should command; and therefore when in a City, there is any one found, so much superiour to all the rest, as the King of the Bees is in greatnesse to the other Bees; or so much in Noblenesse, as the rational faculty is to the sensitive, or so much in ability, as the Sheepeheard is to the flock; then such a one in all reason should be King as Aristotle grants where he faith: "Quius sit tantum quantum Animus a corpore, & homo ab bestia, per hunc modum se habent: having said before, His imperium, illa vero parentes. And in another place he faith, if any one in a City, be found so much excelling all the rest, as Jupiter excells men, that man by right should be made King: Sed quis excellat virtute, quid de eo sit facendum? Non enim dicendum est, ut talis vir sit de civitate pellendus: sed quia gubernationi aliorum, talis vir erit subjiciendus; perinde chim est, ac si quae temporum Gubernare velint. This very thing God meant to shew, when he gave to man the rule over beasts, as Salomon interprets it, when asking wisdome, to the end God should give it him, he said: "Et sapientia tuæ consistit hominem ut Dominaretur; as though he would say, as thou hast shewed, in giving Regal Dominion to man, that hee who will governe others, should in wisdome be as much superiour to his subjects, as a man is to Beasts; so you are bound, having made me King over so many People, to give a like proportion of wisdome, as not able otherwise, to deserve to be a King.

With this supposition then we may grant, that the government of a monarch is the better; as whereof we have an example in the Pope: but this is to handle the question Secondum quid: for if we handle it simpliciter, we deny it. If we come to consider the Power, which is required for Augmentation, I then verily think there is
none so ignorant, but that he knowes, how much an Optimacy is fitter for augmenting, then a Monarchie, whereof we have Example in Athens, which, as it freed it selfe from the Tyranny of Pisistratus, It presently grew to be of incalculable greatnesse. And if you will not stand to this Example, then take Rome, which was no sooner freed from Kings, but that it came to so great greatnesse, that it could not be oppressed but by it selfe. And it availes not to say, that of the foure Empires, one onely was a Commonwealth, that is, that of the Romans, and that the other three were Monarchies, as that of the Assyrians, of the Persians and of the Gracians, because if this reason were of any force. It would prove, that a Tyranny is the best government of all, seeing it is then a Monarchie, when the Subjects are used, as Children, and not as the Persians and Medes did, and at this day, the Turk, who useth his Subjects as servants, or to say better, as slaves.

In comming to consider duration: I care not to prove, that Optimacy continues longer, then Monarchie, seeing this would not serve to prove my intent that therefore it is better, for duration as Aristotle faith, increaseth not goodness, and therefore one white thing, that continues longer then another, is not thereby whiter then the other; but rather the best things of this world, as they are hard to find, so being found, they are soonest lost, as Galen faith of bodies, that are come to the height of health; and Tacitus, the like of states; whereupon it is no marvell, that the Monarchie of the Assyrians continued longer, then any Commonwealth ever did, which happened, because Tyranny held a proportion with that People, seeing People that are imperfect, are necessarily to be governed by a Monarch, and not by Optimates. And therefore our Lord God, always governed the Israelites by one alone, because that rude people was not able
able to suffer Liberty, as liking better to live under a Tyrant, as they made appear, when they demanded a King of Samuel; for though he threatened them, they should have a Tyrant, yet this made them not give over their demand. So when the Senat of Rome granted liberty, to Pafianonia and Cappadocia; the Cappadocians saying they could not live without a King, the Senat was fain to send them Ariobarzannus, to be their King; whereas Livy faith, Barbari quibus pro legibus super Dominorum Imperia fuerunt, quo gaudent, Reges bægent; and Aristotle speaking of this shewes, that they were by Nature made to serve; Obiidentin (faith he) quia magis apta sunt Natura ad servirem quam Graecorum, & corum qui in colonit Asiam, quorum qui Europam, per ferunt servile fugam a quo animo, ut hoc Tyranica sunt hujusmodi Regina. And therefore from hence, there can no argument be drawne, that Monarchie, is a better government then Optimacy, seeing (as Aristotle faith) although one Forme of Common-wealth be in it selfe better; yet for some people, another that is not good, may be more profitable. There might also be brought another Reason, why Tyrannies are of longer Continuance, then Aristocracies a Reason, which hath beene intimated; by a certaine Author; and it is because they are more hard to be surprized, because where all are servants, there can be none to lend a hand, to let in strangers, as hath beene often done in France, in England, and other places: which will alwayes happen, and hath often happened to Monarchies, because such Princes hold their Subjects rather as Companions, then as slaves; and therefore in this point, the Turkz stand more secure 131 and if Alexander Magnus overcame Darius, it was his owne Act. It is indeed true, that as Monarchies are more hardly taken then Common-wealths; so more easily they are held, where Common-wealths are easily taken (all the Subject-Cities being male content, & consequently ready to
afflict strangers; but being taken, they are hard to be held by reason of the name of Liberty, which makes them apt every minute to fall into rebellion. Tyranny then is the most durable of all kinds of states; and if the reason above alleged were of force it would prove it also to be the best, which no man that hath brains will say. But let us come to consider the order of Optimates; which is the same, that is in an Instrument of Music, order so much commanded by all the Holy Fathers, and by all Philosophers; where many Diverse sounds make but one sound, of which order, Saint Chrisfrome in admiration saith Eet est videre mirabilemm rerninnulliss nonna, & in uno multa. And then, if they will consider, the unaptness of it hath to Discord, let him take the City of Venice for an example, which for many ages together, hath never had any. And it availeth not to say, that where many are, they may be at odds between themselves, but one cannot be at odds with himself, for I answer with Aristotle, quod studiis visitant omnes at Ite unus. And the Example of Rome is of no force, because when the Discord entered between the Nobility and the People, it was not then an Optimacy but a mixt Estate: and by reason of the predominating Element, might be called a Popular state; and if ever it were an Optimacy, it was in the beginning, in which they lived in exceeding great concord, until the State came to be corrupted, and here we must advise, that when we compare a Monarchical with an Optimacy, we compare them in their perfection, and not in their corruption; because it is of the Essence of an Optimacy, that all in it should be good men, or else we should dispute equivocally. But to let many other things pass, who knowes not that a City will be better governed by Optimates, then by a Monarch? seeing the most virtuous Govern the best, and a King being but one virtuous, and the Optimates many virtuous, seeing many know more than
you must, of all grant, that they are able to govern better, then any King whatsoever; and the rather, because a King deserves then most praise, when he is governed himselfe by good counsellours, and consequently in as much as he is ruled by many; in the manner of Optimates. So our Lord God appointed Moses, that he should rule by the counsell of Jethro. And this methinks might serve to make men capable; that an Optimacie is better, then a Monarchie, yet there is a further Reason: For not onely an Optimacy may Govern better, as being more vertuous, but as being more then a King, who not being able himselfe alone, to govern all the state, Solus illud non potest sustiner: he must of necessity commit it to officers; and who knowes not, with how much more love and Justice the people are governed, by the Lords themselves being vertuous: then under a King by officers that are strangers; they governing their owne, and these another man's; and therefore Aristotle speaking against Plato saith: that Propriety, a thing being ones owne, is a speciall cause of love, and makes the greater care be taken of it, Nam de propriis maxime Curant homines; and if men (as he shewes) use little diligence; in things that are common, they will use much lesse in things that are neither common nor proper: as we see it daily, (though it be but a homely instance) that a husband-man will tull land better, that is his owne possession, then that which he is hired to till; as in that, regarding his owne particular profit; in this, the Common; in the one, the present only; in the other, the present and the future both. And if it be answered, that a King may have good officers, May, that when we grant the government of a King, to be good, wee mean, that he be good himselfe; but it followes not, that
that a good King must necessarily have good Officers, seeing it is not a thing essential to him: and though we should grant it to be essential, yet it is not constituent, but only consequent; though I rather think it is neither one nor other; but for the present, let it be as it will: This is most certain, that in Optimacy, for all to be good, is both essential and constituent; for otherwise (as I have said) we shall but labour in equivocals.

Also secrecy gives an Optimacy right to be preferred before a Monarchy: for proof whereof, the example of onely the Venetians may suffice, who (as Guicciardini relates) have alwaiies kept their counsels secret: a thing which Princes cannot doe; who being to consult with persons, not interrested in the affairs that are handled, can never be sure, but that they may reveale them. And though none of these reasons were sufficient to winne perswasion to this opinion, yet this certainly must needs be sufficient, to shew, how much the government of God, is more like to an Optimacy, then to a Monarchy: and this will be easily shewed, because our Lord God operates immediatione virtutis; and is, in all things, immediatione suppositi: to which kind of operating and being, the Optimates approach nearer, then the Monarch; who must of necessity make use of Officers, as not able being but one, to be himselfe in all places: whereby it often happens, that a State is more governed by the Officers vertue, then by the vertue of the Prince. But the Optimates being many, may all together doe that of themselves, which a Prince doth together with officers, and may governe the State by their owne vertue, and consequantly operate immediatione virtutis: yet I meane it, in the manner, that a second cause can operate: knowing well, not onely in Theologicall vertity, but also in Philosophicall doctrine, that all vertue proceeds from Heaven.
Then nine and thirtieth Discourse.

Heaven: as Aristotle in his Meteors teacheth us, where he faith, *Oportet hunc mundum inferiorum, superioribus lationibus esse contiguum*: and therefore in a certaine manner, the government of Optimates is more like to that of God. And it availeth not to say, that our Lord God is but one alone, that governs the whole world; because in him is one Essence, indeed one Will, one Soul, one Intelleget onely; but then in three Persons really distinct, in three Supposita, in three Hypostases, in three Substances; (as substance is distinct from Accidents, which are *in aliis tanganum in subjuncto.*) And finally in three Substances, as Substance signifies *Essentiam per se subsistentem*: which three Persons, do in such sort governe the universe, that although the works of Creation be attributed to the Father, the works of Wisdom to the Sonne, the works of Love and Grace to the Holy Ghost; yet all the three concurre equally in all works ad extra, which are common to them all. The Universall therefore is governed by three Persons with one will alone: and the Divine Unity, is an unity of end in plurality of Persons, such as we have shewed the unity of Optimates to be. And this is that unity, which our Lord Christ, desires should be in us, as being like his owne, as he theweth in S. John, where he faith, *Pater Sancte serva eos in nomine tuo* (speaking to his Father) *quos dedisti mihi quod sint semper semini & nos.* And a little after, *Non pro eis rogo tibi, sed pro eis qui crediderunt per verba eorum, in me ut anam semnum sint, semina Patris in me, & ego in te.* So this is a cleere Text, and by every one interpreted to be meant of that unity, which ought to be in all the faithfull, which our Lord God would have to be like the unity of the Divine Persons: and as in them there is a real distinction of persons in unity of Essence; so in the many faithfull, there ought to be one Spirit, one love, one will. They then that have plurality of persons in
in one will, are in that manner one, as the Father, the Sonne and the Holy Ghost are, as in the Gospel our Lord Christ expounds it.

And now who is he, that by the force of so many reasons, will not confess, that an Optimacy, as being more profitable, more Noble, more potent, more natural, more secret, more concordant: and finally more like to the government of God, is farre a better kind of state then Monarchy.

As for authorities, I commonly make no great reckoning, but only of those which I am bound to believe, by commandement of the holy Church; other authorities must convince by reason: and this leave S. Anfins gives me, where he faith; Nèque quorum libet disputationes quamvis Catholicorum & laudatorum hominum velut Scripturas Canonicas habere debemus; ut nobis non licet, salva Honoriscentia, quæ illis debeatur hominibus, aliquid in eorum scriptis improbare; atque respuere, si forte innumerimus quod aliter sentient, quam veritas habet, divino, adjutorio; ut ab aliis intellecta vel in nobis. Talis ego sum in scriptis aliorum, quales volo esse intellectores meorum. And in another place he faith; Sacra Scriptura est adhibenda fides, alios autem Scriptores licet nobis impugnare. But because it becomes not my youth and weakness, to stand in defiance with so many excellent and worthy men: I will endeavouer to make it appeare, that some of the Authours cited before for the contrary, spake not in our fencce: and that some of them speake of our side: some of them irresolutely, and some again, with passion.

Beginning then with the holy Fathers, I say, they spake in another fence, meaning it of the spirituall Monarchy: and though many times they speake generally, which may reach as well to a temporall Monarchy, yet this they did to the end, that Heretickes seeing it granted them, in the government of Cities, an Optimacy
Optimany to be better than a Monarchy, should not from hence take occasion to affirm the like of the spiritual Monarchy. And this is a course, that hath been much used by the holy Fathers, who sometimes have not yielded to things most clear and evident, only because they would not give heretics occasion, by ill interpreting them, to make simple people encline to their opinions. It is a matter clear and evident, and granted by all Divines, that in God there are three Hypostases, and yet many of the holy Fathers, and particularly S. Hierom, have not been willing to grant it; for no other reason, but least Catholicks granting three Hypostases, heretics should thereupon make simple people believe, that in God there were three Essences; and this interpretation is made of it, by all the Doctors upon S. Thomas.

Leaving then the opinion of these Fathers, who speak in another sense, let us come to Philosophers; where I cannot but account my assertion safe; having Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoras of my side. And it availes not to say, that Aristotle in his Ethicks understands it one way; and in his Metaphysicks another: seeing Aristotle when he speaks of the same things in divers Books, speaks of them diversely; and Arts and Sciences consider oftentimes the same things, and yet not in the same manner. A Philosopher and a Physician, both of them consider the same body; but a Physician considers it as it is capable of healing, and a Philosopher as it is capable of motion. So as I never make reckoning of the authority of Aristotle; but in places, where he handles Ex profejo; because many times, he discourses both ways morally in his Ethicks: and in another manner diversely in his Politicks; so in his Rhetoricks, he speaks of felicity in one manner, and in his Ethicks in another. In his Physicks he discourses both ways as a Philosopher one way, another way in his Problems.
Then we write the Diſcours. The authority thea of Ariftote in matters Politicall, must be taken from his Politicks; where I am much deceived: but he is of my opinion: though all men cite him for the contrary; I know not how he could possibly speake more plainly, then where in his Politicks he faith, Sī ergo plurimum Gubernatio honorum antem virorum opinie Optimation dicitur, minus antem Regnum, optabilius esset civitatis ab optimis Gubernari, quam a Rege. And in a thousand other places, whereof some are cited here and there in my Diſcours; and other, every one may looke out of himselfe, being all so cleare that they have no need of my interpreting them. It is true indeed, that once he was tranipoted to say, that the Regall government is the best of all; because a Tyranny is the worst: but he spake then in Idea, meaning if there could be found one as much superiour to others, as God is to men: and therefore in another place, where he leaves his Idea, and comes to Faci, he faith, that all Kings are tyrants; seeing there cannot any one be found, so much superiour to others in goodness, as that he should be worthy to command alone. Non sunt nunc amplus Regna (faith Ariftole) sed si quis fuerant, Monarchiae, & Tvrannides magis fuerant; Ob id quia Regnum spontanea Gubernatio est, ac Majorum propriis & plurimis pares fuerat, neque uique adae praeelenter, ut ad magnitudinem, dignitatemque hisus gradus se posseint attolere. And then that reaſon, which Ariftole brings, Corruptia bona pesima, is false; and is not to be understood as men commonly take it. To prove it to be false, is easie: seeing not onely Plato, but Ariftole himselfe faith, that the government of Optimates, is better then the popular: yet in the second of his Politicks he faith, that the worst formes of government, are a Tyranny, and a Democracy; so as if that reaſon were true, the corruption of Optimates should be worse then that of the people. Besides I should alwaies hold, that the cor-

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The nine and thirtieth Discourse.

ruption of an Optimacy is worse then that of a Monarchy; seeing an evil is so much worse as it is multiplied; specially, being impossible that those few should ever be in concord. And in truth, this reason may be strongly fortified by example; seeing in the government of Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus, and in that of Lepidus, Anthony, and Augustus, both of them comprised under the worst for the of a few, assigned by Aristotle; the Commonwealth of Rome, was more torn and wasted then under Nero, or any other Tyrant whatsoever. Then again, the proposition is not so to be understood, but thus, that an evil will appear so much worse, as a man hath been accustomed to a greater good, as it would be a greater evil, to a Prince who hath always lived deliciously, to be cast into prison, or into servitude, then to a Husbandman that hath been used to digging and hardnèse; because in the Prince is corrupted a greater good: but in Commoner, the same evil is all one, to a Husbandman, and to a Prince. Thus much by way of digression.

To return to our purpose. As concerning Plato, although he be alleged for the contrary, yet seeing he is but wavering, and speaks diversly; sometimes, as in his Dialogues of a Common-wealth, that an Optimacy is the best; and sometimes as in his Dialogues of a Kingdom, that a Monarchy is the best: and oftentimes, that a government mix't of People and Tyrant is the best: we shall doe well to waive his words, and have recourse to that he shewed in deeds, as better expressing mens minds then words. And Plato being asked of Dio, how a Common-wealth might best be governed, he found fault with Monarchy, and counsell'd him to bring in Optimacy: by which it appears, that this indeed, was his very opinion. Now for Pythagoras, we say, The Pythagorans endeavoured all they could, to bring into Italy the government of Optimates: and
Them and the thirtieth Discourse.

If it succeeded not, yet that happened not for want of judgement, but of forces. Then for Plutarch, if he understood it otherwise, we may say he had reason, as being the Schoolmaster to an Emperor; and therefore should have shewed himself very simple, to blame a Monarchy. As for Homer, he no doubt is most fit to be brought in proof of that, which I myself in another Discourse have resolved; which is, that an Army indeed, should be governed by one alone, the Verse which is commonly allledged out of Homer, being spoken by Agamemnon to the Army. And lastly, Herodotus also had reason to conclude, that amongst the Persians; a Monarchy was a fitter government then an Aristocracy; because the Persians were a rude imperfect Nation, as we have shewed in another place.

But because the most of the Arguments, brought against my opinion, are taken out of a booke of S.Thomas, intituled, De Regimine Principis: I desire men would take notice, that I goe not about, to impugne the Doctrine of that Saint, of whom I have made choice for my Advocate with God, and for my Master in all Sciences: but the truth is, that booke is none of S. Thomas, as is easily proved, seeing in that booke many persons are spoken of, which lived not till long after S. Thomas his time, as in the 20. Chapter of the third Booke, De Regimine Principis, it is said, that Adolphus succeeded Ridelphus Count of Habsburg in the Empire, which hapned in the yeere 1292, full eighteen yeeres after S. Thomas was dead; and in many other places, which for brevity I omit. But let the booke be whole it will, there is nothing in it against my opinion; seeing he means onely, that a Monarchy is the better, where the people are imperfect: and this is no more, then what I have said myself. As in his fourth book, and eighteenth Chapter he faith, Quedam autem Provincie, sunt servilia natura, et tales Gubernari debent Principatu.
The nine and twentieth Discourse.

Principatu Despotico; Includiendo in Despotico etiam Regale: quia antem Virtibus animi, & andacia Cordis, & in Confidentia sua Intelligentia sunt; tales region possunt, nisi Principatu Politico; communi nomine extendendo ipsum ad Aristocraticum. This Text sufficiently shewes the Authors opinion; and it differs not from mine.

As for the authority of Tacitus, before allledged; it is easily answered, if we consider, that he speaks not those words as his own opinion: but by the mouth of Afinius Gallus, who having offended the Prince before, meant afterward by flattering words to pacifie him.

In the last place I advertifie, that I counseill not People to change their government, though it be not an Optimacy; but rather, I like that every Country should keepe the forme of government they have; Ferenda Regum Ingenia (faith Tacitus) neque usui Crebras mutationes; and in another place, Vteriora mirari, Præsentia sequi: bonos Imperatorem Vato expetere, qualescumque tolerare, because to alter the forme of government is a mischevious thing: not onely when it is good; but even when it is bad; whereupon it is better to endure a Tyrant, then to rise up against him: for if he should prevale, he would grow more cruel, as having beeene provoked; and if he should be put downe, there would grow a thousand differences about ordering the government: and oftentimes he, that was the forwardest to put downe the Tyrant, would be the readiest to be Lord in his place, and would then governe the more cruelly, for feare to be put downe, as his Predecessour was. And this is his Doctrine, that made the Booke De Regimine Principis. Let People therefore keepe that forme of government they have, and remember that notable Aphorisme of Hippocrates, Consuetu longo tempore, etiamsi deteriora, Insuetis minus molesta esse solent.

Lastly I advertifie, that governments would be proportioned to the Nature of the People; and therefore in some places a Monarchie may do well, where an Optimacy
Optimacy would not; whereupon, we see many Cities in Italie, as Perugia, Florence, Siena, Bolonia, & others, which never were in peace, till they came to be under a Prince.

Nec ideo Iram ejus lenivit pridem invisus, tanquam duxa in matrimonium Vipsania Marci Agrip- pae filia, qua quondam Tiberii uxor fuerat, plusquam Civilia agitaret.

That it is a great helpe for attaining a Kingdome, to have a wife of the blood Royall: and in what danger a Prince is, that hath none but daughters.

The Fortieth Discourse.

Having at this time, no conveniency to Discourse upon all the Bookes of Tacitus: I am forced to take all occasion, though never so small, to handle those things, which more properly would be treated of in another place; I shall therefore desire my reader, that if in these Discourses, I open many Sentences of Tacitus, which might fitter be opened somewhere else; it may be rather attributed, to defect of occasion, then to want of Judgement.

This Passage of Tacitus, in which Tiberius shewed himself doubtfull of Asinius Gallus, that Plusquam Civilia agitaret, as having taken one to wife, that had beene his wife before; gives me occasion, first to shew there is great reason to suspect such, as get them wives of the blood Royall; as being a speciall helpe for attaining the Empire, and having attained it, to maintaine it. Secondly, to shew the danger a Prince is in, that hath none but Daughters; and lastly to shew the course he ought to hold, that would secure himselfe in these cases. Saul had reason to doubt David, having taken his daughter Micholl to wife; and knowing this important point of state; he sought by a thousand impertinencies to free himselfe, but being forced at last to give her to him, the Scripture
The fortieth Discourse.

Scripture relates, that he then began to fear David exceedingly, whereupon it is said, Dediteque ei Saul Micholl filiam suam, and it follows, Michol antem diligebat eum; & Saul capit timere David. The most wise Solomon who also knew this danger, when Bersabee unadvisedly asked Abias the Shunamite for Adoniah; answered, Quare postulas Abias Shunamite Adonie? Postula ei & Regnum; and as he denied to Adoniah his wife, So Tiberius denied to Agrippina her husband, whereof Tacitus speaking, faith; Cesar non ignorans quantum ex Republica peteretur, ne tamen offensionis aut metus manifestus foret, sine reponso, quanquam instantem relinquit. Likewise the same Tiberius knew, that when Seianus demanded Livia; who had been the wife of Drusus, it was as much as to demand the Kingdome, and therefore denied her to him, saying Falleres enimi Seianae te manjuram in codem Ordine putas, & Liviam quae Caius Cesari, mox Drusus mupta fuerat, ea mente aucturam ut cum eique Romano sine scit. It is no marvell also, if vitellius shewed to be afraid of Dolobella, as being in the same case Tiberius was with Asenius Gallus, having taken her to wife, who had been his wife before; Vitellius metu & odio (faith Tacitus) quod Petroniam uxorem ejus mox Dolobella in matrimonium accipiasset, vocatum per epistolam, Vitellius Flaminio vix celebrasse, divertere Interamnam, atque ibi interfici inscit. And therefore Phalci shewed great judg- ment, who when Micholl married before to David, was given him by Saul, yet he never touched her, but (as Rabbi Salomon faith) laid a sword betweene Micholl and himselfe, when he was in bed with her, to keepe him from touching her: and indeed it was well he did so, seeing no sooner was Saul dead, but that David, not thinking himselfe King, if his wife were married to another, said to Abner, Non videbis facienc meam ante quam adduxeris Micholl filiam Saul: This therefore is a special help, for attaining a kingdome; & our Lord God, although he be able of himselfe, to accomplish whatsoever he pleaseth, yet as willing to make
Tufe of second caufes; he caufed David, to the end he might more eafily attaine the Crowne, to which hee was deigned Ab{terno; and to which Samuel had anointed him, to take to wife a daughter of Sauls. And Salomon who was all wisedome and prudence, shews it us himfelfe and finally the moft subtile Scianus, having an intent to get the Empire, knew this way to be if not nece{ary, at least moft profitable.

Thus my intention is proved by Examples, but becaufe there is more force in Reafons to move the under{tanding; and therefore Philofophers never {peak, but they bring their rea{fon; I have therefore {ought out one, which I have found, me thinkes, in Arifotole, in his Books of generation; where {peaking how Elements are tran{mutated, he {faith: In Elementis habentibus Symbo{lum qualitatem, faciiler est transfus. As the Earth which is cold and dry, is more converted into water, which is cold and moif; then into aire, which is hot and moif; as agreeing with that in one quality, of cold; and disagreeing with this in both: So in our cafe, the attaining to a Kingdom, being in a private perfon, a tran{mutation more difficult then that of the Elements, it will more eafily be attained, where there is one symbolizing quality, then where there is none.

He therefore is more likely to attaine the Empire, who being himfelfe a privat man, {hall have a wife of the blood Royall; then he, that both himfelfe and his wife are of private eftates.

A Second Rea{fon (omitting Philofophicall, to come to a Politicall) is, that people bearing affection to their Prince, more eafily {uffer themfelves to be go{verned, as long at there remains in the Kingdom any spark of his blood. Darins a man of exceed{ing great Judgement, com{ming from a privat man to be a Prince; for confirming him in the Empire, tooke to wife a daughter of Cyrus; as knowing, of how great im{por{tance it was, to have a wife of that blood, which had been
The fortieth Discourse.

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beene King before; whereof Justin faith; Principioigitur Regni Cyri Regis filiam Regalisius mætis Regnum firmaturis in matrimonium acceptit; ut non tam in extraneum translatum, quam in familias Cyri reversum videtur. The like consideration had the sones of Tigranes; and if with them, it had not good success, this happened upon other occasion; and therefore good cause had Tacitus to marvell, where he faith; Nec Tigrani diuturnum Imperium neque liberis ejus, quamnam sociatis more externo in matrimonium Regnumque. This brought Demetris to be King of Macedon; that he had Fila to wife, who was daughter to the old King Antipator.

From this passage now spoken off, with good consequence comes in, the second: that a Prince is in great danger, who hath none but daughters: seeing if he marry them, hee can never be secure, that his sonne in law will not take the Kingdome from him: for the facility, we have shewed to be by this occasion.

To meet with this danger, many have taken divers courses: the first hath beene to marry them to meane men; and such, as may have no thought of comming to the Empire, before the time; because such a one seems rather likely to be assistant to the Prince, in his affaires; seeing he may justly hope for more faithfullnesse from a Sonne in law, then from strangers; and need not make doubt of a person, that is not of any Noble Lynage. This conceit was in Augustus; and Tacitus expresseth it in the Person of Tiberius; At enim Augustus filiam suam Exquiti Romano meditatus est. Mirum hercule, sic cum in annis Curas distraberetur; Immensumque attollis providet, quem Conjunctione tali super alius extulisset; Caium Proculeiun, & quosdam in servorumbus babuis; insigni tranquilitate vita, nullis Reipublice negotiis permixtos.

This indeed would be no ill course, so long as those persons of meane condition, be not of a spirit to aspire to the Empire, such as those named by Tiberius were in whom, those words of Tacitus are to be considered: Tran-
quillitate vītē: as though he would say, a man free from audacious & haughty thoughts; and such may safely and without danger be advanced to honour. Whereupon Aristotle in his Politicks, meaning to teach, what kind of men may safely be raised & made great, he faith, *Quod si quē extollere oporteat, non tam eun qui sit moribus audax; nam huīnīnō dī homines aptissīni sunt, ad invadendī circa res om- nes. And if Augustus gave her afterwards to Agrippa, Ignobilis loco, bonum Militia, & victoria socium; this happened because he could not choose but feare Agrippa; whereupon he was forced, either to put him to death; a thing most scandalous not onely in a Christian, but even in a Heathen: or at least to put him in some certaine hope of coming to the Empire. This, Dio in the mouth of Mæcenas teacheth us, who speaking of Agrippa faith, that when a Prince makes a servant too great, and advancehethim too highly, giving him excessive and unlimited authority, he hath then no way to secure himselfe, but either to kill him, or by some match to make him his kinsman.

Cyrus also followed this course, who married his sister to Sibares, a person of most base estate: & as he took the same course that Augustus did, so it was upon the same occasion that Augustus had, whereof Justin faith, Sybarem Ceptorum quem juxta nocturnum visum ergastulo liberaverat comitemque in omnibus rebus habuerat (all one with those words victoria socium) Persis preparavit, forremque suam ei in matrimonium dedit. And because Galba tooke not this course with Otho, which Cyrus tooke with Sibares, and Augustus with Agrippa; it lost him the Empire, as in the first booke of Tacitus Histories, is to be seene.

But yet in truth, this course seems to me both very dangerous, and very uncertaine, because although he to whom their daughter or other of their blood is married, be himselfe a man ignoble and of little spirit, yet he may have a sonne, that may resemble his grandfather more then his father. Also ages was of this opinion, and put it in practice, doubting the future husband of his daughter, and
The fortieth Discourse.

and no leffe, the nephew that should be born of them: Neque Clarvo viro (faith Justin) neque cedit iliam, ne parenta maternaque nobilitas Nepotis animum extolleret: sed de gente obscura tum temporis Persarum Cambysi mediocri viro in matrimonium tradidit. And see how vaine his conceit was; seeing of her was born Cyrus, who in few yeers took the Kingdome from his grandfather Assyages by force.

Again this course takes ill success oftentimes, through the haughtinesse of the women, who though married to men of meane spirits, and quiet dispositions, yet stirre them up, and provoke them to doe things which of themselves they would never doe, or at least, not doe so soon. Tullia the daughter of Servins was one of these, who impatient to wait upon succession, forced in a manner her husband Orontes Tarquinius, to enter upon the Kingdome, with the death of her father; thinking it but fit, that being borne of the Blood Royall, she should be able both to give and to take away the Kingdome at her pleasure, whereof the oftentimes complained, Ipsa Regio femine orta, nullum momentum in dando adimendaque Regno faceret. Thus Tarquinius by the instigation of this infernal fury, got possession of the Kingdome: and it made Servins no whit the safer, that he had married his daughter to Orontes Tarquinius, a man (as Livy reports) of a mild and peaceable disposition, Mitis ingenii Iwovenni.

To be briefe, the daughters of Kings, either cannot, or know not how to live in a private estate. And therefore Damarata the daughter of Hiero King of Syracusa; and married to Andromadorus, with such violence instigated her husband, that she forced him extremely against his will, to take possession of the Kingdome; which Livy shewing, where he alledged the reason, why Andromadorus was moved to feaze upon the Kingdome, Quis effus tandem uxor is vocibus, momentis nuncesse tempus occupandi Regnum.

A second way use by some, for freeing themselves of this danger, hath been to make such women to enter into
into Monasteries, or to speake after the custome of the Ancients, into Temples; and so remove them from their husbands and sonnes, of whom there might be feare: to the end, that they in such places observing chastity, the Princes might live secure from the one and the other. This course was followed by Amulius, who having driven out Numitor, and killed his sonne; he made his daughter who only remained, under colour of honour to become a vestall Virgin, thinking by this means to secure himselfe, both from her, and from any whom she should marry, and from any sonnes that should be born of her: whereof Livy faith, Fratris filiae Rhee Silvia per speciem honoris eum vestalem eam legisjet perpetua virginitate spatius adimit. But neither did this course do Amulius any good: for of her were borne Romulus and Remus, who deprived him of his Kingdome.

I finde therefore another way perhaps better: and it is to keepe these women at home with him, of whose husbands or sonnes there may be any doubt, bearing many Princes in hand, he meanes to marry her to them; but in the meane time, not to bestow her upon any: for by this means, not onely they shall be safe from any danger of their owne, but from any also that may arise by enemies, either foraine or at home: seeing out of this hope, every one will be ready to defend them; and where by marrying her, they might have one defendour indeed, but him with danger, now holding them all at a bay, they will have many defendours without danger. This course was notably put in practice by the Duke of Burgundy, who (as Argenton relates) having one onely daughter, he Promised her to the Duke of Guyenne, and to Nicholas Duke of Calabria, and to Philibert Duke of Savoy; and finally, to Maximilian Duke of Austeria: and (as Argenton verily thinks) never meant to marry her to any at all, as long as himselfe lived. And in truth, if this Duke had carried himselfe as wisely in other things as in this, he had never so foolishly overthrown himselfe, as he did. Quippe
The one and fortieth Discourse.

Quippe Augustus supremis sermonibus cum tractaret, quinam adipisci Principem locum suffecerunt abnuerent, aut impares vellen; vel iudem possent superarentque: M. Lepidum dixerat caparem, sed aspernante: Gallum Asinium avidum, at minorem: L. Aruntium non indignum, & si casus daretur, auffurum.

Whether it be better to refuse Dignities, or to seek after them.

Amongst the last secrets of State, with which Augustus before his death acquainted Tiberius, he propounded three for the Empire, in a diverser manner: One that desired it, but was unworthy: Another that was worthy, but despised it: A third able to discharge it, and if occasion served, would attempt it: Of which three, when Augustus dyed, there was none left living but Marcus Lepidus, who was the man that was worthy of it, but despised it. Omnesque prater Lepidum, varius mox criminius struente Tiberio, circumventi sunt. We shall not need to examine which of these would have done best, in the case proposed by Tacitus, but rather consider the like persons in a Dignity or Office, which the Prince should give. We will therefore examine, First, which is best; either to serve an Honour, and despise it; or else not deserving it, to seek it. Secondly, whether hee that deserves ought to stay till the Prince offer it; or else put himselfe forward by some honest ways to obtaine it.

Concerning the first: It seemes, that as to desire Honours, of which one is not worthy, is a presuming of himselfe, and as an act of Pride, is worthy of blame;
So not to accept those Honours, of which a man is worthy, as being an act of Humility, is exceedingly to be commended.

But if I shall speak my minde freely, I conceive that he is more to be blamed, and commits a greater error; and deserves the Princes displeasure more, who refuseth Honours out of contempt, then he that seeks them without merit; because the one by desiring them, shews he holds them in great account, the other by flighting them, shews he makes no reckoning of them. Whereupon, as contemning is odious to a Prince, and valuing pleaseth him; so more distastfull must he needs be, that being worthy rejects an Honour, then he that seeks it, and is not worthy: And this is Saint Chrysostomes Doctrine, where he faith, *Quare judicio quidem meo, qui istus despsciunt, contemnuntque, multo spectatorum, & piori supplicio digni fuerint, quam fuerit Dathan und cum suis omnibus.* Mi onimos tamens: Principatum ad se non spectatum; sibi vindicabat an tamen miram quidem de se Principatum animo opinionem conceperat: Id quod declaravit, ingens est concubit studium. And a little after: *Neque enim perinde est ad despicien- tiam rationem subducendam, honorem aliquem indebitum ap- petere, et tot tantaque bona fas idire: Verum facinus hoc tanto est illo gravius, quanto inter se diversi intervallo, Fasidium & Admiratio.* So as he not only incures the Princes disliking, but deserves also his reprehension; seeing he that seeks a Dignity without desert, comes within compass of being proud by admiring; where he that deserving it despiseth it, is as proud as the other, if not more, as counting himselfe worthy of greater honours; and while he despiseth Honours equall to his merits, hee falls into as great a degree of presumption as the other, and is guilty of contempt besides. This David understanding, although hee knew he could not fight with Goliah in armour, yet (as
The one and fortieth Discourse.

(as Robert Abbat observes) to the end hee might not seeme to despise the honour the King offered him; he put on Sauls Armor, and tryed whether he could use it. Accinchi ergo David gladio ejus super vestem suam, cepit tentare si armatus posset incedere; non enim habebat consuetudinem, dixitque David ad Saul, non possunt sic incedere; and so hee laid away those Armes throw impossibility, which if he had laid away thorough contempt, it might have made him odious. Marcus Fabius, when the Senate offered him the honour of Triumph, refused to accept it, and thereby got the greater glory: whereof Livy speaking, faith, Also spreta in tempore gloriam, interdum cumulatior reedit: where the word In tempore is to be noted; as though hee would say, if he had refused it at some other time, he might be thought to refuse it out of pride, as accounting the honour too little for his merits: whereupon see (as Dio relates) that Caesar never refused any honour the Senate offered him, to the end they might not thinke him proud.

Another error also hee falls into, that despiseth a Dignitie conferred upon him; and it is, that he shews himselfe unfit for it: so much Plutarch makes Numa Pompilius tell his father. And Janus Blesius, when the great men who hated Vitellius, went about to make him Emperor, and he refused it; for so doing was thought unworthy.

Concerning the second: Whether he that is worthy of a Dignitie, and despiseth it not, ought when occasion is offered then to seek it, or else to stay till it be offered.

In this case, I disinguish of Offices, which may either be of Honour, or of Danger: In this last case, there is no doubt, a man ought not to stay till his Prince require him; but finding himselfe fit for it, he ought to offer himselfe; because Princes oftentimes in such
such cases, would have their Subjects to understand their thoughts, without further expressing. Our Lord God had a purpose to send one to threaten the Isra-
lites, a perfidious Nation, and that used to stone and kill the Prophets, but not willing to impose the charge of this message upon any; hee seemed as though hee knew not whom to imploy: as it is written in Esay, Quem mittam, aut quis ibi nobis? Then Esay knowing perhaps by a Propheticall spirit, that this was an im-
ployment of danger, stayed not to be required, but rea-
dily offered himself, saying, Ecce ego, Misce me: Where besides the reason alleged before, there may an ex-
cellent lesson be learned, either little knowne, or little used now adayes in Courts: and it is, that Esay offer-
ing himselfe, spake in generall, Ecce ego, misce me; as though he would say, Send me whither you please, I am ready to goe: But on the contrary, I have seene
men offer their service unto the Prince, as if they would put a halter about his neck, standing upon terms; If you will bestow upon me such or such an honour, I will then serve you: and when offices are to be be-
flowed, let themselves downe for one of the chiefeft; a fashion much used, but with little judgement: be-
cause by so doing, they manifestly shew they seek to serve themselves, and not the Prince. The obedience of abraham was not of this sort: who, when our Lord God commanded him to goe out of his Countrey, saying, Egredere de terratua, or de domo Patri tuui, & veni 
in terram quam monstraver o tibi; presently without ask-
ing whither hee should goe, hee put himselfe on his journey. So also it is written in the Apocalyps, where Saint John speaking of the Elect, faith, Et sequuntur ag-
num quocunque ieris. Whereupon the Prophet com-
pares himselfe to a beast, Ut jumentum factus sum apud 
me. A beast carryes that which his owner layes up on him, and doth that which his owner pleaseth; he is not
not ashamed if hee carry Earth, and hee growes not proud if hee carries Gold: So ought the Servants of Princes to doe, goe whithersoever they command them: carry Earth, or carry Gold; that is, goe in employments great or small, as occasion is offered. This is the conceit of Saint Gregory, upon occasion of that place of Esay, Ecce ego, mitte me: and although he apply it to Preachers, yet I conceive it may not unfitly be applied to our Discourse.

But to returne to our purpose, and come to the second case proposed before, and is a little more difficult; which is, if occasion be presented of bestowing an honour, whether a man ought to offer himselfe, and seek it; or otherwise stay and wait till the Prince appoint him?

Everyone perhaps (at least the greatest part) will thinke it better, he should be required. First, because it is a signe of lesse ambition. Secondly, because when a Prince, of himselfe puts a servant in any employment, hee is bound to defend him in it; if in anything hee should err. Thirdly, by the example of Moses, who when God said, he would make him Leader of his people; not onely he stayed to be required, but he also refused it: And in truth I was once of opinion, that from hence might bee gathered the reason why Esay (not being required) offered himselfe; and Moses being required, refused; and it is, because Esay knew he went in an employment of danger, and Moses in an employment of honour: whereupon it seemes that we also, in some occasions should stay to be required, and in some other offer our service. Yet notwithstanding all these reasons, I should alwayes hold the contrary: and for the first reason, that it is lesse ambition; I know not what ambition can be greater, then to desire an honour, to deserve it, and yet looke to be required.
The one and fortieeth Discourse.

As for the second reason, which is, That the Prince is bound to defend him, if he commit any error: I am easily able to prove the contrary, both by reason and example. Saul the sonne of Cis sought not after the Kingdome of Israel, but sought after his Fathers Asses; and meeting with Samuel, who had much talke with him about the Kingdome, hee shewed himselfe wholly averse from it: and if it had not beene that God commanded him expressly by the mouth of Samuel, he would never have suffered himselfe to be annoyed King. Moses also in like manner feeding his sheep, without the least thought of governing the Israelites: when God commanded him to undertake it, yet with great importunity he opposed it. So likewise Eli the Priest, not onely sought not to be Judge over the people, and the Priesthood, but was indeed not capable in regard of his Famillie: whereupon after some repulfe he accepted it. Yet neither Saul, nor Moses, nor Eli, were the more excused of God, for having offices put upon them without their owne seeking: but the first committing a notable error, after the victory of Ahab, was by our Lord God (by the mouth of Samuel) deprived of his Kingdome, which was transferred upon David; and finally brought to a miserable end. And Moses, when water failed, had condigne punishment, being denied to gather the fruit, which in so many yeares, and with so much sweat and labour he had sowed. And lastly Eli, for too much bearing with the faults of his Sonnes, was by our Lord God severely indeed, but yet justly punished.

These men therefore if they erre, not onely will not be excused, but will perhaps become more odious to the Prince, and be more severely punished for their doings. Whereupon our Lord God, (as Origen observes) when Saul left to governe after his Commandements, denied that hee had made him King; and therefore
therefore hee faith in Osea, Ipsi regnaverunt, sed non ex me; Principes extiterunt, et non cognovi. The reason is, because they who are thus chosen, not onely erre in prejudice of themselves and their office, but in prejudice also of the Princes discretion; who shews little judgement to make choyce of a person that is not fit for the charge: and so, he that should be a Protestour to defend the errour of another, shall need a protection himselfe for his owne errour. So as the Prince will have no place to say, that his Servant erred thorougly ignorance, because by saying so, hee should presently shew himselfe of little judgement, to employ a man whom hee did not know; and therefore the Servant must needs shew hee hath committed errours of malice, and confequently to have done the Prince dishonour; at which the Prince must needs take greater indignation: and all these things being not found in him, that hath an Honour, or Office, upon his owne requiring it, makes him more easily excused by the Prince, who erres in an employment himselfe hath sought for, than him, who of the Princes owne motion is elected; and is therefore more obliged to demean himselfe well in it.

Concerning the third reason brought of Moses, I say that we are not in his case; seeing Moses refused the Dignitie, not onely because it was a place of Honour, but because, and the more, because he thought himselfe not fit for it: and this is not that we speak of, presupposing a fitness alwayes. That he knew himselfe not to be fit is apparent; where he faith, Quis sum ego ut vadam ad Pharaonem, et educam filios Israel de Aegipto? as though he should say, I am a worme, unfit for so great a dignitie, which afterwards hee shewes againe in Exodus; where answering God, hee faith, Obsecro Domine, Non sum Eloquens: as though he would say, this is an imployment that requires an Eloquent man;
The one and fortyeth Discourse.

man; and as for me I can scarce speake: whereby it manifestly appeares, that Moses refused it not for the greatnesse onely of the dignitie, which certainly hee esteemed highly; seeing in those words, Mitte quem missurus es, he shewes it was an office fit for the Messias; but for this rather he refused it, because he knew himselfe unworthy, and not proportioned for such a place.

Whereupon, the reason why Esay offered himselfe without being required; and Moses being required, excused himself, and Ieremie would not have preached to the Hebrews, in my opinion is this, because Esay could not say, he was unfit; seeing, although at the first, till an Angell had purged him with a coale, he stood mute, bewailing his inabilitie to speake; Vae mihi quia sactui, quia vire pollutius labiis ego sum: yet after hee heard the Angell say, Et as to iniquitas tua, & peccatum tuum mundabisur; as thinking himselfe now fit for any employment whatsoever, since hee had his lips touched with a coale: that is, since he had God in his mouth, he made no stay, but offered himselfe presently. And Moses also, after he heard he should have this coale in his mouth, Et ero in ore tuo, he never offered to make any reply to God. So Ieremie at the first said, A, A, A, Domine Deus; Ecce meci loqui, quia puere ego sum; but when he heard God say, Ne timeas a facie eorum, quia tecum ego sum, ut erum te, dicit Dominus. Et mifi Dominus manum suam, & testigi os meum, & dixit ad me; Ecce dedi verba mea in ore tuo: he also finding that coale in his mouth, prepared himselfe to performe the employment which was commanded him. And now I conceive the reasons allledged to the contrary, are sufficiently answered: whereby it is manifest, that it is better to seeke a dignitie not deserving it, then deserving it to despise it: And again, that it is better, when one deserves it, and despiseth it not, to offer himselfe, then to have it put upon him. Nibil
That it is easier to pass from one extreme to another, then from an extreme to the middle.

Seeing Virtue is situate and consists in the midst, no marvel if the ignorant multitude, leaving one extreme, instead of coming to the middle, go to the other extreme: whereupon Averroes said exceeding well, that a Coward becomes sooner bold, then valiant; Facilium est a superabundantia ad defectum venire; et ab hoc ad illam, quam ad medium. And a little after, Timidum enim facilius aliquid audax operatur quam forse. It is therefore no marvel, if the people pass from Timiditie to Boldneffe; seeing it passes also from base servitude to proud domination: Aut servitium humillitie, (saith Livy) aut superbo dominatur; Libertatem quae media est, neque spernere satie, neque habare sciunt. It may be said by some, that I contradict myself; having said in another discourse, that it is a most difficult thing to goe from one extreme to another, without passing by the middle first. And besides, a Text in Aristotle may be brought for it; where hee saith, Medium est in quod continue mutans prius devinit quam in ultimum: For answer whereunto, wee must know that there are two middles; one which is Secundum Mutationem, (give me leave to use these terms) and in this, it is more easie to goe from one extreme to the middle, then from one extreme to another: and this is that which Aristotle means in his Physicks, and I in my other Discourse. The second middle is called Per abnegationem; and it is the middle, which is betweene
The three and fortieth Discourse.

tweene Excess us and Defect; and in this, it is more easie to passe from one extreme to the other, then from one extreme to the middle; and this is the midst, I meane in this Discourse.

Faustus in Germanicum ominibus, & si vellet imperium promptos oftentavere.

That Germanicus could not carry himselfe in such sort, as to keepe Tiberius from suspecting him; and that he refused the Empire for feare of death, and not out of goodnesse.

The three and fortieth Discourse.

Germanicus being invited by the Legions in Germany, while they were in mutinie, to take upon him the Empire; not onely was displeased with it, but in great choller refused it; by occasion whereof, I conceive it fit to examine, whether this act of Germanicus were done out of goodnesse, or out of feare.

All Authors for the most part are of this opinion; that he refused the Empire, as one that was most free from any such ambition; seeing having the love of the people, as by a thousand Demonstrations was apparent; and withall an Army in his hand: It seemed an easie matter for him to have made himselfe Emperour, if he had affected it; and in truth, hee shewed partly his good intention, seeing, when it was offered him by the Army, he not onely came downe from the Tribunall in a great chafe, but also fell presently into prayes of Tiberius: Tunc a veneracione Tiberii orsus, flexit ad victorias triumphosque Tiberii, precipuus laudibus celebrans; quae apud Germanias illius cum legionibus pulcherri- ma fecisset. An excellent course in truth, and used also by
by Saint Paul, and Saint Barnabas, who, having done a miracle in Lystra; and seeing the people ready to offer sacrifices to them, as to Jupiter and Mercury; Ubi audierunt (as is written in the Acts) Apostoli Barabas et Paulus, confessus tunicis suis, exilierunt in turbas clamantes et dicentes: Viri quid haec facitis? Et nos mortales sumus, similes vobis: and then fell presently to preach Christ Jesus.

Yet looking a little narrower into this Fact of Germanicus, I am of opinion, he did it more for fear, than love; there being no doubt, but that men, although assured of succeeding in an Empire, yet to make that present which is future, they will not stick to hazard their very lives, a small present pleasure, being always a stronger motive, than a much greater that is future: And the reason is, because the will which hath good for its object, in such manner, as the external senses have theirs, is not moved with any, but that which is present. But it may be said unto me, that the future also may be present. In esse cognito, & objective; to which I answer, that this Abstractive presence hath not the like force as the Intuitive hath; seeing the Intuitive, even in future things is much more perfect; then the Abstractive is, whereupon those Divines who hold that future things are not present with God, but only in esse cognito, affirm, that the having them in esse cognito, is as much with him, as for us to have them present; and therefore this knowledge in God they call intuitive, grounding it upon a doctrine of Aristotle, in his Books De Anima; where he saith, if the Species of things could be conserved in such manner as they are, our sight would never be altered, although an object, future off were made to be present. Indeed, that which is good, or true, or appearing so, and is present, doth so much the more forcibly move, than that which is future, that many men for things present, which are not truly good,
good, but onely in appearance, lose the eternall good of the beatificall vision. So as it is no marvell, if many men, though in other things wise, have beeene content with a doubtfull end to prevent a secure succession; as Abjolon, and infinite others, of whom Histories are full. Whereupon I cannot chuse but thinke, that if Germanicus could have come securely to be Emperour, he would never have beeene so angry at the Souldiers invitation: but because he knew it was not without infinite difficulty to be effected, he therefore shewed himselle averse from harkning to it. And it avails not to say, hee had the Army of Germany in his power; seeing there wanted not Legions and Armies in Hungary, in Sclavonia, and other places, that would have stood for Tiberius; and this no man knew better then Germanicus, as appeares; where speaking to the mutinous Army, he said, Non mihi uxor aut filius Patre & Republica cariores; sed illum quidem sua Majestas, Imperium Romanum ceteri exercitus defendens. And of as little force is the second reason, for his being beloved of the people; seeing when there are Souldiers in a City, the people are able to doe little: as it happened to the people of Tarentum, who favoured the Carthaginians; to the people of Vicenza, who favoured the Venetians; to the people of Milan, who favoured Fransco Sforfa; and whereof there may be found a thousand Examples.

Many other difficulties Germanicus should have met with; and this amongst others is not of leaft moment, that Augustus Caesar had declared Tiberius to bee his Successour; in which consideration, Bathsheba used meanes that David should declare Salomon for his Successour; knowing, that whomsoever he should name, though he were not the eldest, yet should be accepted. Verumtamen Domine mi Rex, in te oculi reepiciunt totius Israel, ut mi dices eis quis sedere debeat in solio tuo post te. Which
Which words Hugo Carenfis thus expounds; Ille quem evolueris regnabit post te, et buni quasi Regem sequetur populus, et non alium. Besides, Tiberius had gotten the hearts of the Praetorian Soldiery, and to make a Prince be accepted, it is a matter of great importance to come accompanied with the guard of the deceased King; and therefore the Holy Scripture in the Book of Kings, reckoning those up who went with Solomon, makes mention of the Captain of the Guard with his Soldiery. Descendit Sadoc Sacerdos, et Nathan Prophetae, et Baniae filius Iebojada, et Cerethi, et Phtelei: Whereupon David said a little before, to Sadoc and Bania, sending them to Solomon; Tollite vobi servos Domini vestri; meaning they should take with them the Soldiery of his Guard. To all these difficulties may be added the knowledge Germanicus had of Tiberius; to be a man of excellent virtue, and of singular wisdom; Magnum amisse spectatum bello; which things all together, made the difficulty so great, that I cannot choose but believe, Germanicus refused the Empire, as Claudius Pompeianus did, when it was offered him; Sed ille rexisavit, quia Imperatorem Pertinacem videbat. So Scipio the Carthaginian, when he was proclaimed King by the Army of Spain, would not accept it, Quia Rome intolerabile nomen Regium erat. It is therefore no marvel, that Germanicus entered into choller upon it; seeing to ascend to the Empire, is a thing that requires two extremes; either to shew himself desirous, and at the same time to be near at hand for procuring it; or else, to shew himself wholly averse from it; not only in effects, but in desire, because they who stand farre off in effects, and neare hand with desire, easily in a little time come to ruine. Essa privatis cogitationibus progressum; (faith Tacitus) Et prout velit, plurimus, fami ex fortuna imperium cupientibus nihil medium inter summa aut praeptio. Christ our Saviour was as farre from
from desiring to be a worldly King, as could be; and therefore being called to be a King by the people, hee presently got himselfe farre off from the multitude, because his houre being not yet come, in which hee meant to expose himselfe to die; hee knew it stood him upon, to avoyde such apparenc: and more (as Robert Abbat observes) our Lord Christ never spake of his being a King, till the time of his Passion; knowing that the very name of a King carrieth death with it: If Germanicu had done thus, after he had quieted the mutinies of the Army, had returned to Rome, and had left the Legions behind, that had called him Emperor, he had then freed Tiberius from suspicion; who understanding the inclination of the Army, could not chuse but be in continuall feare, least the Empire should be taken from him: Whereupon, knowing the danger he stood in, he was not willing that Germanicus should conquer Germany; least having once made himselfe Lord of that Country, he should doe as Cesar did, having conquered France. Seeing victorious Armies are formidable and invincible things, and in this case the more; Germanicus being much more like to Cesar, then to Cato; the one (as SalUST saith) aspiring to the Empire; the other, desirous to preserve the Common-wealth: betwene themselves, both like and unlike; like in Age, in Eloquence, in nobleness of minde, and finally in glory: but unlike in this, that Cesar made himselfe famous by his services and courteies; Cato by sinceritie and holiness of life; Cesar got him a name, with being gentle and mercifull; Cato by being severe and sterne. He by giving, by helping, by pardoning, came to be famous: This by finding fault with Donatives, and by not pardoning any, nor so much as himselfe, came to be adored, Cato was the scourge of the wicked, and Cesar, the refuge. Cesar was commended for affabilitie, and Cato...
for constancy; and because Caesar aspired to the Empire, and Cato was always a good Citizen; we may therefore say, that the manners of Caesar ought to be imitated of those that are not ambitious, and the manners of Caesar, of those that are: and therefore seeing Germanicus (as may be gathered by his life) had all those manners and fashions of Caesar; I cannot but conclude, but that his ambition was to aspire to the Empire. So as indeed, he was not well advised to take such courses, and give Donatives to the Soldiers; Quibus nisi ab Imperatore, neque premia accipere poteret, as Tacitus in the second of his Annals saith: where we may see, that Tiberius knew well of what great importance Donatives are to corrupt the Soldiers. Secondly, Germanicus was not well advised, to procure the applause of the Legions, with such artifice as he did; and then manage it only with curtesy and love, which perhaps I should not blame, if he had been Lord of Rome: but seeing not only he was not Lord, but was suspected of him that was Lord; he should not have used the Soldiers with such plausible nesse as he did. And it avails not to say, that if he would do any good in Germany, it behoved him to procure the love of the Army, seeing he might have done as much good with feare, as he did with love; and never have put the Prince into jealouie: and Generalls in warre proceed and prosper, as well with the one as the other. Scipio Afriarm prospered with love, and Hannibal with feare. The course of Scipio will always doe well, where the Commander is Prince; at least, if he can avoid contempt; a companion oftentimes of mildness: and indeed, Scipio by his mildness fell so farre in contempt, that if at last he had not turned his course to a way of feare, he had beene in danger to bee utterly undone.

I have the more willingly used the example of Scipio...
in this case, because indeed in many things he was most like Germanicus; As Scipio was sent into Africa, where his father had manag'd the warre before; so Germanicus was sent into Germany, and might follow the steps of his father Drusus, who had beene there before. Scipio was a young man of most goodly presence, and Germanicus a young man of most beautifull aspect. The one, and the other, of most pleasing carriage towards confederates, towards friends & enemies. Against Germanicus the Legions in Germany rebelled, upon the death of Augustus; against Scipio the Armies in Spain rebelled, upon the false report of his death: both of them tooke the same course for reducing the Armies to obedience, and both of them were blamed for it: Germanicus by Tiberius, as a corrupter of the Army; Scipio by Fabius Maximus, for the like; Natae sum ad corrumpendum Diciplinam, argueré; sic in Hispania plus proper seditionem militum, quam bellum annisum; Each of them was more able to commit no errors themselves, then to correct the errors committed by others. Both of them victorius in batailes; and as Scipio at last made the Senate suspect hee meant to make himselfe Lord of Rome; so Germanicus made Tiberius suspect he meant to make himselfe Emperor of Rome. To Scipio the Army offered the Empire, and hee refused it; to Germanicus also the Army offered it, and he with great indignation likewise refused it. Scipio after all his victories died in exile, thorough the ungratefulness of the Senate; and Germanicus died out of Rome, thorough the ungratefulness and practices of Tiberius. To the one and the other was lent a Succession, to the end they should not finish the warre; and if Germanicus were in this not well advised, as I have shewed before, and perhaps had a meaning to make himselfe Prince; certainly Scipio was not much better advised; of whom that Tribune in Livy saith, Dictatorum eum consul it non legatum
The three and fortieth Discourse.

I legatium in Provincia fuisse, neque ob aliam rem eo profi-
atum, quam ut id quod Hispania, Gallia, Sicilia, Africæ
jam pridem persuasum esse hoc Graeciam, Aegyptiæ, & omni-
bus ad Orientem versus regibus genibusque apparetur;
unum hominem caput columnæque Imperii Romani esse.

These are not ways for men to use, that have no o-
ther end then to be good Citizens; rather, their courte-
ous carriage towards the Souldiers, was done with
a minde to make use of them in the City; as Livy in
another place shewes: Scipionum nomini auxiliarum omi-
nes affectos quos secum in patriam ad merum triumphum
deduceret velitis, quos consulatum petenti, velut si omnium
communis agatur honos, ad futuros speret. It is therefore
no marvel to see so great likenesse between these two
Captaines, seeing Germanicus tooke Scipio for his ex-
ample to imitate; as may be seene in the voyage hee
made in Egypt: Sine milite incedere, pedibus intectius,
& pari cum Graecis amittis; Publii Scipionis amulationem,
quem eadem factitavitns apud Siciliam, quam quis flagrante
aduoc Panorum bello, acceptum. Yet in matter of for-

tune they were something unlike; for Scipio was able
to settle, and I may say to finish his victory, which
Germanicus was not suffered to doe: but if the warre
which the Romans had with the Carthaginians, had
beene Ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum; po-
tius quam cupidini proferendi Imperii; as that of Ger-
manicus was; I make no doubt but Scipio would have
beene as little suffered to finish the warre, as Germain-
cus was. Now if we aske which of them deservd
most praise, and was most worthy of commendation;
I account Germanicus so much worthy of more, as he
was able in so great vertues to be like Scipio, in a time
so unlike; and under a Tyrant Prince: and though by
a little unadvisdnesse hee fell to be suspected of Tib-
erius, yet he is more to be excused then Scipio was; see-
ing a Tyrant Prince is sooner put into suspition, then a
well
well-govern'd Common-wealth. And therefore Corbulo (as Tacitus relates) being hindered by a Letter from Claudius, for going forward with his enterprise, called the ancient Romane Captaines happy: Jam Castra in hostili solio molienti Corbuloni ha l iter a redantur; ille re subita, quamquam multa simul offenduntur, metu ex Imperatore, contemptio ex Barbaris; ludibrium apud socios; nihil alius prolocutus, quam beatos quandain Duces Romanos.

Periculosa severitas, flagitiosa largitio: seu nihil militi; seu omnia conceduntur, in ancipiti Republica.

That it is a hard matter to settle the Insurrection of an Army.

Being a little after to examine the ways, how to settle and compose the Insurrection of an Army;

I will in this place, by occasion of this Text, only say, That to grant them all their demands, is dangerous; because they will make it but a steppe to make greater demands. The Janizaries made an Insurrection against Amurath the Great Turke, demanding the head of Ebraim Beglerbey of Greece; and the Great Turkes entitely friend: and when Amurath gave consent to their demand, they then fell to demand a thousand other extravagant things, and put the Great Turke into no small danger. On the other part, to grant them nothing they demand, is as bad: as that, which exasperates them in such a degree, that they can hardly be ever pacified after; as in the case of Galba was seene. All this we have now said, is expressed in Polybius, by a most excellent similitude; whose words as most worthy
worthy to be read, I have thought good to let down at large, as they are translated into Latine, 
Si quis hoc restitue intueatur (he speaks of the Carthaginian Army being in mutiny) 
on dubito affirma non modo corpora hominum, & quadam in illius ulcera, ita interdum eruptae, 
ulceribus posita, sed id longe magis humanis animis accedere; ut enim in ulceribus event, 
animis medicamentum curandi gratia admittat, ulcera ipsum vi medicaminis augeat, ut vero curam ejus negligas, longe sua ipsius natura extenditur, 
neque prius defit quam omne subjectum corpus corruptum labefactumque fit; ita animis quoque constringes interdum morbi ac tabes accidunt, ulicum ex reliquis animalibus homine atrocius, ut seuerius fiat, cum se interdum veniam aut impunitatem aliquam conscriberis, aut alter benignitate sum prosequilis fuerit, id omne dolum fraudemque existimans, deterior fit; et eam beneficium longe magis insidiis, 
severo contra opposueris, nihil est adeo durum, crudel, nefarium, quod non facile aggregiatur, taudem si ei tam temeritatem existimans, donec ad extremum omnino, effecatas animus humanam naturam exsat.
In what kinde of affaires, it is fit to carry their Wifes with them.

The five and fortieth Discourse.

Upon this passage, there are two Discourses seem to offer themselves: The first, whether it be fit for Governours to carry their Wives with them, and consequently whether Germanicus did well, to have his Wife and Children in the Army. The second, how insurreccions of Armies may be quieted.

Beginning with the first, I say, that Officers may be sent by the Prince, in three kindes of imployment: in governments, in war, or in Embassages. If they go to be Governours, it is then a fair course, and far from being dangerous, as was agreed upon in the Senate, in favoure of Valerius Messalina against Cecina, that they might take their Wives with them: Neque enim ut olim obsideri urbem bellis, aut Provincias hostiles effe. But yet in my opinion, it is fit in this matter to proceed with distinction, because if we speake simpliciter, I should thinke it better, they should not leade their Wives with them, as those who for the most part can do little good, by reason of their unskilfulnesse in affaires, and may do much hurt by reason of their avarice and pride; whereupon as Cecina well said, there seldom came any appeales against the Governours of Pro-

The five and fortieth Discourse.

Eo in metu arguere Germanicum omnes; quod non ad superiorem exercitum pergeret; ubi obs- sequia, & contra rebelles auxilium, latis superque mil- fione & pecunia & mollibus consultis peccatum; vel si viles ipsi falsus, cur filium parvulum, cur gravidam conjugem inter saturetes, & omnis humani juris vi- olatores habetet? Illos saltem uno & Rei- publicæ redderet.
The five and fortieth Discourse.

VINCES, for oppressing the people, but they were more against the Women than the men. Cæcinae, quies repetundarum aliqui argumentum, plura utoribus objectioni. To this may be added, that by reason of their weakness, they give ear to the most wicked of the Province, they keep a Court of themselves, give audience, divide Tribunals, and caused thousand other errors, which by the forefaid Cæcina are well expressed. His statim adhæreſseret erratum quemque Provincialium, ab his negotia futœ, transfigturum agnosce coeli, duo esse Pretoria, and that which followes: whereupon I have reason to believe, that the itant Romans made the Laws, that it should not be lawfull for Governours of Provinces, to carry their Wives with them, not so much for the danger they incurred, by being in Countries of little safety, as least the people newly come under the Roman Empire, should through the avarice and pride of the Women be provoked to rebell. The reason that Valerius brings to beat down that of Cæcina, is this, that to charge Women for doing ill Offices in a Province, is but a weak argument, seeing it is their Husbands fault, who allow their Wives to take more upon them than is fit: Frustra nosbram ignarium alia ad vocabula transferri, nam viri in eo culpam, si femina modum excedat: and therefore Sara in the holy Scripture knowing this, when Agar contented against her with proud terms, she complained not of her, but of Abraham, as knowing it to be the mens fault, if their Wives grow insolent. This reason makes a fair shew, but it clear-eth not the difficulty, seeing it makes no matter, when a Province is ill governed, whether it be long of the Man, or of the Woman, so long as it is done; whereupon I should thinke it better, to provide for things before they be done, according to the advice of Agricola, who Officis & administrationibus pater mens pecunias.
The five and fortieth Discourse.

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turos quam damnare cum peccasent: then to warth with danger when they shall be done; and consequently, if it may be, to leave their Wives at home: and the rather, seeing Princes commonly send persons of age to be Governours, and consequently easie to be led by their Wives, as in another Discourse is shewed: yet it is true, as I said before, that I would make an Exception to this Rule, when Women are judicious and very wise, for then no doubt, they may be of great assistance in the Government. The other reason which Valerius brings, that Wives are a recreation to their Husbands, and make them the better able to bear the labours of their Government, is a meer mockery, seeing men that take upon them such charges, should have no thought but of the Princes service, nor take pleasure in anything but in discharging their places.

But be it as it will, it imports us little for the present: this at least is clear, that in employments of war, it is never fit to carry their Wives with them, and therefore the Romans (as Cæsina reports) would have them when they went into foreign Countries, where there was danger of war, to go always without their Wives, Hand enim frustra placitum olim, ne famina in socios, aut gentes externas taberentur, inesse mulierum comitatu quod pacem luxu, bellum formidine morentur: Therefore as Aристotle saith well, speaking against Plato, Women in the warres are good for nothing but to be a let, and reckoned inter impedimenta, which is then the more to be observed, when they go with an Army that may be likely to mutiny, and therefore when the Army of Germanie fell to mutiny, Germanicus at last perceived what a mischief it was, to have Women amongst seditions: and who knowes but he forborne to use discipline and force against them, onely for the Womens sake? We may then conclude, it was not well done of him, to carry his Wife with him in the Army.
Army. Our Lord God, Maker and Governor of all things, knew the Israelites would rebel against Moses, whereupon having made him his Captain General; and he upon the way with his Wife Sephora, God met him, and threatened to kill him: Cumque esset in itinere, in diversis locis accipit Dominus; et volens occidere eum, which Saint Austin interprets thus, that God made this show, because Moses led his Wife with him, as not being convenient, when a man goeth about great affairs, he should be troubled with Women; and therefore he saith, For si tibi loco honorem intelligere quod plarius velut Deus, quare Moses tanta mirabilis fatus, uxoris impedimentum secum ducere vellet in Aegyptum. But if now he go upon Embassage, then if the Women be but mean of understanding, let them never be carried, as those that may do much hurt; but if they be discreet and wise, it will do well to take them along, as those that may do much good; because one of the chief things an Embassadour is to look to, is to understand and finde out secrets, and none fatter to finde them out than discreet Women, seeing oftentimes, either Senators in Common-wealths, or Princes in their Kingdomes, or their Officers and Secretaries, discover unadvisedly to their Wives many secrets of State, which they afterward being in company with Embassadours Wives, (to shew their intelligence in great matters) easily blab out again, and are apt to reveal, and in this manner in some Counts of Italy, matters of great consequence have been botted out by some discreet Embassadours. And how came Tiberius to know that Augustus went to visit Agrippa Posthumus in the Island of Pannotia, but by this means? For Augustus having Fabius Maximus in his company, he unadvisedly told it to his Wife Martia, and Martia as unadvisedly told it to Livia, and Livia to Tiberius, which was the cause of Fabius his death, and as it is thought
thought of *Augustus* his too. Quippe rumor inceserat, paucos ante menses, Augustum electus consciis, & comite uno Fabio Maximo Planasiam ræatum, ad visendum Agrippam, multis ilic urinque lacrymas, & signa charitatis, frena, ex eo fore, ut juvenis penatibus avi redderetur. quod Maximum uxori Martiae aperuisset, illam Liviam C. Navumid Cesari.

We may then conclude, that mens secrets come easily to be known by the means of Women, and therefore Tyrants (as Aristotle faith) allow oftentimes great Authority to Women, to the end, they may reveal their Husbands secrets.

Satis superque missione & pecunia & mollibus consultis peccatum.

Whether Germanicus did well to grant so many things to the Army, being in mutiny, what other course he might have taken; lastly, that in diversiy of times, and upon diversity of occasions divers courses are to be taken.

The six and fortieth Discourse.

*Germanicus* returning from collecting the taxes, found the Legions in mutiny, demanding that the veteran soldiers might have leave to go home, and to have their pay increas'd, and also to have the Legacy left them by *Augustus*, and he to quiet them, yeelded to many of their demands, for which he was by many much blamed, as in the words here alleged appeares. By occasion whereof, we purpose to examine what courses are fit to be taken, when Armies are in Rebellion.

I say then, that all mutinies and insurrections require not one kind of Remedy, but according to the divers
divers times in which they happen, to the divers occasions upon which they happen, and lastly, to the divers Captains under whom they happen, a divers remedy is to be applied. For if the Generall be a man of whom the Army stands in awe, he may expose himself to any danger without any danger, and have all things succeed well. The Macedonians in Asia, being quite tired with the War, and far from their Country, fell to mutiny under Alexander Magma, standing upon the like terms as they in Germany did, where cicatrices excrucierneribus, verberum notas exprobant, so here, Omnes simul missionem postulare superuni; deformati orae cicatrices, caninemque capita tontantes: whereupon Alexander calling the Souldiers together, to hear him speak, no sooner ended his speech, but he thrust into the midst of those infuriated hearts: and caused the most insolent of them to be taken, and not a man of them durst offer to make resistance, Desiluit deinde (Saith Quintus Curtius) frendens de Tribunali, & in medium armatorum agmen se immisit, notatos quoque qui ferociis oblocuti erant, singulos manu corripuit, nec alios repugnare, tredem affervandos custodibis corporis tradidit, quas credereat saevam Paulus ans consensionem obtorpuisse subito mutu? & cum ad supplicium visidera tribu, nihil alios graviora quam cateros. And thus this brave Resolution in a Generall of whom they stood in fear, sufficed to pacifie this great insurrection. But if a Captain be only loved and not feared, ther him never put himselfe upon such adventure, or think in such fort to cement the matter; for it will undoubtedly be his death; whereupon we see that Germanicus though he exposed himselfe to no danger, yet was not far from losing his life, as by reading Tacitus we may perceive. And the reason of this difference is, because as Choller overcomes Love, so Fear overcomes Choller, which (as Aristotle saith) being with hope of Revenge, as far
as is possible, that Hope is taken away by Fear, and in the place of it enters Sorrow, as Avicen excellently shews in his Book De Anima. And for this cause also it happens, that more Armies mutiny under Captains that are loved, than under Captains that are feared, as was seen in the Army of Alexander the Great, and in that of Hannibal, Captains that were feared; the contrary in the Army of Germanicus, and in that of Scipio, Captains that were loved.

It is very clear, that Germanicus was never able to take any of these violent Resolutions, yet I commend not the course he took to pacifie the mutiny of his Army, by yezling to them in so many things, because being suspected of the Prince, any course had been fitter for him than this, by which he corrupted military discipline, and by giving of his own, he as it were bought the Army, and therefore where Tiberius heard, in what manner he had pacified them, it troubled him not a little, Nuntiata ea, Tiberium latituque ad se, gaudebat oppressam seditionem, sed quod largiendarum missione fessimae, favorem militum quaerisse, bellica quoque gloria Germanici ansequatur. And so much more as there wanted not other ways to have appeased the sedition, and the first way for him being so well beloved, had been that which in matters of love is of such force, and that is, by making them jealous he would leave them; and go to some other Army, shewing how little he regarded his mutinous Army; and in truth, if any notice might have been taken of such conditionall propositional verily thinkes the sedition by it selfe only would have bin appeased; and there are two things that move me to think so; One, the Example of Alexander the Great, who in a mutiny making shew as though he regarded not his Macedon Souldiers, by taking Bérians for the Guard of his Body, and doing them other Honours, all the Macedonians prostrated
prostrated themselves, and in most humble manner bowed unto him, whereof Quintus Curtius saith, Postquam vero cognitum est, Perseius ducatus datos, barbaros in varios ordines distributos, aique Macedonica iis imposita nominis, se vero ignominiose penitus rejectos esse, non jam amplius conceptum animis dolorum perseveraverunt, sed concursu in Regiam facto, interiori duntaxat retenta turca, arma ante janum, paniemiae signum projecerunt, ac pra foribus stantes, intromissi se, fabique ignosci supplici etque fletus orabant, utque Rex supplicis sui potius siaret se, quam contumelios ipse venia impetrare, non defessarios. See here the fruit of jealousy. The second thing that makes me believe, this way would have succeeded well with Germanicus, is the Example we have, in the very mutiny it selfe of the same Army, wherein when the granting them so many things, would not yet pacifie the sedition; then Germanicus (not to this end, but to set them out of danger) was sending away his Wife and Children, to be out of the reach of this tumultuous Army, which the soldiers perceiving, and thereupon growing jealous that any other strange people should keep their Captaines Wife safer than Roman Legions; to the end, he should not send her away, they presently grew quiet, Sed nihil aquae flexit (as Tacitus) quam invidia in Treueros; orant, obstitunt, rediret, manueret; pars Agrippinae occurrantes, plurimi ad Germanium regrosi. And if the departing of his Wife only could prevail so much, what jealousy would they have had at the departing of their beloved Captain? certainly, without making them any other promises, this alone would have pacified the sedition; and in case this jealousy alone had not been sufficient, he might then have gone to the other Army, and sent messengers to let them know, that if they delivered not up into his hands the heads of the Rebellion, he would come and cut them
The six and fortyeth Discourse.

In pieces good and bad, a thing which without doubt would have done much good, as was seen, when at last he was forced to use such terms with his soldiers under Cacina, At Germanicus quamquam contracto exercitu, & parata in defectores ulione, dandum abusc scriptum ratus, si recenti exempli sibi ipse consuere, praemittis litteras ad Cacinam, venire se valida manu, ac ni supplicium in malos praefumant, usurum promiscua cade. This once heard by the soldiers, they presently cut them all in pieces that were guilty of the mutiny: and if this way yet would not have been sufficient, seeing this tumult was grown out of idleness, and he was not willing to use violence, he might have taken the other Army, and put himself in the way to go against the Enemy; this course Cesar took, who when the Army in France rebelled, he took one Legion which he specially favoured with him, and gave leave to the mutinous Legions to go home to Rome, which once seen, there was not a soldier that left not presently his mutinying & followed him: a most easy way, for if any thing hinder an Army that is in mutiny (I mean not out of hatred) from pacifying and appeasing, it is a fear they have to be punished, which fear ceaseth as soon as they are taken to go against the Enemy, every one hoping by some notable deed to cancel the blot of their Rebellion, and therefore as soon as those first Legions were quieted, they presently demanded to be led against the Enemy: Puniret noxios, ignoscet lapsis, & duceret in hostem. Whereupon we see that after such mutinies, Armies commonly shew more valour than at any time before, as Livie shews in a thousand places; and this Germanicus knew full well, who after the slaughter the soldiers of Cacina had committed, led them presently out against the Enemy. Truces etiam tum animos cupidius involas undi in hostem, piaculum furoris, nec aliter
alter potse placari Commilitonum manes, quafi s pectoribus
impiis honesta vulnera acceptissent; sequitur ardorem mil-
limum Caesar. And further, if Germanicus were not will-
ing to depart from the Army, being in mutiny; yet the
mutiny, having beene caused by a sudden motion, he
needed not have beene so hasty, to seeke the appeasing
of so new a mutiny, but might have given the Souldi-
ers deliberation; and then reason taking place, hee
might without doubt have quieted them at his plea-
sure. Our Lord Christ in a parable, would not have
the tares to be rooted out with the corne, as long as it
was in blade and greene; but appointed to stay, till
they were dry; and then dividing them, cast the tares
into the fire: so should he doe with Armies that are
in mutiny, that seeke to preserve them, and not to de-
stroy them all.

He had another excellent way, and most wor-
thy for a General to follow; and it was, to threaten,
that whosoever did not follow him, should be coun-
ted a Rebell; and as a Rebell, should be proceeded a-
gainst; a way of exceeding great force, and especially
in tumults, where there is not a head; and where they
are all equally stubborn, and every one feares for him-
selue, as was seene in Saul; who being declared King,
was yet not followed, but onely of some few; where-
upon, an occasion falling out for relieving the Citie of
Jab, to the end the whole Army should follow him,
he caused two Oxen to be cut in pieces, and be spread
about all the borders of Israel; threatening, that who-
ssoever did not follow him, should have all his heards
of cattell cut in pieces, as those Oxen were: Quicunque
non exierit, & securus fueris Saul, & Samuel; sic fiet bobu
ejus : and where the Israelites before would not all
follow him, now out of feare of the particular punish-
ment, there was not a man that did not follow him.

Invaeit ergo (it followes in the holy Text) Timor Domi-
The very same manner Drusus used with the Legions of Illyricum, employing one Clement a Centurion, In grace with the Souldiers, for his means to pacifie that sedition. Accipit Centurio Clements, & sibi alii bonis artibus grati in colibus; in Vigiliis, stationibus; custodis portarum; se infrunt; spem offerunt; metum intendent. And that this way would have beene available also to Germanicus, is evident; seeing Caesar making use here-
of, with two of those Legions; he so wrought them, that they spared not to punish the chiefe of the sedi-

tion.

Another way also he might have used, and that was, to have pretended himself their Captain in the Sedition: or if not himselfe, (which in many respects was not fit for Germanicus) at least, to have caused some other principal man to feigne himselfe to be of their opinion; and all other remedies sayling, I suppose, this might have stood Germanicus in great stead; because men commonly give great credit to their counsels, who are interest-
ed in the matter as believing they speak sincerely. For this cause, David caused his trusty friend Chusci the Ara-
chite, to feigne himselfe of Abaloms side; to the end he might hinder the counsell of Achitophel, and it happily succeeded. So Gamaliel standing amongst the Priests, was a means to save Peters life. Spurinna being in Placentia, for defence of that Citie, and seeing the Souldi-
ders bent to fight with the Vitellians, who farre exceed-
ed them in number, and in all advantages; feigned himselfe to be of their opinion: seeing them in such a tumult, and thereupon leading them forth, hee easily made them see their errour, and perceive the danger; and shewing them good reasons, he reduced them to obedience. Aed temeritatis alienae comes Spurinna; primo coalesce, mox velle simulant, quo plus authorization infest
confilis, seditio mitesceret. And a little after, Ipse po-
strero Spurinna, non tam culpam exprobrans, quam ratione
offendens, relietius exploratoribus, eversos Placentiam redu-
xit minus turbidos, & impetrum accipientes. The Nolani also, seeing the people bent to take part with Hanniball, feigned themselves to be of the same opinion; and by this means gained time till Marcellus came: Ubi Sena-
tum metus accept, sibi palam contra tendetem, resisti mul-
titudini concitata non posse, clam simulando dilationem mali
invenientur; placet enim sibi, defectioni ad Annibalem si-
mulant.
mulant. This in truth is an exquisite way, when a people cannot be mastered, then to second them; because, being not suspected, they may doe much good: an example hereof we have in the first booke of Tacitus, of that Clement the Centurion; who speaking to the Army, said not, doe you, and say you; but let us doe, and let us say; thereby to shew he was interested as well as they; Quamquam filium Imperatoris obidebimus, quis certaminum finis? Percennioni & Vibuleno sacramentum dicturi sumus?

Seeing then Germanicus had so many ways, available to appease the Insurrection, and he made use of the worst; I cannot but think he was either very unadvised, or very malicious.

Having now distinguished the Captaines; it remains (for performance of my offer) to distinguish the occasions and the times. The occasions then, may in part be just, or wholly unjust: Of the first kinde, are want of Pay, want of Victuals, and such like; and in such insurrections, it is necessary, if hee can, to give the Souldiers satisfaction; if hee cannot, to shew at least that he is not any cause of the want: and if it be in default of Victuals, the Captaine shall doe well to eate in publike of the same meates that others eate; to shew, that hee himselfe suffers as well as the Army: This way hath often beene used, and alwayes with good success. The occasions that are unjust, are wont to happen, either out of some sudden anger, upon denial of some particular demand; or else out of hatred, and a resolution not to serve. In the first case, it is no doubt, more easie to pacifie an Insurrection, then in the second; because hatred is much more durable and incurable, then anger is; as that which growes from a more durable occasion then anger doth: that growing out of a habit, and this out of passion; and as a passion passeth away sooner then a disposition, or a habit;
habit; so anger is sooner passed over and gone, then hatred: Besides, it is also much the worse, because hatred wisheth an enemy evil, as it is evil; where he that is angry wisheth an enemy evil, but not as evil: but Sub ratione boni, (to use this term) esteeming the evil to be just, as being vindicative; and seeing it is manifest, (according to Saint Thomas) that to wish evil under the colour of good, hath less evil in it; then to wish evil simply: it followeth, that hatred is not only of more continuance, but of a worse condition also then anger is. In the first case then, that is of anger; a valiant Captaine shall either by temporizing, or else by bold opposition, which is indeed more becoming a generous spirit, easily appease them. The Legions in Germany, under Flaccus Ordeonius, were in mutiny, and would kill the Captaine for putting a Souldier in prison: whereupon Vocula, Legat of a Legion, being a bold and courageous Captaine, gave order the prisoner should be put to death; which so affrighted the Souldiers, that they were presently quiet: for indeed, it is the nature of common people, if they fear not others, they will make others fear them; but if they fear, they will be as quiet as Lambs; and a child may beat them: according to that place of Tacitus; Terrere ni paseant, ubi pertinuerint, impune contemni. And sometimes they love a man the better for making them fear, as admiring the greatness of his spirit: whereupon we see, that those Legions, after that Vocula had put the Souldier to death, would have him to be their Captaine: Confirmavit Tribunal Vocula (saith Tacitus) mira constantia; praebens unque militem a vociferantem duci ad supplicium jus sit. Es dum mali parent, optimus quisque jus sit parere. Exsiv consensu Ducem Voculam poescenitus, Flaccus summam rerum et permiscit. Another time those Legions mutinying again, tooke that Flaccus Ordeonius and bound him; but upon the comming
ming of Vocula, they presently unbound him: and Vocula meaning to punish this disorder, forbore for a time, till their choler were over; by which means the day following, he easily put to death the Authors of the mutiny. Is postera die, authores seditionis morte aereit, tanta illi exercitiis diversitatis incertus, licentia patientiaque.

But if the occasion grow from hatred, and from a resolution to serve no longer; I then see not any way there is to pacifie it: because if they demand Pay, or such like, they doe it to this end; that being denied it, they may have colour for their insurrection; and to grant them that which they demand, is to give them occasion to ask afterward things impossible. This very thing happened to Flaccus; who having sent certaine companies of Batavians towards Rome, and they by the way receiving Letters from Civilius, fell to demand a thousand impertinencies: of which, when Flaccus had granted them a part, they then took occasion to demand farre greater. Isdem diebus, Batavorum & Canineta atium cohortes, cum jus in Vitelli in urbem pergerent; missus ad Civile nuntius aequitur. Intumuerat sinum superbia, sertioque pretium itineris Donativum, duplex stipendium: augeri equitum numerum, promissa sanè a Vitellio postulabant, non ut aequerentur, sed causam seditioni. Et Flaccus multa concedendo, nihil alius effecerat, quam ut acrim exposcerent, quae sciebant negaturum. The like befell the Carthageneians, whose rebelling Soldiers finding many of their demands granted, they became more insolent then before: for it is not alwayes true, that Humilitie is opposite to Pride, but sometimes, and particularly in this case, Humility makes the Pride the greater: such men thinking, that whatsoever is granted them, is not granted them out of humanity, but out of seare; and thereupon taking heart, they grow to demand farre greater matters. This, thos
whole Senators in Livy meant to inferre, when they said, Cervum habere maiores quoque fæ divinam venierum; concludendo omnia; non miitem in sepulchrum, sed auferriorem; alia ex aliis iniquiora poshulando, cum prius imperasse.

And Tacitus also, when in the life of Agricola, he saith, Nibil profici patientia; nisi ut graviora, quamquam exptatii tolerantibus imperarent. Whereupon against such there is no better way then to shew teeth; (as the Italian Proverbe is) which is, to be rough with them: seeing it is easie for one to make himselfe be feared, if from being vilified before thorough mildnesse; he suddenly contrary to expectation, alters his countenance, and looke bigge.

There is another way also that may be used, and it is, to goe gaining of time so long, till all things may be provided; and then, to cut them all to pieces: seeing (as I said before) that to quiet such is a thing impossible. He that would make himselfe so seated, if from being vilified before thorough mildnesse; he suddenly contrary to expectation, alters his countenance, and lookebigge.

Now for the times; either they are of peace, or of great enterprizes that are in hand, or of the Enemies approaching. In the first, there want not ways; seeing they can never doe much hurt; In the second, though it seemes hard, yet it is but easie; and the best way is, to make a shew, not to regard them. The Solldiers of Augustus foreseeing a warre which was like to be against Ambyly, (as Dio relates) defered leaue to
The six and fortieth Discourse.

be excused from the service, not because they would be so indeed, but because they meant to hold Augustus (as the saying is) to hard meat, and make him grant what they demanded, for fear they should leave him; and he as crafty as they, finding it not fit, for a Captain to submit himselfe to the Souldiers wils, answered them. They had reason to ask leave, and gave it them; retaining only those that had served in the warres ten yeares: and thus by slighting those other, and shewing he cared not whether they stayed or no; There was not a man went from him, but all stayed with him. The last time is of all the hardest, or rather is impossible; and that is, when they are in face of the Enemy: and in this case, the best way is, to seake to quiet them by any means, though never so bad, and by granting them all they demand; whether it be just, or unjust. The Romans having their Enemies at hand, and being at variance with the people, who retired to the Hill Aventine, and would not stirre a foot against the Enemies, unlesse they might have their demands granted: the Senate resolved to satisifie them howsoever, and therefore granted all they demanded; Eam per aqua, per inique, reconciliandam Civitati esse.

At Romæ nondum cognito, qui fuisset exitus in Illyrico; & Legionum Germanicarum motu audito; trepida Civitas inculare Tiberium.

That Tiberius did well not to stirre from Rome.

The seaven and fortieth Discourse.

Although the Citie of Rome, when they heard the Armies of Pannonia and Germany were in sedition, openly complained of Tiberius; and blamed
blamed him, that he would not go in person to appease those tumults; yet Tiberius for all that, was resolved not to stir from the City; which resolution, though it succeeded well with him, yet it is not necessarily to be commended; seeing oftentimes a Council not very advised, hath yet through the favour of fortune, had admirable success; and on the contrary, a mature deliberation, an unhappy issue. So as seeing wise men ought not to judge of Deliberations, which are subject to Accidents, by only the understanding. It is no marvell if some imagine, that Tiberius understood not this, who would stay in Rome, when the Armies were in such confusion. Seeing in Insurrections, the authority of a Prince, and specially when he is Specatus bello, is able to prevail much: Nothing in such cases being of greater moment than Majesty, by means whereof, notonly Augustus, (who by one word speaking, appeaTed a great Sedition,) but infinite others have had in tumults happy success. Yet notwithstanding all this, I am of opinion, that in so great a man as Tiberius was, the Deliberation was not altogether advised, then the success was happy; seeing (as Tacitus saith,) if he had gone, he must of necessity have gone to one Army, before he went to the other; and by so doing, should have shewed himself partial, the only way to have lost their love to whom he went last. And therefore for my part, I should think it the best course, when rebellions arise, to send thither some such person, that if he be flighted, another greater may be sent, and not to shew the uttermost at first. This is made plain to us by our Lord God in Saint Matthew, where in a Parable he saith, that a Father of a Family, seeing the husbandmen
The seven and fortieth Discourse.

bandmen of his Vineyard suffering all things to go to wrack, and having none to send to them but servants and his sonne: at first he sent servants, and them they killed and stoned, and then at last he sent his sonne, which was the last refuge in this case, as Tiberius was in ours: Whereupon he faith, 

*Pater familias Dominum Vinea misit servos ad Agricolas, qui ex ilis dierum, alios lapidavere; Novissime autem misit ad eos filium suum, diciens, Reverebrantur filium meum; hoc est enim ultimum refugium.*

Thus our Lord God sent first his Prophets, to pacifie the Rebellion of men; of whom when part were slaine, and part despised, he came at last himselfe in person. It is therefore the best course, to try first all other wayes, before a Prince expose himselfe amongst Rebels; for if he should be slighted, there then remains no further refuge. *Quod aliud subdium, S Imperatorem prohibent?* and therefore Galba had counsell given him, to try the mindes of the Praetorian Souldiers, being in mutiny, by some other: *Nec per ipsum Galbam suum integrae aut horum remedii servabatur; and so much the more, because the Prince being away, the Souldiers perhaps will beare respect to his Ministers; as fearing otherwise, least the Prince may seek to be revenged: but if the Prince goe himselfe in person, and be killed; what feare can they have of any to revenge it? Whereupon it is written in Saint Matthew, *Hic est bares, venite occid. eum; et occupemus hereditatem ejus.* To this may bee added, that if Tiberius had gone himselfe to these Armies, he must have beene forced to cut in pieces the whole Legions: for if the Army in Germany should have stood upon such termes with him, as it did with Germanicus, he must for his honours sake have made them resent it in a very great degree; and could never have condescended to many things which Germanicus granted: *Majus anim quid A Principe expectatur: see-
ing there are many things tolerated by Generalls of Armies, which if the Prince were there himselfe, would never be tolerated. Whereupon, when Moses prayed God that he would be the Armies Guide into the Land of Promise; He answered him, I will send an Angell to be their Guide; for if I should goe my selfe, and the Army happen to rebell, I should be forced utterly to destroy them. Non enim ascendam te, quia populus dura cervicis est; ne forte disperdam te in vici; and therefore Princes oftentimes should avoid such encounters, that they may not aggravate their Subjects faults. And for this, Germanicus said, he would send away Agrippina from the Army, lest her death should be the more grievous for aggravating the Souldiers fault. And Ieromie, when the Synagogue went about to kill him, seemed to grieve for nothing so much, as that his death should aggravate their offence. Cognoscite, quia si occideritis me, sanguinem tradetis contra vos metipsos. Lastly, if there were no other reason for it, this one would much prevale with me: that a Prince come newly to his State, and but ill beloved of all, should upon no occasion stirre out of the Citie, and specially in his beginning; seeing the presence of the Prince is of greatest force to hinder Rebellions. Whereupon it is no marvell, that Pisboia rebelled against A. guccio of Fagivola, as soone as they saw him gone out of the Citie. And likewise Florence against Charles the King of France his brother. And the people of Israel fell one time to mutiny, for no other cause, but because their Leader Moses was gone from them, being called up by our Lord God into Mount Sinai. If then the people of Israel so much bound to Moses, and after so many yeares, who had freed them from the bondage of Egypt, had nourished them with Manna in the Wildernesse, had made water flow out of Rocks, and many such like benefits, yet onely because he
he was gone up to Mount Sinai to speake with God for their good, could finde in their hearts to rebell: what would have beene done against a Tyrant, a perfidious man, an enemy of the Citie; and in the beginning of his Empire, if he had gone into Germany to pacifie those tumults? and so much the more, as not having any trusty person to leave behind him in his stead, for the Senate was his enimie; his mother repented that ever she holpe him to the Empire: and as for the Traytours Seianus, what trusting was there to him? And indeed, if there had bee any whom he might have trusted, it would have done him no good; no more then it did Moses to leave Aaron in his place. Also Abimelech Prince of the Sichemites, going out of the City, in the beginning of his Empire, left in it his assured friend Zabbul, yet it did him no good; for no sooner was he gone, but the people mutinied, and made Gaal their Prince; as plainly appears in the Book of Judges. So as we may conclude, Tiberius should have hazarded himself exceedingly if he had left, and thereby lost the City of Rome: which he knowing (faith Tacitus) Fixumque Tiberio sult, non amittere caput Imperii. For, having the Senate and people his enemies; Those for taking away their Liberty, Those for taking away their Authority; and then the Armies in mutiny, and calling upon Germanicus to be Emperour, he might well thinke, that if Germanicus had once seen him out of Rome, he would never have refused the Empire in choler. To this I adde; that though Tiberius had beene sure of the Citie of Rome, yet he had no reason to put himselfe into the hands of the Army; which having intended to kill the Legates, and Germanicus himselfe, plainly shewed, they had cast off all respect and reverence. No in collusione verum Majestatem suam consumelius offerre.

As for the reasons before alleagdged, they are of no force;
forces to say, that Majestie is able to appease tumults: 

Ire ipsum & opponere Majestatem imperatoriam debuisse:

for Majestie when it is not accompanied with force, runnes always a hazard; at least, for the most part, as was seene in the Prophets, who came unarmed; which the Romane Souldiers well perceived, in a discord they had with the people: In which Livy faith, 

Huic tanta tempestasi cum se consules obtulissent, facile 

experti sunt, parum tutam Majestatem sine viribus esse: 

seeing (as he faith a little after) there is not a more weake thing then Majestie is, when it is alone. Nibil contemptius, neque infirmius, si sunt qui contemnunt. Yet I say not but that Majestie may do some good at a first brunt, before it be found to be nothing but a shadow without substance, consisting onely in opinion. I doe not therefore marvell that the Emperour Rodolphus passing in his Coach to the Army that was in mutiny, without staying a jott, in manner of a lightening, was able to quiet it. For so also it succeeded well with Caius Fabius, who passed from the Capitoll to the Mount, where he meant to sacrifice, thorough the French Army, in habit of a Priest; seeing it was done in so short a time, and upon such a sudden, as they had not space to take notice of it: Whereupon we see, that Ferdinand of Arragon, going forth amongst the people in a tumult, suddenly appeaied it; but then upon consideration of this reason, he presently returned into his Castle. And for this it was, as I conceive, that when Drusus had quieted the Legions of Illyricum, he would not stay the comming of the Embassadours; but instantly went away to Rome: Whereupon those old Senatours, who at the first taking of Rome, stayed in their houses in their Senatours Robes, were by the majesty of their persons for a little time defended; but it was not long ere the French perceived that this majesty of theirs was without any power, onely in opinion.
on; so as they began at first to scorn them, and at last to kill them.

It may therefore be concluded, that to trust to Majesty without force, is a dangerous business; and therefore Tiberius meaning tacitly to answer the objection, said, Majestate sola, cui est longinquo major reverentia; meaning to shew, that Majesty doth not the like good near hand, as it doth a farre off; seeing the further it is off, the greater it growes; the nearer it comes, it growes the lesser. This was plainly seen, when Scipio and Lucius Quintius standing in competition for the Consulship, it was given to Lucius Quintius, for no other cause but this: whereas Livy saith, Accedebat quod alter decimum jam prope annum assiduus in oculis hominum fuerat: queres minus reverendos magnos homines ipsa satietate factis. And of this, besides Examples, there may be given Philosophical reasons: The first, because reverence to a man farre off, must needs grow from Fame; and Fame cannot come, but it must needs passe by the mouthes of many: so as the first mouth which begins to relate it to another, alwayes addes something out of love and affection to him, whose actions he relates: and the second mouth when it comes to his turne, cannot relate againe, without adding something of his owne; and so that other to another, In infinitum. Seeing we consist of parts that have a naturall instinct, never to returme things in the same manner they receive them, without imparting something of theirs: so the stomack converts the meate into Chylus; the liver, the Chylus into bloud; and so from hand to hand: Whereupon, not without cause it is said of Fame, that it increaseth as it flyes, like a snow-ball falling from a hill; which, though little at first parting, yet every place where it passeth adding snow unto it, it growes at last to a huge bignesse; and this greatnesse it gets by removing farre off from its beginning.

Another
Another reason, if I be not deceived, may be drawn from the conception of the understanding, as being able to form in it self a conceit of things, more or less perfect, then it is it self; If of things more perfect, then it forms a conceit more imperfect, as while it conceives God: If of things less perfect, then it forms a conceit more perfect; and therefore in God's understanding, all things are in such a manner, as he himself is. In understanding, materiall and sensible things are much more perfect then they are in themselves: the understanding being more perfect, because spiritual, whereupon all Philosophers hold, that the pattern of a House is more perfectly represented in the understanding, then the fabric of the House it selfe is in existence: so as by this reason, it is plain, that a thing is greater contemplated then seen: And so it followes, That the Majestie which is contemplated, as represented onely to the understanding, is greater then that which is beheld, as presented to the sense. Whereupon the Prophet Esai, meaning to shew, who they are would follow Christ most; I say, Et qui non audierunt contemplati sunt; as though he would say, that they wert most like to admire the Majestie of Christ, who had neither heard him, nor seen him, but only contemplated him. Plato therefore spake not idly when he said, That love encreaseth by remotenesse; in regard of the Idea. And Aristotle said well, That when men are not knowne, they are reverenced; and when knowne slighted: which was found true in Saul, who when at first he was chosen King, the people desired infinitely to see him; and assoone as they saw him, they began to despise him.

It is therefore manifest enough, that remotenesse is an encrease; and by the contrary, that nearenesse is a diminisher: For the vulgar sort, of whom we now spake,
speake, judgeth things according to sense, from without and in the barke; so as comming to have those things to be present, which they conceived to be great; and not judging them answerable to their expectation, they quickly grow to contemne them, and count all but fables they had heard of them: Therefore our Lord God knowing that this race of people stands onely upon apparences, he gave them Saul to be their King; which Procopius relating, upon those words; Fœnetet me quod constituerim Saulem, saith, Saulem eligis propter egregiam sìaturam; non quod ipse qui omnium est Opifex, tantì eam faceret: sed propter populum; quia ea que sensibus apparent pulchra, tantum inspiciit; et admiratur.

This also may happen thorough mens defects, as well in their mindes as bodies; seeing there is no man so perfect, but he hath some defect or other, which Fame carryes not abroad, but Nearenesse discovers. No marvel therefore that the common people of Rome, seeing Galba not to be so handsome a man as Nero, began to despise him: which happened alfo to Lewis the eleventh. With good reason then, and notably well did Tiberius make answer to the objection of the Citie; Ire ipsum, opponere Majestatem: by saying, Majestate salva; cui è longinquò major Reverentia.
De sentencia legatiStatuunt tempus, quo seditionis cumque et seditioni promptum ferro invadant. Tune signa inter sedana, trahant contubernia, eruidat ignarum.

That to punish sedition Souldiers by the Souldiers own hands is very profitable and that ministers for the most part in punishment exceed their limits.

The eighth and fortieth Discourse.

As soon as Germanicus had punished the heads of those Legions that were amongst the Cauai, those other Legions which were governed by Catinia went away to the Tobi, whereas Germanicus taking great indignation, was preparing to oppress them by force; who thus voluntary had revolted from him, yet he would first send letters to Catinia, advertising him, that if the Souldiers did not themselves punish their seducers, he would come upon them with his Army, and kill both good and bad together; when they who were free from the contagion heard this, they determined between themselves (yet with Catinia's consent) to kill all those Souldiers that had any hand in the Rebellion, and after the signe given for the Execution, they fell with great confusion to cut in pieces, as well good as bad, in such sort, that Germanicus coming to the Camp, with tears reproved them, for so severely executing his will, and passing their bounds.

By occasion of this passage, there are many things that offer themselves to be discoursed of; the first, what the occasion was, why in the former Rebellion, only the Heads were punished, and in this were punished all that any way were guilty of it; Secondly, whether this way of punishing by their own Companions be good.
The eight and fortieth Discourse.

good. Thirdly and lastly, by occasion of these soldierys, who in punishing their Companions, farre exceeded the command given them; we will see whether this happen not also in the Officers of Princes, and why for the most part, they punish more, and reward lesse than they are commanded.

Concerning the first, there was great reason why these should be more severely punished than the other, because having their Example before them, they yet persisted in the same rebellious courses, as Tacitus shews in these words, At Germanicus quamquam contratto exercitu, et parata in defectors ubique, dandum adhuc spatium ratus, fi rectemi exemplo sibi ipsi consulerent. But seeing their Example did not mend them, they were justly punished more than the other. So God punished Lamech more than Cain, and yet Lamech had not killed a brother, but only because he was not amended by the others Example, and thus Theophylact upon Saint Matthew expounds it in those words, Ut veniat super vos omnium sanguis iustus, qui effunditur super terram, et sanguine Abel iusti, utque ad sanguinem Zacharias, whereupon this Author faith, super Judeos illos, qui tunc erant, dicit, veniat omnium sanguis in iustitie effusus, plus enim puniuntur quam patres sui, nam neque post tanta exempla emendati fuerunt, sed enim Lamech post Cain, plus enim punitus fuit, licet non interemisset fratrem, eo quod non suisset ad exemptum Cain emendatus. Good reason therefore had Germanicus to have them be more punished, who were not amended by having an Example before their eyes, so Scipio Africanus did, and many others: but because contrariwise, the first oftentimes are more punished than the second, as was seen in Anania and Saephyra, in the Acts of the Apostles; in the Deluge, in the subversion of Sodome, & infinite many in our time, who committing the same faults, yet have not the same punishments, (I speak not of the Eternal) I would therefore make
The eight and fortieth Discourse.

make distinction, either it is the same party that commits both faults, and then the Law is, he should be more punished, for the second time offending, or else they are several parties, and then, either of faults committed against some new Law, and then the first are more to be punished than the second, to the end there may grow no abuse, and that the Law with more care may be observed, or else we speak of faults committed against a Law already established, and then the second is more to be punished than the first, in regard of the Example he hath before him. To come finally to the particular of these Rebellions; if the first time, the fault be severely punished, it will be a cause, that hardly it will be committed the second time; but if by ill fortune, it be committed, and they rebel the second time, there will be then little hope to quiet them; because the fear to be punished, as at the first time, will hinder them from quiching; and if in the first insurrection there be not used an excess of rigour, it will be an occasion, they will easily make insurrection the second time, but yet it will be easier then to quiet them, as it hapned to Scipio.

Concerning the second, to punish the seditious by the soldiery own hands, is occasion of many laudable effects. First, the hatred goes always against them that set the punishment, and therefore when the Army now quieted, would have Germanicus to punish the offendours, he answered, Ipsa exequionis, whereof Tacitus a little after shewing the reason, faith, Nec Caesar aresbat, (meaning that had done the slaughter) Quando modo spus jusse, penes eosdem seditia facti, et iridiceras.

A second reason is, that seeing all the seditious cannot be punished, but only the Heads; unless he should destroy the whole Army, it seems like if the baser sort be not punished, it will give them means to be
The eight and fortieth Discourse.

be able, and occasion to be ready upon every light
distaste to mutiny again, which by punishing the
Heads by the proper hands of the multitude, will be
remedied and prevented, because they will finde none
afterward forward to incite them, when they see such
an Example of their ungratefulnesse towards them
that incited, and were their Heads before, and
of themselves, they will be never able to make any in-
novation, Nihil auturam plebem principibus amari.

Thirdly, because the Generall by this means will
remove the hatred which might grow by such slaugh-
ters, from himselfe to the soldiers; this way John Ben-
tivoglio in Bolonia took, when being advertised by his
Adversary Duke Valentine, that many of the principall
of the City had a meaning to receive him into Bol-
nia with an Army, which perhaps Valentine did, to the
end that Bentivoglio might shed the blood of his No-
bles, and thereby make the Heads of them his En-
emies, and finally be murthered by them, but the giving
credit to what Valentine writ, cauſed his son Hermes
and the greater part of the young Nobles of Bolonia
to go and commit those slaughters, to the end that
they imbruing their hands in the blood of Bentivog-
glio his Enemies might run the same fortune with
himselfe, and consequently never after abandon their
Prince, because if he should chance to be driven out,
they might be sure themselves to fare no better; so as
Bentivoglio made that a means to make himselfe se-
cure, which Valentine intended should have made him
odious. Herod fearing John the Baptist, and meaning
to put him to death, invited to supper all the principall
men of Galile, to the end that they also might have a
part in the slaughter, and thereby be tied to defend
him, if there should be need, of which the holy Text
in Saint Marke faith, Herodes autem metuebat Johannes,
scies eum virum iustum & sanctum;优秀的moste etcum;
Fourthly, the Souldiers which were no partakers in the Rebellion are the gladder, if they can wash their hands in the blood of the offenders; *Latasit tur justus, cum videris vindictam, manus suas lavabit in jangue peccatoris*. Whereupon in that first sedition, when the Souldiers had killed them that were guilty, as though that slaughter were their own absolution, they rejoiced; *Gaudebat cadibus miles, tanquam semet absolveret*.

It remains to shew whether it be true, that Officers in execution of punishments use to exceed their commission:
The eight and fortieth Discourse.

commission: and that it is true, is plainly shewed by Saint John in the Apocalypse, where a voice saying to the seven Angels, *Ite et effundite septem phialas ire Dei internam*: they went and poured them out, not only upon the land, but upon the rivers also, upon the fountains, upon the sea, and even upon the sun: upon the same occasion, in another place of the Apocalypse, an Angel cried aloud to four Angels, to whom power was given to hurt the Earth and the Sea, saying, *Nolite nocere terræ & mari neque arboribus*: he needed not have said, *arboribus*, seeing those Angels had power to hurt but only the Earth and the Sea, he therefore cried so (as a Writer observes) because he saw those Angels interpreted the power given them to hurt in too large a sense, as meaning to hurt not only the Earth and the Sea, but the trees also; or perhaps he doubted, lest as Officers interpret always too largely the power given them to inflict punishments, so they should interpret too narrowly, the power given them to bestow benefits; whereupon he thought it not enough to say, *Nolite nocere terræ & mari*, and therefore added, *neque arboribus*: so also in Esay, our Lord God commanded that the Israelites should be humbled by the King of the Assyrians, and he intended to destroy them, God commanded him to tread upon them, and he went about to put them all to the sword.

This therefore is an ordinary thing with Officers to restrain favours, and in large punishment, which grows upon this, because as building their fortunes upon the Princes treasure and honours, they think everything lost to themselves which is given to another, and therefore always interpret favours narrowly, and punishments largely, as well to second the Prince in his anger, and make him the more gracious to themselves, as taking to heart the wrongs that are offered him, as also to make the delinquents faults seem greater
greater than they are; to the end, the Prince seeing them so cruel to them, that so perniciously had wronged him, may take notice how faithfully they are in his service, and how much they resent his injuries.

Iunetoque Ponte tramittit duodecim millia
Legionibus sex, & viginti socias cohortes, octo
Equitum Alas, quorum ea seditione inter-
merata modestia fuit.

Whether an Army be apt to rebel, that consists of one Na-
tion only, or that which consists of many.

The nine and fortieth Discourse:

By occasion of auxiliary Souldiers, (which for any thing can be gathered from the forealleaged words of Tacitus) stood alwayes quiet, and kept themselves in good order, when the Roman Legions oftentimes fell into seditions; I am drawn to think, that Armies composed of divers Nations, are lesse apt to be mutinous than those which are all of one Nation; having a manifest Example thereof in the Army of Hannibal, which being composed of an infinite number of Nations, differing in Language, in customes, in Religion, yet they never mutinyed nor rebelled, although they had a thousand times occasion; by the many wants they suffered, which Livy wondred at; saying, Quippe qui cum in hostium terra, per annos tred-
cim jam procul à domo, varia fortunabillem gereret; exer-
citum non suo civilis est mixto ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis, alius habi-
tus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope
diis effent, itaque quodam uno vinculo copulaverit eos, ut nulla
 nec inter ipsos, nec adversus ducem sedition estis. The

reason
reason of this is, because being of divers language, they do not so easily accord, and if one part should happen to mutiny, it is easy to oppose it with another, which either through emulation, or some other cause, can seldom times be brought to agree together; besides it happens, because if one of those Nations chance to mutiny, and abandon the Army, yet the Army will not be much weakened by it, as a thousand times hath been seen in Flanders in the King of Spain's Armies, and other places. When Hannibal meant to passe into Italy, the Carthaginians forsook him, and he making shew he had given them leave, made no matter of it, and his Army was not thereby weakened, where if his Army had consisted of one Nation, he had never been able to passe into Italy. And this Ludovico il Moro found, against whom when his Army rebelled, which consisted all of Swifers, he was forced to loose his state, and be taken prisoner.

But if by ill fortune an Army consisting of divers Nations happen to mutiny, as it is hard to happen; so if it happen, it is impossible to appease it, of which the Carthaginians had a notable experience, when having an Army of that sort, they wanted not much of loosing their whole state, and Carthage it selfe. The reason is, because there cannot be speeches made to the whole Army when it consists of divers Languages, as there might be if it consisted but of one.

An Army then, if only one Nation is more apt to mutiny, but is withall more easie to be quieted; an Army of divers Nations is lesse apt to mutiny, but if it mutiny, is impossible to be quieted: moreover, it is to be known, that as such Armies seldom grow tumultuous against their Commanders, so amongst themselves, there grow tumults often, and of these cases Histories are full, their being alwayses disord where there are divers Nations. Rebecca being great
with childe by Iſaak, and having in her woumbbe Jacob
and Efau, she felt a great striving of these two fonnes,
which put her to much pain, whereof complaining to
our Lord God, he answered, Dua gentes sunt in uero
two, ex duobus populis, ventrae tuo dividetur: as though
he would say, Maruell not if they strive together, see-
ing they are two divers Nations, which thou hast in
thy body.

That to passe from one extreme to another is dangerous,
and how it happens that successours commonly take courses
differing from their predeceſsours.

To passe from one extreme to another without
comming to the middle, not only is dangerous,
but in many things is held impossible; as in
motion, in such manner that some Divines deny, that
Angels can move from one extreme to another, with-
out passing by the middle, so as Hipocrates with good
reason in his book of Aphorismes, mislikes the pas-
fing from a suffet to a diet, and yet a suffet is bad, a diet
good, but the passing from a suffet to a diet is most
dangerous, whereof Aristote in one of his Problemes,
brings Dionysius the Tyrant for an Example, who in
the siege of his City, forbearing to eat and drinke as
he was wont, by this passing from Intemperance to
Temperance, he fell into a Leprofe. What is worse
than a corrupt Common-wealth? What better than a
regall Government? yet he that hath gone about to
passe from the one to the other, as it were at one jumpe, either it hath not been successful, or it hath not been durable: whereupon we see that Musicians will not make a passage from a Discord (as a seventh) to a perfect Concord, as a fifth, without passing first to a sixth, and when they mean to make good a second, they goe to a third, and not to an eighth. By these degrees the Common-wealth of Rome came to a regall power; for from a Democracy, it passed to an Oligarchy; from that, to the Government of One; and this One not willing to make that jumpe, contented himselfe to be called Dictator, for if he had been called King, he had run a manifest hazard, as was plainly seen, when Antonius would have put a Crown upon his head; and indeed Cicero said, that Antonius' tongue calling him King, was more the occasion of Cæsar's death than Brutus' his dagger. After him comes Augustus, and Cæsar having passe from one extreme, it was now easie for him to passe toward the other extreme, and therefore he was able after taking upon him the Tribunitiall dignity, to take upon him also that of Emperour; but he came not full out to the other extreme; seeing hee carried himselfe as a companion, an equall, and as it were a Citizen with the rest, at least in shew; as leaving some authority to the people, and deliberating in a manner of all things with the Senate. After Augustus came Tiberius, and he was able fullily to reach the other extreme; but yet not all at once: For, first he raised himselfe from equality; then he took from the people that little authority they had, and then lastly would be feared, and acknowledged for Prince. Alia Tiberio morum via: sed populum per tot annos molliter habitum, nondum audebat ad duriora venerare.

Augustus then, a Prince of that Prudence, as every one knows, not onely ordained new sports for recreation
of the people, but he in person would be present at them. Tiberius, on the contrary, an excellent man, full of all the State wisdome, that can be in a Prince, was farre from delighting in the sports, yet durst not take them quite away. Whereupon, it should seeme to him that would consider these things to the full, that one of them did doe well, the other ill: seeing of two contraries, when one is good, the other must needs be bad. Yet, I am of opinion that both of them did well, and if they had done otherwise, they would have met with difficulties. For, as for Augustus, there was reason, that the people, who for so many yeares had beene soyled with continuall warres, should be refreshed with some recreations, as Augustus did, by ordaining of sports, and himselfe oftentimes to be present at them, that he might not at first shew that inequality, from which but a fewe yeares before he had beene raised: But because, as after a cruel Prince, if there come another that is cruel, he easie, by reason of the peoples hatred, runnes a hazard: So if after a Prince so milde, that rules onely with love, there come another Prince of like nature, he easie falls into contemt, and thereby stands in hazard of his state. It was therefore necessary, that Tiberius, to make a compleat setting of his power, should use a little rigour; and differing from Augustus, should shew how much a Prince differs from a private person, by getting himselfe not onely love, but fear also; which cannot well be maintained by him that carres himselfe mildly, and suffers himselfe to be often seen. Tiberius then, being to use a diverse manner, hee could not in thole beginnings, Adiutoria mente saeclum, (as I have said) that passing from one extreme to another, is extremly dangerous, and was it that ruined Galba; for the people, and the Souldiers being accompted to the bounty of Nero, finding themselves upon a suddaine
Pompilius was most differing from Romulus. David, a war-like man, had for his Successour Salomon a peaceable man. To Moſea Law-giver, succeeded Jofua a warior. I forbeare to bring moderne Examples, as a thing odious; and looke, that every one should of himſelfe consider, that he who in a government succeeds another that is cruell, is commonly mercifull; and he who succeeds one that is growne odious to the people, makes himſelfe commonly odious to the Nobility. And this is so true, that I think it more needfull to seek out the reason, then to doubt the effect; and although the search of it be difficult, yet I would lay first, that every one having a certaine inbred desire to outgoe his Predecessour, which is a thing easier to be done, in matters wherein he either excelled not, or did ill, they betake themſelves to a contrary course. Whereupon, if Numa Pompilius would have gone about to exceed Romulus in warre, he had never attained it; but
but to excel him in Religion, which by his Predecessours was little esteemed, was easily done. Drusus also going into Germany; if he would have meant to exceed his Predecessour Germanicus in glory of Armes, it would not perhaps have succeeded with him; but to exceed him in art and stratagem, is easily succeeded. From hence it is why many believed (as Plutarch relates) that Tiberius Gracchus, seeing he could never be able to exceed Flavius Posthumius in glory of warre, sought to get himselfe fame by peace; and by, bringing in new Laws among the people.

Secondly, Princes and Governours have before their eyes a Politicall passage, which is hold for an infallible rule; that Governours ought to imitate their Predecessour in things commended, and not to imitate him in things distafted: and so much Nero in Tacitus promised to doe. And therefore a Prince, finding that his Predecessour had made every one his enemy thorough cruelty, he too much desiring to avoid the like, endeavours by all means to win their love with mildness; into which he transports himselfe, sometimes so farre, that to avoid hatred, he falls into contempt.

Thirdly, Princes and Governours carry a certaine envy towards their Predecessours, and desire to be more beloved then they: whereupon for example, if the Predecessour were beloved of the Nobility, he will seeke to be beloved of the people, by being their protector. First, because the people will be gladder of his comming to be Prince, then the Nobility will be; as those that cannot looke for more at this Princes hands, then they had at the others; and consequently cannot chuse but new some passion, at either the death, or at the departing of the Predecessours: which how odious a thing it is to a new Prince, Tacitus teacheth us, where he shews, that after the death of Augustus, the Senatoris made shew to have no leffe joy, in
The one and fiftieth Discourse.

The new Prince, than they had in the old: As Rome ruere in Servitium Consules, Patres, Eques: quanto quia Illustrior, tanto magis fals ac fefthinantes, vulnique com- postio; ne leti excessus Principis, ne trisiores primordio lachrymas, gaudium, questus, Adulationes miscebant.

Secondly, because it is more easie to content the part oppressed, then the part advanced, as every one knows; and thus much for this.

Simul Segestes ipse ingens visu, & me- moria bonæ societatis impavidus; verba ejus in hunc modum suere.

What course is to be used in demanding Peace, and when is the fit time:

The one and fiftieth Discourse.

S egestes boldly and without any feare, being brought before Germanicus, with great confidence delivers his Speech; though it might bee doubted, he had a hand in the death of Varro, and of the three Legions that were with him: and because this place of Tacitus contains in it many Arguments of Discourse; I will first examine, when it is a fit time for men to seek friendship with their Enemies, and in what manner they ought to excuse themselves; and though I may seeme to goe aftray from this place of Tacitus, yet I will not omit to explain the words it contains; that we may see why Segestes speaking of himselfe, spake with great boldnesse: and comming afterward to speake of his sonne, with great humblenesse craves pardon. Pro Inventa & errore filii, eumiam pre- cor. Wherein wee may see, how men that desire to cleare themselves of any thing laid to their charge, ought to treat for procuring of Amity.
The one and fiftieth Discourse.

Such men therefore, either they have committed some fault, or they have not: if they have committed any fault, either they were at first friends, and afterwards are become enemies; or else they have been always enemies. If they have been always enemies, either they have been Principal, or but Adherents. Beginning then with the last; if these enemies that desire to become friends, were only Adherents; they may then doe it, by abandoning their friends in danger without any cause given them; but then withall, they must doe it with much blushing, or else will never be accepted. Seeing hee becomes for ever odious to the world, whosoever is stained with such a blot; as was seen in Bernardino Corte of Pavia; who being left by Ludovico Moro, to keep the Castle of Milan, tendered it up to Lewis the twelfth, and finding himselfe afterward blamed for it of the French themselves; he died with griece. I cannot forbear to relate an example of hatred that is borne to Traytors; which Guicciardine reports in the person of Bourbon, whom the King of Spaine imploied, to require a Captaine to deliver up his Pallace to the King of Spaine; who answered, he could not deny the King; but that as soon as Bourbon was gone out of it, he would set it on fire; as a place infected, and unworthy to be inhabited by men of honour. It is true, that this answer, in my opinion, contained under it another mysterie, which I cannot now examine, as being out of my roade; and therefore will leave it for the Reader to consider it of himselfe. This at least is a cleare case; that Traytors are odious even to those, in whose favour they have done the Treason; whereasof many reasons may be given. And first, a reason taken from the danger they incurre, who keepe such fellows about them; and are like to do as much to them as they have done to others: seeing a man that is growne infamous, cannot do better, then to make
make a gaine of his infamy; as the Lawgiver said, speaking of Harlots. Secondly, because Obligation is a heavy burthen, which men willingly disburthen themselves of, asloone as they finde any little colour likely to doe it: A Prince therefore being obliged to one for becomming a Traytour for his service, payes him willingly with becomming ungratefull for his reward; and thinks the hatred that is borne to Traytors is colour enough for it. A third reason may be taken from the pleasure men seeme to take, in overcomming rather by Force, than by Fraud; and therefore oftentimes they kill the Traytors. So the Sabines did to the daughter of Spurius Tarpeiu, who had opened to them the Castle of Rome: Seu ut ri capta Arx videretur. So the Romans taking the Fortresse of Tarentum, by the treason of the Brutii, put them all to the sword. Brutii quoque multi interfeci, seu per errorem, seu veteres in eos infto odio; seu ad proditionis funam, ut vi potius atque armi captum Tarentum videretur. Fourthly, they are so odious, that they are alwayes in danger, in regard of the Example; for if Princes should make much of them, and hold them in any account; they should give an Example to encourage others to doe the like to themselves: This reason Livy also allledgeoth in the fore-laid case of the Sabines; Seu prodendi Exempli causa, ne quid us quam fidum proditori effet.

Lastly, Segestes faith of such, Nam proditores etiam sus quos anteponunt invisos: and in truth, these reasons are so cleare, that I should marvell there could be any Traytours; if it were not for the force which particulars have to darken an understanding, that is cleare in universals.

Secondly, this may happen for some ill usage from them, to whom he adheres; and in such case, he may speak without blushing: but yet he ought not to staine his honest parting with taking reward. And so much
The one and fiftieth Discourse.

much Indibile did, when passing with his Soldiers from the Carthaginians to the service of Scipio; he rather excused himself for abandoning his friends; then expected thanks for the ayde he brought. Whereof Livy faith; Propiorque excusandi transitionem, ut necessarium; quam gloriamque eo velut primam occasionem raptam: Seire enim transfuga nomen extcrabile conturbibus sociis nonis suspicium esset: neque enim se reprehendere nunc hominum, si tam anceps odium causa non nomen faciat: Merita deinde sua in Duces Carthaginenses memoravit: anaritium contra eorum superbiamque, et omnis genera injurias in se, atque popularas. Inque corpus duntaxat suum ad id tempus apud eos suiisse: animum jambriam ibi esse, ubi jus ubi credere colli: se id Scipionem orare; ut transitus ibi, nec fraudi apud coniun, nec honore sit. Likewise Segestes in his speech to Germanicus, amongst other principal things he faith, this is one, that he had not left his friends to get reward; Neque ob præmium, sed ut me persidia solvam: but because, knowing Peace to be more profitable, he advised those people to give over warre: and Anthony, who by meanes of his faction prevailed, thought the contrary; therefore for his owne safety, and that he might not be oppressed, he had left that side, and was come to the Romans. The very like to this doth Livy relate of Appius Clatus; who advised the Sabines not to enter into warre with the Romans; and finding he was not able to withstand the faction, which perswaded the contrary, he went away to Rome; Cum Pacis ipse Author, a turbuoribus bellipremessur; nec par factioni esset; ab luctu Regido magna cliuem comitatus malm, Roman transfugis.

Thirdly, it may happen by his being dead, to whom he adhered; and then, though the case may seem more difficult, yet it is more easie; at least, if he can make it appeare, that he adhered to the other, more for love to him, then for any hate to the contrary side;
and in such case he may speak boldly, and the more boldly the better. Herod the great had followed the fortune of Antonius until his death, not for any hate he bore to Augustus, whom he never knew, but for the love he bore to Marke Antony, from whom he had received benefits; after whose death he feared not to present himself before Augustus, to whom he spake with a gravity becomming a King, and by this means was received of Augustus into a firme league of friendship: the reason of this is, because the cause of their enmity being ceased, which was the love to the person now dead, and the profit growing by him, they will think to have them hereafter their true friends: as conceiving they will be the same to them as they were to the other before, whereupon we read in Tacitus that Otho seeing how faithful Celsus had been to his enemy: Galba, took him out of the hands of the Souldiers, by putting him in prison, and then gave him a charge, and held him as his special friend, and Celsus served him as faithfully, as he had served Galba. Celsus constantiter servante erga Galbam fidei crimen confessus, exemplum utro imputavit, nec Otho quae ignosceret, sed ne hostis metum reconciliationis adhiberet, statim intra intimos amicos habuit, & mox bello inter duces dilegit, mannifi, Celsus fidelis fataliter, etiam pro Othone fides integra & infelix.

Such then as these shall not need to make any excuses, but onely shew the love they bore, and the faithfulnesse they used towards their friends now dead, and that they did nothing for any hatred they bore to this side, but for the love they bore to the other; out of this respect I conceive it was, that Cesar pardoned all those that had borne Armes against him, saying, that they who had taken part with Pompey out of friendship add one him no wrong: to these things may be added, the force that a free confessing hath, not onely
in this case, but in all other) to procure one's pardon; and the Reason is, because one cannot voluntarily confess an error, but he must withall at the same time commend and praise him to whom he confesseth it, seeing no man would willingly confess an error, if he did not hope it would be pardoned: and out of such hope he grows confident, and falls to praising the Prince for his clemency; things of great force to move one to pardon: whereupon not without mystery, the word *Confiteor* in the holy Text signifies not onely to confess, but also to praise: and we see that our Lord Christ, who being without sin needed not to make Confession to his Eternall Father, yet notwithstanding he said, *Confiteor tibi Domine caeli et terrae*; which means nothing (as Saint Austin and all the Fathers expound it) but, I praise thee Eternall Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth. We may justly say then, that this word *Confiteor* signifies as well To praise, as to confess, seeing in confessing, one is praised. And thus much for Adherents.

Now concerning a Principall: if he have been always an Enemy, either it is in time of war, or in time of peace; if in war, either he is superior, or inferior, if superior, either he knows he is able to hold out, or else he doubts he is like to go down: if he know he be able to hold out, he ought not then to seek after amity; and therefore the Romans meaning to destroy Carthage refused peace: but if he doubt himself, and finde difficulties in it, he shall then do well to accept of peace, if it be required. This made Lutatius the Consul (as Polybius relates) after he had overcome the Carthaginians by sea, not to refuse peace when it was offered him by Amilcar, because he found these were many difficulties yet remaining, before he could get an absolute victory; rather if he stand in doubt he shall come to be inferior, he shall then do well; not onely to accept of peace,
peace, if it be required, but to require it himself: it is true, it is an hard matter to persuade men against reputation, whereupon we see, it succeeded not well with Hanno, when after the defeat the Romans had at Cannae, he counselleth the Carthaginians to demand peace; whose counsel was rejected, not so much for his being of a contrary faction to that of Hannibal, as for the reputation. I cannot therefore but account the Senate of Venice to be full of men of great wisdom, who after the victory the Christians had gotten in a naval battell, yet taking into consideration the depth of things, they made a peace with the Turke, accounting it leffe evil for the conservation of their State, to live in peace, than to be turmoiled with war.

But if such a one be inferior, either he knowes he is like to be inferior still, or else he is in hope to get the better; if thus, not onely he ought not to seek for peace, but not to accept it, if it be offered. Perseus having overcome the Romans in battail, by the advice of his friends demanded peace, but the Consul denied it. So Pyrrhus after he had won the first battail demanded peace, and was denied it. But if he be inferior, and hath no hope to get the better, he shall do well not to stay to the last, seeing as long as he hath any strength left, he may demand peace with the more boldnesse, and make the better conditions: So Hannibal before his last battail demanded peace of Scipio, with great majesty, where is a man stay till he beat the last cast, he must come as a suppliant, and aske with submission, and be fain to take what conditions he can get, and it is great foolery to go to aske pardon, with boasting of his merits, and standing upon terms. And this our Lord Christ expressed in the Parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, where the Publican humbly asking pardon for his sines was heard; and the Pharisee not, because instead of humbling himselfe
The one and fiftieth Discourse.

The reason of this saying is, because when one confesseth his errors he makes himself judge, and consequently him his advocate, to whom he confesseth, where he that speaketh with insolence makes himself his own advocate, and consequently him judge to whom he speaketh; whereupon so much it is better for a delinquent to make him he hath offended to be his advocate than his judge, so much it is better to ask pardon with humility than with boasting: and therefore, when after the Romans had entered Asia, and had gotten some victories, an Ambassador coming to Scipio from Antiochus, to demand peace, he was answered by Scipio, Quod Romanos omnes, quod me ad quan misit es ignoras minus miror, cum te fortunam eji a quo venis; ignorant cernam; Lysimachia temenda erat; ne Chersonesum inramem aut ad Hellespontum obstitendum, ne in Asiam transtum, si pacem a sollicitis de bello eventu petituri eratis, concessero vero in Asiam transisti, et non solum frons, sed etiam iugo accepto, quae disceptatio ex aquirum imperium patientum sit, reliqua est? And finally he gave him this counsel, Nuntia mei verbi, bello abstineat, paci conditionem nullam recuset. For this cause the Etolians did ill, to speak so boldly after they were brought to the last cast, and that they would not accept of such conditions of peace as the Romans offered them, seeing it is a meer foolery to stand upon terms with a Conqueror, as they at last perceived, when the Consul bringing out his Forces, they were glad to humble themselves, and abate their boldness; Tunc frater Phanae ferocia Etolis, alius est, et tandem cuju conditionis esset, sensere, et Phanaes se quidem, et qui adiunt Etolorum seire facienda esse, qua imperentur. There is therefore
in such cases no better course than to lay conditioning aside, and to put ones selfe into the victors hand, who no doubt will remit the more when he findes it is left in his power to do it: so Alorcus counselfed the Saguntines to do, that seeing they had now no hope left, they should rather put themselves into the victors hand, than stand upon conditioning; Haud despero, cum omnium potestas ei a rubis saltaxit, aliquid ex his rebus remissurum: which when the Saguntines would not do, they were all put to fire and sword.

I cannot omit by way of digression, to speak of a custome the Romans had; which at first sight seemes to have been a great error, and it is, that they offered the same conditions of peace in the uncertain beginning of a War, as after they had gotten an absolute victory; as by the answer of Scipio to the Ambassadors of Antiochus may appear, Romani eunhu que in deorum immortalium potestate erunt, ea habemus quae dii dederunt, animos, qui nostra menti sum; eosdem in omni fortuna gestimus, gerimus; neque eos secunda res exulcerunt, nec adversa mirum; ejusm rei, ut alios omnium, Annibalem vestrum rubis darem te ostem, nisi vos ipsos dare possem: posteaquam Hellepontum trajecimus, prins quam castra regia, prins quam aciem videremus, cum communis Mars, et incertus beli eventus esset, de pace rubis agentibus, quá pares paribus forebamus conditiones, eosdem nonc victores rütius ferimus. This way of doing served, it seemes, to no other purpose, but to encourage their Enemies, to eyment their fortune, till they should be brought to extremity, and I make no doubt but that Antiochus having before him the Example of the Carthaginians, would never be brought to accept conditions of peace till he was brought upon his knees with the War. To take away this difficulty, it would not suffice to answer, as Scipio said, that it came from generousnesse of spirit, that they altered not for fortune, seeing little
praise can be given to such a dangerous and prejudicial Generouſnesse, and therefore I should rather attribute the caufe to too great a greedinesse of getting that which is anothers; seeing the Romans made war with Antiochus, and with the Carthaginians, as thinking they could not be quiet, if the one were Lord of this side the mountain Fauros, and the other were posſess of Africke, and this being their motive, there is no doubt but the War would never end, till they had triumphed both over Africa, and over Asia: Whereupon when War is waged with such people, we must make account either to get the victory, or otherwise to be absolutely destroyed: and therefore when Samuel meant to shew Saul, that God intended to root out his Houſe, to the end he might know he would not pardon him till he were utterly destroyed, he called our Lord God by the Name of Triumpher. *Porro Triumphator in Israel non parcet*: as though he would say, as they who fight to triumph, do not pardon till they have utterly destroyed their Enemies, so O Saul, will our Lord God do with thee. But to return to our purpose, if they who would come to amity were friends before, and afterward become Enemies, they must then come with blushing and with great humblenesse, at least if they can shew no just occasion, but let them not then stay till they come to extremity, for then they will never be accepted: therefore the Captains did not, not to open their Gates to the Romans within the time given them; for when they were come to extremity, it availed not then to open their Gates, but all of them were miserably put to the fword.

The last case is of him that demands amity, and comes to excuse himselfe, as having never committed any fault, alwayes really been a friend, and never done them any wrong; and such an one may, or rather must speak boldly. Such a one was Segeſtes, who speaking
speaking of himselfe, *Memoria bone societatis impavidus*, never asked pardon. Such then may speak with confidence, and ought to be hearkened to of the Prince with patience: and this way was a great help to *Terentius in Tacitus*, who being accused for having had friendship with *Sejanus*, he confessed it boldly, shewing not only that he was his friend, but that he had laboured much to come to be so, as seeing him a Companion of *Cesar* in his Consulship, a Kinsman, an inward friend; and a stay of the Empire; and this constancy of his prevailed so far that not only he was pardoned, but his accusers also were ill intreated. *Saul* must pardon me, if I think he in this case, a more Tyrant than *Tiberius*, seeing when *Abimelech* the Priest was accused for giving *David* meat, and the sword of *Goliath*, and was charged for it by *Saul*, he made the like answer as *Terentius* did, *Et qui in omnibus servis suis *sicut* *David* *fidelis*, *et gener Regis, pergens in imperium*, *et gloriosus in domo tua*. But the boldness and innocency of *Abimelech* was not so great, but the cruelty of *Saul* was greater, who for this cause put him to death; certainly a most peridious act, seeing as I have said, and say still, He that is innocent & comes without fault, both ought to speak with boldnes, and ought to be heard with patience: and herein Princes should imitate our Lord God, who takes pleasure in such disputes, as *S. Austin* witnesseseth in his exposition of those words in the Psalme, *Jucundum sit eloquium meum*; which he readeth thus, *Suavis sit ei disputatio mea*; and then saith, *Ostendit Prophetæ suæ, Deo esse disputationem, & argumentationem gratam, qua post peccatorum pænitentiam sit, cum eo pias querelas proponendo & ire illius resistendo viriliter: *Sol* spake, pretending to be innocent, *Ad Omnipotentem loquar, & disputare cum Deo cupio*; and a little after addes, *Quis mihi tribusat ut cognoscam & inveniam illum, & inveniam usque ad folium ejus, ponam coram eo judicium, & os me-
The one and fifteene Discourse.

un reprehendo increationibus, ut seiam verba quae vbi respondeat. And therefore say having in his first Chapter laid, Labamini et mundi ostore: he addes, igitur es arguit me; which Saint Gregory interpreting, laugh; As si patienter dicat; repta agite, & animadversionis mea manus non jam per deprecationem gemittis, sed per fiduciam auctoris obviate: whereupon after, Job had said, Tadet animam meam vita mea: with great confidence he addes, Dicam Deo, Noli me condemnare, as the foresaid S. Gregory in a thousand places excellently observes: with good reason therefore Terentius spoke boldly to Tiberius, rather as disputing than as intreating; with good reason Segestes in our case showed he did not fear, seeing neither the one nor the other had committed any fault: whereupon there was no just cause that Tiberius should accept Terentius for his friend; and Germanicus, Segestes.

Ve quibus initis, quanta Tiberi arte, gravissimum exitium irrepserit, deum repressum sit; postremo arerit, cumque corripuerit, nolcatur.

With what cunning Tiberius introduced and augmented the Law of Treason.

Erfued by the foresaid words of Tacitus; in which he shewes what cunning Tiberius used to bring in the Law of Treason, I have much mused in what that cunning consisted, seeing neither Tacitus declares it, but would have us gather it out of the History our selves: neither can I think, I have fully apprehended his meaning; I will therefore only say that little which my weaknesse hath been able to conceive.
The two and fiftieth Discourse.

cieve of it, that some stronger brain may thereby the
more easily finde out the truth.

First then it might be said, that he used this cunning, when being asked, An judicia Majestatis redder-
rentur? He answered, Exercendas esse leges. The cunning consists in this, that being asked in a particular
which concerned onely himselfe, he answered in a
generall, which concerned the profit of the whole
City; as though he should say, for as much as con-
cernes me, which is the particular of Treason, I make
no reckoning; nor require any to be made; but as much
as concerns the Law, I would have that to be obser-
ved, seeing it is of great importance, that Lawes be
not abused: and in confirmation of this his will, he
granted pardons to all those who at that time were
accused of any crime; and consequently with great
sweetnesse gave a beginning to a most bitter thing;
because by his pardoning the Law was set on foot,
and he brought it in, with such a kinde of clemency,
that it remained ever after in the Princes power to
take it away again.

But in the introducing this Law by Tiberius, his
cunning may perhaps be better considered another
way; for understanding whereof, we must take into
consideration, two cases that are in Tacitus; the first,
is in this place, where Falanius and Ruberius being
both of them accused, Falanius for placing amongst
certain priests of Augustus one Cassius a Buffone; Ru-
berius for violating with perjury the name of Augustus;
Tiberius with divers wayes colouring their errour,
cleared them both; Scripsit consulibus, non ido decre-
tum Patri suo coelum, ut in perniciem civium is honor ver-
tetur, Cassium bi frimonem solutum, inter alios ejusdem artis
interesse ludis, quos mater sua in memoriam Augusti sacr
set: nec contrarreligiones fieri, quod effigies ejus, ut alia nu
minum simulachra, venditionibus hortorum; ac domum
accendat.
It was not long after, but Martellus was accused for speaking ill of Tiberius, whereat though he seemed a little angry, yet he suffered him notwithstanding to be acquitted. The second case we are to consider, is written in the second Book of his Annals, where Apuleia Varilla being accused of Adultery, & for speaking scandalous words of Augustus, of Tiberius and of Livia; he gave sentence, that for what she had spoken against Augustus she should be punished; but for what she had spoken against herself, he would have no matter made of it, and being then asked by the Consul, whether she should not be punished for the words spoken in disgrace of Livia, for that time he made no answer, but the day following he desired in his mother's name, that the words against her, might be no prejudice to Apuleia.

Now if these cases be well understood, we shall easily discover the cunning of Tiberius, which consisting in the way of introducing and enlarging the Lavy, hath need to take in a former consideration; and it is, that the Lavy of Treason, as concerning the name was in use also in the time of the Common-wealth, but contained not the same Heads, he only being then intended to fall into this crime, who practised anything against the Common-wealth, either by raising of Armies, or by making seditions amongst the People, never making reckoning of words, nor of such small matters, but only of hainous things, as Tacitus in this place delivers.

To come then to our purpose, Tiberius being asked, if he would have the Lavy of Treason to be observed, answered, the Lavves must be observed, as though he would say, he would have them in use, as they were in the time of the Common-wealth: whereof he gave a proof in the first case, where Augustus and
and Livia, and himselfe being injured, he pardoned all: and so you see the birth of the Law. Afterward in the second case, where himselfe and Augustus and Livia were injured, where in the first he had said, Deorum injurias diis cura; speaking of Augustus: in the second, he would have Apuleia for the words she had spoken against Augustus, to be punished; for the injury done to himselfe and Livia, he pardoned her: and so you see the growth of the Law: in confirmation whereof, Tacitus hath these words, Adolecebat interea lex Majestatis. And here is to be considered, that Tiberius meaning to begin the growth of the Law of Treason, would not begin it, with making it be observed in his own case, but in the case of Augustus, requiring that boldly for another, which without blushing he could not have required for himselfe: and so much more in this case, as the demand was coloured with paternall piety, and therefore obliged the Senate the more to punish them also who should use any such words against himselfe. Finally, there passed not much time, but by means of this Law, not onely they were punished who committed crimes against the Prince, but it came to that passe, that to every petty fault, and though but against a private person, they gave the name of Treason, that so they might have colour to inflict capitall punishment at their pleasure, as in a thousand places of Tacitus his Bookes is written.
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Id quoque Tiberii morum fuit, continuare Imperia, aut plerisque ad finem in iisdem exercitibus aut Jurisdictionibus habere.

Whether it be good, that Officers should continue in their Places, and why this course was observed by Tiberius,

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Tiberius (by as much as these words of Tacitus signify), used not to change his Officers, whereby it happened, that oftentimes they died in their charge; but because Tiberius had many particular occasions, that made him observe this custom, which in other Princes are not usual: We will first speak of it in general, whether it be a good course, and then in particular; and lastly we will give the reasons of all.

Concerning the first, We cannot proceed without distinction, when the question is therefore, whether it be good to continue Officers: We may either mean it of Officers of Warre, or of those of Peace. If we speak of Officers in Warre, either it is in a warre where the Prince desires to make new Acquests; or else in a war where he makes only for reputation, or some other small interest. If he make it, with a purpose of enlarging his Dominion, I cannot then commend the change of Officers, so long at least as there is no demerit in the Captain; (and this, for the many reasons I have shewed in a Discourse before:) but if hee have no other end, but only to continue the warre, he may then change them as he pleaseth: whereupon we see, that Tiberius himselfe making warre in Germany for Reputation onely, Potius quam cupidine proferendi imperii, changed his Generall, calling home Germanicus.
If we speake of Officers in Peace; either they are meane places, which can neither bring honour nor damage to the Prince, or some midling places; that have other Officers above them; or else they are chiefe & Principal places, that have none above them; and in these (to begin with the last) to continue the same men, is in a manner necessary (so long at least as they carry themselves worthily) as well because they are better acquainted with business, as also because it is a hard thing to find men able to discharge such places: and lastly, because if they should be removed, to exalt them, is impossible, they being now at the highest; and to abate them, is dangerous: whereof in the Booke of Kings we have a notable Example in Ithobaal, who rebelled against Solomon (as some Rabbines interpret) and very well in my opinion only for being put in an Office meaner than that he had before. For where before, he was collector of the Tributes, of the Tribes of Manasses and Ephraim, he was now made overseer of the building of Millo, a much inferior place than the other. In this cause therefore it shall do well to use the custome of Tiberius, to continue them in their places during their lives, provided that they be not made hereditary, as in some Kingdomes hath been done, with much detriment to the Prince.

Again, if we speake of midling places, to suffer them to continue, without hope of being changed, brings forth commonly many evil effects. The first is because all men labour for advancement, and their aime is always at principal places; endeavouring so much the more to do good service, as they know it to be a means to raise them higher, there being no doubt, but he will serve better, that hath advancement for his end, than hee that hath onely conservation for his Object: as we see, that young men eat more than old, because the end of these is onely to conserve themselves; but of the other,
ther, to augment themselves. And therefore Sinan the
Primovilior Generall of the Turke, against the Per-
sians, knowing he could rise to no higher Dignity than he
had already, was willing to hearken to Treatyes of
peace, and pursed the war but coldly. Whereupon
Benhabad (as in the sacred Text is written) had good
counsell given him, that where in his armye hee had
Two and thirty Kings, he should put in their places as
many other valiant men, because They being at the
highest, would never strein themselves much to fight, as
knowing they could rise no higher: where other men
to get advancement, would bestir themselves with
greater vigour. This reaʃon Abulensis brings in these
wordes. Amore Reges singulos ab Exercitutuo, Spone
pro eis principes. For confirmation of this I have now
said, the Example of Seianu (in my opinion) serves
very fitly, who as long as hee had any hope to be ad-
vanced higher, he continued a good fervant, and an ex-
cellent counsellour to his Prince: Quia Seianwincipiente
adhibe potencia, bonis consiliis vocescere volebat, but as soon
as he was got to such a heighe that he could not hope
to rise any higher, he then fell from his good service,
and plunged himselfe in manifest villaney. This rea-
son Tiberius understood well; and therefore when
Sejanu was growne to a mighty heighe of greatnesse,
to the end he might have occasion to continue his good
service, made a shew he would yet raise him higher,
Ipse quid intra animum voluta verim, quibus adhuc neces-
tudinibus immiscere te mihi parem, omitam ad presens
referre. Id tantum aperiam, nihil esse tam excelsum, quod
now virtutes ista, tarnque in me anima meaeamur. This
is an excellent way, and ought to be observed with
those who hold the prime places. Those therefore
that are in midling places, should not be continued
still, but have hope given them, that by their good
service they may rise higher. Otherwise, besides the
reasons
reasons alleged, there would follow another inconvenience, that when they of the chiefe places die, the Prince should want others to put in their roomes; and consequently should be driven, to goe begging in forraine parts for principall Officers: who not being acquainted with busineses, and little affectionate (unlesse for their owne ends) to the Prince; they were like, (in my opinion) to doe but ill service, as neither knowing, nor being knowne. Whereupon the Apostles, being to make an Election, did not use this manner; Oportet ex bis viris qui nobiscum sunt congregati, in omni tempore: and as it follows. To this may be added, that Princes should continue meaner Officers in their places, but to make them fit for greater. This course the Venetians have alwayes used, and it was the ancient custome of the common-wealth of Rome, that when by the death of Senatours there were places void, they would fill them up out of the rankes next below them: an excellent course certainly; for their carriage being continually seene in lesse matters, It may easily be gathered what good service they are like to do in greater. From hence it was, that Fabiu Maximus knew, that Titus Ossacillus was no fit man to governe an Army; Titus Ossacilli in minore re experti operam quam sumus, haud sane cur ad majora tibi fidamus, documenti quicquam dedisti: But though I like well the changing of Officers, yet I like not they should bee changed often. First, because it is the property of them that are to leave a place, to burne (as the Proverbe is) their Cabbins, not so much for any hatred or envie they beare to their Succesflours, as for their owne benefit: Whereof we have an example in Saint Matthew, where he relates, that one had bene possesed with a Devill many yeares, and never found any hurt by the evill Spirit all that while; but when the Devill percieved he was to go forth of his body, he then fell to tear-
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ring him in most cruell manner. And just so it is with some that are in offices; if they thinke they shall stay any while in their places, they do not then so suddenly fall to fleece the Subjects; but if they finde they shall shortly leave them, they then begin to use extremeties. And therefore the Officers of Galba, (as Tacitus reports) doubting they should stay but a small time in their places, by reasone of the Princes old age, fell to fleecing: jam afferebant vanalia cuncta prepotentes liberti. Servorum manus subitus avida; & tanquam apud senem festinantes. But seeing it is necessary sometimes to change them, (as wee have observed before) whether the change be sooner or later; the best course is to do it upon a sudden; that they may not do as Farmers use to do, when they are to part with a Farme, who to make the greater Vintage in their last yeares, care not how barren they make the Vines for the yeare following.

Now if we speake of those meane places, which bring some profit to the Officers, without any danger to the Prince, as some Magistrates that serve for shew, with little substance; in these the changes should be often; as well to the end, many may come to partake of the profit, as also thereby to get the love of all. And this differs not from the opinion of Tiberius; who when the Senate would have perswaded him to make a Magistrate, that continued in his place but one yeare, to continue in it five; he would not grant it. Grave moderationi sua tot eligere, tot differre; Vix per singulos annos offensiones vitari; quamvis repulsam propinquas spes soleat; quantum odi fore ab his, qui ultra Quinquennium projiciantur. I know well, that this was not the meaning of Tiberius; but yet the sentence hee gave may serve for my purpose. It remaines to shew, why Tiberius would never be drawne to change those he had once put in Offices: The first reason which Tacitus
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alreadgeth, is set down in those words; *Tedio none cura, semel placita pro aeternis servavisse:* that is, Tiberius finding it a trouble to make new Elections, was willing to continue the old; but seeing *Tacitus* tells not why it should be a trouble, it seems to be but a cold reason which he brings: we may therefore rather say, that (as other Authors relate) Tiberius had in such manner used cruelty against any that had any vertue in them; that unless he should place men in Offices, that were unfit, he had much ado; and hardly could finde any: and therefore no marvell, having once found some, if he were afterward loath to remove them. To this may be added (as *Tacitus* a little after saith) that though he saw many great wits in the Citie, that would have beene able to discharge such Offices; yet he, standing in feare of such men, chose rather to let them die in idlenesse, as seeking to put men in places, to which they were onely equall: *Neque supra:* that is, such as should not be good at making Innovations: of which sort of men, there is in all places great scarcity; and therefore when he once found such a one, he was never willing to change him; as by whom he might have good service done him: and that without danger. And this is an Exception to the Rule I made before; when they who are employed are but equall to their imployment, and cannot hope to be employed in any greater businesse; not for default in the Prince, but of ability in themselves. Again, it put him to the more trouble, as having a most acute wit; and consequently a wavering judgement, as *Tacitus* shewes us in those words: *Ut callidum ejus ingenium, ita anxium judicium:* a thing which alwayes happens to such persons, because being men that know much, they pierce into all difficulties; and consequently hardly resolve upon anything, finding the darknesse of difficulties even in the light it selfe: as *Moses,* the first time that God called him,
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him, having yet but a grosse braine, thought every thing Light: but the second time, when his braine was purged, he thought everything Darkness. The last reason, which Tacitus brings, (for the other that my seeming are but confirmations of the first) is set down in these words: 

*Quod dixi invicta me pluris fraternarum;* 

that is, Tiberius would not change his Officers, because he would not have many to be enriched by them. This conceit I cannot believe, that either Tiberius, or Earino had, but that it is a most idle vanity of the vulgar: seeing amongst the chief Precepts that Aristotle gives to Tyrants, this is one: Not to suffer Riches to be divided into few hands: And besides, we may give the words a fitter exposition; which is, That Tiberius having very few friends, if the throne change his Officers often, he should be forced at last to bring in some that were his enemies: Whereupon out of very envy, least any enemy of his should grow rich, or get reputation; he was never willing to change his Officers often: which, when at last he could not avoid, but had placed in the Provinces certain of his enemies, he would never suffer them to goe to their charge, but kept them always near about him; a course which many Princes take vvvith their enemies; as by a thousand Examples (which for brevity I omit) may easily be known: wherein it happens to Princes, contrary to that of private men; for these are safest, when their enemies are furthest off; but Princes, when they are nearest: and to this purpose are those words of Tacitus; *Qua necessitate postremo co propellas, ut mandate vis quisdam provincias, quos egredi urbe non erat passurus.* I should not give this sense to this place, if my interpretation were not made good by a passage in Suetonius; where he saith, *Unum et alterum consularem, obtulerit Provncias, non auras à te dimittere, esque adeo destinuit, donec successores, post aliquos annos praemibus daret.*
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I conclude then, that Tiberius did well to continue Officers in their charges, as well for the scarcity he had of fit persons, as also; and more, because he used to employ men that were onely equal to the businesses.

Other Princes shall do well to avoid all extremes.

One only thing remains to be advertised, that when I commend the course, not to change Officers often; I mean, it should proceed from the Prince's own will, not thinking it fit he should bind himself to let them stay in their places any determinate time, as three years, or five, or more; without leaving himself a power to remove them. For this would be to the Prince's great prejudice; which Tiberius considering, made the fore-mentioned answer to Abinius Gallus: Gratia moderationis sui, and as it follows: whereby we may plainly see, that though Tiberius did not like to change his Officers often; yet he liked well to have it in his power to change them often.

FINIS.