RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN

THE APOCRYPHAL ACTS OF ANDREW
A NEW APPROACH TO THE CHARACTER,
THOUGHT AND MEANING OF
THE PRIMITIVE TEXT

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van het doctoraat in de
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door

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ABBREVIATIONS

**Journals**

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<tr>
<td>Apocrypha</td>
<td>Apocrypha: revue internationale des littératures apocryphes. Turnhout, Brepols.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Augustinianum</td>
<td>Augustinianum. Roma, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Augustinus</td>
<td>Augustinus: revista publicada por los Padres agustinos recoletos. Madrid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC. egi</td>
<td>Cuadernos de filología clásica: estudios griegos e indoeuropeos. Madrid, Universidad Complutense.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GV</td>
<td>Geloof en Vrijheid: tweemaandelijksch tijdschrift. Rotterdam, D.J.P. Storm Lotz.</td>
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<td>Habis</td>
<td>Habis: publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla. Universidad de Sevilla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HorSem</td>
<td>Horae Semiticae. London, Clay and Sons.</td>
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<td>Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mnemosyne</td>
<td>Mnemosyne: a Journal of Classical Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MKNAW</td>
<td>Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Afdeling Letterkunde</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muséon</td>
<td>Le Muséon: revue d’études orientales</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAWG</td>
<td>Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck &amp; Ruprecht</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHPf</td>
<td>Neue Hefte für Philosophie</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philologus</td>
<td>Philologus: Zeitschrift für das klassische Alterthum</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBen</td>
<td>Revue Bénédicte de critique, d’histoire et de littérature religieuses</td>
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<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Revue des études anciennes</td>
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<td>REAug</td>
<td>Revue des études Augustiniennes</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHLR</td>
<td>Revue d’Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses</td>
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<tr>
<td>RhM</td>
<td>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</td>
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<td>RRH</td>
<td>Revue de l’histoire des religions</td>
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<td>RPh</td>
<td>Revue de Philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes</td>
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<td>RPhA</td>
<td>Revue de philosophie ancienne</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPhilos</td>
<td>Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSI</td>
<td>Rivista Storica Italiana</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAWW</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Philosophisch-historische Klasse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scriptorium</td>
<td>Scriptorium: revue internationale des études relatives aux manuscrits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semeia</td>
<td>Semeia: an Experimental Journal for Biblical Criticism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMR</td>
<td>Studia Montis Regii</td>
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<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Symbolae oloensae, auspiciis Societatis Graeco-Latinae ediderunt S. Eitrem et G. Rudberg. Christianiae</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Studien zur Palaeographie und Papyruskunde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRORCr</td>
<td>Studi e Ricerche sull’Oriente cristiano</td>
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<tr>
<td>StPatriot</td>
<td>Studia Patristica: Papers Presented to the International Conference on Patristic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>StudPhilon</td>
<td>The Studia Philonica Annual: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ThLZ</td>
<td>Theologische Literaturzeitung</td>
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<td>ThRev</td>
<td>Theologische Revue</td>
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<tr>
<td>ThRdschau</td>
<td>Theologische Rundschau</td>
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<tr>
<td>VChr</td>
<td>Vigilae Christianae: a Review of Early Christian Life and Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>WS</td>
<td>Wiener Studien: Zeitschrift für classische Philologie</td>
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<tr>
<td>WZKM</td>
<td>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZKG</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZPhF</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNW</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche</td>
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Series and Dictionaries

Armstrong, History

BKPh

CCSA
Corpus christianorum series apocryphorum.

CCSL
Corpus christianorum series latina.

CSEL
Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum.

Demetrakos
D. Demetrakou, Mega lexikon holēs tēs Hellēnikēs glōssēs (Athens, 1949-51).

Demetrakos²

Jannaris

Kühner-Gerth

LSJM

OCA
Orientalia christiana analecta. Roma, Pontificio Institutum Studiorum Orientalium.

PG
Patriologia graeca.

PL
Patriologia latina.

PO
Patriologia orientalis.

RE

SBL

ThWNT
G. Kittel et al., Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament.

ThRE
G. Krause and G. Müller, Theologische Realenzyklopädie.

TU
Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur.

WF
Wege der Forschung. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Texts, Editions and Manuscripts

1GrEp
1 Greek Epistle. Greek transl. of Passio sancti Andreae apostoli, M. Bonnet, AAA II/1, 1-37.

2GrEp
2 Greek Epistle. Second Greek transl. of Passio sancti Andreae apostoli with interpolations, Bonnet, AAA II/1, 1-37.

AA
Acts of Andrew

AA’s fragment in V

AAA
M. Bonnet, Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha II/1 (Leipzig, 1898).

AAgr

AAM
Acta Andreae et Matthiae apud anthropophagos

AAPe
Acts of Andrew and Peter

AJ
Acts of John

APE
Acts of Peter

APH
Acts of Philip

Arm
Armenian passion of St. Andrew, L. Leloir, Écrits apocryphes sur les apôtres I (Turnhout, 1986) 228-257.

ATH
Acts of Thomas

BG
Papyrus Berolinensis Gnosticus 8502.

C
Martyrium of St. Andrew in ms Ann Arbor 36, ff. 60v-66v.
**VitaParis** Version of *Vita* in ms Paris BN gr. 1510, ff. 1r-19v.

X Ms Parisinus 5273, including *LatEp* (ap. Bonnet, *AAA* II/1, 1-37).

### Other Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>anno Domini</td>
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<td>BC</td>
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INTRODUCTION

As is customary with the apocryphal Acts of Apostles in particular, and with many other Early Christian writings in general, we know very little about the time and place of composition of the *Acts of Andrew*, let alone its author or its original character and intention. In the case of the *Acts of Andrew*, however, our ignorance is aggravated by its scanty textual situation: less has been preserved of the primitive text than of any other of the five major apocryphal Acts.

Excluding a couple of short and fragmentary testimonies, *AA* survives in a large number of texts of various kinds, lengths and provenances, which allegedly transmit our text, but whose relationship with it is not always easy to establish. At the same time, many of these texts are also imperfect: a considerable number of them are fragmentary and the few cases that are handed down completely frequently present obvious traces of editorial activity. The most important problem posed by these sources, however, is the highly divergent nature of their accounts. According to some testimonies *AA* included both the peregrinations and the martyrdom of the apostle; according to others, in turn, it included the martyrdom with a couple of preliminary events only. But this is not all: the former sources present up to three different versions of Andrew’s itinerary, whereas the latter, even if in general preserving a common basic account, nevertheless show different intentions and pursue different goals. As a result of this textual situation, not only the author, place and time of composition of the *Acts of Andrew* are unknown, its literary genre, contents, length, thought and intention are still a matter of conjecture today as well.

The abundance of second-hand sources and, especially, the lack of old material to check their reliability, has produced a wide range of hypotheses on what the primitive text looked like as well as of interpretations concerning its mentality. As far as the primitive text is concerned, until the 1980s, scholars in general refrained from dubious textual reconstruction and attempted at the most to determine which of the testimonies was closest to the primitive text. As they were conscious of the equivocal character of our sources, investigators used to simply dispose the texts according to their hypothetical sequence in order to provide a tentative and general picture of what *AA* may have looked like.
The 1980s, however, saw a drastic change in investigations into the *Acts of Andrew*. The publication of a couple of new textual witnesses, some of which had already been known since the early twentieth century, seems to have encouraged scholars to radically change the previous careful approach towards the textual witnesses. Two editions, by J.M. Prieur and by D.R. MacDonald, followed each other and even though their methods, scopes and results are completely different, a common aim brings them close to each other: an attempt to provide, at whatever cost, a textual reconstruction of *AA*. Whereas documents used to be treated separately, analysed particularly and only then compared with one another in order to achieve an unbiased evaluation of the reliability of their accounts, now they are merged with one another, independently of their character and provenance, for the sake of the story’s completeness and linearity.

This new approach has advantages and disadvantages. As to the former, we may mention the fact that *AA* has reached a wider public, since it is now possible to read, depending on the edition, either a version of Andrew’s martyrdom or a version of the apostle’s travels. But this may also be a disadvantage: both editions clearly accept two of the literary genres attested by the textual witnesses as a reliable literary framework for *AA*, although we do not know whether either or both fitted the primitive text. However, the most important problem is, in our view, that these textual reconstructions are fallaciously presented to the reader as the primitive text for the section they cover. As a matter of fact, the analysis of most of the sources reveals clear traces of editorial activity, the measure of which is difficult to establish due to our lack of authoritative texts, but which in certain cases can be clearly evaluated on the basis of a comparative study of the materials. As far as the contents are concerned, these sources provide only the textual skeleton of the portion of text they transmit. Another important disadvantage is the heterogeneous character of the sources upon which these reconstructions rely. Due to their different provenance, time of composition, intention and character, they present such stylistic and conceptual differences that the resulting eclectic text resists a coherent study of the text as whole.

Despite the obvious problems posed by these textual reconstructions, scholarly research on *AA* in the last few years has confidently approached them as if they had reliably recovered the primitive text. As a result, in addition to a lack of interest in textual matters, there appears to be an increasing tendency to treat *AA*’s textual reconstruction as a textual whole and to analyse it as if we had a sort of *textus receptus* of *AA*. In our opinion, this attitude has already begun to negatively influence the research on *AA*. Given the wide range of texts – and the mentalities peculiar to them – that underlie these editions, the current
eclectic versions of AA seem to provide support for any interpretation of the primitive text whatsoever.

The present investigation is a critical approach both to the recent editions and to the latest developments in the research on AA. With the conviction that a text is not the sum of the events it narrates but rather the system of signs and symbols with which these events are narrated, it pays more attention to those texts that provide a glimpse into the symbolic and conceptual world of the text. Instead of focussing on the doubtful reconstruction of the itinerary and the stations of Andrew’s apostolic career, it intends to approach the message and intention of the primitive text by concentrating on the textual witnesses that are likely to preserve it in a more original state. Consequently, it deliberately intends to deconstruct the textual conglomerations achieved by merging witnesses of various provenances in order to isolate a testimony that, even if short, may provide access to the thought behind the primitive text. Admittedly, deciding which of the numerous and frequently second-hand materials on the apostle Andrew preserves the most primitive stage is not a simple matter. How can we decide what is old and what is new without a touchstone that proves it to be so? Much of our efforts will indeed be dedicated to an exhaustive analysis of the textual testimonies in order to find a clue that would allow an objective discrimination of the materials.

Within this scope, the investigation is divided into five chapters. In order to avoid subjectivisms as far as possible, the first chapter offers a complete analysis of the research on AA. In chronological order, we follow the developments, advances and relapses of scholarly research in order to see to what extent the theories and hypotheses put forward by scholars rely on an objective selection and analysis of the textual materials and whether their selections influence their analyses or vice versa. The closing section of this chapter offers an overview of the main lines of investigation on AA as well as of the text(s) used to support these investigations.

After the first approach to the textual witnesses in the first chapter, the second offers a more profound textual analysis of their testimonies. On the basis of their textual characteristics, we discriminate different textual groups and attempt to establish their mutual relationships. The comparative analysis of the different texts provides the basis both for a hypothetical sketch of the historical development of AA’s textual transmission and for a tentative explanation of its textual diversification. At the same time, this comparative analysis also allows us to isolate a text that may serve our intention to recover the symbolic and conceptual world of the primitive AA. Given the fact that a representative number of the textual testimonies appear to present transformed and revised versions of the account
preserved in one of our extant sources, it can be reliably assumed that this latter source preserves the ground text or, at least, the oldest stage of all of them.

The third chapter thus focuses on this text, viz. AA’s fragment in Codex Vaticanus graecus 808, and provides a codicological and palaeographical introduction, a re-edition of its testimony and an English translation accompanied by numerous explanatory notes. By isolating this testimony from the remaining texts we can focus on its conceptual peculiarities without the interference of the dubious readings proceeding from apparently later and reworked sources.

The fourth chapter further builds on the foundation provided by the re-edition and translation of the third chapter. A complete literary and conceptual analysis is now possible owing to the liberation of the text from the pressure of other testimonies. With regard to the former, it intends to disclose its complex literary structure and subtle conceptual developments in order to show that the text should not be seen as a careless product of a compiler or as a second or third-class composition. With regard to the latter, it aims firstly to show that the long discourses in the text should not be seen as ‘tedious’ or verbose but empty expositions, but as essential elements in the complex structure of AA’s conception of man and his reality. Moreover, the interconnection and complementary character of the ideas expressed in these discourses and, especially, their conscious disposition in an organised whole reveal that their function is not merely literary but that they also intend to transmit a consistent body of thought and a clear message.

Finally, the fifth and last chapter offers a systematic analysis of AA’s thought on the basis of our previous study. The detailed review of AA’s position with regard to cosmology, theology, anthropology, epistemology and ethics allows the reader to see not only the extent to which our text presents an extremely coherent and consistent body of thought without serious internal contradictions, but also that this thought was not a strange phenomenon in late antiquity. The comparison of AA’s thought to parallel developments in its contemporary historical period reveals that far from being an alien in his world, its author was receptive to the religious and philosophical developments of his contemporaries and he did not hesitate to apply them to express his own Weltanschauung.
CHAPTER I: TEXTUAL WITNESSES AND RESEARCH ON ACTA ANDREAE

Even though we know very little about the primitive Acts of Andrew (AA), a large number of texts have been preserved by textual transmission which truly or falsely claim to be accounts based on original material or which are interpreted as such by the scholarly literature. These texts differ so much from each other that an objective preliminary classification can only be done on the basis of the sections of the primitive text that they allegedly preserve. We therefore provide a tentative classification of the material on the basis of their contents, leaving for the second chapter the attempt to achieve a more consistent organisation on the basis of their textual characteristics and, if any, of their textual relationships.

1. Classification of the Textual Witnesses Related to the Apostle Andrew

1.1. Direct Transmission

A. Material Including the Apocryphon of Andrew and Matthias

A.1. Greek Material

Acta Andrae et Matthiae apud anthropophagos (AAM). Edited by Bonnet from numerous mss of the 9th-16th centuries. It includes Andrew’s adventures in the city of the Cannibals.

A.2. Latin Material

A.2.1. Recensio Casanatensis. Latin version of AAM in ms Casanatensis 1104, 12th c., ff. 26r-43r. This corresponds with the Greek AAM (cf. A.1).

A.2.2. Recensio Vaticana in ms Vaticanus lat. 1274, 10th-11th c., ff. 119v-160r. Rhythmic version of a revised text of AAM.

A.3. Coptic Material

A.3.1. Coptic Fayumic fragments 6-9 in ms Copt. Tischendorfianus VI. According to Von Lemm, the text might depend upon a Sahidic translation of the Greek original.

A.3.2. Coptic Sahidic fragment in ms Vindobonensis K 9576, f. 75v. According to Lucchesi-Prieur it corresponds with the Greek AAM 10-13 (cf. A.1). This text might be the Sahidic source postulated by Von Lemm for the Fayumic text (cf. A.3.1).

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1 M. Bonnet, Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha II/1 (Leipzig, 1898) 65-127.
3 Blatt, Bearbeitungen, 96-148.
4 O. von Lemm, ‘Koptische apokryphe Apostelacten’, BAISSIP N.S. 1 [33] (1890) 558-76.
A.3.3. Coptic fragment in Papyrus Copt. Amherst-Morgan 14 published and translated by W.E. Crum. According to the editor, the text of the papyrus corresponds with the beginning of the Greek "AAM".

A.4. Armenian Material

A.4.1. Long Armenian version of "AAM". Edited by C. Tchékarian on the basis of four mss, Venice 653, 239, 812 and 731. According to Leloir this text depends on the Syriac version (cf. A.6).

A.4.2. Short Armenian version. Edited by Tchékarian on the basis of ms Venice 1447. This text presents a resumed version of "AAM", which does not depend on the longer one, however, but rather on another text that was closer to the Greek original.

A.5. Ethiopic Material


A.5.2. The Preaching of Saint Matthias, preserved in mss Br. Mus. Or. 678, ff. 138a-151b and Br. Mus. Or. 683, ff. 118b-131b. Long version. This version is closer than the former to the Greek "AAM" (cf. supra A.1).

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6 Lucchesi-Prieur, "Fragments Coptes", 340.
8 Lucchesi-Prieur, "Fragments Coptes", 341, however, think that the fragment presents similarities with an episode of the *Acts of Andrew and Bartholomew*, preserved completely in Arabic and Ethiopic and fragmentarily in Coptic and in Greek. If they are right, the possibility that the text of papyrus Amherst-Morgan 14 corresponds with this text cannot be ruled out.
A.6. Syriac Material

Syriac version of AAM, which, according to Von Lemm, depends upon the Arabic version\textsuperscript{15}, although Lucchesi-Prieur disprove such a hypothesis\textsuperscript{16}.

A.7. Arabic Material

Arabic translation of AAM depending, according to Von Lemm, on the Sahidic version (cf. supra A.3.2). Edited and translated by A. Smith Lewis\textsuperscript{17}.

B. Material Including Andrew’s Martyrdom Only

B.1. Greek Material

B.1.1. Martyrium prius (Mpr). First edited by Bonnet from two mss, Vat. Gr. 807, 9\textsuperscript{th}-10\textsuperscript{th} c., and Petroburg. Caesareus gr. 94, 12\textsuperscript{th} c.\textsuperscript{18}. The text begins with the allotment of apostolic fields and the assignation of Myrmenis to Matthias, and of Bithynia, Lacedaemonia, and Achaia to Andrew. Despite its strong revision and recast of the primitive account, Mpr derives from a lengthier version of Andrew’s martyrdom that began with Andrew’s arrival at Patras. Consequently it provides additional information about the events preceding Aegeates’ return from Rome\textsuperscript{19}.

B.1.2. Martyrdom of Saint Andrew preserved in two mss, namely Sinaiticus gr. 526, 10\textsuperscript{th} c., ff. 121\textsuperscript{v}-132\textsuperscript{v} (S) and Hierosolymitanus Sabbaicatus 103, 12\textsuperscript{th} c., ff. 155\textsuperscript{v}-168\textsuperscript{v} (H)\textsuperscript{20}. This version includes the events in Patras after Aegeates’ return from Rome. It presents a rather revised but longer version of the last section of AA\textsuperscript{21}.

B.1.3. Martyrdom of St. Andrew in ms Ann Arbor 36, 14\textsuperscript{th}-15\textsuperscript{th} c., ff. 60\textsuperscript{v}-66\textsuperscript{v} (C). This text is unpublished\textsuperscript{22}. It covers the very last section of the martyrdom and begins at the same point as other versions of the martyrdom (see infra B.1.4 and B.1.5). It presents an abbreviated account of a short version of the martyrdom\textsuperscript{23}.


\textsuperscript{19} On Mpr see infra Chapter 2, pp. 77 and 98-104.


\textsuperscript{21} On this version of the martyrdom, see infra, Chapter 2, pp. 77-78, 88-90, 104-09.

\textsuperscript{22} Collated by Prieur, Acta, 507-49, for the martyrdom.

\textsuperscript{23} On ms Ann Arbor 36, see S. de Ricci and W.J. Wilson, Census of Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the United States and Canada II (New York, 1961) 1110. See also infra, Chapter 2, pp. 75 and 113-14.
B.1.4. Martyrium alterum A (Malt A). This text is preserved by two mss, Parisinus graecus 770, a. 1315, ff. 43v-46v (P)\textsuperscript{24} and Hierosolymitanus Sabbaticus 30, 10\textsuperscript{th}-11\textsuperscript{th} c., ff. 154v-156v (O)\textsuperscript{25}. It includes a short version of the last section of AA\textsuperscript{26}.

B.1.5. Martyrium alterum B (Malt B) in ms Parisinus graecus 1539, 10th-11th c., ff. 304r-305v (Q)\textsuperscript{27}. This document covers approximately the same portion of text as Malt A, but proceeds from a different recension of the martyrdom\textsuperscript{28}.

B.1.6. Greek Epistle. Two independent Greek translations of the Passio sancti Andreae apostoli (cf. infra B.2.1). The first Greek recension (1GrEp), edited from mss of the 11\textsuperscript{th}-16\textsuperscript{th} c., is a simple translation of the Latin text\textsuperscript{29}. The second one (2GrEp), edited from mss of the 10\textsuperscript{th}-16\textsuperscript{th} c., interpolates readings proceeding from a fuller version of the martyrdom\textsuperscript{30}.

B.2. Latin Material

B.2.1. Passio sancti Andreae apostoli (= Latin Epistle, LatEp)\textsuperscript{31}. Chapters 1-9 are an original composition without any parallel in the primitive Acts. By contrast, chapters 10-15 depend on a recension of the martyrdom. Its composition has been dated to the sixth century\textsuperscript{32}, although Bonnet’s edition relies on mss going back to the eighth/ twelfth centuries.

B.2.2. Passio altera sancti Andreae apostoli (Conversante) was probably composed in the sixth century and was first edited by Bonnet from four mss dating to the ninth/ twelfth centuries\textsuperscript{33}. As Bonnet already pointed out, Conversante is an interesting testimony that preserves elements from the ancient Acts, as its contacts with AA’s fragment in cod. Vat gr. 808 (cf. infra D.1.1) and 2GrEp clearly show\textsuperscript{34}.

B.3. Coptic Material

\textsuperscript{24} Bonnet, AAA II/1, 58-64.
\textsuperscript{25} Collated by Prieur, Acta, 507-49, for the martyrdom, but already identified by E. Hennecke, Handbuch zu den neuestamentlichen Apokryphen (Tübingen, 1904) 544-62 at 545 and later by A. Ehrhard, Überlieferung und Bestand der hagiographischen und homiletischen Literatur der griechischen Kirche 1 (Leipzig, 1937) 168.
\textsuperscript{26} On this version of the martyrdom, see infra, Chapter 2, pp. 75-76 and 112-13.
\textsuperscript{27} Bonnet, AAA II/1, 58-64. On this version, see infra, Chapter 2, pp. 75-76 and 112-13.
\textsuperscript{28} M. Bonnet, ‘La passion d’André en quelle langue a-t-elle été écrite?’, ByzZ 3 (1894) 458-69.
\textsuperscript{29} Bonnet, AAA II/1, 1-37. These interpolations appear in his edition conveniently highlighted and in parenthesis. See in general infra p. 74-75 and for 2GrEp infra, Chapter 2, pp. 106-109.
\textsuperscript{30} Bonnet AAA II/1, 1-37.
\textsuperscript{32} M. Bonnet, ‘Passio sancti Andreae apostoli’, AB 13 (1894) 373-78.
\textsuperscript{33} On this text, see infra Chapter 2, pp. 74, 90f, 112f.
Coptic fragment of Andrew’s martyrdom in P. Ien. 649 (PIen)\textsuperscript{35}. This fragment, preserved on the recto and verso of a parchment folio, dated to the fourth or fifth centuries, presents the Coptic translation of the first lines of a short version of Andrew’s martyrdom as preserved by other Greek textual witnesses, such as C, Malt A and B\textsuperscript{36}.

B.4. Armenian Material

Armenian passion (\textit{Arm}). This revised version of the martyrdom, which was probably made in the sixth or seventh centuries, was first edited by Tchékarian from three mss, namely Venice 653, 731 and 463\textsuperscript{37}. It begins at the same point as \textit{Conversante}, namely with the second speech to the brethren, which we know from codex Vat. gr. 808 (cf. \textit{infra} D.1.1), and ends as the other martyria\textsuperscript{38}.

C. Material Including Andrew’s Peregrinations and Martyrdom

C.1. Latin Material

Gregory of Tours’ \textit{Liber de miraculis Beati Andreae apostoli (Epitome)}\textsuperscript{39}, written at the end of the sixth century. Its first chapter includes a version of the episode about Andrew rescuing Matthias from prison (cf. \textit{supra} A.1). It offers a rather lengthy version of Andrew’s peregrinations with occasional contacts with \textit{Laudatio} (cf. \textit{infra} C.2.2), \textit{Vita} (cf. \textit{infra} C.2.3) and \textit{Narratio} (cf. \textit{infra} C.2.1) and a very abridged account of the events in Patras\textsuperscript{40}. It ends with a brief reference to Andrew’s crucifixion.

C.2. Greek Material

C.2.1. \textit{Narratio} was edited by Bonnet from four mss of the tenth/eleventh centuries\textsuperscript{41}. Its composition is usually dated to the eighth century\textsuperscript{42}. It presents a comprehensive account of Andrew’s peregrinations and martyrdom. Its first part has a highly divergent account of Andrew’s peregrinations with only sporadic contacts with the


\textsuperscript{36}See \textit{infra} this Chapter, pp. 43 and 76.

\textsuperscript{37}First edited by Tchékarian, \textit{Armenian Treasury}, 146-67. French translation, Leloir, \textit{Écrits}, 232-57. V. Calzolari is currently working on a new edition of \textit{Arm} that will be based on the testimony of fourteen new manuscripts.

\textsuperscript{38}On \textit{Arm}, see \textit{infra} Chapter 2, pp. 76, 92-94, 112f.


\textsuperscript{40}On \textit{Epitome}’s version, see \textit{infra} pp. 80f. On its relationship with other texts \textit{infra} pp. 96-103.

\textsuperscript{41}Edited by M. Bonnet, ‘Martyrium sancti apostoli Andreae’, \textit{AB} 13 (1894) 353-72. Bonnet first called it ‘martyrium’, see his \textit{praefatio} to \textit{AAA} II/1, XIV.

\textsuperscript{42}See F. Dvornik, \textit{The Idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the Apostle Andrew} (Cambridge (MA), 1958) 172-73. On the issue, see \textit{infra} pp. 81f and note 67 to Chapter 2. Prieur (\textit{Acta}, 121), following Flamion (\textit{L’Apôtre}, 68), dates it to the ninth century.
extant textual witnesses\(^43\). Its second part, in turn, presents numerous contacts with the extant witnesses, especially with AA’s fragment in codex Vat. gr. 808 (cf. \textit{infra} D.1.1), H/S, but also with \textit{Malt} and 2GrEp\(^44\).

C.2.2. \textit{Laudatio}. Edited by Bonnet from three mss of the 11\(^{th}\)-12\(^{th}\) centuries\(^45\). \textit{Laudatio} offers a comprehensive relation of Andrew’s peregrinations and martyrdom. Its first part includes the episode of Andrew and Matthias and presents a version of Andrew’s peregrinations close to that of \textit{Vita}, which seems to imply that for this section they rely on a common source\(^46\). Andrew’s martyrdom in \textit{Laudatio} includes many primitive issues and has contacts with \textit{Mpr}, H/S, 2GrEp, \textit{Vita} in ms Escorial y II 6 (cf. \textit{infra} C.2.3) and \textit{Arm} (cf. \textit{supra} B.4)\(^47\).

C.2.3. \textit{Vita Andreae} by the monk Epiphanius (\textit{Vita})\(^48\). \textit{Vita} is a comprehensive account of Andrew’s peregrinations and martyrdom. Regrettably, the only available edition by Dressel relies on a very deficient manuscript (Vaticanus gr. 824, 11\(^{th}\) c., ff. 105\(^{v}\)-128\(^{v}\)), which includes numerous textual corruptions in its first part and lacks its own version of the second part. From \textit{Vita} 249 D onwards the text follows \textit{Narratio}’s account of the martyrdom\(^49\). \textit{Vita} is also preserved in two unpublished mss, namely mss Paris BN gr. 1510, 11\(^{th}\) c., ff. 1\(^{v}\}-19\(^{v}\) (\textit{VitaParis}) and Escorial y II 6 (gr. 314), 12\(^{th}\) c., ff. 226\(^{v}\}-246\(^{v}\) (\textit{VitaEsc})\(^50\). Whereas the former has a brief end, the latter presents a martyrdom that follows the plan of the primitive one and shows similarities with \textit{Laudatio} (cf. \textit{supra} C.2.2)\(^51\).

D. Other Material

D.1. Greek Material

D.1.1. Fragment ‘ex actis Andreae’ in ms Vaticanus graecus 808, 10\(^{th}\)-11\(^{th}\) c., ff. 507\(^{v}\}-512\(^{v}\) (V)\(^52\). This is plausibly a fragment of the primitive Acts that includes Andrew’s four

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\(^{43}\) See \textit{infra} Chapter 2, pp. 81f.

\(^{44}\) On \textit{Narratio}’s contacts with the remaining extant witnesses, see \textit{infra} Chapter 2, pp. 87f and 104-06.


\(^{46}\) See \textit{infra} Chapter 2, pp. 82f.

\(^{47}\) On \textit{Laudatio}’s textual relationships, see \textit{infra} Chapter 2, pp. 91 and 98-104.


\(^{49}\) See \textit{infra} Chapter 2, pp. 83f.

\(^{50}\) Both mss were already known to Bonnet, \textit{Laudatio}, 310. It must be noted that the reference to this manuscript in most recent studies is wrongly given as Escorial Y II 6 [gr. 261] (so, for example Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 19 and M. Geerard, \textit{Clavis Apocryphorum Novi Testamenti} (Turnhout, 1992) §233) instead of Escorial y II 6 [gr. 314].

\(^{51}\) On \textit{Vita}’s textual relationships with other testimonies, see \textit{infra} Chapter 2, pp. 98-104.

\(^{52}\) M. Bonnet, ‘Ex actis Andreae’, \textit{AAA} II/1, 38-45. See also \textit{ibid.}, p. XIV.
speeches while in prison. These discourses provide essential information for the
analysis of AA’s tenor and character\textsuperscript{53}.

D.1.2. Papyrus Oxyrhynchus 851\textsuperscript{54}. Some lines of text that Flamion and Prieur relate to AA\textsuperscript{55}.

D.2. Coptic Material

D.2.1. Coptic fragment in Papyrus Copt. Utrecht 1 (PCU 1), 4\textsuperscript{th} century\textsuperscript{56}. The fragment
presumably occupied pages 1 to 15 of the ms. The first 8 pages are lost and the extant
text begins on page 9. Pages 11 and 12 are missing as well. Consequently, the Coptic
fragment in PCU 1 consists today of 5 pages (9, 10, 13, 14, 15) and contains one
single episode of Andrew’s peregrinations.

D.2.2. Papyrus Copt. Bodleian 103. Two folio lacunose fragment of a dialogue between Jesus
and Andrew, which its editor and H. Chadwick relate to AA\textsuperscript{57}.

1.2. Indirect Transmission

Besides the textual witnesses of the direct transmission, we also have a certain number of
testimonies proceeding from commentaries, periphrases or passing references to AA.

1.2.1. Certain Fragments

A. Evodius from Uzalum (Evodius I). The fragment proceeds from De fide contra
Manichaeos 38\textsuperscript{58} and has a parallel in S (125\textsuperscript{r} ff) and H (159\textsuperscript{r}ff). It narrates how
Maximilla is substituted by her servant Euclia in her conjugal bed.

B. Evodius from Uzalum (Evodius II). A second fragment from Evodius proceeds from the
same text as the previous fragment and refers to a puerolus speciosus who imitates the
voices of Maximilla and Iphidama in order to prevent Aegeates from discovering that they
are with Andrew\textsuperscript{59}.

\textsuperscript{53} On V’s relationship with the extant textual witnesses, see infra Chapter 2, pp. 84f and 887-95 and 130.


\textsuperscript{55} Flamion, L’Apôtre André, 250; Prieur, Acta, 28-29.

\textsuperscript{56} Edito princeps by R. van den Broek and French translation by Prieur, ‘Édition du texte copte’, in Prieur, Acta,


\textsuperscript{58} Evodius, De fide c. Manich. 38 (CSEL 25.2, p. 968.24-31): Adtendite in actibus Leuci, quos sub nomine
apostolorum scribit, qualia sint quae accipitis de Maximilla uxor Egetis. quae cum nollet marito debitum
reddere, cum apostolus dixerit: uxori uir debitum reddat, similiter et uxor uiro, illa subposuerit marito suo
ancillam suam, Eucliam nomine, exornans ea, sicut ibi scriptum est, adversa riis lenociniis et fucationibus et
eam nocte pro se uicariam subponens, ut ille nesciens cum ea tamquam cum uxor eam concubineret.

\textsuperscript{59} Evodius, De fide c. Manich. 38 (CSEL 25.2, p. 968.31-969.6): ibi etiam scriptum est, quod cum eadem
Maximilla et Iphidamia simul issent ad audiendum apostolam Andream, puerulus quidam speciosus, quem uult
Leucius uel deum uel certe angelum intellegi, commendauerit eas Andreae apostolo et perrexerit ad praetorium
Egetis et ingessus cubiculum eorum finixerit uoce muliebrem quasi Maximillae murmurantis de doloribus
sexus feminei et Iphidamiae respondentis. quae colloquia cum audisset Egetis credens eas ibi esse discesserat.
C. Fragment in the *Pseudo-Titus Epistle*. This fragment, which was identified by D. de Bruyne, refers to Andrew’s intervention at a wedding in order to hinder the marriage⁶⁰. Some scholars see in this fragment the primitive version of the episode in *Epitome* 11⁶¹.

1.2.2. Dubious Fragments

A. Fragment in *Manichaean Psalm-book* 142.20-21 (Psalter I). This reference to AA mentions a fire at Andrew’s lodgings and a crucifixion of Andrew’s followers⁶². It is generally believed that the fragment corresponds with the episode in *Epitome* 12, but Gregory only mentions the arson attack and not the crucifixion.

B. Fragment in *Manichaean Psalm-book* 143.13-14 (Psalter II). The second reference to AA mentions Maximilla and a certain Aristobula, who is not attested in any of the extant witnesses⁶³.

C. Fragment in *Manichaean Psalm-book* 192.26-28 (Psalter III). The third reference mentions Maximilla and Iphidama. Strikingly, the passage asserts that the latter was put in prison, although no extant witness preserves such a tradition⁶⁴.

D. Fragment in Augustine’s *Against the Manichean Felix* 2.6. In the alleged fragment Augustine states that according to the Acts written by Leucius, man’s degradation is not due to his nature but to his own will. Different scholars have claimed that it preserves a lost section of AA⁶⁵.

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⁶⁰ De Bruyne, ‘Nouveaux fragments des Actes de Pierre, de Paul, de Jean, d’André et de l’Apocalypse d’Élie’, *RB* 25 (1908) 149-60 at 157, ut uenisset denique et Andreas ad nupcias, et ipse, ad demonstrandum gloriam dei, destinatos sibi coniuges deuinxit masculos et foeminas ab inuicem et docuit eos singulari statu permanere sanctos.

⁶¹ On the issue, see *infra* this Chapter, note 143.


2. Research on AA

Before beginning our study of the research on AA, here, for the sake of clarity, is an alphabetical list including the abbreviations of the main textual witnesses that appear in the following pages.

AA’s fragment in V: Fragment ‘ex actis Andreae’ in Codex Vaticanus graecus 80866.
Arm: Armenian passion67.
C: Martyrdom of St. Andrew in ms Ann Arbor 3668
Conversante: Passio altera sancti Andreae apostoli69.
Epistle: Passio sancti Andreae apostoli, of which we possess three versions:
   LatEp: Latin version70.
   1GrEp: Greek translation of LatEp71.
   2GrEp: Greek translation of LatEp with interpolations72.
Epitome: Liber de miraculis beati Andreae apostoli by Gregory of Tours73.
H: Martyrdom of St. Andrew, preserved in ms Hierosol. Sab. 10374.
Laudatio: Acta Andreae apostoli cum laudatione contexta75.
Malt A: Martyrium alterum A, martyrdom of St. Andrew76.
Malt B: Martyrium alterum B, martyrdom of St. Andrew77.
Mpr: Martyrium prius78.
Narratio: Martyrium sancti Andreae apostoli79.
PCU 1: Coptic fragment in Papyrus Copt. Utrecht 180.
Plen: Fragment of the Coptic translation of Andrew’s martyrdom in Plen 64981.
S: Martyrdom of St. Andrew preserved in ms Sinait. 52682.
Vita Andreae: Life of Andrew by Epiphanius Monachus, of which we possess three versions83:
   Vita: Dressel’s edition of Vita Andreae on the basis of Codex Vaticanus graecus 824.

66 See supra § D.1.1, p. 6f. In order to facilitate the comparison of our results with those of other scholars, references to this text in the two first chapters follow Bonnet’s edition (Vb). From chapter three onwards we follow our own re-edition (Vr).
67 See supra § B.4, p. 5.
68 See supra § B.1.3, p. 3.
69 See supra § B.2.2, p. 4.
70 See supra § B.2.1, p. 4.
71 See supra § B.1.6, p. 4.
72 See supra § B.1.6, p. 4.
73 See supra § C.1, p. 5.
74 See supra § B.1.2, p. 3.
75 See supra § C.2.2, p. 6.
76 See supra § B.1.4, p. 4.
77 See supra § B.1.5, p. 4.
78 See supra § B.1.1, p. 3.
79 See supra § C.2.1, p. 5.
80 See supra § D.2.1, p. 7.
81 See supra § B.3, p. 4f.
82 See supra § B.1.2, p. 3.
Our review of the research on $AA$ begins with the monumental work by R.A. Lipsius$^{84}$. On the basis of the testimonies and materials collected by his predecessors and contemporaries, Lipsius attempted the first comprehensive, exhaustive and critical approach to the traditions about the apostle Andrew. Greek and Latin testimonies edited by J.A. Fabricius$^{85}$, K.C. Woog$^{86}$, C. Thilo$^{87}$, A. Dressel$^{88}$ and C. Tischendorf$^{89}$ are enriched with commentaries on many unpublished manuscripts and completed with references to Syriac, Ethiopic, Anglo-Saxon, Slavonic, Arabic and Coptic testimonies. This highly interesting and far-reaching study attempts not only to reconstruct the Vorlage of these diversified materials, but also to go beyond it by considering the different traditions that might have been combined in the ancient Acts.

At the time of this publication only a few texts had been published in their current definitive form. They are the following: $AAM$ and $AAPe$ in the editions by Tischendorf; $LatEp$ $^{90}$, $1EpGr$ and $2EpGr$ $^{91}$; $Epitome$ and $Conversante$ in Fabricius’ edition of the third book of Pseudo-Abdias; $Vita$ and the $upomnma$ in the Greek menaeon by Symeon the Metaphrast$^{92}$. However, other important unpublished documents were also accessible to Lipsius: $Laudatio$ in mss Paris BN 1463 and Coisl. 105$^{93}$; $Vita Andreæ$ by Epiphanius in ms Paris BN 1510$^{94}$; $Narratio$ in ms Paris BN 1485$^{95}$; $Mpr$ in ms Vat. gr. 807$^{96}$ and $AA’$’s fragment in $V$. $^{97}$

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$^{83}$ See supra § C.2.3, p. 6.
$^{86}$ *Presbyterorum et diaconorum Achaiae de martyrio S. Andreae apostoli epistola encyclica* (Leipzig, 1749).
$^{88}$ A. Dressel, *Vita Andreæ* by Epiphanius. See supra this Chapter, note 48.
$^{89}$ C. Tischendorf, *Acta Apostolorum apocrypha* (Leipzig, 1851) and *Apocalypses apocryphae* (Leipzig, 1866).
$^{90}$ *LatEp* has been repeatedly published since the *editio princeps* by B. Mombritius, *Sanctuarium* I (1476) 55-57.
$^{91}$ Tischendorf, *Acta*, 105-31 and 132-66, respectively.
$^{93}$ Lipsius, *Apostelgeschichten* I, 184, 570ff.
$^{94}$ Lipsius, *Apostelgeschichten* I, 575 note 1. It was Lipsius and not Flamion, as Prieur (*Acta*, 133) seems to believe, who first realised the deficiency of ms Vat. gr. 824 and pointed out the errors in Dressel’s edition. Moreover, as we will show below (p. 17), Flamion’s suggestions on the textual relationship between *Laudatio* and *Vita* are mere speculations.
$^{95}$ Lipsius, *Apostelgeschichten* I, 548 and Ergänzungsheft, 12.
$^{97}$ Lipsius, *Ergänzungsheft*, 30-31. Lipsius briefly reports the notices about these two last mss given by Bonnet and already emphasises their interest. Prieur, *Acta*, 135-36, wrongly omits these two mss from the list of documents known to Lipsius.
On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of published and unpublished materials, Lipsius concludes that the origin of all these texts is the Περίποδοι Ἀνδρέου, a Gnostic text written in the second half of the second century. Due to its Gnostic orientation, this text was extensively revised, censored and re-elaborated by orthodox hands. The result of this revision is what he calls the Catholic Πράτει, the text on which Laudatio, Vita and Symeon the Metaphrast are dependent. Epitome, in turn, depends directly or indirectly on the Gnostic text. This conclusion is important, since Lipsius, for the first time, prefers Epitome’s testimony for the relation of Andrew’s peregrinations, which in the testimony of the catholic Πράτει are combined with other local traditions. In his opinion, Andrew’s sojourn among the cannibals and his activities in Amasea, Sine, Nica, Nicomedia, Hellespont, Thracia, Macedonia and Achaia, as preserved by Epitome, belonged to the Gnostic Περίποδοι Ἀνδρέου.

Lipsius’ interpretation of the Gnostic character of his Περίποδοι Ἀνδρέου is based on the indirect transmission of AA and on so-called Gnostic traces in the extant testimonies that had escaped the scrutiny of orthodox revisions. Even if his criteria to conclude the Gnosticism of the ancient Acts might, as has been suggested, be ‘dépassés’, his sharp insight and understanding of the texts related to the apostle should not be underestimated. It must be noted that, excluding his references to AAM and AAPe, all the passages he isolated as

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98 Lipsius, Apostelgeschichten I, 587-88. Prieur, Acta, 147, wrongly seems to imply that it was Flamion who first emphasised Epitome’s importance.
99 Lipsius, Apostelgeschichten I, 587. The activities in the regions around the Pontus Euxinus that are interrupted by two journeys to Jerusalem must, consequently, be excluded from the plan of the ancient Acts.
100 According to Lipsius, the Gnostic Acts combined older and more recent traditions on the apostle. The oldest layer consisted of legends concerning his activity among the Achaians of the northern coast of the Black Sea (see Aristotle, Polit. 1338b 22). See on the issue A. v. Gutschmid, ‘Die Königsnamen in den apokryphen Apostelgeschichten’, BnM 19 (1864) 161-83, 380-401 at 393. Combined with them are still other local traditions that recorded the events of his activities along the eastern and southern coasts of the Black Sea. The more recent tradition, in turn, reported his martyrdom at Patras and originated in a confusion between the Achaians of the northeastern Black Sea with the inhabitants of Achaia in Greece. Both traditions combined with each other to form the plan of the ancient Gnostic Acts which, as Philaster notices, took Andrew from Pontus to Achaia (Lipsius, Apostelgeschichten I, 608ff). See, however, T. Schermann, Propheten- und Apostellegenden nebst Jüngerkatalogen des Dorotheus und verwandter Texte, (Leipzig, 1907) 251-52; further, Dvornik, Apostolicity, 219-20.
101 For the two fragments Evodius I and II, see Lipsius, Apostelgeschichten I, 590-92. For pseudo-Augustine, De vera et falsa poenitentia, see ibid., 592-94.
102 See Lipsius, Apostelgeschichten I, 594-602. As Gnostic traces, he quotes Christ’s manifestation as a child in AAM 18 (87.3ff), as light and voice in AAM 3 (67.6ff) and 4 (68.12ff), as a pilot in AAM 5 (69.14-71.3), the fantastic journey in AAM 3ff and Andrew’s invisibility (99.13-101.10). Lipsius also recognises traces of Gnostic theology in AAM 6 (71.4-72.11) and 10 (76.9-77.10). Also, the narration about the Sphinx in AAM 12-15 (78.9ff) betrays Gnostic traces. Concerning AAPe he quotes Christ’s manifestation as a beautiful child in AAPe 2 (117.18ff) and the request to Onesiphorus to leave possessions and wife in AAPe 13 (123.4-14).
belonging to an older stage of the text’s history are still today considered to preserve, if not ancient passages, at least the closest testimonies to the ancient Acts\textsuperscript{104}.

M. Bonnet’s studies on our text are of a more philological kind. Although he already seems to have been working on AA’s testimonies while Lipsius was preparing his \textit{Apostelgeschichte}\textsuperscript{105}, it was not until 1885 that he first published one of them: the \textit{Liber de miraculis beati Andreae} by Gregory of Tours\textsuperscript{106}. Nine years later, in 1894, he published three texts that are essential for our knowledge of AA: \textit{Laudatio}, \textit{Narratio}, which he still calls ‘martyrium’, and \textit{Conversante}\textsuperscript{107}. From the same year dates his study on \textit{Epistle}\textsuperscript{108}, where he argued that the Latin version is the source of the Greek recensions. He furthermore affirms that while the first 9 chapters of \textit{Epistle} are an original fiction by the author, chapters 10-15 rely either on the primitive Gnostic Acts or on a Catholic revision thereof\textsuperscript{109}. It was not until 1898 that he published what would become the standard edition of the Latin and Greek texts for AA\textsuperscript{110}. Some of the texts included in his edition had already been published. So, for example, \textit{AAM}, \textit{AAPe} and \textit{Epistle}, which appears in a synoptic edition that allows a better comparison of \textit{LatEp}, \textit{1EpGr} and \textit{2EpGr} with its interesting interpolations\textsuperscript{111}. Other texts were known but remained unpublished. They are the following: \textit{Malt} A and B, \textit{Mpr} and AA’s fragment in V, which would reveal itself as an essential document for our knowledge about the ancient Acts.

Bonnet’s prolific editorial activity increased the interest in AA. In 1897 M.R. James\textsuperscript{112} compared three sections of the recently edited \textit{Laudatio} with passages from \textit{Epitome}, \textit{APe} and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[104]{So, for example, the fragments Evodius I and II (\textit{supra} this Chapter, § 1.2.1, A and B, p. 7), the speech to the cross preserved by \textit{Laudatio} (346.16-347.10), \textit{Vita} 252 D-253 A5 (read \textit{Narratio} 367.6-13) and interpolations in \textit{2EpGr} 24.19-30; 25.23-24; Andrew’s words to Aegaeates in \textit{Laudatio} 348.10-21; as well as the older elements preserved by interpolations in \textit{2EpGr} 31.19-26 and 32.9-27. Also correct is his appreciation of the textual relationship between \textit{Vita} and \textit{Laudatio}. Even if, since Flamion, \textit{Laudatio} is considered to be dependent on \textit{Vita}, a proper analysis of the textual evidence shows that Lipsius’ opinion that they both depend on a common source must be preferred, see infra this Chapter, p. 17 notes 159-160.}
\footnotetext[105]{Lipsius reports on several occasions that references to manuscripts are provided by Bonnet.}
\footnotetext[106]{Bonnet, \textit{Epitome}, see this Chapter, p. 5 note 39.}
\footnotetext[107]{These three texts first published in \textit{Analecta Bollandiana} 13 (see \textit{supra} notes 33, 41 and 45) would be reprinted in \textit{Supplementum codicis apocryphi} II (Paris, 1895) 1-44; 45-64; 65-70, respectively. In the introduction Bonnet (ibid., XI), in line with Lipsius, already defends that \textit{Laudatio} and \textit{Vita} used a common source.}
\footnotetext[108]{Bonnet, ‘La passion d’André’, see \textit{supra} this Chapter, note 29.}
\footnotetext[109]{Bonnet, ‘La passion d’André’, 467 and note 4.}
\footnotetext[110]{Bonnet, \textit{AAA} II/1.}
\footnotetext[111]{Some of them had been already pointed out by Lipsius, see \textit{supra} this Chapter, note 104. As we will show below, these interpolations do not proceed, despite Priceur (\textit{Acta}, 138), from the ancient martyrdom but from a later version, which, though more complete than most recensions, presented omissions as well. See infra Chapter 2, pp. 106-09.}
\footnotetext[112]{M.R. James, \textit{Apocrypha anecdota} II (Cambridge, 1897), pp. XXIX-XXXI.}
\end{footnotes}
AJ in order to defend the idea that AA had no other writer than Leuciuss. In the same year A. Harnack published the second volume of his Geschichte, which demonstrates his scepticism concerning Lipsius’ Gnostic interpretation of the primitive Acts. In 1900, and as a preamble to his lengthier introduction to AA in his Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, E. Hennecke’s review of Bonnet’s edition already advanced some points he would develop later in following studies. He stressed the capital importance of AA’s fragment in V, which he studied personally at the Vatican Library, and suggested, on the basis of their similar Gnostic tendency and stylistic resemblance, a close relationship between APe, AJ and AA. In the next two years, two publications by R. Liechtenhan followed Hennecke in these two points. Liechtenhan’s studies represent a turning point in the research on AA, since he paid, for the first time, due attention to the recently published AA fragment in V. Unlike Lipsius, he claims the Gnostic character of the ancient Acts on the basis of a conceptual analysis of this document and of the speech to the cross in Mpr 14. With regard to the former, he notices the essential role played by Andrew’s speeches and states that their conceptual developments provide a direct insight into Gnostic religion. Even though his study dedicates only a single paragraph to summarise its contents, Liechtenhan already isolates its four constituent speeches and resumes their major themes. In his second publication he dedicated some more space (two pages) to a commentary on the four speeches, namely the first speech to the brethren, to Maximilla, to Stratoicles and the second speech to the brethren. This analysis allowed him to conclude that no other fragment of Gnostic literature gives so clear an idea of Gnostic

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115 In contrast to Prieur’s opinion (Acta, 141), who seems to imply that Harnack supported the hypothesis of a Gnostic origin for the ancient Acts, he is actually quite sceptical about the issue. Preuschen (Geschichte I, 127ff) had already shown his reservations, and Harnack disputes in the first part of his second volume some of Lipsius’ statements (Geschichte II/1, 544). Furthermore, according to him (Geschichte II/2, 175), it is impossible to determine whether the ancient Acts were Gnostic or ‘vulgär-christlich’.


118 R. Liechtenhan, Die Offenbarung im Gnosticismus (Göttingen, 1901) and ‘Die pseudepigraphische Litteratur der Gnostiker’, ZNW 3 (1902) 222-37, 286-99.

119 According to Liechtenhan, Die Offenbarung, 73-74 and 92-93, this section presents conceptual parallelisms with APe and AJ.

120 Liechtenhan, Die Offenbarung, 50: ‘Der Mann, der das Fragment ex actis Andreae geschrieben hat, verdient trotz allen Absonderlichkeiten unsern Respect; so konnte nur schreiben, wer wirklich zur Freiheit des Gotteskindschaft hindurchgedrungen war. Hier thun wir, wenig gestört durch theologische Phantastereien, unmittelbare Blicke in die gnostische Religion’.

121 Liechtenhan, Die Offenbarung, 92-93. See our conceptual analysis of the four speeches infra Chapter 4, pp. 191-221.

122 Liechtenhan, ‘Pseudepigraphische Litteratur’, 295-96. Especially interesting is his interpretation of the obscure and difficult passage in V42.4-6.
beliefs as this section of AA. As a result, he states that all other Gnostic traces pointed out by Lipsius are very doubtful and irrelevant.

O. Bardenhewer’s review of AA, from 1902, does not offer any new insights for our understanding of the Acts. Instead, he seems to ignore Hennecke’s and Liechtenhan’s progress on the subject and limits himself to the positions defended by Lipsius and James, even when he includes a detailed up-to-date bibliographical report. We have to wait until 1904 for new developments in research into AA when, in the introduction to his Neutestamentliche Apokryphen and in his Handbuch, E. Hennecke adopted a critical attitude towards the approaches by Lipsius and James. In his view, it is only AA’s fragment in V that can provide access to the ancient Acts. Concerning the reconstruction of AA’s main outline, it is not Epitome as Lipsius and James suggested, but Narratio that is our best source. The numerous contacts between AA’s fragment in V and Narratio show that the latter depends on a lengthier and better version of AA than Epitome. Hennecke also rejected Lipsius’ assumption that AAM and AAPe preserve traces of Gnosticism under their reworked current state. Notwithstanding this, the analysis of AA’s oldest testimony does show, in his opinion, that the Gnostic background cannot be ruled out. Finally, with Lipsius and James, he noticed significant contacts between AA and APe and AJ. With regard to AA’s time and place of composition, he concluded that the scarcity of reliable testimonies did not allow a definitive answer.

Among Hennecke’s many interesting opinions about the different textual witnesses, special attention deserves to be paid to his acute observation that some variants of LatEp provided the model for the Pseudo-Augustine De vera et falsa poenitentia. Harnack had
already refuted Lipsius’ assumption that this text belonged to the ancient Acts\textsuperscript{134}, but later he seems to have changed his mind under the influence of C. Schmidt\textsuperscript{135}, for he accepts Bardenhewer’s point of view on the issue. According to Hennecke the speech to the cross and \textit{de vera et falsa poenitentia} present important thematic and conceptual divergences\textsuperscript{136}.

Hennecke’s textual reconstruction, translated into German by G. Schimmelpfeng, is divided into three sections. The first one, including the preliminaries to AA’s fragment in V, is based on Evodius’ fragments I and II only\textsuperscript{137}. The second section includes AA’s fragment in V\textsuperscript{138}. The third section, finally, presents a reconstruction of the martyrdom on the basis of interpolations in 2EpGr, Mpr, Narratio, Laudatio and Malt\textsuperscript{139}. Most interesting are the two commentaries offered in his \textit{Handbuch}, one by Schimmelpfeng and another by Hennecke himself, with explanatory notes concerning philological, conceptual and literary matters\textsuperscript{140}.

In an article from 1908, D. de Bruyne\textsuperscript{141} identified certain quotations from apocryphal Acts in the \textit{Pseudo-Titus Epistle}\textsuperscript{142}. Among them is one that might belong to AA\textsuperscript{143}. Three years later, in 1911, Flamion published his study on AA and related texts\textsuperscript{144}. In spite of its promising title, Flamion’s work does not add any new material to the already existing corpus of texts on the apostle\textsuperscript{145}, but does attempt a new approach and interpretation of the extant testimonies. This interpretation, however, is highly preconditioned by the point he wants to demonstrate: the writer of the ancient Acts was not a Gnostic, as defended by many previous scholars, but might rather be considered to belong to ‘la grande Église’.

\textsuperscript{134} Lipsius, \textit{Apostelgeschichten} I, 592-94.
\textsuperscript{135} Harnack, \textit{Geschichte} II/2, 175.
\textsuperscript{136} Hennecke, \textit{Handbuch}, 548, note 1. Prieur (\textit{Acta}, 29-30) wrongly thinks that this discovery is due to Flamion, \textit{L’Apôtre}, 190-91.
\textsuperscript{137} Hennecke, \textit{Neutestamentliche Apokryphen}, 464. His second edition, however, adds notices from Narratio to these fragments. See \textit{Neutestamentliche Apokryphen}², 251.
\textsuperscript{138} Hennecke, \textit{Neutestamentliche Apokryphen}, 464-70.
\textsuperscript{139} Hennecke, \textit{Handbuch}, 556-57.
\textsuperscript{140} Hennecke, \textit{Handbuch}, 549-62.
\textsuperscript{141} De Bruyne, ‘Nouveaux fragments’, 157. See supra this Chapter, note 60.
\textsuperscript{142} On the \textit{Pseudo-Titus Epistle}, see G. Sfameni Gasparro, ‘L’Epistula Titi discipuli Pauli de dispositione sanctimonii e la tradizione dell’enkrateia’, \textit{ANRW} II 25.6 (1998) 4551-664.
\textsuperscript{143} Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 20-21, 42-43, suggests that this story, in which Andrew is said to have prevented a man and a woman from marrying, is the original story that underlies \textit{Epitome} 11, in which the apostle intervenes at a wedding in Philippi to hinder an incestuous marriage between cousins. The obvious differences between these episodes are to be explained, in Prieur’s view, as a result of Gregory’s censoring activity. Such a relationship, however, is highly conjectural, for there is no definitive evidence proving that these episodes are the same.
\textsuperscript{144} Flamion, \textit{L’Apôtre}.
\textsuperscript{145} So already Ehrhard, ‘Review Flamion’, 517.
In order to state his point, Flamion draws on both Hennecke’s exclusion of AAM from the ancient Acts and on his reconstruction of the martyrdom. With regard to AAM, he suggests that its composition must be placed in Egypt and dated to the fourth century. Concerning the last part, he tends to overstate the significance and reliability of the testimonies for the martyrdom with a view to supporting his hypothesis of the so-called Martyrium source, which he considers to be a recension of the last part of the ancient Acts.

Unlike Hennecke, however, he believes that Gregory’s Epitome is our best testimony for the first part of the Acts – that is, Andrew’s peregrinations. If Flamion’s purpose was to demonstrate that AA’s writer was an orthodox Christian, his goal was almost achieved with his choice of textual witnesses. After taking so reworked a source as Epitome for the beginning and such a revised and re-elaborated text as the testimonies for the end of the martyrdom, now he only had to adapt the mentality of AA’s fragment in V to the general character of these highly revised testimonies to complete his goal. This is indeed what happens.

Despite the influence that his work has exercised on some researchers of the twentieth century, Flamion offers a very subjective analysis of the documents that frequently mistakes their mutual relationships, magnifies irrelevant contacts, minimises relevant issues and generally makes the wrong choices between what is ancient and what is innovation. These drawbacks are evident in the already-mentioned hypothesis regarding the Martyrium source. The numerous passages adduced by Flamion to support such a hypothesis are not only

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146 As Hennecke, ‘Zur christlichen Apokryphenliteratur’, ZKG 45 (1926) 309-15 at 313-14, himself would point out, Flamion’s reconstruction is essentially the same as the one he proposed. See Hennecke, Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, 462 note 1.


148 See L’Apôtre, 269-300.

149 L’Apôtre, 177. See contra Hennecke, Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, 470 note 1.

150 See, for example, Dvornik, Apostolicity, 226-27; Prieur, Acta, 146-47.

151 For example, his conclusions on Conversante’s dependence on LatEp are totally ungrounded. On the basis of a very subjective analysis of passages (see L’Apôtre, 46 with note 4), he invents non-existent contacts (for instance between Conversante 375.16-18 and LatEp 19.6, 8; 20.6), exaggerates similarities (see L’Apôtre, 45 with notes 1-4), and misunderstands relationships among the texts (in page 46 note 4, for example, he relates Conversante 374.18-22 to LatEp 19.1, whereas the former passage clearly depends on Vat gr. 808 or a similar text). Most of the passages adduced in L’Apôtre, 43-50 do not provide support for his argument (see references ibid., 45 note 2), either because the adduced similarities are too vague or simply due the fact that both texts deal with the same theme (see L’Apôtre, 45, note 4). As a result, his conclusion that Conversante depends on LatEp and ‘other documents’ is not only vague and imprecise, but also arbitrary.

152 See L’Apôtre, 107-08, for his surprising statement that the reference to Andrew’s two-day crucifixion (preserved by LatEp, Conversante and Narratio) is preferable to the four-day crucifixion preserved by most documents (interpolations in 2EpGr 28.12-13; 28.26-27, MPr. 56.3, Malt A 61.11-13; 62.1, Laudatio 347.25) and which has more recently been confirmed by new material such as H (f. 167; 167’) and S (f. 131’) and C (ff. 64’ and 64’).
These texts can hardly depend on the same source because such divergences cannot simply be attributed, as Flamion suggests, to their respective copyists. The obvious contacts between *Malt* A and B, interpolations in *2EpGr* and *Narratio*, which had already been pointed out by previous scholars, neither imply a common ancestor nor a direct dependence on the ancient martyrdom. Rather, all these documents simply preserve the same section of *AA* and their numerous and important divergences clearly show that they rely on different versions of the martyrdom, which had already been revised. The same problems appear in his analysis of the textual relationship between *Vita* and *Laudatio*. Against Lipsius and Bonnet, who suggested that both documents depended on the same source, he proposes that for the section containing Andrew’s peregrinations *Laudatio* depends on *Vita*. However, his arguments to support his point of view are not conclusive and, when the facts contradict them, he simply resorts to speculation to explain them.

References are frequently incorrect. These numerous errors make a cross-examination of the passages a rather tedious and exasperating task. See, for example, wrong references to *Malt* A and B in *L’Apôtre*, 102 note 2; on page 96 note 7 most of the references are erroneous.

See next note.

See *L’Apôtre*, 93 for his explanation of the divergences between *Malt* A and B.

So, for instance, his efforts to demonstrate that *Malt* A and B depend on the same source. In order to do so, he falsifies the relationship between the texts, thus minimising their important divergences, such as the reference to the duration of Andrew’s crucifixion, which according to *Malt* A lasts four days and according to B two days (for their parallels in different testimonies see supra this Chapter, note 152). More relevant are textual divergences such as the description of the apostle’s crucifixion (compare *Malt* A 60.19ff with *Malt* B 61.20ff). These texts can hardly depend on the same source because such divergences cannot simply be attributed, as Flamion suggests, to their respective copyists.


See Lipsius, *Apostelgeschichten I*, 574 and Bonnet, *Supplementum*, p. XI.

For this statement he draws on F. Diekamp, *Hippolytos vom Theben* (Münster, 1898) 143-45, who first suggested that *Laudatio* might depend both on *Vita* and on their common source. However, as Flamion himself declares, he radicalises Diekamp’s opinion by stating that *Vita* is the only source for *Laudatio*. After reading his arguments and examining the quoted passages, one cannot but conclude that this affirmation is not only arbitrary, but also completely ungrounded.

See *L’Apôtre*, 205-12. Once again, as in the previous case of the Martyrium source, besides numerous inaccurate textual references (on p. 206 note 2: of the seven references to *Vita*, three are erroneous; on p. 207 note 1: six references, of which three are wrong; on p. 207 note 3: of six references, four are incorrect), one finds a clear arbitrariness in his evaluation of the materials. For example, he alleges (p. 206) that *Laudatio*’s writer corrects passages of *Vita* when he does not understand them. The examples adduced, however, do not support his interpretation: the divergences might still arise from their different reworking of a common source. Another argument is that *Laudatio* eliminates all references to ocular testimony (p. 207 note 1). This is also a weak statement, for these references might be an invention by Epiphanius. Flamion’s claim that *Laudatio* eliminates all trivial discourses from *Vita* might be also turned against *Vita*, for Epiphanius might have amplified or added them to shorter references in his source. Besides, it might also be hypothesised that these references already appeared in the common source, and that *Vita* included them while *Laudatio* eliminated them. Even more speculative is his analysis of obvious errors in *Vita*, which in his view are simply due to Dressel’s defective edition and inferior mss (Vat. gr. 824). When doing so, he simply repeats Lipsius’ view of the issue (*Apostelgeschichten I*, 575 note 1) and does not make any effort to contrast Vat. gr. 824 with other documents, such as mss Paris BN 1510 and Esc. y II 6, both of which were already known to Bonnet, who consulted them for his edition of *Laudatio*, see *AB* 13 (1894) 310. The readings of these mss often disprove his speculative statements about *Vita*. On the palaeographical errors in *Vita*, *VitaEsc* and *VitaParis* see infra Chapter 2, pp. 98ff and notes 109-10.
Even more seriously at fault is his interpretation of AA’s fragment in V, which in his view is a section detached from a recension of the Martyrium source. In order to relate the fragment to the extant textual witnesses for the martyrdom, he alleges a stylistic and doctrinal proximity between Narratio and AA’s fragment in V. However, his assertion that the former preserves all the speeches of the latter in a revised and transformed version is tendentious, for it overlooks the fact that Narratio completely omits the most important sections of AA’s fragment in V. To what extent AA’s fragment in V presents contacts with the other testimonies of his Martyrium source remains a mystery for the reader.

The analysis of the doctrinal character of AA’s fragment in V is also very speculative. This is perhaps not the place to review all his speculations individually. Suffice it to mention just a couple of them. According to Flamion, a ‘theory on ecstasy’ is one of the central issues developed by AA’s fragment in V. And it is precisely this ‘theory on ecstasy’ that leads him to the conclusion about the Neopythagorean and Neoplatonic influences on the text. However, the most representative (and only) passage he adduces as an example is a highly interpretative translation that tendentiously adds to the Greek original the necessary elements to fabricate such a theory. Other cases are, for example, his arbitrary and indiscriminate use of passages to support his interpretation of ‘l’humanité sauvée’, his tendency to interpret the figure of

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161 See Flamion, L’Apôtre, 206 with note 1, where he alleges errors ‘de la tradition manuscrite’ in order to explain visible obstacles to his theory. See also ibid., 207 note 2, where he even fills a lacuna in Vita on the basis of Laudatio. In both cases no serious textual analysis supports his assertions.

162 His opinion is not, as is Ehrhard’s (followed by Prieur), based on codicological arguments, but simply on arbitrary speculations. See L’Apôtre, 145 note 1.

163 The omitted sections are Vᵇ 38.2-20; 40.10-41.14; 41.36-42.7; 42.9-31 and 44.33-45.33. On the issue, see infra Chapter 2, pp. 117-19.

164 When parallels from the extant testimonies are adduced, similarities, if existent, are usually irrelevant. See L’Apôtre, 150 note 6; 151 notes 3 and 5. In other cases apparent similarities concern general issues that might appear in any text dealing with the same theme. See ibid. 151 notes 7-10.

165 Contra, Quispel, ‘Unknown fragment’, 143 note 17. Besides, it remains a complete mystery what Flamion understands by Neopythagoreanism and Neoplatonism. He repeatedly refers to both (or just one?) philosophical groups in his analysis of Mpr (L’Apôtre, 135, 136, 139, etc.) and of V (ibid., 149; 157, 160; etc.). However, he never provides a precise parallel from one or the other philosopher, but refers generally to whole sections of Zeller’s Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung III/2. Die nacharistotelische Philosophie. Zweite Hälfte (Leipzig, 1881), which deal with comprehensive treatments of philosophers and not, as one might expect, with precise conceptual parallels to AA’s ideas. In addition, the alleged philosophical parallels are generally as distant in time and orientation from each other as Philo, Plutarch, Numenius and Plotinus can be. In any case, as we will see below, the alleged contacts between AA and Plotinus are inconclusive. See, for example, his comparison (L’Apôtre, 136) of the symbolism of the cross, which in his view ‘symboliserait notre salut aîla manière de ce retour a l’Un’, with Neoplatonic ecstasy.

166 Compare his translation (L’Apôtre, 149-50): ‘te ramassant sur toi-même dans ce repos en toi et reprenant pied, réfléchis à la hauteur où Dieu t’a placée et contemplant ta personnalité dans la bonté de ton être, désire voir celui-là même qui se montre à toi, et que connaîtra seul qui aura l’audace de tenter aussi périlleuse ascension’ with Vᵇ 41.2-7. None of the sections in italics correspond to the Greek.

167 See L’Apôtre, 152-153: ‘Le salut donne le sens et la valeur à toutes choses’ [reference to Vᵇ 38.8] (...) et en même temps, il est la force [reference to Mpr. 55.7] et donne la puissance sur tous les adversaires [references to 2EpGr 27.11; 30.23; Vᵇ 40.28].
the apostle as a new Socrates\textsuperscript{168}, etc.\textsuperscript{169}. His most striking statement, however, is perhaps his reference to the ‘verbosité sans frein’ of \textit{AA}. Echoing the ancient opinion of Gregory of Tours, the author seems to consider that the speeches to the cross, to Maximilla, to Stratocles and to the brethren are simply pompous and superfluous rhetorical exercises\textsuperscript{170}. It seems that Flamion is as eager as Gregory to eliminate them, whereas the speeches preserved by \textit{AA}’s fragment in \textit{V} are the most obvious obstacle to his interpretation of the ancient \textit{Acts of Andrew} as the work of an ‘orthodox’ writer.

A glance at the reviews of Flamion’s work shows that none of these issues escaped the attention of scholars\textsuperscript{171} such as A. Ehrhard\textsuperscript{172}, T. Schermann\textsuperscript{173} and E. Hennecke\textsuperscript{174}. Ehrhard mainly criticises Flamion’s lack of interest in unpublished materials and the fact that he bases his investigation exclusively on known testimonies. His commentary on the issue is very relevant to the investigation of \textit{AA}: on the one hand, Ehrhard draws attention to the interest of \textit{mss Hierosolym. Sabbait. 103} and \textit{Sinait. gr. 526}\textsuperscript{175} and, on the other, he states that the author of \textit{Laudatio} is Nicetas the Paphlagonian\textsuperscript{176}. In addition, Ehrhard also critically comments on Flamion’s conclusions about the literary, compositional and dogmatic issues in the ancient \textit{Acts}, although admitting the ‘hoher Grad innerer Geschlossenheit’ of his argument. Schermann’s review presents a more detailed and critical analysis. Indeed, he denounces Flamion’s many repetitions and subjective analysis of the documents and correctly points out that the Neoplatonic influences alleged by Flamion should have implied a later dating of the ancient \textit{Acts}\textsuperscript{177}. Against Flamion’s assertion that the text was written by orthodox Christians, he adduces Eusebius’ and Epiphanius’ reports, which affirm that the text was mainly used by heretics. Hennecke’s criticism, finally, focuses on the subjective treatment of highly reworked texts, such as \textit{Malt A and B}, \textit{Mpr} and \textit{Narratio}, which in Flamion’s view appear as reliable representatives of the last section of the ancient \textit{Acts}. He also disputes Flamion’s hypothesis that \textit{Epitome} offers a reliable source for Andrew’s peregrinations. All these testimonies are

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\textsuperscript{168} Flamion, \textit{L’Apôtre}, 156; 172.
\textsuperscript{169} See his invention (\textit{L’Apôtre}, 172-73) of the ‘jealous’ demon’ governing Aegeates, which in the apostolic stories replaces ‘la Tyché des romans grecs, divinité jalouse’ (?). See, finally, the subjectivism with which he concludes concerning the author’s orthodoxy (ibid. 165-67).
\textsuperscript{170} Flamion, \textit{L’Apôtre}, 169.
\textsuperscript{171} Not so James, ‘Review Flamion’, \textit{JThS} 13 (1912) 435-37, who praises Flamion’s study and conclusions and simply points out a couple of the many misprints in a note.
\textsuperscript{172} Ehrhard, ‘Review Flamion’, see \textit{supra} this Chapter, note 20.
\textsuperscript{173} Schermann, ‘Review Flamion’, \textit{ThR} 10 (1912) 300-03.
\textsuperscript{174} Hennecke, ‘Review Flamion’, \textit{ThLZ} 3 (1913) 73-74.
\textsuperscript{176} See Ehrhard, ‘Review Flamion’, 517. See also his \textit{Überlieferung} II, 237-42.
significantly reworked and a comparison with AA’s fragment in V immediately shows that, in spite of Flamion, their tenor and character is completely different.

In 1912, C.F.M. Deeleman published his study on AA. It is difficult to ascertain whether he knew of Flamion’s work, the only visible contact is his dating of AAM to the fourth century. At any rate, he presents a completely different approach to AA than his predecessor. In his opinion, it is not Gregory and his very reworked story of the apostle Andrew but Narratio that can give us an idea about the main outline of the ancient Acts. Even if revised, Narratio’s text does not, as Epitome, completely alter the character of the genuine AA. Besides, Narratio’s contacts with AA’s fragment in V affirm that the former is based on a recension of the ancient Acts. Nevertheless, AA’s fragment V remains the only piece of evidence for the reconstruction of the general tenor of the original text. It is precisely a comparison between this document and AJ and APe that leads Deeleman to date AA to the year 180. With regard to its doctrinal orientation, the scholar recognises obvious Gnostic traits but rejects the idea that they should necessarily imply a Gnostic writer. The most characteristic trait of our text is its marked encratite tendency and this is not at odds with the mentality of the ‘kerkelijke kringen’ (‘ecclesiastical Christianity’ as opposed to heretic sects) of the later second century. Deeleman consequently denies that the loss of the ancient Acts might be the result of its doctrinal orientation. In his view, AJ includes much more difficult passages for orthodox readers than AA, and, despite this, more has been preserved of the former than of the latter. Instead, it was AA’s popularity among certain heretic groups, especially among Manicheans, that provoked a negative reaction from the orthodox side.

In 1913, W. Bousset briefly commented on a section of the speech to the cross in Mpr 14. After referring to passages by Justin and Irenaeus that reflect an identification of the Platonic World-soul with the son of God and of its Chi-form with Christ’s cross, Bousset

177 Schermann, ‘Review Flamion’, 301. See also infra Chapter 5, pp. 343-44.
179 According to Deeleman (‘Acta Andreae’, 552), Andrew’s speeches are the best proof to assess the good and elaborated style of our author. Rather differently, Flamion described them as simple ‘verbosité sans frein’ (see supra this Chapter, p. 18.
181 Following Hennecke’s point of view, Deeleman sees close contacts between AA, AJ and APe. These similarities, however, do not, in his view, imply a common writer. Rather, they can be easily explained as a result of mutual influences. His analysis of the parallelisms between AA and AJ allows him to infer that the former depends on the latter. At the same time, the contacts between AA and APe show that the latter depends on the former. Given that AJ is dated to 165 and APe to 200, AA should be dated to c. 180.
182 See, however, Sturhahn’s opinion, infra this Chapter, note 210.
analyses the appearance of these ideas in apocryphal Acts, namely APe, APe, AJ and AA\textsuperscript{184}. According to Bousset, the speech to the cross in Mpr 14 shows connections with speculations on the cross, which under the influence of the Platonic Timaeus distinguished between a celestial cross – that is, the Logos that gives measure and life to everything in the material world – and a material one, which is a simple reflection of the former.

More than 10 years later, in 1924, Hennecke published the second edition of his Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, in which he reviews the new insights and approaches to AA over the previous 20 years\textsuperscript{185}. Hennecke still rejects the possibility of finding anything else in Epitome than miracles and considers that for the section preceding AA’s fragment in V only the fragments Evodius I and II are certain\textsuperscript{186}. He also rejects Bousset’s conclusions about the speculations on the cross, for although Justin does indeed refer to the chi-form of the cross, the apocryphal Acts quoted by Bousset do not\textsuperscript{187}. As to Flamion’s suggestion about Neoplatonic and Neopythagoric influences on the speech to the cross, Hennecke considers this rather improbable. AA’s contacts with Plotinus are not conclusive enough to suggest AA’s dependence on the philosopher\textsuperscript{188}.

In the same year M.R. James published The Apocryphal New Testament\textsuperscript{189}. In his introduction to AA he restates the views of Flamion. Epitome is our best source to get a general idea about the contents of the ancient Acts. AAM did not belong to this older textual stage and its legend is akin to later Egyptian romances. He dates the text to 260, although without explaining why. James considers that AA’s fragment in V is our best testimony for the reconstruction of the character of the ancient Acts. Strikingly, however, he considers our fragment ‘highly tedious in parts’\textsuperscript{190}.

In his study of the Letters of Ignatius, from 1929, H. Schlier pays some attention to the central part of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla in AA’s fragment in V\textsuperscript{191}. He clearly pleads for a Gnostic orientation of the fragment. In his opinion, Andrew’s words about the destiny of the first couple and about Maximilla’s and Andrew’s correction of their fall (V\textsuperscript{b} 40.12ff) are

\textsuperscript{184} See Bousset, ‘Platons Weltseele’, 275 for APe 37, where the scholar recognises a blend of two myths, namely the \textit{prwy} and \textit{afrwpw}\textsuperscript{1} myth and the Chi-form of the World-soul in the Timaeus. From the combination of these two elements, according to Bousset, proceeds ‘die groteske Phantasie von dem Urmenschen (…), der, auf dem Kreuze hängend, in die Materie kopfüber hinabrollt und dieser Leben und Bewegung bringt’.

\textsuperscript{185} Hennecke, Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Tübingen, 1924) 249-56.

\textsuperscript{186} See supra this Chapter, § 1.2.1, A and B, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{187} Hennecke, Neutestamentliche Apokryphen\textsuperscript{2}, 250.

\textsuperscript{188} See also supra this Chapter, p. 19 and note 177.


\textsuperscript{190} James, Apocryphal NT, 350.

\textsuperscript{191} H. Schlier, Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatiusbriefen (Giessen, 1929) 160-62.
reminiscent of the conversion of Eve through Adam in the myth of Sophia according to the Valentinians\textsuperscript{192}.

R. Söder also pleads for the Gnostic character of the \textit{Peri prodoi Androbu}\textsuperscript{193}. She recognises in \textit{AA}'s fragment in \textit{V} our most valuable testimony for the ancient Acts\textsuperscript{194}. \textit{Narratio} is, in her view, an excerpt of the genuine text and probably from the fragment in \textit{V} itself. \textit{AAM} and \textit{AAPe} are believed to preserve a part of Andrew’s peregrinations\textsuperscript{195}. As has been pointed out\textsuperscript{196}, she already drew attention to Homeric reminiscences in \textit{AAM}\textsuperscript{197}, as MacDonald would do many years later\textsuperscript{198}. With regard to \textit{Epitome}, Söder echoes Lipsius’ opinion that it depends directly upon the Gnostic Acts, but reworks the materials and adds new issues. Concerning \textit{Vita} and \textit{Laudatio}, she suggests with Lipsius and Bonnet that they have a common source. On the basis of \textit{V} and \textit{Narratio}, though not always consistently\textsuperscript{199}, Söder establishes interesting contacts between \textit{AA} and the ancient novel\textsuperscript{200}, which can be seen not only in the use of certain specific common motifs\textsuperscript{201}, but also in more general issues\textsuperscript{202}.

\textsuperscript{192} According to the speculations preserved by Irenaeus (\textit{Adv. haer.} 1.15.3), Christ, after descending with Sophia, leaves her behind as destined to be the best part of humans and returns to the Pleroma. After Sophia’s exile and suffering far from the Pleroma, Christ’s return will finally free her from corruption (\textit{Ignatiusbriefen}, 160). Since the following section of \textit{AA} (\textit{V} \textsuperscript{b} 40.23ff) describes the soul as crying out its suffering, breaking its ties and wishing to see the one who has appeared to it, Schlier (ibid., 161) concludes that the passage presents a clear parallel with the suffering and final salvation of Sophia (Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. haer.} 1.4.1). Consequently, and taking into account that in \textit{AA} these themes are applied to the pursuit and achievement of gnosis, he considers that Maximilla is simultaneously the \textit{γυνὴ ὡν ζήτηει} Eve crying in suffering due to her being far removed from the gnosis that Andrew, finally, transmits to her.


\textsuperscript{194} See her brief treatment of \textit{V}'s chapters 5 and 7 in \textit{Romanhafte}, 125-26.

\textsuperscript{195} Söder, \textit{Romanhafte}, 14.


\textsuperscript{197} Söder points to Homeric precedents for many motifs in the \textit{AAM}. Examples include Polyphemus’ episode in the \textit{Odyssey} for the cannibal motif (\textit{Romanhafte}, 103 and 203); the miraculous sea travel (\textit{AAM} 4) has a precedent in the Phaeacians’ ship (\textit{Romanhafte}, 43; see E. von Dobschütz, ‘Der Roman in der altchristlichen Literatur’, \textit{DRu} 111 (1902) 100; as for the use of the magic potion in \textit{AAM} 1ff, it has several parallels in the \textit{Odyssey} (e.g. 5.213 and 10.235f). Divine help during the sea voyage (\textit{AAM} 1) already occurs in Apollonius of Rhodes 2.537ff and 598ff (\textit{Romanhafte}, 163).

\textsuperscript{198} See infra, pp. 38-40.

\textsuperscript{199} See, for instance, her use of \textit{Narratio} instead of the preferable text of \textit{V}, \textit{Romanhafte}, 114-45.

\textsuperscript{200} However, in our opinion, Söder’s conclusion about Aegeates’ jealousy (\textit{Romanhafte}, 144-45) is certainly exaggerated and based on \textit{Narratio} (chapter 15). Such jealousy does not appear in the older textual stage represented by \textit{V}. A comparative analysis of Aegeates’ words to his wife in the different documents (curiously, they are preserved in most of them) shows that there is indeed a tendency to interpret Aegeates’ attitude in that way. \textit{Narratio}'s version of the section can be considered as a middle point between \textit{V}, where there is no jealousy, and \textit{Laudatio} and \textit{Vita}, where Aegeates is so jealous that he wants to take revenge not only on the apostle (\textit{Narratio}) but also on Maximilla. That the motif of jealousy is a later element is evident, we think, in \textit{Epitome}, for in this text it replaces the real reason for Aegeates’ rancour: Maximilla’s chastity.

\textsuperscript{201} See, for example, \textit{Romanhafte}, 145 for the striking parallel between \textit{V} 39.29-31 and Achilles Tatius 5.27. Compare also \textit{V} 41.15-17 to Achilles Tatius 6.21-22.
Blumenthal’s study on the apocryphal Acts\textsuperscript{203}, published in 1933, mainly focuses on the first part of \textit{AA}. As Hennecke’s reconstruction of the martyrdom seems to him satisfying enough\textsuperscript{204}, he concentrates on \textit{AA}’s problematic preceding part – that is, Andrew’s peregrinations – of which only \textit{Narratio} and \textit{Laudatio} can provide a general idea. All other extant testimonies, such as \textit{Vita, Epitome} and Symeon the Metaphrast, are said to be irrelevant\textsuperscript{205}. Nevertheless, in his view, a comparative analysis of both texts immediately reveals insurmountable gaps. On the one hand, \textit{Narratio} and \textit{Laudatio} not only present rather different accounts of Andrew’s peregrinations, but also have diverging versions of their common episodes. For example, when comparing \textit{Narratio} and \textit{Laudatio}’s accounts of Andrew’s rescue of Matthias from prison with that of \textit{AAM}, it becomes clear that all three texts present independent versions of a common source, which probably was a short notice in the ancient \textit{AA} and which they rework according to their styles and purposes\textsuperscript{206}. Something similar happens with the episode about the demons of Nicæa\textsuperscript{207}. On the other hand, \textit{Narratio} and \textit{Laudatio} approached their source differently. Whereas \textit{Narratio} abbreviates its source, \textit{Laudatio} reworks it by amplifying the periods and by adding new issues. All this shows that a reliable reconstruction of the plan of Andrew’s itinerary on the basis of these documents is not possible\textsuperscript{208}.

C.L. Sturhahn’s work on the Christology of the oldest apocryphal Acts of the apostles (1951) presents one of the most complete and interesting studies on \textit{AA}’s fragment in V\textsuperscript{209}. He focuses solely on \textit{AA}’s fragment in V and, on the basis of its testimony, defends the Gnostic character of the ancient Acts. Typically Gnostic are, in his view, the notion of a human

\textsuperscript{203} M. Blumenthal, \textit{Formen und Motive in apokryphen Apostelgeschichten} (Leipzig, 1933) 38-57.
\textsuperscript{204} Blumenthal, \textit{Formen}, 38 with note 8 and 39 with note 1. He considers V a trustworthy section of the last part of \textit{AA}.
\textsuperscript{205} Blumenthal, \textit{Formen}, 38 note 10.
\textsuperscript{206} Blumenthal, \textit{Formen}, 40-45.
\textsuperscript{207} Blumenthal, \textit{Formen}, 45-47.
\textsuperscript{208} Blumenthal, \textit{Formen}, 55-56.
degraded condition, which is explained by means of an anthropological dualism, the idea of a
saving gnosis that comes from transcendence and reveals to humans their real divine nature,
and the role of the apostle as a redeemer in a Gnostic sense\textsuperscript{210}. This is hardly the place to
examine all the aspects of this highly interesting and profound analysis\textsuperscript{211}. For the time being,
suffice it to say that Sturhahn’s interpretation of the Gnostic character of our text is not based
on simple speculations or doubtful traces of Gnostic thought under orthodox re-elaborations.
On the contrary, his conclusion derives from a very scrupulous analysis of Andrew’s two
speeches to the brethren and the speeches to Maximilla and Stratocles\textsuperscript{212}. At the same time, it
is worth mentioning that Sturhahn was the first to reject the interpretation that sees the means
to salvation in Maximilla’s asceticism and in the apostle’s martyrdom. Both issues should
rather be understood as mere external signs, visible manifestations of Maximilla’s and
Andrew’s previous reception of the saving gnosis.

In 1954, a brief but extremely interesting analysis by Festugière stresses the
similarities between the Gnosis of the Acts and the Hermetic Gnosis. His study focuses on the
central section of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla (40.10-41.7)\textsuperscript{213}. In his view, the key issues in
this part of our fragment are the process of degradation suffered by the \textit{roudj} or ‘intellect’ and
the means to recuperate its pristine situation before its fall. The abundant and interesting notes
illuminate many conceptual and textual issues, and establish suggestive contacts with many
texts of the period.

The Gnostic interpretation of the ancient Acts received important support from G.
Quispel’s discovery of Papyrus Copt. Utrecht I\textsuperscript{214}. According to Quispel, the fragment
preserves the original form of a similar story in \textit{Epitome} 18. A combination of a textual
corruption and Gregory’s censoring activities is, in his opinion, enough to explain visible

\textsuperscript{209} C.L. Sturhahn, \textit{Die Christologie der ältesten apokryphen Apostelacten. Ein Beitrag zur Frühgeschichte des
altchristlichen Dogmas} (Heidelberg, 1951; Mikrokopie, Göttingen, 1952) 128-47.

\textsuperscript{210} According to Sturhahn (\textit{Die Christologie}, 133-34), \textit{AA}’s conception of the apostolic figure presents many
parallels with the New Testament: 1. Andrew receives a command from his Lord to develop his activity; 2. This
activity is performed by means of wondrous actions and the proclamation of the words; 3. The concept of
suffering and persecution; 4. The theological explanation given by Andrew for his martyrdom in V\textsuperscript{b} 44.35ff. In
spite of these similarities, the figure of the apostle Andrew can only be properly understood from the point of
view of the ‘Erlösungsmythos’. Andrew not only assumes the role of redeemer himself by stressing the
commandment given to him, but also by stressing that his activity consists of the transmission of a saving gnosis.

\textsuperscript{211} More detailed references can be found in our analysis of V. See infra Chapter 4, § 3, pp. 191-221.

\textsuperscript{212} His conclusions about the Gnostic character of our text come to the foreground in his threefold analysis of
\textit{AA}: 1. Der Gnosis-begriff; 2. Die christologische Struktur des Apostelbegriffes and 3. Die Offenbarungsrede. All
three issues clearly reveal the undisputed Gnostic character of the ancient Acts, which, he argues, might have
defended the Gnostic concept of salvation in a more radical way than \textit{AJ} and \textit{ATH}.


\textsuperscript{214} Quispel, ‘Unknown Fragment’, \textit{supra} this Chapter note 56. Even though this fragmentary Coptic text bears
the title ‘The Act of Andrew’, Quispel suggests that the text might have been detached from the ancient Acts, as
was also the case with a Coptic fragment of \textit{APe} (see Schmidt, \textit{Petrusacten}, 7).
differences between the texts\textsuperscript{215}. Having established a textual relationship between the Coptic fragment and AA, for in his opinion \textit{Epitome} preserves the main outline of the genuine Acts\textsuperscript{216}, he proceeds to outline a conceptual relationship by comparing the mentality of PCU 1 with AA’s fragment in V. The starting point for this comparison is Andrew’s words to the soldiers, as preserved by PCU 1, 9.22-24: ‘Are you afraid of me because you see your nature (\textit{fugij}) convincing and exposing you?’\textsuperscript{217}. Since these words reflect, in Quispel’s view, a distinction between a bad nature and a true one, he concludes that the underlying anthropological dualism coincides with that of AA’s fragment in V and that of \textit{Laudatio} 348, 7-14\textsuperscript{218}. Furthermore, PCU 1’s alleged dualism is confirmed by its description of the soldier as someone ‘who is cast out of the palace’\textsuperscript{219}.

Quispel’s arguments, however, are problematic. Firstly, the alleged parallel between PCU 1 and \textit{Epitome} 18 is rather weak, for it relies exclusively on his conjecture about \textit{Epitome}’s corruption of Varianus into Virinus\textsuperscript{220}. Even before attempting to establish the textual relationship between both testimonies on a solid basis, an incidental detail is used as the main argument to support such a relationship\textsuperscript{221}. At the same time, Gregory’s censoring activity is not a conclusion derived from an analysis of the comparison of both episodes, but rather an \textit{a priori} statement As a result, his conclusions about the conceptual contacts between PCU 1 and AA are also questionable. On the basis of this precariously established textual

\textsuperscript{215} L. van Kampen, \textit{Apostelverhalen. Doel en Compositie van de oudste apocriefe Handelingen der apostelen} (Diss. Utrecht, 1990) 159-60, has pointed out that both episodes present relevant divergences. In PCU 1, on the one hand, a certain Varianus sends four soldiers to Andrew. One of them is possessed by a demon. The demon explains the current situation as a result of the sorcery of a certain magician, who wanted to seduce the soldier’s sister, and relates how her chastity has prevented the magician’s success. The soldier is freed from the demon and finally converts to Christianity. In \textit{Epitome} 18, on the other hand, the proconsul Virinus sends soldiers to take Andrew. As they fail, the proconsul sends twenty more soldiers, who fail again. Finally he sends a large number of them, among whom is one possessed by a demon. After seeing Andrew, this demon pronounces some words and leaves. The possessed soldier dies. Finally, the proconsul himself comes to threaten Andrew who, after preaching and praying, awakens the soldier. The proconsul orders Andrew to be thrown to wild beasts. However, they do not harm him. The public intervenes and threatens the proconsul, who is now protected by Andrew. See further \textit{infra} this Chapter, note 222.

\textsuperscript{216} Quispel, ‘Unknown Fragment’, 137. In any case, and avoiding the question of whether or not these texts are actually identical, one thing is clear: if one suggests that the story in PCU 1 is the original form of the very different story in \textit{Epitome} 18, a necessary and logical conclusion is that Gregory is not a reliable source for the ancient Acts on all points.


\textsuperscript{218} Quispel, ‘Unknown Fragment’, 143 note 13, wrongly refers to \textit{Laudatio} 384.7-14.

\textsuperscript{219} Quispel, ‘Unknown Fragment’, 142, who interprets it as affirmation that the soldier who is converted to Christianity is a ‘transcendent being’ (??).

\textsuperscript{220} Against Prieur’s preference for the form Virinus, Bremmer, ‘Man, Magic’, 33 and note 74, suggests that Varianus is to be preferred, since the variant in PCU 1, unlike that of \textit{Epitome}, is widely attested.

\textsuperscript{221} Even though Gregory frequently alters the names, and hence makes Quispel’s conjecture plausible, the relationship between the texts must first be established on a sound basis, and only then can their differences be explained. See Van Kampen, \textit{Apostelverhalen}, 308 note 317.
relationship, the alleged conceptual parallels are not conclusive. Even admitting the existence of an anthropological dualism in PCU 1, of which the passage 9.22-24 is a rather vague example, nothing confirms a relationship with V or with *Laudatio* 348.7-14. In addition, it should also be noted that nowhere in the extant testimonies for AA can one find a description of the transcendent realm as the ‘heavenly palace’.

In any case, from these notions Quispel concludes that AA knew of a natural distinction between two races: those belonging to the celestial realm and those belonging to the body. Since in his opinion such a *praedestinatio physica* and the myth of the Self are typical second-century Gnostic ideas, and since all the issues that Flamion interpreted as Neoplatonic can also be paralleled with the Gnosticism of the period, he concludes that Lipsius was right when he suggested the importance of Gnostic elements in the ancient Acts. Nevertheless, in his view, the Gnostic traits of our text do not necessarily imply a Gnostic writer for an orthodox author might easily have dealt with such Gnostic ideas without leaving the Church. Quispel finally suggests that AA be dated before and not after 200. As Schmidt recognised that AP used *APe* and Peterson had suggested that it also knew *ATh*, he thinks it possible that AP also used AA. Since AA was written after *APe* and AJ but before AP, AA cannot be dated after 200.

1958 saw the appearance of Dvornik’s study of the material related to the apostle Andrew. He focuses mainly on the origins of the different traditions concerning Andrew’s apostolic activities. As the introduction points out, his purpose is not to research whether or not these traditions are legendary. Rather he intends to establish the period in which these traditions appeared in order to determine the role that the idea of apostolicity played in Rome and Byzantium. This means, however, that he is not particularly concerned with a critical analysis of Andrew’s testimonies. His position with regard to the issue is absolutely

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222 According to Van Kampen (*Apostelverhalen*, 160), the alleged similarities between the texts are the following: 1. According to Quispel a possessed soldier appears in both stories. However, whereas in *Epitome* he dies, in PCU 1 he carries a talking demon and once he is cleansed of him he joins the ‘heavenly army’. 2. According to Quispel the expression ‘What have I done to you …’ underlies *Epitome*’s ‘quid mihi et tibi, Virine proconsul, ut mitteres me ad hominem …’ (*Epitome* 18.24-25). This expression, however, which also appears in *Epitome* 17.2-3, is much more common than Quispel seems to think. 3. The names Varianus and Virinus. His conclusion is clear (ibid., 160): ‘de twee passages hebben niets met elkaar te maken, het zijn twee verschillende verhalen’ (‘the two passages have nothing in common. They are two completely different stories’). For additional textual divergences, see *infra* Chapter 2, note 51.


224 Such as those reflected by *TriTrac* (NHC I, 5) 60 and *GosTruth* (NHC I, 3) 21.11-22.19. See Quispel, ‘Unknown Fragment’, 143; see, however, *infra* Chapter 5 note 361.

225 However, note that Lipsius’ Gnostic interpretation of the ancient Acts is based on completely different grounds than Quispel’s. See *supra* this Chapter, note 102.

226 Quispel, ‘Unknown Fragment’, 145-47. Prieur, *Acta*, 150, offers a confusing version of Quispel’s conclusions and wrongly thinks (ibid. 153) that it was Hornschuh who suggested AP’s dependence on AA.
dependent on Flamion’s views\(^{228}\), on which he also relies for the interpretation of their contents\(^{229}\). With regard to the doctrinal orientation of the ancient Acts, Dvornik simply reports the two known antithetic opinions, namely the Gnostic and the orthodox interpretations, without choosing between them\(^{230}\), but showing a certain sympathy for Flamion’s point of view\(^{231}\). According to Dvornik, \(AA\) should be dated to the end of the third century.

In 1960, J. Barns published a fragmentary dialogue between Jesus and Andrew preserved in ms Bodleian Copt. f. 103\(^{232}\). He suggested that Andrew’s claim (I recto 15ff) that he has left not only his parents, but also his wife and children reveals the encratite tendency of the fragment and that, consequently, it might belong to \(AA\), perhaps to its beginning\(^{233}\). All this is nothing but speculation\(^{234}\). Andrew’s words might be a simple parallel to Mk 10.24ff\(^{235}\). Besides, the text is so corrupted, short and insubstantial that no conclusions can be drawn about its doctrinal orientation\(^{236}\).

M. Hornschuh’s introduction to \(AA\) in Schneemelcher’s \textit{Neutestamentliche Apokryphen} presents an interesting and comprehensive approach to the problems posed by the research on \(AA\)\(^{237}\). His analysis includes all the texts known today, with the exception of Andrew’s martyrdom in S and H and the martyrdom in C. Among all these documents, only \(AA\)’s fragment in V and PCU 1 proceed directly from the ancient Acts and can give us a proper idea about the doctrinal character of the text. The other extant witnesses present important re-elaborations to suit the dogmatic needs of the later Church. Despite their revised

\(^{227}\) Dvornik, \textit{Apostolicity}. See supra this Chapter, note 42.

\(^{228}\) Incidentally, he does not seem to be aware of the criticism of Flamion’s work expressed by Ehrhard and Schermann, for he only refers to Hennecke’s point of view (\textit{Apostolicity}, 194 and note 40) and to James’ favourable review (ibid. note 43).

\(^{229}\) Especially striking is his repetition of Flamion’s ungrounded conclusions on the relationship between \textit{Laudatio} and \textit{Vita} (\textit{Apostolicity}, 226-27).

\(^{230}\) See Dvornik, \textit{Apostolicity}, 196-97, where the author declares that such a question is of secondary importance for his investigation.

\(^{231}\) Dvornik, \textit{Apostolicity}, 195 rejects Quispel’s Gnostic interpretation of PCU 1 not by questioning his statements, but by simply stating, with Flamion, that the alleged Gnosticing ideas might have been popular at the period of composition and that they, in any case, are not enough to suppose a Gnostic orientation (\textit{Apostolicity}, 195 note 43c). His statement, however, that Flamion disproved Liechtenhan’s interpretation of V (see supra this Chapter, p. 13 and notes 120 and 123) is ungrounded. In the pages of Flamion’s work reported by Dvornik (\textit{L’Apôtre}, 152; 155 and 162), he does not discuss Liechtenhan’s statements but simply rejects his thesis without arguing why.

\(^{232}\) Barns, ‘Coptic Fragment’. See supra this Chapter, note 57.

\(^{233}\) ‘Coptic Fragment’, 75.

\(^{234}\) See, for example, his attempts (‘Coptic Fragment’, 75) to base such an attribution on the garrulous style of the Coptic fragment and Gregory’s opinion about \(AA\)’s \textit{verbositas}.

\(^{235}\) See infra this Chapter note 243.

\(^{236}\) Cf., however, Nagel, ‘Die apokryphen Apostelakten’, 161.

character they might be of help in reconstructing the lost AA, on which they certainly draw. The first step in this reconstruction, however, must be the analysis of our most reliable documents, namely V and PCU 1, in order to proceed afterwards to cautiously widen our textual basis by means of elements deriving from Laudatio, Narratio, Mpr and Malt.

As far as the reconstruction of Andrew’s peregrinations is concerned, Hornschuh considers that Epitome might preserve the outline. This does not mean, however, that he blindly trusts Gregory’s testimony. Rather, he adopts a middle position between the opinions of Hennecke and Flamion. With the former he thinks that Gregory presents a rather poor summary that preserves nothing but the external frame of the ancient Acts. With the latter he thinks that Epitome, as it coincides with Philaster’s report of Andrew’s itinerary, might preserve at least the textual skeleton of AA. With regard to the second part of AA, his reconstruction of the martyrdom coincides with Flamion’s (and James’) reconstruction and is based on elements from Mpr, Malt, Laudatio, Narratio, Conversante and 2GrEp. Among the fragments, Evodius I and II and Augustine’s fragment are considered as certain, but the Coptic fragment in Bodleian Copt. f. 103 is only included with reservations.

When analysing AA’s mentality, Hornschuh rejects, with Hennecke, Flamion’s suggestion about Neopythagoric and Neoplatonic influences. He also reviews Quispel’s opinion about AA’s Gnostic orientation in order to refute the existence of a praedestinatio physica in our text. According to Hornschuh, the chief ideas in AA’s fragment in V, namely

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238 ‘Andreasakten’, 272.
239 As Prieur (Acta, 152) seems to imply.
241 See ‘Andreasakten’, 277. He very cautiously states that one should consider as belonging to the ancient Acts only those episodes in Epitome that are also confirmed by other witnesses. Accordingly, in his review of Epitome’s contents (ibid., 277-80), he only accepts as probably genuine Epitome 18 (PCU 1); 12 (+ Manichaean Psalmbook 142.20); 6 (Narratio 4, Laudatio 18); 21 (Laudatio 33); 31 (Laudatio 40); 32 (+ Laudatio 40); 33 (Laudatio 41); 34 (Laudatio 43). For Philaster’s reference to AA see infra Chapter 2, p. 129 and note 191.
243 Hornschuh rightly remarks that Barns’ attempts to find encratite ideas in his fragment are ungrounded. Andrew’s claim (I verso 22-24) that he left not only his parents, but also his wife and children are probably nothing more than a parallel to Mc 10.24 and parallels. The other alleged encratite trait in II verso 51ff is also inconclusive (ibid., 296 note 1). See also Erbetta, Apocrifi II, 396 note 2.
244 ‘Andreasakten’, 272.
245 In his view, the alleged anthropological dualism is not the result of a natural predisposition, but simply arises from the acceptance or rejection of Andrew’s message. The objective of the salvation message is the true nature of the listener, namely his dianoikikos meno, or ‘intellectual part’, by means of which he achieves his intellectual essence. This is precisely what differentiates the Christian, namely the reception of the saving words, from the man who rejected the message. According to Hornschuh, Augustine’s quotation (see supra this Chapter, p. 8) clearly shows that this dualism is not of a Gnostic sort. In our view, however, Augustine’s passage is not a conclusive argument because, firstly, it is uncertain that it belongs to AA and, secondly, the continuation of the passage shows that Augustine is especially interested in stating his point on free will (Flamion, L’Apôtre, 189f and É. Junod and J.D Kaestli, L’histoire des Actes apocryphes du IIIe aux IX siècle: le cas des Actes de Jean (Genève, 1982) 65), (C. Felic. Manich. 2.6): vide quemadmodum hic, et “per se ipsum” dicit, et “per seductionem”. Fuit enim seductor hominis diabolus, non natura peccator, sed prior
rejection of tangible reality and the will to return to the stability of the One, should rather be sought in Middle Platonism, the philosophical environment which might also explain AA’s encratite tendency. It is in this context that Hornschuh endorses Bousset’s analysis of the speech to the cross in Mpr 14 and completes it with references proceeding from Middle Platonists. The ancient Acts were not Gnostic but were rather influenced by Hellenistic philosophical thought of the period. As suggested by Peterson, contacts are especially close with Tatian. Concerning the date of composition, Hornschuh draws on the studies by C. Schmidt, Peterson and Quispel and takes Hadrian’s reign as terminus a quo and the composition of AP as terminus ad quem. Given that AP used both APe and Ath, it is not strange to admit contacts with AA as well, as suggested by Quispel. The close relationship Hornschuh sees between APe and AA supports a dating for AA around 190.

In 1966, M. Erbetta published the second volume of his Apocrifi, in which he provides Italian translations for the most relevant textual testimonies. However, he refrains from a collation of the materials and simply presents the testimonies, according to their hypothetical sequence, one after the other. The texts are the following: AA’s fragment in V, PCU 1, five fragments proceeding from the indirect transmission, namely Evodius I and II, Augustine’s fragment, the fragment in the Pseudo-Titus Epistle and the Pseudo-Augustine de

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voluntate peccator. Sed quia erat in hominis potestate seductori non consentire, ideo positum est, et “per se ipsum”, et “per seductionem”: ut in eo quod positum est, “per se ipsum”, liberum arbitrium; in eo vero quod positum est, “per seductionem”, intelligas diabolum, non oppressorem inviti, sed tentatorem volentis.

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petstate seductori non consentire, ideo positum est, et “per se ipsum”, et “per seductionem”: ut in eo quod positum est, “per se ipsum”, liberum arbitrium; in eo vero quod positum est, “per seductionem”, intelligas diabolum, non oppressorem inviti, sed tentatorem volentis.

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See ‘Andreasakten’, 273. Developing Bousset’s views, Hornschuh adds other parallels from Albinus (=Alcinous, Didasc.) 170.1-13 and Atticus (ap. Eusebius, PE 15.12.3) in order to state that AA (Mpr 14) presents a mixture of Platonic and Stoic thought characteristic of Middle-Platonism. This mixture is revealed, in his view, by the fact that the Stoic idea of the Logos conferring unity and stability to the cosmos is applied here to the World-Soul. It must be noted, however, that the idea of the soul ‘binding together and enclosing’, which does not appear in Plato, is explicitly stated by Aristotle in De an. 411b 6ff. The idea appears later in Posidonius (fr. 149 Edelstein-Kidd). See W. Theiler, Über die Seele (Darmstadt, 1959), 104 and J. Dillon, Alcinous. The Handbook of Platonism (Oxford, 1993) 127.

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In Hornschuh’s view (‘Andreasakten’, 274) the expression toltou+2+2ου fwi in AA (45.15) reveals a clear influence of Tatian, Or. ad Graec. 13.3. Also, Christ’s epiphany as a beautiful child and as a bright light in AA must be explained as proceeding from Tatian. Furthermore, both in AA and in Tatian the fall of Paradise is something that simply follows creation and has no cosmological implications. The restitution of the pristine situation before the fall is, according to both, the result of self-knowledge, rejection of materiality and a fight against demons (which in AA are substituted by the devil).

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vera et falsa poenitentia\textsuperscript{254}. Furthermore, he translates the virtutes Andreae in Pseudo-Abdias III, Epistle, including the interpolations in 2GrEp, Mpr and Malt\textsuperscript{255}. Finally, he offers an overview of \textit{Vita} and a short reference to Symeon the Metaphrast\textsuperscript{256}. Of all the textual witnesses, and in spite of its strong revision, \textit{Epitome} represents the best means to achieve a proper idea about the main outline of the ancient Acts. \textit{Vita} and Laudatio, finally, are considered to depend on a common source\textsuperscript{257}.

Notwithstanding this, and in line with previous scholars, Erbetta takes \textit{AA}’s fragment in V, together with PCU 1, to be the only representative of the genuine Acts. In analysing its mentality, and with Hennecke and Hornschuh, he rejects Flamion’s suggestion about Neopythagoric and Neoplatonic influences. He also reviews Quispel’s point of view concerning the Gnostic traits of \textit{AA}, Hornschuh’s suggestions about \textit{AA}’s contacts with Hellenistic philosophy and Peterson’s alleged parallels with Tatian. Yet there are no strong arguments to exclude a possible Gnostic orientation of the ancient \textit{AA}\textsuperscript{258}. By contrast, our best testimonies show that \textit{AA}’s way of exposition presents similarities with Gnostic writers, for it elaborates ideas by taking concrete situations as a starting point\textsuperscript{259}. In this sense, the action itself has a secondary or preparatory role. With regard to PCU 1, Erbetta accepts Quispel’s interpretation, excluding perhaps the alleged contacts with \textit{AP}. According to Erbetta, the Coptic fragment presents closer contacts with \textit{ATH}. Hence, \textit{AA} should be dated to 250-300, for the determining issue is not \textit{AP}, but rather \textit{AA}’s dependence on \textit{ATH}\textsuperscript{260}.

Moraldi’s translation of \textit{AA} does not provide any new ideas on the text but simply accepts the current views on \textit{AA} and provides Italian translations of the most relevant testimonies in the following order: \textit{Epitome, Epistle, Mpr, ms Vat. gr. 808, PCU 1 and the Papyrus Bodleian Copt. f. 103}\textsuperscript{261}. Although he deems \textit{AA}’s fragment in V as our best testimony for \textit{AA}, he follows Flamion and James in considering \textit{Epitome} a reliable synthesis of \textit{AA}.

\textsuperscript{254} V, Apocrifi II, 399-403; PCU 1, 404-06; fragments, 406-07.
\textsuperscript{255} Virtutes, Apocrifi II, 408-28; Epistle, 429-37; Mpr and Malt, 438-45.
\textsuperscript{256} Erbetta, Apocrifi II, 446.
\textsuperscript{257} Erbetta, Apocrifi II, 446.
\textsuperscript{258} According to Erbetta (Apocrifi II, 398), the efforts by Peterson and Hornschuh to disprove a Gnostic interpretation are not wholly justified. The lack of typically and univocally Gnostic elements is a weak argument, for our evidence for the ancient Acts is scarce. Moreover, Gregory’s explanation for his summarising activity in his prologue (Epitome, prol. 11-13, quia inviolatam fidelis non exegit multitudine verbositatis, sed integritas rationis et puritas mentis) seems to imply that not only verbosity but also its doctrinal character impelled the bishop of Tours to revise the text.
\textsuperscript{259} Apocrifi II, 398.
\textsuperscript{260} Apocrifi II, 404.
\textsuperscript{261} L. Moraldi, Apocrifi del Nuovo Testamento II (Turin, 1986 [1971]) 1351-429.
In 1976, A. Orbe dedicated some attention to AA in his Cristología Gnóstica\textsuperscript{262}. In his view, Andrew’s speech to Maximilla (V\textsuperscript{b} 40.12-22) reveals a background of Gnostic categories according to which man’s degradation into materiality arises from the intellect’s error of distracting its attention from its proper activity. Accordingly, the passage focuses on the correction of this first fall and presents Maximilla and Andrew as a reversal of the first couple.

In his article ‘Apokryphe Apostelakten’\textsuperscript{263}, Plümacher offers a review of the research on AA, which mostly follows Hornschuh’s points of view on the issue. After reviewing the textual witnesses for AA and offering an evaluation of their reliability in accordance with the analysis of Flamion\textsuperscript{264}, he states that Andrew’s peregrinations should be reconstructed by means of Epitome only when its testimony is confirmed by other sources\textsuperscript{265}. With regard to PCU 1, he accepts Quispel’s suggestion that the fragment presents the original episode of Epitome 18 and also follows him in establishing contacts between AA and AP. As the latter also uses APe, it is clear that AP used AA and not vice versa\textsuperscript{266}. Consequently, the composition of AP can be considered a terminus ad quem, while the terminus a quo is Hadrian’s reign, the period in which the encratite sects originated\textsuperscript{267}.

Detorakis’ publication of 1982 deserves to be mentioned not for its quality but simply because it includes, although in a deficient form, the editio princeps of Andrew’s martyrdom in S and H. The interest of these two mss had already been emphasised by Ehrhard in his review of Flamion’s book\textsuperscript{268}. His introduction to this edition combines Flamion and Dvornik’s views on AA with a couple of unnecessary and erroneous contributions of his own, which have thus far remained concealed thanks to the fact that it is written in Modern Greek. Thus, for example, his ‘refinement’ of Flamion’s theory about a Western and a Eastern transmission, which he completes with a subdivision of the Eastern branch into an Achaean (‘naturally and

\textsuperscript{262} A. Orbe, Cristología Gnóstica. Introducción a la soteriología de los siglos II y III (Madrid, 1976) 161-62.
\textsuperscript{264} ‘Apostelakten’, 31.
\textsuperscript{265} ‘Apostelakten’, 32. So also Hornschuh, see supra this Chapter, pp. 27-29 and note 241.
\textsuperscript{266} ‘Apostelakten’, 34.
\textsuperscript{267} Peterson, ‘Beobachtungen’, 211.
\textsuperscript{268} See supra this Chapter, note 20. At first sight, it might seem that Detorakis is not aware of his predecessor, for Ehrhard is significantly ignored in all bibliographical references. However, Detorakis’ attribution of Laudatio to Nicetas the Paphlagonian clearly shows that the editor is deliberately ignoring his source of information. With the exception of Ehrhard, every single scholar since Bonnet has considered Laudatio anonymous. The obvious conclusion is that Detorakis draws both issues, i.e. his knowledge about S and H and Laudatio’s attribution to Nicetas, from Ehrhard’s review.
logically the closest to the historical facts’ (!) and a Constantinopolitan branch. At the same time, his valuation of H and S, which he seems to prefer to Vat. gr. 808 is, in our opinion, if not incorrect at least disproportionate. Furthermore, he not only wrongly considers Laudatio the most complete text of the Eastern transmission (Narratio is completely ignored in his study), but he also states that it depends upon Andrew’s martyrdom in S and H. No less striking is his dating method: his terminus a quo is the composition of the ancient Acts and his terminus ad quem Laudatio, as this text uses mss S and H (!).

In 1985, A.F.J. Klijn published the second volume of his Apocriefen van het Nieuwe Testament. After a short introduction, in which he summarily reviews the contents and the character of AA, he includes Dutch translations of PCU I by R. van den Broek, and of AA’s fragment in V and of the martyrium by A. Heeringa. Also in 1985, M.A. Williams dedicated some pages to AA, or more precisely to some sections of AA’s fragment in V. He first comments on the opening lines of Andrew’s incomplete speech to the brethren in order to defend, with Hornschuh and against Quispel, that our text does not state a praedestinatio physica – that is, a deterministic dualism of natures –, but rather a distinction between those who accept Andrew’s message and those who do not.

At the end of the 1980s, after a number of publications on the apostle Andrew, J.M. Prieur finally published his edition and commentary on AA. The second volume of his work is the textual edition itself and includes, firstly, the so-called Actes d’André grecs (AAgr).
narrating the events between Stratocles’ return to Patras and Andrew’s crucifixion. This edition consists of a collation of already known materials and two new textual witnesses for the martyrdom. Immediately afterwards, Prieur reproduces Bonnet’s edition of Epitome furnished with a French translation. There follows PCU1, edited by R. van den Broek and translated into French by Prieur. Then, he offers a new edition of Mpr, which adds four new manuscripts to the two already known and used by Bonnet. Surprisingly, in this case only, the editor deprives the reader of a translation. Finally, he offers some extracts from Laudatio and Mpr and a synoptic exposition of different versions of Andrew’s speech to the cross, which includes the Greek testimonies and Arm in the French translation by L. Leloir, but ignores the parallels in the Latin testimonies.

Unlike in former editions and translations, AA fragments proceeding from indirect transmission are not included in the textual edition but in the introduction to his commentary. According to Prieur, the fragment transmitted by Pseudo-Titus Epistle is a paraphrase of a longer and transformed episode in Epitome. As to the alleged Coptic fragment in Papyrus Bodleian Copt. f. 103, he reproduces, with serious errors, Barns’ text and provides a French translation thereof. With regard to Augustine’s fragment, Prieur thinks that its style and contents present similarities with AA and that it might refer to a lost section of the ancient Acts. He naturally also refers to Evodius I and II, and for the former mentions an episode preserved in S and H (AAgr 17) in which Euclia replaces Maximilla in her conjugal bed. The latter, including the reference to a puerulus speciosus, might have appeared in the lost section following chapter AAgr 32, for this chapter refers to a paideráske ejorphoe that opens the prison doors for Maximilla and Iphidama. He also includes the fragment in Papyrus Oxyrhynchus 851, although due to its brevity he does not accept Flamion’s suggestion that the fragment belongs to the episode preserved by Epitome.

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281 Prieur, Acta, 441-549.
283 The two new textual witnesses for the martyrion are mss Ann Arbor 36 and Hierosol. Sab. 30.
284 Prieur, Acta, 551-651.
286 Prieur, Acta, 673-703. Even though the introduction to the edition of Mpr (Acta, 675-83) mentions five new manuscripts, later one reads that one of them was not accessible (ibid. 677), namely the ms under siglum M (Athens BN Methochion 245). Nevertheless, the ms is included in the list of mss.
290 Prieur, Acta, 22. Lines II recto 40-45 are displaced to II verso. As a result, the text lacks section II recto 40-45 and section II verso 55-end is illegible. See also J.K. Elliott, ‘Review Prieur’, NTest 33/4 (1991) 377-81 at 380.
292 Hennecke already suggested that Evodius II should be placed before the beginning of V.
293 Flamion, L’Apôtre, 250.
that considers the Pseudo-Augustine de vera et falsa poenitentia a fragment of AA. With regard to the other texts including stories about Andrew and another apostle, such as AAM and AAP, Prieur rejects their belonging to the ancient Acts.294

At first sight, Prieur’s AAgr seems to present a complete textual reconstruction of the last section of the ancient Acts, including the totality of the events at Patras preceding Andrew’s martyrdom. Indeed, the title given to this reconstruction, Actes d’André grecs, seems to imply such a conclusion and so does the analysis and exposition, in the introduction to his book, of all extant textual witnesses for this part of AA. In addition, his apparatus to the text also includes frequent references to other witnesses, such as Laudatio, Mpr, Narratio and Arm. A closer analysis of this edition, however, shows that a reconstruction of AA, including all known events during Andrew’s stay in Patras, is not within the scope of the editor. Rather, he takes the testimony of S and H as a textual frame within which all other textual witnesses are included. Since all other witnesses, excluding V and C, are usually used as correctores, his AAgr can be considered as a corrected edition of S and H rather than a comprehensive edition of the last section of AA.295 By means of this procedure, Prieur seems to pursue a textual continuity that, by flowing from beginning to end, might provide the reader with an uninterrupted account of the last part of AA. Despite his meritorious efforts, the continuity achieved by means of using S and H as a textual frame remains an artificial continuum.296

295 We think that this is evident in the beginning of his AAgr, which neglects the numerous events following Andrew’s arrival in Patras, as recorded by several other reliable documents. Thus, for example, Andrew’s visit to Sosios and the subsequent healing of a very sick man (Laudatio 335.15-20; Vita 244 D and, partially, Epitome 22; cf. 30.4), Lesbos’ episode (Laudatio 335.21-338.8; Mpr 3-8; Epitome 22-27) and the series of miraculous healings of Maximilla, a paralytic, a blind man and a leper (Laudatio 38, 39, 40, 41; Vita 245 A8-D11; Epitome 30.5, 31, 32, 33). Prieur begins where S and H begin, namely with the episode of Stratočes’ return to the city. But this tendency can also be found in other sections of the text. On the one hand, in Andrew’s speech to the cross, Prieur’s arbitrary choice of witnesses excludes many passages that, preserved by Mpr and Laudatio, are also supported by Arm. These elements are not included in his AAgr and are presented separately from the main Greek text in a synoptic exposition at the end of the book (Prieur, Acta, 734-45). Prieur’s explanation is that these documents do not allow an exact reconstruction of this section of AA and only give a general idea – one may wonder whether this does not apply to S and H as well. On the other hand, it frequently includes sections that are only attested by S and H. This is the case with AAgr 54.8-10, which is only attested by S (f. 130’) and H (f. 166’). Another example is AAgr 53.19-25, which is only vaguely echoed by Arm 11, but has no correspondence in any of the Greek and Latin documents. Especially interesting is the section AAgr 61.4-11, which consists of two parts preserved by different unique testimonies: the first one, 61.4-8, by S and H and the second one, 61.8-11 by C. See also AAgr 64.1-2, where the editor introduces the reading S/H, Q, which will have important consequences in later commentaries on AA, against the testimony of all other extant textual witnesses (C, Laudatio, Narratio, P, O and 2GrEp). See infra p. 59, note 417.
296 The text presents an important internal unevenness which, even if less perceptible in Prieur’s homogenising French translation, is nevertheless visible in the Greek text: vocabulary, syntax, style, context and mentality diverge significantly from section to section depending on the documents used to reconstruct them. The marked differences between sections AAgr 1-32, 33-50 and 51-65 are more than evident and should prevent the reader from accepting the text as a harmonious textual whole.
A glance at the disposition of the texts offered by Prieur clearly reveals his evaluation of the textual witnesses. The eclectic text resulting from S and H and the collation of the extant testimonies for this section occupies a privileged position, as its title clearly shows. In this textual reconstruction, Arm has a very high rank, although thus far neither its value for the martyrdom's textual reconstruction has been assessed nor its relationship with the Greek tradition been determined on the basis of a critical analysis of their concordances and divergence.

Epitome also occupies a high rank among AA’s testimonies and it provides, as S/H do for the martyrdom, the textual frame for Andrew’s peregrinations. As according to Prieur, Epitome depends on a Latin version of the primitive Acts and Gregory’s revision only eliminates AA’s excessive verbosity, he assumes that it preserves, in an abbreviated and revised form, the right sequence of Andrew’s peregrinations. As no real assessment of Epitome’s genuineness and reliability is offered, Gregory’s value seems to be exclusively deduced from the alleged contacts with Pseudo-Titus Epistle and PCU 1. While the former fragment allegedly preserves the original tenor of Epitome 11, the latter is said, with Quispel, to preserve the genuine account of what appears in Epitome 18 in a very revised version.

With regard to the other witnesses preserving Andrew’s peregrinations, Prieur adopts Flamion’s point of view that Laudatio depends on Vita. As we have already pointed out, Flamion’s interpretation is hardly correct. In Prieur’s case, however, such an assertion is more serious because he claims to have consulted mss Paris BN 1510 and Esc y II 6 in order to complete Dressel’s defective edition of Vita, and these mss annul most of Flamion’s assumptions. As for Narratio, according to Prieur only its second part relies on the ancient

297 It remains unclear whether Prieur considers his reconstruction of the last part of AA satisfying or not, for he pronounces contradictory statements on the issue. Whereas on page (Acta) 7, he seems to consider that his reconstruction preserves the section it covers almost completely, on page (ibid.) 436, he is more sceptical about the results.

298 See V. Calzolari, ‘La versione armena del Martirio di Andrea e il suo rapporto con la tradizione manoscritta dell’originale greco’, Muséon 111 (1998) 139-56 at 143: ‘Fino ad oggi, tuttavia, non è stata espressa una valutazione del valore critico dell’armeno per la ricostituzione del martirio, né è stato precisato quale sia il rapporto tra la versione e la tradizione manoscritta greca, attraverso un essame dettagliato ed esaustivo delle concordanze e delle divergenze del testo armeno rispetto ai testimoni greci ...’.

299 However, as Erbetta pointed out (see supra this Chapter, note 258), Gregory’s words in his prologue seem to imply that something more than AA’s verbosity was bothering the Bishop of Tours.

300 As we have seen, Hornschuh already warned that Epitome’s episodes should be only accepted when other textual witnesses also support them.

301 Only two passages, which had already been discussed by previous scholarship, namely Epitome 11 and 18, are contrasted with alleged original passages in Pseudo-Titus Epistle and PCU 1, respectively. See Prieur, Acta, 40-45.


303 In our opinion, Laudatio’s account is to be preferred to Vita. In general, the former presents a superior version of the first part including Andrew’s peregrinations, and from Andrew’s arrival at Patras onwards its superiority is more than clear. See supra this Chapter, p. 17 and note 160.
Acts. The overestimation of Epitome’s account results, in our view, in certain erroneous evaluations concerning those episodes that might have belonged to the ancient Acts and those that did not.

There are also other documents that, in Prieur’s view, are reliable enough to illuminate certain obscure points. This is the case with Epistle, which he appreciates not only for the interpolations included in its second Greek translation, but also because the Latin original might preserve remains of a dialogue between Aegeates and Andreas preceding his imprisonment. However, even accepting the possibility that its dialogue style might reflect the existence in the ancient Acts of similar sections, the alleged contacts between LatEp 3.8-9 and AAgr 26.10-11 are none such. With regard to Conversante, Prieur follows Flamion in believing that it depends both on LatEp and on AA. As we will show below, this presumption is unnecessary for Conversante’s contacts with LatEp may be simply due to the fact that they use the same or similar sources.

Prieur’s Acta Andreae has certainly contributed positively to the research on AA. His comprehensive approach to the extant textual witnesses, which are also enriched by two new manuscripts for the martyrdom and with four more for Mpr, is a valuable contribution. His

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304 So, for instance, Prieur’s evaluation (Acta, 46-47) of the disagreement between Laudatio (and Vita), on the one hand, and Epitome, on the other, with regard to the events immediately following Andrew’s arrival in Patras. According to Laudatio (335.15-20), Andrew goes with his followers to Sosios and after healing him he walks around the city where he sees a very sick man lying on a rubbish heap (= Vita 244 D). Epitome 22, however, omits both issues and begins with Lesbios’ story. As far as Epitome omitting Sosios is concerned, Prieur argues that the omission is not that relevant because according to Gregory Lesbios sends someone to look for Andrew at his lodgings and this place cannot be anywhere but Sosios’ house. Moreover (Acta, 46 note 1), Epitome knows the name Sosios (wrongly for Sosia in Epitome 30.3-4). It is his explanation of Epitome’s second omission that is most peculiar, for against all the evidence he attempts to impose the superiority of its account. In Prieur’s view, it is not Epitome that omits, but Laudatio and Vita that repeat the same healing that they include later on (Laudatio 41 and Vita 245 D). Prieur’s speculations, however, are ungrounded. Both episodes in Laudatio and Vita, even though they have a rubbish heap in common, are completely different stories. Whereas in the first one (Laudatio 33; Vita 244 D) Andrew encounters the sick man lying on the rubbish, in the second (Laudatio 41; Vita 245 D) he is requested by some people to go with them to the place where the man is. While in the first one the healing takes place in the city, in the second it happens in the harbour; whereas in the first one the man is just said to be very sick, in the second he is a leper, etc. It seems obvious that Epitome presents a defective version of the facts. We may conclude that for the events between the apostle’s arrival in Patras and Stratocles’ return from Italy, Laudatio and Mpr are our best testimonies and even Vita, certainly inferior to the former documents, preserves a better version than Epitome.


306 The so-called parallels are as different as day and night. Whereas AAgr 26.10-11 (Σου έπειται ο οικίσκος σου, κατέστρεψε τα ναούδα των Θεών και ειπέν μας να πάμε σε μια καταπρακτική πολιτική…?) expresses Aegeates’ surprise on recognising the apostle and, consequently, is a simple affirmative sentence, LatEp 3.8-9 is a question (Tu es Andreas, qui destruis templam deorum et suades hominibus ad superstitionem sectam …?). The character and the contents of both passages are so different that one is surprised to read that something like ‘You are’ can be used to establish a textual relationship between them. In spite of Prieur, as Bonnet already suggested, the first 9 chapters of LatEp should be considered an original invention of its writer and have nothing to do with the ancient Acts. Notwithstanding this, it is, of course, possible that a scene in the Acts including a dialogue between Aegeates and Andrew might have inspired Gregory.

eclectic text for the last section of *AA* on the basis of S and H has the advantage of providing a
general idea about the development of the action in the last part of *AA*. However, it also has
disadvantages. The most important is the inclusion of *AA*’s fragment in V in an artificial
textual continuum achieved by means of the mass of later and reworked textual witnesses. Such an inclusion is clearly problematic because obvious differences in the resulting text with regard to style, textual continuity, contents and mentality are barely disguised by means of, in our view incorrect, emendations proceeding from S and H. The stylistic differences are due to the fact that S and H systematically eliminate every substantial discourse. As a result their mainly narrative style strongly contrasts with the eminently discursive character of *AA*’s fragment in V. The fictitious textual continuity between sections 1-32, 33-50 and 51-65 is very obvious. Prieur lets chapter 32 be followed by *AA*’s fragment in V, but the obvious lacuna between both sections – even if difficult to evaluate since *AA*’s fragment lacks its beginning and S and H omit the whole speech to the brethren – seems to be larger than the editor supposes. With regard to the section between the end of *AA*’s fragment in V and the beginning of the martyrdom – that is, between chapters *AAgr* 50 and 51 – the matter is also unclear. S and H, *Arm* and *Narratio* agree in letting both sections follow each other, but this is not conclusive evidence for they all also agree in eliminating the most substantial parts of V.

Nevertheless, the most serious problem of this textual reconstruction is the conceptually extraneous context in which *AA*’s fragment in V is placed. The peculiar mentality reflected by this document is overshadowed when combined with lengthier sections that have been extensively revised and rewritten. As might be expected, Prieur’s interpretation of *AA*’s mentality is highly conditioned by the diversified materials that form his textual edition. Given the fact that his *AAgr* include very divergent versions of the ancient Acts, the reader is not surprised when Prieur concludes that *AA* presents the influence of

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308 See *infra* Chapter 2, § 3.1.2.1.2, pp. 109-114.
309 As we will show below (see *infra* Chapter 2, § 3.1.1, pp. 87-95), V can be used to test the reliability of the documents presenting sections that overlap with it. Textual comparison reveals that all other extant testimonies highly revise or simply omit discourses almost completely and only keep the necessary elements to assure textual continuity. S and H belong to the second group. Their common source was obviously extensively revised and omitted important sections not only in the passage preserved by V, but also at the beginning of their text, as many traces of clumsy cutting clearly show.
310 Compare *AAgr* 37.4 to V 39.30; *AAgr* 37.5-6 to V 39.31-32; *AAgr* 44.4-6 to V 43.8; *AAgr* 44.6-7 to V 43.8-9; *AAgr* 46.5-7 to V 43.30-31; *AAgr* 46.11-12 to V 43.37; *AAgr* 50.20 to V 45.29.
311 The following discursive sections of V are omitted in S and H: V 38.2-20; 40.10-41.9; 41.26-27; 41.36-42.8; 42.8-31; 44.8-45.14.
312 In any case, if Prieur is right in assuming that Evodius’ fragment about the *puerolus speciosus* was placed after the end of *AAgr* 32, a necessary conclusion is that the lacuna is more relevant than he seems to be prepared to admit, for one must still add the lost beginning of the speech to the brethren in V to this episode.
Neopythagoric, Middle Platonic, Stoic, Neoplatonic, and Gnosticising thought all at the same time. In spite of all this, the artificial continuum of AAgr 1-65 appears to the reader as a unity provided with the Aristotelian tripartite structure of introduction-core-denouement. The first 32 chapters are almost exclusively narrative and give the impression of narrating the sequence of introductory events that would lead to Andrew’s imprisonment. However, many truncated, re-elaborated and revised short discursive sections in this first part show that the text was originally much more discursive and, consequently, not what it seems in its current form. AA’s fragment in V, as it is mainly discursive and contains important conceptual developments, seems to occupy the central part of the continuum, the core of the story that will be resolved in the last part or martyrdom. This apparent textual continuity would also, in our view, generate some negative developments in the scholarly research on AA. Until Prieur’s edition, researchers had always been aware of the important re-elaboration of the extant testimonies and, consequently, had also been extremely cautious when attributing a given scene or trait to the genuine Acts. Editions as well as translations of the materials always presented the different traditions separately in order to facilitate a proper comparison of their differences and peculiarities. Since Prieur’s edition this has no longer been the case. The bulk of publications on AA which have appeared since then tend to consider Prieur’s eclectic text as a ‘real’ continuum and consequently proceed to analyse it and draw conclusions on its character, style, contents and mentality, as though scholars were facing a textual unity transmitting the last part of AA.

Precisely a year later, in 1990, D.R. MacDonald published his edition of AA, which presents an approach to Andrew’s traditions rather different from Prieur. His eclectic text is the result of a comprehensive analysis of the transmission that attempts to reconstruct the contents and the whole itinerary of the ancient Acts. The major difference with the previous edition is that, unlike Flamion and Prieur, he considers the story about Andrew rescuing Matthias from the city of cannibals as belonging to the ancient Acts. After defending his

314 AAgr 7; 8.1-5; 9.3-17; 11; 12.1-14.
315 See *infra* this Chapter, note 333.
317 However, he admits that AAM in its current form may include later interpolations and that, consequently, Flamion’s claim about the Egyptian traits and origin might be correct (*Cannibals*, 46-47). Manuscriptal and external evidence shows that the section AAM 11-15 is due to later interpolators, who have also changed other sections. These changes explain the evident stylistic differences between AAM and other undisputed sections of AA.
point and discussing Flamion’s and Prieur’s arguments denying that \textit{AAM} belongs to \textit{AA}, he offers his reconstruction of the Ancient Acts, which is divided into four sections. The first one offers a reconstruction of \textit{AAM} by combining the Greek testimonies with the Latin and Anglo-Saxon versions\(^{318}\). The second part reproduces \textit{Epitome} along with parallels from \textit{Laudatio}, \textit{Vita}, \textit{Mpr} and \textit{Narratio}\(^{319}\). In this section, \textit{Epitome} is not only collated with other documents in different languages, but also interrupted by six excursuses that intend to fill the gaps created by Gregory’s clumsy cuts. The introduction to this section states MacDonald’s position with regard to the textual witnesses used for it\(^{320}\). His views do not differ much from those held by Flamion and Prieur: Gregory provides the main textual frame into which the other testimonies are included\(^{321}\). He further considers that \textit{Laudatio}, a recast of \textit{Vita} in the section covering Andrew’s peregrinations\(^{322}\), uses another source, which was also used by \textit{Mpr}, for the last part of \textit{AA}. \textit{Narratio}, finally, is said to combine ‘other sources’, some of which themselves may have used the ancient Acts\(^{323}\).

The third part of his text includes the passion\(^{324}\). MacDonald’s text is primarily based on \textit{S} and \textit{H}, \textit{C}, \textit{V} and \textit{Arm}, but occasionally incorporates readings from \textit{Laudatio}, \textit{Mpr} and \textit{Epistle}. Those parts that he considers ‘potentially primitive’ are simply included in the text or in the notes independently of their provenance or language. He also includes an excursus that presents a hypothetical reconstruction of the speech to the cross by comparing Greek testimonies with \textit{Arm}\(^{325}\). The fourth section, finally, is dedicated to other related materials and actually includes only two fragments, namely Augustine’s fragment in \textit{Against the Manichean Felix} 2. 6 and the fragment in Papyrus Bodleain Copt. f. 103.

As a result of this combination of material of diverse origin, date and purpose, the scholar achieves a varied textual whole which is said to narrate Andrew’s peregrinations first from Achaia to the Myrmidons, then through Amasia, Nicomedia and Byzantium toward Thrace and Macedonia in order finally to arrive in Patras. As MacDonald thinks that this textual whole reliably reflects the contents of the ancient Acts, he concludes that there are in

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\(^{318}\) Cannibals, 61-177.
\(^{319}\) Cannibals, 179-317.
\(^{320}\) Cannibals, 181-86.
\(^{321}\) His opinions generally coincide with those of Prieur. The \textit{Pseudo-Titus-Epistle} is said to allude to the double wedding at Philippi in \textit{Epitome} 11; the Manichaean \textit{Psalm-book} to the extinguished fire in \textit{Epitome} 12 and Pap. Oxyrh. 851 (‘almost certainly a fragment of the Acts’) is believed to correspond with \textit{Epitome} 18. Similarly PCU 1 is, in his view, a fuller version of Gregory’s recasting in \textit{Epitome} 18.
\(^{322}\) He even refers to Flamion’s ‘brilliant assessment’ of \textit{Laudatio}’s recasting of Epiphanius (\textit{Cannibals}, 184 note 15).
\(^{323}\) Cannibals, 185.
\(^{324}\) Cannibals, 319-441.
\(^{325}\) Excursus H, \textit{Cannibals}, 409-51
the text enough elements to believe that its author(s) wanted to write a Christian *Odyssey*. By means of this Christian remake of Homeric poems, *AA* might have tried to replace the Greek traditional system of values with another in which Christian virtues were conceived as a reversal of the Homeric ones. With regard to *AA*’s date and place of composition, MacDonald takes Origen’s reference to the apocryphal Acts (ap. Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 3.1) as the *terminus ante quem*. Thus, *AA* should not be dated later than 200. With regard to the place of composition, he thinks that, given Origen’s knowledge of the Acts, the influence of Middle-Platonism and *AA*’s similarities with *AJ*, Alexandria is the most likely place.

After reading MacDonald’s book, it is impossible to deny that his is a fresh and new approach to *AA*. His study presents many interesting aspects and brings to the foreground relevant issues that had previously remained veiled. Notwithstanding this, the question arises about the extent to which his reconstruction reflects the contents of the genuine Acts at all. Long ago Hennecke had already warned those scholars who too optimistically wanted to reconstruct *AA* on the basis of an indiscriminate use of *Epitome* that this text was just a collection of *admiranda miracula* and very much revised. This is not a problem for MacDonald – in his edition *Epitome*, along with *AAM, Vita, Laudatio* and *Narratio*, articulates the story about Andrew as it supposedly appeared in *AA*. As a result, in MacDonald’s reconstruction *AA* becomes a collection of miracles, a simple series of healing and wondrous deeds, which eclipses the central role that Andrew’s words played in the genuine Acts. *AA*’s ancient fragment in V, which is mainly discursive, disappears under the weight of much reworked and revised material.

A reaction against such an interpretation of *AA* on the basis of the outline offered by *Epitome* can already be found in L. van Kampen’s *Apostelverhalen* from 1990. The starting points of his investigation are PCU 1 and Prieur’s reconstruction of the last part of *AA*. After

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326 So, for instance, the Myrmidons and their visit, like Odysseus, to the netherworld; Andrew’s journey back to Achaia replete with demons, storms and monstrous beasts; Patras as the equivalent of Ithaca; Andrew is tied to the cross as Odysseus to the mast, etc. etc. Those interested in this highly imaginative and intelligent reading can consult his monographic study on the issue, *Christianizing Homer. The Odyssey, Plato and the Acts of Andrew* (New York/ Oxford, 1994). A critical discussion of his arguments can be found in in Hilhorst-Lalleman, ‘Andrew and Matthias’, 6-14.

327 *Cannibals*, 55: ‘Instead of Odysseus’s wealth, sex, and violence, the heroes here represent poverty, chastity, and military disobedience’.

328 *Cannibals*, 56-57. MacDonald believes that Origen’s wording shows that he derived his knowledge of Acts from the original version. Since Origen wrote his commentary before his flight to Caesarea in 231, and since at that time the Church considered the Acts as an established tradition, *AA*’s composition cannot be placed after the end of the second century.

329 Consider that of the 341 pages of text and translation in MacDonald’s edition, less than 10%, only 26 pages, is occupied by V. It is obvious that the importance of this fragment and its contents (which are, by the way, seriously altered as a result of the introduction of, in our view, inferior readings proceeding from S and H) disappears under the bulk of materials of miraculous kind.
analysing the content and form of the Coptic papyrus, Van Kampen focuses on Prieur’s AAgr, a text that in his view represents a well-finished and coherent textual whole. In his opinion, a comparison between the contents of these two texts with the alleged parallels in Epitome clearly shows that Gregory’s version is a very poor and unreliable testimony for the reconstruction of AA. As to PCU 1, he rejects Quispel’s opinion, followed by Prieur, that Epitome 18 preserves a transformed version of the episode in the Coptic fragment. In his view there are enough basic differences to raise reasonable doubts about the alleged contacts between both texts. With regard to AAgr, he thinks that a comparison of this text with the parallels in Epitome 34-36 shows that Gregory resumed and transformed to such an extent that almost nothing of the primitive text remains. Epitome only preserves certain spectacular aspects of the story and systematically eliminates direct speech. Hence, he concludes, even admitting that Gregory worked on a version of the ancient Acts, his rendering is a rather poor one. By contrast, a comparison between PCU 1 and AAgr reveals enough parallels to be able to assume that PCU 1 belongs to the ancient Acts.

Van Kampen’s critical attitude towards the too easily accepted contacts between PCU 1 and Epitome 18 and towards the apparent reliability of Gregory is an interesting and necessary conclusion to Prieur’s textual reconstruction. If one accepts that AAgr reliably

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330 Van Kampen, Apostelverhalen, see supra this Chapter, note 215.
331 Apostelverhalen, 123-27.
332 Apostelverhalen, 128-58.
333 Apostelverhalen, 129. According to Van Kampen, AAgr 1 and 64 can be seen as the beginning and end of a closed textual unity for they both refer to the two protagonists of the story, namely Stratocles and Maximilla. This interpretation of Prieur’s edition as a textual whole, and a subsequent literary analysis that tends to distinguish three constitutive sections, namely introduction, core and denouement, will become from now on a standard one. It is true that Van Kampen divides the text into four sections, plus an epilogue and a conclusion, but his literary analysis of these sections shows that they can be easily reduced to three basic units, of which Andrew’s discourses form the textual core.
335 See supra this Chapter, note 222.
336 Apostelverhalen, 160. The correspondences are the following: Epitome 34.1-3 = AAgr 1-12; Epitome 35.14-25 = AAgr 13; Epitome 36.26-28 = AAgr 26; Epitome 36.28-31 = AAgr 54 and 63.
337 Apostelverhalen, 159; ‘Acta Andreae and Gregory’, 19. As Epitome reduces to 3 all 65 chapters of Prieur’s textual reconstruction, and assuming that the same ratio applies to the remainder of his version, he argues that the ancient Acts might have consisted of 798 chapters.
338 Apostelverhalen, 160-61. He refers to the following issues: Stratocles loses his predominant role; Aegeates’ characterisation as the devil’s son disappears; Maximilla’s chastity is reduced to a minimum; the essential role played by Andrew’s words as a means of salvation is completely ignored.
339 Apostelverhalen, 160. Whereas in AAgr direct speech occupies 60.4 %, in Epitome 34-36 it is only 17.2%.
340 With regard to the events preceding the beginning of AAgr, he also thinks that Epitome 30 is not a reliable witness. (Apostelverhalen, 161 and ‘Acta Andreae and Gregory’, 22). However, in this case his scepticism with regard to Epitome seems to go too far, for Maximilla’s healing alluded at in AAgr 26 is also reported by other witnesses, such as Laudatio (338.9ff) and Vita (244D-245B).
preserves \textit{AA}'s last section, it necessarily follows that \textit{Epitome} is far from providing a trustworthy version of \textit{AA}. Van Kampen's critical evaluation, however, is not radical enough, since he nevertheless takes Prieur's textual reconstruction as a starting point, whereas this text should also be scrutinised with the same strict criteria applied to \textit{Epitome}. Even though not so drastically as \textit{Epitome}, Andrew's martyrdom in S and H also reduces the text considerably and eliminates direct speech sections almost completely.

A similar position towards the textual evidence can be found in F. Bovon's article ‘The words of Life in the \textit{Acts of Andrew},’\textsuperscript{342} After asserting that \textit{Epitome} eliminates all substantial speeches by the apostle, he declares that he will base his study on Prieur's textual reconstruction. His paper is divided into three sections and analyses, firstly, the principal discursive passages in \textit{AAgr}\textsuperscript{343} in order to summarise, secondly, the main issues arising from these speeches\textsuperscript{344}. Its third section, finally, attempts an interpretation of \textit{AA}'s mentality and tries to place it in its historical context. In considering the origin of \textit{AA}'s theology of the words, in Bovon's view three origins might be taken into account. Firstly, the Jewish and Christian tradition, although the text's silence with regard to Christology and the dualistic character of its teaching seem to exclude this possibility. Secondly, the Gnostic tradition. Even if \textit{AA} does not affirm the secret character of the sayings as Gnostic texts normally do, \textit{AA} presents obvious similarities with the \textit{Gospel of Thomas} in that they both emphasise the mysterious, saving and vivifying nature of the words. Thirdly, Bovon alleges Middle-Platonic influences on the concept of spiritual maieutics, the invitation addressed to the soul to flee from the sensual, and the emphasis on precise parts of the soul\textsuperscript{345}.

The most recent research on \textit{AA} is characterised both by a lack of interest in textual issues and by the ambiguity concerning the textual basis for the study of \textit{AA}. Sometimes, scholars take either Prieur’s or MacDonald’s reconstructions for granted and proceed to analyse \textit{AA}'s mentality on the basis of these eclectic texts. Other times they choose another textual basis, such as PCU 1 or \textit{Epitome}. Only in a few cases do investigations rely exclusively on \textit{AA}'s fragment in V.

\textsuperscript{341} See his review of these parallelisms in \textit{Apostelverhalen} 162-63. He admits that both texts also show certain divergences, although he thinks that these might simply arise from the fact that the texts narrate different episodes.


\textsuperscript{343} Bovon, ‘Words of Life’, 141-47, analyses Andrew’s speech to Stratocles in \textit{AAgr} 6-12; the speech to Maximilla in \textit{Vb} chapters 5-9; the speech to Stratocles in \textit{Vb}, chapters 10-13; Andrew’s speech to the brethren in \textit{Vb}, chapters 15-18 and Andrew’s words to the crowd in \textit{AAgr} 54-64.

\textsuperscript{344} Bovon, ‘Words of Life’, 147-52.

\textsuperscript{345} Bovon, ‘Words of Life’, 152-54.
For instance, in 1991 already, K.C. Wagener studied the motif of ‘conversion’ in AA on the basis of Prieur’s textual reconstruction\textsuperscript{346} and consequently puts conceptual issues preserved by V and other elements proceeding from quite revised sections transmitted by S and H on the same level. Something similar happens in D.W. Pao’s study on the genre of AA\textsuperscript{347}, which also mostly relies on Prieur’s edition. Andrew’s figure and role in the ancient Acts is apparently based on a single text (AAgr), but in fact the apostle’s personal traits are derived from at least three different sources (S and H, V and the martyrdom), all of which present divergent views on Andrew. Symptomatic of the ambiguity that reigns over AA’s textual basis is the fact that the same scholar, some years later, would carry out an analysis of the function of healing miracles in AA but now not on the basis of AAgr but mainly on the testimony of Epitome\textsuperscript{348}.

In 1998 T.S. Richter published the first certain Coptic fragment of AA\textsuperscript{349}. The fragment is in the Jenaer Papyrusammlung and belongs to a parchment-codex dated to the fourth or fifth century. Unlike the other two Coptic papyri, P.Ien.inv. 649, according to Richter, presents a literal parallel to the beginning of the Greek martyrdom and is close to the version preserved by S/H. Especially interesting is the fact that its first page presents both quire and page numbering. Given the fact that in both cases the Coptic numbering is “λ”, it is certain that the Coptic fragment includes the first and second pages of the lost codex\textsuperscript{350}. This means that as early as in the fourth or fifth century, AA’s martyrdom had been detached from the whole text and circulated separately.

In 1999, L.S. Nasrallah’s paper on the function of the words in AA appeared\textsuperscript{351}. Her argumentation jumps with ease from sections only preserved by S and H to sections transmitted by V in order finally to draw important conclusions about the tenor and scope of AA from problematic sections\textsuperscript{352}, such as the last two chapters of Prieur and MacDonald’s reconstruction\textsuperscript{353}. The same tendency can be observed in two other articles that appeared in


\textsuperscript{349} Richter, ‘Splitter’, 275-84.

\textsuperscript{350} Richter, ‘Splitter’, 280.


\textsuperscript{352} So, for instance her references to AAgr 9, 10 and 29.

\textsuperscript{353} Chapters 64 and 65 of both textual reconstructions are based on a mosaic of different texts that hardly reflects, in our view, a writer’s conclusion to his book. Desperate efforts to explain the lack of coherence of this section result in complicated (sometimes even contradictory) speculations about authorship. Contrast, for instance, MacDonald’s opinion in \textit{Cannibals}, 48-50 that AA was written by the very Xenocharides and Leonidas referred...
1999 and are concerned with philological aspects of AA. The first of them, by E. Zachariades-Holmberg, tends to consider AAgr as a homogeneous textual unity and proceeds to draw conclusions on philological aspects of AA. It is true that in spite of doing so, she does perceive differences between the three basic constitutive parts of the textual reconstruction, namely AAgr 1-32, 33-50 and 51-65. Her conclusions, however, seem to allow the possibility that the obvious unevenness of this eclectic text might be due to the writer or to his editing activity rather than to the fact that it relies on a number of different textual witnesses, all of them with different scopes and certainly with different working methods. In the second article, D.H. Warren bases his stylistic study on AAgr and his statistics on its first 10 chapters only. With the only exception of the section AAgr 13.1-5, he indeed confines himself to the first 10 chapters of AAgr, which are transmitted completely by S and H and partially by Laudatio, and does not pay attention to the section preserved by V (AAgr 33-50) at all. This is indeed a glaring omission in a study that claims to research the style and language of the ancient AA.

The papers on AA collected and published by J.N. Bremmer in 2000 also reveal the influence of the ambiguous textual situation originating as a result of the editions by Prieur and MacDonald. Prima facie the theme of these articles, which are mainly concerned with to by Innocent I with his new estimation (necessary to explain the first person of AAgr 65) in Christianizing Homer, 288, according to which a single author claims to be a simple and trustworthy transcriber of a long oral tradition. Prieur’s explanation is not satisfying either, for it also needs hypotheses concerning alleged prologues and an unnecessary differentiation between the group of followers that recorded Andrew’s acts (here he follows Philaster’s reference) and the actual writer of the text (Acta, 38).


Zachariades-Holmberg, ‘Philological Aspects’, 141.

A clear example is AAgr 13.1-5, which according to her interpretation shows a tendency to return to earlier prototypes of diction. The accumulation of genitive absolute participles, however, seems rather to show the recensor’s struggle to join two sections (AAgr 12 and 14) after eliminating a considerable portion of text.


‘A Study in Style’, 106.

See ‘A Study in Style’, 108 table I and 117 table II.

Peculiar is the fact that his interpretation of the abusive use of genitive absolute participles in this section is radically different from the one expressed by Zachariades-Holmberg some pages later in the same volume. According to the former (‘A Study in Style’, 109), ‘such a complex interlocking of participles, genitive absolutes, and finite verbs serves to increase the reader’s involvement in the action of the story and in the lives of its characters’. According to the latter, however, ‘Apparently, the author, in his attempt to create a sophisticated style, transforms the verbs of a paratactic syntax into participles in the genitive absolute because he lacks the skill of classical sentence construction, which would have required a combination of infinitives and participles (‘Philological Aspects’, 131. The result of his effort, thus, is awkward. A paratactic syntax would have been a better choice’. As already pointed out, however, this section may not be the result of any sort of rhetorical device, but might be simply due to desperate efforts by AA’s recensor(s) to fix the mess resulting from his (their) scissors.

literary matters and only in two cases deal with philological and textual issues, might seem to indicate that a minimum consensus regarding AA’s textual basis has already been attained among scholars. A closer examination of these studies, however, immediately shows that this is not the case. The great variety of textual witnesses used as a starting point for the different papers actually shows that Prieur and MacDonald’s editions, far from creating consensus have resulted in if not disagreement certain insecurity with regard to the reliable textual witnesses. One of these papers is based on MacDonald’s textual reconstruction363, two on Epitome364, most of the rest on AAgr365. Only a single paper is mainly focused on AA’s fragment in V and includes a couple of sporadic references to AAgr366.

The opening essay by Hilhorst and Lalleman analyses some of the so-called parallels and differences between AAM and AA in order to refute that the former can be considered a part of the ancient Acts and to reject MacDonald’s interpretation of the texts as a Christian Odyssey367. AAM not only presents many thematic differences, but its style and language clearly diverges from that of AA.

Taking Epitome and PCU 1 as a starting point, J.N. Bremmer intends to say something more about authorship, place and time of composition of AA. By focussing on apparently secondary issues, such as certain expressions368, customs369 and emphases of the text370, the scholar concludes that the ancient Acts should be placed, if not in Bithynia itself, almost

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367 Hilhorst and Lalleman, ‘AAM and AA’. See supra this Chapter, note 196.

368 Bremmer, ‘Man, Magic’, 15. The expression (Epitome 3) ‘first of the city’ has parallels in AJ and AP and is attested in a Pontic inscription (ibid. note 5).

369 Bremmer, ‘Man, Magic’, 16. The mention of the steward of Lesbos’ wife is also significant. Although a Roman proconsul would hardly have taken his wife’s steward with him to his province, stewards of wealthy Greek women are epigraphically attested in central Anatolia and Bythinia (ibid. note 8). His attention also focuses on other aspects which, although normally neglected by scholars, may provide interesting information about the primitive Acts. As these secondary elements were not directly related to doctrinal argumentation, they are likely to preserve ancient traits. Thus, for example, issues such as the different punishments that appear in the text (ibid., 22), the high role of women (ibid., 21), human movements (ibid., 28), etc.

370 Bremmer, ‘Man, Magic’, 17-18. The text’s emphasis on civic virtues and the use of the terms (moderate’), (‘reasonable, fair’) and (‘gentle’) to denote good personal qualities echo the author’s acquaintance with the ethical codes and vocabulary of the upper classes to which he probably belonged.
certainly in Asia Minor and be dated to c. 200\textsuperscript{371}. With regard to the author, he agrees with former scholarship in considering him a cultivated man who belonged to the upper classes\textsuperscript{372}. T. Adamik analyses the topic of eroticism in \textit{Epitome} and the way in which Gregory dealt with sections of \textit{AA} including love stories. Given the fact that the bishop includes many of these stories, the exclusion of Euclia’s episode and Maximilla’s problematic marital relationship, he concludes, is due to the doubtful morality of her encrateia and its consequences\textsuperscript{373}. M. Pesthy studies Aegeates’ characterisation as the devil. On the one hand, and considered in himself, Aegeates personifies all the sins and attitudes rejected by Christian morals\textsuperscript{374}. On the other hand, and from the point of view of his relationship with others, he represents the seducer who wants to abort Maximilla’s spiritual development and Andrew’s most obvious antagonist\textsuperscript{375}. J. Bolyki offers a mainly literary analysis of what he calls ‘the triangle connection’ after the relationship between Aegeates-Maximilla-Andrew\textsuperscript{376}. After comparing five examples of the OT with two others from the NT, he proceeds to analyse the peculiarities of AA’s triangle\textsuperscript{377}, which in his view is simultaneously a paradigm for dramatic relationships, a thermometer for history, a basic structure of myths and world views and an authorial ‘message in a bottle’.

G. Luttikhuizen focuses on AA’s fragment in V\textsuperscript{378}. His short but very interesting study on the fragment points out its concentric structure and stresses the vital importance of its central section, which in his view not only speaks about the identity and dignity of human nature but also refers to the spiritual past of humankind. In an interesting article that intends to clarify Andrew calling Aegeates a ‘relative of the sea’ (\textit{AAgr} 62), J. Bollok asserts conspicuous similarities between \textit{AA} and \textit{Poimandres} with regard to the manifestation of evil forces\textsuperscript{379}. The coming into being of the sea in \textit{Poimandres}, which does not even come into contact with the Logos, may offer a parallel for AA’s negative conception of the sea and water that strongly contrasts with the more extended view according to which it represents a

\textsuperscript{371} Determinant for a proper dating is, in Bremmer’s view, the reference to the rejection of military service by Stratoches. Whereas in the first two centuries the issue can hardly be found in Christian texts, it suddenly begins to become prominent around the beginning of the third century (Bremmer, ‘\textit{Man, Magic}’, 20 and note 25).

\textsuperscript{372} Bremmer, ‘\textit{Man, Magic}’, 16 adds the alleged influence of Platonic philosophy, the use of many names reminiscent of many figures of the arts and literature, such as Calliope (muse), Alcmanes (Spartan poet Alcman), Gratinus (probably Cratinus, the Old Comedy poet), Antiphanes (Middle Comedy poet), Lesbios (Lesbos, island famous for its poets Sappho and Alcaeus), etc.

\textsuperscript{373} Adamik, ‘\textit{Eroticism}’, 46.

\textsuperscript{374} Pesthy, ‘\textit{Aegeates}’, 47-50.

\textsuperscript{375} Pesthy, ‘\textit{Aegeates}’, 50-53.

\textsuperscript{376} Bolyki, ‘\textit{Triangles}’.

\textsuperscript{377} Bolyki, ‘\textit{Triangles}’, 71-74.

\textsuperscript{378} Luttikhuizen, ‘\textit{Religious Message}’.
cleansing and purifying element. C.T. Schroeder discusses the current idea, according to which the Acts of Apostles, in contrast to Greek novels, pursue a subversion of social cohesion and values based on love and marriage. In her view, the last part of AA shows that the eros of the Greek novel, rather than a subversion of the motif, becomes the pure Platonic eros. A. Jakab’s article about AA and Alexandrian Christianity accepts the second half of the second century as the time of composition for AA, but rejects Prieur’s suggestion that our text was written in Alexandria. I. Czachesz and P. Lalleman, finally, offer a literary and a conceptual analysis of AA, respectively.

Bremmer’s collection of articles also re-edits two contributions by F. Bovon and V. Calzolari, the former of which has already been commented upon. Calzolari’s essay deserves special mention since it presents interesting conclusions on the last section of AA based on a textual and philological comparative study of certain sections of the Greek and Armenian versions. Like Prieur and MacDonald, she claims the capital importance of Arm for the reconstruction of the Greek text. Unlike her predecessors, however, she proceeds cautiously by first analysing the working procedure of the Armenian translator in order to distinguish his amplifications from potentially primitive sections that may have been lost in the Greek transmission. A comparison between Greek and Armenian versions of the martyrdom in general shows that while both texts run almost parallel in narrative sections, in the discursive sections they present important differences. The translator works very scrupulously and only occasionally commits errors. When he alters his original, his changes

379 Bollok, ‘Poimandres’, 107, who compares the parallels between AAgr 11 and Poimandres 4, where darkness, fire, steam and fog are related to evil forces.
380 Schroeder, ‘Embracing the Erotic’.
381 Jakab, ‘Christianisme alexandrin’, 135.
382 Czachesz, ‘Whatever …’; P. Lalleman, ‘Andrew and John’.
383 See supra this Chapter, p. 42.
384 V. Calzolari, ‘La version arménienne du Martyre d’André’, in Bremmer, 149-85. This paper is a revised version of her ‘La versione armena del Martirio di Andrea’, SROCr 16 (1993) 3-33.
385 Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 154 note 16. As she points out, both scholars attribute great value to Arm and discuss parallel sections (Prieur) or even include them in the text (MacDonald). None of these parallel sections, however, has ever been evaluated on the basis of a direct and complete analysis in order to establish possible linguistic, stylistic and lexical similarities.
are clearly intentional and are either due to his translating technique\(^\text{388}\) or to his doctrinal intentions\(^\text{389}\).

Most interesting is Calzolari’s commentary on the last part of AA’s fragment in V, namely the episode containing the fight between ‘the one without beginning’ and the devil, where she corrects the view of Prieur, who seems to have committed more than one error in his synoptic table with the Armenian and Greek sections\(^\text{390}\). A proper analysis of the real textual correspondences between the texts clearly shows that the \(\text{αξιοριστῆς}\) must be understood with Hennecke\(^\text{391}\) as God\(^\text{392}\) and not as the \(\text{νοῦς}\) or ‘intellect’ as Prieur suggests\(^\text{393}\). Consequently, Calzolari concludes that the idea of Christ’s redemption may not be an addition by the Armenian translator, as supposed by Prieur\(^\text{394}\), but might rather have belonged to the primitive Acts\(^\text{395}\). Furthermore, she claims that two Armenian sections of encratite character and preserved only by Arm may be primitive as well. The first one concerns the section \(\text{AAGr}\) 56.18f (\(\text{kαι επεξετότω (... αἵ ἑκ ἔρεσθαι})\) and presents in \(\text{Arm}\) (\(\text{C} 158.16-21\)) a more developed form. The second passage appears in \(\text{Arm}\) (\(\text{C} 158.27-159.3\)) after the translation of \(\text{AAGr}\) 57.2f (\(\text{hμῖ] έκ του επεξέτοτω γενοῦ ejbarseij, (...) peprane[θῃ}}\)). A comparative study of both sections reveals important lexical and structural parallelisms between \(\text{Arm}\) and the Greek martyrdom suggesting the potential primitive character of the passages\(^\text{396}\). Another interesting case is the

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\(^{388}\) Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 155, distinguishes three categories: 1. The translator tends to make neutral adjectives, pronouns or numerals more explicit (\(\text{AAGr}\). 49.2 and \(\text{C} 147.19\); 50.19 and \(\text{C} 149.17\); 55.2 and \(\text{C} 157.8\)); 2. Sometimes he uses periphrases to render Greek verbs (\(\text{AAGr}\). 55.4 and \(\text{C} 157.10\); 51.11 and \(\text{C} 150.12\); 551.16 and \(\text{C} 150.19\); 47.8 and \(\text{C} 146.11\); 47.4 and \(\text{C} 146.6\)) and 3. He adds words that do not appear in the Greek original (\(\text{AAGr}\). 51.4 and \(\text{C} 150.2\); 62.23 and \(\text{C} 165.7\)).

\(^{389}\) Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 157-61, distinguishes four different categories: 1. The translator frequently colours his translation with reminiscences of biblical passages (\(\text{AAGr}\). 64.7 and \(\text{C} 167.14\) interpreted according to Ac 8:20; \(\text{AAGr}\). 55.11 and \(\text{C} 157.19\), interpreted according to Mt 11.15; \(\text{AAGr}\). 52.10 and \(\text{C} 151.7\), interpreted according to Ga 6.2); 2. He repeatedly emphasises the need to follow God’s commandments (\(\text{C} 148.6\); 152.21; 153.8; 167.20-22); 3. He revises the text to avoid doctrinal ambiguities (\(\text{AAGr}\). 47.9 and \(\text{C} 146.13ff\); \(\text{AAGr}\). 49.8 and \(\text{C} 147.25f\)) 4. He also pays great attention to the works of the devil (see Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 160 note 36 for numerous references).

\(^{390}\) Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 161-65, presents both Prieur’s and her own synoptic tables in order to show that: 1. Prieur wrongly thinks that Arm interprets the descent of the \(\text{αξιοριστῆς}\) as the fall of the prince of the angels (Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 165 and Prieur, \(\text{Acta}\), 22); 2. Prieur erroneously supposes that the epithets ‘faible’, ‘impuissant’ and ‘invisible’ were originally applied in the Greek original to the \(\text{αξιοριστῆς}\), (Prieur, \(\text{Acta}\), 22), but in Arm they are clearly applied to the devil; 3. \(\text{Arm}\) ‘ils ne connaissent pas’ is a parallel to Greek \(\text{ΠΚΓΣ ΗΥΖ (…)}\) \(\text{ΝΔΛ?ΓΛ?ΧΡ?ΝΔΛ}\) and not to Greek \(\text{ΠΚΓΣ ΗΥΖ (…)}\) \(\text{ΝΔΛ?ΓΛ?ΧΡ?ΝΔΛ}\).

\(^{391}\) Hennecke, \textit{Handbuch}, 555 with references to Tatian, \textit{Or. ad Graec.} 4; Plato \textit{Lg}. 715e 7 (ap. Hippolytus, \textit{Refut.} 1.19).

\(^{392}\) Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 166-67, adds to the references by Hennecke (see previous note) Heraclides \textit{ap. Origen, Dialog. cum Heraclid.} 2; Hymeneaus et al., \textit{Epist. ad Paulum Samos}. 2; J. Chryst., \textit{Hom. in Col.} 5.3.

\(^{393}\) Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 208 note 3 and 225. Parallels adduced by Prieur, such as \(\text{AAGr}\). 37.2; 7.2; 7.11; 7.19, are not, in her view, \textit{loci similes}.

\(^{394}\) Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 223.


\(^{396}\) Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 171-75. Thus, for example, the vocabulary of \(\text{Arm}\) (\(\text{C} 158.16-21\)), including terms such as ‘volupté’ (\(\text{hδόμην}\)), ‘accouplement, union’ (\(\text{μετία}, \text{συνοισία}\)), ‘attrister’ (\(\text{λυπεῖν}\)), etc., is perfectly
Armenian parallel for \textit{AAgr} 58.2f (\textit{hre\-na to\-gi\-ar\-ou\-s andrej qar\-rou\-s ink\-\textit{tl}}). \textit{Arm} apparently interrupts the sentence in order to amplify the period. This passage, however, may not be an amplification but rather a primitive section belonging to the ancient Acts. After emending the Tchêkarean reading \textit{nerk’ins’}, translated by Leloir with ‘(les choses) intérieurs’, into the reading \textit{nerk’in mardn} (‘l’homme interieur’) attested by many textual witnesses\textsuperscript{397}, Calzolari claims that the passage includes an original reference to the concept of the ‘inner man’\textsuperscript{398}. The potentially primitive character of these passages shows, in her view, the need to reconsider at least two other passages that appear in \textit{AAgr} and are only preserved in \textit{Arm}\textsuperscript{399}.

3. Overview: Main Lines of Research on \textit{AA}

It is now time for an overview of the main lines of research on our text.

3.1. Methods and Scopes of Analysis

The bulk of publications reviewed in the preceding section reveal an obvious lack of consensus with regard to essential aspects of \textit{AA}, such as a proper evaluation of textual witnesses, content, tenor, authorship, time and place of composition. This is not as striking as it may seem, if one considers the available textual basis. On the one hand, of the five major apostolic Acts less has been preserved of the primitive \textit{AA} than of any of the other Acts. On the other, the great diversity of testimonies that allegedly transmit wholly or partly the ancient \textit{AA} diverge significantly from each other concerning both general and particular issues. In their investigations on \textit{AA}, scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been confronted with a laborious textual and literary analysis of exiguous genuine testimonies and of abundant second and third-hand texts on the apostle Andrew. The highly divergent results of these studies arise from the different approaches or criteria applied by scholars when faced with this peculiar textual situation.

From the point of view of the approach to the textual witnesses and scopes, all contributions to \textit{AA}’s research may be reduced to two main lines of investigation.

\textsuperscript{397} Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 182 note 100. The reading \textit{nerk’in mardn}, ‘l’homme interieur’ is attested by an auxiliary mss of the Venice edition and by mss Paris 110, 118, 178, Jerusalem 1-d and Erevan 2601 and 1325.

\textsuperscript{398} We must confess that, excluding the mention of the inner man (following Calzolari’s emendation), I do not see any other relevant reference to the concept in a textual section that seems simply to contrast the pursuing of externalities to the striving for God.
3.1.1. Recovering AA’s tenor and Character from AA’s fragment in V

The first line is represented by those scholars who cautiously refrain from attempting a doubtful reconstruction of the outline of the ancient Acts on the basis of obviously reworked and transformed versions. This group of scholars generally distrusts the testimony provided by the majority of (if not all) the textual witnesses and focus exclusively on the testimony preserved by AA’s fragment in V in order to recover not the general plan but the tenor and character of the ancient Acts (Liechtenhan, Schlier, Sturhahn, Festugièrè, Orbe, Williams).

3.1.2. Recovering AA’s General Plan by Means of a Selective Use of Textual Witnesses

Scholars of the second line of research have engaged themselves in the arduous and laborious task of scrutinising the totality of the extant witnesses in order to distinguish ancient from new elements, true from false issues, and genuinely transmitted from interpolated sections. The territory explored by researchers in this group is obviously more hazardous than in the previous line. As most of these later textual witnesses are anonymous and hardly dateable, researchers must often resort to hypothetical dating of the documents, supposed textual contacts between the different specimens or alleged contamination and/or collation in order to explain differences and similarities in the documents. As a result, the outcome of these investigations is frequently divergent, sometimes even contradictory.

Investigations of this line of research may be divided into two subcategories according to their changing scopes and work criteria. On the one hand, there are those scholars who, being aware both of the reliability of AA’s fragment in V and of the very revised character of the later remakes, pursue an hypothetical reconstruction of AA but subordinate their results to the more relevant analysis of AA’s tenor and character (Hennecke, Blumenthal, Quispel, Hornschuh, Plümacher). On the other, there is a group of investigators who, less cautiously than the former, are primarily interested in reconstructing the visible stages in Andrew’s itinerary in order to achieve a textual continuum that may reflect the plan of the ancient Acts from beginning to end (Flamion, Deeleman, Söder, Erbetta, Prieur, MacDonald). In this latter case, however, textual quantity obviously tends to replace textual quality. This tendency implies that lengthier but more revised sections of text come to occupy the main focus of the

399 Calzolari, ‘Rapporto’, 149-55, applies the same analytical method to the study of AAgr 61 and parallels in Arm and concludes that the sections preserved only in Arm might be primitive.
400 This group of scholars is generally more cautious than the second subgroup and more exigent in their criteria for accepting passages as genuine or rejecting them as forgeries. Some scholars prefer Narratio to Epitome (Hennecke and Blumenthal), whereas others prefer Epitome, for example Hornschuh’s selective use of materials for establishing a general line in Andrew’s itinerary. Although a comparative analysis of Laudatio, Epitome, PCU 1 and other testimonies allows him to reconstruct some landmarks in the development of AA, the tenor of the ancient Acts is exclusively studied on the basis of V.
investigation, as a result of which our most valuable but brief AA’s fragment in V is frequently overshadowed, if not transformed, adapted or simply ignored\textsuperscript{401}.

The following section summarises the highly divergent conclusions achieved by means of the previously reported approaches with regard to the evaluation of textual evidence, content, tenor, authorship, time and place of composition of AA.

3.2. Results of the Investigations on AA

3.2.1. Evaluation of the Textual Witnesses

The evaluation of the textual witnesses by scholars may be divided into two major groups, namely those investigators who only take V into account, and those who even while recognising V as the best document, also attempt to recover other sections from a number of selected textual witnesses.

3.2.1.1. AA’s Fragment in V as a Uniquely Reliable Witness

Scholars of this group prefer the fragmentary but ancient testimony of V to the lengthier but revised and transformed testimonies of other textual witnesses (Liechtenhan, Schlier, Sturhahn, Festugière and Williams).

3.2.1.2. AA’s Fragment in V Combined with Other Selected Documents

Scholars within this group agree in considering that, even if V is the best textual witness, other selected documents may also be useful in reconstructing the sections preceding and following V’s testimony. Important differences, however, appear in the evaluation of which textual witnesses may serve this purpose. The numerous diverse opinions may be reduced to two major groups, the second of which presents some variants:

3.2.1.2.1. V + Narratio + Martyrdom Testimonies

V is the best testimony. For the first part of AA, Narratio, as it presents many contacts with V, is the most reliable document. In spite of its revised and resuming version, Narratio is believed to rely on a lengthier document, probably the ancient Acts. Its testimony is consequently to be preferred to Epitome, for the latter presents a very transformed and revised version. As far as Laudatio is concerned, although its first part includes many secondary elements, its second part, in turn, includes primitive issues. As regards the testimonies for the martyrdom, Mpr, Malt A and B, Narratio, Laudatio and 2GrEp partly preserve the general plan of the last part of AA (Hennecke, Deeleman, Söder, Blumenthal).

\textsuperscript{401} The most obvious example in this group is Flamion’s analysis, which falsifies the tenor of V in favour of
3.2.1.2.2. V + Epitome + Martyrdom Testimonies

V is still the most important textual witness, but Epitome takes the place of Narratio in the reconstruction of Andrew’s peregrinations. Narratio is said to collate different sources and to consist of two differentiated sections. Epitome, by contrast, even though revised and expurgated, preserves the main outline of AA. In spite of its predominant position, V already begins to be influenced by lengthier and more developed sections of text. The textual witnesses for the martyrdom are now the following: Malt A and B, Mpr, 2GrEp, Laudatio and Narratio (Flamion, James, Dvornik).

3.2.1.2.2.1. V + PCU 1, Epitome, Laudatio, Narratio + Martyrdom Testimonies

Since Quispel’s publication on PCU 1, a number of scholars consider the Coptic fragment a section of the primitive Acts, the value of which is equivalent to V’s testimony. As PCU 1 is said to preserve the primitive episode of what appears in Epitome 18 in a revised version, Gregory naturally receives increasing attention from now on. Epitome’s reliability, however, is still proved against the touchstone of other testimonies. Only those episodes in Epitome that are also preserved by other witnesses, such as Laudatio and Narratio, are taken into account. The textual witnesses for the martyrdom are the same as in the previous point (Hornschuh, Plümacher).

3.2.1.2.2.2. H and S, V, C + Epitome

Since Detorakis’ edition of H and S, their testimony tends to overshadow AA’s fragment in V. Epitome is an essential textual witness for the reconstruction of AA’s outline. Laudatio and Narratio are only useful for the last part of AA, of which they preserve a few ancient elements. As to the martyrdom, the testimony provided by H/S and C assures the textual continuity of this section and consequently replaces the textual mosaic that so far had been reconstructed on the basis of the other textual witnesses. From now on these documents are mostly used as correctores (Prieur, Elliott).

3.2.1.2.2.3. AAM + Epitome, Laudatio, Narratio + H, S, V, C

This group makes an indiscriminate use of the textual witnesses. AAM is the beginning of AA. Epitome is combined with Laudatio and Narratio not to check the reliability of the former but in order to increase the volume of text, because all documents may present primitive elements and therefore be useful for the reconstruction of AA. The selection of

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other later and more re-elaborated sections of AA.

402 Elliott presents a peculiar mixture because although he follows Prieur’s textual reconstruction, he uses MacDonald’s translation.
potentially primitive sections is left to the opinion of the investigator. Important falsifications of our most ancient and reliable document in V appear as a result of the adoption of readings proceeding from later and more revised documents (MacDonald).

3.2.2. Contents of the Ancient Acts

Already since Lipsius, but especially after Bonnet’s prolific editorial activity, scholars have agreed on conceiving AA as consisting of two different parts: Andrew’s peregrinations and Andrew’s activity and martyrdom in Patras. This division of AA’s contents seems to proceed from the textual transmission itself because, on the one hand, the later remakes of AA from Gregory onwards present such an internal dichotomy, and, on the other hand, numerous testimonies confine themselves to the martyrdom. As some of these latter textual witnesses often contain references to events not included in the actual texts, they are generally believed to be detached from lengthier texts that also comprised previous sections of AA.

Disagreement, however, appears when determining what these two parts looked like and especially when establishing the outline of Andrew’s peregrinations. As already pointed out, the extant witnesses, while generally agreeing in their accounts of AA’s last part, present rather divergent versions of Andrew’s peregrinations. Laudatio and Vita present approximately the same account due to their relying on a common source, but their version differs both from Narratio’s account and from Epitome. Given the lack of reliable documents that might unequivocally prove the trustworthiness of any of these three versions, the reconstruction of Andrew’s travels is still today a matter of conjecture and, consequently, of controversy.

However, controversies arise not only from differences among the textual witnesses. One of the most (if not the most) important subject of disagreement among scholars concerns an episode that is preserved with small variants in all lengthier reworkings of AA. This episode is, of course, Andrew’s sojourn in the city of the cannibals. Against the testimony of four important textual witnesses (Epitome, Narratio, Laudatio and Vita), many scholars since Flamion deny that the episode ever belonged to the ancient Acts. The Belgian scholar analysed AAM and concluded that important stylistic, lexical and thematic differences reveal that this text is essentially different from the ancient AA and it was probably composed in Egypt in a later period. According to Flamion, if Epitome does include this episode, this is simply due to the fact that Gregory collated two different sources. Flamion’s interpretation has influenced later approaches to the matter to such an extent that scholars invariably see in AAM the source on which later recasts on AA depend. This is not necessarily the case. As has
been pointed out⁴⁰³, Laudatio, Narratio and AAM present such differences in their accounts that they can be considered independent versions that rely on a common source. Consequently, even if one accepts with Flamion that AAM includes many later elements and that it in general presents a different tenor than AA, this does not rule out the possibility that the episode, in a simpler and shorter version, was included among Andrew’s peregrinations. AAM would then be an independent and highly reworked recast of this original story.

When analysing the different points of view with regard to the reconstruction of Andrew’s peregrinations, investigations may be, once again, divided into two groups, namely those that deny that such an outline can be recovered from the extant textual witnesses and those that consider that a partial or even a complete reconstruction is possible.

3.2.2.1. Andrew’s Peregrinations are not Recoverable
The more sceptical scholars of the first group implicitly or explicitly refrain from reconstructing the outline of Andrew’s peregrinations. In their view, the marked differences between the accounts of the textual witnesses make the reconstruction of the apostle’s itinerary an impossible task (Liechtenhan, Schlier, Sturhahn, Festugière, Williams, Van Kampen⁴⁰⁴).

3.2.2.2. Andrew’s Peregrinations are Recoverable
The second group may be divided into two subgroups according to the textual witnesses chosen by the scholars.

3.2.2.2.1. Andrew’s Peregrinations are Partially or Completely Recoverable from Narratio.
Scholars in this group prefer Narratio to Epitome for the reconstruction of Andrew’s peregrinations. Some of them accept only a couple of episodes as genuine, but others consider that the whole account of Narratio may preserve the main outline of AA (below).

3.2.2.2.1.1. Partially Recoverable from Narratio
The complete reconstruction of Andrew’s itinerary is impossible. We can only recover a couple of episodes. As Epitome is disproved of for its obvious revision and recast of AA, all that can be recovered from Andrew’s peregrinations must proceed from Narratio and occasionally from Laudatio. The comparison between these testimonies, however, immediately reveals that only a couple of common elements might be considered primitive.

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⁴⁰³ Blumenthal, Formen, 40-45.
⁴⁰⁴ Van Kampen admits that PCU 1 may include a section of Andrew’s peregrinations.
Thus, for example, according to Hennecke\textsuperscript{405}, Bithynia, Nicaea and Patras are the only sure stations of Andrew’s travels. Blumenthal\textsuperscript{406} adds to these episodes the story about Matthias’ liberation, because in his view a primitive story must underlie the three divergent versions preserved by \textit{Laudatio}, \textit{Narratio} and \textit{AAM}.

3.2.2.2.1.2. Completely Recoverable from \textit{Narratio}

The less sceptical scholars adopt a more flexible position and hesitantly state that \textit{Narratio}, even though revising and resuming, can provide us with the main outline of Andrew’s peregrinations. According to Deeleman and Söder, the sequence Bithynia, Nicaea, Thrace, Scythia, Sebastopol, the cities in the region of the Black Sea, Byzantium, Thessalia and Patras presents the skeleton of Andrew’s itinerary\textsuperscript{407}.

3.2.2.2.2 Andrew’s Peregrinations Partially or Completely Recoverable from \textit{Epitome}

Investigators included in this group are far more numerous. They all agree in considering that \textit{Epitome} preserves the best account of Andrew’s peregrinations, although they also admit the strong revision and transformation that the ancient Acts have undergone in Gregory’s version. However, not all is consensus. Some scholars accept only some episodes from \textit{Epitome}, others either accept all or all but the first episode (below).

3.2.2.2.2.1. Partially Recoverable from \textit{Epitome}

The more sceptical among the scholars only accept as original those episodes in \textit{Epitome} that are also corroborated by other witnesses. According to Hornschuh, followed by Plümacher, only the following episodes are primitive: demons of Nicaea (\textit{Epitome} 6; \textit{Laudatio} 18; \textit{Narratio} 4); Philippi (\textit{Epitome} 12; \textit{Manichaean Psalm-book} 142.20); Thessalonika (with hesitation, \textit{Epitome} 18; PCU 1); Lesbius’ episode (\textit{Epitome} 21; \textit{Laudatio} 33); miraculous healings at Patras (\textit{Epitome} 31-33; \textit{Laudatio} 40-41); Alcmanes’ healing (\textit{Epitome} 34; \textit{Laudatio} 43).

3.2.2.2.2.2. Completely Recoverable from \textit{Epitome}

Within this group one may distinguish between those scholars who accept the whole testimony of \textit{Epitome} and those that consider its first chapter an interpolation.

3.2.2.2.2.2.1. Itinerary Including the Rescuing of Matthias

\textsuperscript{405}Hennecke, \textit{Handbuch}, 547; \textit{Neu-Apokryphen}, 462-463. According to Hennecke, the story about Matthias’ liberation proceeds from \textit{AAM}.

\textsuperscript{406}Blumenthal, \textit{Formen}, 43-44.

Lipsius was convinced that the episode about Andrew’s sojourn among the cannibals was a primitive one, but he never stated that *AAM* in its current form was a part of *AA*. On the contrary, he considered that this text was a very reworked and later version of an episode that probably appeared in the ancient *Acts*408. It is precisely his conviction concerning the genuineness of the episode that leads him to consider that *Epitome*, as it includes the episode at the beginning, is a reliable witness depending directly or indirectly on the *Periβdoι Ἀνδρείου*. In spite of presenting a revised and resumed version of the ancient *Acts*, *Epitome* provides the main outline of Andrew’s travels: Cannibals, Amaseia, Sinope, Nicaea, Nicomedia, Hellespont, Thrace, Macedonia and Achaia. To this group also belong Bardenhewer, Schermann and, more recently, MacDonald.

3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. Itinerary Excluding the Rescuing of Matthias

All scholars in this group reject *AAM* belonging, in whatever form, to the ancient *AA*409. Consequently, they accept the reliability of all but one chapter of Gregory’s account, the first. They all attribute great relevance to Gregory’s testimony, which is considered to rely on a complete Latin version of the primitive *Acts*410 and consequently to preserve, in a revised form, the totality of Andrew’s peregrinations411. In their view, *AA* originally included all the episodes between Andrew’s stay in Amaseia and his martyrdom in Patras as recorded by *Epitome*.

3.2.3. Tenor and Character of *AA*

As might be expected, a similar variety of opinions can be found in the discussion of *AA*’s mentality.

3.2.3.1. Gnostic Interpretation of *AA*

Uninformed readers of Prieur’s overview of the research on *AA* might easily believe that the Gnostic interpretation of the ancient *Acts* is a homogeneous and monolithic hypothesis and mainly due to the influence of Lipsius’ analysis412. Yet this is hardly the case and if it is true

409 Flamion, James, Dvornik, M. Peterson, Erbetta, Moraldi and, especially, Prieur, who restates many of Flamion’s points of view on the text.
410 Flamion, *L’Apôtre*, 262, 265; Prieur, *Acta*, 8, 119. This opinion, however, is rather weak. First, it seems to contradict Prieur’s assumption that Gregory collated *AAM* and *AA*. If he indeed had a complete version of *AA* in front of him, why did he collate this text with another including an episode alien to this textual whole? And further, why would he refer to the passion of the apostle and not to the original end of the text he was abridging? As Quispel already suggested (‘Coptic Fragment’, 141), it seems more reasonable to think that Gregory’s source was already expurgated.
411 See Prieur, *Acta*, 31, where his diagram implies that *Epitome* preserves a complete version of Andrew’s peregrinations. See also ibid. 40-65.
412 *Acta*, 129-56 and especially 139-40 and 155.
that he influenced some studies at the beginning at the twentieth century, most investigators who claim a Gnostic interpretation do it independently of their predecessor and on wholly different grounds.

Lipsius, following Thilo, was indeed the first scholar to defend the Gnostic character of the ancient Acts. His view, however, was mainly based on the indirect transmission of $AA$ and on alleged Gnostic traces in orthodox reworkings of $AA^{413}$. Some scholars, such as Bardenhewer and Söder, followed him without critically scrutinising the criteria used to deduce such an interpretation. Already at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, a critical reaction to Lipsius’ theses appeared, especially from scholars who agreed in considering a Gnostic trend in $AA$. Liechtenhan, for instance, explicitly distanced himself in his second investigation by rejecting the so-called Gnostic traces summarised in *Apostelgeschichten* on the grounds of their inconclusiveness and vagueness$^{414}$. He based his own Gnostic interpretation of the primitive Acts exclusively on $AA$’s fragment in V. Hennecke adopted the same attitude and, after rejecting that $AAM$ and $AAPe$ belonged to the primitive text, he stated that the only genuine representative of the ancient Acts shows a clearly Gnostic background. Subsequently, several scholars, such as Schlier, Sturhahn, Festugièrè, Quispel, Erbetta (with hesitation) and Orbe, also concurred in the Gnostic character of the ancient Acts from $AA$’s fragment in V.

3.2.3.2. The Orthodox Interpretation and Neopythagorean and Neoplatonic influences
Flamion is the first exponent of the view that the writer of $AA$ belonged to mainstream Christianity, although Harnack labelling the text as ‘vulgär-christlich’ may be considered a precedent. Flamion’s interpretation mainly relies on *Epitome* and on the textual witnesses for the martyrdom, all of them texts that show important later revision. All doctrinal peculiarities in V are explained as resulting from Neopythagoric and Neoplatonic influences, as if Flamion was implying that Platonic Christianity is perfectly consistent with mainstream Christianity.

3.2.3.3. The Orthodox Interpretation and the Gnosticising influences
Another line of research states that the lack of a strict differentiation between orthodox and heretic in the second century makes labelling $AA$ as Gnostic or heretic at least anachronistic. Deeleman certainly recognises the Gnosticising trend of $AA$, but also considers that a mainstream Christian might have gone as far as the writer of $AA$ in stating his point. Moreover, $AA$’s main trait is its encratite tendency and this is not at odds with the mentality of

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$^{413}$ See *supra* this Chapter, p. 11 and note 102 for an overview of these Gnostic traces.

$^{414}$ It is true, however, that in his *Die Offenbarung* 49, Lichtenhan follows, to a certain extent, Lipsius’ viewpoint.
‘kerkelijke kringen’ (‘ecclesiastical Christianity’) of the second century. Quispel, in spite of recognising clear Gnostic traits in the textual witnesses of AA, also thinks that the possibility of an orthodox author cannot be excluded.

3.2.3.4. Middle Platonic / Platonic Influences
The first to defend such a position was Bousset who suggested that behind Andrew’s speech to the cross Mpr 14 there were speculations on the cross, which originated under the influence of Platonic commentaries on the Timaeus. The most recent defender of this interpretation is Hornschuh, who completes Bousset’s references to Justin and Irenaeus with passages from Middle-Platonists and states that AA shows a typically Middle Platonic mixture of Stoic and Platonic thought.

3.2.3.5. AA reflects the ‘Mentality of the Period’
The most peculiar interpretation of AA’s tenor is perhaps to be found in Prieur’s analysis of AA’s mentality. He argues that AA reveals both the influence of (Neo) ‘Platonism’ and of Neopythagoreanism, it is Gnosticising without being strictly Gnostic and presents echoes of the Stoic ethical doctrine. Such a peculiar mixture cannot surprise the reader aware of Prieur’s eclectic textual basis. Whereas (Neo) Platonism is deduced from the first part of H and S, Neopythagorean influences and a Gnosticising tendency seem to be concluded from V. The Stoic ethics, finally, seem to proceed from the highly revised textual witnesses for the martyrdom.

3.2.4. Authorship, Time and Place of Composition
Lack of consensus also reigns over the hypotheses concerning authorship, time and place of composition.

3.2.4.1. Authorship
There are three main positions adopted by scholars with regard to the issue: according to some, nothing can be said about the author of AA; according to others, AA is the product of a single writer; one scholar, finally, suggests a dual or collective writer.

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415 Prieur’s changing statements reveal a certain insecurity with regard to the alleged Platonic influences. Sometimes he seems to reject such an influence, for it may imply a later dating of AA (Acta, 209 note 3); at other times he seems to accept it (Acta, 292f). At the same time, his terminology is also inconsistent, for he refers to the same issue sometimes with ‘Neoplatonism’ (Acta, 209) and other times with ‘Platonism’ (Acta, 376f.). Against this loose use of terminology, see H. Dörrie, ‘Was ist “spätantiker Platonismus”?’, ThR N. F. 36 (1971) 285-302 (= Platonica Minora (Munich, 1976) 508-23.

416 As was the case with Flamion’s alleged Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean influences, Prieur does not offer any parallel from Neopythagorean writers and simply refers to the study by A.J. Festugière, L’idéal religieux des Grecs et l’Évangile (Paris, 1932). See Prieur, Acta, 377 and note 5. See also ibid. 409ff.
The first of these positions groups scholars that simply refrain from proposing a hypothetical writer on the grounds of the scarcity of reliable material (Hennecke, Hornschuh, Plümacher). More numerous, however, is the group of scholars who attempt to say something more about the issue by means of a literary analysis of one or more of AA’s textual witnesses. Some of them adopt the second of the positions listed above, namely the view that sees AA as the product of a single writer. Of them, Flamion was the first to suggest that, given the abundant use of Greek names and the style of AA, its author was an Achaean intellectual fond of Greek rhetoric, an ascetic Christian influenced by the philosophy of the period. Bremmer, in contrast, even though endorsing the author’s characterisation as an intellectual, disproves Flamion’s argument that the use of Greek names may imply an Achaean origin. More interesting is in his view that most names in AA are reminiscent of real or literary figures from Greek culture. In addition, AA’s emphasis on civic virtues and their application to denote personal qualities shows that this Greek intellectual certainly belonged to the upper classes.

Prieur and MacDonald defend the collective authorship, or third position. Prieur, by relying excessively on a doubtful primitive passage (AAgr 65.5-8), suggests that AA originated in a community of believers that transmitted its creed to the writer. For this statement he adduces support from the use of the first person plural in AAgr 64. This writer, whom Prieur characterises as a cultivated person, probably a Christian convert, may have served as a simple transcriber. MacDonald, in turn, presents a more complicated theory, which he has explained in two different ways. In his edition of AA he combines Philaster’s reference, according to which AA was written down by followers of the apostle, with the view of Innocent I († 417), who believed that the Acts were written by the philosophers Xenocharides and Leonidas. Accordingly, he states that Andrew’s peregrinations were written by one of them and Andrew’s martyrdom by the other. In his view, this would explain the shift of the narrative into the first person plural (AAgr 64) and singular (AAgr 65), because then the passion was written by a single author. In his Christianizing Homer, on the other hand, he puts the matter differently. He begins by stating that the sophisticated content of AA suggests that it was the work of one or more Christian Platonists. In accordance with this new position, he thinks that in AAgr 65 the author locates himself as a transcriber ‘at the end of a chain of

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417 However, Prieur’s reading in AAgr 64.1-2 is rather weak. In spite of his confusing app. ad loc., which seems to imply something different, such a reading is attested only in H/S and Q. All other textual witnesses for the martyrium (C, Laudatio, Narratio, P and O) simply omit it.
418 Prieur, Acta, 381.
419 Cannibals 47-51; Christianizing Homer, 287-88.
oral tradition’. With regard to Xenocharides and Leonidas he now thinks that the names probably appeared somewhere in AA’s text.

3.2.4.2. Time of Composition

Although an apparent consensus seems to reign over AA’s dating, as all hypotheses oscillate between the second and the third centuries, controversy is still a matter of fact. This becomes obvious when observing the arguments alleged by scholars as support for their hypotheses. We will divide all opinions into two groups according to whether they date AA to the second or to the third century.

3.2.4.2.1. Second Century

E. Peterson has defended the earliest date of composition on the grounds of AA’s encratite tendency. In his opinion, AA, AJ and ATh were written at a time that these sects first appeared or became known, namely in Hadrian’s reign (117-138)\(^{420}\). However, most scholars defending the second century as the time of composition prefer a later date. Lipsius, for instance, places it in the second half of the second century and so does Prieur, who takes AJ as the \textit{terminus post quem} and the \textit{Manichaean Psalm-book} (end of the third century) as the \textit{terminus ante quem}\(^{421}\). Deeleman, in turn, attempts to date the text more precisely. Given the fact that AA uses AJ (c. 165), whereas APe (c. 200) uses AA, the ancient Acts might be dated to c. 180\(^{422}\). According to Hornschuh, AA was written between 150 and 190. He takes Peterson’s reference to Hadrian’s reign as \textit{terminus post} and AP (190-200) as \textit{terminus ante}, for it uses AA. As APe (180-190) presents clear contacts with AA, Hornschuh concludes that the latter should not be dated later than 190\(^{423}\). MacDonald also thinks that AA was written when the second century was drawing to a close, because Origen’s reference (\textit{ap. Euseb. Hist. eccl.} 3.1) to the apocryphal Acts is his \textit{terminus ante}\(^{424}\). In Quispel’s opinion, AA should not be dated after 200, since our text was composed after AJ and APe but before AP\(^{425}\). Bremmer, finally, returns to the internal literary analysis to determine AA’s time of composition. Together with the already mentioned development of civic virtues to personal qualities, the rejection of military service by Stratocles points to the end of the second or beginning of the third century, for such a theme hardly appears in Christian texts from the first two centuries.

\(^{420}\) See \textit{supra} this Chapter, p. 29 and notes 247 and 249.

\(^{421}\) On Lipsius \textit{supra} this Chapter, pp. 10-12.


\(^{423}\) \textit{Supra} this Chapter note 252.

\(^{424}\) \textit{Supra} this Chapter note 328.
3.2.4.2. Third Century
In contrast to the variety of dates proposed by scholars of the first group, all who surmise the third century as the time of composition allocate AA in its second half. Flamion first suggested such a date on the grounds of AA’s alleged Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean influences. Probably following Flamion’s assertion, James considers AA the latest of the apocryphal acts and dates it to 260, although he does not provide any reason to support his chronological precision. Erbetta has also suggested the second half of the third century. Since PCU 1 and AA present obvious similarities, and since PCU 1’s vocabulary has close contacts with ATh, he thinks that AA depends upon ATh. Consequently, AA must be dated to 250-300. Dvornik, in his turn, prefers a later dating to the end of the third century. On the one hand, the ‘Monarchean’ prologue to Luke’s gospel (supported by Jerome) attributes Achaia to Luke and, on the other, Origen only knows of Scythia as a field of activity for Andrew.

3.2.4.3. Place of composition
Opinions also diverge with regard to the geographical origin. On the one hand, there are scholars who think that the place of composition cannot be determined (Hennecke, Hornschuh). On the other, numerous scholars have attempted to deduce a hypothetical origin for AA on the basis of different arguments. Three places have been proposed: Achaia, Alexandria and Asia Minor. Flamion suggested the Achaean origin on the grounds of AA’s use of Greek names. Prieur, differently, considers Alexandria as the most suitable place for the composition of a text that presents contacts not only with Philo, but also Corpus Hermeticum, Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean philosophy. MacDonald also considers Alexandria as the most likely place of composition, on the grounds of Origen’s knowledge of AA, Middle-Platonic influences and AA’s similarities with AJ. Other scholars, however, tend to allocate AA to Asia Minor. Thus, for example, Plümacher, who thinks that AP’s use of AA might indicate that they were composed in the same region. Bremmer, finally, suggests on the basis of certain realia that AA should be placed if not in Pontus and Bithynia, at least in Asia Minor.

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425 Quispel, ‘Unknown Fragment’, 147.
426 As Schermann already pointed out (see supra this Chapter, p. 19 and note 177), such influences should have implied a dating later than the third century. On the issue, infra Chapter 5, pp. 343-44.
427 James, Apocryphal NT, 337.
428 supra this Chapter note 260.
429 PL 26.18.
430 Dvornik, Apostolicity, 214.
3. 3. Conclusions on the Research on AA

The preceding review shows clearly that the research on AA has not yet achieved conclusive answers to the main questions posed by the ancient Acts of Andrew. As already stated, this peculiarity is partly due to the textual witnesses and to AA’s problematic textual transmission. The great diversity of the documents and the lack of univocal evidence to determine their chronology or their mutual relationships places a serious obstacle in the way of a coherent analysis and classification of the material with a view to isolating the oldest textual stage that may allow a consistent study of the primitive Acts. On the other hand, it is also true that the scholarly approach to this diversified textual evidence frequently tends to complicate the matter instead of clarifying it. Preconceptions about the ancient Acts have often hindered an objective analysis of the textual witnesses that might have allowed both an assessment of their particular characteristics and an evaluation of their convergences and divergences. As the analysis of the single documents frequently serves the purposes of a given hypothesis, studies tend to blur their peculiarities and thus to confuse the issue of a proper and unbiased comparative analysis of the textual witnesses.

The rather different, sometimes even contradictory, interpretations of AA’s tenor and character will suffice to illustrate the negative results of this combination of factors. The Gnostic interpretation by Lipsius was based more on common sense than on textual evidence. If AA has come down to us despite the fact that since early times it has been classed among the heretic writings, the extant witnesses must present a revised version of the primitive text. As revisions can hardly be completely successful in eliminating undesirable elements, these revised texts should preserve traces of the primitive source. Among AA’s textual witnesses, those with a fabulous undercurrent, such as AAM and AAPe, seemed to Lipsius more likely to preserve these original traits. Up to this point his approach is legitimate, for any working hypothesis is useful for a better understanding of the textual evidence. Problems, however, arise when, on the basis of his preconception of AA, he proceeds to analyse the remaining extant witnesses exclusively from the perspective of the text or texts that in his view play a central role. Thus, for example, Epitome is said to depend directly or indirectly on the Gnostic Periodoi, because it includes a version of the cannibal episode closest to AAM. In contrast, Laudatio, Narratio and Vita, as they present a rather different version, depend on the catholic Pratej. In short, the conclusions on AA’s textual transmission are not drawn from an

431 Obviously, problems arise when determining what is the result of revision and what is not. How is one to establish the working procedure of the revisor if one does not positively know what he is revising? In any case,
objective and comprehensive analysis of the textual witnesses but rather from their alleged relationship with a text that, according to a previous interpretation of *AA*, allegedly represents the oldest textual stage.

With regard to the opposite, orthodox interpretation of *AA* by Flamion, one might say that he, despite the different method, textual basis and conclusions, presents a similar approach to the textual witnesses. As he is willing *a priori* to deny that a ‘doctrinal revision’ may be relevant in the genesis of *AA*’s textual witnesses, he relies on a doubtful interpretation of Gregory’s prologue in order to suggest that the recastings of *AA* merely intended to eliminate its excessive verbosity. In doing so, however, he carries out a biased analysis of the indirect and direct transmission of *AA*. First, he neglects the external references that class *AA* among the heretic writings. Second, he deliberately chooses those texts that may support an orthodox reading, namely *Epitome* for Andrew’s peregrinations and *Malt A* and *B*, *Narratio* and interpolations in *2GrEp* for his martyrdom. The most serious interpretation, however, begins when the scholar attempts to beat the remaining extant witnesses into the shape of his ‘Martyrdom source’. All other textual witnesses are not only exclusively analysed from the perspective of his hypothetical source, but they are also tendentiously interpreted so as to fit in the plan of this source. There are many examples of this procedure in his book, but the clearest instance is Flamion’s tendentious interpretation of *AA*’s fragment in V. Without providing any conclusive evidence to support his statement and minimising the profound divergences between V and the remaining extant witnesses, he states that *AA*’s fragment in V is a section detached from his Martyrium source. Next, he carries out a very interpretative analysis of its contents in order to suggest the Neopythagoric and Neoplatonic influences on its message. Finally, he extends the conclusions drawn from this document to the remaining martyrdom and assesses the doctrinal character of the previously reconstructed ‘martyrium source’. In short, Flamion’s approach to the textual witnesses follows a clearly preconceived idea about the ancient Acts. Although his selection of texts to suit his bias might, in a certain light, be accepted as a means to analyse the material, he clearly transcends this scope and projects his interpretation onto the analysis of all other textual witnesses that do not fit in his narrow scheme.

Lipsius thought he did and summarised those elements in *AAM* and *AAPe* that in his view betrayed a Gnostic background. See supra this Chapter, p. 11 and note 102.

433 Thus, for example, his interpretation that *Laudatio* depends on *Vita*, or his explanation of the textual relationship between *Conversante* and *Epistle*.
434 Flamion, *L’Apôtre*, 142-45; see also his conclusions on p. 177.
As far as the orthodox Gnosticising interpretation is concerned, it has the merit of trying to go beyond the rigid limits imposed by an interpretation of late antiquity exclusively based on black-and-white conceptions proceeding from patristic sources. The lack of a strict differentiation between heretic and orthodox at the time of AA’s composition makes plausible the hypothesis that different groups were receptive to different ideas proceeding from diverse ideological environments. Hence, the appearance of Gnostic traits in AA does not necessarily imply a Gnostic orientation of its writer. Deeleman’s approach to the primitive AA might be correct, as might be his suggestion that the loss of the ancient Acts was not due to the text’s doctrinal orientation but rather to its popularity among heretic groups. However, this interpretation has once again a negative influence on the analysis of the textual witnesses because the assumption of AA’s doctrinal harmlessness prevented the scholar from realising that the obvious reduction pattern of Narratio is precisely focussed on eliminating undesirable doctrinal issues from AA’s fragment in V.

With regard to the Platonic interpretation by Bousset, this relies on a very reworked text: Mpr. It is true that although he does not extend the conclusions of his study to other textual witnesses for AA, in Hornschuh’s analysis, which endorses Bousset’s interpretation, the speech to the cross in Mpr (54.16-55.19) already gives support to a new hypothesis. Admittedly, Hornschuh’s study is more careful than the preceding ones: he begins his exposition of AA’s character with an analysis of AA’s fragment in V, and only then incorporates other textual evidence. However, the alleged influence of the Stoic conception of Logos is exclusively concluded from the speech to the cross in Mpr and Laudatio (348.19). And it is this evidence, together with the Platonic influence he recognises in AA’s fragment in V, that seems to allow the conclusion that Middle-Platonism mostly influenced AA. Once again, consequently, AA’s fragment in V is interpreted in line with later and more reworked textual witnesses.

The last major interpretative line of AA states that it reflects the mentality of its historical period. This ambiguous denomination is deliberately coined by Prieur to embrace all the different ideologies that come to the surface in his eclectic textual reconstruction. The alleged appearance of Neoplatonic, Neopythagoric, Stoic, Gnostic and mainstream Christian elements should have been enough evidence to conclude that such a textual reconstruction is not a viable one, for it is likely to be a collage including elements of extremely varied

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provenance. On the contrary, Prieur confidently proposes this philosophical fair as the genuine thought behind AA and even theorises on the eclectic *homme de lettres* who might have composed it. Such an interpretation of AA is the result of his indiscriminate use of textual witnesses and the *ad libitum* combination of sections to build his textual reconstruction. Once again, his approach is as valid as any other working hypothesis, but it certainly becomes problematic when the priority given to S/H begins to affect the character of our oldest testimony for AA. AA’s fragment in V is not only emended on the basis of readings proceeding from such reworked sources, but is also incorporated in an alien textual environment that facilitates the distortion of its message in line with that of the documents with which it is merged.

The obvious conclusion from this brief survey is that there is a close relationship between the diversity of AA’s textual witnesses and the unsystematic, sometimes anarchic approach of scholars to the textual witnesses. The major problem is that among the numerous and various documents, it is always possible to find sound support for almost any hypothesis whatsoever. Given this circumstance, scholars tend to begin their studies by analysing first those texts which best suit their expectations and only then proceed to compare them with the remaining extant witnesses. In all cases this comparative analysis obviously confirms both the working hypothesis of the investigator as well as his interpretation of the document(s) chosen to sustain it.

A serious study of the primitive Acts, however, must be preceded by a detailed and objective study of the single textual witness that may allow the investigator to sort the material with a view to sorting reliable from unreliable witnesses. The investigations of those scholars who confined themselves to the testimony of AA’s fragment in V for the study of the tenor of the ancient Acts should have provided the starting point for such an analysis. However, their implicit or explicit mistrust of the remaining extant witnesses has never been clearly and distinctly argued on the basis of a systematic comparison of these testimonies with V, so as to encourage scholarship to focus exclusively on this document for conceptual matters. On the contrary, the lack of a categorical assessment of the reasons that justify their preferring V to the remaining extant textual witnesses has given grounds to the idea that a combination of the latter with the former might produce a reliable result. As has already been seen, this is indeed the approach of the vast majority of the investigations. All five major

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439 See *supra* pp. 36-38.
440 See *supra* this Chapter, §§ 3.1.1, 3.2.1.1, 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.3.1.
441 For the scholars who maintain this view, see *supra* this Chapter, § 3.1.2, pp. 49-50 and § 3.2.1.2, pp. 51-52.
interpretations of AA claim the testimony of AA’s fragment in V as support for their own reading. Whereas in the Gnostic interpretation by Quispel, AA’s fragment in V gives support to the praedestinatio physica he finds in PCU 1, in Flamion’s orthodox reading it forms the foundation for a subjective textual and conceptual interpretation of AA. While in the orthodox Gnosticising explanation the textual and conceptual peculiarities of our fragment disappear under the influence of Narratio, in the Platonic reading V is brought into line with Mpr. In Prieur’s interpretation, finally, our document vanishes under the weight of lengthier and more developed sections of the textual reconstruction, even though it provides the conceptual basis for the text.

Our present investigation will proceed differently. In the next chapter we shall first analyse AA’s textual transmission in order to attempt an assessment of its textual diversification. We are aware of the difficulty and risks of such an enterprise: as far as we know none of the previous studies on AA has attempted to include all the major textual witnesses into a comprehensive and coherent whole. However, it is only on the basis of such a systematic comparative analysis of the textual witnesses that we may isolate the reliable one or ones in order to generate, afterwards, a consistent analysis of the primitive Acts of Andrew.
CHAPTER II: AA’S TEXTUAL TRANSMISSION

At the start of the first chapter we offered a tentative classification of the textual witnesses based on their content, that is, whether they preserved or omitted certain sections that the primitive text allegedly contained. This classification, which roughly coincides with the one underlying the scholarly literature on AA, admittedly includes a petitio principii, for it assumes an understanding of the primitive text and of its textual transmission before the texts have been properly and exhaustively analysed. The question whether AA originally consisted of two parts, namely peregrinations and martyrdom, from which some textual witnesses detach the martyrdom, or whether it consisted of the martyrdom only and the texts that include both parts collate it with other sources can only be properly answered after a consistent analysis of the extant witnesses.

In this chapter we will proceed differently. In the first section we will review the standard classification of the textual witnesses, now stressing the great divergences between documents that are normally grouped together as if they attested to a homogeneous text. This brief review intends to demonstrate that these texts transform the primitive text to such an extent that they cannot be treated as simple representatives of a textual transmission without first establishing their textual characteristics. In the second section, therefore, we pay due attention to the textual witnesses and attempt a new classification on the basis of their literary character and scope. From this analysis it will become clear that, given the profound transformation of AA according to their peculiar literary purposes, the vast majority of the textual witnesses are not reliable sources either for a reconstruction of the primitive AA or for an analysis of its tenor and character. The third section furnishes support for this interpretation by means of a comparative textual analysis of the textual witnesses in order to determine the extent to which they transformed the primitive text and to establish, as far as possible, the intertextual relationships, genealogy and hypothetical chronology of the different versions. The fourth section, finally, suggests a historical explanation for the textual diversification, revealed by the comparative textual analysis.

1. Diversity of AA’s Textual Witnesses

1.1. Character of the Witnesses included in Group A (Andrew and Matthias)

All the texts included in the first group relate the adventures of Andrew in the land of cannibals when rescuing his friend Matthias. Characteristic of these texts is their interest in
wondrous and miraculous elements and their tendency to introduce legendary issues. The numerous versions in different languages testify to the success of the text in the most diverse environments throughout the Middle Ages.

The abrupt end proves that the text is not preserved in its original form and length. The loss of the last part seems to date from ancient times and can be traced back to the hyparchetype or archetype of the stemma. How long the text actually was and what the continuation looked like is a matter of conjecture.

1.2. Character of the Documents included in Group B (Martyrdom)

Although all the documents included in this group have Andrew’s martyrdom as their main focus, they are far from forming a homogeneous group. The writers of these texts were inspired by or interested in the apostle’s martyrdom above all, but their ways of understanding and rewriting the primitive text present clear differences. Most of these versions diverge considerably from one another with regard to textual length, character and style.

From the point of view of the portion of the primitive text they preserve we may distinguish three categories: longer, medium-length and short texts. The longer texts include the preliminary events to Andrew’s imprisonment, the medium-length ones begin with Andrew’s last words in prison and continue with the narration of the martyrdom. The short versions, finally, focus exclusively on the martyrdom itself. None of them, however, allows us to go back beyond Andrew’s arrival in Patras.

With regard to their character and content, the textual witnesses also present important differences. Some texts only preserve a few elements of the original story and incorporate them in a new textual framework. Other texts present a very summarising version of the ancient martyrdom that only preserves the strictly necessary issues to assure textual continuity. A couple of texts preserve a fuller version of the last part of the martyrdom, which seems to follow the plan of the primitive text but which nevertheless presents traces of important omissions.

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1 See supra, Chapter 1, pp. 1-3.
2 Blatt, Bearbeitungen, 1.
3 This possibility seems to be supported by the production of a new text, the Acts of Peter and Andrew, that would suit the missing end of AAM. Cf. MacDonald, Cannibals, 17.
4 See supra, Chapter 1, pp. 3-5.
5 Andrew’s martyrdom in S and H.
6 Arm and Conversante.
7 Malt A and B, Andrew’s martyrdom in C.
8 Epistle.
9 Malt A and B, Mpr.
10 Andrew’s martyrdom in C, Arm.
From a stylistic perspective, finally, it is also possible to distinguish several subcategories. Some of the texts are completely new texts inspired by older materials. In this sense, although they may occasionally present echoes of the older text, their style is radically different. Other texts are remakes of the primitive story that generally follow the line of the ancient Acts, sometimes adding new elements and at others eliminating old issues. A couple of texts, finally, might perhaps reflect the original style of the ancient Acts, but they abridge the story to such an extent that it is not always clear what their source actually looked like.

All these important differences in the textual witnesses show that a purely textual analysis can hardly determine their mutual relationship with a view to establishing a genealogy of the documents or to reconstructing their archetypal.

1.3. Character of the Documents included in Group C (Peregrinations and Martyrdom)

In contrast to the incompleteness of the textual witnesses in groups A and B, those in group C are complete and offer an account, with a beginning and an end, of Andrew’s apostolic activities. Regrettably, however, these texts present rather diverging accounts of the story with only a few sporadic contacts. Noteworthy is that in their first part they all include a version of the events narrated by the texts of group A and, in their second part, a version of the events narrated by the texts in group B. Syncretism of sources has been adduced as an explanation for this peculiarity, but problems arise when determining which texts served as sources. Regarding the episode of Andrew and Matthias, their accounts are so different from AAM that this text can hardly be considered to be the source of the others. As to the martyrdom, texts in this group also present important differences and only two of them (Laudatio and Narratio) occasionally present contacts with textual witnesses from group B.

As far as the literary character is concerned, obvious differences come to the fore. While Narratio, Laudatio and Vita clearly have biographical intentions, Epitome is more interested in Andrew’s miracles than in Andrew himself.

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11 *Conversante*, Epistle.
12 *MPr*, Arm.
13 *C, Malt* A, B, Andrew’s martyrdom in S and H.
14 See *supra*, Chapter 1, pp. 5-6.
15 All texts included in this group are said to collate different sources. The idea is partly due to the fact that the testimonies themselves claim to base their accounts on authoritative materials. Such a statement, however, is likely to be a simple topos, see *infra* this Chapter, pp. 81-84 and notes 69, 75 and 79. According to some scholars (Flamion, Prieur), for instance, *Epitome* collates the ancient *AA* with *AAM*. The same is true of Narratio, which is said to combine two different sources, Pseudo-Dorotheus for Andrew’s peregrinations and *AA* for the events at Patras. Similarly, *Vita* is believed to merge different sources and *Laudatio* is said to depend on *Vita*.
16 For this issue see Blumenthal’s opinion (*Formen*, 40-45). Further, *supra* Chapter 1, p. 23.
1.4. Character of the documents included in Group D (Remaining Texts)\textsuperscript{17}

Group D includes fragmentary portions of text that have traditionally been related to \textit{AA}. Of the four documents listed above, however, only V has parallels in other textual witnesses and can with certainty be attributed to \textit{AA}. PCU 1 has generally been related to \textit{AA}, although its alleged contact with \textit{Epitome} is not absolutely certain. The other two documents are not only very fragmentary and lacunose, but also present unknown stories without parallels in any of the extant witnesses.

1.5. A Hypothetical Archetypon?

Given the great differences between the documents, an objective textual reconstruction of the primitive text on the basis of their testimony is, in our opinion, a chimera in both a literal and a figurative sense: literally, because a text built up from textual remnants so different in character, style and content and coming from wholly diverse environments and historical periods necessarily resembles the artificial combination of limbs of this imaginary being\textsuperscript{18}; figuratively, because a text produced in such a way resists a coherent interpretation of the textual unity as a whole.

The great divergences in our documents represent insurmountable gaps between the pieces of evidence, and thus any attempt to go beyond a hypothetical and general sketch of the primitive \textit{AA} would imply a tendentious interpretation of the extant documents. One might even wonder whether such a textual reconstruction is methodologically possible. As we have seen, affiliation between documents of different groups is not always clear and often impossible to determine. By contrast, the many divergences often force scholars to surmise complicated and purely conjectural combinations again based on a hypothetical relative chronology of the documents\textsuperscript{19}. But if the reconstruction of a relatively certain stemma for documents presenting related texts is not possible, how is one to suggest a hypothetical archetypon for documents that present visibly different texts and sections of texts? Again, in such a case, what kind of textual transmission should be imagined? Is it possible to surmise a textual transmission in the strict sense of the word for \textit{AA} or for parts of it? Textual

\textsuperscript{17} See \textit{supra}, Chapter 1, pp. 6-7.

\textsuperscript{18} For contradictory interpretations of stylistic matters based on the same textual reconstruction, see the opinions of Warren and Zachariades-Holmberg (\textit{supra}, Chapter 1, note 361); for conceptual matters, see Prieur’s interpretation of \textit{AA}’s mentality on the basis of his textual reconstruction of \textit{AA} (\textit{supra}, Chapter 1, pp. 37 and 58). On the Chimera, see J.L. Borges, \textit{The Book of Imaginary Beings}, s. v.

\textsuperscript{19} Thus, for instance, in the case of \textit{Narratio}, which was dated to the ninth century by Flamion and Prieur in order to explain its divergent version of Andrew’s peregrinations as depending on Pseudo-Dorotheus (but, see \textit{infra} this Chapter, pp. 81-82, note 72). As Dvornik has shown, however, it is more plausible that Dorotheus draws on \textit{Narratio} than vice versa. The same is true for the textual relationship between \textit{Laudatio} and \textit{Vita} (see for this issue, \textit{infra} this Chapter, pp. 99-103).
reconstruction is only possible if textual transformations follow the rules of textual transmission. The great diversity of AA’s witnesses, however, seems to indicate that their divergences cannot be explained as due to the contamination of sources resulting from the effects of textual transmission\textsuperscript{20}. Rather, we seem to be dealing with texts that, although inspired by the primitive Acts, freely rewrite their source by selecting, adapting or transforming the primitive account in order to make it fit their literary purposes.

2. Towards a New Classification of AA’s Textual Witnesses

2.1. Reworking as a Common Trait in the Textual Witnesses

That reworking is the main characteristic of all textual witnesses included in groups A, B, and C seems to be a reasonable conclusion from three facts. First, the texts lack any relevant issue that may explain AA’s stigmatisation, ever since Eusebius condemned our text on the grounds of its heretic provenance\textsuperscript{21}. It is obvious that if AA indeed included ‘unorthodox thought’, problematic sections have been eliminated or adapted to the more standardised thinking of the later emerging Church. Second, the textual witnesses are so different from one another that their divergences can only be explained as a result of the process of recasting AA’s story according to their peculiar working procedures and scopes. Third and most important, a comparison between V and those texts that include a version of its contents shows that in all cases they significantly transmit a completely different version.

A comparative analysis of the main textual witnesses that focuses on their textual characteristics reveals interesting results with a view to establishing a better classification of the documents. On the basis of their reworking procedures and literary scope, the texts may be divided into three groups. The first includes the martyrdom texts: Conversante, Epistle, C, Malt A and B, Plen, Mpr, H and S. Although these texts diverge significantly from one another, they agree in presenting Andrew as an impassive, almost passive figure and in minimising his individual initiative in order to let him follow orders from above. The apostle’s characterisation is imparted with the tragic traits of an individual who stoically accepts his task and the fate of Christ’s defenders in an alien environment.

The second group includes texts that are more interested in Andrew’s miraculous activities than in his apostolic figure, namely AAM, PCU 1 and Epitome. As these texts place the emphasis on Andrew’s wonders, the apostle’s character loses personality and

\textsuperscript{20} For the problems generated by ‘contamination’ of the transmission and for possible solutions in rendering the textual relationships between documents, see P. Maas, Textkritik (Leipzig, 1957) 31 and M.L. West, Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique (Leipzig, 1973) 12ff.

\textsuperscript{21} Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 3.25.6.
protagonism. Fantastic elements (more in AAM than in Epitome) as well as descriptions of imaginary and hostile places are now used in order to depict the apostle’s immutable determination when dealing with obstacles to his activities as a representative of God.

The third group, Narratio, Laudatio and Vita, is formed by texts with a biographical undercurrent. These texts seem particularly to concentrate on describing an itinerary, in which the journey itself and the sequence of geographical destinations describe the fulfilment of Andrew’s task as apostle, pushing to the background the narration of his individual deeds. The removal of traits from Andrew’s character and the neglecting of his individual deeds for the sake of the general description of his itinerary facilitates the creation of a universal, exemplary figure more suitable for depicting the ideal personification of piety.

2.2. The Testimony of the Indirect Transmission

The way in which our text is referred to by the indirect transmission is evidence of a similar variety of perceptions of the text. Our first references describe AA with the term prateij, actus, or ‘conspicuous deeds’. Other references use a closely related term, the generic title virtutes Andreae, although in this case the emphasis is not so much on the ‘conspicuous deeds’ as on the apostle himself and his special qualities to perform them. Despite their different emphasis, both descriptions agree in conceiving AA as a collection of conspicuous deeds or wondrous acts. But the text is sometimes also referred to as periodoi Andreou or ‘travels of Andrew’. The relationship with the old literary genre of ‘geographical description’ (periodoi ge periplus), which is documented by the fragments of Hecataeus of Miletus, parts of Herodotus’ History or Avienus’ Ora Maritima, is not exclusively etymological. As we have already seen, some of Andrew’s traditions do indeed narrate the apostle’s life and works, following a strict geographical itinerary that takes him from the Pontus Euxinus to Achaia in Greece. The most successful title, however, is Acta, ‘acts’ or ‘court records’, notes taken during the trials of the martyrs on which some martyrdom texts

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23 The question as to whether or not these texts must be considered as belonging to a ‘praxeis-literature’, as Wikenhauser (Die Apostelgeschichte und ihr Geschichtswert (Münster, 1921) 95-98; 95; 103-4; 106-7) surmised, is difficult to answer on the basis of our exiguous material. As A. Hilhorst, ‘The Apocryphal Acts as Martyrdom Texts: the Case of the Acts of Andrew’, in J. N. Bremmer, The Apocryphal Acts of John (Kampen, 1995) 1-14 at 1 note 1 rightly points out, our evidence is too fragmentary to surmise such a literary genre.

24 Epitome, prol. 5: nam repperi librum de virtutibus Andreae apostoli, etc.

might originally have been based\textsuperscript{26}. Closely related to the latter, we still find the title \textit{marturion}, ‘martyrdom’ or ‘passion’, a literary genre which normally focuses only on the arrest and the death of the martyr.

Despite their apparent diversity this variety of references allows a three-fold division as well. The indirect transmission understands \textit{AA} either as a) a relation of Andrew’s martyrdom; b) a relation of Andrew’s miracles, or, finally, c) a relation of Andrew’s life and activities.

2.3. Classification of Textual Witnesses According to how they Rework \textit{AA}

The striking coincidence between the reworking procedures and scopes of \textit{AA}’s textual witnesses and the interpretations of commentators on our text allows us clearly to distinguish three different conceptions of \textit{AA}:
1. Text conceived and meant to commemorate a saint’s martyrdom\textsuperscript{27}
2. Text intending to offer a collection of a saint’s \textit{admiranda miracula}
3. Text understood as a biography of a saint that offers a comprehensive relation of his life and activity.

These three categories show that we are dealing with texts that, even if inspired by the ancient Acts or even incorporating more or less primitive sections, actually do not intend to transmit the old text but rather to create new ones. Consequently, it seems more reasonable to attempt a classification of the textual witnesses on the basis of their reworking pattern and scope. This classification offers obvious advantages, the most interesting being that it allows us to deal with \textit{AA}’s transmission as an organic whole. Instead of distancing the textual witnesses from one another on the basis of a preconceived idea about the primitive text, it connects our testimonies more closely by paying attention to the particular way in which they transform primitive issues. At the same time, whereas a classification of the texts on the basis of their content would lead the investigator into a dead end, distinguishing reworking groups allows a better understanding of the genesis and development of the different specimens. Finally, by paying attention to the reworking process we can to a certain extent establish which issues are likely to have proceeded from the primitive text and which ones are peculiar to the different reworking versions of \textit{AA}.


\textsuperscript{27} Since such texts were read on the anniversary of the saint’s death, they only included his passion.
On the basis of this threefold discrimination, we now will offer a classification of the textual witnesses according to their character, content and literary scope. This first analysis will reveal that the vast majority of AA’s textual witnesses do not simply transmit the primitive text but actively transform or adapt it to their individual literary scope.

2.3.1. Martyrdom Texts

Martyrdom literature is the most productive genre among the material related to Andrew. All the texts in this group are primarily interested in Andrew’s martyrdom. As the apostle’s passion constitutes their main focus, they can all be considered martyrdom texts, even though a comparative analysis reveals clear differences between them. As the time of composition of these reworkings of the last part of AA oscillates between the fourth/fifth and the ninth century, there is an obvious shift in the literary form adopted by the recensors. Martyrdom texts can, therefore, be divided into three categories.

2.3.1.1. Recastings of Andrew’s Martyrdom

*Conversante* is a very short and summary version of the last section of AA. As Bonnet has already pointed out, it preserves ancient elements. These primitive issues, however, are included in a new textual framework, which develops the antagonism between Aegeates and Andrew. All other characters disappear or are reduced to a minimum. Maximilla and Stratocles are only mentioned by a passing reference. Obviously, this implies that Aegeates’ motivation to imprison and punish Andrew is different from the primitive text. According to *Conversante*’s first chapter, Andrew is accused of destroying the temples of pagan gods and of spreading a new religion.

After this first chapter, *Conversante* 2 picks up the line of AA’s martyrdom and begins with Andrew’s last speech to the brethren, in an abbreviated and transformed version. It is interesting to note that *Conversante* begins exactly at the same point as *Arm*.

*Epistle* is a new re-elaboration of the last section of AA that tries to create a new narrative framework by adducing ocular testimony. As has already been pointed out, *Epistle* survives in its Latin original form ([*LatEp*]), according to Bonnet written in the sixth century, and in two

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29 See Bonnet, ‘Passio sancti Andreae apostoli’, 373; see also *supra* Chapter 1, p. 12 and note 107.
30 *Conversante* 378.3 and 378.7, respectively.
31 For *Conversante*’s recast of this speech, see *infra* this Chapter, pp. 90-91.
32 For the parallelism between *Conversante* and *Arm* and for the plausibility of a common or similar source, see *infra* this Chapter, pp. 90 and 112-13.
33 The search for verismo might also explain 2GrEp’s interpolations in the translation. On this issue, see *supra* Chapter 1, p. 12 note 111. On the provenance of the interpolations, see *infra* this Chapter, pp. 106-09.
Greek recensions (1GrEp and 2GrEp)\(^34\). Epistle consists of two differentiated parts. The first nine chapters present a dialogue between Andrew and Aegeates, of which the only primitive elements are the names of the two interlocutors. From chapter 10 onwards, Epistle presents a short version of AA’s martyrdom. 1GrEp is a simple Greek translation and 2GrEp a contaminated translation from the Latin that, from chapter 10 onwards, interpolates older readings from another source\(^35\).

Similarly to Conversante, Epistle reworks the martyrdom so as to present a story in which the conflict between Aegeates and Andrew receives the main emphasis. The antagonism between them, which is appropriately developed by the dialogue in the first nine chapters, develops smoothly until the end of the text owing to the omission of all secondary issues. All characters in the original story either completely disappear or are mentioned only in passing\(^36\).

2.3.1.2. Short Versions of Andrew’s Martyrdom

**Andrew’s martyrdom in ms Ann Arbor 36** (C). Among the extant Greek and Latin witnesses for the martyrdom, C includes the best and fullest account of the last part of the primitive Acts. In spite of abundant errors due to the textual transmission\(^37\), C frequently offers better versions for many sections that in other textual witnesses are corrupted, and occasionally a unique Greek testimony for sections that are only preserved by Arm. At the same time, a comparative analysis with the extant witnesses for the martyrdom shows that its working procedure mainly consists of reducing the text. Consequently, C might preserve a fairly reliable but very summary version of the main outline of AA’s last section.

C’s version of AA’s martyrdom begins immediately after Andrew’s last speech in prison and consequently relies on a shorter recension. In contrast to the preceding examples of the martyrdom, C does not radically alter the tenor of the text and it preserves all the characters that we know from other textual witnesses.

**Martyrium alterum A** and **B**. These testimonies not only present a rather abbreviated and poor version of the last section of Andrew’s martyrdom, but also introduce an important distortion of the personae and of Andrew’s message. Mali B is clearly the most summary of

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\(^{34}\) Bonnet, ‘La Passion d’André’, 459 ; Flamion, L’Apôtre, 40ff.

\(^{35}\) Bonnet identified these interpolations and properly highlighted them in his edition (AAA II/1, 1-37). As we will see below, a proper comparison of the interpolations with Laudatio, Narratio, Conversante, S and H allows the conclusion that the source from which 2GrEp contaminates its translation belongs to the same family of these testimonies. But see infra this Chapter, p. 107 and note 151.

\(^{36}\) Maximilla is completely ignored by most mss of LatEp and is mentioned only by three of them (M, Nau and R), see Bonnet, AAA II/1, *app. ad* 34.1-2 and *ad* 35.1-3 (for mss X and U). Stratocles is mentioned only once by most mss and a second time by a few others. See Bonnet, *app. ad* 35.1-3.
both versions. Malt A’s reductions mainly affect discursive sections and it generally preserves narrative sections, whereas Malt B eliminates discourses and simplifies the action by summarising narrative sections as well.

Malt A and B not only preserve a short version of the martyrdom that begins after Andrew’s last speech in prison, but also considerably abbreviate the retained section. Hence, despite Flamion and Prieur, we think that Bonnet was right when he argued the exiguous value of these documents.

Coptic Martyrdom in P. Ien. 649. This textual witness is extremely short and only consists of several corrupted and lacunose lines. Even though very little extra information can be deduced from these scanty remnants, the evidence provided by PIen is enough to prove the circulation of a short version of the martyrdom in Coptic as early as in the fifth century. The text preserves the beginning of the martyrdom as it appears in the short versions of the Greek transmission. Codicological evidence, moreover, shows that the preserved section is in fact the original beginning of the text.

Armenian Passion. The Armenian translation presents an interesting version of the martyrdom. When compared with the extant Greek and Latin witnesses, Arm seems not to reduce the body of the text, but this impression cannot be definitively confirmed because we lack a reliable version of the martyrdom with which to compare those sections only attested by Arm. In any case, when Arm can be tested against parallels in the Greek transmission, it becomes obvious that the Armenian translator considerably transforms the tenor of the text, either as a result of his translating technique or of his doctrinal views.

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38 Flamion, L’Apôtre, 56-57.
40 Bonnet, AAA II/1, p. XVI: ‘Alterum martyrium erunt qui mirentur quod ediderim, tam misere id corruptum est (nam ne duo quidem codices manu scripti coniugi potuerunt: separatim posui) tamque paucula noua in eo insunt, nam eadem fere leguntur vel in Martyrio a me a. 1895 edito quam Narrationem dicere debui, non Martyrium, et abhinc dicam, c. 22 et q. s. ad 38 (=Anal.Boll. XIII p. 365, 7-372, 29), vel infra 23, 28—36, 11. ac sane diu multumque dubitaui’.
41 On the basis of codicological and palaeographical evidence, Richter, ‘Splitter’, 275 and 279, respectively, dates the Coptic fragment to the fourth or fifth century. We prefer the later dating, since the production of martyrdom texts to suit liturgical needs developed in this period in particular owing to the fact that the Council of Carthage (397) officially allowed the reading of the passions. See infra this Chapter, p. 126 and note 194.
42 On the issue, see supra Chapter 1, § B.3, p. 4; see also supra p. 43.
43 Calzolari (‘Rapporto’, 149-55 and ‘Version arménienne’, 171-75) has attempted to analyse some of these sections by means of a comparative study on the basis of structural and lexical parallelisms. See supra Chapter 1, pp. 47-49.
Arm presents a longer version of the martyrdom which includes Andrew’s last speech in prison. It begins exactly at the same point as Conversante, which seems to imply that there was a longer recension of the martyrdom that began at this point.\footnote{See supra this Chapter, p. 74. Furthermore, infra this Chapter 112-13.} 

2.3.1.3. Narrative Versions of the Martyrdom

**Martyrium Prius.** Unlike the other versions of the martyrdom, Mpr clearly has narrative intentions. The climax of the text is still Andrew’s martyrdom, but Mpr presents it as the last episode of a coherent textual whole that gradually develops to its natural end. Its compact and economic structure focuses mainly on the essential motifs that will lead the apostle to the cross, presenting him as an ideal apostolic figure. Andrew’s complete success in converting Governor Lesbios and the destruction of the pagan temples by the people of Patras provoke the governor being replaced by Aegeates. A dream announces his approaching end to Andrew. Aegeates, furious because of the temple’s destruction, arrests the apostle and finally condemns him to be crucified.

The narration begins with Andrew’s first arrival in Patras and describes a series of events before the apostle’s encounter with Aegeates that we know from other sources. The text presents a clear plan and intention. Mpr consistently reworks its source in order to reach three main goals. First, it reduces the characters to mere personifications, which considerably reduces their role in the action.\footnote{For example, Lesbios becomes the pagan ignorant of the Christian God who, as soon as he is given the opportunity, converts to Christianity; Aegeates is depicted as the guard of pagan values who angrily reacts to the transgression of the civic order; Andrew, finally, represents the messenger of a new religion.} Second, Mpr eliminates every ambiguous detail from the original story. The disappearance of Maximilla (her name is not even mentioned) eliminates Aegeates’ personal interest in condemning the apostle. Andrew’s dream, moreover, presents his final martyrdom as an episode in God’s plan. At the same time there is a clear shift in the motivation of Andrew’s imprisonment and final punishment.\footnote{It is interesting to note that these are no longer a consequence of his activity as a messenger of the Christian faith. Rather, it is a subversive action by the people of Patras that seems to provoke it (Mpr 51.1-7). At the same time, an interesting speech (Mpr 52.5-23) by the apostle advising the people of Patras to calm down and let him fulfil his destiny rules out the possibility of seeing Andrew as a subversive element.} Third, this recension effectively eliminates all secondary details presenting the text as a gradual crescendo that reaches its climax in the speech to the cross.

**Andrew’s martyrdom in S and H.** The interest in narrative motifs, character description, excursus and trivial details, especially in the narration of the events preceding Andrew’s imprisonment, points to the peculiar character of this longer version, which was probably intended for different purposes than the shorter versions of the martyrdom. Given the marked
narrative sequence of the text, which appears as an independent textual unit provided with a kind of introduction, core and denouement, it may well have been intended for reading and not for being read in public. Similarly as in the previous case, however, the martyrdom remains its climactic moment and consequently the main goal of the text.

The text begins with Stratocles’ return from Italy and narrates the events between this point and Andrew’s martyrdom\textsuperscript{48}. It also includes the healing of Alcmanes and Stratocles’ conversion, Aegeates’ return to Patras, Maximilla’s rejection of his sexual advances and her stratagem to let Euclia substitute for her in Aegeates’ bed\textsuperscript{49}. Aegeates finally imprisons the apostle and orders him to be crucified.

These two mss present a lengthy version of the martyrdom beginning with Stratocles’ return from Rome. In spite of important divergences between S/H and \textit{Epitome}, they apply a similar procedure in abridging \textit{AA} – they only preserve a relation of events that systematically eliminates every discursive section. In addition, the martyrdom’s recensor is as clumsy as Gregory in reworking his source. The first chapters of S and H show that he initially tried to keep some discursive sections by revising and adapting their contents. Given the unsuccessful result\textsuperscript{50}, it is not surprising to see him definitively opting for the scissors to work on the prison scenes. This procedure is obvious when comparing the sections overlapping with V – S and H simply eliminate entire discursive sections and just keep the essential elements to ensure textual continuity.

2.3.2. Selective Collections of \textit{admiranda miracula}

As some references in the indirect transmission already show, from the fourth/fifth century onwards there appears to be a clearly increasing interest in the conspicuous deeds of the apostle. Of our textual witnesses, three documents seem to fit this textual category.

\textit{AAM}. The story of Andrew in the city of cannibals is good example of the category that focuses on the miraculous activities of the apostle. \textit{AAM} begins with the casting of lots and with Matthias’ departure to his field of activity. On his arrival in the city of cannibals Matthias is imprisoned, but his sacrifice is delayed for 30 days. Jesus appears to Andrew and compels him to go to rescue Matthias, which he does after a miraculous trip in a ship piloted by Jesus in disguise. As Andrew frees not only Matthias but also his fellow prisoners, the

\textsuperscript{48} For Stratocles’ return from Athens according to other textual witnesses see \textit{infra} this Chapter, note 135.

\textsuperscript{49} On the motif (for which Heliodorus 1.11; 15-17, presents a variant), see S. Thompson, \textit{Motif-Index of Folk-Literature}, vol. 4, under K 1223.3, ‘Wife (mistress) substitutes for mistress (wife)’.

\textsuperscript{50} See, for example, the accumulation of absolute genitives in \textit{AAgr} 10, a chapter that bridges two discursive sections. The same issue appears in \textit{AAgr} 13.1-5. See also the lack of conceptual continuity between Andrew’s words in \textit{AAgr} 11 and 12.
cannibals, confronted with a lack of victims, resort to their own people to meet their sacrificial needs. Andrew’s intervention once again frustrates their plan, but he is finally imprisoned and murdered by the cannibals. After being revived by Jesus, Andrew compels a statue to spew a flood from its mouth. The flood kills many of the inhabitants until Andrew, convinced by the repentance of the survivors, orders the waters to retreat. An abyss swallows the waters and the executioners. Andrew then reanimates the dead people and cattle and leaves the city after promising the cannibals that in due time he will return to rescue those who remain in the abyss.

The question as to whether or not AAM belongs to the primitive text is still a matter of dispute among scholars. The two latest textual reconstructions, by Prieur and MacDonald, exclude and include it, respectively. Against its exclusion by the former, it is possible to adduce both the abundant literature and arguments collected by MacDonald51 and the fact that many of AA’s textual witnesses include a version of the story. Against its inclusion, Flamion provided evidence to date AAM to a later period, namely to the end of the fourth century52, and more recently Hilhorst and Lalleman claimed that a stylistic comparison between AAM and AA shows that they are completely different texts53. However, even though admitting the profound stylistic differences between these texts, nothing hinders the hypothesis that the primitive AA included the basic version of the story in a simpler and shorter form as one of its numerous episodes. This episode might have served as the inspiration for the writer of AAM.

Papyrus Copt. Utrecht 1. The very damaged and lacunous Coptic fragment narrates Andrew’s confrontation with four soldiers, who seem to be searching for the apostle’s followers54. One of these soldiers, a very young man, is suddenly possessed by a demon that casts him to the ground. Andrew intervenes and converses with the demon. The latter explains to Andrew how and why he, against his will, came to inhabit the soldier, although a lacuna deprives the reader of knowing exactly how this happened. Andrew finally compels him to leave the young man and the demon obeys. Finally, the young man takes off his soldier’s uniform and converts to Christianity.

Although the beginning of the text is missing and it is not possible to ascertain the precise context surrounding this episode, it seems obvious that the contacts with Epitome 18 are exiguous55. In the strict sense of the word, the only link between both passages seems to be

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51 MacDonald, Cannibals, 6-47.
52 Flamion, L’Apôtre, 269-300.
54 PCU 1 9.1-6.
55 For the alleged contacts between these two sections see supra Chapter 1, pp. 24-26.
the similarity between Varianus (PCU 1) and Virinus (Epitome)\textsuperscript{56}. In spite of its lost beginning, it can reasonably be assumed that the Coptic fragment only included this single episode. As already noted, this seems to be the logical conclusion from the title at the end of the text (ΤΕΠΡΑΔ[Γ] ἝΝΗΛΕΠΕΔ[Γ])\textsuperscript{57}. In addition, the Coptic pagination shows that this excerpt was the first text of the ms and that the four lost papyrus folios can only have included the beginning and the mise-en-scène of the episode\textsuperscript{58}.

**Gregory’s Epitome.** As Hennecke has already pointed out\textsuperscript{59}, Epitome mainly preserves a collection of *admiranda miracula*. Epitome does indeed narrate Andrew’s miraculous activities in different stations in a journey that takes him first from Achaia to the city of cannibals and then to Amaseia, Sinope, Nicea, Nicomedia, Byzantium and Thrace. From the latter place he finally arrives in Greece and after a number of stations he reaches Patras, where he is crucified by Aegeates.

*Epitome* is an abridged version of *AA* that only preserves Andrew’s miraculous activities. Even though Flamion scholars tend to assume that Gregory only eliminated *AA*’s ‘excessive verbosity’, as already pointed out, the last words of his prologue seem to suggest that something more than the elimination of verbosity was the objective of his revision\textsuperscript{60}. A comparison of *Epitome* with other versions of the events in Patras (the only section for which we possess reliable witnesses) shows to what extent Gregory has transformed *AA*. *Epitome* systematically eliminates all discursive sections and only preserves the narrative skeleton\textsuperscript{61}. The martyrdom is reduced to a minimum, to be precise to 8 lines\textsuperscript{62}. The reason Gregory adduces for omitting the passion is that he knew a version thereof that was very well written. It has been suggested that this passion is *Conversante*\textsuperscript{63}, but two important differences seem to

\textsuperscript{56} To the textual divergences summed up by Van Kampen (see *supra* Chapter 1, notes 215 and 222), add the following: 1. In *Epitome* the soldiers come into a house, which seems to have more than one floor, to arrest Andrew (*Epitome* 18.9; 16). In PCU 1, however, Andrew seems to be outside, for he is said to go to the middle of the street (PCU 19.4-5). 2. According to *Epitome* soldiers and cavalry come to arrest Andrew (*Epitome* 18.6-7). By contrast, in PCU 1 the four soldiers seem to intend to arrest his followers and not Andrew himself (PCU 1 9.1-5). 3. Whereas *Epitome* repeatedly describes the possessed person as a soldier (*Epitome* 18.23; 29; 44), PCU 1 always refers to a ‘very young man’ (PCU 1 9.8; 11; 16; 21). 4. The words ‘Quid mihi et tibi ...etc.’ in *Epitome* (18.24ff) are pronounced by the demon, as his fear of being exorcised clearly shows (ibid. 18.24-26). In PCU 1, however, it is the soldier who protests (PCU 1, 9.13-15; 16) and it is his complaint that seems to induce the demon to cast down the young man (ibid. 9.16-18).

\textsuperscript{57} On the issue, see Quispel *supra* Chapter 1, p. 24 and note 214.


\textsuperscript{59} See *supra* Chapter 1, note 128.

\textsuperscript{60} For Gregory’s words, see *supra* Chapter 1, 258. Furthermore Lipsius, *Apostelgeschichten* I, 563; Quispel, ‘Unknown Fragment’, 137f; Hornschuh, ‘Andreasakten’, 276 note 5; Erbetta, *Apocriph* II, 398.

\textsuperscript{61} See *supra* Chapter 1, p. 41 for Van Kampen’s calculations regarding percentages of direct speech in *Epitome* and other versions (Chapter 1, note 339) and the reduction ratio of Gregory’s abridgement (Chapter 1, note 337).

\textsuperscript{62} *Epitome* 34.4-11.

\textsuperscript{63} Flamion, *L’Apôtre*, 54; Prieur, *Acta*, 650 and note 37.2 to *Epitome*. 
disprove such an assumption. First, according to Epitome, Andrew hangs on the cross for three days and dies on the third day, whereas according to Conversante he hangs for two days. As we will see below, in spite of its apparent triviality this issue is significant for establishing different textual families among the textual witnesses. Secondly, according to Epitome, the name of the proconsul is Egeas, whereas Conversante calls him Aegeates. Another possibility evaluated by Lipsius is that Gregory was referring to Epistle, but such a relationship presents the same problems as the previous one.

2.3.3. Comprehensive Accounts of Andrew’s life and works

After a reference to the apostle’s field of activity, all versions in this group include an account of his travels and deeds that incorporates Andrew’s visit to the city of cannibals. They all conclude their narration with a version of the martyrdom of the apostle.

Narratio is the oldest of the comprehensive relations of Andrew’s activities. Its anonymous author refers to the use of local traditions and other written sources, as Laudatio and Vita also do. Narratio begins with an account on the apostle that relies on the NT tradition. From chapter 4 onwards, however, Narratio relates Andrew’s travels, which begin in Bithynia and, after the episodes of Nicaea and Andrew’s rescue of Matthias from the cannibals, take him to his last destination in Patras. Despite the sporadic contacts with the extant witnesses (Nicaeas, city of cannibals and Patras) for Andrew’s peregrinations, Narratio’s account differs from that of Epitome, Laudatio and Vita. It has been suggested that Narratio’s itinerary depends on Pseudo-Epiphanius with which it coincides in the main outline, although it eliminates a couple of stations of Andrew’s travels, such as the city of the Sogdians and that of the Gorsinians.

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64 Conversante 377.1, biduo enim suspensus.
65 See infra this Chapter, p. 101 note 136 and p. 113 under a.
66 For the origin of the corruption of Aegeates’ name see Schermann, Apostellegenden, 251.
67 Lipsius, Apostelgeschichten I, 162.
68 LatEp 29.2, iam secunda die in cruce positus; 1GrEp 29.6-7.
69 Narratio 356.8 and 356.24-25; 357.1, respectively.
70 See Bonnet, app. ad Narratio 1-3.
71 Dvornik, Apostolicity, 175
72 Prieur (Acta, 17-18), following Flamion (L’Apôtre, 62-69), suggests that Narratio depends on Pseudo-Dorotheus, but Dvornik (Apostolicity, 179-80) has convincingly shown that it is probably the other way around. On the one hand, Narratio seems to be written in the eighth century and Pseudo-Dorotheus cannot be earlier than the ninth century. Narratio refers to Macedonia, Thessaly and Achaia as the ‘western parts’, which implies that the text was written when the province of Illyricum belonged to the patriarchate of Rome. As this situation changed after Leo III (either in 733 or in 757) and the province passed to the patriarchate of Constantinople, Narratio must have been written before 733, or 757, or at the latest very soon after this date, when the new situation had not yet been fully accepted. Besides, Pseudo-Dorotheus is neither known to Theophanes’ Chronography (810-815) nor to the Vita by Epiphanius. Hence it should be dated, at the earlist, to the second quarter of the ninth century. On the other hand, the itinerary of Andrew’s travels in Narratio follows a more
It is *Narratio*’s account of the events at Patras, however, that allows an assessment of the writer’s intentions and working procedures. *Narratio* presents a highly revised version of *AA* that not only eliminates numerous substantial parts, but also reworks many others. From its chapter 13 onwards, we can compare *Narratio*’s version of *AA* to that of other testimonies such as S, H and V. A comparison of *Narratio*’s version of Andrew’s martyrdom with S/H shows that, although they follow different working procedures – S/H tends to summarise, *Narratio* reworks – the two documents are closely related. In general, *Narratio*’s testimony is longer and more complete than that of S/H. On the other hand, the comparison between *Narratio* and V throws light on the way in which *Narratio*’s writer reworks *AA*’s discursive sections. Although it does not wholly eliminate Andrew’s speeches, the sections that remain are re-elaborated to such an extent that the tenor of the primitive text is completely transformed.

Regarding Andrew’s martyrdom, *Narratio* presents a rather long version with enough parallels to most extant witnesses for the martyrdom. Especially interesting are its contacts with interpolations in 2GrEp, because they show that *Narratio* is based on a similar version of the last part of *AA*.

*Laudatio* also presents a comprehensive relation of Andrew’s life and activities that begins with the account of his travels and ends with his martyrdom in Patras. Similarly to *Narratio* and *Vita*, it pretends to base its account on local traditions and written sources. Although its first 31 chapters offer a version of Andrew’s travels that differs from that of *Epitome* and *Narratio* (witnesses with which it has only sporadic contacts), and is only supported by *Vita*, from chapter 32 on numerous textual witnesses provide enough support to suggest its use of authoritative sources.

*Laudatio*’s version of the events at Patras begins with Andrew’s arrival in this city and includes the apostle’s sojourn with Sosios, the Lesbios episode, Maximilla’s healing and the series of healings following it. *Laudatio* also includes Stratocles’ return to Patras and Alcmanes’ healing and a very abridged version of Andrew’s imprisonment and discourses.

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73 For *Narratio*’s chapter 12 and its alleged relationship with V, see infra this Chapter, note 98.
74 Compare for example *Narratio* 362.10-12 with V 39.31-40.4 and *Narratio* 364.19.25 with V 44.4-8.
75 *Laudatio* 324.8; 341.30-342.2.
76 According to *Laudatio* (342.7), *Epitome* (34.2) and S (f. 121v, 2/3) and H (f. 155v, 16), Stratocles returns from Italy, but *Vita* (248B) and *VitaEsc* (f. 243v, 2/7) have him returning from Athens.
while in prison. Regarding the martyrdom, Laudatio offers a short version thereof that does not begin until Andrew’s speech to the cross.

A comparative study of those passages in Laudatio with parallels in other textual witnesses shows the working procedure and scope of its writer. Its style is mainly narrative, to such an extent that Andrew’s discourses are almost totally absent. This text is very abridged, but despite this it does not eliminate secondary events or characters but simply reduces them to a minimum. As Lipsius has already pointed out, the encomiast was especially interested in giving an accurate relation of Andrew’s works, mainly his miracles. However, his scope is different from that of Epitome. Andrew’s works are presented as an outline of his apostolic career which has an obvious biographical intention and which includes the beginnings of his activities and finally his death after having accomplished his task.

Vita Andreae by Epiphanius. The Vita Andreae by Epiphanius, according to his own statement, aimed to fill the lack of a comprehensive relation of Andrew’s life. In doing so, he pretends to combine his personal investigation in places visited by Andrew with consultation of local traditions, different documents presenting portions of the apostle’s activity, and indirect notices proceeding from several authorities. As we have already seen that both Narratio and Laudatio include similar statements, it is plausible that such a claim is a simple topos.

The value of this testimony is uneven. Its version of Andrew’s peregrinations runs parallel with that of Laudatio, but the latter in general preserves a better testimony than the former, which shows a clear tendency to amplification. After Andrew’s arrival in Patras, Vita’s testimony is clearly inferior because it eliminates important issues, such as the Lesbios episode, and transforms its source to a greater extent than Laudatio. The comparison of Vita’s version with that of V clearly shows that Vita’s reworking is certainly different and clumsier than that of Laudatio. Due to the more extensive cutting of its source, Vita creates some absurd situations, such as Aegeates’ conversation with his wife in 249 A-C. In this passage Aegeates intends to convince Maximilla to resume sleeping with him and threatens her by saying he will have the apostle crucified. However, although according to the other

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77 Laudatio 344.22-345.13.
78 Lipsius, Apostelgeschichten I, 571 note 1.
79 Clement of Rome, Evagrius of Sicily, and Epiphanius of Cyprus. However, Lipsius (Apostelgeschichten I, 575) already suggested that Epiphanius may just have intended to give the impression of erudition.
80 Thus, for example, its account of Stratocles, see Vita 248 B-C.
81 For the textual relationship between Laudatio and Vita see infra this Chapter, pp. 100-105.
textual witnesses Aegeates has indeed already imprisoned the apostle, in Vita’s version this is not the case\textsuperscript{82} – Aegeates imprisons the apostle only after Maximilla refuses his advances\textsuperscript{83}.

Vita’s version of the martyrdom is more problematic. Ms Vat. gr. 824 lacks its original end, which has been substituted for Narratio’s account of the martyrdom. Vita\textit{Paris} has a very brief conclusion and Vita\textit{Esc}, in its turn, presents a very abridged version that only preserves a few echoes of original elements in order to ensure textual continuity and to reach the end of the text as quickly as possible. This summary version of the martyrdom in Vita\textit{Esc} only mentions an open speech to the brethren, Stratocles’ attempt to release the apostle on the second day of Andrew’s crucifixion, the people’s reaction on the third day, and Aegeates’ fear and intention to free Andrew\textsuperscript{84}. The text closes with a reference to the destiny of the main characters, namely Aegeates, Maximilla and Andrew.

2.4. AA’s Fragment in V and Its Relationship with the Other Textual Witnesses

There is, however, one single document that cannot be classified in any of the previous textual categories. We are referring to AA’s fragment in V. In contrast to the majority of textual witnesses, all of them provided with a beginning and an end, V is fragmentary. As a result, it is impossible to ascertain either its original length or what sort of text it was\textsuperscript{85}. Due to this circumstance there is no external evidence, such as title or colophon by the copyist, that might give us a clue as to how the text was considered along the textual transmission. As regards the internal evidence, such as textual framework, literary character and intention of the text, the situation is no better. Due to its fragmentary character, the text mainly consists of speeches and we do not know how much text preceded or followed them.

The events narrated by AA’s fragment in V are not new. Many textual witnesses include versions of this section that preserve the basic line of the action. Andrew is in prison and his followers frequently go to him in order to listen to his preaching. Aegeates attempts to regain his wife but she refuses. Finally, the proconsul decides to crucify the apostle. The most important aspect of this document, however, is that it preserves four lengthy speeches by the apostle Andrew during his imprisonment and one by Aegeates to his wife. Only the latter has been entirely preserved in other textual witnesses. Of Andrew’s speeches, one of them is

\textsuperscript{82} Vita 249 A1-6; Vita\textit{Esc} f. 244\textsuperscript{°}, col. 1.
\textsuperscript{83} Vita 249 A 6-7.
\textsuperscript{84} Vita\textit{Esc}, f. 245\textsuperscript{°}, col. 2
\textsuperscript{85} See, however, infra, Chapter 3, § 1, pp. 131-38.
otherwise completely lost\(^\text{86}\) and the extant witnesses preserve only vague echoes of the other three\(^\text{87}\).

2.4.1. *AA*’s Fragment in *V* as a Touchstone for the Study of the Reworking Process of *AA*

The neglect of the three clear reworking groups, analysed in section 2.3, in the research into *AA* has frequently resulted in an unsystematic approach to the textual witnesses. The large number of testimonies and the arbitrary evaluation of single documents seem to provide a context in which almost every interpretation apparently finds proper support, as the strikingly different results of the research on *AA* clearly show. By contrast, the threefold discrimination of interpretative groups furnishes us with a more suitable frame for sorting and organising the material and for understanding the stages in the transformation process that explains *AA*’s textual diversification.

However, the analysis of the transformation process would not be possible without a testimony to provide a point of reference in the analysis. *V* will serve this purpose. Ever since its discovery and publication, there has been wide consensus among scholars in considering *AA*’s fragment in *V* as the text closest to, or even a genuine fragment of, the primitive Acts\(^\text{88}\). Yet this is not the main reason that motivates the central place that *V* occupies in our inquiry. The most important argument to support it is that *V* preserves a section of *AA* that has also been preserved in six other important textual witnesses (*Narratio*, *S* and *H*, *Laudatio*, *Vita*, *Conversante*, *Arm*). In addition, a preliminary comparison of all the versions seems to allow the conclusion that *V*’s version preserves a fuller account than the remaining extant witnesses. If our further inquiry confirms this preliminary impression, *AA*’s fragment in *V* may be of help in determining both the specific reworking patterns of the documents and in establishing their mutual relationships.

Even though *V* appears to occupy a unique position among what Hennecke calls the ‘Wirrsal späterer katholischer Bearbeitungen’ of *AA*\(^\text{89}\) and its essential importance is generally

\(^{86}\) For its alleged preservation in *Narratio* 12, see *supra* this Chapter, note 73.

\(^{87}\) To the parallels *V*\(^b\) 38.2-39.26 and *Narratio* 359.24; *V*\(^b\) 39.27-40.22, *Narratio* 362.2 and *Laudatio* 345.3; *V*\(^b\) 41.8-35 and *Narratio* 362.23; *V*\(^b\) 41.15-18 and *Laudatio* 345.7; *V*\(^b\) 42.7-44.3 and *Narratio* 363.5; *V*\(^b\) 44.4-16 and *Conversante* 374.23; *V*\(^b\) 44.17-45.11, *Narratio* 364.28 and *Conversante* 374.23, pointed out by Bonnet (*AAA* II/1, p. XVIII) add *S/H* 432-554 (highly abbreviated version of *V*) and *Arm* 1-6 for the section *V*\(^b\) 44.4-45.33.


\(^{89}\) Hennecke, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen*, 249.
recognised\(^90\), the ultimate implications and conclusions resulting from a systematic comparison of it with the other extant documents have never (or only partially) been drawn.

This is what we shall therefore attempt in the following pages. Taking the textual comparison of V with the witnesses that present a version of its content as a starting point, we shall proceed to analyse the textual evidence. This choice, however, necessarily implies a restriction: we will limit our investigation to the section of AA beginning with Andrew’s arrival in Patras, and thus will leave aside AAM and parallels. This restriction is not due to a preconceived idea about the content of the primitive text but rather to the inherent limitations imposed by the reliable material. On the one hand, only for this section do we possess enough witnesses to establish consistent intertextual relationships. On the other, V, preserving as it does a section of text that has parallels in the most important textual representatives of this section, offers a suitable touchstone to prove the reliability of the extant witnesses and to understand their reworking patterns.

3. Comparative Textual Analysis of AA’s Versions

Having established a new classification of the documents on the basis of their reworking patterns, we will now attempt to determine their mutual relationships by analysing their convergences and divergences. It is obvious that, given the diversity of the textual witnesses, there is no place for a stemmatical study in the strictest sense in the context of AA’s transmission\(^91\). Our materials are too varied to allow their inclusion in a stemma exclusively based on their textual agreements and divergences. If we are to make progress in synthesising the dispersed materials and reducing them to a coherent whole, we have to renounce, initially, the method of establishing relationships between documents on the basis of errores significativi (‘Leitfehler’) of a purely textual sort. A comparison of readings peculiar to different groups of documents in a premature phase might easily overshadow more important typological relationships. Apparent textual similarities or divergences, when taken out of their proper context, might easily lead to dead ends, frustrating a proper analysis of the textual transmission and falsifying the genesis of the single documents.

Given the character of AA’s transmission, we must take separative errors (errores separativi) and conjunctive errors (errores coniunctivi) sui generis: the inclusions and omissions of the documents\(^92\). This is the only way to achieve a reliable selection of the

\(^90\) See supra Chapter 1, § 2, passim.
\(^91\) Cf. supra this Chapter, note 40, for Bonnet’s comment on the character of Malt A and B.
\(^92\) See Maas, Textkritik, 27-31.
material in order to establish families of texts that, in a later phase, can be more precisely defined or redefined on the basis of philological means. This approach will allow us to classify and group together texts that present similarities in dealing with the primitive text.

Despite its complexity, we consider the analysis of AA’s transmission absolutely necessary for four reasons. Firstly, it is only on the basis of a serious and detailed study of the single documents that one can understand the historical development of AA’s transmission and properly evaluate the significance of the textual witnesses. Secondly, the evaluation of the textual witnesses and the intertextual relationships alleged by scholars are often influenced by preconceptions about the primitive text. This means that documents have been allocated more or less importance or are said to depend on this or that document according to the place they occupy in a given hypothesis. Thirdly, in modern scholarly literature it is a common phenomenon to find the repetition of outdated opinions concerning intertextual relationships between the textual witnesses. Even if at the time these might have been plausible as an explanation of the available documents, the discovery and edition of new documents in the last years necessitates their revision. Fourthly, as already suggested, it is the arbitrary choice of a textual basis that explains the irreconcilable interpretations of scholarly literature concerning AA’s character and thought.

3.1. Hypothetical Genealogy and Relative Chronology of AA’s Transmission

Eusebius and Philaster, at the beginning and end of the fourth century respectively, give us a terminus post and a terminus ante to enclose a historical period in which AA’s circulation in a complete form can be relatively ascertained. Eusebius’ categorical rejection may speak about the unaltered character of the text he knew. Philaster’s mention in turn seems to support the hypothesis that a Latin version of AA was already circulating in his time. This version was very probably complete as well, since Pontus and Greece are referred to as the beginning and

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93 See supra Chapter 1, § 3.3, pp. 61-65.
94 An obvious example of this is the evaluation of the textual relationship between Laudatio and Vita. There is a clear interest in letting Laudatio depend on Vita. Obviously the hypothesis of collation of different sources to explain the appearance of AAM at the beginning of AA is better defensible if one surmises a single text (Vita) that collates and then derive from it all other texts presenting the same plan. Even if a common source might be an easier solution, it would imply a source no older than eighth century that already included both traditions. For Flamion’s (L’Apôtre, 206-12) apriorism in analysing the textual relationships between Laudatio and Vita, cf. infra this Chapter, pp. 99-103 and notes 119-128.
95 This is obvious, for example, for Narratio and for Laudatio. Both documents must be re-evaluated after Detorakis’ publication of H and S. The same is true for the provenance of 2GrEp’s interpolations, which are normally said to proceed from the primitive Acts. Thanks to the testimony of C discovered by Prieur, however, it is clear that the interpolations in 2GrEp proceed from a document that had also been revised (see infra this Chapter, 106-09). The same might be said of the alleged dependence of Conversante on Epistle. A comparison of the former with Arm shows that this hypothesis is no longer tenable.
96 See infra this Chapter, p. 126 and note 195; see also Bremmer’s suggestion concerning a Latin translation circulating in the second half of the fourth century, infra this Chapter, p. 125 and note 187.
end of Andrew’s activities and Philaster mentions AA’s textual dichotomy. It is from this
text circulating in the fourth century that we, ex hypothesi, develop two branches in the
transmission: Transformative and Non-Transformative.

3.1.1. Separative Evidence Supporting the Existence of a Non-Transformative Branch

Separative issues supporting the hypothesis of a split in the transmission proceed from a
systematic textual comparison of V with those documents that present a version of its
contents. These are the following: Narratio 13-21; S (ff. 128v-129r) and H (ff. 163v-165v);
Conversante 2; Laudatio 44; Vita 249A2-B and Arm 1-6.

A. Separative Issues in Narratio 13-21

The section Narratio 13-21 overlaps with V. Narratio’s version of this text omits numerous
primitive elements and profoundly reworks many others. The reworked sections consist either
of amplifications introduced in the primitive text or of simple transformations thereof.

A.1. Omissions in Narratio

- Vb 38.2-20, completely omitted, compare Narratio 360.15.
- Vb 40.10-41.14, completely omitted, compare Narratio 362.16-23.
- Vb 41.36-42.7, completely omitted, compare Narratio 363.5.
- Vb 42.9-31, completely omitted, compare Narratio 363.9-10.
- Vb 44.10-44.14, omitted, compare Narratio 364.25.
- Vb 44.35-45.33, completely omitted, compare Narratio 365.6-7.

A.2. Amplifications in Narratio

- Narratio 359.24-360.15. New composition based on materials proceeding from other
  sections. Compare Narratio 359.24-360.7 to S (f. 123v, 2/11-124f, 1/7) and H (f. 157f, 35-
  157v, 20) and Narratio 360.7-360.11 to Vb 40.6-8.
- Narratio 360.29-361.2, compare Vb 39.7.
- Narratio 362.16-18, compare Vb 40.7.
- Narratio 362.29-363.4, compare Vb 41.15-18.
- Narratio 363.5-8, is an amplification with a narrative

97 See infra this Chapter, pp. 126-27.
98 For the evidence allowing the assumption of such a split in the transmission, see infra this Chapter, § 3.1.1, pp.
99 For possible reasons that may explain it, see infra this Chapter, § 4, pp. 121-28.
100 Bonnet, Narratio, 360.16-365.6. Since Hennecke, Handbuch, 551, scholars tend to believe that Narratio 12
101 Bonnet, Conversante, 374-75.
102 Bonnet, Laudatio, 344.23-345.13.
103 Dressel, Vita Andreae, VitaEsc, ff. 244f col. 2—244v col. 2, and VitaParis ff. 18v, col. 1-19f col. 1.
A.3. Reworking Sections in Narratio

- **Narratio** 360.16-27, compare Vb 38.21-39.4.
- **Narratio** 360.28-361.10, compare Vb 39.5-11.
- **Narratio** 362.4-16, compare Vb 39.27-40.6.
- **Narratio** 362.18-23, compare Vb 40.7-10.
- **Narratio** 362.22-30, alters the sequence of Vb 41.15-27. **Narratio** 362.23-28 picks up and amplifies Vb 41.19-27; **Narratio** 362.28-30 picks up and amplifies Vb 41.14-18.
- **Narratio** 363.8-14, om es a ne s h e... t e ... k a r d i n. This section presents an obvious re-elaboration of the passage Vb 42.32-43.3 which includes two lines of the original beginning of Andrew’s speech (Vb 42.8-9) and which expands the closing section (Narratio 363.12-14).
- **Narratio** 363.15-23 is a re-elaboration of the passage Vb 43.4-18 in order to bring the text into line with the mustard-seed parable.
- **Narratio** 363.23-364.2, recast of Vb 43.19-25, with minor changes, that in general preserves the tone of the primitive text.
- **Narratio** 364.3-13, slightly amplifying version of Vb 43.26-36.
- **Narratio** 364.13-15, is a very interpretative and amplifying version of Vb 43.36-37.
- **Narratio** 364.19-25, very reworked version of Vb 44.4-9.
- **Narratio** 364.25-28, very reworked version of Vb 44.14-16.
- **Narratio** 364.28-365.4, compare Vb 44.17-28.
- **Narratio** 365.4-6, compare Vb 44.29-32.

B. Separative Issues in S and H

Instead of rewriting as **Narratio** does, S and H achieve their goal mainly by abridging their source. Amplifications and reworked sections are in general intended to soften the awkward changes of action resulting from the cuts. As a result of their different procedures, **Narratio**, S and H apparently diverge from each other. However, as we will show below, a closer analysis reveals that they are likely to have a common ancestor and, therefore, to belong to the same textual family.

B.1. Omissions in S and H

- Vb 38.2-20, omitted in S (f. 128r, 2/5) and H (f. 163r, 18).
- Vb 38.25: kai\ apl l ag h ekastoj ej ta\ autou=compare S (f. 128r, 2/14) and H (f. 163r, 23).
- Vb 39.3-4: kai\ toij=loipoi=α\ pl e\ t\ wj ekousi n per i s kept o nov eit$ per i bol $kai\ xa\ riti tou\ kuri\ bu. Compare S (128r, 2/23) and H (f. 163r, 29).
- Vb 40.10-41.9: q\ gat n alista (...) te\ nei ta\ ei\ mena. Omitted in S (f. 128r, 2/27) and H (f. 164r, 11).
- Vb 41.15: taj\ kata\ ta\ des\ ma\ omitted in S (f. 129r, 1/3) and H (f. 164r, 19). Compare **Narratio** 362.28-30.
- Vb 41.26-27: a\ kia\ mton, a\ jr\ wton, a\ ke\ mton, a\ ke\ mton, a\ k a\ d\ a\ l i\ s\ t\ o\ n, a\ s\ uph\ ga=pro\ t\ t\ a\ tou\ ka\ ef\ ga. omitted by S (f. 129r, l/19) and H (f. 164r, 30).
- Vb 41.31: di\ s\ e\ auth\ de omitted by S (f. 129r, 1/27) and H (f. 164r, 1). This omission introduces re-interpretation. (see infra § B.4).
B.2. Amplifications in S and H

- S (f. 128v, 2/7-9) and H (f. 163r, 19-20), a bepa\n ato aut\ aj e\ hkw\ : Por\ eue\ se e\ e\ h\ -
eu\ at\ q, compare Vb 38.22.

- S (f. 128v, 1/9-11) and H (f. 163r, 9-10), t\m\w\.k\ ai\ g\r\a\p\e\i\w\m\ =\\l\u\x\e\j, \w\ per \d\e\ s\p\oi\n\ m\ ou\ di\a\gra\f\e\s\, compare Vb 39.17, up\'e\ou\h\hi\t\%mir\ h\ww\m%.

- S (f. 129v, 1/13-15) and H (f. 164r, 26), di\' aut\ou\=\com\pare\ Vb 41.22-23: to\ut\ou se\tou= des m\w\th\ri\b\uk\ u\q\i\ e\i.

- S (f. 129v, 1/34-37) and H (f. 164r, 5-7), e\h to\ut\oi\j o\ Strat\okl h\=\ i\e\ e\ i\s\i\ proj\ ton \\n\d\e\r\a\n\k\l\ ai\w\n\ k\ai\b\ut\ou\m\n\j\, compare Vb 42.8-9. Same as Narratio 363.5-8.

B.3. Changes Due to Dubious Readings

- S (f. 129v, 2/2-3) and H (f. 164v, 8-9), e\h ek\ht\ou\n, eu\ou\n o\h e\b\q\o\n\, krat\=\com\pare\ Vb 42.33: ek\w\ko\h\hj\ap\w\n.

- S (f. 129v, 2/17-20) and H (f. 164v, 16-18), a\h\k\ai\w\n\k\ai\w\n\ k\ai\f\al\e\g\w\n\ proj\ \thn \s\h\n\ st\or\g\h\n k\ai\t\o\i\p\a\c\h\t\k\o\n\ m\er\oi\j \th\=\ y\ux\h\j=\\r\m\, compare Vb 43.7-8: e\k\ka\i\w\n\m\ ne\: \thj=\ y\ux\h\j=\\r\m\ut\o\l\p\o\j\ to\i\h\k\ous\ m\e\h\oi\j, Similar to Narratio 363.16-19.

B.4. Re-interpretative Sections in S and H

- S (f. 128v, 2/19-20) and H (f. 163r, 27), s\i\ e\p\e\i\m\ dou\h\\tou\\e\ou\=\h\\h\j\\t\ou\bo, compare Vb 43.14-15, s\i\ e\pe\i\m\ i\l\h\hj\1\h\l\h\hj\ou\b\n.

- S (f. 129v, 1/15) and H (f. 164v, 37), ta\l\au\t\s\=\a\l\ot\ria\ e\g\a, compare Vb 43.24-25: ta\l\ auth\=\a\l\ot\ria.

- S (f. 129v, 1/27-28) and H (f. 165r, 7-8), t\s\thj=s\ar\ko\j\ m\h\ri\k\i\k\j\#, Gloss? Compare Vb 43.30-31: a\h\m\ thj=s\ar\ko\j\ xa\i\f\e\m\f\ra\a\s\a. S (f. 129v, 1/31-32) and H (f. 165r, 9-10), th\o\m\i\a\n\a\t\\m\\a\l\w\i\s\, compare Vb 43.32: th\th\ o\m\i\a\n\a\l\w\i\s.

- S (f. 129v, 2/18) and H (f. 165v, 22), o\i\p\ar\m\e\j\ a\h\w\r\p\oi\j, compare Vb 44.7-8, di\a\g\ou\i\, ter\p\o\m\e\noi\ t\ai\=\eb\i\l\ ab\e\in\i...
C. Separative Issues in Conversante 2

This version is very reductive and reworked. Nevertheless, its second chapter allows the assumption that its writer or copyist is working on a model that, similarly to the model for Arm, began with the speech to the brethren. Obvious similarities with Arm, which will be analysed below, may support their dependence on a common model105.

- **Conversante** 374.18-20, ‘ego missus sum apostolus a domino meo ad vos carissimi fratres ut homines positos in tenebris et umbra mortis per verbum domini ad viam veritatis et luminis revocarem’, compare Vb 44.4-8.
- **Conversante** 374.21-23, ‘quibus vero non cessavi hortans vos ut recedentes a daemoniorum culturis verum deum quaerentes et in mandatis eius perserverantes promissionis eius heredes inveniamini’, compare Vb 44.8-16. (for ‘in mandatis eius’, see Arm 1.7-8).
- **Conversante** 375.3-9, ‘ceterum in his quae mihi contigerint106 nolo vos contristari. ista enim praemissa sunt a deo meo Iesu Christo, sicut scriptum est pro nomine illius multa nos esse passuros et flagellantos, (...) a servis domini superatus’, compare Vb 44.29-37.

D. Separative Issues in Laudatio.

Laudatio offers a remake and résumé of the section preserved by V, which is similar to Vita. In spite of these similarities, there is evidence to surmise dependence on a common source rather than their interdependence (see infra).

**D.1. Omissions in Laudatio**

- Vb 38.2-39.11, compare Laudatio 344.22.
- Vb 40.11-43.25, compare Laudatio 345.9.
- Vb 43.37-45.33, compare Laudatio 346.12.

**D.2. Amplifications in Laudatio**

- **Laudatio** 344.29-345.3, aļaļagat ouk elaqe (...) utalaj=a[pwl ei]# paraǥRWm, compare Vb 39.18-26.
- **Laudatio** 345.14-346.9, amplification similar to Vita 249B 10-C 10 that includes echoes of the missing speeches by Andrew. **Laudatio** 345.17-19: mention of Stratocles and the

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105 See infra this Chapter, pp. 112-13.
106 B and Q read ‘contigerunt’. Cf. Bonnet *app. ad loc.* Compare, however, Arm 6.7-8 where there is a similar change from future to past tense.
brethren that echoes both Stratocles’ speech in Vb 42.7-43.25 and Andrew’s second discourse to the brethren in Vb 44.4-45.33. See Laudatio 345.28, Ὑδασκων καὶ οὐκ ἔτυμπα ἡσε and 346.2, μετὲρων ἄυτοι τῶν ἀκραυτῶν καὶ ἀπαφῶν του = Χριστοῦ = μυσθρίῳ.

Laudatio 346.10-12, οὕτως παραμιαρός (...) στρατιώται παραδίδωσιν Amplification due to re-interpretation introduced in Laudatio 345.1-3. Conjunctive with Vita?

**D.3. Summarising or Reworking Sections**

- **Laudatio** 344.23-25, very summary but reliable version of Vb 39.12-26. However, the writer omits the last section with a view to transforming Aegeates’ character in the amplifying section Laudatio 344.29-345.3. (See supra § D.2)
- **Laudatio** 344.25-29, very summary version of Vb 39.27-40.10 that reduces the whole section to five lines.
- **Laudatio** 345.3-9, most summary reworking of Vb 41.12-35.
- **Laudatio** 345.10-11, very summary version of Vb 43.26-31.
- **Laudatio** 345.11-13, transforms into direct speech the section Vb 43.31-34.

**E. Vita offers an extremely summary version of V. A comparison with Laudatio shows that, in spite of the similar versions, the latter cannot depend on the former.**

**E.1. Omissions in Vita**

- Vb 38.2-39.11, compare Vita 249A 1.
- Vb 40.11-43.25, compare Vita 249B 7.
- Vb 43.37-45.33, compare Vita 249C 11.

**E.2. Amplifications in Vita**

- **Vita** 249A 6-7, ταυτής ἐν (…) εἰς ᾖλς αὐτός This amplification is due to the fact that Vita 249A 2 omits mentioning Andrew’s imprisonment by Aegeates (compare Laudatio 344.19-22). Separative for Laudatio?
- **Vita** 249B 10-C 10, amplification similar to but not identical with Laudatio 345.14-346.9.
- **Vita** 249C 11-13, οὐκ ἀναποτατοῖ (... ἡ ἀνασκοῦσα = Amplification due to the re-interpretation introduced in Vita 249A 11-15.

**E.3. Summarising or Reworking Sections**

- **Vita** 249A 2-6, very abbreviated version of Vb 39.12-26 that retains the same primitive elements as Laudatio 344.23-25. (See supra § D.3)
- **Vita** 249A8-10, highly abbreviated version of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla in Vb 39.27-40.10.
- **Vita** 249B 5-7, very summary parallel to Vb 41.19-35.
- **Vita** 249B 7-9, compare Vb 43.26-34.

**F. Separative Issues in Arm**

Like Conversante, Arm begins with Andrew’s second speech to the brethren (Vb 44.4ff.) and consequently omits all preceding speeches. At first glance Arm might seem to present a version of this speech similar to that of V, although a closer comparison reveals important differences between them.
F.1. Omissions in Arm

- Vb 38.2-44.3, omitted by Arm.
- Vb 44.15-16: kai l' autow musthia optrizomênon, omitted by Arm 1.15-16.
- Vb 44.20-21: ofa tegehaisin, omitted by Arm 2.5-6.
- Vb 45.4-5: kai l' auton de auto epistasaqai, omitted by Arm 4.10.
- Vb 45.14-15: ai' ote thj= xasitoj musthion ethf qh, kai l' (boul h' thj= a hapausewj efj a newthim, omitted by Arm 5.10.
- Vb 45.16: tois% zonethen genoh', omitted by Arm 5.10.
- Vb 45.25-26: tois' (de' thj= oikonomiaj xrhma etafgen ouj) egw i' xuroteran, omitted by Arm 6.1-3.

F.2. Amplifications in Arm

- Arm 1.10-11, "jusque même, l'habitude y aidant, les pensées et les paroles des hommes", compare Vb 44.11-12: mekri h' hwa i' wph wj.
- Arm 4.11-13, "C'est pourquoi (...) abîmes des enfers", compare Vb 45.5.
- Arm 5.1-4, "Il <Jésus> nous a (...) fourberie du diable", compare Vb 45.6.
- Arm 5.16-17, "...entreprit de nouveau de livrer avec nous le combat habituel de contestation et de semer ...", compare Vb 45.19-20: hicato proj hrjaj=mei kai ekq# kai
epecanastai ahtipl ekain.
- Arm 5.18-19, "... et d'autres assauts déréglés de pensées, afin que nous nous querellions les uns avec les autres", compare Vb 45.20 (cf. previous example).

F.3. Changes Due to Dubious Reading or Translation in Arm

- Arm 1.7-8, "ce qui vous est prescrit par les lois" (mofima), compare Vb 44.8-10: mofima (cf., however, infra F.4).
- Arm 2.8-10, "...vous qui avez vu de si nombreux signes. Je pense que même la nature muette crie la parole que je vous ai confiée", compare Vb 44.21-23: ekete d' enhou=erga
gegonota oij ouk eketea epistheai autoj=gegonota shmeia toiauta aikaitaka h' al oj
fuij jekkracetai: ogyouj utimparevdika ouj eukomi, ktl.
- Arm 5.18-19, "afin que nous nous querellions les uns avec les autres", compare Vb 45.20: epecanastai (cf., however, supra F.2).

F.4. Re-interpretative Sections

- Arm 1.3, "tous <ceux> qui sont apparentés à mes paroles", compare Vb 44.6: pata toh
suggenh=twel ogywn ahtorwpon.
- Arm 1.4, "... ils ont usé de méchanceté", compare Vb 44.7: oq ekakoi=toij=proskai/toij
diaqousi.
- Arm 1.7-8: "ce qui vous est prescrit par les lois", compare Vb 44.9: ta/mofima (cf., however, supra F.3).
- Arm 1.12-13, "Et ceci arrive à l'âme indisciplinée, qui délire par sa propre volonté, et éprouvera en elle-même le gage des maux", compare Vb 44.12-14: touto desunbai/hai diâ
thn aipaidetoun yuxhn thn ejj fuis paniqesan kai kata/ thj= pl an/h ehekura
dekousan.
- Arm 2.2-3, "... sur le fondement ferme, inébranlable et que personne ne détruit. Et vous tous qui avez construit sur ce fondement ...", compare Vb 44.18-19: epi t% genemel i% t%=
katabebel hmen% utim oqti asal euf% kai ahepiboul euf% pansi t%=ponhreumed% epi
tous toh genemelion r/zwhte.
Arm 2.4-6, ‘... et souvenez-vous de ce dont vous avez été les spectateurs, comment je me suis comporté au milieu de vous’, compare Vb 44.20-21: mhhmoneufoj wá ofa te geomets unu anastrefont mou pasinuwm.

Arm 2.13-14, ‘... et Dieu, à qui vous vous êtes convertis’, compare Vb 44.26-27: kaiwutaj= o(geoj ei) oebiitseuasteel ehjaaj.

Arm 3.1-2, ‘Et l’événement prochain, qui va m’arriver, que je vais accomplir...’, compare Vb 44.24-29: todelpeirichneel onsumbainei mholtwj tarassewutaj.

Arm 3.3-4, ‘... car Dieu donnera récompense à ses serviteurs pour <leurs> œuvres et paroles; <il la donnera également à celui> qui, de manière criminelle <et> violente est, sans raison, en cette vie temporelle, calomnié jusqu’à la mort par un homme méchant’, compare Vb 44.30-32: qti o(oueou=ou=ou=oj, %pol la aparexeto autoj o(geoj di’ efewn kail ogwn, ouflaj bi’ upolaj wjwou ponhrou=ap hel aujetai toutou tou=pros kaijou bjou.

Arm 3.9-11, ‘... le diable impudent a détournés de Dieu et <don’t> il a fait ses fils, il <les> pousse, après <les> avoir armés, à suivre sa volonté...’, compare Vb 44.35-36: o(papta a=aihaj diabol oj ta’xka tekna oplis=ei kat’ autumw opjw aut%unqwertai.

Arm 4.1-3, ‘Comme il était prince des anges et crée avant tous <les autres>, s’il est nécessaire de <le> dire, il est tombé des cieux comme <l’éclair>’, compare Vb 44.37-45.2: a=pol men thj= pah=twaj a=phaj= kai\ hllh l egelin et ouar o=ah=oraj t$s=up’ autoj a=ix$s= kath$gen, ktl.

Arm 4.9-10, ‘... il séduit les esprits de ceux qui ne connaissent pas Dieu’, compare Vb 45.3-4: kai\ nhde=wp dunanenon gwnri=saj.

Arm 5.6-7, ‘... tout en jetant les hommes dans des amours déréglées et les désastres de l’impureté’, compare Vb 45.8-11: upolaj wj\ gat aut%-ta\ idia pola kij die gray=en eh\ddona ojta kai\ apathl a=di’ wá autou=perkrati=sic ejlokei: ekroj men oue ebeiknuto=ej tofaner=ej pros poidou=nen=ej fili=an\th\ au=otua=itian.

Arm 5.7-10, ‘Telle est en effet son œuvre: amener les hommes aux oublies et négligences, en vue de <les> désorienter de Dieu notre créateur et de <les> soustraire à la vie éternelle’, compare Vb 45.12-14: kaitouto hae aut%-e=gon epi\=pol w\=ginomenon, wj eij hllh gnri=saj ekei=eh% gwnri=sai auton\ toul\ e\xin ou=oj= di=ata\=etou=we=ra.

Arm 5.10-12, ‘Mais quand la grâce de saintes pensées s’est répandue en nous, et que la douce volonté de Dieu est apparu parmi nous et que la sainte illumination du Verbe ...’, compare Vb 45.14-15: al\’ ofe thj= xafitoj mstrhion ek\=foj, kai\ h\=boul h\=thj= a=ha\paus=ejwj eja\ner=wh, kaitotou=ogou=wj=ek\=qaj, ktl.

Arm 5.13-19 compare Vb 45.16-22 (see supra F 2).

Arm 5.19-20, ‘... et cela non seulement en paroles’, compare Vb 45.20-21: kaitotou e=eh% es=tei=tai.

Arm 5.20-22, ‘... il s’efforce en effet de <nous> amener à consommer <le péché> par les œuvres, et il ne nous lâche pas qu’il ne <nous> ait porté préjudice’, compare Vb 45.22-25: tofe men gat a=neri=moj heao=hini=al=driqoj, kai\ fili=an pros epoile=to stelj=sai proj harmaj= th\=n= autou=akian: e=izen= de\ kai\ to\ nh\=fobeisqai nh\ a=post\ween pepl anh\=newnoi up\=autou=.


Arm 6.5-7, compare Vb 45.27.

Arm 6.7-8, ‘Puisque nous sommes informés maintenant, frères, des événements antérieurs’, compare Vb 45.28: ebista\=nenoi to\=garou\=to\=nen=ien\ kesqai.
The analysis of *errores significatiui* based on a comparison of V with the extant witnesses preserving in a more or less revised form the same portion of text allows the following conclusions:

1. V undoubtedly preserves the best testimony for this section of AA.
2. It clearly belongs to a radically different family of texts, which is clearly related to the primitive text.
3. Common textual divergences from V in the remaining witnesses allow their inclusion in a common family, which we call *transformative transmission*. In spite of their divergences in achieving their recasting (re-elaboration, cuts, or résumé), their relationship can be established because transformations always affect the same sections.
4. This textual interrelationship is also supported by the fact that all witnesses consistently preserve the same narrative sections.
5. In spite of their similarities, clear divergences in content allow a differentiation of subfamilies in the transformative branch. These will be analysed in the following section.

The following scheme illustrates the provisional results of the comparative analysis:

```
  AA
 / \               / \       
 /   \         /   \       /   \       
/     \       /     \     /     \     /     \       
/       \     /       \   /       \   /       \     
/         \   /         \ /         \ /         \   
/           \ /           \          \          
/             \           \           
/               \         \         
/                 \       \       
/                   \     \     
/                     \   \   
/                       \ / \  
/                         \  
/                           
```

3.1.2. Conjunctive Evidence Supporting the Existence of a Transformative Branch

The comparative analysis of the preceding section could only rely on those documents that include a section overlapping with V. When analysing the transformative branch we have a wider corpus of texts available to us. However, the relevance of many of them has been
traditionally disputed on the grounds that they are Byzantine recastings\textsuperscript{107}. Against this argument might be adduced Pasquali’s motto \textit{recentiores non deteriores}\textsuperscript{108} or, even more precisely, Maas’ comment concerning this principle: ‘... es gibt überhaupt nicht „gute“ und „schlechte“ Zeugen, sonder nur abhängige und unabhängige, d. h. Zeugen, die von erhaltenen (oder ohne sie rekonstruierbaren) abhängig oder unabhängig sind’\textsuperscript{109}. Moreover, it is plausible to think that early Byzantine writers or copyists had access to uncial texts that have been lost or did not survive the change from uncials to minuscules that took place in the ninth and tenth centuries\textsuperscript{110}. At the same time, the reliability of the textual witnesses for the martyrdom has been frequently exaggerated on the grounds that these testimonies have a closer relationship with the primitive text. Consequently, everything that did not fit in what Flamion called the ‘martyrium source’ was considered alien to \textit{AA}.

Rather than adopting this negative and aprioristic approach to our material, we undertook, firstly, an analysis of the single witnesses and, secondly, a comparative study of their testimony in order to attempt an explanation of the totality of the textual evidence without systematically recurring to the argument of syncretism or collation of sources. The chronological diversity, different character, style, content, and intention of these testimonies were important obstacles to such an analysis. In addition, once we move into the transformative branch of the transmission, reworking, as common to all witnesses, is no longer a separative issue\textsuperscript{111}. Nevertheless, comparative analysis reveals that, together with reworking, another trait characterises the transformative branch: a marked tendency to reduce the body of the text appears at all stages independently of the scope and character of the text (below).

The separative issues upon which we base our hypothesis concerning the existence of a non-transformative textual branch are obviously conjunctive for the textual witnesses of the transformative branch. Their similarities in dealing with \textit{AA}’s discursive and narrative sections offer a consistent basis for treating them as representatives of the same branch in the transmission. When studying the historical development of the transformative branch, we will


\textsuperscript{109} Maas, \textit{Textkritik}, 32-33.


\textsuperscript{111} Of course, reworking still plays an essential role in determining textual diversity, but the lack of a point of reference (the section preserved by V excluded) negates the possibility of using it as a distinguishing issue.
firstly reduce the variety of documents by means of a comparative study of their textual characteristics. Secondly, we will proceed to distinguish subfamilies by paying attention to their reduction pattern, namely their mentions and omissions; and, thirdly, we will refine the relationships between related documents by a closer comparison. It is at this stage that textual issues begin to matter. Once families and subfamilies have been established, a proper philological analysis might offer a more precise idea of their stemmatic relationships.

3.1.2.1. Separative Issues Within the Transformative Branch
Texts within the transformative branch of the transmission may, on the basis of their content, be divided into two different groups: texts that were interested in Andrew’s activities as a whole and texts that were only interested in Andrew’s martydom. While texts of the first group, which we call **transformative long version**, present varying lengths, those of the second group, or **transformative short version**, consistently preserve the same section of text: none of them begins before Andrew’s speech to the brethren (Vᵇ 44.4-45.33).

3.1.2.1.1. Transformative Long Version
All documents included in this textual group present a common scope: a lengthier relation of Andrew’s life and activities. Testimonies for this family are *Epitome, Mpr, Laudatio, Vita, Narratio*, S and H. Even though they present varying lengths as well as diverse reduction patterns, most of documents include a couple of common episodes from Andrew’s activities as their beginning, Andrew’s martyrdom as their end, and a series of common episodes in the central section. Given the time span between the witnesses, it is plausible to think of a common source from which all documents drew and which included at least the common episodes. Comparative analysis supports the inclusion of *Epistle* and the interpolations in *2GrEp* in this group.

a) Conjunctive Issues within the Long Version
Even though the documents in general present their own selection of episodes, they retain enough conjunctive issues at the beginning, in the central section, and at the end to ensure a narrative sequence.

Beginning:
- *AAM* at the beginning: *Epitome* 1, *Laudatio* 317.13-318.27; *Vita* 220A 1-221B 8; *Narratio* 5-7 (356.19-358.6).
- Episode about demons of Nicea: *Epitome* 6; *Laudatio* 323.14-326.5; *Vita* 229B 8-240B 14; *Narratio* 356.6-18.
- Mention of Argyropolis: omitted by *Epitome*, *Laudatio* 335.1; *Vita* 244C 9; *Narratio* 358.9.

Central section:
• Mention of Antiphanes: Epitome 29; Mpr 51.14.
• Reference to Sosios: Epitome (Sosias) 30.4; Laudatio 335.15; 338.13; Vita 244D 5, 245A 3.
• Lesbos episode: Epitome (Lysbius/Lisbius) 22.7; 23.11,58; 24.52; 25.12; 26.4.20; 30.2; Laudatio 335.21-338.8; Mpr 47.16-50.22. Omitted by Vita and VitaEsc.
• Sequence of healings (Maximilla, paralytic, blind, leper): Epitome 30.5,31; 32; 33; Laudatio 338.16-341.8; Vita 245A 8-D 11.
• Stratocles’ return and Alcmanes episode: Epitome 34; Laudatio 342.3-344.9; Vita 248B 5-D 4; S (f. 121\textsuperscript{v}, 2/25-123\textsuperscript{v}, 2/11) and H (f. 155\textsuperscript{f}, 13-157\textsuperscript{f}, 35).
• Aegeates’ return to Patras: Epitome 35; Laudatio 344.10-19; Mpr 50.24-51.10; Vita 248D 5; S (f. 124, 2/6) and H (f. 158\textsuperscript{f}, 6).

End:
• Andrew’s imprisonment: Epitome 36; Laudatio 344.19-22; Vita 249A 6-7; Mpr 51.15-20; Narratio 359.15-17; S (f. 127\textsuperscript{f}, 1/33) and H (f. 161\textsuperscript{v}, 26).
• Aegeates tries to convince Maximilla (V\textsuperscript{b} 39.12-26): omitted by Epitome; Laudatio 344.23-25; Vita 249A 2-6; Narratio 361.11-362.3; S (f. 128\textsuperscript{f}, 2/37ff) and H (f. 163\textsuperscript{v}, 3ff).
• Andrew in prison: Epitome 36.2-4; Laudatio 345.14-346.9; Vita 249A 9-C 9; Narratio 360.16-365.6; S (f. 128\textsuperscript{f}, 2/5-130\textsuperscript{f}, 1/13) and H (f. 163\textsuperscript{v}, 18-165\textsuperscript{v}, 3).
• Andrew’s crucifixion: Epitome 36.4-5; Laudatio 346.12-16; Vita 252A 1-C 14, VitaEsc f. 245\textsuperscript{v}, 2/8-246\textsuperscript{f}; Narratio 367.1-5; S (f. 130\textsuperscript{f}, 2/25-132\textsuperscript{f}) and H (f. 166\textsuperscript{v}, 4-168\textsuperscript{v}).

b) Separative Issues within the Long Version

A simple glance at the mentions and omissions shows that, according to their reduction pattern, it is possible to distinguish two groups of texts, which we call \( \text{D} \) and \( \text{E} \). The first of them, represented by Epitome and mainly interested in Andrew’s activities, edits the end significantly and develops its narration following a succession of miracles. Andrew’s imprisonment and martyrdom occupy just a couple of lines. The second group is represented by Mpr, Laudatio, Vita, Narratio, S/H, and Epistle\textsuperscript{112}. These texts include both Andrew’s activities and his martyrdom and, by applying internal reduction, preserve a more developed beginning and end.

A. Family \( \text{D} \): End Reduction

Epitome’s version of \( \text{AA} \) includes \( \text{AAM} \) as the beginning and offers a comprehensive relation of Andrew’s miraculous activities. In spite of its more complete relation of the events between \( \text{AA} \)’s beginning and Aegeates’ return to Patras, it summarises the remaining episodes in three chapters (Epitome 36-38, thirty lines of text).

\textsuperscript{112} The case of Epistle deserves special mention. LatEp and 1GrEp are very greatly reworked as a dialogue between Aegeates and Andrew that \textit{mutatis mutandis} shows certain similarities with Mpr 10-13. The reason for them being included in this subfamily is that they seem to know the reason why Lesbos is substituted by Aegeates: the Latin version (LatEp 3.8-9; 4.1-2) and both Greek translations (1GrEp 3.18; 4.10 and 2GrEp 3.28;
B. Family B: Internal Reduction

The documents included in this group offer a relation of Andrew’s life and activities that preserve the beginning and end but significantly reduce the middle. The conjunctive issues listed above, however, show that not all documents accomplish this reduction in the same way. On the basis of their differences, it is possible to establish two subfamilies of texts. The first, which we call g, includes Mpr, Laudatio, and Vita; the second, which we call d, includes Narratio, S and H, and interpolations in 2GrEp.

B.1. Subfamily g (Mpr, Laudatio, Vita)

A proper study of this subfamily is at present impeded by some obstacles. Firstly, Mpr, given its special characteristics, does not offer conclusive information. This text is a very abbreviated and reworked version of AA that follows a very precise scope. This means that its omissions do not necessarily indicate similar omissions in its source. Secondly, a serious study and comparison of Laudatio with Vita is, at present, also problematic, as Dressel’s edition of Vita relies on a deficient manuscript (Vat. gr. 824). Two other mss, Paris B.N. 1510 and Escorial II 6, were already known to Lipsius and Bonnet, but they still remain unpublished. The problems of Vat. gr. 824 concern not only evident palaeographical errors and numerous lacunae, but also important structural deficiencies. An example of the latter is that Vita lacks its original end (if it ever had one): from Andrew’s imprisonment onwards (Vita 249D 1), Vat. gr. 824 exactly follows the last part of Narratio (365.20-372.29).

4.17-19) have echoes of the destruction of statues and temples. Thus, it is obvious that they depend on a longer version of AA that included these events. For the peculiarities of 2GrEp see infra this Chapter, pp. 106-09.

113 Cf. supra, this Chapter § 2.3.1.3, p. 77.

114 Lipsius (Apostelgeschichten I, 575, note 1) knows at least the first of them. Bonnet reckons with both for his edition of Laudatio (see Laudatio, 310, although he wrongly writes cod. Par. 1540; erratum?).

115 Of all these errors, only in one case (last of this list) does VitaEsc correct the corrupted readings in Vita. See Vita 241B 11-12: ej $musat on pol in, VitaEsc f. 240v, col. 1: ej $amusat on pol in, compare to Laudatio 332.13: tw$ Samasat on m gi$ sth

116 In spite of Flamion, who suggested that the lacunae in Vita would be supplied in a good edition based on other extant mss, VitaEsc corrects one single lacuna (number 6 in the following list). The lacunae are the following: (1) Laudatio 317.2-4: kakei$e mikro$be diatri$ge$nte xro$on kai tina$ kath$hs ant$e$ kal anba$in en A$gku $# pol ei$ th= Galatia$. The whole section is omitted in Vita 217 D, VitaEsc and VitaParis begin later. (2) Laudatio 328.29-330.22: Anostran$w mpol in kal an bai$e$ he gis$ sth ou$an ka$\{peris$a$ t$hn (…$) apa$$ e$ t$ eth$ enh$ thw$ Sin$pwd$pol in kate$ aben. Omitted by Vita 240 C12 and VitaEsc 239v, col. 1: VitaParis omits the whole section but mentions Sinope (f. 12’). (3) Laudatio 321.17 is omitted in Vita 228C 4, VitaEsc f. 230v, col. 2 and VitaParis f. 4’, col. 2. (4) Laudatio 322.24-5 is omitted by Vita 229A 5 and VitaEsc f. 231’, col. 2. (5) Laudatio 323.2-4 omitted by Vita 229A 13, VitaEsc 231’, col. 2 and VitaParis f. 5’, col. 1. (6) Laudatio 333.8-9, lacuna in Vita 241D 4, but not in VitaEsc 241’, col. 1. (7) Laudatio 335.21-338.8 omitted by Vita 244D 10 and VitaEsc f. 241’,
*VitaParis* has a very brief conclusion and *VitaEsc* a rather summary version that just includes some highlights of the martyrdom.

### B.1.1. Excursus on the Textual Relationship between *Laudatio* and *Vita*

The question of the textual relationships between *Laudatio* and *Vita* is one of the most obvious examples of the frequent biased interpretation and evaluation of the textual witnesses by twentieth-century scholarly research. Comparative analysis led Lipsius to conclude that they are not mutually dependent but rather that they have a common source not older than the eighth century\(^{117}\), of which *Laudatio* always gives a better version\(^ {118}\). Nevertheless, since Flamion it is generally believed that *Laudatio* depends on *Vita*\(^{119}\). Indeed, the Belgian scholar, drawing on Diekamp’s opinion that *Laudatio* even if it does depend on a common source might also have used *Vita*\(^{120}\), goes further and states that *Laudatio* is exclusively dependent on *Vita*\(^{121}\). His argumentation, however, relies on a naïve acceptance of Epiphanius’ alleged ocular testimony\(^{122}\) and on an arbitrary comparative analysis of both texts\(^{123}\).

A proper analysis of the convergences and divergences between *Laudatio* and *Vita* clearly shows that Flamion’s opinion is untenable. *Laudatio*’s version of Andrew’s peregrinations frequently transmits an improved text for sections that are corrupt in *Vita*\(^{124}\). *Laudatio*’s improving version of the common source is especially evident in the section including the events after Andrew’s arrival in Patras, for *Laudatio*’s and *Vita*’s versions can be checked against the testimony of numerous textual witnesses. The first clear omission in *Vita* is the Lesbios episode. *Laudatio* not only preserves the whole episode, which is also attested by other textual witnesses\(^ {125}\), but also mentions Sosios twice, before and after the

\(^{117}\) Lipsius, *Apostelgeschichten* I, 570-84.

\(^{118}\) See also Bonnet, *Supplementum*, XI; Hennecke, *Handbuch*, 545.


\(^{120}\) Diekamp, *Hippolytos von Theben*, 143-45, who does not offer a proper assessment of *Laudatio*’s possible use of *Vita*. Even though he states that the arguments by Lipsius (in *Apostelgeschichten* I, 571 note 1) are not enough to rule out this possibility, he does not provide any evidence to make his case.


\(^{123}\) As has already been pointed out (see *supra* Chapter 1, notes 160-161), Flamion does not offer conclusive evidence for his statement. His preconception about *Laudatio*’s dependence on *Vita* can be seen both in his surprising comment on *Vita*’s frequent lacunae and defective readings and in his explanation of *Laudatio*’s improved readings for the same passages. In spite of his optimistic remarks assuring us that a proper edition of *Vita* would certainly show that these errors are exclusively due to the manuscript transmission (*L’Apôtre*, 205-12), his statement is not based on a study of the variants in the different mss but on simple speculation. On the other hand, our comparative study of all three mss preserving *Vita* shows that *VitaParis* and *VitaEsc* present the same errors, if we exclude a couple of isolated examples. For *Vita*’s palaeographical errors, see *supra* this Chapter, note 114. For *Vita*’s lacunae, see *supra* this Chapter, note 115.

\(^{124}\) See *supra* this Chapter, notes 114-115 and *infra* notes 124-125.

\(^{125}\) *Laudatio* 335.21-338.8: *Vita* 244 D omits the entire section about Lesbios (see Lipsius, *Apostelgeschichten* I, 573 note 1.
Lesbos episode, which shows that it neither depends on *Vita* nor on *Mpr*. In addition, *Laudatio*’s contacts with *Epitome* prove that these events belong to the primitive text. *Epitome* not only includes the Lesbos episode but also mentions, precisely in the same order as *Laudatio*, Maximilla’s healing and the subsequent series of miracles, including a paralysed man, a blind man, and a leper being healed.

A close comparison of *Laudatio*’s and *Vita*’s testimony for this section immediately shows that the former preserves a more original stage. After mentioning Argyropolis (*Vita* 244C 9), Epiphanius lets Andrew go to Macedonia and finally arrive in Patras. The double mention of Sosios is followed by a highly abbreviated version of the healing of Maximilla. The sequence of a paralysed man and a blind man being healed is also reduced, but the third case is the most obvious example of reduction. The following section, *Vita* 248A 1-B 4, is also shortened. It is, however, after *Vita* 248B 5 that the omissions become more relevant. In addition, a better comparison is now facilitated thanks to the parallel in S/H that begins at this point. *Vita* offers a highly abbreviated version of the events following Stratocles’ return to Patras, for which *Laudatio* can always be shown to be more accurate. Alcmanes’ healing in *Vita* is not only very reduced, but also presents significant omissions. On the basis of this comparison it seems clear that *Laudatio* depends on the same or a similar source as S and H. This source, which S and H preserve selectively, probably included the events preceding Stratocles’ episode in *Laudatio*, for the latter’s account is sustained by the testimony of *Mpr* and *Epitome*.

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and 581 note 1). Omitted by *VitaEsc* f. 242r, col. 2 as well. *Laudatio* is supported by *Mpr* (47.16-51.10) and *Epitome* (22.7; 23.11; 58; 24.52; 25.12; 26.4; 20; 30.2).

126 Flamion’s conclusion (*L’Apôtre*, 62) that *Laudatio* uses *Mpr* is hardly correct. A comparison of the Lesbos episode in *Mpr*, *Epitome*, *Laudatio*, and *Vita* clearly shows that (a) *Laudatio* preserves the episode in its original place (cf. *Epitome*). In *Laudatio* the Lesbos episode is preceded and followed by a reference to Sosios (335.15 and 338.13, respectively). (b) *Vita* eliminates the whole passage, although preserving both references to Sosios (244D 5 and 245A 3, respectively). (c) *Mpr* preserves the Lesbos episode but does not mention Sosios at all. If *Laudatio* drew on *Mpr* for this passage, how could its writer know the proper place for the episode he was interpolating into *Vita*? The only possible solution is that *Laudatio*, together with *Epitome*, preserves the best text and that it depends on the same or a similar source as *Mpr*.

127 Compare *Vita* 245A 1-7 to *Laudatio* 338.21-344.22 and the lengthier version in S (f. 121r-128r, 2/5) and H (f. 155r-163r, 18).

128 See *Epitome* 30.5-19; *Laudatio* 338.16-339.5.


130 Eleven lines of *Vita* (245D 1-11) occupy almost two pages in *Laudatio* (339.20-341.8).


132 Compare *Vita* 248B 5-D 12 to *Laudatio* 342.3-344.22 and the lengthier version in S (f. 121v-128r, 2/5) and H (f. 155r-163r, 18).

133 *Laudatio* 341.19-344.22.

134 For example, Stratocles’ rejection of military service (*Laudatio* 342.6; S (f. 121v) and H (f. 155r), or his attempt to commit suicide due to the desperate situation of Alcmanes (*Laudatio* 342.11-13; S (f. 122r, 1/10-2/3) and H (f. 155r, 25-155v, 10).
Many other particular issues contradict the hypothesis of Laudatio’s dependence on Vita. A clear example is that Vita, against the testimony of Laudatio and all extant witnesses, asserts that Stratocles returns to Patras from Athens and not from Italy. Another example concerns the duration of Andrew’s crucifixion. According to Laudatio, supported by the majority of textual witnesses, Andrew hangs on the cross for three whole days and on the fourth day the people of Patras react against Aegeates. According to Vita, supported by Epitome, however, it is on the third day that the people react. At the same time, Andrew’s rebuke to Aegeates in Laudatio, also attested by other testimonies, shows not only that Laudatio does not depend on Vita, but also that it cannot depend on Mpr. Also different are Laudatio’s and Vita’s accounts of the events after Andrew’s death.

Prieur subscribes to Flamion’s hypothesis that Laudatio depends on Vita, although he does not offer arguments to explain why he does so. His treatment of the issue is in general rather vague and his statements sometimes even contradictory. According to Prieur, similarities between the version of the martyrdom in Laudatio and VitaEsc show that the former depends on the latter. However, a careful comparison of the alleged similarities in these two documents with the remaining textual witnesses proves that there is only a single passage in Laudatio and Vita which is not also present in other testimonies for the Martyrdom. The apparent parallels between Laudatio and Vita are the following:

- **Laudatio** 346.10-12 and **VitaEsc** f. 245, 1/22-26. Both documents preserve a tradition according to which Aegeates was afraid of Maximilla’s parents.

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137 Laudatio 347.25: wj dekaiketaithj hemaj diagonehj kaitosoutwn nuxtwn. Similarly in 2EpGr. 28.12-13: triwm nuqshemw wn autoj ohilv wn (…) wj dekaiketaiths hmej #. Malt A 61.11-13; Mpr 56.3; 2EpGr. 28.26-27; Malt A 62.1; differently VitaEsc f. 245, col 2: wj dekaiketrifsh hmej #. So also Epitome 36: in qua cum per triduum vivens penderet.

138 Laudatio 348.6-21: tijs prop ton sò alla orion Algibatw elhxwaj (…) egathj pathj ahonij. This section, which is supported by 2EpGr. 30.8-11; 12-20 [cf. Arm 32; 33; 34] is omitted by Mpr (56.12-57.2), which presents instead a highly re-elaborated version. Differently, VitaEsc f. 245 col 1, 9-17, presents a rather different text: episqen on ej metanoi kai swqti: oullogonmai/sou tò khalian tathm ouukle oqosj mou: ej gat agoqal/propehpi ej me ei)de(oun metanohsiej kai ou) pisteuej aut% kq: kq% metap% apol% eai.

139 Laudatio 348.26-27: oijerwftoj episqopoj Stratoklej hafr nswrni Macinijl $ proshi qwh etel us en. Similarly, Mpr 57.8-9. According to VitaEsc f. 245, col 1, however, Maximilla is the one to carry the action and Stratocles simply accompanies her.

140 Despite his affirmation that he consulted the other two mss preserving Vita, the only information he gives is (Acta, 19), ‘Le texte de ce manuscrit (scli. Esc y II 6) débute plus bas que l’édition de Dressel (PG 120, 221B), mais ses discours son souvent plus longs. Enfin, il est pourvu d’une fin particulière, fidèle au plan du Martyre des AA, et possédant des similitudes avec la Laud.’(?) One would at least like to know, for example, what the plan of the martyrdom it preserves is, as well as its alleged similarities with Laudatio.

141 So, for instance, he first states (Acta 15-17) that Laudatio’s and Mpr’s versions of the martyrdom depend on the same common source, but later on (ibid., 20) he affirms that similarities between Laudatio and VitaEsc in the last part of AA are due to the fact that the former depends on the latter.
Laudatio 347.12-16 and VitaEsc f. 245², 2/1-8. It also appears in Mpr 55.21-56.3; Narratio 367. 25-368.2; 2EpGr 26.16-19; Malt A 60.14-18 [cf. Arm 20.5-9]. It is true, however, that all these testimonies agree in presenting a different motivation for Aegeates' decision than Laudatio and Vita.

Laudatio 347.16-20: autou de kremati meno epi tou toul ou pantaj ekipiaske nh to qnanon alla th n atramian dedekheai. VitaEsc f. 245², 2/8-15: o de kremati meno epi tou stauroi= (...) ekipiaske nh to f脖子 epi th qnanon alla xaiein. Both texts present a summary version of a lengthy section preserved in its essentials by C 14², and very succinctly by 2EpGr. 27.13-22. (A reworked and summarised version also appears in Narratio 368.14-369.5.)

Laudatio 347.21-24 and VitaEsc f. 245 r, 2/16-21 have a parallel in Narratio 369.6. This testimony, however, omits any reference to Stratocles.

Laudatio 347.31-348.7: sunedra meg pantaj epi to praitwriion, tou du se bouj= ahqupa tou katabowretej kaith= aho giaj krišewj autou katamenofrej. VitaEsc f. 245², 2/26-245³, 1/7: sunedra meg pantaj= o aqj epi tou ahkupaton bowretej: Ti/thentar a hoq wpoj ouboj olouwj aλj wj pikr%= qanat% aqophs KE: oule gar ej Kαjara ou ej touj norouj. Laudatio presents a better version with parallels in 2EpGr. (28.21-22: aho gia ta dikasthia/sou), in Narratio (369.13: aho giaj ekrija); Malt A 61.16 (ahoiwfata ta dikasthia/sou).

Laudatio 348.22-23: tauba eipnou kai/ðocaj (... t) pneuma paraqehrenoj. It appears with differences in VitaEsc f. 245³, 1/19-23, but also in Mpr 57.3-4; Narratio 371.26-28; Malt A 63.5-6; Malt B 63.20-21.

Laudatio 349.8; 10 appears with certain differences in VitaEsc f. 245², 1/11-15, but also in Narratio 372.18-23; Malt A 64.4; Malt B 64.14-15.

All this evidence is enough to disprove the hypothesis of Laudatio’s dependence on Vita and to return to Lipsius’ sagacious conclusion that both texts draw on a common source.

Let us now proceed with the analysis of this subfamily of texts.

a) Conjunctive Issues of Subfamily g

Two issues characterise the documents of this subfamily: firstly, they attest the events at Patras preceding Andrew’s imprisonment that the extant testimonies (Epitome excluded) omit; secondly, they severely abridge the events between Andrew’s imprisonment and his crucifixion.

Lesbos episode: Mpr 47.8-50.24; Laudatio 335.21-338.8.
Reference to Sosios: Laudatio 335.15, 338.13; Vita 244D 5, 245A 3.
Maximilla healed: Laudatio 338.20-339.5; 342.15; Vita 245B; 248C 2 (cf. Epitome 30.5-19) 14³.
Sequence of miracles: Laudatio 338.16-341.8; Vita 245A 8-D 11.
Events at Patras: Laudatio 342.3-344.22; Vita 248B 5-249A 2.
Rework of Vb 4: Laudatio 344.22-345.3; Vita 249B 2-D 1 (Rework of Aegeates’ character different than in Narratio and S/H).

14² C f. 62³, 1/8-64, 1/21.
14³ Passing reference in S (f. 122³, 1/35-37) and H (f. 155³, 6-7).
• Prison door miraculously open: *Laudatio* 345.19-25, 346.8-9; *Vita* 249B 9-C 5, 249C 9-10.
• Stratocles receives ecclesiastical authority from Andrew: *Laudatio* 346.3-9 (cf. also 348.26-27: οἱ ἐπισκόποι Στρατοκλῆς); *Vita* 249C 9-10. Both versions are somewhat different.
• Echoes of the missing speeches by Andrew: *Laudatio* 345.14-346.9; *Vita* 249B 10-C 10.
• Remake of Aegeates character in Vb 39.18-26: *Laudatio*344.30-345.3; *Vita* 249A 11-15.
• Speech to the cross: *Laudatio* 346.16-347.10; *Mpr* 54.21-55.19.
• Andrew tied to the cross: *Laudatio* 347.12-16; *Vita* 249C 12-16; *Mpr* 55.20-26.3.
• Omission of a reference to Andrew’s three-day discourse: *Mpr* 56.3; *Laudatio* 347.24.
• Mention of the fourth day as turning point: *Mpr* 56.3; *Laudatio* 347.25. Third day in *Vita* (see *infra*).
• Same rework of Andrew’s description after three days on the cross: *Mpr* 56.3-8; *Laudatio* 347.25-31. Omitted by *VitaEsc*, f. 245r.

b) Separative Issues within Subfamily g

Some mentions and omissions will help us to refine relationships between the documents.
• Reference to Sosios: *Laudatio* 335.15; 338.13; *Vita* 244D; 245A 3; *VitaEsc* f. 242; omitted by *Mpr*.
• Lesbios episode: omitted by *Vita* and *VitaEsc*.
• Maximilla healed: *Vita* 245A-C, *VitaEsc* f. 242r; *Laudatio* 338.18-339.5; omitted by *Mpr* (as well as any other reference to Aegeates’ wife, with the exception of a passing reference in *Mpr* 57.8).
• Section in speech to the cross: *Mpr* 55.5-11 (cf. *Arm* 18.4-5); omitted by *Laudatio* and *Vita*.
• Speech to the cross: omitted by *VitaEsc* f. 245r.
• Aegeates’ reason only to bind Andrew to the cross: *Mpr* 56.1-3 (cf. *Narratio* 367.29-368.2; S/H 621-22) is different than *Laudatio* 347.14-16 and *Vita* 249C 13-17; *VitaEsc* f. 245r.
• Third day as a turning point: *VitaEsc* f. 245r (so also *Epitome* 36), differently *Mpr* and *Laudatio* (see *infra*).
• Reaction of the people against Aegeates’ judgement: *Mpr* 56.5-8 strongly differs from *Laudatio* 347.31-348.3 and *VitaEsc* ff. 245r-245v.
• Andrew’s description after three days on the cross: omitted by *VitaEsc* f. 245r.
• Aegeates’ fear: *Laudatio* 348.3-6; *VitaEsc* f. 245v. Omitted by *Mpr* 56.9-10.

Consequently:
1. *Laudatio* cannot depend on *Vita*. *Vita* cannot depend on *Laudatio*. Thus, they must have a common source.
2. *Laudatio* cannot depend on *Mpr*. In turn *Mpr* cannot depend on *Laudatio*. It is obvious that the common sources of *Laudatio* and *Vita*, on the one hand, and *Mpr*, on the other, have a common ancestor.

144 From *Vita* 249D 1 onwards Vat. gr. 824 follows *Narratio*. References to *Vita* proceed from now on from *VitaEsc*.
B.2. Subfamily \( \mathbf{g} \) (Narratio, S/H, and Interpolations in 2GrEp)

This subfamily of texts depends on a source that, similarly to that of subfamily \( \mathbf{g} \), applied internal reduction. However, both families follow a different reduction pattern: whereas the source of subfamily \( \mathbf{g} \) has a minor internal reduction, it presents a shorter conclusion. The source of subfamily \( \mathbf{g} \), on the contrary, applied a larger internal reduction (affecting all events at Patras until Stratocles’ return), but in turn retains a longer conclusion including a reworked version of the events after Andrew’s imprisonment that we know from V.

a) Conjunctive Issues of Subfamily \( \mathbf{g} \)

- Inclusion of a reworked version of V: Narratio 360.16-365.6, S (f. 128\(^{r}\), 2/5-130\(^{l}\), 1/13) and H (f. 163\(^{r}\), 18-165\(^{r}\), 3) offer the best testimony of the transformative transmission for Andrew’s speeches while in prison. Comparative analysis of both versions shows that they rely on a very similar source that included an already revised version of the section preserved by V.

- Beginning of V: Narratio (360.16), S (f. 128\(^{r}\), 2/5) and H (f. 163\(^{r}\), 18) begin exactly at the same point: V\(^{b}\) 38.21. Both documents completely omit V’s first (and today incomplete) speech in V\(^{b}\) 38.2-20.

- Maximilla’s speech (first part) omitted: Both texts omit approximately the same section of Maximilla’s speech. Narratio 362.16-23 omits V\(^{b}\) 40.10-41.14. S (f. 128\(^{r}\), 2/27) and H (f. 164\(^{r}\), 11) omit V\(^{b}\) 40.10-41.9.

- Important omission of V\(^{b}\) 41.15: kata\(\tau\)\(\alpha\)\(t\)\(a\)\(i\)\(s\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\mathrm{r}a\)\(r\)\(m\a\)\(a\)\(\mu\a\) Omitted by S (f. 129\(^{r}\), 1/3) and H (f. 164\(^{r}\), 19). Cf. Narratio 362.28-30.

- Maximilla’s speech (second part) omitted: Narratio 363.4-5, S (f. 129\(^{r}\), 1/34) and H (f. 164\(^{r}\), 5) all omit V\(^{b}\) 41.36-42.8.

- Aegeates’ words to Maximilla: Narratio 361.11-362.3 and S (f. 128\(^{r}\), 2/36-128\(^{l}\), 1/29) and H (f. 163\(^{r}\), 3-23) present a rather unaltered version of V\(^{b}\) 39.12-26. Differently, Laudatio and Vita alter this section introducing a strong interpretation of Aegeates’ character\(^{145}\).

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- Andrew’s speech to Stratocles: Narratio 363.9-10, S (f. 129\(^{r}\), 1/37) and H (f. 164\(^{r}\), 7) omit exactly the same section V\(^{b}\) 42.8-31.

- New juncture between Maximilla’s speech and Stratocles’ speech: Narratio 363.5-8, S (f. 129\(^{r}\), 1/34-37) and H (f. 164\(^{r}\), 5-7).

- Andrew’s words to Stratocles in V\(^{b}\) 42.32-43.3: S (f. 129\(^{r}\), 2/2-3) and H (f. 164\(^{r}\), 8-9) (amplified); Narratio 363.9, 11-12 reworks the section altering the primitive sequence of the passage.

- Section of Stratocles’ answer to Andrew in V\(^{b}\) 43.7-8 reworked: similar interpretation (amplification) of the section in Narratio 363.15-23, S (f. 129\(^{r}\), 2/17-20) and H (f. 164\(^{r}\), 16-18).

- Narratio 364.13-15, S (f. 129\(^{r}\), 2/4) and H (f. 165\(^{r}\), 14) present an equivalent interpretation of V\(^{b}\) 43.36-37: ai\(p\i\)\(i\)\(n\)\(m\)\(e\)\(v\)\(h\)\(a\)\(t\)\(a\) j\(a\)\(n\)\(h\a\) j\(o\)\(n\)\(b\)\(i\)j ey\(t\)i\(t\)\(e\)\(t\)\(z\a\)\(o\)\(j\).\(^{146}\) The comparison of both texts shows that they must rely on a source that already included the gloss \(w\j\ q\h\). This

\(^{145}\) Compare Narratio 361.26-27, S (f. 128\(^{r}\), 1/22ff) and H (f. 163\(^{r}\), 17ff) with Laudatio 345.1-3 and Vita 249A 11-15.

\(^{146}\) Compare Narratio 364.13-15: ai\(p\i\)\(i\)\(n\)\(m\)\(e\)\(v\)\(h\)\(a\)\(t\)\(a\) j\(a\)\(n\)\(h\a\) j\(o\)\(n\)\(b\)\(i\)j ey\(t\)i\(t\)\(e\)\(t\)\(z\a\)\(o\)\(j\).\(^{146}\) All this is clearly superfluous, because Aegeates’ characterisation is already achieved by letting him go to eat just after deciding to crucify Andrew.
superfluous detail is an interpolation probably due to a scholion that, written in the margin, finally found its way into the text.

- Omission of section Vb 44.33-45.14: Narratio 364.28-365.5 offers a very interpretative and summary version of Vb 44.17-28 and a passing reference (365.5: ῥήματα ἔθρωμα) to Vb 44.29-33. S (f. 129v, 2/20) and H (f. 165v, 23) omit a larger section: Vb 44.8-45.14.

b) Separative Issues within Subfamily G

- **AAM** in the first part: Narratio 356.19-358.6; omitted by S/H.
- Events after Stratocles’ return to Patras: S (f. 121v, 2/26-128r 2/5) and H (f. 155r, 7-8) due to interpolation: τοῦλήθατε σαρκὶ τὸν ἀδέλφιν ἑαυτῷ ἔφη. Probably marginal note interpolated in the text. The text is not only superfluous but also contradictory. Maximilla’s doubts are not due to her inclination or vice (κακία), but rather to external reasons. Narratio 364.5 paraphrases the passage as: ἀπαντά ταὐτον καὶ εἴσενθαζασά. which seems to support V’s reading.
- Section Vb 43.26-31: amplifying version in S (f. 129v, 1/27-28) and H (f. 165r, 7-8) due to interpolation: τοῦληθατε σαρκι τον αδελφιν εφη. Probably marginal note interpolated in the text. The error might easily be explained as haplography of two equivalent sounds. However, the emendation is not strictly necessary as there are also a couple of examples of ἀνάλογον in genitive. See Herod. 4.95; POxy 903; Pythag., Sin. 28; Olym., Hist. P. 453 D.

Consequently:

147 The problem of an apparent anacoluthic construction (αὖρα first followed by dative and afterwards by genitive) can easily be solved by adding τοῦληθατε σαρκι τον αδελφιν εφη: The error might easily be explained as haplography of two equivalent sounds. However, the emendation is not strictly necessary as there are also a couple of examples of ἀνάλογον in genitive. See Herod. 4.95; POxy 903; Pythag., Sin. 28; Olym., Hist. P. 453 D.

148 Cf. infra, this Chapter § B.3, b, pp. 108-09.
1. Narratio does not depend on S/H nor S/H on Narratio.

2. Narratio, or its source, and the common source for H and S depend on a common hyparchetype.

B.3. Interpolations in 2GrEp

More interesting are the interpolations in 2GrEp due to (Horizontal? Vertical?) contamination, appearing from 2GrEp 10 onwards. It has been suggested that the interpolations in 2GrEp depend on the primitive AA. A comparison of the section 2GrEp 27.13-22 with its parallel in C (Prieur 56.5-57.22) offers decisive evidence to assume that the source for 2GrEp was already revised. 2GrEp omits very important sections preserved in C and supported by Arm and occasionally by S/H.

Interpolations in 2GrEp have close parallels in C, Malt A and B, Laudatio, Mpr, Narratio, and S/H. A more detailed analysis shows that these readings are particularly close to Narratio and S/H, in such a way that it is possible to suppose a genealogical relationship with the documents of subfamily δ. However, 2GrEp occasionally presents readings omitted by Narratio and S/H but preserved in Laudatio. This shows that 2GrEp probably draws from the hyparchetype δ, which was closer to Laudatio than Narratio and S/H.

a) Conjunctive Issues for 2GrEp and Subfamily δ

- Andrew approaches the cross: 2GrEp 23.28-24.19; S (f. 130v, 2/25-27) and H (f. 166v, 4-5); Narratio 367.4-5 (cf. Laudatio 346.15-16; Mpr 54.18-19).

- Beginning of Andrew’s speech to the cross: 2GrEp 25.23-26; S (f. 130v, 2/27-31) and H (f. 166v, 5-8) (Mpr 54.19-21; cf. Conversante 376.23).

- Omission of the second part of the speech to the cross: 2GrEp 25.26; S (f. 130v, 2/31) and H (f. 166v, 8). Narratio 367.6-21 presents its own development of the speech to the cross. For the rest, it omits the entire section.

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149 Less carefully than Bonnet, who considered that the interpolations proceeded from an older version of the martyrdom (AA/A 11/1, XII, quia in eum inserta sunt non nulla ex aliquo martyrio sit uetusto). Prieur (Acta, 13) relates them to the primitive Acts.

150 2GrEp 27.17 omits the following sections preserved by C (f. 62v, 1/20-63r, 1/12): e) touto hgeisqen (...) ahiwdatoi (cf. Arm 22.3ff); C (f. 63r, 1/19-2/6): toh hdonwśefnon (...) ekdeknthn (cf. Arm 24); C (f. 63v, 2/15-63r, 1/10): ej talupet swma (...) akousai al edw (cf. Arm 25).

151 Compare S (f. 131v, 2/11-28) and H (f. 167v, 3-11) with C (f. 62v, 1/20-2/18); S (f. 131v, 1/2-6) and H (167v, 17-19) with C (f. 63v, 1/12-19); and S (f. 131v, 1/16-11) and H (f. 167v, 19-22) with C (f. 63v, 2/6-15).

Andrew is put on the cross: \textit{2GrEp} 25.26-26.1; S (f. 130', 2/35-131', 1/4) and H (f. 166', 10-16); \textit{Narratio} 367.23-25.

Crucifixion’s specifications: \textit{2GrEp} 26.16-18 (with \textit{lacuna}: homoioiteleuton)\footnote{Cf. S (f. 131', 1/3-11) and H (f. 166', 14-18): \textit{auto=toj} \textit{podaj} \textit{kai} \textit{taj masxalaj} \textit{nh} 
\textit{prosperonh} \textit{taj} \textit{autoush} \textit{metaj} \textit{xeraj} \textit{nh} \textit{toj} \textit{podaj} \textit{nh} \textit{nh} \textit{taj ajkufaj} \textit{apotehmotej}.}; S (f. 131', 1/4-12) and H (f. 166', 16-20); \textit{Narratio} 367.25-29. (Cf. \textit{Laudatio} 347.12-14: rework; \textit{Mpr} 55.20-56.1).

Reason for the previous specifications: \textit{2GrEp} 26.18-19; S (f. 131', 1/12-14) and H (f. 166', 20-22); \textit{Narratio} 367.29-368.3 (\textit{Mpr} 56.1-3; cf. \textit{Laudatio} 347.14-16: different reason).

Stratocles’ question and Andrew’s answer: \textit{2GrEp} 26.21-27.17; S (f. 131r, 1/26-2/3) and H (f. 166v, 26-34); \textit{Narratio} 368.4-15.

Central section of Andrew’s speech: \textit{2GrEp} 27.19-20; S (f. 131v, 1/6-9) and H (f. 167r, 19-21). Cf. \textit{Narratio} 368.14-26: very reworked.

Omission of the essentials of Andrew’s speech: compare \textit{2GrEp} 27.15-22, S (f. 131r, 2/11-131v, 1/12) and H (f. 167r, 3-22) with C’s testimony for this section. It is obvious that \textit{2GrEp} and S/H follow a similar model but rework differently\footnote{Thus similarly \textit{Narratio} 369.1-5 presents an interesting remake of the whole section. Compare \textit{Narratio} 369.3: \textit{ofal} \textit{mi} with C (f. 63', 2/20-22): \textit{ekrate ... ofal} \textit{mi} 369.3: \textit{akos} = with C (f. 63', 1/8-10): \textit{kai\ dimesneta uwm} \textit{taj} \textit{akoaj} \textit{akousai all} \textit{egw} 369.3: \textit{kard} = with C (f. 63', 1/2-3): \textit{kai\airabwrisase}\ \textit{mou} \textit{ton} \textit{nou}.}.


Events on the fourth day of Andrew’s crucifixion: \textit{2GrEp} 28.13-20; S (f. 131v, 1/24-35) and H (f. 167r, 30-36); \textit{Narratio} 369.8-13 (after almost two days, however).

Reaction of the people: \textit{2GrEp} 28.20-29.12; S (f. 131v, 2/19-132r, 1/3 and H (f. 167r, 35-167v, 9) with minor differences, cf. infra; \textit{Narratio} 369.13-24 (only two minor amplifications, cf. infra).

Aegeates’ fear and decision to free Andrew: \textit{2GrEp} 29.15-27; S (f. 131', 2/19-132', 1/3) and H (f. 167', 9-22); \textit{Narratio} 369.25-370.7.


Aegeates tries once again to release Andrew: \textit{2GrEp} 31.19-26; S (f. 132', 2/6-16) and H (f. 168', 11-17) with lacuna, see infra; \textit{Narratio} 371.15-18.

\textit{2GrEp} 31.26-31.9 and \textit{Narratio} 371.19 preserve a section omitted by S (f. 132', 2/16) and H (168', 17).

\textit{2GrEp} 32.23: \textit{oh ofiSa, oh ekw, oh fil w ouae}, also preserved by \textit{Narratio} 371.23-24 (slightly amplified); S (f. 132', 2/17-18) and H (f. 168', 18) rework badly: \textit{oh epho} \textit{sha}, \textit{oh ha} \textit{pha} \textit{sha}.

Andrew’s last words: \textit{2GrEp} 32.26-33.10; \textit{Narratio} 371.25-26; S (f. 132', 2/18-21) and H (168', 18-20).

Reference to Andrew’s death: \textit{2GrEp} 35.8-9; \textit{Narratio} 372.1-2; omitted by S/H. (Cf. \textit{Mpr} 57.8-9; \textit{Laudatio} 348.25-26.)

Maximilla rejects Aegeates; Aegeates cannot convince her to come back. Same sequence in \textit{2GrEp} 35.17-23 and S (f. 132', 1/2-17) and H (f. 168', 30-168', 2); \textit{Narratio} 372.7-11 inverts the sequence.

b) Separative Issues for \textit{2GrEp} and the Extant Witnesses of Subfamily G
• The whole section in S (f. 131r, 2/11-131v, 1/6) and H (167r, 3-19): έπαχθείς υπο- 
τείνης th=zh(=...) τον ἄπωλόντος aπονθα τῆν πρὸς καίρον... is omitted by 2GrEp 27.17.

• Conclusion of Andrew’s speech: 2GrEp 27.20-22 preserves the last lines. Not so S (f. 131v, 1/9-12) and H (f. 167r, 21-22).

• 2GrEp 8-9 omits the words kαί προστινήσθθεν ήμείς in S (f. 131v, 1/14-15) and H (f. 167r, 24).

• 2GrEp 28.13-14: ἔπειτα ἡμέρας τις επί μέρος. S (f. 131v, 1/24) and H (f. 167r, 30): ἔπειτα ἡμέρας.

• 2GrEp 28.16-17: τοι' σώματα τον πνευμάτος (cf. Narratio 369.10). Bad reading in S (f. 131r, 1/29-30) and H (f. 167r, 32): τοι' σώματα τον πνευμάτος.

• Reaction of the people: minor differences in Narratio 369.17 (pαύσθος τάραττει): 20-21 (kαί πίστευσιν τούτον αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ χρυσόν θείον) due to amplification. Cf. 2GrEp 28.20-29.12 and S (f. 131r, 1/34-2/18) and H (167r, 30-167v, 9).

• 2GrEp 28.23: πατάτα ἡμᾶς Ἀγία Σ. (f. 131v, 2/4), H (f. 167v, 37) and Narratio 369.16: πατάτα ἡμᾶς Ἀγία Σ.

• 2GrEp 28.25: ἔγειρος ἔλθες (f. 131r, 2/8) and H (167v, 3): ἔγειρον.

• 2GrEp 28.25-26: ἔγειρον S (f. 131v, 2/9) and H (f. 167v, 3): ἔγειρον.

• 2GrEp 29.11-12 omits the section preserved in S (f. 131v, 2/15-16), H (f. 167v, 7) and Narratio 369.21-24.

• 2GrEp 29.27-28 omits Andrew’s rebuke to the brethren: S (f. 132r, 1/4-19) and H (f. 167v, 22-31); Narratio 370.8-18.

• 2GrEp 30.9: τί στηρείς ὡς qαί; (cf. Arm 32.8: Où <veux-tu> m’expédier?) omitted by S (f. 132r, 1/25) and H (f. 168v, 2).

• Lacuna in 2GrEp 30.11 due to homoioteleuton. S (f. 132r, 1/29-32) and H (f. 168v, 3-5): οὐὶ σοὶ συνόντοι, οὐὶ αἱ ταῦτα ἀπανθέστησεν αἱ σταματαί ἐγαύτου = οὐὶ αἱ ἀπιθ σοὶ συνόντοι, οὐὶ αἱ ταῦτα ἀπανθέστησεν αἱ σταματαί ἐγαύτου. 155

• Omission in S (f. 132r, 1/33) and H (f. 168v, 5) of the section 2GrEp 30.12-20. Narratio 371.1-5 only omits 2GrEp 30.12-17.

• Narratio 371.13 omits the section preserved by 2GrEp 30.24-26, S (f. 132v, 2/3-6) and H (f. 168v, 9-11). (Cf. Laudatio 348.21, omits it as well).

• Lacuna in S (f. 132v, 2/14) and H (f. 168v, 18) due to homoioteleuton. 2GrEp 31.23-25: ... δεσπόται: τό οἶνος ποτός τοῦ θρήσκευόν μη διαβόλοντα σοι διαβολοντα σοι διαβολοντα σοι διαβολοντα σοι διαβολοντα... ktl. Cf. Narratio 371.16-17: μὴ παρασύροντας τον οἶνος τοῦ θρήσκευόν μη διαβολοντα σοι διαβολοντα σοι διαβολοντα σοι διαβολοντα... ktl.

• 2GrEp 31.26-32.9 and Narratio 371.19 omitted by S (f. 132v, 2/16) and H (168v, 19).

• Reference to Andrew’s death: 2GrEp 35.8-9 and Narratio 372.1-2 is omitted in S (f. 132v, 2/24) and H (f. 168v, 24).

• Narratio 372.7-11 alters the sequence of S (f. 132v, 1/2-17), H (f. 168v, 30-168v, 2) and 2GrEp 35.17-23.

Consequently:

1. The interpolations in 2GrEp do not depend on the primitive AA. They depend on a revised version as do Narratio and S/H.
2. \textit{2GrEp} cannot depend on S/H or on \textit{Narratio}. Similarities with \textit{Laudatio} and \textit{Mpr} show that the interpolations might proceed from hyparchetype \(\xi\) (or a similar text), which was closer to \textit{Laudatio} than \textit{Narratio} and S/H.

3.1.2.1.2. Transformative Short Version

All the texts included in this group have a common scope: Andrew’s martyrdom. Unlike the witnesses for the transformative long version, these texts do not show any interest in other aspects of Andrew’s activities. According to their length, it is possible to distinguish two different textual families. The first one, which we shall call \(\varepsilon\), includes texts presenting a longer version of the martyrdom, which is preceded by Andrew’s last speech in prison (\textit{Arm}, \textit{Conversante}). Despite presenting a short version of the martyrdom, the numerous parallels between \textit{Malt} B and \textit{Conversante} allows its inclusion in this family. The second, which we shall call \(\eta\), includes texts that regularly begin with the martyrdom itself and present a very similar version thereof (Andrew’s martyrdom in C and \textit{Malt A}).

Before proceeding to an analysis of the interrelationships of the witnesses in this family of texts, some words must be said with regard to including \textit{Conversante} in this group. Since Flamion, it has generally been believed that \textit{Conversante} depends on \textit{Epistle} \(^{156}\). Flamion based his thesis on considering the first eight chapters of \textit{Epistle} \(^{157}\) as completely alien to the original ‘martyrium source’ \(^{158}\). Given the fact that \textit{Conversante}, especially in its first chapter, includes a couple of passages with a dialogue between Aegeates and Andrew, he considers that they depend on \textit{Epistle} \(^{159}\), whose first nine chapters consist mainly of a dialogue between both figures. However, the dialogue between Aegeates and Andrew in \textit{Mpr} 10-13 (52.5-54.16), and similar parallels in other testimonies, present the same stylistic traits \(^{160}\).

A proper study of \textit{Epistle} and \textit{Conversante} shows that correspondences between them are due to the similarity of the sources they draw on. It is obvious that both texts present a certain number of parallels, but, first, these are restricted to the interpolations in \textit{2GrEp}, and, second, they are also present in the remaining witnesses for the martyrdom. This shows that the similarities are nothing other than the normal and necessary parallels between texts that

\(^{157}\) Bonnet, \textit{AAA II/1}, 1-21.
\(^{158}\) Flamion, \textit{L’Apôtre}, 115-16.
\(^{159}\) Flamion, \textit{L’Apôtre}, 45-46.
\(^{160}\) Prieur (\textit{Acta}, 13-14 and 53) thinks that S (f. 127\(^{\prime}\), 1/17-27) and H (f. 161\(^{\prime}\), 17-23) might preserve traces of such a dialogue in a revised form. Further, compare \textit{Conversante} 375.13-25 with S (f. 130\(^{\prime}\), 1/21-34) and H (f. 165\(^{\prime}\), 8-15).
preserve the same tradition. At the same time, Conversante presents enough essential differences from Epistle to dismiss its alleged dependence on the latter.

a) Conjunctive Issues of the Transformative Short Version

- All documents only include AA’s martyrdom.
- Reference to a night-time reunion and Aegeates’ words to Andrew: Conversante 375.10-15 (second part 13-15 is reworked); Arm 7.1-14; Malt A 58.3-12; Malt B 58.21-26; C (f. 60^v, 1/6-2/8).
- Aegeates’ order to torture and crucify Andrew: Conversante 375.26-28; Arm 7.15-18; Malt A 58.13-14; Malt B 58.27-28. C (f. 60^v, 2/10-12).
- All documents present a speech to the cross in varying lengths: Conversante 376.3-10; Arm 16-19; Malt A 60.9-11 (very reduced); Malt B 60.24-27. C (f. 61^v, 2/19-25).
- Andrew tied to the cross: Conversante 376.10-12; Arm 20.1-9; Malt A 60.14-19; C (f. 61^v, 2/23-62^i, 25). Omitted by Malt B 60.28-29.
- Dialogue Stratocles-Andrew: Conversante 376.14-15 (passing reference); Arm 21.6-17; Malt A 60.22-61.6; Malt B 60.30-61.18. C (f. 62^i, 2/14-64^i, 1/7).
- Andrew’s words to the people: Conversante 376.15-17, (passing reference); Arm 22.1-27.20; C (f. 62^i, 1/20-63^v, 1/10).
- People’s reaction at the sight of Andrew’s endurance: Conversante 376.18-377.5; Arm 28.1-25; Malt A 61.12-62.2; Malt B 61.21-62.25. C (f. 64^i, 2/6-64^i, 25).
- Aegeates’ fear: Conversante 377.5-8; Arm 29.1-8; Malt A 62.3-8; C (f. 64^v, 1/26-2/17). Omitted by Malt B.
- Number of people: omitted by Conversante 377.5-8, however, cf. 376.13, ‘uigintia milia’; Arm 29.4-5; Malt A 62.5: disμυρίου (sic). C (f. 64^i, 2/7-8) disμυριοι. Omitted by Malt B 62.26. Cf. S (f. 131^i, 2/24), H (f. 167^i, 12) and Narratio (370.1) disξιφιοι.

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161 Consider the following examples: Reference to destruction of temples: Conversante 374.4-6 and LatEp 3.9; 1GrEp 3.18-4.8; 2GrEp 3.28-4.17, but also Laudatio 337.15-20; Mpr 50.1-6. Andrew’s imprisonment: Conversante 374.14-15 and LatEp 16.1; 1GrEp 16.8-9; 2GrEp 16.18-19, but also Epitome 36; Laudatio 344.19-22; Vita 249A 6-7; Mpr 9 (51.15-20); Narratio 359.15-17; S (f. 127^i, 1/33-2/5) and H (f. 161^v, 26-33). Reference to a night-time discourse: Conversante 375.10-11 and LatEp 18.8-9; 1GrEp 18.18-19; 2GrEp 18.28-29, but also S (f. 130^i, 1/13-25) and H (f. 165^i, 3-10); Narratio 365.7-10; Malt A 58.3-7; Malt B 58.21-26. Andrew tortured and crucified: Conversante 375.26 and LatEp 22.1; 1GrEp 22.8; 2GrEp 22.17, but also S (f. 130^i, 1/34-37) and H (f. 165^i, 15-17); Narratio 365.17-18; Malt A 58.13-4; Malt B 58.29-30. Andrew’s audience: Conversante 376.13: ‘uigintia milia’ and LatEp 26.5 ‘uigintia milia’; 1GrEp 26.12; 2GrEp 26.20-21 and 29.18: disμυριοι, but compare also Malt A 62.5: disμυρίου. See also Arm 21.2; 29.5 and S (f. 131^i, 1/15-18; f. 131^i, 2/25) and H (f. 166^i, 20-22; f. 167^i, 12). Andrew’s endurance and people’s reaction: Conversante 377.5 and 2GrEp 28.8-29.12, but also S (f. 131^i, 1/35-2/18) and H (f. 167^i, 35-167^i, 9): Narratio 369.13-24. Aegeates’ fear: Conversante 377.5-10 and 2GrEp 29.15-23, but also S (f. 131^i, 2725-34) and H (f. 167^i, 12-18); Narratio 379.1-3; Malt A 62.6-8. Andrew’s rebuke to Aegeates (first part): Conversante 377.10-16 and 2GrEp 29.29-30.12, but also S (f. 132^i, 1/21-32) and H (f. 167^i, 32-168^i, 5): Narratio 370.19-371.11; Malt A 62.14-19. Andrew’s rebuke to Aegeates (second part): Conversante 377.17-26 and 2GrEp 31.19-32.9, but also S (f. 132^i, 1/32-2/22) and H (f. 168^i, 5-20); Narratio 371.12-26; Malt A 63.1-5; Malt B 63.16-19.

162 First of all, Conversante includes certain passages of Andrew’s speech to the brethren in V: Conversante 374.18-20; 21; 374.23-375.1; 375.3 (V 44.7; 44.8-9; 44.17-18; 44.29). Epistle omits everything and offers instead a new discourse that does not include anything primitive. The speech to the cross, in spite of Flammion, presents much closer connections with the testimonies of Laudatio, Mpr, Malt B and Arm than with Epistle. See Conversante 376.5-7: ‘qua propter laetus pergo a te, quia secretum tuum cognosco qua de causa fixa est’, omitted by Epistle, and compare to Laudatio 346.16-17; Mpr 54.19-23; Malt B 60.24-27. Cf. Arm 16.3-6 (reworked). Another obvious example is Conversante 376.10-11: ‘et illi litigantes manus et pedes eius secundum quod eis fuerat praeceptum’. Epistle (26.2-4) summarises badly: ‘qui accedentes levaverunt eum in crucem et extendentes funibus totum corpus eius sicut eis iussum fuerat suspenderunt’. Cf. Mpr 55.20-21: oi(dhīnai katedh[anavou]tu]j podai kai[taj xei)rj. 
b) Separative Issues Within the Transformative Short Version

- Omission of Andrew’s reprimand to the brethren: *Conversante* 377.10; *Malt* A 62.14; *Malt* B 62.29; C (f. 65r, 1/5-11; 1/13-24) offers a very unsuccessful résumé of the section. Cf. Arm 30-31.


- Andrew’s second rebuke: *Conversante* 377.22-378.2; *Arm* 37.1-14; *Malt* A 62.20-63.6; *Malt* B 62.30-63.21; C (f. 65r, 2/19-66r, 1/26).

- Conclusion about Maximilla: *Conversante* 378.3-7; *Arm* 38.1-15; *Malt* A 63.7-15; *Malt* B 63.22-32; C (f. 66r, 2/1-66v, 1/7).

- Conclusion about Stratocles: *Conversante* 378.7-10; *Arm* 39.1-9; *Malt* A 63.15-64.3; *Malt* B 63.32-64.15; C (f. 66v, 1/7-1/23).

On the basis of these divergences we can distinguish the two following families of texts.

A. Family e (*Arm, Conversante, Malt* B)

In spite of clear divergences due to their different scopes and characters, *Conversante* and *Arm* present a clear typological relationship. In contrast to the other versions of the martyrdom (*Malt* A and Andrew’s martyrdom in C) that begin after Andrew’s speeches in prison, *Arm* and *Conversante* include Andrew’s last speech to the brethren in a revised form (Vb 44.4-45.33). The existence of this typologically equivalent version of AA’s martyrdom in such remote geographical regions together with strong evidence in the Latin and Armenian texts pointing to a Greek model imply an hyparchetypon presenting the same plan.\(^{163}\)

The study of this lengthier version of the martyrdom is very difficult. Our only testimonies transmit their model far from reliably. Both documents are very reworked. *Arm*, as we argued above\(^{164}\), reworks extensively and its tendency to amplification is obvious.

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\(^{164}\) See *supra* this Chapter, § 2.3.1.2, pp. 75f.
Conversante, even though it occasionally reworks, usually abridges. Its omissions, therefore, do not necessarily imply parallel omissions in its source. In spite of their peculiarities and their opposite character, the former amplifying and the latter resuming, their typological relationship seems to be assured both by their common plan and length and by their following the same sequence of events. Excluding the section between Aegeates’ verdict and Andrew’s crucifixion, which do not fit in the plan of the Latin text, Conversante even though abridging (sometimes in just a couple of words) registers all events mentioned by Arm.

However, Conversante and Malt B do allow a closer textual comparison. Their agreements against Malt A and C show that they belong to a different subcategory of texts.

a) Conjunctive Issues for Conversante and Malt B

- **Beginning:** Conversante 374.21-23: ‘Conversante et docente et praedicante verbum dei beato Andrea apostolo apud Achaiam, comprehensus est ab Aegeate proconsule in civitate Patras’. Malt B 58.21-23: Didaskontoj tou= Andebu tou=apostolou el Patraij the= Exaij upontou Aiheafou tou= upafou kl $ketai ej ful akhn
- **Résumé of the last speech in V:** Conversante 375.10-11: ‘Cum haec et alia plurima exhortans turbam per totam noctem docens’. Malt B 58.23: whi ei de{kai\el\idas\ken\dia\pahj nuktdj:
- **Stratocles and the soldiers (cf. Malt A 59.1-22) is omitted by Conversante 375.28-29 and Malt B 59.30-32.**
- **Andrew’s words to Stratocles (cf. Malt A 59.25-29) are omitted by Conversante 375.28-29 and Malt B 59.30-32.**
- **Andrew’s words to the brethren (cf. Malt A 60.1-6) are omitted by Conversante 376.1 and Malt B 60.24.**
- **Andrew’s speech to the cross (second part) in Conversante 376.6-7: ‘... secretum tuum cognosco qua de causa fixa es’. Malt B 60.26-27: grwrizw sou to\musth\ion di’ o{kai\pephgaj.**
- **Andrew hangs two days on the cross:** Conversante 376.16: ‘nocte igitur die’; 376.18: ‘sequente vero die’; 377.1: ‘biduo enim suspensus’; Malt B 61.21-22: wi de\prwthn kai\deuter a hheran; 62.23: dusi\hheraij krem\renojo $=
- **Words of the people:** Conversante 377.2: ‘et nos suis refecit eloquis’. Malt B 62.23-24: htraj twmlo\gwn ekortasenthj=didaskali\aj autou=
- **Andrew’s prayer in Conversante 377.28-29: ‘ne permittas famulum tuum domine Iesu Christe, qui propter nomen tuum pendit in ligno, solvi. ne permittas secretis tuis inhaerentem humanis tradi conversationibus. ne permittas domine eum qui iam tuam per crucem cognovit magnitudinem ab Aegeate indigno humiliari. sed suscipe me tu magister meus Christe, quem dilexi, quem cognovi, quem retineo quem videre desidero, in quo sum quod sum’. Malt B 63.16-19: mn\de\m\k\h\e\m\t\e\p\a\i\n\w\ou\w\o\a\ti\d\i\k\o\j\ sou\ificio\al\la\a\u\t\o\j\par\a\b\a\l\e\t\o\l\p\e\u\m\a\s\ou\\b\s\o\\u\X\r\i\s\te\ou\e\p\o\b\h\s\a\oh\h\e\d\en\oh\b\h\p\h\s\a\k\w\i\d\a.** Compare to 2GrEp 31.19-26;32.9.

b) Separative Issues for Conversante and Malt B

- **Speech to the brethren in Conversante 374.17-375.9 is omitted by Malt B 58.23.**
- **Andrew tied up to the cross Conversante 376.10-12 is omitted and transformed in Malt B 61.18-19: kai\el\qo\tej\di\h\m\i\o\p\o\s\h\w\a\n\a\t\o\u\e\h\t\s\t\a\r\ou\t\ou\j\pod\a\j\a\w.**
Andrew’s words to the people: *Conversante* 376.15-17 (passing reference). Omitted by *Malt* B 61.18.


Andrew’s first rebuke to Aegeates: *Conversante* 377.10-12 is omitted in *Malt* B 62.29.

**B. Family q (Malt A and C): Begin Reduction**

All the texts grouped in this subfamily begin at exactly the same point, namely the preliminaries of Andrew’s crucifixion. They all preserve a revised form of the last section of *AA*. Of the three witnesses, *Malt* A (O, P) and Andrew’s martyrdom in C, the latter preserves the best and lengthiest version of their common source. A comparison of C with the martyrdom preserved by textual witnesses in other families allows the same conclusion. However, even though not as summary as other versions of the martyrdom, the importance of this document should not be exaggerated. In addition to many textual errors, C is far from reflecting *AA*’s martyrdom in its original form. A comparison with *Arm* shows to what extent C or its model summarises, transforms, or eliminates.

**a) Conjunctive Issues**

- Both texts begin exactly at the same point: Aegeates’ verdict: C (f. 60v, 1/6); *Malt* A 58.3.
- Stratocles’ words to the soldiers: C (f. 61r, 1/24-2/14); *Malt* A 59.1-13.
- Reworking of Andrew’s discourse to Stratocles and brethren: C (f. 61v, 2/11: with evidence of summarising (*ἔπειτα δὲ προσ ἀυτοῖς πολλαὶ καὶ ὅπως ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς ἁγίους Ιησοῦς Χριστόν*); *Malt* A 59.25-29; 60.1-6. (Cf. *Arm* 11.1-15.7: long speech by Andrew.)
- Highly abbreviated version of the speech to the cross: C (f. 61v, 2/17-23); *Malt* A 60.9-11. (Cf. *Arm* 15.8-19.8; *Mpr.* 54.19-55.19; *Laudatio* 346.16-347.10.)
- Number of people: C (f. 64v, 2/7-8): *GLVPXULRL*; *Malt* A 62.25: *GLVPXULRXM* (sic).
- Reworking or elimination of Andrew’s reprimand to the brethren: C (f. 65v, 1/5-13; 1/13-24) clumsily summarises thus changing the meaning (cf. thus, similarly, S (f. 132r, 1/4-19) and H (f. 167v, 22-33). Omitted by *Malt* A 62.14.
- Reworking of Andrew’s first rebuke to Aegeates: C (f. 65v, 2/4-17; 2/17-21; 2/22-65v, 2/8): clumsy résumé, many corruptions; *Malt* A 62.14-19: summarising. (Cf. *Arm* 32.1-36.6.)

**b) Separative Issues**

- Beginning of the martyrdom: C (f. 60v, 1/6): *οὖν λαοί τοῦ μακρίων ἐστιν ἄλλοι πόλεις τῆς Κρήτης ἁγίων Χριστοῦ*; *Malt* A 59.3-4: *tou makriwta tou apostolou Andréa diálogon tois àpsi le foveis* = *Malt* A 59.3-4: *tou makriwta tou apostolou Andréa diálogon tois àpsi le foveis*
- Speech to the cross: C (f. 61v, 12/21-25: *εὐαγγελία καὶ αἱ ἡγεμονίαις σελοῖς χέριν ἐκ πολλὰς κεκοίμηκεν καὶ ἁβάλην χρήσιν χρίσματος χριστιανοῖς ἁγίας τιμή*; *Malt* A 60.10-11: *εὐαγγελία καὶ αἱ ἡγεμονίαις σελοῖς χέριν ἐκ πολλὰς κεκοίμηκεν καὶ ἁβάλην χρήσιν χρίσματος χριστιανοῖς ἁγίας τιμή*).
- Andrew’s discourse to the people: C (f. 62v, 1/14-64v, 2/10); omitted by *Malt* A 61.7.
- Andrew’s reprimand to the brethren: C (f. 65v, 1/5-13; 1/13-24) omitted by *Malt* A 62.11.
- Text’s conclusion in C (f. 66v, 1/17-2/26). Omitted by *Malt* A 64.3.
C does not depend on Malt A. Malt A is not dependent on C: they have a common ancestor.

B.1. The Common Source of P and O

Both documents preserve the same text. However, there are enough textual divergences to confirm that they do not depend on each other. Rather, they depend on a common source.

a) Separative Issues (a selection)
- Malt A 58.6, P: strizonefwn; O: strizonefwn.
- Malt A 58.7, P: neta penya meno; O: neta penya meno.
- Malt A 58.7, omitted by P; O: aut=%
- Malt A 58.8, P: kriewj; O: kriewj.
- Malt A 58.10, P: gunaika palai; O: gunaika th palai.
- Malt A 58.13-14, P: usteron deke eus en a haskol opishai; O: hounstaurwheai.
- Malt A 59.5, P: ekriy a meno; O: ekriy a meno.
- Malt A 59.12, P: apsei proj ton ...; O: apsei sub aut%proj ton ...
- Malt A 59.22, P: el; O: prosetacen.
- Malt A 61.1, P: sterezheca; O: sterezheca.
- Malt A 61.2, P: teknon mou Stratokhis; O: teknon mou Stratokl h=.
- Malt A 61.16, P: ahos wata; O: ahosia.
- Malt A 61.16, P: dikasthia sou; O: hki$hij sou.
- Malt A 62.1, P: tek sarsin heraij krefatai kai$he; omitted by O.

P and O are not mutually interdependent. Rather, they draw on a common source.

3.1.3. Conclusions from the Comparative Textual Analysis of the Versions of AA
3.1.3.1. Overview of the Transformative Transmission
The systematic textual comparison of V and the extant witnesses that preserve a version of the same section of the ancient Acts allows the conclusion that the latter go back to a common, revised source (see next section) which omitted important sections of the primitive text. Despite the lack of a textual touchstone such as V for the martyrdom, the comparative analysis of the textual witnesses for this section shows that the last part of AA also presents revisions. Even the fullest version of the martyrdom in the Greek transmission, Andrew’s martyrdom in C, presents obvious traces of revision cuts. A preliminary comparison of C with the testimonies of S, H and Arm leads to the same conclusion. Arm offers a much fuller version of the martyrdom and presents numerous sections that are missing in the Greek transmission. Admittedly, this field of investigation is rather shaky because the lack of parallels means that the Armenian passages cannot be tested, and we have seen above that when the Armenian translation can be checked, Arm is far from giving a literal version of its source. As a result it cannot be ascertained whether these sections are primitive or simple.

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165 As Calzolari, ‘Rapporto’, 149-55 and ‘Version arménienne’, 156-61 argues, the study of the Armenian sections without parallels in the Greek transmission must be based on a careful lexical and structural comparative
amplifications peculiar to Arm. For our present purposes, however, such a question is irrelevant. More important is the fact that on nine occasions these passages appear immediately before or after sections that present traces of cutting in the Greek transmission. The fact that all textual witnesses agree in presenting irregularities precisely in the same sections implies that something is happening with the source. If our conclusion is correct and the source of the transformative transmission was already revised, it seems obvious that differences between the extant textual witnesses of the Greek and Latin transmission should be explained otherwise than is customary. A careful comparative study of all versions of AA allows the conclusion that textual transformations peculiar to the different texts correspond to their literary scope. In this sense, their peculiar reduction patterns are also the means to achieve their specific textual goals. Family a, or Epitome, skips Andrew’s martyrdom and only preserves a brief mention of the end. This reduction pattern is strictly the result of Gregory’s literary objective: he is only interested in Andrew’s wondrous activities. Family b, in contrast, applies internal reduction: texts in this group are mainly interested in Andrew’s apostolic career. Consequently, they focus both on the beginning and on the end of his activities. Textual diversification within this family once again presents the same reduction procedure: the source of S and H applies reduction at the beginning and presents a unity of action which begins and ends in the same geographical location. The source of Narratio also sticks to the reduction pattern peculiar to its family, internal reduction. In this sense, it preserves the beginning and end but reduces the central section to a greater extent than S and H. LatEp, finally, applies reduction at the beginning because it is only interested in those elements of Andrew’s martyrdom that can be included in a new textual framework.

With regard to the transformative short version, it applies reduction at the beginning. It is plausible to think that the source of this group of texts included Andrew’s last speech to the

166 In order to facilitate the checking of these sections we will now quote Prieur’s edition. The nine passages are the following: (1) Section AAgr 53.16-54.3 is a rather problematic one in all textual witnesses and Prieur’s reconstruction mainly relies on S and H (see app. ad loc. and note the confusing reference in app. ad 54.1-3: O and P do not sustain the reading of S and H). Precisely in this section, Arm 11-15 includes a passage only attested by this document. (2) Section AAgr 54.7-10 is also problematic and presents cuts in S, H, O, P, Q, Laudatio, Mpr, 2GrEp. Arm 16-19 presents a more developed section that is partly sustained by Laudatio 346.16-347.10 and Mpr 55.17-56.19. (3) Section AAgr 56.19-57.4 is completely omitted by all textual witnesses except occasionally S and H and occasionally C. Arm 23 here includes a more developed section. (4) Section AAgr 57.22-58.1 is very problematic and is only attested by C and very fragmentarily by 2GrEp. After AAgr 58.1, Arm 26.6-13 also includes a section missing in the Greek transmission. (5) After AAgr 58.18, S and H pick up the narration. At this point Arm 27.16-17 includes additional text. (6-8) Chapter AAgr 61 is a very problematic one. Most textual witnesses (Laudatio, 2GrEp, O, P, Q, Mpr) simply omit it, but C, S and H preserve it fragmentarily. Precisely in this section Arm includes up to three sections 30.6-10; 12-15 and 31.2-10 (Leloir wrongly, 5-11). (9) AAgr 62.28-30. Problematic section: C stops, S and H begin, Laudatio stops, O, P, Q omit it altogether. Arm 35.2-15 includes here a section unknown to the Greek transmission.
brethren in its entirety. As we will show below, the evidence provided by Arm and Conversante, on the one hand, and by Narratio, S and H, on the other, seems to allow such a conclusion. The fact that four documents present different recasts of this section seems to imply that the speech was complete in their source and that they each adapted it to their own literary scope. In any case, the texts within subfamily $\phi$, namely the Armenian and Latin versions, as they begin exactly at the same point, seem to imply the existence of a Greek source with the same plan. A proper comparison of Arm and Conversante, however, is at present difficult, for they apply completely different working procedures when adapting their source. Finally, the affinity between Conversante and Malt B (Q) with regard to preserved and omitted sections in the martyrdom seems to imply that they rely on a common source.

With regard to subfamily $\phi$, the texts included here present the shortest section of $AA$. They all begin at exactly the same point, namely with Aegeates’ order to crucify the apostle. As already stated, C presents the fullest version of the martyrdom. Malt A (O and P), in contrast, present a highly summarising version that systematically eliminates all discursive sections.

3.1.3.2. The Source of the Transformative Transmission

As has already been pointed out, the lack of any other reliable source to check the textual transformations of the transformative branch implies that the study of its common source must be confined to the section preserved by V. Textual comparison has shown that all extant witnesses present a reworked version thereof. On the other hand, a proper textual comparison of the reworked textual witnesses with one another is difficult since all six documents present divergent textual characteristics. Narratio, S and H preserve a lengthier version of V as they present a selective account of the whole section. Laudatio and Vita, in their turn, present a very reworked version of V that only preserves some highlights and introduces important amplifications to achieve their particular recasting. Arm and Conversante, finally, merely present a complete and a selective version of Andrew’s last speech to the brethren, respectively. In spite of these differences, it is plausible to assume that the common, revised ancestor of these six texts looked as follows:

- $V^b$ 38.21-40.10. The revised version of V surely began at $V^b$ 38.21. Andrew’s first speech to the brethren is completely missing from all the transformative textual witnesses. Four of these texts (Narratio, S, H, Laudatio and Vita) include a version of the section $V^b$ 38.21-40.10. Whereas the source common to Narratio, S and H preserved a lengthier version that included the preliminaries of Aegeates’ speech to his wife, the speech itself, and the first part of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla, the source common to Laudatio and Vita preserved a highly reduced account. Both documents, nevertheless, include a résumé of

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167 See infra this Chapter, p. 118f.
Aegeates’ words to his wife and a summary remake of the first part of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla.

- **Vb 41.9-41.35.** All four witnesses preserve a version of this section that includes the last part of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla. While S and H include the section Vb 41.9-41.35 completely, *Narratio*’s writer perceived the banality of its first part and simply left it aside in order to begin in Vb 41.14. Both texts, however, preserve Andrew’s advice to Maximilla to resist Aegeates’ threats and not to pay attention to the sufferings of his visible body. *Laudatio* and *Vita* confine themselves to reporting the two central issues of Andrew’s advice in a very summary way.

- **Vb 42.8-9.** All four textual witnesses omit Andrew’s speech to Stratocles. However, their common source probably included a reference to Aegeates’ brother, as may be inferred from *Narratio*, S and H.

- **Vb 42.32-44.3.** The best testimonies are, once again, *Narratio*, S and H. They present the fullest version of this section, although they both also transform Stratocles’ answer to Andrew. *Laudatio* and *Vita* omit the entire answer, but by mentioning Stratocles they show that they draw on the same common source168. The narrative section relating Maximilla’s final decision to abandon every aspect of materiality is preserved by all four documents. While *Narratio*, S and H preserve a rather reliable version, *Laudatio* and *Vita* recast the section and present it in a dialogue form. The contents, however, are exactly the same as in the other two versions.

- **Vb 44.4-45.33.** A comparative analysis of the four versions of this section (*Narratio*, S, H, *Conversante* and *Arm*) allows the assumption that the common source of the transformative branch included a complete version of Andrew’s last speech to the brethren. The lack of agreement between the extant witnesses with regard to preserved and omitted sections seems to allow the conclusion that their common source preserved the whole speech and that textual divergences are due to individual textual selection and working procedures. *Narratio* includes the best version of the Greek transmission, as it preserves the sections Vb 44.4-9; 14-16; 17-28 and 29-35. S and H, in turn, follow their characteristic working procedure and preserve the beginning (Vb 44.4-8) and end (Vb 45.15-33) of the speech. *Conversante* preserves the sections Vb 44.4-8; 8-16; 17-28 and 29-37. Even though this document is highly transformed, it generally preserves enough primitive elements to prove that it is working from a lengthier source. *Arm*, finally, presents the longest version of Andrew’s last speech to the brethren. However, as already seen, it amplifies the text considerably and frequently transforms conceptual issues.

168 See *supra* this Chapter, § 3.1.1, D.1 and E.1, p. 91.
After reviewing the sections included by the common source of the transformative branch, we should now summarise those sections that were omitted by the same source. These are the following:

- $V^b$ 38.2-20, including Andrew’s first speech to the brethren.
- $V^b$ 40.10-41.8 including the central section of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla.
- $V^b$ 41.36-42.31 including the last section of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla and Andrew’s speech to Stratocles.

These sections include the most important conceptual developments of $AA$’s fragment in $V$. If to these three lengthy omissions we add the fact that the four textual witnesses that preserve the speech in $V^b$ 44.4-45.33 each present a different version, it becomes clear that the transformative textual transmission has completely eliminated or transformed $AA$’s primitive message.

The obvious conclusion from this survey is that the transformative branch of $AA$’s textual transmission, which includes all the extant witnesses except $V$, has severely transformed the primitive text by altering or eliminating its original message. In spite of our lack of a textual touchstone to prove the reliability of other sections, such as the events at Patras and Andrew’s martyrdom, it is not only plausible but also highly probable that in these sections, too, the texts have severely transformed their source. At present, $AA$’s fragment in $V$ is our only reliable textual witness to reconstruct $AA$’s original thought and message.

3.1.4. Hypothetical Stemma of the Transformative and Non-Transformative Transmission

On the basis of the typological and textual comparative analysis, it is possible to establish a hypothetical stemma that includes all testimonies presenting the events after Andrew’s arrival in Patras. As already mentioned, the characteristics of $AA$’s transmission exclude the possibility of a strenge Stemmatik. The analysis of its historical development is only possible after the individual character of the documents and the consequent adaptation of Andrew’s traditions to their peculiar scopes has been recognised. This means to say that their divergences are not, as is generally believed, due to censure or revision, but rather to the effects of the adaptation of $AA$ to changing purposes through history.
Notes to the stemma: AA’s circulation in its original form can be relatively ascertained during the fourth century. f represents the non-revised archetype from which a revised version would be derived. ‘Transformative transmission’ is the name given to this hypothetically revised version. The split into two branches, long and short, describes the two groups of texts passed down by AA’s transmission. Within the former, families α and β distinguish two clear reduction patterns, namely end reduction and internal reduction, respectively. Subfamily γ, thanks to its peculiar internal reduction pattern, presents parallels both with family α (or Epitome) and with subfamily δ. At the same time, subfamily δ, with a different reduction pattern, presents interesting issues. Narratio, being longer than S/H, presents contacts with Laudatio and with S/H. The special characteristics of S/H show that, even though including a rather lengthy version of the martyrdom, they do not represent a martyrdom text in the strict sense of the word. The ‘short version’, in turn, was detached from the transformative version at a certain point between the beginning of the fifth and the middle of the sixth century. Two groups of texts may be distinguished. Family ε represents the longest group. Arm and Conversante are its extant representatives. Malt B (Q), in spite of being a short version of the martyrdom, also belongs to this group. Siglum r represents the hyparchetypon common to Conversante and Q. Family θ applies reduction at the beginning. C presents a rather complete version of its source. Plen 649, as it also presents a short version of the martyrdom, may also be included in this group. Finally, t is the common source of O and P.

4. Towards an Explanation of AA’s Textual Diversification

Once we have sorted the documents on the basis of their textual characteristics and have provided this classification with a consistent foundation by analysing their textual divergences and convergences, it is time to place our results into a context and to attempt a historical explanation of AA’s textual diversification. On the one hand, the stylistic traits of the vast majority of the textual witnesses reveal clear traces of rewriting. On the other, the comparative textual analysis of these testimonies confirms this conclusion insofar as they always present an abridged version of V. The question now arises whether the almost complete disappearance of the primitive text and the emergence of textual transformations are exclusively due to internal reasons, namely to the character and tenor of the primitive text, or whether we have also to consider other external reasons, such as AA’s alleged circulation among Manicheans or the rise of new literary genres to suit the new needs of emerging orthodox Christianity.

4.1. Circulation of the Primitive AA until the End of the Fourth Century

There has been much speculation about the tenor of the primitive AA. A good deal of this speculation is allegedly supported by AA’s indirect transmission, that is, by the references to or comments about AA. As we will see now, however, these references are both too scanty and too superficial to allow an assessment of the orientation of AA’s thought that may explain its early stigmatisation.

The indirect transmission from the fourth century onwards documents AA’s circulation in a wide geographical area and in a variety of ideological groups, including Encratites, Apotactics, Origenists, Manicheans, and ascetic movements in the Occident. Even though our very first reference in Eusebius is not at all informative on the issue and simply defines AA as
‘spurious’ (noppj)169, Epiphanius’ Panarion localises AA in three of these heretic environments, the Encratites, Apotactics and Origenists170. The alleged circulation among these groups has given rise to the suggestion that AA appealed to them because of its ascetic or encratite character, but the inclusion of Origenists seems to invalidate this hypothesis171.

As far as the three references to AA in a Coptic Manichean Psalter are concerned172, they allegedly prove that Manicheans read AA at the end of the third century173, but the confusing character of these references174 seems to suggest indirect rather than direct acquaintance with AA175. As for the Pseudo-Titus-Epistle, it has been used to support the


170 Epiphanius, Adv. haer. 47.1.5 for Encratites; 61.1.5 for Apotactics; and 63.2.1 for Origenists. Prieur (Acta, 99f) mentions a fourth group (Ebonitories), but this passage (Adv. haer. 30.16), generally referring to ‘acts of apostles’, does not necessarily include AA (Adv. haer. 30.16.6, P r a t e i j d e s i l l a j k a l o u i n a p o s t o l i n k t l.). See Peterson, ‘Beobachtungen’, 212. See also J.D. Kaestli, ‘L’utilisation des actes apocryphes des apôtres dans le manichéisme’, in M. Krause (ed) Gnosis and Gnosticism. Papers of the seventh International Conference on Patristic Studies (Leiden, 1977) 107-116 at 115.

171 Prieur, Acta, 99, describes these groups as encratite, but Epiphanius’ detailed description of their beliefs and practices allows one to dismiss the alleged ascetic trend as their common trait. Although Encratites and Apotactics may indeed have been ascetics, Origenists were not. Epiphanius’ account (Adv. haer. 63.1.3-4) of their sexual behaviour shows that they were rather the opposite. Lipsius more plausibly (Apostelgeschichten I, 543) points to dualism as a common characteristic.

172 Allberry, Psalm-Book II, 142.20ff, 143.13ff, and 192.26ff. The editor dates the Coptic text to 340, although this is a translation of a Greek version relying on a Syriac original. Furthermore, Allberry, ‘Manichæan Studies’, JTHS 39 (1938) 347-49. Kaestli, ‘L’utilisation’, 114f, believes that the attribution of some of the Psalms to direct disciples of Mani, such as Thomas and Heracleides, implies that the composition of the Psalter can be dated to the end of the third century, namely to the start of the Manichean Church.


174 These references are rather vague and present much confusion. The first passage (Allberry, Psalm-book II, 142.20-21) has two dubious references, namely a crucifixion of Andrew’s disciples not attested in any of the texts related to the apostle, and an arson attack on Andrew’s lodgings. The relationship of the latter episode with the End of the third century, namely to the start of the Manichean Church.

175 According to Kaestli, ‘L’utilisation’, 115-16, Mani might owe his knowledge of the apocryphal Acts of the apostles to the fact that they were used in the Judaean-Christian and Gnosticising milieus where he passed his youth. See G.P. Luttikhuisen, The Revelation of Eclesaii. Investigations into the Evidence for a Mesopotamian Jewish Apocalypse of the Second Century and its Reception by Judeo-Christian Propagandists (Tübingen, 1985) 163-64, 220-22.
hypothesis that AA was read among Priscillianists and ascetic groups in Spain. More recent studies on this epistle, however, not only prefer an earlier dating to the fourth century, but also dismiss its alleged Spanish origin.

Consequently, not very much can be concluded from these references. Epiphanius simply names our text without giving any further details; the Manichean Psalter’s knowledge of AA is rather dubious and the *Pseudo-Titus-Epistle* allows quite different conclusions than are customarily drawn.

But even in the case that AA’s circulation in these contexts could be established, this by no means implies the assumption of a distinctive trait, common to our text and to all these milieus (dualism or encratism, according to Lipsius and Prieur, respectively), in order to explain their interest in AA. Such an assumption might be misleading, because the interpretation of AA peculiar to a given group does not necessarily exhaust other possible interpretations of the text. At the same time, we might easily jump to the wrong conclusions by construing a particular aspect of our text as its general trait. The fact that certain aspects of AA, for example dualism or encratism, allegedly appealed to certain groups obviously does not imply that they occupied a central position in the primitive text’s thought.

If all these references indeed always refer to the same text, all we can conclude from them is that AA in fact appealed to a variety of ideological environments. Consequently, there is no reason to assume that the almost complete elimination of the primitive text was due to the fact that it presented marked sectarian thought to orthodox eyes. This seems to be a plausible conclusion not only from the range of environments in which it allegedly circulated, but also from the contradictory opinions of ecclesiastical authorities when assessing the text’s heretic character (below).

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177 De Santos Otero (‘Pseudo-Titus-Brief’, 90-91), followed by Prieur (*Acta*, 20-1), associates the epistle with Spanish ascetic groups close to Priscillianism of the middle of fifth century. His hypothesis is based on (1) the existence in Spain from early times of extreme ascetic movements; and on (2) the testimony of ‘offiziellen Dokumente der spanischen Hierarchie’, which when reProving its ideological orientation associate it with Priscillianism. De Santos Otero, however, admits a second possibility: the epistle might have also been written by an ‘enthusiastic catholic’. According to Sfameni Gasparro (‘L’Epistula’, 4652) both possibilities can be rejected. On the one hand, there is no objective evidence in the epistle that might induce one to associate it with Priscillianism, and on the other, the very tone and character of the text excludes the ‘catholic’ possibility. Based on (1) the analogy between the epistle and other works datable to the fourth century; on (2) the absence of references to the monastic institution; and on (3) the free use of apocryphal literature, she (‘L’Epistula’, 4654-5) prefers an earlier dating to the fourth century. In addition, given the existence of ascetic movements not only in Spain but also in Gaul and Africa, once one has dismissed the ‘Priscillianist theory’, Spanish provenance is not a necessary hypothesis. One should also consider the ‘alternativa (...) africana’.

178 Which they clearly do not, see *supra* this Chapter, note 168, for the alleged reference to AA by Origen *ap. Eusebius*. 
4.2. AA’s Alleged Use by Manicheans as the Origin of its Stigmatisation

In contrast to the range of environments in which AA is said to circulate during the third and the fourth centuries, from the beginnings of the fifth century our sources only report its circulation among Manicheans. At first sight, the consistency of these reports raises serious doubts, since they do not always suggest direct knowledge of the text and since the only testimony from the Manichean side is that of Faustus of Milevis, which, moreover, is mediated by Augustine. Besides, at this time the Manicheans had become the heretics. As the orthodoxy-heresy polarity becomes Christianity-Manicheism, non-canonical writings were considered to be composed, interpolated or used by Manicheans.

The possibility that the apocryphal Acts were composed by Manicheans or that they circulated among them before the end of the fourth century seems to be ruled out by the fact that neither Eusebius nor Epiphanius report anything of the kind. There are, however, scholars who surmise a Manichean corpus, with or without canonical validity, including the five major Acts. Against the possibility of seeing a Manichean canon in this alleged collection, Kaestli already argued that only Mani’s writings seem to have had such status. Besides, in our opinion, the testimony of Augustine, a Manichean himself before 383, also seems to invalidate such a hypothesis. Augustine refers a couple of times to the apocryphal Acts, and if they had been included in a defined corpus we would expect him to have given some indication of the fact. On the contrary, he does not seem to know anything of the kind. His first reference in Against the Manichean Faustus, written in 397/8, mentions ‘apocryphal writings’ in general, among which he only explicitly refers to Thomas, and he does not seem to know anything about a writer. On the other hand, a couple of years later, in his Against

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181 For this issue see Schäferdiek, ‘Manichean Collection’, 90 and note 45, who is reacting to Kaestli, ‘L’utilisation’, 108-12 and Junod-Kaestli, Histoire, 140, and claims a wider definition of the term ‘corpus’.
182 See supra this Chapter, note 173.
183 Kaestli, ‘L’utilisation’ 111-12. See, however, supra this Chapter, note 180.
184 Even though not fully initiated into Manicheism, Augustine was a Manichean for 9 or 10 years (see K.L. Edwin Lee, Augustine, Manicheism, and the Good (New York, 1999) 5 and 95 notes 4 and 5) and seems to have been well acquainted with Mani’s writings (Augustine, Nat. bon. 44) and with other Manichean writings (Confes. 3.4.10; C. Faust. Manich. 13.6. See J. van Oort, ‘Augustin und der Manichäismus’, ZRGG 46 (1994) 126-42.
185 Augustine, C. Faust. Manich. 22.79 (CSEL 25, p. 681): legunt scripturas apocryphas Manichei, a nescio quibus sutoribus fabularum sub apostolorum nomine scriptas: quae suorum scriptorum temporibus in auctoritatem sanctae ecclesiae recipi merentur, si sancti et docti homines, qui tunc in hac vita erant et examinare talia poterant, eos vera locutos esse cognoscerent. (My highlighting). In C. Adimantium, Augustine says that Manicheans consider the apocryphal writings ‘most incorrupt’ (17.2, scripturas apocryphas incorr uptissimas) and explicitly mentions the Acts of Thomas (17.2) and the Acts of Peter (17.5), but he never refers to a collection of texts. In around 420, he again explicitly mentions only the Acts of Andrew and the Acts of John, Augustine, C. adv. leg. 1.20, 39 (CCSL 49, p. 70), Sane de apocryphis iste posuit testimonia, quae sub nominibus apostolorum Andreae Ioannisque conscripta sunt.
the Manichean Felix (404), he does mention a writer, namely Leutius (sic), but he remains vague with regard to the text(s) he is referring to.\(^{186}\)

The very same testimony of Augustine also seems to rule out the hypothesis suggested by Schäferdiek that this collection, even without a canonical character, was put together by Manicheans at the end of the third century.\(^{187}\) It seems more reasonable to suggest that these texts were collected, if at all, no earlier than the end of the fourth century. As a matter of fact, if we exclude the problematic references in the Manichean Psalter, none of our references allow us to go back beyond this date. A more plausible hypothesis is, consequently, to assume with Bremmer that a Latin translation of the five major Acts was completed by a Manichean in North Africa at the end of the fourth century, more precisely between 359 and 385.\(^{188}\) This might indeed explain the curious proliferation from the early fifth century, especially in the West, of references that bring the apocryphal Acts into close connection with Manicheism.

Be that as it may, the fact is that from the end of the fourth century onwards \(AA\) was systematically related to Manicheans and all our references appear in the context of Manichean polemics.\(^{189}\) Even though most of these references do not seem to suggest direct knowledge of \(AA\), its alleged Manichean provenance was enough to determine its condemnation by the ecclesiastical authorities.\(^{190}\) Admittedly, the testimonies of Philaster of Brescia and Turribius of Astorga (below) bear witness to a more flexible attitude that would

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186 For Augustine’s alleged reference to \(AA\) in C. Felic. Manich. 2.6, see supra Chapter 1, p. 8 note 65. This passage presents some problems, however. Firstly, Augustine does not mention \(AA\) but refers in general to the ‘Acts of Leucius’. Secondly, it appears in a section where Augustine is interested in defending the idea of \textit{liberum arbitrium}, and consequently it might appear rather transformed to suit his argument. Thirdly, he seems to be quoting from memory (Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 108) and this implies the possible introduction of personal interpretations of the text. Even if not literal, his reference might present \textit{mutatis mutandis} a parallel for a preserved passage of \(AA\).


188 Bremmer, ‘Apocryphal Acts: Authors, Place, Time and Readership’, in Bremmer, \textit{Acts of Thomas}, 149-70 at 154-56. The chronological precision is achieved by means of combining an institutional detail, the mention of the \textit{curiosi} or \textit{agentes in rebus}, a kind of imperial secret police that reported directly to the emperor only from 359 onwards, and the date of the execution of Priscillian in 385, who shows knowledge of the \(AAA\) in the so-called Würzburg tractates (for which, H. Chadwick, \textit{Priscillian of Avila} (Oxford, 1976) 77f.

189 Augustine, \textit{De actis cum Felic. Manich.} 2.6; Evodius of Uzala, \textit{De fide contra Manich.} 5; 38; Philaster of Brescia, \textit{Div. her. lib.} 5-7 (CCSL 9, 255-6); Turribius of Astorga, \textit{Ep. ad Id. Cep. episc.} 5 (PL 54.694C); Innocent I, \textit{Ep.} 6.7 (PL 20.502); Leo I, \textit{Ep.} 15.15 (PL 54.688A); Timothy of Constantinople (PG 86.1.21C) ascribes \(AA\) to Manicheans together with other texts.

190 From all the references previously quoted (\textit{supra} this Chapter, note 188) only Evodius seems to have direct knowledge of \(AA\). Even though in \textit{De fide contra Manicheos} 5 Evodius repeats Augustine’s controversy against Manicheism and adduces the same passage (supra Chapter 1, note 65) without adding anything new, later on in the same work he paraphrases two sections of \(AA\). In the first one (Evodius I) he mentions Euclia’s episode (see \textit{supra} Chapter 1, note 58) and the second one (Evodius II, \textit{supra} Chapter 1, note 59) refers to a \textit{puerulus quidam speciosus, quem uult Leucius uel deum uel certe angelum intellegi} that imitates the ‘pains of women’ to delude Aegeates.
facilitate \textit{AA}'s later remakes, but the hard line represented by Innocent I\textsuperscript{191} and Leo I\textsuperscript{192} condemned our text to the flames\textsuperscript{193}.

4.3. The Functional Transformation of Texts and the Rise of New Literary Genres

However, if \textit{AA}'s alleged Manichean provenance is the plausible origin of its systematic elimination, how is it possible that we possess so many versions based on the primitive text? There is evidence to suggest that \textit{AA}'s textual diversification is due to the appearance and development of new literary genres, which were designed to meet the increasing demand for religious texts for the celebration of special festivities, services and anniversaries.

The martyrdom genre reveals the growing need for texts for the veneration of saints and for the calendar observances of their deaths. This practice, as has been pointed out, seems to have started at an early date, as appears from the \textit{Martyrdom of Polycarp}, the sending of the Letter of the Churches of Lyon and Vienna and from the \textit{Martyrdom of Pionius}\textsuperscript{194}. However, it is not until the Council of Carthage (397) that it seems to have become official, for in spite of the general condemnation of apocryphal literature the council allows the reading of the passions of the martyrs \textit{cum anniversarii eorum dies celebrantur}\textsuperscript{195}. The numerous martyrdom texts among \textit{AA}'s textual witnesses testify to the importance of this practice.

At the same time, the testimonies of the indirect transmission of \textit{AA} show the appearance and development of another literary genre that focuses on the miraculous activities of the saints. The testimony of Philaster of Brescia, who might have had direct acquaintance with \textit{AA}\textsuperscript{196}, is already evidence of this incipient development because it stresses an internal

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Innocent I, \textit{Ep.} 6.7 (\textit{PL} 20.502), \textit{Caetera autem, quae vel sub nomine Matthiae sive Jacobi minoris, vel sub nomine Petri et Joannis, quae a quodam Leucio scripta sunt [vel sub nomine Andreae, quae a Nexocharide et Leonida philosophis], vel sub nomine Thomae, et si qua sunt alia, non solum repudianda, verum etiam noveris esse damnanda.}
  \item Cf. Leo I, \textit{Ep} 15.15 (\textit{PL} 54.688A), \textit{apocryphae autem scripturae, quae sub nominibus apostolorum multarum habent seminarium falsitatum, non solum interdicendae, sed etiam penitus auferendae sunt, atque ignibus concremandae.}
  \item Prieur’s conclusion on the basis of these references (\textit{Acta}, 111-16) that \textit{AA} was used by Priscillianists is unconvincing. Firstly, because the reference to \textit{AA} in the letter of Innocent I is probably an interpolation (cf. Flamion’s admission [\textit{L’Apôtre}, 263 note 1] that this reference does not appear in \textit{all manuscripts} but only in the \textit{Collectio Dionysiana} and in the \textit{Collectio Hispana}). Secondly, nothing confirms that Leo I (\textit{PL} 54.688A) includes \textit{AA} when generally referring to \textit{apocryphae scripturae ... quae sub nominibus apostolorum}. Thirdly, the relationship between \textit{Pseudo-Titus-Epistle} and Priscillianism has been refuted by Sfameni Gasparro (‘\textit{L’Epistula}’, see \textit{ supra} this Chapter, note 176). Finally, the \textit{Decretum Pseudo-Gelasii} simply mentions \textit{AA} without relating it to any heretic group.
  \item Bremmer, ‘\textit{Perpetua}’, 80. See \textit{MartPolyc.} 18.3; \textit{Ep. Eccl. Lugd. Vien.} 1; \textit{MartPionii} 2.
  \item Philaster almost certainly read \textit{AA}. His testimony is interesting, firstly, because it is informative concerning Andrew’s itinerary: Pontus and Greece are referred to as the beginning and end of his journey. On the different interpretations of the word ‘\textit{Pontus}’, see MacDonald, \textit{Cannibals}, 21-22. On Pontus and Bithynia as possible
dichotomy in our text: the ethical message is valuable and should be read a perfectis, but the miracles have been interpolated by heretics\textsuperscript{197}. This development is confirmed some years later by Turribius of Astorga (c. 450), our first explicit reference to this dichotomy, for he not only distinguishes between doctrine and miracles, but also attributes the former to heretic interpolations and only retains the latter as the true testimony of the apostles\textsuperscript{198}. A similar distinction can also be seen in the so-called \textit{Passio Ioannis} attributed to Melito, Bishop of Laodicea\textsuperscript{199}, who stresses that while the miracles included in these texts are true, the doctrine is false. These references not only show a general mistrust of rational argumentation, but also the increasing appeal of miraculous narratives. The dichotomy words-deeds, consequently, provides the basis for the creation of a new genre that is exclusively interested in the apostle’s miraculous activities. This practice is explicitly documented by John of Salonica at the beginning of the seventh century\textsuperscript{200} and by the writer of the \textit{Miracula beati Thomae apostoli}\textsuperscript{201}, but appeared already at an earlier date, as \textit{AAM}, PCU 1 and the \textit{Epitome} by Gregory of Tours clearly attest.

As time went by, a new textual genre would appear alongside martyrdom texts and miraculous literature. A new interest in the life and deeds of the apostle generated the production of comprehensive accounts of Andrew’s activities, which either recombined the

\textsuperscript{197}Philaster of Brescia, \textit{Div. her. lib.} 5-7 (CCSL 9, 255-56): \textit{Scripturae autem absconditae, id est apocrypha, eti legi debent morum causa a perfectis, non ab omnibus legi debent, quia non intelligentes multa addiderunt et tulerunt quae voluerunt heretic}.

\textsuperscript{198}For the grammatical difficulty of this sentence and the lacuna (after \textit{apostolum}) restored with ‘adhibent’ or ‘legunt’ see Nagel, ‘Die apokryphen Apostelakten’, 159-60 and notes 62-66. See in general Lipsius, \textit{Apostelgeschichten} I, 544f. With regard to Philaster’s mentioning ‘talking cattle, dogs, and animals’, as far as Andrew is concerned, there is an interesting example of a talking dog in one of the Coptic fragments published by O. von Lemm (‘Koptische Miscellenen LXVIII-LXXII’, \textit{BAISSIP} 6e série, 4 (1910) 61-69 at 63/67) and preserved by Codex Copt. Paris. 129, f. 87 Recto b 9-23, which apparently belongs to the \textit{Acts of Andrew and Philemon}. For other examples in the \textit{Acts of Peter, Paul and Thomas}, see Schäferdiek ‘Manichean Collection’, 90-91, although his inference that this description allows us, in spite of Philaster’s omission, to include the \textit{Acts of Thomas} in the collection he is commenting on, seems to go too far.

\textsuperscript{200}Turribius of Astorga, \textit{Epist. ad Iac. et Cep. episc} 5 (PL 54.694C), \textit{specialiter autem Actus illos qui vocantur S. Andreae; vel illos qui appellantur S. Joannis, quos sacrilego Leucius ore conscripsit; vel illos qui dicitur S. Thomae, et his similia: ex quibus Manichei et Priscilli anistae vel quaecumque illos est secta germana, omnem haeresim sua confirmare nituntur.}

\textsuperscript{201}Pseudo-Melito (PG 5.1239), \textit{Volo sollicitim esse fraterinitatem vestram de Leutio quodam, qui scripsit apostolorum Actus Joannis evangelistae et apostoli sancti Andreae et Thomae apostoli; qui de virtutibus quidem quas per eos Domini fecit ulla dixit, de doctrina vero eorum plurimum mentitus est. On the so-called Passio Ioannis, see K. Schäferdiek, ‘Die Passio Johannis des Melito von Laodikea und die Virtutes Johannis’, \textit{A B} 103 (1985) 367-82.


\textsuperscript{203}Bonnet, \textit{Acta Thomae} (Leipzig, 1883) 96-97; Chadwick, \textit{Priscillian}, 209 note 2.
dissected sections or relied on material that had escaped revision. This new biographical interest is paired with a change in the ideal of the apostolic figure. The apostle is from now on mainly characterised as a traveller and his mission is presented as an itinerary around the ancient world. The appearance at the beginning of the seventh century of a new term to denominate the apocryphal Acts, "journeyings", testifies to the development of this new genre, the success of which is visible in AA's textual witnesses: three of them, Narratio, Laudatio, and the different versions of Vita, present these textual characteristics.

Even though these reworked versions of AA are partly responsible for the transformation of the primitive text, it is only thanks to them that we have a general idea about what the ancient Acts may have looked like. Given the stigmatisation of AA due to its alleged relationship with Manicheism, our text would never have survived the transliteration process which took place between the ninth and tenth centuries, if not accidentally. This use of the text, however, to suit the new needs of Christianity means the materialisation of a split in AA’s transmission. The selection of certain parts of the text and their adaptations to different scopes created an almost insurmountable gap between the resulting product and its source. At the end of this interpretative process even the reconstruction of AA’s outline would become a matter of hypothesis.

5. Conclusions on the Study of AA’s Textual Transmission

The comparative analysis of the stylistic features of the abundant texts related to AA as well as the text critical study of their convergences and divergences allows the following conclusions.

5.1. The Split in AA’s Textual Transmission

On the basis of the extant testimonies that preserve a version of the portion of text preserved by V, namely Laudatio, Vita, Narratio, S, H, Conversante and Arm, we can assume a split in AA’s textual transmission. When compared with one another, these textual witnesses present obvious divergences as a result of their different uses of the primitive text for their own literary purposes. However, when they are confronted with V, divergences become secondary and a more important common trait comes to the foreground. Whereas the documents disagree in the way they transform AA, they agree in that they always preserve and omit precisely the same sections. It is clear that on the basis of this agreement with regard to preserved and omitted sections a common source for all of them can be postulated.

202 This new ideal, incidentally, is also confirmed by the writers of these texts, who present themselves as travelers who followed the itinerary of the apostle Andrew and included in their accounts the testimony of local traditions about the apostle.
Consequently, we can assume a Vorlage or archetype from which two separate branches develop, a transformative one and a non-transformative one. Due to the reasons set out in section 4 of the analysis above, AA’s fragment in V is currently the only representative of the non-transformative branch of the transmission. With regard to the transformative branch, the numerous testimonies analysed above imply the existence of a revised version of AA from which they all develop.

5.2. The Primitive AA
It is also plausible to assume that the primitive AA circulated in a complete form between its date of composition and the end of the fourth century. Already from early in this century, AA was considered ‘spurious’, but its circulation among minor splinter groups did not represent a threat to the emerging orthodoxy and its canon. It is only in the early fifth century and in the context of the polemic against Manicheans that AA plausibly came under pressure due to its association with this heretic group. If the hypothesis of a Latin translation of the AAA by a North African Manichean at the end of the fourth century holds true, this might provide sufficient explanation for this peculiarity.

5.3. The Revised Version of AA
Due to its alleged heretic character and to the fact that its doctrine was now associated with Manicheism, it is likely that already during the fifth century a revision of the primitive text took place. This revision presumably deprived AA of all substantial discourses, since these sections included most of the suspicious doctrine. The testimonies that we included in the so-called transformative branch of the transmission support this hypothesis insofar as they systematically eliminate the same discursive sections. It is from this revised text that the transformative branch develops.

5.4. AA’s Textual Diversification
Consequently, AA’s textual diversification is not due to different or subsequent revisions of the primitive text. Rather it arises from the different goals that these versions intended to fulfil. The differentiation of three clear transformative groups, as well as the assessment of three distinctive reduction patterns peculiar to them, allows the conclusion that their transformation of the revised version is due to the literary purpose they pursued. Whereas martyrdom texts apply beginning reduction, those that focus on the miracles regularly apply end reduction. The texts with a biographical undercurrent, finally, apply internal reduction.
5.5. Textual Reconstruction of the Primitive Text

Given the previous conclusions drawn from our analysis, it seems obvious that a textual reconstruction on the basis of these diversified textual witnesses is not viable. On the one hand, our only testimony is both fragmentary and too short to provide a solid textual basis for such a reconstruction. On the other, the remaining extant witnesses not only proceed from an already revised version of the primitive text, but also transform and adapt this source to their peculiar purposes. This means that, if we nevertheless attempt such a textual reconstruction, the results will vary strongly according to the testimonies chosen as the basis. In our view, this is exactly what has happened with the two latest textual reconstructions by J.M. Prieur and D.R. MacDonald.

5.6. AA’s Fragment in V and the Tenor of the Primitive AA

The issues analysed in the preceding pages already highlight the essential value of V for the study of the primitive AA. In contrast to the extant witnesses of the transformative branch, which have overshadowed or transformed the tenor of the ancient Acts according to their changing goals, AA’s fragment in V presents an unaltered section of the primitive text. In spite of its fragmentary character and limited length, V presents a coherent exposition that will help us to delineate the essentials of AA’s original thought. This consistent body of thought has thus far not received due attention. On the one hand, the study of lengthier versions of AA has monopolised the interests, relegating the analysis of this essential piece of evidence for the primitive Acts to the background, whereas on the other, its conceptual peculiarities have been frequently falsified in order to fit interpretations based on the mentality of other witnesses. Our purpose in isolating V and systematically studying its thought aims both to fill the absence of such an analysis and to rectify the injustice done to its message as a result of an indiscriminate use of testimonies.

At the same time, a study of V also allows an understanding of AA’s character and style. Its mainly discursive character underlines the fact that rational argumentation was a very important issue in the original AA. This is confirmed not only by the evidence of our fragment, but also by the remains of truncated and incomplete speeches in S/H, transformed discourses in Arm and Narratio, and, especially, by the negative evidence of the effective elimination of speeches in most witnesses. The analysis of the rhetorical structures and vocabulary of these lengthy speeches permits not only the study of the manner in which rational argumentation is built up, but also the understanding, thanks to their changing perspectives, of a precise psychological characterisation of the personae.
CHAPTER III: EDITION AND TRANSLATION OF AA’S FRAGMENT IN CODEX VATICANUS GRAECUS 808

1. Codicological and Palaeographical Analysis of Codex Vaticanus graecus 808

1.1. General Description of Codex Vaticanus graecus 808

R. Devreessse dates the ms to the eleventh century\(^2\), although in M. Bonnet’s opinion it might date to either the tenth or eleventh century\(^3\). The ms is of simple appearance and execution. The new back added to the red leather, eighteenth-century binding shows the *tesserae gentiliciae* of Pius IX and the librarian A. Mai. The edges of the ms have been extensively cut, hence its thick and compact appearance. The beginning and end are mutilated. There are no signatures or inscriptions at the beginning, with the exception of the title *Vitae Martyrum et Confessor(um)* on top of f. 1r, which was added in the sixteenth century\(^4\). All other inscriptions, if there were any, have disappeared with the (subsequent?) cuts to the manuscript’s exterior sides.

Today it consists of 512 parchment folios. Although Devreessse’s description counts 65 quaternions (with irregularities due to the loss of one or more folios)\(^5\), it actually consists of 66 quires, most of which are indeed quaternions. The writing is arranged in two columns of 30 lines each\(^6\). There is no trace of quire signatures. The current folio numbering runs from 1 to 512. The black ink numbers are rather regularly placed in the external intersection between the superior line and the external right indentation line. Despite the severe cut of the pages, an old red ink numbering is still partially visible at the top right of the pages, although in general (with the exception of very few cases) no whole number can be distinguished\(^7\). As we will see below, the comparison of the old and the new numberings allows interesting conclusions concerning the original structure and length of some parts of the ms\(^8\).

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\(^1\) This section includes a shorter version of our study of this ms: ‘Vaticanus Graecus 808 Revisited: A Re-evaluation of the Oldest Fragment of Acta Andreae’, *Scriptorium* 56 (2001) 126-40.


\(^3\) Bonnet, *AAA* II/1, XIV. Ehrhard (*Überlieferung* I, 481 note 4) thinks that it might be dated to the early eleventh c. and so does O. von Gebhardt, *Die Akten der edessenischen Bekenner Gurjas, Samonas und Abibos*, ed. E. von Dobschütz (Leipzig, 1911) XX.

\(^4\) Devreessse, *Codices*, 345.

\(^5\) Devreessse, *Codices*, 345: ‘Constat hodie fasc. 65 quaternionibus (si excipiás 27, 33, 49, 64 et 65), etc’.

\(^6\) However, Devreessse’s quire 33, instead of being an incomplete quaternion (six folios), is actually a binion (ff. 256-259) and a bifolio (ff. 260-261), which are clearly separated from each other.

\(^7\) According to Devreessse (*Codices*, 345), the number is 31. However, not a single example in the whole ms has 31 lines.

\(^8\) In the first 44 folios, however, this earlier red ink numbering is placed at the bottom of the page in the inter-columnar section. These pages also exhibit the black ink numbering at the top right of the page.

\(^9\) See *infra* this Chapter, §1.2.3, pp. 134-36.
V contains a pre-metaphrastic November-menologium of special characteristics. A. Ehrhard, who studied not only the ms itself but also other related exemplars in different libraries in Europe and the Near East, underlined the interest of V for understanding the development of the internal structure of the November-menologium. From his comparative study of this ms with other November exemplars, Ehrhard concluded that while mss Vat. gr. 807 (tenth c.), Vat. Palat. 9 (eleventh c.), and Vindob. hist. gr. 5 (tenth-eleventh c.) belong to the earlier type, the exemplar preserved by V, together with Marcian. gr. 349 (tenth-eleventh c.), belongs to the recent type of November-menologium. Such a conclusion is supported, in his opinion, by the structural similarity between V and the October-menologium preserved in the Coisl. 110 (eleventh c.). Both mss contain a metaprasij, an encomium by Nicetas and another by Leo the Wise. The November-menologium preserved by V, then, represents the last pre-metaphrastic stage, as Coisl. 110 does for October. Its original composition must be dated to the tenth century.

But the interest of the November-menologium in Cod. Vat. gr. 808 is not purely due to structural matters. The fact that it was composed in the time prior to the activities of Symeon the Metaphrast means that the texts included in the ms have escaped the profound transformation that texts normally experienced from the rewriting of this Byzantine writer. This peculiarity has been decisive for the preservation of AA’s fragment.

1.2. Description of the Last Quire (ff. 507r–512v) of Codex Vaticanus graecus 808

AA’s fragment occupies the remaining six folios of the last imperfect quire of the ms and corresponds with the saint for 30 November. Although the beginning and end of the ms, essential for determining its original size, are missing, it may reasonably be assumed that the text on the Apostle Andrew was the last of the menologium. The beginning and end of this text are missing as well. Due to this circumstance, there is neither title, usual in the other texts of the ms, nor colophon nor other inscriptions that might give us essential information about its original length.

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9 Ehrhard, Überlieferung I, 477-509.
10 For a more recent study of the November-menologium, see F. Halkin, ‘Un manuscrit grec inconnu: le ménologe de Douai Abbey, près de Reading’, Scriptorium 7 (1953) 51-58.
11 Text number 4 in V. See Devreesse, Codices, 343, under 4.
12 Text number 2 in V. See Devreesse, Codices, 343, under 1.
14 Ehrhard, Überlieferung, 483.
16 As Jan Bremmer suggested to me, this circumstance might incidentally also have helped in the preservation of this text.
The cut of this last quire is clumsier than in other sections. This might be due to the quire’s position at the end of the ms. As a result of this, the text is not very well centred but fortunately remained untouched. At the same time the measurements also reveal peculiarities.

1.2.1. Palaeographical Description

The ms presents many different hands. Although the reddish-brown ink writing is rather regular, it nonetheless shows peculiarities that help to differentiate scribes. Different ligatures, a changing percentage of capitals reintroduced in the minuscule, different choice of the letters that are substituted by capitals, and the changing relationship of the writing with the guiding lines are all quite obvious variations.

The round writing may be compared with the *Perlschrift* identified by Hunger, although its form and ductus are a bit clumsier than might be expected. The reddish-brown writing is rather regular. The space between the lines is regular as well. Word and letter division is not always respected. Kappa, lambda, and epsilon are the only letters that systematically alternate between minuscule and capital varieties. Other capitals are very rare: the nu, eta, and pi capitals, which are normal in the eleventh century, are almost completely absent. Alpha alternates between cursive and semiuncial varieties. Beta is always minuscule. The superior arc of delta is always inclined to the left. Epsilon, when minuscule, exhibits a closed inferior part. Its superior line goes upward and often joins the following letter. Now and then it forms the ‘ace of spades’. The Zeta has the characteristic shape of the number 3. Theta is normally minuscule in ligatures, although its capital variety appears as well. Eta usually has a rounded minuscule form. Iota presents either a normal appearance written within the body of the text or a larger one transcending vertically above and below the writing. Pi and omega are always closed. Ypsilon is semicircular. Phi presents the characteristic violin form and inferior widening. Psi regularly has a cross form whose horizontal line rests on the guiding line. The ductus is round and soft, the letters rather large, although this last impression might be due to the current smaller size of the folios. The absolute absence in the last six folios of the capital variety of Η is striking. There is a frequent use of abbreviations for *ai'orwpoj, kukroj, Xristoj*, and *uperatorvion*.

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17 In general, the writing rests on the guiding line, although depending on the scribe it may appear on it or even slightly below. Very often the scribe transcends right as well as left indentation lines in order simply to complete a word. Occasionally capitals appear in the inter-columnar space in order to shift the beginning of a sentence, although this is not a regular procedure. This means that the appearance of the page is not ‘clean’.


19 In f. 389, for example, it appears seven times.
Comparative writing tests with dated examples of *Perlschrift* by K. and S. Lake have revealed interesting similarities with mss dated between the last years of the tenth century and the first of the eleventh\(^{20}\). Such an early dating is consistent with the already-mentioned relatively clumsy form and ductus of our writing.

1.2.2. Materials and Ruling

The quality of the parchment is very irregular. Colour and thickness change abruptly from quire to quire. In general it has a light yellowish colour. The measurements of the folios are also irregular. They generally measure 22.5 x 29.5 cm, although the first current quaternion measures 21.5 x 29.2 cm and the last two quires (65 and 66) 21.5 x 29.5 cm.

Compared with the rest of the ms, the last quire presents clear peculiarities. In the first place, its structure consists of three bifolios. The normal structure of the ms is based on the quaternion pattern. The parchment of ff. 507-512 is also different. It is much thinner than normal, to such an extent that the folios bend easily. The external edges of the folios are quite damaged; all of them are thinner in this section. The most serious damage, however, appears on f. 512, which, for this reason, used to be narrower. It has been repaired with a parchment band of c. 2 cm width in order to fit the normal width.

The ruling shows the same pattern as the rest of the ms, thus Leroy 00C2\(^{21}\). It consists of four vertical lines of 29.5 cm and 30 horizontal lines. While the first systematically reach the inferior and superior sides of the parchment, the latter irregularly surpass the indentation lines: they reach the binding centre but do not normally reach the external edge of the page. In contrast to the rest of the ms, the horizontal lines are not quite discernible in the inter-columnar section.

1.2.3. Original Length of AA’s Fragment in V

As already pointed out, it is generally believed that the six remaining folios preserve an excerpt of *AA* in almost its original length. Ehrhard, supposing that quires 65 and 66 were quaternions lacking the external sheet and that they immediately followed each other, already suggested that not much of the text has been lost\(^{22}\). Drawing upon Ehrhard’s hypothesis,

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\(^{20}\) See K. and S. Lake, *Dated Greek Minuscule Manuscripts to the year 1200* (Boston, 1934-39), vol. III, ms 91, pl. 160 (Mt. Athos, The Laura, a. 986); ms 94, pl. 165 (Mt. Athos, Vatopedion Cod. 181, a. 997); vol. V, ms 220, pl. 389 (Moscow, Historical Museum Cod. VI 101 (104), a. 990); vol. IX, ms 343, pl. 628 (Messina, Biblioteca Universitaria Cod. gr. 14, a. 1017).


\(^{22}\) Ehrhard, *Überlieferung* I, 483, note 1: ‘Da die Fol. 507-512 einen Quaternio bilden, dessen äußere Lage verloren ging, so kann von diesem Texte nicht viel fehlen, vorausgesetzt, daß die beiden Quaternionen unmittelbar aufeinanderfolgten.’
Prieur goes further and estimates the size of the missing beginning of AA. If between the last folio of quire 65 and the first of 66 there are only two folios missing and the text of quire 65 (Vita Stephani iunioris) is incomplete, he argues, these missing two folios must have contained this text as well. His conclusion is that at least three pages (one and a half folios) were filled by the preceding text. Consequently, the remaining page (half a folio) was just enough for the title of AA and the beginning of the first incomplete speech (Vb 38.2-20)\textsuperscript{23}.

However, as we argued elsewhere, there is enough codicological evidence to suggest that the double premise on which Ehrhard based his assessment of the text’s length is incorrect. As already seen, the ms has two different folio numberings, an earlier red ink numbering probably proceeding from the ms’s restoration in the fourteenth/fifteenth century, and a more recent black ink numbering from the last restoration and binding of the ms in the eighteenth century. The difference between both numberings allows the conclusion that in the period between both restorations the ms consisted of at least 519 folios and thus had 7 more folios than it does now\textsuperscript{24}.

Even more interesting, however, is the fact that four of these seven folios can be placed with certainty between the two current last quires of the ms, namely quires 65 and 66. Hence, we can conclude that the two last quires of the ms either did not immediately follow each other or else were not quaternions. Two possibilities might be considered to explain the four folios between quires 65 and 66. The first is that the two last quires were quaternions, but were separated by a bifolio. According to this hypothesis there would have been four folios before the beginning of quire 66 and one after it. Given the fact that the Vita Stephani iunioris must have 1½ of these 4 folios, we can envisage 2½ folios preceding the current beginning of AA’s fragment in V and another at the end. If this was indeed the case and our text had 3½ folios more, it was, consequently, at least 58% longer than it is today.

The second possibility is that quires 65 and 66 were not quaternions but quinions\textsuperscript{25}. According to this second hypothesis there would have been four folios between the current

\textsuperscript{23} Prieur, Acta, 3.

\textsuperscript{24} The more recent black ink numbers run from 1 to 512 and correspond with the current extension of the ms. It is very plausible that this numbering dates from the last cut and binding of the manuscript, which took place in the eighteenth century. Thanks to the clumsy cut of the last two quires, however, it is still clearly possible to discern the older red ink numbering on the superior-right angle of the page. Although these red numbers are discernible in almost all folios of these two last quires, it is only on the last folio of quires 64, 65 and 66 that the whole number is visible. Given the fact that the paper sheet (f. 210) which was added between ff. 209 and 211 in a restoration dating from the fourteenth or fifteenth century shows this red numbering as well, it is also plausible that the earlier numbering belongs to a restoration of the ms at this date. See also our ‘Vaticanus gr. 808 Revisited’, 136-40.

\textsuperscript{25} Although this second possibility is not as suitable with regard to the ms’s quire base pattern, it actually fits the numberings better. It explains the four missing folios between quires 65 and 66 as well as two other missing
quires and two more folios after quire 66. This means that AA’s fragment in V was 4½ folios longer (2½ at the beginning plus 2 more at the end). According to this hypothesis, our text would have been at least 75% longer than it is today.

The consideration of both hypotheses shows the need to re-evaluate AA’s original length, for in any case five more pages are missing at the beginning. Since two-and-a-half folios of ms (ff. 507r-509r) fill somewhat more than four pages of Bonnet’s edition (Vb 38.2–41.18), it is possible to postulate approximately 111 lines of Greek text of the same edition preceding the first speech to the brethren in V.

The loss at the end of the ms is more difficult to evaluate. It is possible to postulate at least one or two more folios, belonging either to a quaternion or to a quinion, respectively. However, the possibility of a lost quire after the current text cannot be ruled out. This possibility may even be highly probable, given the fact that missing quires at beginning and end of mss are extremely common and that, otherwise, the text for 30 November would be extremely short. As is the case with the first quire of the ms, the last one might be lost as well.

When considering the original length of AA’s fragment, Prieur suggested two hypotheses. According to the first, the fragment was originally approximately as long as it is today. The missing external sheet of a quaternion might have contained just the title and beginning of the first incomplete speech in the first half of the bifolio and a small portion of the martyrdom in the last half. According to the second, the beginning would remain the same but the end would have been longer. He thinks that given ‘the disposition and the writing of the ms’, the complete martyrdom would need four more folios. This last statement can hardly be correct. The comparison of his edition of V’s text (AAgr. 33-50) with Bonnet’s edition shows that both texts have an equivalent number of lines of Greek text, 273 and 269, respectively. His edition of the martyrdom consists of 302 lines. Now, every column of ms equals approximately 10-12 lines of Bonnet’s edition. Hence every page of ms includes between 20 and 24 lines and every folio between 40 and 48. Taking 44 lines as an average, if the martyrdom was at least as long as reconstructed by Prieur, we would have to think rather of seven folios.

It follows that Prieur’s opinion that AA’s fragment did not include the preliminary events to Andrew’s imprisonment and the subsequent martyrdom is unfounded. The text of

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folios before quire 65. It is true, however, that this possibility is only acceptable if the lacuna after f. 500v is large enough to fill two folios.

AA preserved in V might very well have originally included all episodes between Andrew’s arrival in Patras and his Martyrdom.

1.2.4. Bonnet’s Edition of AA’s Fragment in V

The comparison of the ms with Bonnet’s edition shows that the editor of the editio princeps performed very scrupulous and accurate work. As he notes in the introduction to his edition, he did not change the text, emend the writing or add corrections. The only changes we have noticed are the correction of evident errors due to homophony resulting in iotacism\textsuperscript{27}, reductions of diphthongs, confusions between omicron and omega, and the full writing of terms that appear in the ms as compendia. Our reading of the ms revealed a single reading error by Bonnet\textsuperscript{28}, probably due to an homoearchon\textsuperscript{29}. This omission, however, does not affect a whole section between the equivalent terms of the homoearchon, but rather a single word. The manuscript in f. 507v, second column reads:

\begin{quote}
\texttt{w\textae} \texttt{e\textup{j}w\textup{u}p\textup{o}l\texttt{w} = \texttt{w\textae} \texttt{au}th\texttt{u}p\texttt{e} \texttt{e\texttt{h}rou= eht\%\texttt{pant}i\texttt{v}h\texttt{w} = \texttt{bi}b\%}
\end{quote}

Bonnet’s edition (V\textsuperscript{b} 39.16-17) simply omits the word \texttt{h\texttt{u}j \texttt{h\texttt{v}\texttt{l}z \texttt{q}}}. Prieur wrongly points out that V omits the word\textsuperscript{30}, and according to his apparatus he emends the text on the basis of S and H.

1.2.5. This Edition

Given the pulchritude and accuracy of Bonnet’s edition, our re-editing of AA’s fragment in V will surprise more than one reader. Two reasons, however, motivate our decision to do so. On the one hand, as already stated, the two last textual reconstructions tend to overshadow this unique testimony for the primitive AA by collating it with later and very reworked texts. This re-edition allows us to free AA’s fragment in V from the extraneous framework in which it has recently been placed and to present it separate from the remaining extant witnesses, as was customary until the 1980s. By isolating this fragment, we intend both to draw attention to its unique testimony and to focus exclusively on its character and message.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Bonnet, AAA II/1, 38.18, V \texttt{i\texttt{l}om\texttt{en} = V\textsuperscript{b} \texttt{i\texttt{l}om\texttt{en}; 39.9, V \texttt{ef\texttt{a}k\texttt{oi} = V\textsuperscript{b} \texttt{ef\texttt{a}k\texttt{ei}; 42.13, V \texttt{e\texttt{h}gen = V\textsuperscript{b} \texttt{e\texttt{h}gen; 42.24, V \texttt{l\texttt{i}om\texttt{ai}w\texttt{h} = V\textsuperscript{b} \texttt{l\texttt{u}m\texttt{e}w\texttt{h} (iotacism and reduct. of diphthong \texttt{ai} to \texttt{ei}; 44.5, V \texttt{k\texttt{i}n\texttt{hata} = V\textsuperscript{b} \texttt{k\texttt{i}n\texttt{nata}; 44.25, V \texttt{el\texttt{p\texttt{e}t\texttt{e} = V\textsuperscript{b} \texttt{el\texttt{p\texttt{e}t\texttt{e; He also corrected a couple of \texttt{g} instead of \texttt{\texttt{w}}: 41.20, V \texttt{ek\texttt{doh\texttt{j} = V\textsuperscript{b} \texttt{ek\texttt{doh\texttt{j; 45.18, V \texttt{di\texttt{a}gel \texttt{om\texttt{e}n\texttt{on} = V\textsuperscript{b} \texttt{di\texttt{a}gel \texttt{om\texttt{e}n\texttt{on.}}

\textsuperscript{28} For two other minor reading errors, see app. to V\textsuperscript{131} and V\textsuperscript{e} 248.

\textsuperscript{29} The fact that I myself committed the same reading error due to the homoearchon (\texttt{w\textae} ..... \texttt{w\textae} ...) helped me to correct my own mistake and to identify Bonnet’s omission.

\textsuperscript{30} Prieur, Acta, 487.
On the other hand, the re-edition of AA’s fragment in V has other clear advantages. In the first place, it allows us to include a certain number of interesting conjectures, notably those by Liechtenhan and Festugière, which have been neglected by Prieur’s critical apparatus. It also allows us to incorporate, when pertinent, those emendations proposed by Bonnet that improve our understanding of the text and, finally, to propose a few improvements ourselves.

In addition, we provide an English translation furnished with numerous explanatory footnotes that highlight many interesting aspects of AA’s thought, which have thus far not received due attention. These footnotes are therefore a first approach to AA’s conceptual analysis, which is fully developed in Chapter 4, and which in turn provides the basis for the systematic and comparative study of the thought behind the text in Chapter 5.

At the same time, our re-edition includes three apparatuses for the text: textual, conceptual and critical. In addition to the traditional critical apparatus, we offer a textual apparatus, which includes parallels to AA’s fragment in V in the remaining extant witnesses and will allow the reader to know at any moment whether a certain section has been preserved, eliminated or transformed in the other versions. With regard to the conceptual apparatus, it intends to contextualise AA’s conceptual developments by placing them in the religious and philosophical world of Hellenism, Imperial Rome and later antiquity. Obviously, this apparatus intends to clarify possible influences on our text, but its main scope is to provide conceptual parallels to AA’s exposition that may be of help in understanding its conceptual peculiarities.

In spite of providing AA with a new line numbering, we preserve Bonnet’s chapter division in order to facilitate textual comparisons with other editions and translations. With the same view in mind, we also indicate in the right margin the beginning of each page of Bonnet’s edition and the beginning of the folios of Codex Vaticanus graecus 808, which Bonnet’s and all later editions omitted.
TEXT AND TRANSLATION OF
\textit{AA}'S FRAGMENT IN
CODEX VATICANUS GRAECUS 808
ff. 507r-512v
ABBREVIATIONS

alt. alterum


Bonnet ‘Ex actis Andreeae’, Bonnet’s edition of AA’s fragment in V (AAA II/1, 38-45).

C Martyrium of St. Andrew in ms Ann Arbor 36, ff. 60v-66v.

Convers. Conversante: Passio altera sancti Andreae apostoli, M. Bonnet, AB 13 (1894) 373-78.

Demetrakos D. Demetrakou, Mega lexikon holês tês Hellênikês glôssês (Athens, 1949-51).


H Ms Hierosolymitanus Sabbaiticus 103, ff. 155v-168v, including the Martyrdom of Saint Andrew.


Liechten. R. Liechtenhan, Die Offenbarung im Gnosticismus (Göttingen, 1901).

Ljungvik H. Ljungvik, Studien zur Sprache der apokryphen Apostelgeschichten (Uppsala, 1926).


Malt A Martyrium Andreae alterum A, M. Bonnet, AAA II/1, 58-64.

O Ms Hierosolymitanus Sabbaiticus 30, ff. 154-15, including *Malt A*.

pr. *prius*


S Ms Sinaïticus gr. 526, ff. 121⁰-132⁰, including the *Martyrdom of Saint Andrew*.


V Vat gr. 808 (manuscript reading)

*V* Our edition of AA’s fragment in V.


*VitaEsc* Version of *Vita* in ms Escorial y II 6 (gr. 314), ff. 226⁰-246⁰.

*VitaParis* Version of *Vita* in ms Paris BN gr. 1510, ff. 1⁰-19⁰.

Sigla

[] In the Greek text, brackets indicate a lacuna that can be supplied by the context. In the translation, they indicate material supplied by the translator for the sake of clarity.

<> Editorial correction.

<...> Lacuna.

{} Delenda.

. A dot placed under a letter indicates that the letter is not wholly visible, although traces of ink remain.

! Beginning of new folio in the manuscript.

- In the text, beginning of a new page in Bonnet’s edition. In the apparatus it indicates a line separation.

Bonnet, p. in mrg. Page number in Bonnet’s edition.

1. .... peri\u03c8\u03b3\u03c8 t\u03c8 p\u03b3\u03b1\u03be\u03c5 = a\u03b1\u03c9\u03ab\u03ce\u03c7\u03c8 \u03b9\u03c0\u03c6\u03c5\u03ce\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1 t\u03c5; ou\u03c5w e\u03c6 \u03b9\u03ce\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c5\u03ce\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

2. gnwrisqentej th\u03c9 xrh\u03c9 tou\u03c9 t\u03c5; a\u03c9\u03b7\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03ce\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

3. sunhs\u03c9\u03c5\u03ce\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c8\u03c9\u03c0\u03c6\u03c5\u03ce\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c8\u03c9\u03c0\u03c6\u03c5\u03ce\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1. 

4. ei\u03c9\u03c1\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

5. e\u03c9\u03c1\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

6. ou\u03c9 e\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

7. xamairri\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

8. ou\u03c9 ou\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

9. ou\u03c9 ou\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

10. ou\u03c9 e\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

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1-20 deest "

1-17 CH 1.15 \u03c8\u03b1\u03c9\u03ab\u03ce\u03c7\u03c8 \u03b9\u03c0\u03c6\u03c5\u03ce\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1 \u03b9\u03c0\u03c6\u03c5\u03ce\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1.

8 verba gene\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1. Bonnet gene\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1 Schimmel. gene\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1 Liechten. " <> Liechten. 9-10 al\u03c9\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1 <> e\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1 (homoeotel.) scripsi e\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1\u03c7\u03c9\u03c5\u03be\u03c1 Schimmel. "
1. “(...)” [What] is all this debility in you? Don’t you still blame yourselves for not yet carrying His goodness? Let us stand in awe, let us congratulate ourselves for His unenvious sharing. Let us say to ourselves: ‘Blessed is our race, by whom has it been loved? Blessed is our existence, by whom has it been pitied?’ We are not those cast to the ground, since we have been recognised by such a height! We do not belong to time and then are dissolved by time; we are not a product of movement that disappears again by itself, nor a cause of generation [so as] to come to a similar end. Rather, we are akin to the unextended and are hostile to extension. We certainly belong to the one

31 Beginning of Codex Vat. 808, f. 507v. No other extant testimony can be of help in reconstructing the lost section including the start of Andrew’s first speech to the brethren. In spite of Schimmelpfeng (in Hennecke, *Handbuch*, 552; similarly, Flamion, *L’Apôtre*, 143), *Narratio*’s chap. 12 (359.24-360.15) is not a revised version of V’s first incomplete speech, but rather a fake discourse that intends to fill the gap created by the elimination (or absence in its source) of the present speech. *Narratio*’s speech combines themes and motifs appearing in later speeches by Andrew in V (compare *Narr.*, 159.26 with V 219-220; 360.5 with V 238-265; 360.7-9 with V 63-68; 360.10-11 with V 116) and also elements proceeding from speeches that have been preserved in a revised form by S and H (compare *Narr.*, 359.27 with S, f. 125v, 1/14 and H, f. 157r, 35-157r, 2; 360.6-7 with S, 123v, 2/11-13 and H, f. 157r, 35-157r, 2).

32 In the current passage the correct translation is clearly ‘unenvious sharing’. Andrew’s emphasis is not on the abundance of God’s patrimony, but rather on God’s sharing attitude towards the brethren (see *infra* Chapter 4, note 156). He shares His goodness with His children by paying attention to them and by showing His mercy. Giving or ‘creation’ is an essential part of the Good. As God is the supreme Good, he is free from any envy whatsoever. The notion, of course, arises from Plato, *Tim.* 29e, a poieita poietai fangroj dia poludie de laouj perivoudeq epiqnetei fangroj. This idea would give grounds to Proclus’ statement (In Parm. 922) that God is not only *causa finalis*, as Aristotle assumes, but also *causa efficiens*. ‘In giving rise to the effect the cause remains undiminished and unaltered’ (Doddas, *Proclus*, 214). The idea, however, appears earlier and is frequent in Gnostic texts (see *TriTrac* [NHC I, 5] 53.12-20). For other developments of the notion of God as *causa efficiens* on the basis of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, *infra* Chapter 5, § 2.2.2.3, pp. 274-76. See Plato, *Tim.* 42e; Numenius, fr. 14; Plotinus, *Enn.* 5.4.2; Proclus, *El. Th.* 25; *Ph.* 5.18.283.

33 For the meaning ‘cast to the ground’, see Gregory of Nyssa, *Contr. Eun.* 11.675.3; Herodianus et Pseudo-Herodianus, *Partit.* 168.2. It might also be translated as ‘liable to inhumation’ or simply ‘mortal’ (*fqarto*), see *Schol. in Iliad.* 5.442.

34 Bonnet suspected the expression and some scholars do indeed correct the passage (see app.). The correction is unnecessary, since the expression is extremely common both in philosophical (Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Proclus, Simplicius, Philoponus) and theological texts (Themistius, Nemesius, Origen, Athenagoras, Eusebius, Athanasius), especially in combination with concepts such as ‘movement’ (see, e.g., Aristotle, *MA* 700a 26ff; *GA* 764b 34ff, Philoponus, *GC* 14.2.288.26).

35 The dichotomy ‘extended-unextended’ is also frequent in philosophical discussions, especially in those concerning the origin of tangible reality and its relationship with transcendent causes (so for example in Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1075b 29) and the processes of coming-to-be and passing away (see Simplicius, *in Caet. Cels. 7.578.11f*). Plotinus (*Enn.* 3.6.1.31) uses the dichotomy in discussing the nature of the soul and so does Porphyry when he defines the soul as (Sent. 17) *ou kai ahege he, aal ej, akara he, ezhw par e bath ekous v to zh kekthemhn to elai*. See Proclus, *Inst.* 171.1 (applied to the *nous*). See furthermore Justin, *Dial. c. Tryph.* 4; Gregory of Nyssa, *De op. hom.* 209.47-212.5; Didymus the Blind, *De trinit.* 16.10.1. See H. Dörrie, ‘Die platonische Theologie des Kelsos in ihrer Auseinandersetzung mit der christlichen Theologie auf Grund von Origenes C. Cels. 7.42ff’, in his *Platonica Minora* 229-62 at 243; J. Whittaker, ‘NeoPythagoreanism and Negative Theology’, *Studies in Platonism and Patristic Thought* (London, 1984) IX, 109-25 at 115-17.
tonoj: dia\tou\> ap\> tou= kei\> tonoj feugomen. e\> men tou= kal\> ou= di\> ou\> a\> xr\> oh ap\> w\> ou\> me\> qa: tou= di\> ka\> ibu; di\> ou\> a\> to\> a\> dik\> on ri\> (tomen: tou=) e\> h\> no\> noj, di\> ou\> a\> to\> oh a\> hel e\> h\> no\> na afi\> men: tou= s\> %\> zo\> nto\> j, di\> ou\> a\> to\> oh ap\> l\> u\> nta e\> g\> n\> wr\> is\> amen: tou= w\> to\> j, di\> ou\> a\> o\> skotoj e\> ri\> y\> amen: tou= e\> noj, di\> ou\> a\> pol\> l\> u\> a\> ap\> str\> a\> me\> qa: tou= u\> per\> our\> an\> i\> bu; di\> ou\> a\> \> e\> p\> i\> ge\> ia e\> h\> p\> o\> men: tou= me\> h\> on\> toj, di\> ou\> a\> me\> h\> on\> ta <\> to\> men: <\> dia\> tou\> o\> de\> \> o\> er\> oh e\> sti\> lo\> godou> a\> tion

(1-20 deest) -

10-17 e\> men tou= - <\> to\> men Philo Ad Gaium 5; Qu. Gen. 2.54; Alcinous Didask. 165.27-34; Maximus of Tyre Diss. 11.8, 168ff; Celsus (ap. Origen C. Cels. 7.42) 14-15 tou= w\> to\> j - e\> ri\> y\> amen GosThomas (NHC II, 2) 50; PS 62, 124.2; TreatSeth (NHC VII, 2) 60.9 - 15 tou= e\> noj - ap\> str\> a\> me\> qa Philo Leg. alleg. 2.1, Heres 216; Plutarch De E 393a-c; Numenius fr. 11.11-14; 19.11-13; Asclep. 1, 2, 20; C.H. 1.14; 4.1, 5, 8; Plotinus Enn. 6.9.2; Proclus Inst. 1-6 - 15-16 tou= u\> per\> our\> an\> i\> bu Plato Phdr. 247c 3ff; cf. Speusipus (ap. Aristotle Metaph. 1092a 11-15); Xenocrates fr. 5; Alcinous Didask. 181.40; Apuleius De Plat. 1.11, 28-31; Maximus of Tyre Diss. 10.9, 235-37; Asclep. 27 (332.9 N-F) - 16-17 tou= me\> h\> on\> toj - <\> to\> men Cf. V' 7-8; 210-11; Alcinous Didask. 165.37f; 170.24-26; Apuleius De Plat. 1.10.1-2; Porphyry, Sent. 44.45-46; Chalcidius, In Tim. 104 17-19 C.H. 1.31, 10.15, 12.12; Asclep. 41 -

12 pr. ou\> Bonnet - oh V - me\> qa Bonnet - me\> qa V - 16-17 post ta\> m\> add. Bonnet (Prieur, MacDon.) 17 pr. < > Bonnet - post to\> men lacunam a Prieur statutam ita implevi -
who shows mercy. We belong to the better, therefore we escape from the worse. We belong to the beautiful, by means of which we separate ourselves from the ugly. We belong to the righteous, through which we reject the unrighteous. We belong to the merciful one, through whom we distance ourselves from the unmerciful one. We belong to the saviour, through whom we recognised the destroyer; to the light, by means of which we rejected the darkness. We belong to the One, through whom we turned away from multiplicity; to the supercelestial38, through which we understood earthly matters; we belong to the immutable, through whom we perceived the immutable39. Therefore, if

36 The translation ‘We are akin to the unextended and are hostile to extension’ renders our correction of V’s reading (see critical apparatus ad 9). In its current form the text is clearly corrupt. Bonnet (see app.) suspected a lacuna, although epiboul oij and not before as we suggest. Despite its difficulty, all commentators and translations of AA in the last hundred years unanimously understand the passage as ‘We are aspirant of greatness’. The development of the argument seems to imply this meaning, but the text by no means allows such a translation (cf. Prieur, Acta, 199). Rendering the adjective epiboul oij, lat. ‘insidious’ as ‘aspirant’ in the positive sense not only implies forcing its meaning but also its clear negative charge. In addition, neither modern nor ancient lexica document such a positive meaning. Besides the numerous testimonies (LXX Reg. 1 29.4; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.8.38.3.2; Quis div. salv. 1.2.1; 27.1.4; Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 5.35.1.3; 7.10.15.1; Eccl. hist. 9.2.1.2; Com. in Psalm. 27.769.34), the Martyrium Andreea itself documents the negative use of the term (see 2GrEp 27.10, allofi a autoi megen epi/bouleij we autoi, also documented by S, f. 1293; H, f. 1666; O (see Prieur, AAgr 55.1); C (f. 622); cf. Mail A 61.4, epiboul oim). Thus the arguments for our correction are the following: 1. The manuscript text cannot be understood as ‘aspirant to greatness’ by any means, but rather as ‘enemies’ or ‘conspired against greatness’. 2. Besides expressing quality and degree (‘greatness, magnitude’), megejij has a mathematical (‘magnitude’) and a philosophical (‘extension’, see Plotinus, Enn. 2.4.11) use. In the latter sense it is frequently opposed to the adjective a)mege/qhj ‘unextended’ (Aristotle, Metaph. 1075b 29; Plotinus, Enn. 6.5.12) in order to express the opposition ‘extended-unextended’ that is comparable to material-immaterial. 3. The preceding sentences also establish an opposition between material and immaterial realms by means of the attributes that normally distinguish them in philosophical texts, namely ‘time’ (xronoij), ‘movement’ (kinhsij) and ‘generation’ (genesij). The appearance of a fourth philosophical term in the adjective a)mege/qhj is not only not surprising, but rather to be expected. 4. An omission due to homoeoteleuton is in the current context easily explainable, since it presents frequent repetitions of the same term or of conceptual opposites (V’7 xronoij-xronoij; 12 di kai=a lfi kon; 13 el ehnroij a)nej ehnroj). A more economic solution would be correcting epiboul oij with ephbol oij ‘he who is in possession of (gen.)’. Taking iotacism into account it is plausible to think that the more frequent ephbol oij replaced the rare ephbol oij. This would give: esme/jij ev a)ra megepouj ephbol oij, which would be rendered as ‘We are those having achieved greatness’. We prefer the first possibility.

37 In our text ta)ka has a reinforcing function. Thus, kai=ta)ka ‘and certainly’. For a similar emphatic use see infra V’41, all/takata ‘but rather’. The same use in Plotinus, Enn. 2.4.10.10 and 6.3.25.35, while probability is expressed by means of kai=taka a)h.

38 This affirmation implies a tripartite conception of the cosmos formed out of a supercelestial, a celestial and a sublunar realm. See infra, Chapter 5, § 1.2, pp. 245-50.

39 On the basis of the parallelism with the former sentences, which play on pairs of contraries, Bonnet proposed the emendation (see app.) adopted ever since Schimmelpfeng (Prieur, MacDonald). However, our text is clearly proposing the via eminenteriae as a dialectical means to reach the knowledge of God’s existence (on the issue, see infra Chapter 5, notes 196-197). This method to apprehend the ultimate principles of being begins with the lower stages of reality and gradually ascends step by step until it reaches the highest object. Once the awareness of the brethren has been awakened by being acted upon by God’s recognition and their affinity to the higher realm has been established, the via eminenteriae provides them with the possibility of achieving a preliminary knowledge of God’s existence. Since the phrase tou= mehontoj, di o)uata mehonta eijbolen describes the culmination of this dialectical method, it is precisely
euκαριστήνην ήπαρρησίαν ήμυνον ήκαυκήνα προελθένοι εἰς εἶπεν εἰς τὸν έχοντα ήμέρας εῶν ήγνώρισθεν έποιήν τοῦ αὐτοῦ

2. Καὶ οὖν ἔσκις τοῖς τοίαυτοῖς αὐθεντῶν έτοιμάζετε τοῦ καστοῦ εἰς τὰ ἄνθη εἰπών αὐτοῖς:

Καὶ οὖν ἔσκις τοῖς τοίαυτοῖς αὐθεντῶν έτοιμάζετε τοῦ καστοῦ εἰς τὰ ἄνθη εἰπών αὐτοῖς:

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καί ἡ εἰς τοῖς τοίαυτοῖς ἀγαλλίασίς αὐτῶν εἶπεν εἰς τὴν έκατον γενόμενην, εἷς αἱ ὡς εἰς ἑαυτόν έχον δέχομαι τοῦ ἀποστόλου έν άλλων εἴσπυρστον οὖν ἑκατον τοῦ εἴπου τῇ θντιν Κυρίου τῷ πίδα: καὶ συνελογομενοί παντεῖς αὐξώμενος εἰς τὸ δεσμωθεῖν αὕτη τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ θανάτῳ τοῦ αὐτοῦ περιβάλλοντος τοῦ σκότους έκοίμησά τις εἰς πάντας εἰς τὴν περίπολον τοῦ Κυρίου έπαθεν καὶ οἰκωδότης τοῦ Κυρίου.

3. Καὶ οὖν (Αἰγεάθης) δικαζόμην τὴν μέραν εἰς ἑαυτόν καὶ ἑκατον τῇ άλλῃ τῇ Άνδραμ ἄνερταν: καὶ ως περί τις ἑρμηνεύς γενομένης αἱ ὡς εἰς τὸ ξερσίν δικήν εἰκόνα, καὶ αἵσταται τοῦ βολατοῦ, καὶ δρομῆς τῇ παραγεννησίας εἰς τὸ πραγματείαν, εὑρήσασθεν τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκεῖναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς τῆς άλλης τῇ Μακιμίλλῃ καὶ κολακεύων τὴν δεδεμονάδον τὴν εἰς βάλοντα τῇ έκόπτοντος τῆς αὐθηναίης εἰς ἐκείναν εἰς την περίπολον τοῦ Κυρίου έπαθεν καὶ οἰκωδότης τοῦ Κυρίου.


(17-19 C.H. 1.31, 10.15, 12.12; Aesclep. 41 }

30 periskepomoai V  periskepomoai  Bonnet (Prieur, MacDon.) 34 eiken Bonnet  eixon V
35 dromaiwj scripsi  dromaiieij  Bonnet  dromoiwj  V  36 efqakei Bonnet  efqakoi V  37 eisbalousa Bonnet  eisbaliousa V
we intend to offer our gratitude or our confidence\textsuperscript{40}, to sing a hymn or to boast of the God who showed mercy on us, there is nothing else worth mentioning but the fact that we have been recognised by Him”.

2. Having said these things to the brethren he sent every one about his own business saying to them\textsuperscript{41}: “None of you, servants of Christ, will ever be abandoned by me thanks to His love, nor I will be ever abandoned by you thanks to His mediation”. And everyone went home.

There was a great joy\textsuperscript{42} among them during the many days in which Aegeates did not think of continuing the process against the apostle. And everyone was strengthened in the hope of the Lord. And gathering fearlessly at the prison, together with Maximilla, Iphidama and the rest, they all were incessantly\textsuperscript{43} busy meditating\textsuperscript{44} on the abundance\textsuperscript{45} and grace of the Lord.

3. And one day, while Aegeates sat as judge, he remembered Andrew’s affair. And as if being seized by madness he dropped the case he was dealing with, got up from the tribunal and, running, arrived at the praetorium in order to trouble\textsuperscript{46} and to flatter Maximilla. Before him Maximilla had already rushed back from the prison into the house. And having approached her, he said.


\textsuperscript{41}See infra Chapter 4, note 104.

\textsuperscript{42}For the construction see Jannaris § 2106; see also W.J. Aerts, \textit{Periphrastica} (Amsterdam, 1965).

\textsuperscript{43}On the basis of \textit{Narratio} 360.19-27 (he wrongly refers to 364.19), Bonnet considered that some events had been omitted by V. However, this is just a wrong impression due to \textit{Narratio}’s amplification: this text does not add anything new and simply amplifies the periods. See supra Chapter 2, § 3.1.1, A.3, p. 89. See also supra this Chapter, note 31.

\textsuperscript{44}We maintain, in spite of Bonnet and all subsequent scholars, the reading of V \textit{periskept\textsc{on}e\textsc{ni}}. For the construction with \textit{\textsc{e}kw} + participle, see LSJM, s. v. \textit{\textsc{e}kw}, B, IV.b; Kühner-Gerth § 482.12; Jannaris § 1845. For the meaning of \textit{periskept\textsc{on}ai}, see Suda, p 1219.1: perire\textit{qai.pado\textsc{g}ew\textsc{ei}p.\textsc{r}e\textsc{qai}.front\textit{zein}. See also Demetrakos, s. v. \textit{periskept\textsc{on}ai}, ‘\textsc{ske}pt\textsc{on}ai kal wj, mel et\textit{\textsc{e}wj meta\textsc{p}eriske\textsc{e}\textsc{wj}}’. Cf. also the interpretation of the expression in \textit{Narratio} 360.24-25.

\textsuperscript{45}For \textit{peribolh/’abundance’, ‘richness’}, see Origen, \textit{Comm. in evang. Matth.} 13.16.91; \textit{Fragm. in Psalmos} 105.8.4; Suda, g 189.2 and p 1084.2; Philostratus, \textit{VS} 1.504.4; Synesius Phil., \textit{Dion} 1.12; Gregory of Nyssa, \textit{In Canticum cant.} 6.415.19. Cf. \textit{Narratio} 360.25.

\textsuperscript{46}See Demetrakos, s. v. \textit{ebr\textsc{a}s\textsc{omai}, ‘inaestuare’}; Stephanus, s. v. \textit{ebr\textsc{a}s\textsc{omai}, ‘inaestuare’}. The \textit{praetorium} was the Governor’s official residence.
4. Ακίνητωσον οἱ (σοὶ) γονεῖς Ἰακώβου τὸν σοὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ

sou kathēggōναν τοὺς σοὶ γαμβρῶν, μὴ διακομήσας ἔντον

apōdοτε τὴν ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν, ἀλλὰ τακτά πρὸς τὸ

τῇ ἑυφήμῳ μονοτρήσει, μὴ τὴν ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τῶν γεννητῶν σοὶ ἐπαγόν

εὐργεσίαν, ἡ τε αὐθ᾽ ἑυθὲν τῇ παρατήρησει ἡμᾶς ἐλέης, εἰς τὸν ἑαυτὸ

c. 508r

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40 γαρ ὁ δικασθὸς, <καταληψίας> συνετέλεσεν εἰς τὸν ἐκείνῳ ὑπὸ τῆς παρατηρήσεως ἡμᾶς τῆς ἐλειτουργίας, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῷ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθένεισίν, ὡς τε τῆς ἐν τῷ δίκαιῳ γεννητὸν σοὶ ἐκθέ

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4. “As your parents considered me worthy to marry you, Maximilla, they pledged me as your bridegroom without considering wealth, family, or fame, but rather looked at the prudence of my soul. And to leave aside the many things I might adduce to your shame (such as the attentions I received from your parents and those you received from me during our whole life), having left the court on purpose I come to hear from you this one thing. If you might be [again] the one you used to be, living with me in the way we know, sleeping with me, keeping me company and raising children together, I would please you in everything. I will even release the stranger I have in prison. If you do not agree, however, against you I will not undertake anything, since I could not bear to do so. Rather I will certainly punish that one you love more than me. After considering which possibility you prefer, Maximilla, answer me tomorrow. I am already completely prepared for it”. And after saying this he left.

5. And at the usual time Maximilla together with Iphidama went again to Andrew. And having put his hands on her eyes and taken them to her mouth, she began to relate

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47 For gambro as ‘bridegroom’ see Sappho 103; Pindar, Pyth. 9. 116; Theoc. 18.49; 15.129; Aratus 248. See LSJ, s.v. gambro IV. Also in Modern Greek, see Demetrakos, s.v. gambro 2, o

48 For the use of ta, see supra this Chapter, note 37.

49 See infra Chapter 4, note 44.

50 Bonnet suspected the sequence sugkaeousa/(…) suntkeousa. But see infra Chapter 4, p.170 and note 54.

51 Aegeates’ kindness and love for his wife, evident in these lines, have been radically altered throughout AA’s transmission. Narratio, S and H explain Aegeates’ decision to punish Andrew as a means to indirectly punish his wife. Laudatio (345.1-3) and Vita (249A 13-15) go further than the former and, eliminating every trait of kindness from Aegeates’ words, put in his ultimatum a threat to both Maximilla and Andrew. Söder, Romanhafte, 144-45.

52 On the function and meaning of this gesture, see infra Chapter 4, note 72.
Andreaj aut$= apiekri$ato: Epi$tamai men waeMacimilla
paidiôn mou kai authn kekinhn en se ajtibaihein proj to
par à
thj= sunousiaj epaggel mα, musarou= bíou kai rúparou=
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boul oménn<n> xwri$es qai: kai tou=moi ek pollou=kekra$pto
thj=ehnoiaj: hīnh de kaiithn éhnh gnwfnh epi$marturhs=ai boulei.
epimarturw=Macimilla, nh\ praç$j touto: nh\ h$thquj= <tau$>
Ai$geaatou apeilaij= nh\ kinhqj= upo\thj= [e]kei$ou ou\liaj: nh\
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fobhqj= ta$ ai$xraj autou=sunbouliaj: nh\ nikhaqj= ta$= ehteknoij autou=kol akeiiaj: nh\q gel h$ sj ek dowm ai e\authn sou
taij= rúparaij= autou= gohteiaj: al\' upo$neinon pasan
autou=bafan on ofwsa ej h\maj=proj oligion, kai\on auton ol\$y
narkwnta kai\ marainomenon apo\ tesou=kai\ paftwn twm
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suggenwnsou.

olqat málistα ekrh\mei epei=pro$ se, ou\lgαt h$xuazw <to>
dia$sou=ef whenon kai$gino$menon pragm\ poihsaj, upedra men
me: kai\iekotwj esoi$thn Euan ofw$metanoousan kai\eh eno$iltω
G dam epi$trefonta: olqat ekei$h epaqen aignoousa, su\num

(54-70  S (f. 128v, 1/30-2/26); H (f. 163v, 23-164f, 11); cf. Narr. 362.4-16; 18-23; cf. Laud. 344.25-29; 345.3-9; cf. Vita 249A 8-10; 15-22 ”)  71-101  deest ”

66-67 nh= gohteiaj Porphyry Ad Marc. 33.7 = 73-75 kai\iekotwj = epistrefousα GosTruth
(NHC I, 3) 35.22-23; Clement of Alexandria Paed. 1.6.32.1; cf. Alcinous Didask. 165.1-4; Maximus of Tyre
Diss. 10.3 = 73-77 Plotinus Enn. 4.8.4 = 73-82 CH 1.21 = 74-78 olqαt = paqousα GosTruth (NHC I, 3)
17.10-15 = 74-82 Origen C. Cels. 4.3; Plot. Enn. 2.9.15.21ff; ApJohn (BG 2) 47.4ff ” Basilides (ap.
Hippolytus Ref. 7.25.2 ”

58 hpista\nhn HS = 61 add. Bonnet ”kekrafunto HS kekrathto vel kekratunto Bonnet kekrathto
saleuqj= nikhaqj=V, cf. 65 = 66 sou del. Bonnet, sed cf. Jannaris § 546; 1407β se authn HSNarr. ” 68
aforwα Bonnet ” 71 add. Bonnet ”
to him the whole demand of Aegeates. And Andrew answered her. “I know Maximilla, my child, that you decided yourself to go against any obligation of intercourse, for you want to be separated from a foul and sordid life. For a long time this [certainty] has dominated my mind. But now you also want me to express my opinion, and I express it – Maximilla: don’t do this! Do not be overcome by Aegeates’ threats. Do not be moved by his speech. Do not fear his base counsels. Do not be defeated by his cunning flatteries. Do not want to give yourself to his mean incantations. Resist each of his tortures paying little attention to me, and you will see him becoming entirely numb and fading away far from you and all those akin to you.

“For what was really necessary for me to tell you comes now over me, since I do not rest to fulfil the matter that becomes visible and actual through you. Rightly I see in you Eve becoming aware and in me Adam turning back to himself. Since what she

53 For the use of ἐγχειά as the ‘incantation’ proceeding from the material and biological aspects of life and for the need for overcoming it, see Porphyry, Ad Marc. 33.7-8.

54 These words are normally translated as ‘looking to me (or, to us) for a short while’. However, consider that a) as Maximilla has chosen her new way of life, Aegeates’ last chance to convince his wife is by using Andrew’s torture as a means to put pressure on her; and b) Andrew is aware of Aegeates’ trick and must consequently encourage her to dismiss it, without paying attention to the torture of his body (see infra V 108-112).

55 Despite Behm (in ThWNT, s.v. metanoēv), in the present passage metanoēv is not a synonym of ἐπιστρεφω, but rather a previous step to it. Only after changing one’s mind is it possible to ‘turn back’ to oneself and subsidiarily to God. Against the general consensus, we keep the ground meaning of metanoēv as ‘to change one’s mind’ (on which E. Norden, Agnostos Theos. Untersuchungen zur Formgeschichte Religiöser Rede [Darmstadt, 1971] 134-40) and translate with ‘become aware’ (see for this translation infra, Chapter 5, § 5.3.2). It is true that under Judaic-Christian influence the term experiences a specialisation to express ‘remorse’ and ‘repent’ (see Behm, ibid. B; Norden, Agnostos Theos, 139), but there are enough testimonies documenting the ground meaning as well (see Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 7.14.85.1; APH I 138). See the etymological sense in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.6.26.55, μετανοώ γνώσεται and especially 4.22.143.1. Cf. also Tertullian, Adv. Marc. 2.24 (CSEL 3.369.20ff). In the present passage the emphasis lies on the understanding, namely on the awareness that allows Maximilla to change her mind, to go back to herself and to correct in this manner Eve’s error of going astray from herself and consequently from God. In general, P. Hadot, ‘Epistrophe et metanoia dans l’histoire de la philosophie’, Actes du XIe congrés international de philosophie, vol. XII (Amsterdam, 1953) 31-36; R. Joly, ‘Note sur la metanoia’, RHR 155 (1961) 149-56; A. Michel, ‘La métanoia chez Philon d’Alexandrie: de Platon au Judéo-christianisme en passant par Cicéron’, Augustinus 32 (1987) 105-20; J.N. Bailey, ‘Metanoia in the Writings of Philo Judaeus’, SBL Seminar Papers Series 30 (1991) 135-41.

56 The motif of the ἐπιστρεφω or ‘reversion’ towards oneself and/or to God plays an important role in Middle-Platonism and Neoplatonism. As Dodds (Proclus, 218) points out, the notion shows a progressive development from a general to a technical meaning. Whereas in Plato (Rep. 519b) στρέφω / περιστρέφω is applied to the eye of the soul in its ‘turning to’ higher truths, in the NT ἐπιστρεφω is used for ‘religious conversion’. In Alcinous (Didask. 165.1-4; 169.30-35) ἐπιστρεφω describes the celestial intellect’s ‘turning to’ the first God, after the former has been awakened by the latter. The full actualisation of the celestial intellect takes place when it thinks the intelligibles, namely the thoughts of God. On the relationship between ‘awakening’ and ‘reverting’ see W. Theiler, Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (Zürich, 1964 [1934]) 41-42 (with parallels). See also Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 10.3, etc. The closest parallel to AA’s passage is, however, GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 18.31-19.10 and 21.14-25, where in a similar way as in the Neoplatonic conceptions of ‘procession’ (προδοξή) and ‘reversion’ (ἐπιστρεφόν), awareness of being incomplete and imperfect is a precondition for reaching perfection by reversion (see infra note
proj hŋ apoteiŋomai yuxhn, katorqoi=j epistrefousa: kai\oper o( sunekeiŋs kataxqiŋ kai\apoliŋs qhsaj e\utou=\ouj=\paqen, eg\w\ suh soi/t$=gnwrezous$ e\uthn a\nagone\jn, diorquma\i. to\gar ekeiŋh e\ndeej aut\h\sw mh\ta\n\a\ia paqousa: kai\to\ekeiŋh a\t\el ej eg\w\tetef eka prosfug\n qe%=kai\olekeiŋh parhkousen su\hkousaj: kai\o\ekeiŋhj su\nageto eg\w\feug\w: kai\a\ekeinoi e\sfajh\nsan h\mei= eg\w\r\is\amen. to\gar diorq\sa\i e\ka\tou to\i\ionpta\ia\n e\panorqum\tefaktai.
suffered because of not knowing, you now, soul to which I’m referring, rectify it turning back to yourself. And precisely that which the intellect suffered together with her when it was shattered and alienated from itself, I correct it with you, who recognise yourself as being lifted upwards. For what she was lacking you fixed it by not going through the same [errors]; and what in him was imperfect I brought it to perfection taking refuge in God. What she heard carelessly you listened to. And from what he agreed on I escape. And what tripped them up, we recognised. For it is pre-established that everyone’s correction amends his own error.

60. The reversion by Maximilla and Andrew takes place when they reorient their ῥήγησις or ‘desire, appetency’ (arising from their awareness of their lack of knowledge) towards God. The emphasis on the correction that their attitudes bring about indicates the ‘wrong direction’ of Eve’s and Adam’s desire for knowledge being the reason for their error. The knowledge supplied by Andrew enables the distinction between irrational desire (ἐπιθυμία), which pursues the apparent good, and rational will (благо желание), which pursues the real good. See Aristotle, Metaph. 1072a 26ff.

57 Ignorance and not free will is the ultimate cause of suffering. This is an essential argument in order to dismiss an interpretation of metanoeō in a religious sense. The emphasis on the knowledge achieved by Maximilla and Andrew shows, in our opinion, that the verb must be understood from a cognitive perspective.

58 We understand κατατάξω as passive aorist participle of καταλαμβάνω ‘break in pieces, shatter’ or ‘weaken, enervate’ (LSJM, s.v.) and not as proceeding from καταφύγω ‘bring down’ (act.). Hence, I do not see a causal relationship (as is normally accepted, assuming that the intellect’s suffering arises from its being ‘brought down’ together with Eve) between Eve’s suffering and the suffering of the intellect. Both sufferings might very well be two concomitant effects of the same cause, on which regrettably our text is silent. However, the phrase ‘shattered and alienated from itself’ seems to imply that the cause of the intellect’s suffering is the loss of its intrinsic characteristics, namely its unity and self-centred activity (see Aristotle, Metaph. 1072b 20-1073a 14; De an. 430a 22; Plotinus, Enn. 5.9.5). Furthermore infra Chapter 4, pp. 201ff and Chapter 5, § 3.2.1.3.1, pp. 292-95.

59 The current passage is frequently, but not always, interpreted as alluding to sex. For adherents and opponents of such an interpretation, see infra Chapter 4, p. 163 with note 23 and pp. 197-200 and note 179.

60 ‘Reversion’ or ἐπιστροφή is an accompaniment of ῥήγησις or ‘desire’ (see supra V 58-61). As the presuppositions of ῥήγησις are lack of the thing desired and awareness of it (see Proclus, In Parm 922), so the conditions of the reversion are distinctness of the effect from the cause and its potential identity with it (Dodds, Proclus, 218). Maximilla’s and Andrew’s awareness of the first couple’s imperfection allows them to correct their error. Their being conscious of their true nature and origin enables them to acknowledge their deficiency. This awareness is essential inasmuch as it generates the will (cf. Plotinus, Enn. 6.1.21) that will allow the ἐπιστροφή or ‘return to God’, since they now distinctly perceive themselves as effects of a cause and they subsequently recognise their potential identity with it. See Proclus, Inst. 31 and Aristotle, Metaph. 1050a 7ff and 1077a 18ff.

61 Unawareness of their incompleteness and imperfection might have led the first couple to try to supersede their ignorance by their own means. Since AA explicitly relates the ‘suffering’ to ignorance (see V 74-78), it seems clear that ‘arrogance’ (TriTrac [NHC I, 5] 78.17: ἕκκος; Plotinus, Enn. 5.5.1: τὸ ῥᾶ) is not relevant in the explanation of this first error. Furthermore, infra Chapter 5, pp. 291-96.

62 ‘It is pre-established (ταφθαται) that everyone’s correction (τὸ γὰρ διόργανον ἐκαστοῦ) amends (ἐπαναργάζεται) his own error (τὸ ἰλιον πλαίσιά).’ Compare Orbe, Cristología, 162: ‘Porque está ordenado que la enmienda de cada uno remedie el propio error’. The cardinal relevance of the idea of ‘correction’ is emphasised by the use of three different forms (dioqav, katorqav, epanorqαv) to describe it. This correction is not of a sexual kind. As Sturhahn has suggestively pointed out (Die Christologie, 147), Maximilla’s asceticism is just an external manifestation of her receiving the saving gnosis. By receiving this knowledge, Maximilla is able to overcome the suffering originated by Eve’s ignorant, deficient condition. Together with her, Andrew corrects the dispersion of the intellect. For the
6. έγγυμεν ουᾳτά ταυτα εἶπον, εἶποι καὶ ἔλθει γας: εὐαγράψω ἵνα ἰξύσα σαν ἔαυθα ἀποκρύψα.

85 εὐαγράψω καταμανχάς τα ἴτας καὶ ἐπί τας ἔπειρομενοι: εὖαγράψω οι ακούον τω ἐλγομένων: εἰς μεῖζονα 

90 σε καταμανχάς ὃ<τα> λεγομένων: εἰς δυνατώτερον σε; ἐγνώριζ τω αἰδι纳税καθαβαλο ὁτων 

ταυτα οὐαἰςπάντα καταμανχάς αἱγράψω εἰς εὐαγράψώ ὀτι αἱ ὀι ὑπάρχει, ὀτι ὁγοι, ὀτι 

ωφι, ὀτι συγγενής, τοι ἀγαθόντου, ὀτι 

νοερός, ὀτι οὐάνοιος, ὀτι 

διαγωγή, ὀτι 

καπορός, ὀτι ὑπέτ 

σάκα, ὀτι ὑπέτ 

κόσμον, ὀτι ὑπέτ 

αἰξῆ, ὀτι ὑπέτ 

(71-101) deest)

84-86 ἐγνώριζ — ὑφι — αἱγράψω — Plutarch De facie 943a; Alcinous Didask. 164.18-19; cf. Marcus Aurelius Med. 3.16.1, 12.3.1-2; C.H. 10.24 (125.10-16 N-F); TeachSilv (NHC VII, 4) 92.10-32 85 εὐ 

αγράψω — εὐαγράψω — cf. V 77-78, 105-06; Porphyry Ad Marc. 10.5 85-88 εὐαγράψω — ἐλγομένων C.H. 1.15, 21-22; Asclep. 8; Philo Plant. 42, Congr. 97 85-90 C.H. 13.7 86-88 εὐαγράψω — ἐλγομένων Cf. V' 137-38; Philo Migr. 12-13; Plutarch De gen. Socr. 588e 4ff 91-96 ταυτα — ὑπάρχει J. C. 1.15; Asclep. 7, cf. 8; Philo Somn. 1.36 Philo Heres 69-74 (cf. 263-265); Plutarch De Is. 382d 4ff; C.H. 10.5-6; Plotinus Ens. 5.3.17, 21ff; 6.9.4, 1ff 92 τοι ἀγαθόντου Cf. infra V' 100, 239; GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 38.32-33; TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 51.27ff; 52.9; 53.7; ValExp (NHC XI, 2) 22.23-24, 37-38; Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.2.5, 1.11

84-85 εὐαγράψω — post rhde Atransp. Schimmel. vel ἰξύσα σαν <αὐθή> ἐλγομένων αἰγράψω αὐθήν ἐλγομένων αἰγράψω — H(i)ξύσα σαν <σφ> εὐαγράψω ἐλγομένων αἰγράψω — Festugière 86 ἐλγομένων Bonnet V 88

add. Festugière nooumein ὃν ἐλγομένων Bonnet 90 katabal otnw Bonnet katabal otnw V
6. “Having said these things as I said, I would also say the following. Well done you, saved nature, since you were not strong and you did not keep yourself hidden! Well done you, soul, shouting out which you suffered and returning to yourself! Well done Anthropos who understands what is not yours and hastens towards what is yours! Well done [you] who listens to what is said! For I see you [now] thinking much greater things than what is said; for I am aware that you are much stronger than what seems to oppress you; for [I see that] you excel above what brought you down into deformities and above what led you to captivity.

“Having recognised all these in yourself, Anthropos, that you are immaterial, holy, light, that you are akin to the unbegotten, [that you are] intellectual, heavenly, radiant, [and] pure and that you are above flesh, above the world, above the powers,
εἶκουσιά, ἐφ' ὁπ' ὁμενή ἐν λαβῷ αὐτοῦ ἐν καταστάσει ἐστὶν καὶ ἀπὸ λαβὼν μόνε ἐν διαφανείᾳ: καὶ ἂν διά τὸν πρὸς ἐπάνω ἐν θυσίᾳ σοῦ, τὰ παρατηρήσεις αὐτῶν, τὰ παρανόμητα, τὰ μὴ γενέσθαι σοὶ, τοὺς δὲ πρὸς ὁμοίως γενέσθαι σοὶ ὁμοίους, ποῖθεν ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ, οὕτω γένοντας, ὡσποδὲ ὑπὲρ τούτος σει χειροτέρα ὡς ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ ὁμοίως αὐτὸς τὸν νῦν ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ. τὸ δὲ Ἀἴγατος αὐτῆς ἐκ μεταφρασμοῦ σει τῆς ἡμέρας. ὁπλὶ τῷ θρόνῳ οὐκέτι διὰ τὴν ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ ὁμοίωςν. ταῦτα εἰσέχοντες τοῦτον ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ οὕτω γένοντας, ὡσποδὲ ὑπὲρ τούτος σει χειροτέρα ὡς ὁ πρὸς τὸν θρόνον τοῦ ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ ὁμοίως αὐτῶν τὰς μηδενὶς μεταφρασμοὺς ἐπιμέλειας καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἡ ὑπόθεσις οἰκείῃ. 

7. ταῦτα εἰσέχοντες τοῦτον ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ ὁμοίως ἐκ μεταφρασμοῦ ταῦτα εἰσέχοντες τοῦτον ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ οὕτω γένοντας, ὡσποδὲ ὑπὲρ τούτος σει χειροτέρα ὡς ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ ὁμοίωςν. ταῦτα εἰσέχοντες τοῦτον ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ οὕτω γένοντας, ὡσποδὲ ὑπὲρ τούτος σει χειροτέρα ὡς ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ ὁμοίωςν. ταῦτα εἰσέχοντες τοῦτον ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ οὕτω γένοντας, ὡσποδὲ ὑπὲρ τούτος σει χειροτέρα ὡς ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ ὁμοίωςν. ταῦτα εἰσέχοντες τοῦτον ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ οὕτω γένοντας, ὡσποδὲ ὑπὲρ τούτος σει χειροτέρα ὡς ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἐν καταστάσει σοὶ ὁμοίως.
above the authorities, beyond which you really are; having recollected and recovered yourself in your [true] condition\(^{66}\), think that in what you excel. And since you have seen your face in your essence, breaking all the shackles\(^{67}\) (I do not mean those shackles of generation, but also those belonging to the realm beyond generation\(^{68}\), of which we gave you outstanding appellatives\(^{69}\)), desire now to see that one who has not yet been seen\(^{70}\) by you, who has not been generated, whom you alone\(^{71}\), if you have the nerve, will soon perceive.

7. “I said this for your sake, Maximilla, since in its power\(^{72}\) what has been said also applies to you. Just as Adam died in Eve, having agreed on her concession, so I also now live in you, since you are observing the commandment of the Lord and are transporting yourself to that which is coherent with your essence\(^{73}\). Reject Aegeates’ threats, Maximilla, since you know that we have a God that pities us. Do not let his noises move you, but remain pure. As for me, let him inflict on me not only the tortures of prison, but let him also throw me to the beasts, burn me with fire or throw me off a cliff. What, then? Since it is only this body and it is akin to him, let him dispose of it as he pleases.

\(^{66}\) For the expression \textit{eu}t\textit{on}ap\textit{abw} see Porphyry (\textit{ap. Festugière}), \textit{Sent.} 37.1; 38.9; 38.21; 39.14; 17.  
\(^{67}\) For this conception of materiality and physical existence as ‘shackles’ for the true and real being, see Plotinus, \textit{Enn.} 4.8.4 and Porphyry, \textit{Ad Marc.} 33. See \textit{infra} Chapter 5, § 3.2.2.1.2, pp. 300-04.  
\(^{68}\) This mention also seems to imply a tripartite conception of the cosmos (see \textit{supra} this Chapter note 38), as it refers to two sorts of \textit{desma/}or ‘shackles’, namely to those of generation, or lower realm of physis, and those beyond the realm of becoming (see \textit{infra} Chapter 5, § 1.2, pp. 245-50 at 246). Furthermore, see Sturhahn, \textit{Christologie}, 141 and note. According to Festugière (\textit{La Révélation IV}, 230 note 2), the ‘names’ or ‘appellatives’ (\textit{proshgori/a}) may be those of the Gnostic Eons.  
\(^{69}\) As Maximilla is still attached to the discursive means of rationality – that is, to speech and persuasion – Andrew’s knowledge of the supramundane has been transmitted by means of words. However, once she has seen ‘her face in her essence’ she has transcended rationality as well and can engage herself in pure contemplation. See Philo, \textit{Immut.} 62.  
\(^{70}\) For the use of the dative with the passive voice as ‘\textit{upo}t\textit{iroj}’, see Blass-Debrunner § 191 with A1. Or should \textit{of\textit{ent}a} be understood as a deponent intransitive? See Blass-Debrunner § 313 and Ljungvik, \textit{Studien}, 34.  
\(^{71}\) For the solitude of this act of contemplation of God, see Numenius fr. 2, 11-12; Plotinus, \textit{Enn.} 1.6.7.8-9; 6.7.34.7-8; 6.9.11.50-51.  
\(^{72}\) For Andrew’s words as endowed with a \textit{du}\textit{romanij} see \textit{infra}, Chapter 4, note 113.  
\(^{73}\) As Luttikhuizen, ‘Religious Message’, 99-100, suggests, the passage ‘speaks about the fate of the first humans (not about their conduct)’. In his view, the reference to Adam’s dying in Eve and to Andrew living in Maximilla should not be understood as a reference to sexual union and abstinence, but rather to the creation of Eve. Hence (ibid., 100) ‘the tacit supposition is that the division of the Pre-Paradisiac Adam into two human beings of different sex is the real cause of the fateful condition (the ‘fall’) of human kind’. 
8. โปรเจค เดโม่ใน (โลโก), Macimíla: έγω σοι, μή έκδωσή εαυθνήτ% Αιγέας: σθείτε μετά τα έκθεσι τω εκθέστι: και μάλιστα υπομονέμου και Μακιμιλανθυνομείνοι και μή ελεγοντά: 

το = Αιγέας πάθη Ανδέα διαβολή του: σε να θεσμωθριΐου εκουσί. Σομ ουβεαυτώθων ήλιον έλαται σεαυτήν αγνήν και θαράν, αγίαν, ασπιλόν, ειλικρίνην έανικεύτων, 

απολυτατύπωντα ευμίλια όλη λογίαν, Μακιμίλα προτάσει τά έλεγχον εμαντία, και [αυτο)] 

ανάπαυομαι ουτήν και εμβολίαν τού έλατον τόσον έλεγχον εμαντία, αποστάν παράκαταν εμπευμένοι, 

τάκα και έναυικύ συγκαταίνου μελετάν δώρον διασέλι αυθον δεξιός και σεμπάν 

ταύτα δεξιός 

πεσιτάτων ταύτα δεξιός 

αυθον 

πεσιτάτων ταύτα δεξιός 

αυθον 

πεσιτάτων ταύτα 

αυθον 

113-120  S (f. 129', 1/8-19); H (f. 164', 22-30); deest in Narr. etc.  

120-121  deest  

121-129  S (f. 129', 1/19-34); H (f. 164', 30-164', 5); deest in Narr. etc.  

121 έργα  

Clement of Alexandria Exc. Theod. 54; HypArch (NHC II, 4) 91.10-15  

114 έκδωσή Bonnet έκδοσί V 115 μου Bonnet μοι V 120 ακλαστόν Bonnet ακλαστόν V 125 συγ- Bonnet συγκαταίνου V 126 πεσιτάτων έλατον Μακιμίλα προτάσει V 124 πεσιτάτων
8. “My speech is once again for you, Maximilla. I tell you, do not give yourself to Aegeates. Maximilla, stay firm against his treacheries, especially since I have seen my Lord telling me ‘Andrew, Aegeates’ father, the devil, will free you from this prison’. Let it be your duty then to preserve yourself pure and clean, holy, stainless, unmixed, without adultery, not sympathetically disposed to what is alien to us; unbroken, not split, unbending, invulnerable, undisturbed, undivided, free from offence, without sympathy for the works of Cain. If you do not give yourself, Maximilla, to the opposite of these, I myself will get rest as well, merely being forced to put an end to this life on behalf of you, which means on behalf of me.

“However, if I were driven away from this place – being able then to be of help for other people akin to me because of you – and you, in turn, were convinced by Aegeates’ utterances and by the flatteries of his father, the snake, in such a way that you might go back to your former deeds, know that because of you I will be punished until you realise that I repudiated to live the life because of an unworthy soul.

74 For the double meaning of desmewrion, as ‘prison’ and ‘prison of the body’, see infra Chapter 5, pp. 300ff.

75 The expression ‘the works of Cain’ in the present context refers to an earthly existence, characterised by the lack of rationality and the need to attend to externalities. Although originally in an upright position and therefore clearly differentiated from animals, man has lost his privilege and is now equally bent to the ground (see supra V 6, xamirrifej) and forced to work the land for his subsistence (see Minucius Felix, Octav. 17.2) and hence cannot perceive or be receptive to the divine (see Tertullian, Adv. Marc. 2.2.6). Cain, as a farmer, represents in the current passage the terrestrial man and his life full of the toils peculiar to his material condition (see HypArch [NHC II, 4] 91.10-15, where Cain’s generation is preceded by the appearance of the burdens of physical work, ignorance, etc.). In our view, therefore, the expression ‘the works of Cain’ does not refer to sexuality (cf., however, the interesting analysis by Pesthy, ‘Aegeates’, 50-53). Rather, it should be placed in the context of the polarity Seth/Cain, as spiritual-man who looks upwards and as the irrational, material man exposed to all the toils (obviously those of sexuality as well) of his inferior existence, respectively. See Clement of Alexandria, Exc. Theod. 54.
9. δείκνυται οὖν ὅπως ἰδάσκεται ἄνδρῷ ὁ ὁμοίαν ἔμεινη

eὐθύνῃ οὖν ἄνδρας εἰς τὸν ὂνομα ὅπως ἰδάσκεται

dιαφύλαξε, παρακάλεσε, ἵνα ἔχῃ φόβον, ἵνα ἐχθροῦ

τὸ ἁμαρτίαν καὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ τὴν τυχερήν

σὺν τῷ πάσῳ, ἵνα ἔχῃ φόβον.
9. “I beg you, rational man\textsuperscript{76}, so that the clear-sighted intellect remains firm\textsuperscript{77}. I beg you, invisible intellect, so that you might be preserved. I beg you, love Jesus. Do not be subdued by the worse\textsuperscript{78}. Take part with me, man that I am begging, so that I may become perfect. Help me as well, so that you may know your true nature. Suffer with me in [my] pain, in order to know what I’m suffering and to escape the suffering. See what I’m looking at and you will disable what you are looking at. See what you must and you will not see what you must not. Listen to what I say and what you listened to throw it away.

\textsuperscript{76} ‘Rational man’ (\textit{frō̂nimoj ahh̄r}). The use of \textit{ahhr} in the present passage seems to be somewhat odd, for until now the rational or intellectual man has exclusively been referred to as \textit{ahcrwoj}. A possible explanation is that we are dealing with a simple copyist slip, for some lines below the word \textit{ahcrwoj} refers to the same addressee. However, it may also be that the expression makes a differentiation between an immanent variety of the ‘rational man’ (\textit{frō̂nimoj ahh̄r}) – that is, a rational man in the process of becoming a purely intellectual man, completely detached from externals – and the primordial and transcendent man or \textit{ahcrwoj}. This possibility might also explain the meaning of Andrew’s advising him to stay awake and preserve the clear sight of his intellect, for he is still apt to be influenced by the lower aspects of his being.

\textsuperscript{77} The term \textit{eubij} is a hapax legomenon, but a neologism cannot be ruled out in the current passage, for \textit{oj} as ‘sense of sight’ is widely attested in philosophical texts (Democritus D-K 68, B 11; Plato, \textit{Crat.} 396b; Aristotle, \textit{De an.} 428a 6). For a similar expression compare \textit{eubij} to the \textit{eukuderkh} or ‘wohlverständiger Scharfblick’ (Diels-Kranz) of \textit{frō̂nsij} in Democritus D-K 68, B 119 (\textit{ap. Stobaeus} 2.8.16). See Philo, \textit{Praem.} 165, \textit{qē̂s ojij}; Plotinus, \textit{Enn.} 5.9. For the intrinsic relationship between ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’ (\textit{gignw̄skein} or \textit{ojij} and \textit{nouj̄}) see R. Bultmann, ‘Zur Geschichte der Lichtsymbolik im Altertum’, \textit{Philologus} 97 (1948) 1-36 at 15-23, esp. 17-18.

\textsuperscript{78} Rationality or intellect is the best part of a human being, but its predominance over the worse or inferior parts is not assured. If irrationality revitalises as a result of the call of and assent to externalities, it can bring about a cloudiness or obsfuscation of the intellect and its inherent clear sight.
10. ταύτα εἰπὼν σὲ·καὶ παντα τὸν ἀκουόντα, εἰ·α·
ακούστος· σὺ·δὲ·ὸς·Stratokλ ἦ·σι·απίδωθι·πρὸ·τὸν·εἰ·καὶ·τον·τῷ·
συνεκτὸς·πολ·λοι·δικρυβὶ·καὶ·στηθεῖ·εὶ·εἰ·κακουστὸν·τῷ·
τῷ·περὶ·σὲ·δὲ·καὶ·τὸ·πολ·λο·μᾶ·τῇ·τῇ·πολ·λο·μᾶ·

tαὐτῷ·προῆ·καὶ·παντὰ·τὸ·ἀκούοντα·

140·εἰρά·ἀκακίας·εἰ·προῖ·σὲ·εὐκομάε·τεκνὸν·ὅ·φ·ν·διατεύμενα·
μαντήρει·πρὸ·τὸ·ν·εἰ·ηταί·τα·εἰ·ημένη·α·

145·εἰγεν·σὸ·ποι·διανοθίκου·μερούς·ἐκ·

150·ινontology·

139-141 cf. Narr. 362.8-10; deest in S/H etc. ἀπὸ·

143·diatetqσεν; ἔφη·ἀτόμοι—μεροῦς·Plutarch·De·gen.·

144-45 ἔφη·ἀτόμοι—μεροῦς·Mt·8:20;·Lk·9:58·

142·ἀνέί·Bonnet·ἀνάι·V·—·add.·Bonnet·ἀνέί·Bonnet·ἐπαναντίον·τόν·τόν·φως·

145-46 τὸν·ἐπαναντίον·τόν·φως·Bonnet·εἰκωνον·τόν·τόν·φως·Bonnet·

146·Bonnet·ἀπάντησε·Bonnet·ἀπάντησε·V·—·Schimmel.·

147·οὐ·τί·ορίζει·οὐ·τί·ορίζει·V·—·
10. “These things I said to you and to every one that listens, if he really listened\textsuperscript{79}. And you Stratocles”, he said turning to him, “why are you so constrained by many tears and groan so loudly? What is your despair; what your acute pain and much distress\textsuperscript{80}? Do you apprehend the uttered words and why I beg you, son, to dispose yourself [accordingly]\textsuperscript{81}? Do you understand to whom the pronounced words were pronounced? Did each touch your understanding? Did it reach your rational part\textsuperscript{82}? Do I still have the one who listened to me? Do I find myself in you? Is there someone talking in you whom I see as belonging to me? Does he love the one that has spoken in me and does he want to communicate with him? Does he want to be united with him? Does he strive to be loved by him? Does he desire to be yoked with him? Does he find in him some rest? Does he have somewhere to recline his head on\textsuperscript{83}? “Is there perhaps something withstanding him? [Something] that becomes exasperated, that resists, hates, [or] that escapes, [something that] grows wild, that refuses, that has turned away, that breaks out, that is distressed, that struggles\textsuperscript{84}? [Is

\textsuperscript{79} Milazzo, ‘Gli “Atti di Andrea” ed il romanzo antico’, in \textit{La narrativa cristiana antica} (Roma, 1995) 53-75 at 71 note 2, sees in these words evidence to suggest that \textit{AA} was conceived (at least partially) to be read in public or even to circulate orally. However, Andrew’s appeal to other hearers is directed to potential addressees among the other brethren who are present while he speaks to Maximilla. Even if the text omits any reference to other individuals, the next lines (\textit{Vr} 140ff) show that Stratocles, at least, was also present.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{AA} presents a clear bipartite conception of the soul, consisting of a rational and an irrational part. Whereas the former is busy with rationality and moderation of the emotional responses, the latter is the seat of affections and its overbearing character requires the rational part to keep close watch on it. Stratocles’ expressions of acute grief and pain alarm the apostle, for the appearance of these affections may be evidence of a factual or impending predominance of the irrational on the rational part of his soul.

\textsuperscript{81} If this is not the case and rationality is apt to be subjugated by irrationality, the words can reawaken and strengthen the rational part of the soul. Precondition for this therapeutic influence, however, is that the addressee is receptive to the words and their message.

\textsuperscript{82} Andrew’s last questions intend to discover whether Stratocles was and (still) is receptive to the words and whether he understands the goal of the words. The latter issue is essential, for the words seem to have both an immediate and a long-term influence on the soul of the addressee (see \textit{infra} \textit{Vr} 174-77). On the one hand, they awaken the rational part of the soul, in case due to the circumstances it happens to be numb or subjugated by affections and their overbearing character. On the other hand, the contents of the words, namely the knowledge they transmit, must achieve a more permanent effect by strengthening rationality and by helping it to keep emotions within borders.

\textsuperscript{83} The last section makes explicit the issues commented on in the previous notes. Andrew’s words ‘do I still have the one who listens to me, etc....’ indeed refer to the rational part of Stratocles’ soul. If the words have reached Stratocles’ soul and if he has understood their meaning, the rational part should by now be sufficiently reinvigorated so as to have command over affections and be able properly to control them, by transforming them into something rationally acceptable. On the issue, see \textit{infra} Chapter 4, § 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, pp. 206-09.

\textsuperscript{84} Given Stratocles’ extreme affection, evident from his groans and crying, Andrew wonders whether the irrational part has taken control of the soul. The emotional instability of the soul resulting from this situation is obvious in the vocabulary chosen to describe its tempestuousness. See \textit{infra} Chapter 4, p. 208 and note 231.
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...efenoi oti dei mh uf efewn koi akeuetai; mh efenoi suntigetai; mh ala aut dioxl ei mh tij a)l otrof jou ew; mh ahtidikoj; mh lumewh; mh ekropj; mh gohj; mh periergoj; mh strebl of; mh upoul of? mh dol ij; mh misa hqwpjoj; mh mis ogoj; mh turahnwn omoij; mh al azwh; mh ephrnheoj; mh mani wdhj; mh of ewj suggenhj; mh diabol ou ofl on; mh puroj; sunhgoroj; mh skotoj iploj; mh tij en soi of ouk ahegetai/mou Stratoklh legontoj tauta; tij gar; a pokrinai; mh mathn al w=mh mathn eper; ouf hsi o(enhsoi Stratoklh palin dakrusaj ahrwpjoj.

11. Kail labofoenoj of andreaj th=xeiroj Stratokle ouj ei pen: exw oh hjapwn. aha paus oai ef oh pros edokoun to/gar eli — Bonnet p. 43

165 mh on sthein se kai akaqektwj dakruin sunbol on moi pepoihtai proj to/hdh aha pepausqai, ofi ou)mathn pepoihtai proj setouj suggei=mu logouj.

12. Kail oath Stratoklh ha aut apokrino to: Mh nohize makariwte andreq ofi efentoj/estinto/(aiwme) l'hjsu ofi(gar dia sou= ektoj tej logoj puri akontizofenoj ej epe ebi kasin, kai enou= ekastoj autwn kaqiknetai wla hqwj= ekkaiwn me: th=j yuxhj= mou to/ proj toij= khou mehoj oh thn meta toutwn ahi an


154-55 mh suntiqetai. Cf. V 80, 143, 188, 192, 237 "171-72 th=j yuxhj=— oh Aristotile Protr. B 60, B 61, EN 1102a 27ff; Posidonious fr. 148; Galen PHP 444d; 453d; Plutarch De virt. mor. 442b 10ff; Philo Leg. alleg. 3.128ff; TeachSilv (NHC VII, 4) 93.25-94.8; Evagrius of Pontus Schol. in prov. 3.5 "

156 lumewh Bonnet loimaiwh V "160 of Bonnet oja V "Stratoklh (voc.) Bonnet Stratoklh hV "162 Stratoklh (voc.) Bonnet Stratoklh hV "163 Stratokle ouj Bonnet Stratokle oj V "165 moi Bonnet me V "170 akontizofenoj Bonnet "171 post re verba kai katafjal ejwn (ei H) proj thn shnh storghn habent HS (pariter Narr.), suppl. Prieur " ante th=j yuxhj= verba kai to/paqhtikohn (glos., cf. Narr.) habent HS, suppl. Prieur "172 toutmeta/tou= aihian HS, em. Prieur "
there something] that speaks with others or which is flattered by others? That agrees
with others? Or do other things perhaps disturb him? Is there someone inside who is
alien to me? Someone inimical, destroyer, adversary, sorcerer, tricky, crooked,
treacherous, or deceitful?

"[Is there] a misanthrope, a hater of words, someone similar to tyrants, a quack?
An arrogant person, someone producing madness, someone akin to the snake, weapon
of the devil, defender of fire, or pertaining to obscurity? Is there anyone within you,
Stratocles, who does not suffer me while I say these things? Who then? Answer! Do I
speak in vain? Did I speak in vain? No! says the man in you who began to cry again,
Stratocles".

11. And Andrew, taking Stratocles’ hand, said. “I have the one I loved. I will rest on
the one I expected. For the fact that you are still groaning harder and uncontrollably
crying is the sign for me that I have already got rest, since not in vain have I directed to
you the words that are akin to me"

12. And Stratocles answered him: “Do not think, blessed Andrew, that there is some
other thing grieving me but you. Since the words that from you are directed to me seem
to flash with fire, and each of them reaches me and truly lights me up. But the part of
my soul that is disposed toward what has been heard is tormented auguring the pain

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85 Whereas Stratocles’ receptiveness to the words and the mastery of rationality achieved by them implied
that there was in Stratocles something akin to Andrew, the mastery of irrationality is described as inimical
to the apostle. Instead of being open to the knowledge transmitted by the words, Stratocles may be then
open to a deceiving use of speech, to the flattery of those (or that) which is alien to him. Irrational as it is,
the inferior part of the soul is prone to the body and the externalities with which it ‘agrees’ tend to disturb
it. Note the conceptual opposition *diatithmi* (‘to dispose oneself to’) / *suntithmi* (‘to agree with’) to
describe the soul’s relationship to what is akin and to what is alien to it, respectively. See also *infra* this
Chapter, notes 92, 93 and 107, and Chapter 5, § 5.3.2, pp. 332-37 at 335 with note 787.

86 See *infra* Chapter 4, note 223.

87 Prieur’s emendations on the basis of S and H (see app. ad 171 and 172) seriously alter the conceptual
development of Stratocles’ answer. As I will show below (see *infra* Chapter 4, § 3.3.4, pp. 209-10).
Stratocles’ reasoning in V exactly correlates with Andrew’s questions in the preceding section, and this
correlation vanishes in Prieur’s text. The melodramatic expression of S and H is actually closer to
*Narratio* than to V. Compare *Narratio* 363.16-19, *oi(a)pò(st)hatoj sou ebiotetj lopoi wju pu= akontizotej katafelecaj mou thn kardan kalj proj thPistent jou=upoj sou el'kus an katagegl lomenou Xristou=kai'storgnh thj=sj makariohtoj. As far as the reading kataflegwn
proj thn shn storgnh is concerned, this expression is hardly primitive, as storgfh/ stegws normally
means ‘love, affection’, especially of parents and children, and only rarely refers to ‘sexual love’, see
LSJ, s.v. *storgf/. The qualification of such filial affection as ‘burning’ is certainly odd, especially when
referring to the effect of Andrew’s words.

88 Obviously, the ‘rational part of the soul’ or, in Andrew’s words (V’ 145), *tò dianohtikoj metoij*. 
Prieur’s emendation (see app. ad 171) on the basis of S and H seems to be incorrect. The emendation not
only alters the correspondence between Andrew’s and Stratocles’ words (for which see *infra*, Chapter 4,
pp. 211-13). The expression *topaqhtikoj metoij* thju'xuhsj mou, *toporj toj=nikous metoij oij also
introduces a flagrant *contradictio in terminis*, for a characteristic of the affectionate part of the soul is
precisely not to listen to or obey words. Rather, it is the rational part of the soul that the *lopoj* aims to
manteuo/menon ko εξεταί: α)πάλλασσα γὰρ αὐτοῖ, καὶ εὐαίσθητα οί καὶ ἔκτις ἔτθη δεμεταί ταύτα σοῦ εἰρήνει εἰ αὐτόι καὶ στοργῆ πνεύματι· τα ημῶν γυνῶν τῷ σωματίῳ λόγων δεδεμένην σοῦ ἑνεκὼ τοῦ σπορέων: τό δὲ ἀλήθεια ταύτα καὶ ἐκφυνοι οὐκ ἑγόρασσα, ἀλλὰ σοῦ δεῖται Ἀνδρέας μακριώτατε. καὶ τί ἐν ταῖς συνεικόνεσιν καὶ δοξαζῶν που ἐφέρασα ἀλλὰ σοῦ παρά τοῦν ἡλικίαν ἐν τοῖς προϊστάμενοι καὶ μετατηρήσασα ὡς ἐκω σου σπερματικών: α) οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπίδωσέ σοι ἀλλὰ ἡ καὶ οἱ τού τοῦν ἡμῶν τοῦν ἐφαίνομαι οὐκ ἑκατονοτις ἀλλὰ σοῦ δεῖται Ἀνδρέας μακριώτατε.

13. Καὶ ᾧ Ἀνδρέας αὐτῷ ἐς περικράτος· Ταύτα ἡετεικνὼν α) τοῦ καὶ τοῦν οὐκ ἐφέρασα καὶ συνεικόνεσιν καὶ δοξαζῶν που ἐφέρασα ἀλλὰ σοῦ παρά τοῦν ἡλικίαν ἐν τοῖς προϊστάμενοι καὶ μετατηρήσασα ὡς ἐκω σου σπερματικών: α) οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπίδωσέ σοι ἀλλὰ ἡ καὶ οἱ τού τοῦν ἡμῶν τοῦν ἐφαίνομαι οὐκ ἑκατονοτις ἀλλὰ σοῦ δεῖται Ἀνδρέας μακριώτατε.

14. Καὶ τῶν Ἀνδρέας θάλαμον ἐπικράτος· Ταύτα τουσ τοῦ ἐπικράτους οὐκ ἔχοντος οὐκ ἐπάθηνεν γὰρ τούτῳ λόγῳ κατακουσάσα σοῦ προϊστάμενοι, καὶ τροπόν τίνα διατείχεσα επ' αὐτῷ καὶ γενόμενον

(168-182) cf. S (f. 129v, 2/10-129v, 1/3); H (f. 164v, 12-30); cf. Narr. 363.15-23) "183-189" S (f. 129v, 1/4-17); H (f. 164v, 30-38); Narr. 363.23-364.2 "190-204" S (f. 129v, 1/17-2/11); H (f. 164v, 38-165v, 18); Narr. 364.3-18; cf. Laud. 345.9-13, Vita 249B 7-9 "

174 εἰρήνει εἰ αὐτοῦ καὶ στοργῆς Ἐπεμδοκείς. fr. 109; Antiph. fr. 73; Philemon fr. 200; Demetr. Lac. Her. 1012.44; Plutarch Non poss. suav. 1100d 5 "175-82" τα ημῶν — αναίσθητα Αριστοτέλης EN 1179b 27ff; [Plutarch] De lib. ed. 4b-c; C.H. 1.29; Galen De cog. an morb. 7.40, 1-8 "188" ἄκρης συντιγμένην; cf. V 80, 143, 155, 192, 237 "192" diateίχεσα. Cf. V 80, 143, 155-55, 188, 237 "

175 manteuo/menon Bonnet manteuo/menon V "185" οὐκ εὐκενεμάθης εἰν Σεν οὐκ εὐκενεμάθης εἰν ΒΗ οίδε Schimmel. "189" δοταὶ H Bonnet δοτῖ V "192" τίνα ἐν προϊστάμενοι, επ' αὐτῷ συνεικόνεσιν τίνα ἐν προϊστάμενοι.
that comes after it. For you are departing and I know well that this is good. But when searching for the care and affection that from you usually come together with it where or in whom shall I find it? I received the seeds of the words of salvation and you were the sower. But in order for them to shoot up and produce they need no-one else but you, blessed Andrew. And what can I tell you further than this? I need much compassion and help from you so that I might be worthy of the seeds I have from you. These will not otherwise grow unceasingly and come forth unless you want and pray for them and for all myself.

13. And Andrew answered him: “This was what I myself too had seen in you, son. And I praise my Lord that my cogitation about you did not go astray, but knew what it said. But so that you all may know: tomorrow Aegeates will have me crucified. For Maximilla, the servant of the Lord, will trouble the enemy in him – to whom he belongs – by not agreeing with him on what is alien to her. And he will think to console himself by turning against me.”

14. While the apostle was saying these things, Maximilla was not present. For she, having heard the words that he had directed to her and having, so to say, disposed herself according to the words and become precisely what the words indicated, she influence. The irrational part of the soul can only be influenced either by the rational part or by irrational actions. Cf. Aristotle, Protrep. B 60, B 61 Düring; EN 1102a 27ff; Posidonius, fr. 148; Galen, PHP 444D; PHP 453D, oujgat dhpay taj doaay taj dou ayogistikoumetadafkotai proj twau hrafew, all a\ tolpaghtiknth=uyuxi=algonupafson egeitkontai te kai graukontai diakinh=ewna al ogwn t\ men gat a)lo6% datw=ah)ogwn hate wfe eka=ta= bl abh, t%H ogk%deli episthnhj= te kaic amaq=aj. Furthermore, Plutarch, De virt. mor. 442b 10ff; Philo, Leg. alleg. 3.128ff; Evagrius of Pontus, Schol. in Prov. 3.5.

Stratocles’ words imply a quasi-materialistic effect of the words on the soul of the listener. Some lines above, Andrew has indeed described the action of the words with the verbs a(ptw and qigga/nw, which imply the same conception. This ‘touching’ of the words seem to produce ‘pain’ (a)ni/a) in a similar way as for Plutarch (De gen. Socr. 588e) human words (in contrast to divine loge) produce a ‘wound’ in the soul of the listener. Andrew’s care and affection, so declares Stratocles, have until now helped him in overcoming this pain, by reorienting and transforming it into something beneficial for him. However, as he is now aware that Andrew must depart, he is tormented foreseeing both the pain that the words will generate in his soul and his lack of a helper that might bring them to a good end.

Scil. ‘with those things which have been heard’.

Stratocles’ words are usually traced back to the ‘seed-sower parable’, but a comparison of our passage with Mc 4.1-20 reveals important differences. Stratocles’ main concern is to state that Andrew’s care and attention are essential to bring his educational process to a good end. Consequently, the focus is not on the seeds (= words) or on the quality of the ground (listener), but rather on the sower as the only craftsman who can let the plant grow properly and produce abundantly. The agricultural metaphor, as it appears here, has been traditionally applied to describe the learning process and the relationship between master (or teaching) and pupil, but since Aristotle it is particularly used to describe ethical teaching (see infra, Chapter 4, § 3.3.5, pp. 212-13). AA’s use of the metaphor must rather be traced back to this latter use, as the similarities to numerous parallels of the period clearly show. See also infra Chapter 4, § 4.3.1, pp. 226-28.

See supra this Chapter, note 85 at the end.

See previous note.
toute oer oi(logoi epeiknuon, etornhása ouk akriwv joude\a\astoaxtwj paregeneto ejj toipraitwfon, kai%anti\bi%afh\a
\\(toij\) th= sarkoj xaifein frašasa. kai\ tou= Ai\geafou 
a\hnenekhojtoj aut=thn omoian a\i\wsin peril\h\a e\fhsen aut= =
diaskey\a\saqai, ei)aj\a bou\itoj aut=%sugk\ae\ufeitein, apeiapa-
\rehj de/ peril\h\a tou=\ndrebu a\hai\esin loipon e\e\trappto, kai\ 
e\k\e\pteto poi% qanaf% auton peribaloi. kai\wij e\pekrafted
aut=%twmpantwn monontol\a\hskol opisq\mai, a\i\wn me\n autoj
af\a toij=o\moibij esiti\zeto; h\(de\)Macimi\la prohgoumenou aut\hj=
\-tou=kuriu ide\# tou=\ndrebu af\a ts=\fi\da\ha palin paragi/
netai ejj to\des mwth\fion. kai\\(kl\ou pl\ei\nnoj o\h\toj e\h\\\non \t\\v\\a\jel f\w\katal an\\banhei auto\\i logouj poiou\fenontoioufouj:
\\(15.\\\\\) \eg\w\a\jel f\oi=\ek\epen\q\h\q\h\h\q un\p\ou\tou=kuriu a\postol oj ejj ta\ 
\klh\nata tauta w\a me kathci\wsen o(ku\jioj mou, dida\kai meh
ou\\d\h\n, upom\h\h\h\h\g\i\ de\pa\hta toh suggenh=tw\a\\\log\jn a\hqrwpon,
o\h\ en kakoij=toij=pro\kai\toj dialogui, terp\h\nh\n\j=epi-
\bl\h\be\sin aut=\tw\\f\\ant\h\\h\j: w\a a\jel kai\ u\raj= parekali\esa
\eksth\mai, kai\\e\pi\ita\mo\nima ebei\ges\qai proefreya kai\pantwn

\(190-204\) S (f. 129\(v\), 1/17-2/11); H (f. 164\(v\), 38-165\(v\), 18); Narr. 364.3-18; cf. Laud. 345.9-13, Vita 249B 7-9) 
\(205-209\) S (f. 129\(v\), 2/11-20); H (f. 165\(v\), 18-23); cf. Narr. 364.19-24; cf. Convers. 374.18-20; [cf. Arm. 1.1-5] 
\(209-211\) cf. Narr. 364.24; cf. Convers. 374.21-22; deest in S/H etc. [cf. Arm. 1.5-7]; ”

\(194-95\) kai\%\se= frašasa Porphyry VP 7.34-35, 40 “207-11 upom\h\h\h\gai= poihs\asqai Cf. infra V\(\a\)
250-51, 267; Clement of Alexandria Paed. 1.632.1 “208-09 terp\h\nh\n= fantasi\aj Aristotle De an. 427 
15-429a 9; C.H. Stobaeus fr. 2A 12, cf. C.H. 5.1-2 “209-12 w\a= a\hqrwp\h\fwn Alcinous Didask. 166.27ff; 
Maximus of Tyre Diss. 1.2, 44-54; 5.6, 140-42; 10.5, 103-110; Plutarch De E 392a-b7; Seneca Ep. 58.22f, 27f; 
Cicero Acad. pr. 3f; Ovidius Metam. 15.176ff; Asclep. 30 (338.13-20 N-F) “210-11 ta\mo\nima —
opihs\asqai Cf. V\(\a\) 7.8-16, 17; C.H. 7.2-3

\(195\) addidi “post af\a verba ts=t=k=e\\j\i k\e\\j\i (\(glos., cf. Narr.) habent HS, suppl. Prieur “201 post 
o\moibij verba wij g\h\(t\) (\(glos., pariter Narr.) habent HS, suppl. Prieur “206 kl i\nata Bonnet kl h\nata V “210 proefreya Bonnet -trej\a\saqai V ”
had set out neither thoughtlessly nor without purpose and arrived at the praetorium, since she had said farewell both to all externalities and to those things belonging to flesh. And when Aegeates exposed to her the same demand about which he had asked her to reflect (namely, if she would agree to sleep with him) and she refused, he finally turned his attention to Andrew’s execution and considered to which kind of death he would put him. And when, finally, from all possibilities only crucifixion prevailed in him, he went out and ate with his friends.

But guided by the Lord in the form of Andrew, Maximilla went to the prison together with Iphidama. And since there was a large group of brethren inside, she found him telling the following.

15. “Brethren, I have been sent by the Lord as an apostle to these regions, of which my Lord considered me worthy, not to teach anyone, but to remind each man akin to the words that they live among temporal evils, enjoying their [own] deluding representations. From these I always encouraged you to stay away; I urged you

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94 On this description of Maximilla’s movements and behaviour, see infra Chapter 4, p. 172 and note 67.
95 For this biased interference by the author, see infra Chapter 4, p. 170 and note 54.
96 Note that Aegeates thinks he is deciding something that has actually already been decided in advance. Some lines above (V 185-189) Andrew indeed already knows that he will be crucified by Aegeates. On the narrative function of the issue, see infra Chapter 4, p. 169.
97 This is, we think, a necessary addition, since in some cases (e.g. Junod-Kaestli, Histoire, 65 note 2: ‘Car ils vivent dans les réalités mauvaises passagères, en prenant plaisir à leurs apparences nuisibles’), translations seem to put the emphasis on the ‘appearance’ rather than on the percipient subject (see next note). The problem of the passage originates in the ambiguity concerning the antecedent of αὐθώμα. The copyist(s) of S and H have tried to solve this problem by adding οἴπαφτεµ ἁχρῶποι (S, f. 129v, 2/18; H, f. 165r, 22). Cf. also Prieur, Acta, 501 app. ad loc. and MacDonald, Cannibals, 386, who adopts this reading.
98 As a verbal noun of φανοναι and φανταζοναι ‘place before one’s mind’, ‘picture one object to oneself’, ‘imagine’, fantasiā expresses not only the ‘appearance’ but also the act of perceiving by a percipient individual. In this sense, its translation as ‘appearance’ can be only accepted on condition that it also implies the active participation of the percipient subject. Otherwise, one runs the risk of laying the blame exclusively on the decepiveness of tangible reality. Our passage, however, clearly points to a wrong deluding perception of things. Material reality is certainly evil, but it is a deluding representation thereof that makes it extremely dangerous. ‘Representation’ (see Hennecke, Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, 254: ‘… wenn sie sich an den schädlichen Vorstellungen ihrer Einbildungskraft erfreuen’) is, therefore, a better translation. Consider that it is the active side of perception, namely the individual’s assent to what he perceives, that is responsible for having pleasure in what is deluding. See furthermore infra pp. 216-19.
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(210-11 τανομίμα — ποίες ασκεί Cf. V' 7-8, 16-17; C.H. 7.2-3) 211-12 Aristotle Protr. fr. 10 Ross; Plutarch Numa 14.5; Philo Somn. 1.245, Opif. 151, Leg. alleg. 3.38; Marcus Aurelius Med. 5.23; Maximus of Tyre Diss. 11.7, 153-162; Gregory of Nyssa De virg. 4.7 213-14 Cf. supra V' 74-77, 84-90 215-16 Aristotle EN 1102b 31 218-219 αποκοδομείσθαι — ῥξωθτε Maximus of Tyre Diss. 1.5, 140-143; 29.7, 169-175

211 twmante ῥευστάων υψίσθαι add. Bonnet } Bonnet 214 addidi (haplogr.) καὶ καταθήκει V και κακαθελ καὶ κατάθηκε Prieur 216 optrizomēnouj V κατ- Bonnet 218 εποικοδομείσθαι Bonnet 221 post wā lacunam suspic. Bonnet desiderans fere <εθεσάσθαι> vel <ἐκουσάτε> add. Bonnet
to strive for the abiding and to escape from all that is in flux. For you can see that nothing of yours stands firm, but everything, even man’s moral character, is subject to change. All this happens because the uninstructed soul went astray in the physical realm and [still] keeps the ties (e)ne/xura related to it going astray⁹⁹. Therefore I consider blessed those that have become obedient¹⁰⁰ to the proclaimed words and through their mysteries gain insight¹⁰¹ concerning their own true nature, for the sake of which everything has been built.

16. “Therefore I command you, dear children, build firmly on the foundation laid for you, which is unshakeable and against which no evil power can conspire. Root on this foundation. Stay firm remembering all what has been achieved while I was living together with all of you. Works have you seen performed through me that you cannot disbelieve¹⁰², [works] that have become such signs that even the irrational nature [in

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⁹⁹ Our addition <ta> supplies the necessary acc. for a metaphorical use of kata/(see Jannaris § 1584ff) ‘according to, after’ [‘related to’]. See, for the same use, supra V 109. Cf., however, Jannaris § 1590 for the possible but rare omission of the acc. and the elliptical use of kata/with gen. The term e)ne/xuron – normally ‘pledge’, but also ‘security’ (see infra) – describes in the current passage the negative consequences on the soul’s condition after being lost or going astray in physical reality. There is no reason to explain it as ‘Satanaspfänder’ nor to relate the passage to AJ 69.15 (so, Schimmelpfeng in Hennecke, Handbuch, 555; so, also E. Junod and J.D. Kaestli, Acta Johannis [Turnhout, 1983] 262 note 3). Given the absence of any reference – such as giver, receiver, the acts of giving or receiving – that might suggest a pure contractual meaning, the term e)ne/xuron must be considered as metaphorically expressing (see Aeneas Tacticus 5.1) the ‘ties’ that keep the soul attached to its material existence. See for this sense E. Kriaras, (Lexiko, s.v. e)ne/xuron 2: ’eggu/hsh: ei ekei (enn. e epifropoj h/kouratwr) enekura bi/ou, toutesti/paidaj. Cf. especially Demetrakos, s.v. e)ne/xuron 2: ‘kt. e)pekt. pam to katakratovenon proj oi rhn poti desmeusin’. A similar use in Clement of Alexandria. Quis dives 25.7.1 and in Lucian, Catapl. 15.1.

¹⁰⁰ The irrational soul, even though strictly speaking alien to rationality, may to a certain extent pay heed to rational speech. For kath/kooj as ‘obedient’ to the lo/goj see Aristotle, EN 1102b 31.

¹⁰¹ The participle o)ptrizo/menoj is normally translated as ‘seen as in a mirror’. We reject the simile, because the present passage puts the emphasis on the insight that words provide. The verb o)ptri/zomai seems to refer here to a special kind of insight and understanding, namely to an intellectual process provoked by the words. By being obedient to them, the brethren achieve, through their mysteries, a glance at their own real nature. For a similar meaning, see the use of e)noptrizo/menoj in Eusebius, C. Hierocl. 411, 21-24, lheate pote ka/dianhate thA me/oj kaiAdiaioj o)ptri/zome n poti e)noptri/sas pro/apon. See also John of Damascus (Vita Barlaam, 438.4-11) and Const. VII Porphy. (De sentent. 27.3-27.10). Interesting is the fact that the Armenian translator renders the verb o)ptrizo/mai with the Armenian form tesanem (Č 146.17) ‘voir’ and not with ‘voir comme dans un miroir’. Cf. Calzolari, ‘Version arménienne’, 156-57.

¹⁰² ‘Works or deeds’ (e)/rga). This is the only passage in AA’s fragment in V in which Andrew mentions his deeds. In contrast to the previous speeches that only refer to his words, in this second speech to the brethren Andrew’s activity seems to consist of a combination of words and deeds. Whereas the words are aimed at reaching the rational part of the soul, the deeds are intended to modify or subdue the irrational part, since the latter is in general unreceptive to rational speech and only reacts under the pressure of irrational actions (on the issue, see supra this Chapter, note 88). For those who are used to living an irrational life Andrew’s deeds are essential, for the astonishment they provoke alters the habitual and mechanical causal chain that, by means of sensorial perception and representation, keeps them attached to materiality (on which, see infra Chapter 4, pp. 214-19).
225 uţinîtreowardska ouj eukomai ouťw j katadekesqai uf' uňwřw j
autoi\oi\(logoi qel ou\i\in sthrizes qe oua\a\aphtoi\epi\pas\i\in oĩā
<ẽ>iəte, oĩā hko\us\ate, oĩā e]\koj\wnh\š\ate: kai\uŋj=spo(\geoj e)j
oň ępiseu\š\ate[le]\ e]eh\aj e우\řtou\j parasth\š\ei eaut%=a
hapeaume\houj eij a\pan\aj ai\m\aj.

230 17. to\de\ peri\e\n mel\on sunbain\en\n mh\ouťw j tarassen\w
uŋj=wij\ ti ce\on qa\ma, oţi o(tou=qeou=dou=oj, %ā po\la\nparestå\eto a\uj\ o(\geoj di\ef\g\n kai\l\og\n, ou\\o\j bi# upol\n a\hr\wpou ponhou=apel a\netai tou\tou tou=pro\kaifu\ou bi\ou: ou)
me\on ga\t peri\e\n t\(to\oi\ou\n sunb\š\eta\i, a\lla\ka\|ei\) pa\ntaj
ouj hqap\cko\aj ka\|ei\) auton pepisteuko\aj kai\auton orol o-

365.5-6; cf. Convers. 375.3-7; [cf. Arm. 3.1-7] ~ 233-238 deest [cf. Arm. 3.7-13]

you] will acclaim them\(^{103}\). Words I transmitted to you, which I entreat you to receive in the way the words need to be [received]. Beloved, stay firm on all things that you saw, that you listened to\(^{104}\) and that you participated in, and the God you have believed in, showing mercy on you, will place you beside Him as those who please Him and who have achieved eternal rest.

17. “With regard to what is about to happen to me do not let it disturb\(^{105}\) you as though it [were] a strange marvel that the servant of God – to whom God Himself allowed so many things through deeds and through words – is driven away from this ephemeral life so violently by a wicked man\(^{106}\). This will not come upon me only, but also upon all those who loved and believed in Him and confess Him. [For] the

\(^{103}\) a)lalοj fυ̇sij refers to the ‘irrational’ or ‘ignorant nature’ in man himself and not, as it is normally interpreted, relying on Luke 19:40 (εν ουμοίωσιν, ολίγοι θριασιάωσιν, to ‘mute nature’ (cf. Ger. ‘stumme Natur’: Hennecke, Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, 254; Hornschuh, ‘Andreasakten’, 290; Schneemelcher, Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, 121; Engl. ‘dumb nature’ James, The Apocryphal NT, 355, though he does not refer explicitly to Luke. 19:40; or ‘mute nature’, MacDonald, Cannibals, 389; It. ‘natura muta’: Moralidi, Apocriph II, 1421; Fr. ‘nature muette’: Leloir, Écrits, 233; Prieur, Acta, 500; Dutch ‘stomme natuur’: Heeringa, in Klijn, Apocriefen, 174. Although there are a few testimonies (Clement of Alexandria. Protr. 4.50.1.4; Orac. Sib. 3.29-31; 4.6.7) documenting the combination of the adjective a)lalοj (present in AA) with the substantive līpoj (present in Luke), none of them mentions the act of screaming. The ‘irrational nature’ of our interpretation is the counterpart of the ἀθάνατος, the ‘real’ or ‘true nature’, namely man’s rational nature. In this sense a)lalοj fυ̇sij must be an equivalent of the a)logοj fυ̇sij. a)lalοj in this context is either a corruption of a)logοj, due to the phonetic and semantic proximity of the terms (cf. Georgius Monach., Chronicon 5.23.11: άνω δενδρον είναι ων και α)λαλοειν την α)λαλοεινου και α)λαλοεινον α)λαλοεινον, Origen, Hom. in Luc. 5.30-31, ἄστι γατ κωδικον αμοαιν ἄλαλον α)λαλοεινον. a)λαλοειν την, that you listened to, and that you participated in, and the God you have believed in, showing mercy on you, will place you beside Him as those who please Him and who have achieved eternal rest.

\(^{104}\) Andrew’s words and deeds form here the unshakeable foundation upon which the brethren must stay firm. This double reference seems to imply that for the brethren Andrew’s activities in physical reality and the knowledge transmitted by his words have an equivalent value. As already said, it might be that their attachment to externals requires the deeds or wonders as a precondition to being receptive to the words.

\(^{105}\) This reference seems to support our interpretation in the previous note(s). If Andrew’s deeds are relevant for the brethren in order to achieve a proper understanding of things, this implies that they are still open to the influence of externals. In the case of Andrew’s activities, his deeds or wonders seem always to be accompanied by fitting words, which must reorient the seers in case the former strike them. Given the fact that his crucifixion may also appear to them as a ‘strange marvel’, and given that he will not be there to provide them with a proper explanation, the apostle fears that it will produce ‘disturbance’ or ταραχή. In the following lines he provides such an explanation in advance in order to prevent the brethren from forming a judgement (δοκα) as a result of their own perceptual representation (fantasia) of things. For the relationship between ταραχή/‘disturbance, fear’, and fantasia and δοκα, see infra Chapter 4, note 285.

\(^{106}\) Note the felicitous implicit association of bi# and bi bu in V 232-233.
gounatj o(pahta ahaidhj diabolj talija tekna opišei kat' autw poswj aut%sunqwatj: kai'ouk e'ei o'boj'etai.

kai'dia t; taua e'pixerw e'g/wra'se: apolmèn thj = pa'twn a'ixhj kai'ei dei e'gein e'pi ouper o(a'haxoj t's'= up' auton a'ixs = kathqen, apwqhs e'p(o pol emioj e'ihhj all' o'frioj toh mh'liaj, alla'm'ontina t'wa'j gwnwstefwn kai' <nq' e'pifanh kai' mhde/pw dunat'mnon gwnwtes qai: kai'dia t; mhde/auton e'pistas qai, toutou efheken ekeinon up' autou ekhrh-pol emeoqai: doçaj gat auton ekein kai' despozèin autou = ei'sai tolouton aut% = antiferetai w[ thn autw ek'ran fili'aj paraplisian er'gasqes qai. upoballwn gat aut%talijd poliaj diegrayen ehhdona ofha kai'apathh al di'w autou = peri[kratei ef'tokei: ek'roj men ouk e'deliknuto ej tof'arerno, prospoourenoj fili'an thn autouati'ajn.

18. kai'toutoj haeaut%efgon e'pi'pol ulginojenon, w[ ej] l'hqhn gnwistes qai ekein%, gwnwstai <del> auton: touti' e'stin oua'wj dia/ta' eautou = dwma. ali' ofe <del> thj = xa'fioj mu'sth'f'íon ekfhq, kai'h(boul h'thj = a'hapau'sewj ef'anerwqh, kai'to'tou = o'gou fwj = edelikqh, kai'to's%zo'nenon genho hj'egxqh pollaij = h'donaij = pol emou'renon, toh] al' o'tri'oj auton katafronou'renon, e'auton ej

(233-238 deest [cf. Arm. 3.7-13]) "239 deest [cf. Arm. 4.2] "240-242 deest [cf. Arm. 4.7-10] "242-244 deest "244-249 deest [cf. Arm 5.4-10] "249-252 deest "252-260 S (f. 129', 2/20-36); H (f. 165', 23-32); [cf. Arm. 5.10-22]

237 sunqwatj Cf. V' 80, 143, 154-55, 188, 192 "239 o(a'haxoj Cf. supra 92, 100; Plutarch De E 393a; C.H. 4.8 (52.11-13 N-F); Eunostos (NHC III, 3) 75.2; Soph.JesChr (BG 3) 91.3; ApJohn (BG 2) 23.6-7; TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 51.27ff, 52.9, 53.7, 77.22-25; GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 17.10ff, 38.32-33, ValExp (NHC XI, 2) 22.23-24, 37-38; Irenaeus Adv. haer. 1.1.1, 1.2.5 "250 l'hqhn Cf. supra V' 207, infra 267; Plato Phdr. 248c, 250a; Philo Subr. 2, Somn. 2.101ff, Plant. 177; Alcin. Didask. 169.32-41; Plutarch De an. procr. Tim. 1026 e-f; Maximus of Tyre Diss. 10.6, 140-43, 159; TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 77.22-25; 85.25-32; C.H. 10.15; "251 C.H. 1.15 "

239 ei'dei Bonnet h'h V "239-40 aliquid deesse iudic. Bonnet "240 apwqhs ejlunjvik apwqhsai V apwqhs kai'Schimmel. apeiqhsai Bonnet apwqhsai <...> Prieur "pol emioj, o' Bonnet "241 add. Bonnet "245 parapl h'sian Bonnet parapl h'sian V "248 ouk V ovma'male leg. Bonnet (pariter Prieur) "250-51 fort. ej] l'hqhn efheken gnwri/"251 add. Bonnet "ou'wv scrpsi ou'boj V "252 post dwma lacnam suspic. Bonnet toHS deest in V "255 toh] al' o'tri'oj V itwo] al' o'tri'oj HS "
completely shameless devil will arm his children against them in order that they may agree with him. But he will not get what he wants.

“And I will tell you why he undertakes this. From the beginning of all things, or so to say, since the one without beginning came down to the beginning below Him, the enemy, alien to peace, misled the one that did not belong to him but was only one of the weakest, not conspicuous and that could not be recognised by God. But as this one would not acknowledge him (scil. the enemy) either, it was necessary for him (scil. the enemy) to conquer him by battle. However, with a view to keep him and dominate him forever, he opposed him in such a way as to present the enmity between them as a friendship. In order to dominate him, he frequently enrolled his [children], who are delightful and deceitful and through whom he thought he would prevail over him. By disguising as a friendship his [real] value, he did not present himself openly as an enemy.

18. “And his activity took place for so long that both to be known by Him (scil. God) and to know Him came into oblivion. This is so because of his (scil. the devil’s) presents. But when the mystery of grace was set aflame and the will for rest was manifested and the light of the word appeared; and when, through the kindness of the one who shows mercy, it was proved that the saved race was to fight against many pleasures, [that it was] was to despise the alien one and was to ridicule him for his own

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107 See supra this Chapter, notes 85, 92 and 93.
108 Here, too, as in V 100 (ου γενόμενον), God’s transcendence is explicitly stated. Whereas in the former case, god is said to be beyond the process of coming-into-being and passing away, the current passage states that he is also beyond time.
109 The intrinsic relationship between ‘being known’ by God and ‘knowing’ him is fully developed in the first speech to the brethren (V 1-19). In the current passage, the incapacity to be known by God and to know him (the reason for which is difficult to determine due to the corruption of our text) obviously implies that men (or at least some of them) could not acknowledge the enemy either. Delightful and deceitful appearances will, then, be the means applied by the devil to conquer humanity.
110 ‘Bribes’ (?). Given the negative view of the physical realm as well as of everything related to it, it seems plausible that the writer here made use of the pejorative sense of the term as ‘bribe’.
ta\ e\ autoc= dw\ diagel y\ henon, di\ w\ autoc= e\ bokei
katofruousqai, dia\ th\ tou= el)h\ anto\ xrhstothta, h\ cato pr\j
h\(aj= m\ sei kai\ ek\atr# kai\ ep\ecanalastic\ ei a\ti ple kei[n]: ka\h
touto e\h\(ef%teq\eta\ai, nh\ pau\as qai af\h\(wm\mekrij a\h
noniz$ x\ri\zein to\fc\m\ga\t an\erimnoj h\eo(h\(i\a)=}\ l\ofi\j, ka\fi\l\i\an
prosepoieito stel\les qai pr\j h\(aj= th\(h\ autoc= a\fi\an: ei\\een de\l
kai\to\nh\f\beis\qai nh\ apost\wen pepl an\m\m\noi up\' autoc= to\d
\e\lthj= o\konomi\j xrh\ma ei\afq\n ou\\al e\gw i\(x\uroteron, to\fgar
krupt\h\h\menon autoc= thj= fu\sewj kai\to\dokou\lanq\ai\ein, touto
h\j\eg\en kai\to\rol ogei\(o\(estin pares keu\as en.

epi\sta\h\h\noi toig\aro\u an to\ mel\\on e\les qai a\de\f\oi\di
up\niz\w\\e\ga, nh\ dus\ fora\nte\j, nh\del s\xh\m\atiz\h\noi, nh\del
apokoni\\zi\n\tej autoc= k\n\e\pi\ti\\w\\\\y u\\xw\\\\\w\\ta\m\ji\a h\(wm\al\a\l\a\ol\oi eh\ of t%\(\(\og% epaiwrou\\h\h\noi to\t\el\oji\ pa\nte\j a\sm\e\h\w\j
pros dec\w\\\e\ga kai\th\h ap\'\ autop= fugh\\n po\h\\w\men, op\wj kai\ autoj l\opoh dei\xq\\wj est\th\th\fush\h\h wepi\ta\h\\nera .......

(252-260 S (f. 129v, 2/20-36); H (f. 165v, 23-32); [cf. Arm. 5.10-22]) 263-265 deest [cf. Arm. 6.2-5] 265-
266 deest 266-271 S (f. 129v, 2/36-130r, 1/13); H (f. 165v, 32-165r, 3); [cf. Arm 6.7-8; 6.9-10; 6.11-15] 

256-257 kato- Bonnet kata- V 263 ou\(\a\c\ris\i ou)V \i\(x\uroteron scris\i i\(x\uroteran V \(\ante to'
lacunam stat. Bonnet desiderans fere <all> e\(hanestefan a\pe\deicen autoc= thh ek\\ran> 267
xei\maz\\h\hnoi HS (Prieur) 269 epaiwrou\h\hnoi Prieur e\pewrou\h\hnoi VS e\perwrou\h\hnoi H
presents—through which presents he thought he would prevail—, he began to embroil us with hate, enmity and sedition. And this is what he intends to do: not to stop until he thinks [we] desert.

“Before this time our enemy had no preoccupations and [simply] pretended to present his value as a friendship to us. For, deceived by him as we were, he did not fear that we would depart. But the matter of [divine] economy shone stronger than the one I’m referring to\textsuperscript{111}, since it refuted what was hidden of his\textsuperscript{112} nature and what seemed to remain unnoticed, and prepared it to confess what it is.

“Consequently, since we know what will happen, brethren, let us stay awake without despairing, without demeaning ourselves and without carrying on our souls his traces, which are alien to us. Rather, since we are all buoyed up by the whole word, let all of us accept gladly the end and make the escape from him, so that he also, finally, would appear as he is, our nature on our own …\textsuperscript{113}.”

\textsuperscript{111} Scil. the enemy.
\textsuperscript{112} Scil. the enemy
\textsuperscript{113} Abrupt end of Codex Vaticanus gr. 808, f. 512\textsuperscript{v}. 
CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS OF AA’S FRAGMENT IN CODEX VATICANUS GRAECUS

Ever since its discovery and publication by Bonnet, AA’s fragment in V has been considered to be a portion of the genuine AA\(^1\). Yet the ultimate conclusions of such an assumption have never, or only partially, been drawn\(^2\). Chapter 2 has provided enough arguments to distinguish this document from the remaining extant witnesses. The present chapter focuses on an internal literary and conceptual analysis of the fragment that, by bringing its radically different mentality to the foreground, will prove it to be our only reliable source for the analysis of the message of the primitive Acts.

1. General Character of AA’s Fragment in V

As AA’s fragment in V begins in medias res and ends abruptly, it is impossible to ascertain how long the text was originally\(^3\). The lack of title and colophon, which probably explains its preservation, means that we don’t even know anything about how the last copyist understood the text.

When approaching the fragment, two main issues immediately draw our attention: the marked philosophical vein of the text and its predominantly discursive style. With regard to the former, the text’s tendency towards abstract formulation is evident in the regular and abundant use of philosophical or pseudo-philosophical terms and expressions\(^4\). Even though Andrew’s discourses always originate in concrete situations, his approach to and treatment of the subject matter always proceeds from the particular to the universal in an attempt to facilitate a more abstract scrutiny of the situation he is analysing\(^5\). This kind of exposition not only reveals the writer’s acquaintance with philosophical formulations, but also presupposes the reader’s familiarity with such a mode of analysis. Take, for instance, the characteristic cosmological dualism that pervades our text. The negative conception of tangible reality is

\(^1\) For the consensus on the issue see supra Chapter 2, p. 85 note 88.
\(^2\) This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, scholars who consider V as our only reliable document for the analysis of the primitive Acts generally refrain from a comparative study of this testimony with the remaining extant witnesses (see supra Chapter 1, p. 65 note 441). On the other hand, those scholars who carry out a more comprehensive study of AA’s transmission are not interested in emphasising differences between the documents, but rather in searching for parallels and similarities that may widen the textual basis for their analysis of the ancient Acts (see supra Chapter 1, § 3.3, pp. 62-66).
\(^3\) As already seen, however, the widespread assumption that AA’s fragment in V is an excerpt from AA that is preserved almost in its original length is wholly unfounded. See supra Chapter 3, § 1.2.3, pp. 134-37. See supra Chapter 3, notes 31 and 113.
\(^4\) See infra this Chapter, § 2.3.3, p. 181.
\(^5\) According to Erbetta (Apocrifi II, 398) this working procedure brings AA’s fragment in V close to the style and way of exposition of Gnostic writers.
neither stated by dint of a categorical enunciation of its worthlessness nor insinuated by describing the burdens of everyday existence. Rather, the imperfection of the sensible world is derived from a continuous and systematic comparison with the supra-sensible one by means of conceptual pairs of oppositions with an old philosophical tradition, such as ‘movement/rest’, ‘change/permanence’, ‘identity/difference’, and ‘unity/plurality’. The same is true of the anthropological dualism that in AA divides humanity into two genrh or ‘races’, and that even recognises a dichotomy within an individual between a false and an authentic nature. Admittedly, the conception might simply echo the old topical axiological differentiation of humanity⁶. Yet the philosophical approach comes to the foreground when analysing the causes of the current human, degraded condition and the means to improve it.

As far as the style is concerned, AA’s fragment in V is predominantly discursive: of the 271 of our edition, little more than 10% – i.e. 29 lines, if the inevitable narrative junctions between the speeches are excluded – is purely narrative. The remaining 242 lines are distributed over five speeches, four by Andrew and one by Aegeates. Whereas the latter plays a purely narrative role in the plot’s development⁷, Andrew’s speeches are concerned with the spiritual development of his followers and convey essential information for understanding the personae and their function in the text.

Unfortunately these discursive sections are not intended as dialogues, since the exchange of ideas between interlocutors might have offered more precise information. Instead, the addressee’s complete silence during three of them rather gives the impression of a soliloquy by the apostle, which effect is softened by regular interruptions in Andrew’s argumentation in order to apostrophise or attract his hearer’s attention⁸. Notwithstanding this, there are other ways to grasp the context and scope of these speeches. The apostle’s words are always the result of a given psychological state in his addressee that originates in a precise context⁹. Our understanding both of the hearer’s state of mind combined with an analysis of Andrew’s response provides us with all the necessary co-ordinates to properly construe the message of these speeches.

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⁶ Such an axiological dualism does indeed appear as soon as the notion of individuality develops – it is the principium contradictionis that provides the individual with a clear-cut idea about himself and about the other, since it only the existence of B that proves that A is A and not B. In Greek antiquity such an anthropological dualism adopts many different forms and the criteria that support it generally show an evolution from external tokens such as wealth or nobility (Homer), to more internal aspects such as courage in battle (Archilochus), insight (Heraclitus), innate excellence (Pindarus), and balanced character (Aristotle).

⁷ See infrathis Chapter, § 4.4.1 at p. 231.

⁸ See V 21 (brethren); V 58, 63, 102, 113, 115, 122 (Maximilla); V 140, 160, 162 (Stratocles); V 205, 211, 218 (brethren).

V’s philosophical character and discursive style clearly differentiate this document from the bulk of textual witnesses preserving AA’s traditions. In the best cases the extant witnesses radically transform them and in the worst completely eliminate them. This means that a proper analysis of both issues can rely only on V’s testimony. Consequently, taking this document as a textual whole, and avoiding references to other witnesses as far as possible, we will now concentrate on its literary analysis, which will provide us with both a consistent literary framework in which to place the speeches and their message and with the means to properly interpret them.

2. Literary Analysis of AA’s Fragment in V

2.1. The Plot of the Fragment
The first incomplete speech places us in prison, at a meeting between Andrew and his followers, immediately after the apostle’s imprisonment and before his final crucifixion. As V begins, Andrew is reprehending his hearers for their feebleness and begins a categorical praise of the community and of the radical superiority of its individuals due to their belonging to the higher realm, to the realm of the best, of the Good, of justice, and of light. They are akin to the transcendent realm of unity and permanence and this belonging provides them with complete insight into earthly matters. After assuring his followers that, thanks to their love in Christ, he will never abandon them and that, thanks to Christ’s mediation, they in turn will never abandon him, Andrew sends them away.

The following narrative section introduces all personae (except Stratocles) who will play a role in the further action of our fragment: Andrew, the proconsul of Patras Aegeates, his wife Maximilla, her chambermaid Iphidama, and the brethren. The first half of this section describes the happiness and optimism of all the followers and their strengthening reunions in prison during the days that Aegeates seems to have forgotten Andrew’s case. This joy, however, is not abiding. Consistent with the tone of the first incomplete speech, which denies any stability in the realm of change, the second half of this narrative section brings a sudden turn in the action: Aegeates remembering puts an end to their temporary relief. Becoming furious, the proconsul leaves the court and rushes back to the praetorium.

10 For the preceding sections and the alleged textual continuity between this chapter and the preceding one in Prieur’s textual reconstruction (AАgr 32-33), see supra Chapter 1, pp. 36-37 and note 312.
11 V’ 1-19.
12 V’ 20-24.
13 V’ 25-38.
15 V’ 32-37.
At this point, Aegeates’ speech to his wife takes place. The silent Maximilla, who had arrived just a few moments before her husband, listens to the ultimatum that he issues to her: if she agrees to resume their former conjugal life he is willing to free Andrew; on the other hand, if she refuses he will punish him. Troubled by this new turn of events, Maximilla, together with Iphidama, returns to the prison and tells the apostle about her husband’s proposition (ατικμα). The apostle’s response to her news begins a new discursive section. In his lengthy speech to Maximilla, Andrew first encourages her not to listen to Aegeates’ proposition, paying attention only to the worthiest part of her essence (τοθηλουσια) sou ατικμα). She must reject Aegeates’ crucial test (θανο), ignoring the threat to the apostle. Only by accepting his suffering and undermining its importance, he says, can she achieve her complete liberation from Aegeates. In order to argue his point, Andrew analyses the consequences of both possibilities, i.e. a negative and a positive answer to her husband’s proposal. Maximilla’s rejection of Aegeates’ threats and her maintaining her free determination is considered from a universal point of view because its consequences go beyond the particular cases. The simile introduced by Andrew to support his point includes a very interesting reinterpretation of the Paradise scene and of the reasons that caused the first couple’s error (μπασανο). In his argument Maximilla and Andrew represent the exact opposites of Eve and Adam. Both, as representatives of mankind, can correct the first couple’s deficiency and incompleteness thanks to the acquaintance gained by Maximilla and by her recognising herself as belonging to the realm above. The next section of Andrew’s speech describes the results of such a correction. In accordance with the general tone of the preceding lines, Andrew introduces the praise of a generic ‘saved nature’ (θανο) that becomes a ‘(transcendent) man’ (αθαναποι) once the soul, having screamed out its suffering, ascends to itself and recognises what belongs to it and what is alien to it.

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16 V 37-53.
17 V 58-140.
18 On the double meaning of the term θανο as ‘crucial test’ and ‘torture’, see infra this Chapter, p. 205.
19 On the typical, double approach to the subject matter in Andrew’s discourses, see infra this Chapter, pp. 174-75.
20 See infra this Chapter, § 3.2.4, pp. 200-03 and § 3.2.5, pp. 203-05.
21 V 71-82.
22 On Andrew and Maximilla as counterparts of Adam and Eve, see Pesthy, ‘Aegeates’, 50-51; Bovon, ‘Words of Life’, 84-85; Luttikhuizen, 96-100; Schroeder, ‘Embracing’, 120-21.
23 For a sexual interpretation of the Paradise scene see Hennecke, Handbuch, 552; Söder, Romanhafte, 125-26; Nagel, ‘Die Wiedergewinnung’, 375-77; Prieur, Acta, 204-06; Wagener, ‘Repentant Eve’, 350-52; Cirillo, ‘L’uomo interiore’, 11-21; Schroeder, ‘Embracing’, 120-21; see also the suggestive analysis by Pesthy, ‘Aegeates’, 50-53. Against this reading, see our interpretation infra this Chapter, § 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, pp. 197-200 and note 179 and Sturhahn, Christologie, 138-47, especially 147; Festugière, La Révélation IV, 227-31; Erbetta, Apocrifi II, 400; Luttikhuizen, ‘Religious Message’, 99-100.
24 V 91-101.
After some transitional lines in which the apostle restates his first argument, reinforcing it with manifest disdain for his visible body, the next section of the speech considers Maximilla agreeing with the terms of her husband. The greatness of her refusal and its universal implications disappear with this agreement. This means of course that the universal viewpoint is substituted by a particular one: the same themes and arguments as in the preceding lines reappear but are now directly applied to Maximilla’s particular case. The change of tone is underlined by the emphatic repetition of her, her husband’s and the apostle’s names. In his turn to the particular, Andrew shows Maximilla that her agreement would have negative effects for his own situation as well. Therefore he adds one last argument to dismiss her husband’s threat: it is through Aegeates that the apostle will be released from his prison; although the proconsul thinks he is punishing him, he is actually liberating him. Hence, Andrew concludes, his own perfection depends on the ‘clear sight’ (ευθύτης) of Maximilla’s. She must understand that it is only by accepting an ephemeral and irrelevant suffering, in order to avoid radical and serious suffering, that she can know her real nature, releasing all her bonds and superseding her physical being.

Despite the formal continuity of the speech in the next lines, Andrew’s address to Stratocles and a circumstantial phrase highlight the change of hearer and hence the beginning of a new speech. Andrew’s speech to Stratocles, the only discourse with a pseudo-dialogue form, includes a short answer from Stratocles. Realising that Stratocles is crying, Andrew turns to him and asks the reason for his grief. He wonders why Stratocles is crying effusively and showing clear signs of acute grief: if Andrew’s words have reached his ‘thinking part’ (τοδιανοητικον μερος), he argues, such grief is unjustifiable. In order to clear up this uncertainty, Andrew begins to question Stratocles, provoking rather than calming him down. His reaction to Andrew’s emotional test will provide incontestable proof of Stratocles’ mental state and, secondarily, a suitable response to the apostle’s doubts. At the end of this questioning, Stratocles’ renewed crying indeed provides him with this proof and assures Andrew that his words have not been wasted. In addition, Stratocles’ answer confirms Andrew’s impression by specifying the reason and the nature of his crying. Each of

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25 V 102-12.
26 V 102-29.
28 V 130-38.
29 See infra this Chapter, p. 205 and note 211.
30 V 139-89; Stratocles’ answer in V 168-82.
31 On the rhetorical style of the speech and its scope, see infra this Chapter, § 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, pp. 205-08.
32 V 168-82.
Andrew’s words, he says, has certainly reached his soul and he knows that Andrew’s departure is meant to be a good thing. If he is nonetheless crying, it is simply because he will not be able to complete the process of his education. An agricultural metaphor depicts the future lack that Stratocles is already feeling: his soul being the ground and Andrew’s words the seeds; both need the sower’s care in order to grow and develop properly. Andrew, satisfied by his answer, changes the subject and announces to him that the next day he will be crucified.

There then follows a narrative section, in which Maximilla, being wholly confirmed in her decision by Andrew’s words, returns to the praetorium and announces her refusal to Aegeates. As Aegeates weighs up a proper punishment for the apostle, only crucifixion prevails in his mind. Once her husband has left, Maximilla and Iphidama return to the prison, where they meet a large number of Andrew’s followers.

Andrew’s last speech to the brethren begins with his description of how his master sent him in order to awake or to remind everyone akin to the words that they are wasting their time among ephemeral evils. After encouraging them to flee from a fluent and unstable reality, he praises those among them that have become listeners to his words and by means of them have had a glance into their own nature. He then advises them to build on the foundation that he has laid for them by means of actions and words. Finally, he warns them not to be struck as by a strange marvel when they see him leaving this ephemeral life by means of the violence of an evil man. Instead of being strange, such is the end for those who have chosen the right way: the devil arms his children against those who have rejected his false friendship. At this point, the universal approach once again replaces the particular one. By placing his expected martyrdom within a universal framework and by letting it be part of a cosmological plan, Andrew deprives it of every dramatic aspect. In this way he retains only its positive side and inverts its negative evaluation: his martyrdom is not only necessary but also expected as the final release from his last ties to the world.

At this point our text ends abruptly, in the middle of a sentence. Let us now analyse the characters in this story.

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33 On the use of the simile and in its implications in the present context, see infra this Chapter, p. 212 and notes 250-251. For parallels, see infra this Chapter, pp. 227-28 and notes 307 and 312.
34 V’ 190-204.
35 V’ 205-271.
2.2. Characters

Prima facie, the characters in AA’s fragment in V give the impression of simple stereotypes that, incarnating certain ideals, ways of life or states of mind, create a suitable context for Andrew’s speeches. This first impression, however, seems to be negated by the diverse portrayal procedures applied to build up the characters.

The characterisation of personae in our fragment differs from character to character. These differences concern not only the style and vocabulary with which the characters are described, but also the technique used to build them up and present them. Sometimes there is a clear combination of perspectives: the narrator’s perspective, the character’s own self-perception, the opinion of other characters, and the reader’s point of view work together in the characterisation (Aegeates). In contrast to this method, a character may also be succinctly built up by the narrator’s description and additional information proceeding from other personae (Maximilla). At other times, there is no external and more objective sketch by the narrator and the personage is defined by a combination of another character’s viewpoint and that of the reader’s perspective on the basis of his words and actions (Stratocles). But it is also possible for both the narrator’s viewpoint and that of other personae to be wholly missing. In that case, it is the reader who has to figure out the character’s personality by means of what he says or does (Andrew). Finally, a few characters are described either by another’s character perspective (brethren) or they are not portrayed at all (Iphidama).

An approach to AA’s characters from this perspective, i.e. the literary devices to present and develop them, will help us to understand the place they occupy both in the story and its underlying doctrine.

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36 Many scholars have paid attention to all or to some of AA’s characters. These studies, however, normally rely either on the majority of the transmitted testimonies related to AA or on a predetermined selection of materials. Given our intention to isolate the document of V, in this chapter we will refrain as far as possible from references to other interpretations of AA based on materials other than AA’s fragment in V. Wagener, (‘Repentant Eve’) focuses on the characters of Stratocles and Maximilla, although his approach and conclusions are strongly influenced by other textual witnesses for AA (such as S and H) and by alleged literary parallels, such as Plato’s Theaetetus. P.J. Achtemeier, ‘Jesus and the Disciples as Miracle Workers in the Apocryphal New Testament’, in E. Schlissler Fiorenza (ed), Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity (Notre Dame, 1976) 149-86, focuses on the figure of the apostle, approaching the text mainly from the viewpoint of its common traits with other apocryphal texts. For the characterisation of some of AA’s personae and the text’s relationship with the Greek novel see Bremmer, ‘Novel and Apocryphal Acts’, 157-80 and especially Bremmer, ‘Man, Magic’, 16-24.

37 We are aware that this divergence in characterisation could simply be the result of our fragmentary knowledge of the text. However, it is only after having analysed every character and its place in the text that definitive conclusions can be drawn.
2.2.1. Aegeates

Aegeates, ‘the goat-like’, or ‘caprine one’ is the antagonist of Andrew. As governor of Patras and representative of the established political power and religion he is the “natural” adversary of Andrew. But at the same time he is also his ‘cultural’ enemy, at least from the point of view of our fragment. As the husband of Maximilla and brother of Stratocles, he represents the blood or contractual family bonds that tie an individual to his social world. Aegeates’ all-pervading presence in our fragment arises from the fact that he represents on a general and on a particular level all the values (political power, pagan religion, family and status) implicitly and explicitly rejected by Andrew and his community.

It has been suggested that ‘Aegeates is the only character with a touch of individuality’. This impression might very well be due to the already mentioned combination of viewpoints in his portrayal. This combination provides us with a complete description that, after an external narrator’s sketch of his character, explores more subjectively his perception of himself and other characters’ opinions about him, and even allows the reader to form his own idea on the basis of his words to Maximilla. It is indeed the cross-

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38 Aegeates’ name is usually interpreted as related to the Aegean sea (see supra Chapter 1, p. 47 and note 379). In our view, however, it derives from the Greek word for ‘goat’, 

39 The goat represents the wild and untamed side of nature as well as belligerence. Such symbolism may arise both from the goat’s external appearance, with its beetling brows and thrust-out lower lip, and from the animal’s overbearing temper and aggressiveness which made them dangerous to sheep and destructive to cultivated areas. The goat’s presence on certain islands or regions was since older times associated with uncultivated or unproductive soils (for the frequent appearance of the word ‘goat’ in toponyms of the Mediterranean, see J.N. Bremmer, ‘A Homeric goat Island’, CQ 36 (1986) 256-57). In Greek mythology the goat is frequently related to other representatives of natural or wild aspects of life, uncontrolled desires, sexuality and abuse of food and wine, such as Pan or the satyrs, whose inferior extremities were goat-like and who even had horns on their heads. It is likely that the satyrs influenced medieval representations of the devil in which he clearly adopts goat characteristics (see G. Papini, Il Diavolo. Appunti per una futura diabologia [Florence, 1953]). This association, however, seems to be older, for one of the Hebrew words for ‘goat’, ša’ir (‘shaggy, hairy one’), which generally means ‘he-goat’ (Gen. 37:31; Lev. 4:28; Ezek. 43:22), appears in some passages with the meaning ‘demon / satyr’ (Lev. 17:7; 2Chr. 11:15; Isa. 13:21; 34:14). The negative view of the goat, finally, is also clear in Matthew’s gospel, for in Matt. 25:32, sheep and goat (εἶφος) represent good and bad natures, respectively. Both aspects, namely the polarity nature/culture (for which see P. Vidal-Naquet, Le Chasseur noir [Paris, 1983] 39-68) and the goat’s association with evil, perfectly fit the characterisation of Aegeates, whom Andrew also calls ‘relative of his body’, ‘serpent’, ‘son of the serpent’, ‘devil’, ‘son of the devil’.

40 As has been pointed out by Pesthy, ‘Aegeates’, 47, in spite of his central role in AA, Aegeates does not seem to have attracted the attention of scholars, who usually concentrate on the protagonists Maximilla and Andrew.

examination of his person provided by these diverse viewpoints that constitutes his individuality.

The changing perspectives under which Aegeates appears present him to the reader as a figure marked by an inherent contradiction. This contradiction, however, does not arise from his inconsequent or unstable character. Rather it is the consistency and determination of his will and the sharp contrast between his idea of reality and reality itself that makes him contradictory. The totality of his personal world falls apart and he is the only one who cannot see it: deprived of his brother and of his wife, he persists in his view, unable to see that without family and conjugal ties his individuality is rather precarious. This blindness, negative though it may be, makes him tragic rather than arrogant because it concerns the idea of the individual both about himself as a person and about his impact or influence on his environment. Instead of giving an idea of unity, Aegeates’ characterisation depicts the fragmentariness of the individual, revealing how illusory is his self-perception.

The discrepancy between Aegeates’ will and reality is first stressed by the contrast between the narrator’s perspective and Aegeates’ self-perception. At the beginning of V Aegeates seems to have forgotten Andrew’s case\textsuperscript{42}, but when he remembers, he ‘goes crazy’ (\textit{sw pei tij ehmanhj genohen}), leaves his business, and rushes back to the praetorium\textsuperscript{43}. However, in his first words to his wife he defines himself as ‘prudent’ or ‘reasonable’ (\textit{Vr 41-42, to\thetuj\gamma\upsilon\chi\eta\varepsilon\mu\omega\epsilon\upsilon\gamma\eta\nu\nu\mu\omicron\nu}). His words indeed are consistent with his self-perception. The civil tone of his words to Maximilla, which deliberately combine the emotional and contractual aspects of matrimony, and the fairness of his proposal contradict his alleged madness\textsuperscript{45}. He begins his plea by referring to her parents’ assent to their marriage, but he immediately comes to the point: renouncing recriminations and declaring that he is unwilling to take revenge, he asks his wife to come back to him. Instead of being a rancorous or vindictive husband, his words present him as a partner who misses his companion. In addition, his proposal is not of a sexual sort: he asks her to ‘live with’ him in the way they are

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Vr 26-27.}
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Vr 32-38.}
\textsuperscript{44} The criteria followed by Maximilla’s parents when accepting Aegeates as a husband for their daughter (\textit{Vr 39-42}) have been traditionally misunderstood as Aegeates’ admission of his lower economic and social status (see \textit{Laudatio} 346.10-12 and \textit{Vita} 249C 11-13). On the contrary, Aegeates’ words seem to echo the criteria recommended by the Stoic Antipater (\textit{SVF III, fr. 62}) in order to seek a good companion: wealth, nobility, and fame are rejected and the emphasis is put on ‘good character’. The resemblance between both passages is so striking that one is even tempted to see a paraphrase of Antipater in Aegeates’ words.
\textsuperscript{45} As we will see below, this sharp and sudden change of mood at the beginning of Aegeates’ characterisation points, on a particular level, to the contrast between ideal and reality, but also, on a general one, exemplifies the instability and flux of human affairs. See the reference to the instability of human habits and customs in \textit{Vr} 211-12.
used to (V 46-47, sunbiousa moi on epistamega tropon), to ‘sleep with’ him (V 47, sukaeudousa moi), to ‘keep him company’ (ibid. surgery), and to ‘raise children together’ (ibid. surgery). The terms of his will are perfectly coherent with the restrained standard Stoic concept of marriage\textsuperscript{46}. A decisive proof of the sincerity of his demands appears in his closing words, when he considers a possible negative answer from his wife: ‘If you do not agree I will not undertake anything against you, because I could not bear to do so’\textsuperscript{47}.

But Aegeates’ incongruity is also emphasised by the sharp discrepancy between his subjective self-perception as an individual who is master of his acts and his actual passive role both as a victim of events and as an instrument of God’s plan. This contrast is obvious, for example, in the apparent resolution of his closing words to Maximilla: ‘Answer tomorrow which of both possibilities you choose; I have prepared myself for every eventuality’\textsuperscript{48}. By giving his wife an opportunity to choose and his determination to act accordingly in case of a negative answer clearly show that he sees himself as the master of his acts, as an individual free to act and decide. This is, however, clearly contradicted by the predetermined plan that seems to rule the development of events: even before he receives his wife’s answer, Andrew knows that Aegeates will crucify him the next day\textsuperscript{49}. When he finally does so, he thinks that he is deciding something that has actually already been decided for him. This peculiarity is stressed by the narrator’s description of Aegeates’ ‘decision’: ‘[He] considered to which kind of death he would put him (scil. Andrew) (…) and (…) from all possibilities only crucifixion prevailed in him (ebekraaths en aut%)’\textsuperscript{50}.

Andrew’s viewpoint is more extreme than the narrator’s perspective and consequently develops and explains Aegeates’ incongruity. It is significant that when talking about Aegeates, Andrew systematically does so from a universal point of view that deprives his opponent of any individual traits and his actions of any individual motivation. Deliberately avoiding any further reference, he approaches Aegeates’ proposal from its negative side by simply defining it as mere coercion. From Andrew’s perspective Aegeates is an intimidator, a flatterer, and a torturer; all his efforts to win back his wife are simply ‘sordid witchcraft’\textsuperscript{51}. This is not surprising: deprived of motivation, human action becomes either contingent or

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\textsuperscript{46} See Musonius Rufus fr. 11 and his assertion that marriage and procreation are unavoidable civic duties. In general, see ‘On the goal of Marriage’, in O. Hense, \textit{C. Musonii Rufi Reliquiae} (Leipzig, 1905); add Seneca’s \textit{De matrimonio} and Epictetus, \textit{Ench.} 33.8; Diss. 2.4.

\textsuperscript{47} V 49-50.

\textsuperscript{48} V 51-52.

\textsuperscript{49} V 186.

\textsuperscript{50} V 198-200.

\textsuperscript{51} V 63-68.
externally predetermined. And as far as Andrew is concerned, as we will see below, both possibilities are equally negative because they, in sum, amount to the same: externals and evil have an equivalent ontological status in the text.

From Andrew’s perspective Aegeates cannot be an individual because there is no such a thing as individuality. Individuality is nothing but an illusion and Aegeates’ case is the most obvious example: his ignorance of himself exposes him to the variability of an unstable environment under the influence of which his behaviour becomes mechanical. Precisely for this reason he is just ‘noise’ (V 108,  

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It is obvious then that Aegeates’ action can only be negative: he symbolises everything that is sordid in man. The only existence Andrew seems to recognise in Aegeates is his capacity to threaten the achievements and decisions of his wife; it is even possible to say that in his eyes Aegeates only exists while intimidating her: he is nothing but activity, ergo infamous activity. Consequently, behind Aegeates’ actions Andrew sees exclusively one efficient cause: the personification of evil, the devil. When he returns again to the particular cases, he sees Aegeates as a simple instrument of the powers of darkness.

From this perspective we are able to understand an apparent inconsistency of the text. After Aegeates has proposed to his wife that they resume their conjugal life, the narrator describes Aegeates’ second encounter with Maximilla and relates how he demands from her an answer. He paraphrases Aegeates’ proposal as ‘namely, if she wanted to sleep with him’. By presenting this equation, or more precisely, this reduction of marriage to sexual intercourse, he clearly shows that it is not simply sexuality that is being rejected. The reduction, by rejecting the institution of marriage as a whole, deliberately denies any other possible motivation for marriage than mere copulation. This refusal implies not only a denial

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52 Individuality, in the strict sense of the word, only exists as a struggle to subdue one’s immanent existence, but once one has succeeded in doing so (as Maximilla has) one transcends this individuality and orientates oneself to the universal. This may explain why Stratocles is the only character that is presented as an individual. On the issue, see infra this Chapter, § 2.2.3, p. 173.

53 V 116-17, 126-27.

54 V 197. This apparent inconsistency even led Bonnet to propose deleting  

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in V 47-48 (Bonnet app. ad loc.). Prieur (transl. ad loc.) and MacDonald (transl. ad loc.) interpret these three verbs as explaining the first  

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in the sense of ‘sexual cohabitation’, but this can hardly be correct. The verb in the present context refers to marriage, clearly focussing on the ‘companionship’ aspect that is also stressed by  

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which although it presents sexual meaning in a couple of passages, in the vast majority of cases it points instead to ‘association, company, assistance’. The appearance of  

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‘rear children with another’ clearly shows the contradiction of understanding the passage exclusively from a sexual point of view. Aegeates is not only pursuing the futility of sexual pleasure, he is entreating his wife for a life together with her that naturally includes all aspects inherent to the free association of man and woman.
of all the values upon which marriage is based, but also an absolute rejection of all the principles and ideals of a society for which marriage is an essential pillar.

Andrew’s removal of every human motivation from Aegeates’ intentions and the narrator’s reduction of marriage to copulation provokes an odd contradiction with Aegeates’ (and the reader’s) values. Thanks to the character’s cross-examination and the combination of the universal and particular perspectives the reader understands the reasons for this contradiction: it arises from the complete ‘Umwertung aller Werte’ that the text proposes. This redefinition or transmutation of standard values concerning man and his reality cuts the ground from under Aegeates’ feet, making him either ridiculous or tragic, or even both at the same time: it simply depends on the stature the reader ascribes to him. But beyond this evaluation, whether ridiculous or tragic, Aegeates nevertheless represents the futility of the individual, ignorant of himself and blind to the hints from his world revealing to him this futility. His persistence in fulfilling his ideal of life in an alien environment represents both the ignorance of the self and the reluctance (or incapability) to come to know it.

2.2.2. Maximilla

As her name a priori seems to suggest, Maximilla, ‘the most important’, plays an essential role in AA. She is beyond any doubt the person closest to the apostle and as such closest to the fulfilling of his ideals.

In contrast to her husband’s character, the personage of Maximilla immediately transmits to the reader a sense of coherence and unity. This impression primarily arises from the fact that Maximilla is always silent and exclusively portrayed from an external perspective. The lack of a more subjective characterisation that might have arisen from her utterances implies the absence of any possible contradiction between what she really is and what others think she is. In this sense, being described exclusively from an external perspective, Maximilla is beyond individuality. As we will see, such a characterisation seems to fit both the text and its underlying doctrine.

The consistency of her character is also emphasised by the absolute coincidence of the two main perspectives that build up her portrayal: the narrator’s and Andrew’s perspectives not only coincide but also complement each other in describing her personal development.

55 J. Ortega y Gasset, Meditaciones del Quijote (Madrid, 1981) 105-15, has properly shown how easily tragedy may turn into comedy depending on the background against which the hero’s activity is projected. In his Poetics (48a 16-20), Aristotle refers to the same issue when he stresses the difference between tragedy and comedy in that the former pretends to represent ‘better persons’ and the latter ‘worse persons’.


57 See Söder, Romanhafte, 147-48 for a comparison of Maximilla with other heroines from the apocryphal Acts and Greek novels.
This evolution, in addition, does not alter her stable virtue and integrity at all. Despite important changes concerning the principles that regulate her behaviour, her commitment to the new values is equally virtuous as it was before. From Aegeates we know that before Andrew’s appearance she was obedient to her parents. They arranged her marriage to Aegeates and she respected their decision accepting him as a husband. But she also observed social norms and values on all occasions. This is emphasised by the narrator, who never lets her act alone: every time she goes out to meet Andrew, Iphidama accompanies her. Her respectability is not even the subject of suspicion by Aegeates. When he refers to her relationship with Andrew he uses the verb ‘to have affection’, which normally appears in contexts of filial love.

Maximilla’s compliance with the standard values of her society and the contractual aspects of her marriage, however, does not arise from her indolence but rather from her ignorance. Once she gains insight, she actively decides to stop with her former life, and her decision does not arise from her changeable mind but from her firm conviction. If she is nevertheless troubled by Aegeates’ proposition, it is simply due to her own judgement and to her ‘humanity’, which she is easily able to supersede once Andrew has reassured her in her decision. Andrew encouraging her to sacrifice all externalities to her conscious and individual choice allows her to refuse everything that is alien to her. Freed from externalities and confirmed in her determination, Maximilla’s new attitude and state of mind is obvious in the description of how she goes to meet her husband after her interview with Andrew. Whereas in her first encounter with Aegeates she unconsciously rushes into the house, in the second one she does it ‘not rashly nor thoughtlessly’ but with the ease and tranquillity of a woman in absolute control of herself.

By superseding the last threat of her husband’s ‘proposition’ and directing herself towards her ‘essence’ Maximilla comes back to herself, and this return
allows her to reject everything that is not hers. The contrast between the unity and coherence of her character and the incongruity of her husband’s is the more obvious because the redefinition of her values reassures instead of endangering her personality. Her active involvement in her circumstances and her steadfast determination indeed give such an impression of coherence that they bring her character close to an ideal. Andrew comparing her with the first woman and placing her in a primeval paradisiacal situation confirms this impression: she transcends the particular cases by orientating herself towards the universal.

2.2.3. Stratocles
Unlike Aegeates, his brother Stratocles strives for a unity and soundness he has not yet achieved. This aspect is emphasised by the lack of a narrator’s perspective in his portrayal. Stratocles, ‘famous in battle’, is characterised by a combination of Andrew’s viewpoint and his own self-perception. The fact, moreover, that Andrew’s speech originates in his doubts about Stratocles’ state of mind and that the latter’s answer intends to remove these doubts from Andrew transmit to his character the features of something incomplete, although in the process of being achieved.

This interpretation is supported not only by the content of Andrew’s words but also by Stratocles’ answer, where he admits that, in spite of advances in his personal development, the process is not yet fulfilled. Precisely because of this and because of his grief and tears, Stratocles appears to the reader as a real person, as an individual who is suffering the internal struggle with his emotions and applying himself to the task of controlling them. His being conscious of his unperfected development and his declaration of his need of Andrew make his individuality even more evident.

2.2.4. Andrew
In the case of Andrew the reader must exclusively rely on the apostle’s words and actions to form an idea of the character, since there is no external sketch and the point of view of other personae is reduced to the always implicit veneration of his followers.

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67 See supra this Chapter note 52.
68 See infra this Chapter, § 3.3.1, 205-06.
69 See infra this Chapter, § 3.3.5, pp. 211-13.
70 V 139-67.
71 V 168-82.
72 Andrew’s role as spiritual father and his followers’ veneration of his person seems to be obvious in V, because it mainly consists of discourses in which the apostle comforts and advises his followers and they obediently listen and obey his recommendations. AA’s fragment in V, however, does not present any single instance of explicit veneration by his followers. According to Prieur (Acta, 302-03), followed by Pao (‘The Genre’, 185), Maximilla’s gesture (V 55-56) of taking the apostle’s hands and putting them on her eyes and mouth not only shows the pupils’ veneration of their master, but also Andrew’s characterisation as a or ‘divine man’.
The text deliberately avoids a characterisation that may provide him with individual traits and any description that might imply an a priori evaluation of his personage. The few references by the narrator are succinct and neutral, calling him simply or . The only time another personage refers to him, his description is equally neutral: Aegeates simply calls him ‘stranger’ or ‘that one’ towards whom Maximilla shows affection. In spite of this peculiarity, Andrew is a kind of centre around which the characters orbit and where the action of our fragment develops, and the text repeatedly describes how all the characters go to him. Because of this, Andrew’s status in the text is a rather peculiar one: on the one hand he lacks the characteristics of a personage, but, on the other, his presence is so all-pervading that it might even be possible to say that he is above or beyond the text.

When analysing his words in search of a characterisation, the ambiguity of his character does not diminish. Andrew’s profile or characterisation, if we may call it so, changes from speech to speech. For Maximilla he is both the interpreter of her intentions and state of mind and the provider of a deeper or ultimate understanding; for Stratocles he is a severe master and helpful assistant, and for the brethren he is the ‘awaker’ or ‘reminder’ and the layer of their foundations. The versatility of his character is more understandable if we consider that Andrew’s imprisonment and future crucifixion provoke different attitudes and problems in his followers. In each case the apostle’s words intend to offer his changing listeners the support they personally need and, at the same time, a cognitive clue with which they may properly assimilate the events to come. This is the reason why the reader sees Andrew’s role changing with the context of his speech and the particular needs of his interlocutor.

In his view, by this procedure Maximilla intends to receive the supernatural power that emanates from his person. The first scholars to propose such a reading were Junod-Kaestli (Acta Iohannis, 436-37), who compare ‘s passage and state that the acts of touching in both passages imply the conception of the apostle as a ‘divine man’. However, although in ‘ there are enough elements to support such a reading, such as the touching of the feet and especially the clothes of the apostle (compare the healing of the hemorhaisa in Mt 9:20-22; Mc 5:32-34; Lc 43:48), nothing of the kind appears in ‘s passage. In addition, the almost literal appearance of the same motif in Achilles Tatus (5.27, ), already pointed out by Söder (Romanhafte, 145, although she wrongly refers to 6.27, seems to disprove such an interpretation. In this passage of Leucippe and Cleitophon, the context is very similar, for Melitte comes to visit Cleitophon in prison. Rather than veneration, Melitte’s reaction seems to express the enchantment produced on the listener by the charm of speech.

Only once does the vocative appear, at the beginning of Stratocles words (V 168-69), but this is the only example and is perfectly justified by the tone and character of his pupil.

When describing himself in the speech to the brethren he also uses the word (V 205).
But the changes in his role do not result from the change of addressee only. In addition to the versatility of his character in virtue of circumstance and interlocutor, the role he may take on every occasion unfolds in a double perspective: universal and particular. In all three speeches Andrew’s words always present him from these two viewpoints. In Maximilla’s speech, from a universal perspective, he is ‘Adam reaching perfection’ 78, but from a particular one he is just a body, which as such is akin to Aegeates and hence should be treated accordingly 79. In Stratocles’ speech he is at the same time speaker and message – namely a kind of all-embracing \( o_\gamma o_j \) that is simultaneously outside and inside his listener 80 – as well as an instrument for the apparent consolation of Aegeates 81. In the brethren’s speech he provides them with a touchstone to supersede the influence of externals 82 but he is also the victim par excellence of these externals 83.

Andrew’s main goal consists of transmitting a knowledge that may provide his followers with a cognitive anchor in their personal situation and state of mind. Consequently, given the fact that the transmitted knowledge can adopt different faces according to the changing circumstances, Andrew’s message must be placed in a stable frame of reference. The universal and particular perspectives assure a stable framework for Andrew’s words by placing them in a clear and steady conceptual context. The change of perspective is necessary because the person Andrew is ultimately everything and nothing, because lacking individual traits he is defined as pure activity. This activity materialises in his words, which are the bridge between the particular and the universal, between immanence and transcendence.

2.2.5. Brethren
The numerous group of anonymous and silent followers (\( o(\ i\ o\ i\ o\ o\ i\ \ a\ d\ e\ f\ o\ i\ ) \) is characterised from Andrew’s viewpoint only. Although the narrator’s passing references usually depict them as simple company for the protagonists of the story 84, Andrew’s speech to the brethren provides the reader with a more precise description 85.

The more superficial content and the paternalistic tone of Andrew’s first and second speeches to the brethren clearly differentiate them from characters like Maximilla or

78 V’ 78-79.
79 V’ 108-12.
80 V’ 144-50.
81 V’ 185-89.
82 V’ 205-17.
83 V’ 230-49.
84 V’ 20, 23-24, 27, 28.
85 V’ 205-71.
Stratocles. His explaining to them the essentials of his apostolic activity\(^\text{86}\), the reasons and task of his performance\(^\text{87}\), as well as providing a kind of cosmogonical explanation, is evidence both of a greater personal distance between master and followers and the more elementary stage of initiation of the latter\(^\text{88}\). Andrew’s repeated references to their sensorial perception suggest this incipient development\(^\text{89}\).

2.2.6. Iphidama

Even though Iphidama, the ‘mighty governess’, is in our fragment barely more than a simple name, she plays an important role as the loyal servant of Maximilla\(^\text{90}\). It is her activity that facilitates Maximilla’s movements in a hostile environment. She is always mentioned together with her mistress, especially when the latter proceeds from one place to another\(^\text{91}\).

2.2.7. Conclusions from the Study of Characters in V

Even though at first glance AA’s characters might give the impression of stereotypes, the analysis of the portrayal reveals important differences between them. The changing lights under which characters appear to the reader intend to offer examples of different personal developments in a gradual process of detachment that leads them from individuality to loss of individuality. This is obvious in the textual devices used to present the four main characters in our text: Aegeates, Maximilla, Stratocles and Andrew. If the cross-examination of a character like Aegeates provides him with the instability that characterises individuals, the exclusively external approach to Maximilla confers on her an equilibrium and coherence that draw her character near to an ideal disappearance of individuality. This, however, does not mean that she has completely succeeded yet: her doubts after Aegeates’ proposal reveal the obstinate persistence of certain individual traits. Her own judgement (\(\text{\textit{do\text{\textipa{t}}a}}\)) and her \(\text{\textit{\textipa{t}o\text{\textipa{r}wpi}}\text{\textipa{t}}\text{\textipa{a}}}\), which is manifest in her concern for and attachment to the apostle and the community, represent the very last ties that she must sever to fully achieve her ultimate goal. Her character, consequently, does experience a certain evolution and is not as steadfast as might, at first sight, be supposed.

The most obvious example of this process of personal transformation, however, is Stratocles, who is depicted in a process of development. After having become aware of his individuality, he engages himself in bringing it into a given balance. The combination of

\(^{86}\) V\(^\text{17}\) 205-11.

\(^{87}\) V\(^\text{17}\) 211-14.

\(^{88}\) V\(^\text{17}\) 238-271.

\(^{89}\) V\(^\text{17}\) 208, 209, 211, 215, 216-17, 222, 227. On the issue, \textit{infra} this Chapter, § 3.4.1, pp. 214-16.

\(^{90}\) See for parallels Söder, \textit{Romanhafte}, 146-47.

\(^{91}\) V\(^\text{17}\) 29, 55, 201-03.
Andrew’s and his own perspective emphasise this work in progress: while the apostle refers to Stratocles’ goal, he himself focuses on the means and the way to achieve it.

All these aspects are evidence that the characters in AA are something more than simple personifications of a given ideal. If they nevertheless transmit such an impression, this arises from the ideal aspiration of a text that strives for the gradual release from an individual’s bonds that culminates in complete loss of personality.92

2.3. Style and Vocabulary of the Fragment

As already pointed out, the style of our fragment is mainly discursive. Excluding one brief narrative juncture between Aegeates’ speech and Andrew’s speech to Maximilla93 and a couple of occasional and quick interventions in discourses by the narrator94, there are actually only two narrative sections in our fragment. The first consists of barely 14 lines and the second one of 1595. These two sections represent a relatively tiny part of the fragment, considering that in Bonnet’s edition the text occupies 270 lines. The remaining text is exclusively discursive.

2.3.1. Narrative Sections

Even though short, the only two narrative sections play an important part in the plot since they include two essential moments that decisively change the course of events: Aegeates remembering Andrew’s case and Maximilla’s negative response to her husband’s proposal. These narrative sections show formal similarities. They both consist of two segments: a first part summarises the action of the previous speech, describing the effect of Andrew’s words on his addressee; the second part brings about a turn in the action that introduces the following speech. In the first narrative section, the beginning describes how the weakness of the community is transformed into joy and strength owing to Andrew’s words.96 Similarly, in the second narrative section97, it describes the success of Andrew’s words on Maximilla; she is even said to have disposed herself according to the words. If before the speech she was afraid and her doubts about what to do transmitted a certain uneasiness to her behaviour, she is now completely calm, having decided to reject Aegeates’ proposal and determining to live according to her choice.

92 Note the frequent pregnant uses of the terms despote (V 97; 109) and des. noptw. (V 117). For despote see furthermore infra Chapter 5, § 3.2.2.1.2, pp. 300-04.
93 V 54-55.
94 V 20-21, 140, 163, 168.
95 V 23-38 and 190-271, respectively.
96 V 23-31.
97 V 190-98.
As for the second part, in the first narrative section, Aegeates’ remembering interrupts the joy of the brethren and prepares the context for his words to his wife\(^{98}\). In the second one, Maximilla announces her decision and Aegeates considers the punishment for Andrew\(^{99}\). Maximilla’s return to prison is the transition to the speech to the brethren.

The narrative sections’ internal dichotomy is evident in the change of verbal tenses. Whereas the effects of Andrew’s speeches, in the first part, are described in the past tense\(^{100}\), the turn in the action in the second appears in the present tense\(^{101}\). This change of verbal tenses is evidence that, in spite of their length and of the role they play in developing the action, their main function is a transitional one and their task, consequently, mainly a focalising one.

2.3.2. Discursive Sections

The remaining text of \textit{AA}’s fragment in V is discursive and arranged into five speeches. The first presents very interesting conceptual issues but, unfortunately, is incomplete\(^{102}\). Thanks to a brief intervention by the narrator\(^{103}\), almost at the end of the speech, the reader knows that Andrew must have pronounced it and that the brethren must have been the addressees\(^{104}\). The second speech consists of Aegeates’ words to Maximilla\(^{105}\). The subsequent three speeches are all uttered by Andrew and the addressees are Maximilla\(^{106}\), Stratocles\(^{107}\), and the brethren\(^{108}\), respectively.

From a stylistic and conceptual perspective we can differentiate the speeches into two groups: on the one hand there is Aegeates’ speech, and, on the other, Andrew’s speeches. Whereas the former presents a clear rhetorical structure and a straightforward development, Andrew’s speeches are less easily classifiable from a rhetorical point of view.
2.3.2.1. Aegeates’ Speech

Aegeates’ discourse to his wife has a main purpose: convincing Maximilla to return to their former conjugal life. In line with this purpose, the *exordium* of the proconsul’s speech deliberately begins with a reference to Maximilla’s parents that purports a *captatio benevolentiae* of his hearer\(^{109}\). After this introduction, which astutely includes an indirect self-appraisal, he immediately makes his statement in the form of an alternative that apparently transfers to Maximilla the responsibility for the future development of events\(^{110}\). The conclusion briefly ends the speech\(^{111}\).

2.3.2.2. Andrew’s Speeches

Andrew’s speeches always present the same set-up and constitutive elements. A given situation has provoked an emotional response in the addressee. In order to dissipate his doubts, fear or uneasiness, Andrew intervenes with a speech that may meet his needs. Andrew’s speeches, however, do not present a straightforward development. Rather, they include numerous digressions that, even if apparently superfluous, are in fact essential parts of the message and that, additionally, are completely justified by the context and by the state of mind of the addressee. As a result the speeches present important thematic divergences\(^{112}\).

It could not be otherwise. As we will see below, these important differences arise from Andrew’s adaptation of his word to the diverse state of mind of his addressees. As his words are conceived as a therapeutic word, they are arranged according to the aim they must achieve\(^{113}\). Since the beginnings of what has been called verbal psychotherapy, the effectiveness of speech on the psychological disposition of the hearer depends not only on the proper form and disposition of the discourse, but also on its suitability for and its adequacy to

\(^{108}\) V\(^t\) 205-71.

\(^{109}\) V\(^t\) 39-44.

\(^{110}\) V\(^t\) 44-51.

\(^{111}\) V\(^t\) 51-53. For the contents of this speech and for Aegeates’ characterisation see supra this Chapter, § 2.2.1, pp. 167-71.

\(^{112}\) See infra this Chapter, § 4.1, pp. 221-222.

\(^{113}\) The therapeutic scope of Andrew’s words cannot be neglected. Note that all Andrew’s speeches include a reference to a given ‘weakness or infirmity’ or affection in his addressee (V\(^t\) 1, αἰθαὐσκος; V\(^t\) 68, 109, ἐπανειδώ); 141, στῃν; 142, δυσκομία ἄγοι, ἀκαβεῖα [em. Bonnet]); 230, ταρασσόμαι. In addition, the vocabulary with which Andrew refers to his words clearly endows them with curative allure. Thus, for example, Andrew’s emphasis in his speech to Stratoles on the ‘contact’ fulfilled by the words with the verb αἰθαὐσκος ‘touch, reach’. This kind of ‘verbal contact’ provided by the words substitute for the physical contact that would normally take place by the placing on of hands. In addition, the use of the term αἰθαὐσκος in Andrew’s speech to Maximilla in V\(^t\) 102 seems to recognise in the words the same sort of ‘healing fluidum’ (by means of which the healing takes place) that some NT examples (cf. Lc 6:19) attribute to healing by physical contact. See on the issue L. Gil Fernández, ‘Las Curaciones del Nuevo Testamento’, *CFC*: eg 8 (1998) 9-39 at 11 and note 11; see also P.J. Lalleman, ‘Healing by a mere Touch as a Christian Concept’, *Tyndale Bulletin* 48 (1998) 355-61.
the state of the addressee\textsuperscript{114}. For Plato and Aristotle the success of \textit{dōγ̃} depends on the proper combination of a good and prestigious speaker, of which in the case of Andrew there is no doubt, and his ability to adapt his speech to the character and disposition of the hearer\textsuperscript{115}.

As the needs of the hearer are determined by his \textit{hæρ̃} or ‘character’, resulting both from nature and education, by his \textit{daβ̃ẽi̹} or ‘disposition’, and the \textit{κaι̹ρ̃õ̹} or ‘occasion or opportunity’, the speaker must take these into account in order to succeed in his enterprise\textsuperscript{116}.

The eventual suitability of a given discourse is finally determined by its results: whether or not it succeeds in altering the ‘affections’ (\textit{pαθ̃}) and ‘beliefs’ (\textit{πι̹σ̃τ̃ε̃i̹}) of its addressee.

It is precisely the attention to all these issues that causes the important differences between the speeches. From a stylistic point of view, they resist a coherent systematic and comparative analysis: divergences in the discourses concern formal issues such as length, structure, oratorical genre, and tone of speech. Similarly, their contents vary as well.

Andrew’s speeches to the brethren, i.e. the first\textsuperscript{117} and last discourses in \textit{V}\textsuperscript{118}, are concerned with the actual belonging of the community to the transcendent realm and with a description of its temporary sojourn in materiality that focuses on epistemological issues, respectively.

Andrew’s speech to Maximilla deals with a primeval situation before the degradation of the ‘intellect’ (\textit{νο̹u̹λ̃}), with the cause of this decay and the way to reverse the process\textsuperscript{119}. The speech to Stratocles deals with the intellect and the soul as mixed in the individual and the subsequent struggle of rationality (\textit{τo̹λ̃i̹d̃a̹ν̃ο̹t̃i̹k̃o̹ñ μe̹ρ̃õ̹}) to control and temper affection\textsuperscript{120}.

The paramount interest of these important divergences is obvious: although disagreeing thematically, the speeches agree with each other insofar as they are by one and the same speaker. Consequently, they provide us with a comprehensive exposition of the different aspects of Andrew’s (and the author’s) conception of reality.

\textsuperscript{114} In what follows we are indebted to the excellent study of the therapeutic applications of speech in Antiquity by P. Lain Entralgo, \textit{The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity} (New Haven and London, 1970). See especially Chapter 3, ‘The Platonic Rationalization of the Charm’, an interesting analysis of what the Spanish thinker considered the origins of verbal psychotherapy; see also Chapter 5, ‘The Power of Word in Aristotle’, with a very suggestive analysis of the Aristotelian development of the issue.


\textsuperscript{116} The combination of these three elements deals with the confluence of three important psychological aspects. The first one (\textit{ethos}) takes account of what the hearer is from a double perspective, what he is by nature and what he is by culture or education; the second one (disposition), considers the nature and character of the affection the speech wants to deal with and its weight in the soul of the hearer; the third one (opportunity), finally, takes into consideration the moment in which the discourse occurs and places it in the wider vital context of the hearer.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{V}' 1-23. For the conceptual analysis of this speech, see \textit{infra} this Chapter, § 3.1, \textit{passim}, pp. 191-95.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{V}' 205-71. See \textit{infra} this Chapter, § 3.4, pp. 213-21.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{V}' 54-139. See \textit{infra} this Chapter, § 3.2, esp. § 3.2.5, pp. 203-04.

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{V}' 140-89.
Given that a proper analysis of these speeches requires a detailed scrutiny of their context, the addressee’s state of mind and, most important of all, their conceptual basis, we will postpone their rhetorical analysis until the study of these issues has been completed.  

2.3.3. Vocabulary

As already indicated, the philosophical vein of the fragment and its tendency to abstraction is evident at first sight. One might define AA’s vocabulary as quasi-philosophical inasmuch as its philosophical intention and abstract formulation do not contrive a consistent, precise, and coherent terminology. This definition, however, should not be understood as an underestimation of its contents: it simply aims to describe the textual phraseology rather than to minimise its purports. Before uttering a positive or negative evaluation of our text, factors such as author, context, theme, hearer or reader, and naturally the ability of the latter to understand its message, must be borne in mind. Admittedly, the vagueness of the vocabulary of our text might originate in the shortcomings of its writer and his lack of a philosophical training to formulate his ideas. Yet there are also other possible explanations. It could arise, for instance, from the nature or the goal of a text that, in spite of its philosophical undercurrent, did not pretend to be philosophical in the strict sense of the word; or even from an intentional use of everyday speech in order to reach a readership lacking the sophistication for a strictly philosophical argumentation. Consequently, our conclusion about the value and fitness of AA’s argumentation rather than its (obviously subjective) terminological precision should be inferred from its adequacy for the needs of the occasion and of its success in fulfilling these needs. And, indeed, a proper analysis of AA’s phraseology and its context reveals that the exposition of our fragment fulfils both requirements.

2.4. Textual Structure of the Fragment

The preceding sections have analysed the plot, characters, style and vocabulary of AA’s fragment. In order to advance the literary analysis we must now turn our attention to its textual structure. Our analysis distinguishes three textual levels. Firstly, the text itself and its formal disposition; secondly, the development of the plot, namely the characters, action and topic by means of which the story is narrated; and thirdly, the thematic development underlying the text.

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121 See infra this Chapter, §§ 3.2.2 (Maximilla), 3.3.2 (Stratocles), 3.4.1 (Brethren).
2.4.1. Formal analysis

In spite of the fragmentary character of our text, an analysis of its textual structure reveals interesting issues that will certainly provide us with a better understanding of its meaning. *Prima facie* an objective stylistic analysis of the text allows its division into seven sections, two of them narrative and five discursive:

1. Andrew’s first incomplete speech to the brethren (V r 1-24).
2. Narrative section focused on Aegeates (V r 25-38).
3. Aegeates’ speech (V r 39-53).
4. Andrew’s speech to Maximilla (V r 54-140).
5. Andrew’s speech to Stratocles (V r 140-89).
6. Narrative section focussed on Maximilla (V r 190-204).
7. Andrew’s second speech to the brethren (V r 205-71).

The disposition of these sections reveals a well-balanced structure based on the proportioned distribution of discourses and narration. A first approach to this sequence based on a purely stylistic analysis results in the following diagram:

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1. Textual structure on the basis of stylistic traits

The text begins and ends with a discursive section (1 and 7); the subsequent two narrative sections (2 and 6), focusing on Aegeates and Maximilla respectively, enclose three speeches that concentrate on the three main personages of the story: Aegeates, Maximilla (presented by Andrew), and Stratocles. From this perspective a double frame, the first discursive and the second narrative, stresses the importance of the central section consisting of three discursive

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122 For the analysis of *AA’s* vocabulary, see Chapter 5, *passim.*
sections. In this central section, Andrew’s speech to Maximilla, as the lengthiest and most
developed, occupies the natural centre.

However, this formal and external analysis may be refined by adopting an internal
approach to the text and its structure. In doing so, we will focus firstly upon the evolution of
characters, action, and topic and, secondly, upon the thematic development.

2.4.2. Evolution of the Plot: Characters, Action, and Topic
From the point of view of characters, Andrew’s speech to Maximilla, which includes the two
most prominent characters and is placed exactly in the centre of this structure, seems to
provide a suggestive division of AA’s fragment in V into two halves. These two resulting
sections not only present an equivalent structure ‘discourse—narrative section—discourse’,
but also present in their central narrative section their respective predominant character: the
first one, Aegeates, and the second one, Maximilla. Aegeates’ and Maximilla’s spheres of
influence, however, extend beyond the limits of the narrative sections and reach the preceding
and following speeches123.

When looking at the development of action and at the role of the characters therein, we
notice a clear shift, even an inversion of roles in both sections. In the former, the plot develops
under Aegeates’ initiative: his role is active and his wife’s is passive. In the latter, Maximilla
impels the development and has an active role, while her husband remains passive. Of course,
Andrew’s speech to Maximilla, by articulating both sections with each other, is the turning
point that allows the evolution both of action and characters. Whereas up to this point
Aegeates’ sphere of influence seems to rule the events by leading the action towards a
possible solution, Andrew’s intervention negates this supremacy and alters the trend of events
in the opposite direction. Andrew’s intervention is essential because his counterarguments
dismantle Aegeates’ intention, opening up the possibility for a topical transition from suasio,
in the first half, to dissuasio, in the second half. These relationships between the textual halves
are summarised in the following diagram:

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123Aegeates’ sphere of influence in the first half is clear. On the one hand, Andrew’s first incomplete speech to
the brethren intends to reaffirm the brethren’s inconstancy, which arises from the apostle’s imprisonment by
Aegeates. On the other, Aegeates’ speech, which exposes the terms of his proposal, clearly extends his sphere of
influence over Maximilla’s determination to change her way of life. With regard to the second half, Maximilla’s
sphere of influence extends both to the speech to Stratocles and to the speech to the brethren, for what provokes
them is a direct result of Maximilla’s decision to change her way of life.
2. Textual structure: Evolution of the plot: characters, action, and topic

2.4.3. Thematic development

The thematic analysis shows that the sections of the text are arranged concentrically. The central position of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla is once again obvious. Instead of articulating two subsections, however, it represents the climactic moment from a thematic viewpoint.

Two incomplete speeches (1 and 7\(^{124}\)), which are concerned with the description of the real and true transcendent origin of the community and with the explanation of its accidental sojourn in the immanent realm, respectively, provide the text with a consistent frame. Enclosed within these two points of reference is a coherent textual whole in which the plot, in the strict sense of the word, develops. This unit of action opens and closes with a narrative section (2 and 6). The first is dominated by Aegeates’ character\(^{125}\): it is his forgetting or remembering that determines either the well-being or distress of the community.\(^{126}\) Symmetrically disposed at the other end of this action unit and dominated by Maximilla’s character, the second narrative section (6) closes the action. The antithetic character of both

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\(^{124}\) Numbers refer to the above classification of the sections on p. 182.

\(^{125}\) This narrative section may be divided into two sub-units (V 23-31 and 32-38). Aegeates’ prominence is assured in both sub-units by means of the repetition of his name.

\(^{126}\) This contrast materialises, on the one hand, in the joy of Andrew’s followers during the period of time that Aegeates seems to have forgotten the apostle’s case and, on the other hand, in Maximilla’s implicit fear once he remembers.
narrative sections is manifest not only in their symmetrically opposite places, but also, as argued above, in their content, the clear inversion of roles, and the change of topic.

Aegeates’ speech to his wife (3), by apparently offering her a choice between two possible solutions of the state of affairs, creates the proper context for Andrew’s speech to Maximilla, in which the apostle argues and demonstrates to her that there is only one possible solution. Andrew’s speech to Stratocles (5) confirms this unique way out and analyses the implications of this one solution for Aegeates’ brother. This intentional distribution of the material creates a well-balanced concentric structure in the middle of which Andrew’s speech to Maximilla clearly occupies the central and most important position.

The concentric textual structure of our text is illustrated in the following diagram:

The interest of this diagram, however, is not merely illustrative. It reveals an intentional disposition of the materials and a calculated arrangement consistent both from the point of view of the development of the plot as well as from the point of view of content. This becomes even more obvious if, following the concentric structure of the text, we now focus on its central section, because Andrew’s speech to Maximilla also presents a clear concentric structure.
2.4.4. Textual Structure of the Central Section

2.4.4.1. Formal Analysis

A formal analysis of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla allows a division into five basic segments:\footnote{Vr 55-138.}

1. Introduction (V\textsuperscript{r} 55-73).
2. Paradise Scene: Eve/Maximilla (V\textsuperscript{r} 73-82).
3. Praise of the transcendent \textit{a}h\textit{h}r\textit{w}p\textit{o}j (V\textsuperscript{r} 83-101).
4. Paradise Scene: Adam/Andrew (V\textsuperscript{r} 102-06).
5. Conclusion (V\textsuperscript{r} 106-38).

The formal disposition of the speech again reveals its concentric character:\footnote{The concentric structure of this single speech has already been pointed out by Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 200ff and, more recently, by Luttikhuizen, ‘Religious Message’, 96-103.} introduction and conclusion enclose a mythological section in the middle in which the praise of the ‘transcendent man’ takes place.

However, the external formal analysis may once again be refined by an internal approach to the text that concentrates on the evolution of the plot by focusing on the characters, action, and topic and on the thematic development.

2.4.4.2. Evolution of the Plot: Characters, Action, and Topic

From the point of view of characters, Maximilla and Andrew (and of course Eve and Adam) dominate the action of the speech. However, what the formal analysis marks as the central section, namely the praise of ‘transcendent man’, is characterised by the absence of any reference to individuals:\footnote{See Luttikhuizen, ‘Religious Message’, 97.} The apparent receptor of this praise is referred to as ‘nature’ (\textit{f}\textit{u}s\textit{i}j), ‘soul’ (\textit{y}\textit{u}x\textit{h}) or more generally as ‘man’ (\textit{a}h\textit{h}r\textit{w}p\textit{o}j). Consequently, on the basis of its distinctive trait, this central section concerned with supra-individuality may be considered as a natural division of the speech into two halves. The first one, consisting of (a) introduction and (b) myth, focuses on Maximilla’s perspective; the second one, consisting also of two sections, namely (b) myth and (a) conclusion, concentrates on Andrew’s perspective.

From the point of view of the action, both sections also present clear differences regarding the involvement of the characters in the action. Since Andrew’s speech originates in Aegeates’ threat, it is possible to speak of characters both as actors and as recipients of the action. In the first half of the speech, Maximilla is the goal of Aegeates’ threat, since she appears to have decided by herself to remain pure. But in the second half, the proconsul’s...
 menace falls on the apostle because she decides not to agree to Aegeates’ demand for Andrew’s sake. In this sense, the central praise allows a topical transition from the sphere of ‘that which is morally right’ (to\(\text{kato}\text{qwrma}\)) to the sphere of ‘that which is befitting, or convenient’ (to\(\text{kachkon}\)). Given that Maximilla has already decided for herself, the only threat to her determination appears to come from outside. The central section allows her to supersede the apparent negative effects of her free choice on her environment. Considering that these are simple externalities, she must accept them as unavoidable and even as necessary. These relationships are schematised in the following diagram:

4. The structure of the central section: evolution of characters, action and topic

\[130\] Andrew’s exposition seems to work on the two spheres of moral virtue as distinguished by Stoicism, the sphere of that which is ‘morally right’ (to\(\text{kato}\text{qwrma}\)) and the sphere of that which is ‘convenient’, or ‘befitting’ (to\(\text{kachkon}\)). Andrew’s argumentation, however, deliberately inverts the terms of the Stoic doctrine. Whereas in Stoicism the perfectly right action (to\(\text{kato}\text{qwrma}\)) depends exclusively on the individual’s conscious and moral determination and the ‘convenient’ (to\(\text{kachkon}\)) is that which from the point of view of ORJRM can be rationally defended, in Andrew’s words it is the ‘morally right action’ that seems to require argumentation (and is even likely to be put in danger by argument: D\(\text{FL}\) Z\(\text{VL}\) M). At the same time, ‘that which is convenient or befitting’ consists precisely in the rejection of every aspect normally included in the concept of to\(\text{kachkon}\) – the meaning of which was originally very close to to\(\text{kachkon}\) – ‘what is necessary’ and which used to define the individual’s obligations towards his fellows and the community. Whereas in the Stoic point of view to\(\text{kachkon}\) originates in a sense of coherence with the ‘universal nature’, the unwritten laws that determine the proper behaviour towards our neighbour, Andrew’s conception of ‘what is convenient’ (to\(\text{kachkon}\)) is precisely the rejection of these duties. This clear inversion points to a critical attitude towards Stoicism and its conception both of community and of humanitas. According to Andrew, then, ‘morally right’ is that which can be rationally argued and that which is fully achieved only by rejecting every external obstacle that may hinder its fulfilment. The Sceptic Arcesilaus appears to have adopted, with controversial intentions, the same approach to the Stoic doctrine concerning moral virtue (see ap. Sextus Empiricus Adv. math. 7.158, to\(\text{de}\) to\(\text{kato}\text{qwrma}\) einai o\(\text{pe}\) praxekes\(\text{g}l\) o\(\text{g}\)n to\(\text{kachkon}\) Cf. SVF III 493). For an investigation in Stoicism, see SVF III 11, 500-543; for a critical examination of the same in SVF III 491-499; A. Dyroff, Die Ethik der alten Stoa (Berlin, 1897) 126-150 and M. Pohlenz, Die
2.4.4.3. Thematic Development

The analysis of the textual structure on the basis of its thematic development reveals more precisely the careful concentric disposition of themes and motifs around the central section. These concentric circles present a gradual transition from the particular, in the most external ring, to the universal, in the centre.

Let us begin the analysis with its climactic moment: the praise of ‘transcendent man’ (ανθρωπός). This central section (F), characterised by its abstract formulation, is properly enclosed by a mythical exposition. The first part of the mythical section (E) provides exemplary parallels in illo tempore that permit the speaker to raise the tone of the speech and proceed from the particular to the universal, preparing in this manner the way to the more abstract and elevated tone of the central section. Although including both protagonists of the Paradise scene, Eve and Adam, this first part focuses in particular on the female character and consequently approaches the myth from Maximilla’s perspective. The second part (E’) is a counterpoint to the first one and decreases the tone from abstract to universal. Like the first part, it includes both protagonists, but concentrates on the male perspective and consequently approaches the myth from Andrew’s perspective.

The next thematic ring consists of what we may call ‘approach to’ and ‘withdrawal from the myth’ (D and D’). Both sections consist of two sub-units whose concentric construction is clear in their being disposed according to the pattern: D1-D2 D2’-D1’. Concerning the approach to the myth, its first sub-unit (D1) includes a reference to the ‘torture, threat’ (βασανιζων)131 put upon Maximilla and encourages her patience. Its second sub-unit (D2) provides the transition to the myth132. With regard to the withdrawal from the myth, it includes the same sub-units although in a (logically) inverse order. The first one (D2’) functions as a transition from the myth133, whereas the second one (D2’) includes a reference to the βασανιζων but with Andrew as its receiver134.

The next ring (C and C’) enunciates Andrew’s advice to Maximilla not to be defeated by Aegeates’ threats. In this case both pieces of advice are similar. The difference, however, appears in the following ring that evaluates Maximilla’s decision (B and B’): whereas its first

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Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung (Göttingen, 1949). For the influence of the issues on Early Christianity see Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 6.14.111.3.

131 See supra this Chapter, note 18.
132 V 67-70.
133 V 106-08.
134 V 108-12.
part considers her decision as due to her own free determination, the second one encourages her to fulfil her choice for Andrew’s sake.

The outer ring, finally, introduces and concludes the speech (A and A’). Whereas the former simply states the theme of the speech, the latter recapitulates the notions that have been developed in the whole discourse, namely Andrew’s perfection, Maximilla’s ‘true nature’ which is assimilated to the ‘transcendent man’ (α τοποτικός), sympatheia and suffering (παθοσ). The concentric structure of the central speech to Maximilla is schematised in the following diagram:

5. Concentric thematic disposition of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla

This concentric composition presents a consistent construction around the central section, whose contents and conceptual development we will analyse below. In addition to the concentric disposition, the special relevance of this conceptual centre is emphasised by the

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135 See *infra* this Chapter, § 3.2, pp. 195-205.
accumulation of stylistic figures such as polyptoton\textsuperscript{136}, anaphora\textsuperscript{137}, metonymy\textsuperscript{138}, antithesis\textsuperscript{139}, parallelism\textsuperscript{140}, alliteration\textsuperscript{141} and, especially, by the intentional gradation of the periods.

2.4.5. Conclusions from the Study of the Textual Structure
The preceding triple analysis of AA’s fragment in V has demonstrated the relevance of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla: the formal disposition, the evolution of the plot, and the thematic development reveal a concentric construction around this climactic section. At the same time, the particular analysis of this speech following the same triple approach shows that it also has a concentric structure: formal disposition, evolution of the plot, and thematic development emphasise its middle section, namely the ‘praise of transcendent man’, as the conceptual centre of the speech. Given its central position within the central section, this ‘praise’ represents the textual and conceptual heart of the whole fragment. The questions why this particular section received such importance and what are the implications from a literary and conceptual perspective will be properly answered once the conceptual analysis of our fragment has been completed. This conceptual study, which places the middle section in its wider doctrinal frame and uncovers its relationships with other sections, will sufficiently explain its paramount position.

2.5. Conclusions from the Literary Study of AA’s Fragment in V
The literary study of AA’s fragment in V provides enough evidence to support the hypothesis that content, characters, style, and textual structure are clearly designed to achieve a common goal. The combination of textual devices to present events and characters, the changing style of the discourses and their specific vocabulary, and the proportioned arrangement of the material point to a writer who is strongly interested in both the form and the message of his text. In the following pages, the conceptual analysis will show the extent to which every element of this construction plays a precise role in the intention of the text.

\textsuperscript{136} V\textsuperscript{83}, εἰ ζωήν οὐκ ἄμετα εἰμὶ ἡμῖν, εἰδομεν ἀλῆς ἐκεῖ ἡ ἀλήθεια.
\textsuperscript{137} V\textsuperscript{83-87}, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον.
\textsuperscript{138} V\textsuperscript{85}, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον, εὐαγγέλιον.
\textsuperscript{139} V\textsuperscript{86}, καθαράνα παραδύναμαν ως αἰκαλείπτας, σαλτσβαχτονσε.
\textsuperscript{140} V\textsuperscript{89-90}, ως επεξεργασθεὶς των μεγίστων των αἰώνων, καθαράνα παραδύναμαν ως αἰκαλείπτας, σαλτσβαχτονσε.
\textsuperscript{141} V\textsuperscript{91}, αὐτα εὐαιστοντα καταπάνω ἄνω ἰπτσεν τοῦ ἢλθονσε.
3. Conceptual Analysis of Andrew’s Speeches

The speeches to the brethren, to Maximilla and to Stratocles present Andrew’s adaptation of his教导 to the changing state of mind of his addressees. All four speeches originate in the same context of Andrew’s imprisonment and impending martyrdom and pursue one and the same aim, namely providing the addressees with the spiritual support they need to face the situation.

The purpose of the speeches, however, is not merely comforting. Instead of encouraging his addressees to patiently accept the situation, Andrew urges them to work actively in transforming it into something useful, into something that may serve their personal development. In doing so he blends the strengthening scope with certain doctrinal aspects that may help his followers in this constructive transformation.

3.1. Andrew’s First Speech to the Brethren

In spite of being frequently neglected by commentators142, Andrew’s first speech in V (Vr 1-24) is essential in many respects. The very first lines already state the clear dualistic conception of reality that will govern the exposition of the whole fragment. Transcendent and immanent realms are distinctly described and are contrasted with one another in many ways. Whereas the former is the changeless and immutable supercelestial realm, the latter partakes in time, movement, generation and extension143.

At the same time this speech presents one of the very rare treatments of the divinity. God is described objectively, i.e. following a philosophical description of His attributes, but also subjectively, namely from the point of view of His attitude towards His people144. From the former perspective, God is beyond movement, time and generation and corruption: He is the One (τὸ ἐθνός) who dwells in the immutable realm beyond multiplicity145. From the latter perspective, however, He is ‘most powerful’, the ‘most beautiful’ and ‘the righteous one’146. He is also the ‘merciful one’ (ἐθνός), the saviour and the light; in short: He is the

142 With the exception of Liechtenhan, Die Offenbarung, 50; 112 and ‘Die pseudopigraphische Litteratur’, 295, who emphasises the central importance of the ideas of this section, commentators usually neglect this first speech in order to focus on the lengthier parts of AA. See, for instance, Bovon, ‘Words of Life’, 81-95, who in spite of analysing the other three speeches in V, omits any reference to Andrew’s first speech. The same can be said of the articles collected by Bremmer, Acts of Andrew. As the index of names, subjects and passages (ibid. 190-200) shows, the first chapter of AA’s fragment in V (= AAgr 33) is completely ignored, if we exclude a single and passing reference.
143 Vr 7-9 and 15-17.
144 On this double approach to the divinity, see infra Chapter 5, § 2.2.1, pp. 263-69 (objective description) and § 2.2.2, pp. 269-76 (subjective description).
145 Vr 12-17.
‘unenvious sharer’ who cares for His people insofar as He transmits to the community His love and pity.

But the speech to the brethren also focuses on the description of the ‘blessed race’ (τὸ μακαριστὸν γένος) which though currently immersed in immanence is actually destined for transcendence. It is precisely their participation in God’s sharing that endows the brethren with the special status that will finally release them from their current degraded state.

However, the most important aspect is the emphasis laid on the motif of the recognition of the community by God. This recognition is simultaneously the beginning and the end of the cognitive process that will finally lead to the overcoming of man’s current degraded condition. As a beginning, this ‘becoming known’ (γνωριζόμενοι) establishes the proper co-ordinates of a cognitive frame: it awakens in the brethren an awareness of kinship with the divinity that they seem to have forgotten. As an end, it provides them with a goal for their search for knowledge, it supplies a point of reference for them to turn to, attracting them as the object of desire does. Given the central importance of the issue, it is not surprising that the motif dominates the whole speech.

3.1.1. Character and Scope of the Speech

Only the last part of Andrew’s first speech is preserved. Fortunately, the very first, incomplete sentence gives us a precise notion of the context in which the apostle’s words must be placed: the followers’ fragility. Although we cannot ascertain absolutely the reason for this lack of confidence, the place and theme of the speech and, especially, its closing words point to Andrew’s imprisonment as the main cause of their uneasiness.

The organisation of Andrew’s speech is coherent with this context. The current beginning and the conclusion of the speech are concerned with the spiritual support of the brethren. If the opening lines reprove them for their ‘feebleness’ (ἀλοίπος) and for not carrying with them ‘God’s goodness’ (Χριστός ὁ Θεός), the closing ones paternalistically assure them that, in spite of circumstances, they will not lose each other. The central section in turn provides them with the necessary insight that may help them to correct their attitude.

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146 V 10-13.
147 V 4-9.
148 For the importance of the Aristotelian conception of God as causa finalis in the philosophical discussion of late antiquity, see infra Chapter 5, § 2.2.2.3, pp. 274-76.
149 V 21-23.
150 V 1-2.
151 V 21-23.
152 V 2-19.
you will acclaim them\textsuperscript{103}. Words I transmitted to you, which I entreat you to receive in the way the words need to be [received]. Beloved, stay firm on all things that you saw, that you listened to\textsuperscript{104} and that you participated in, and the God you have believed in, showing mercy on you, will place you beside Him as those who please Him and who have achieved eternal rest.

17. “With regard to what is about to happen to me do not let it disturb\textsuperscript{105} you as though it [were] a strange marvel that the servant of God – to whom God Himself allowed so many things through deeds and through words – is driven away from this ephemeral life so violently by a wicked man\textsuperscript{106}. This will not come upon me only, but also upon all those who loved and believed in Him and confess Him. [For] the

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{ajal aq fuṣiḥ} refers to the ‘irrational’ or ‘ignorant nature’ in man himself and not, as it is normally interpreted, relying on Luke 19:40 \textit{ekein ouboi siwphousin, ol lipoi kratorosin}, to ‘mute nature’ (cf. Ger. ‘stumme Natur’: Hennecke, \textit{Neutestamentliche Apokryphen}, 254; Hornschuh, ‘Andreasakten’, 290; Schneemelcher, \textit{Neutestamentliche Apokryphen}, 121; Engl. ‘dumb nature’ James, \textit{The Apocryphal NT}, 355, though he does not refer explicitly to Luke. 19:40; or ‘mute nature’, MacDonald, \textit{Cannibals}, 389; It. ‘natura muta’: Moraldi, \textit{Apocrifi II}, 1421; Fr. ‘nature muette’: Leloir, \textit{Écrits}, 233; Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 500; Dutch ‘stomme natur’: Heeringa, in Klijn, \textit{Apocriefen}, 174. Although there are a few testimonies (Clement of Alexandria. \textit{Protr. 4.50.1.4; Orac. Sib. 3.29-31; 4.6.7}) documenting the combination of the adjectival \textit{ajal aq} (present in \textit{A}) with the substantive \textit{ibq} (present in Luke), none of them mentions the act of screaming. The ‘irrational nature’ of our interpretation is the counterpart of the \textit{liša fuṣiḥ}, the ‘real’ or ‘true nature’, namely man’s rational nature. In this sense \textit{ajal aq fuṣiḥ} must be an equivalent of the \textit{ajal aq}. \textit{ajal aq} in this context is either a corruption of \textit{ajal aq}, due to the phonetic and semantic proximity of the terms (cf. Georgius Monach., \textit{Chronicon} 5.23.11: \textit{aša delt\% og\% elimw\%} kaindeinen \textit{aša}; Origen, \textit{Hom. in Luc. 5.30-31}, \textit{BST} gat kwof jumul aq jaišbail aq: kaišwip gat ouk hael en kwof jaišbogog jaišbail aq egin, ekbal wa toin logon al’ erautou-kaišmb dumang, perimheng, logon akodoumai nomikou-\#prophitikou-\#ogou, Dionysius Halic., \textit{De comp. verb.} 14.84-87, opposes ghrwéh jaiš\textit{ajal aq} to logíkhn fwhnh lakisari defkaišbei tol\% y, kai pl elonansafad apei-ghrimwduj gat kaiš\textit{al aq} ou na\% on logi\% kh = efaptes qai dokes \#whnh = (surigqu\% ) or it is simply an equivalent thereof (c.f. Hesychius, a 43, \textit{abakimn}\textit{ajal aq} (\textit{abakew}, ‘to be speechless’, LSJM, s.v., but also ‘ignore’). See also a 53, \textit{abakimn}\textit{ajal aq}, \textit{asunetoj} (\textit{asunetoj} ‘void of understanding, ‘witless’ (LSJM, s.v.)); a 44, explains the verb \textit{abakew} as \textit{agonhase amartanen}, It is the ignorant or irrational nature which is responsible for the prolongation of man’s stay in materiality, the target of Andrew’s \textit{efga}.

\textsuperscript{104} Andrew’s words and deeds form here the unshakeable foundation upon which the brethren must stay firm. This double reference seems to imply that for the brethren Andrew’s activities in physical reality and the knowledge transmitted by his words have an equivalent value. As already said, it might be that their attachment to externals requires the deeds or wonders as a precondition to being receptive to the words.

\textsuperscript{105} This reference seems to support our interpretation in the previous note(s). If Andrew’s deeds are relevant for the brethren in order to achieve a proper understanding of things, this implies that they are still open to the influence of externals. In the case of Andrew’s activities, his deeds or wonders seem always to be accompanied by fitting words, which must reorient the seers in case the former strike them. Given the fact that his crucifixion may also appear to them as a ‘strange marvel’, and given that he will not be there to provide them with a proper explanation, the apostle fears that it will produce ‘disturbance’ or \textit{taraxh}. In the following lines he provides such an explanation in advance in order to prevent the brethren from forming a judgement (\textit{doca}) as a result of their own perceptual representation (\textit{fantasia}) of things. For the relationship between \textit{taraxh}/‘disturbance, fear’ and \textit{fantasia} and \textit{doca}, see \textit{infra} Chapter 4, note 285.

\textsuperscript{106} Note the felicitous implicit association of bi\# and bi\#u in V 232-233.
3.1.2. Being Known and Knowing in Andrew’s first Speech

Leaving the opening and closing sections aside, the central part of the speech may be divided into three parts. In the first one\(^\text{153}\), the love and pity of God received by the community is equalled to an act of recognition. The second section develops the ontological and epistemological implications of the fact that the community has been recognised from ‘such a height’\(^\text{154}\). The third one restates the paramount importance of this becoming known\(^\text{155}\).

In the first part, Andrew attempts to eradicate the cloud of pessimism from the minds of the brethren. In order to do so, he attempts to actualise the awareness of their belonging to the higher realm by encouraging them to recall their participation in God’s ‘unenvious sharing’ (\(\text{afqonj koimwnta}\))\(^\text{156}\). ‘Let us stand in awe, let us congratulate ourselves for His unenvious sharing. Let us say to ourselves: “Blessed is our race, by whom has it been loved?”’ This act of grace, which manifests itself as God’s ‘love’ (\(\text{afgaph}\)) and ‘pity’ (\(\text{efeq}\)) for His race, assures a mutual belonging since it implies being recognised (\(\text{grwrizonai}\)). Andrew’s objective in his opening words is clear: by recalling this recognition he is not only stating the existence of a percipient subject (God) as well as a perceived object (brethren), but also the quality of the latter inasmuch as it is worthy of God’s attention. The act of recognising, moreover, implies a given affinity, a relationship of belonging between subject and object in the act of knowing by the principle of \(\text{otnoij othoi}\)\(^\text{157}\). By being loved and

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\(^{153}\) V' 1-6.

\(^{154}\) V' 6-17.

\(^{155}\) V' 17-19.

\(^{156}\) V' 2-4. The idea that God can be envious might seem odd. Consider, however, that envy does not arise from the objects themselves but from their symbolic value. The possession of certain goods confers upon the possessors a given axiological superiority that determines human interrelationships and defines hierarchical relatedness. Hence, envy is likely to appear indistinctly in the attitude of inferiors towards superiors (‘ascendant envy’) as well as that of superiors towards inferiors (‘descendent envy’). In this sense, the envious individual does not envy the possession of a given good in the strict sense of the word, but rather the axiological distance provided by these goods. See L. Roig Lanzillotta, *La envidia en el pensamiento griego* (Diss. Univ. Complutense, Madrid, 1997), Chapter 1, passim. W.C. van Unnik, ‘De \(\text{afqonj}\) van God in de oudchristelijke literatuur’, MKNAW N.R.36/2 (1973), 4-5, 12, rightly remarks that translating the term \(\text{afqonhij}\) as Dutch ‘royaal’ or ‘abundant’ undermines the envy factor underlying the protective attitude with regard to status tokens that is adopted by those who possess them. It should be noticed, however, that the basic meaning of \(\text{fgoneav}\) is not ‘envy’ but simply ‘deny, place obstacles’, as in Od. 11.381: \(\text{okc afgonebmi ajoreusai}\) (see Pohlenz, *Herodot der erste Geschichtschreiber des Abendlandes* (Leipzig, 1937) 110 note 3), which meaning still remained unaltered in Plato’s time (Tim. 23a 4; Phd. 61d 9-10; Lg. 664a 7-8). For the Platonic use of the verb \(\text{fgoneav}\) as a means either to ask an open or sincere question or to manifest the absence of obstacles that may hinder speakers in communicating something, see our *La envidia*, 413-19.

\(^{157}\) The theory that like is known by like is attributed by Aristotle to Empedocles (De an. 404b 8-15), but later sources recurrently trace it back to the ‘Pythagoreans’. See Alcinous, *Didask. 169.29-30; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. 7.92; Chalcidius, Comm in Tim. p. 100, 10-11W; Iamblichus, *De com. math. sci. 8*, p. 38.6-8F. It appears
pitied, by being recognised from such a height (ὑπὸ τοῖς οὕτως ὑμῖν γνωρίσθει), the community receives kinship with the suprasensible and supersedes the nothingness of ‘those that are cast to the ground’\(^{158}\).

In the second part, the effects of this recognition by the divinity are immediate. The awareness of being recognised endows the community with a special ontological status, i.e. with a transcendent essence and origin, that is perceived by means of the via negativa, that is, by abstraction or negation of the attributes that until then seemed to define their existence\(^{159}\):

We do not belong to time and then are dissolved by time; we are not a product of movement that disappears again by itself, nor a cause of generation [so as] to come to a similar end. Rather, we are akin to the unextended and are hostile to extension \(^{160}\).

The emphatic repetition of the idea of belonging to the merciful one in Vr 10 marks the beginning of a new conceptual development. The awareness of the kinship enables the blessed race to reject everything that is alien to it, and this rejection provides in the first place self-knowledge:

We certainly belong to the one who shows mercy. We belong to the better, therefore we escape from the worse. We belong to the beautiful, by means of which we separate ourselves from the ugly. We belong to the righteous, through which we reject the unrighteous\(^{161}\).

By introducing a dichotomy within the spheres of power, beauty, and justice, the principle of contradiction creates the context for the knowledge of right and wrong in human terms. But once the awareness of the kinship has established the co-ordinates of the cognitive process and the principle of contradiction, in its turn, the means by which knowledge is attained, the via eminentiae or way of ascending degrees may be continued to attain the knowledge of God\(^{162}\). Self-knowledge allows the individual’s stage by stage withdrawal from the lowest to recurrently in the Corpus Hermeticum (1.31, 5.2, 10.4, 6, 11.20, 12.3, 13.18); Alcinous (ibid.); Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 11.9; Plotinus, Enn. 1.6.9.29-34; Porphyry, Sent. 25; Proclus, Theol. Pl. 1.3, p. 15.17-18 S.-W. See Whittaker, Alcinoos, 113 note 262 and the bibliography quoted there. For the origins of the notion in early Greek thought, C.W. Müller, Gleiches zum Gleichen (Wiesbaden, 1965). In particular, on the relationship between man and God, see H. Merki, Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa (Freiburg in der Schweiz, 1952).

\(^{158}\) Vr 4-6.

\(^{159}\) See Alcinous, Didask. 165.17-19 for the via negativa as a means to achieve knowledge of God: ‘The first way of conceiving God is by abstraction of these attributes, just as we form the conception of a point by abstraction from sensible phenomena, conceiving first a surface, then a line, and finally a point’ (transl. Dillon).

\(^{160}\) Vr 6-10. For our emendation of the passage see app. ad Vr 9 and supra Chapter 3, notes 35 and 36.

\(^{161}\) Vr 10-13.

\(^{162}\) For the via eminentiae, see infra Chapter 5, note 190 and 191. On the quattuor viae to achieve knowledge of God, namely the via negationis, via analogiae, via eminentiae and via imitationis, see H. Dörrie, ‘Die Frage nach dem Transcendenten im Mittelplatonismus’, in his Platonica Minor, 211-28 at 223-24; Festugière, La Révélation IV, 92-123; C. Andresen, Logos und Nomos: die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum (Berlin, 1955). As Dörrie points out, the via analogiae (which originates in the simile of the sun in Plato, Rep. 508d ff.) and the via eminentiae (Plato, Symp. 210a-212a) have in Middle Platonism an exclusively auxiliary character. On the issue, see infra Chapter 5, § 2.1, pp. 261-63.
the highest levels of reality in order to apprehend, finally, the first principle:

We belong to the merciful one, through whom we distance ourselves from the unmerciful one. We belong to the saviour, through whom we recognised the destroyer; to the light, by means of which we rejected the darkness. We belong to the One, through whom we turned away from multiplicity; to the supercelestial, through which we understood earthly matters; we belong to the immutable, through whom we perceived the immutable.

This is the reason why the third part of the central section recapitulates and stresses once again the essential importance of being recognised by Him. Since this recognition is the principle of all subsequent achievements, any act of thanksgiving to this divinity must focus exclusively on this issue. ‘Therefore, if we intend to offer our gratitude or our confidence, to sing a hymn or to boast of the God who showed mercy on us, there is nothing else worth mentioning but the fact that we have been recognised by Him.’

This recognition is not only a most important precondition for achieving insight, but also salvation. Naturally, the full consciousness of the fellowship with the divine, implied by the recognition of the same by the same, opens the way for the inversion of roles in the cognitive process. Once subject and object have been clearly established and their mutual relationship defined, nothing hinders the object from achieving acquaintance with the subject. This potential interchangeability of the roles already points to the actual identity of subject and object in the very act of knowing.

The issues developed in these few lines are essential to grasp the meaning of the three subsequent speeches. Whereas this first discourse focuses on the capital importance of ‘being recognised’ and on its role in providing a cognitive clue, the following will define the gradual process of coming to know oneself as a preliminary stage on the way to knowledge of God.

3.2. Andrew’s speech to Maximilla

As the literary and formal study of AA’s fragment in V has shown, Andrew’s speech to Maximilla forms the axis of the text. This pivotal position is coherent with the predominant place Maximilla occupies both in the plot and in the message of the text. As we will see now, in our fragment she represents the most advanced stage of self-knowledge.

From a conceptual perspective, Andrew’s speech to Maximilla is perhaps the most

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163 V' 13-17.
164 The text is corrupt. See app. ad V' 17 for our emendation.
165 The desired fusion with the divinity resulting either in the cloud of unknowing or in complete illumination due to understanding is a common characteristic of many philosophical and religious movements of the period. The origins of these ideas can be sometimes traced back to Platonic philosophy, sometimes to Aristotelian influences, and at other times to a combination of both. Further, cf. Chapter 5, pp. 282-91.
166 See supra this Chapter, § 2.4.1, pp. 181-82 and 2.4.3, pp. 184-85.
difficult of all four discourses. In spite of being complete, the speech presents interpretative problems that are related to its complex structure and intricate conceptual development. The interpretative difficulties arise mainly from the apparent sudden changes from the particular to the universal perspective and the subsequent interruptions in the train of thought.

3.2.1. Character, Disposition and Scope of the Speech
Andrew’s speech to Maximilla is the best example of the application of his verbal psychotherapy. The apparently complicated structure of this speech arises from the apostle’s adaptation of his message both to the character and disposition of the addressee and to the occasion of his discourse. If the speech is approached not from its conceptual development but from the point of view of its addressee’s psychological state, its development is far from obscure.

Aegeates’ recent words to his wife have dangerously threatened Maximilla’s determination to change her way of life. This is not because she lacks confidence or will: knowing that the state of things cannot easily be altered at his wife’s stage of spiritual development, Aegeates did not intend to question the principles of her new behaviour. On the contrary, he appeals to something that is not strictly related to her decision, but which is certainly under his control, namely Andrew’s destiny. This intelligent introduction of an external issue to undermine her determination seems to succeed. Compromised by the situation and apparently holding Andrew’s future in her hands, Maximilla does not seem to realise her husband’s treacherous use of speech. The threat therefore is not purely external. Even if persuasion proceeds from the outside and hence is not strictly related to the individual, it cannot work on its own without somewhere to root and develop. It is a combination of both persuasive speech and Maximilla’s beliefs or judgement that generates her doubts and which is likely to negate the achievements of her spiritual progress.

In order to provide Maximilla with the support she is asking for, Andrew’s speech must achieve several important goals at the same time. First of all, it has to reconfirm Maximilla’s determination to live a spiritual life. Next, it must deconstruct Aegeates’ intelligent use of speech and avert the threat to her determination. But in order to do so, it

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167 On the issue, see supra this Chapter, § 2.3.2.2, pp. 179-80.
168 Vr 39-53.
169 Vr 48-50.
170 The beginning of the speech to Maximilla, naturally, is not as explicit, but as the discourse advances, Andrew’s firm advice to her reveals that she takes her husband’s proposition seriously and considers it a plausible solution for the situation.
must first accomplish a coherent analysis of persuasion and judgement that depicts them as clearly negative and alien to Maximilla, and free her from their influence. Yet, the most difficult and important of Andrew’s goals is to convince Maximilla to take the step that will condemn him. Andrew’s advice to reject the menaces and to let Aegeates punish him as he wishes to is therefore placed significantly at the end of the speech. If Andrew has achieved the previous goals, he can now easily go a step further and state that his death means his life and in turn his life means his death. The matter, consequently, is a delicate one and requires a tactful approach and development.

3.2.2. Rhetorical Structure

With a view to favourably influencing Maximilla, the speech follows a gradually ascending line that reaches its climax in the praise of the transcendent man (αὐθεντικός). Up to this point Andrew exclusively develops the positive side of Aegeates’ threat, since this gives Maximilla a chance to bring her spiritual development to culmination. The apostle begins his speech by minimising Aegeates’ mean threat and by a priori implying its rejection171. The mythical section continues the positive approach with the consideration of the Paradise Scene, in which Maximilla’s rejection is compared to the correction of Eve’s error172. The central praise of transcendent man is a suitable climax for the culmination of Maximilla’s heroic overcoming of this last threat to her spiritual achievements173. Having reached this point, the elevated and heroic tone of the first part gradually begins to descend again in order to consider the negative side and implications of a possible agreement by Maximilla. Instead of high achievements and liberation from phenomenal constrictions, there appears frustration of expectations, failure of intentions and death174. Andrew’s closing words make use of these sombre perspectives. They impel her not only to accept his suffering but also to share it with him. By remaining alert and preserving her clear-sighted intellect, she must actively contribute to the consummation of the process175.

171 V’ 63-70.
172 V’ 71-82.
174 V’ 113-29.
175 V’ 130-38.
The rhetorical and psychological aims of Andrew’s speech result in a clear concentric structure that I have already analysed in the first part of this chapter. By obviating particular issues and leaving the introduction and conclusion aside for the moment, we can reduce this concentric structure to three basic concentric rings, as the following diagram shows:

6. Rhetorical Structure of Andrew’s Speech to Maximilla

The first and most external ring is concerned with the very problem that gave rise to the speech. From a specific perspective, Andrew attacks Aegeates’ sophistry and states the vacuity of his only threat to force the situation. The second ring, with its mythical exposition, allows the apostle to elevate the tone and to change from individual to paradigmatic examples of action and behaviour. The parallelism in illo tempore provided by the introduction of the Paradise Scene not only shows Maximilla that hers is not a new situation, but also gives depth to her commitment to resolving the problem. The universal tone of this mythical section, moreover, allows the apostle to reorient the matter by presenting it as a cognitive issue. The third ring or innermost section exposes the core of Andrew’s

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176 See supra this Chapter, § 2.4.4, pp. 186-90.
177 V 58-70 and 106-29.
178 V 71-82 and 102-06.
179 The cognitive reinterpretation of the Paradise scene (V 71-82) is, in our view, evident. Note, in the first place, the great accumulation of terms for the semantic field ‘knowledge’ / ‘ignorance’ (ἀγνοεῖν, σφάλλω, πταίσμα, μετανοεῖν, ἐπιστρέφω, γνωρίζω, διοργάνω, κατοργάζω, ἐπανοργάζω). At the same time, the processes of devolution and of restoration of the primal state are clearly placed in a cognitive framework, since degradation
message. The supra-individual and a-temporal character of this part of the speech intends to reaffirm Maximilla’s self-confidence, encouraging her to ignore all external noises and to abandon her judgement. She must focus on her essence, which she has already glimpsed, by overcoming the last remnants of her inferior being in order to fulfil the ultimate step of her personal development.

3.2.3. Particular Approach: Overcoming Speech

Troubled by her husband’s speech and suddenly burdened with the responsibility of deciding about the apostle’s freedom or death, Maximilla returns to the prison in order to ask advice of her master. After declaring that he has long been aware of her firm determination and that therefore his support is not necessary, Andrew nevertheless agrees to give Maximilla his opinion of the new situation. By doing so, he places the problem within the context of persuasion. Since there are no internal impulses that may impel her to renounce her principles, he seems to imply that the danger can only proceed from outside.

Andrew’s attack on the immanent in its double aspect of persuasion and judgement is interrupted by a lengthy mythological section. In this sense it consists of two parts, an introductory approach to the theme and a fuller development thereof. The introductory words mainly focus on disqualifying Aegeates’ proposal and on describing it as base and treacherous use of speech. The semantic field of the passage is clear about this. The six prohibitions encouraging Maximilla not to be defeated by her husband’s persuasion present a combination of substantives, adjectives and verbal forms that clearly depict Aegeates’ proposal as simple ‘mean witchcraft’ (rupara)gohteib). However, the basis on which this persuasion relies, namely the threat or bašanoj, is only superficially referred to in these introductory words. Without going into its character and goal, the apostle simply advises Maximilla to resist it by looking at him only for a short while. By doing so she will see Aegeates fading away from her and her companions.

Differently, Andrew’s thorough treatment of persuasion in the part after the arises from ignorance and error and restoration from knowledge and correction. See infra this Chapter, § 5.1 and 5.2, pp. 233-40.

180 V’ 83-101.
181 V’ 54-58.
182 V’58-62.
183 V’ 62-70 and 106-29, respectively.
185 V’ 67-70.
mythological section deepens the analysis of the bašaroj, intending to show Maximilla that
the threat is not a threat as such. It is only her interfering judgement that is keeping it alive. In
order to demonstrate his point, Andrew analyses four different aspects that might be causing
her wrong judgement, providing in each case the means to correct it. After referring to her
confidence in the mercy of God186, to the contempt of the physical body187, and to his
martyrdom as a part of God’s plan188, the fourth aspect touches the core of Maximilla’s
judgement. On the one hand, she wrongly thinks that by agreeing with Aegeates she can spare
Andrew from suffering, whereas it is precisely her agreement that will give him torment until
the day she realises her error. On the other hand, she may think that by escaping from death,
Andrew might be of help to other kindred people, and that by not giving herself to what is
alien Andrew can achieve his ariapausij or ‘rest’, thus serving Maximilla, or what boils
down to the same thing, himself:

If you do not give yourself, Maximilla, to the opposite of these, I myself will get rest as well,
merely being forced to put an end to this life on behalf of you, which means on behalf of me.
However, if I were driven away from this place – being able then to be of help for other people
akin to me because of you – and you, in turn, were convinced by Aegeates’ utterances and by
the flatteries of his father, the snake, in such a way that you might go back to your former
deeds, know that because of you I will be punished until you realise that I repudiated to live
the life because of an unworthy soul189.

Falling into the trap of persuasive speech due to the influence of one’s judgement has
disastrous consequences not only for the individual but also for his human environment.
Maximilla agreeing with her husband’s proposal would imply the annihilation of the process
she has fulfilled. At the same time, the apparent goal she might have attained in yielding to
persuasion is the product of an inferior sort of reasoning and consequently generates
degradation instead of improvement.

3.2.4. Universal Approach: Overcoming Judgement

Maximilla overcoming the dangers of persuasion simply consists of consciously following her

186 If Maximilla is aware of his mercy she can a priori suspend her judgement and easily decline Aegeates’ threat
(V 106-07): ‘Reject Aegeates’ threats, Maximilla, since you know that we have a God that pities us’.
187 As Andrew’s body is akin to Aegeates (i.e., it is material and perishable), he may do with it what he wants (V 107-12): ‘Do not let his noises move you, but remain pure. As for me, let him inflict on me not only the tortures
of prison, but let him also throw me to the beasts, burn me with fire or throw me off a cliff. What then? Since it
is only this body and it is akin to him, let him dispose of it as he pleases’.
188 Maximilla is wrong in supposing that Andrew’s impending martyrdom is negative. On the contrary, it fits
within the plan revealed by the Lord to Andrew: the devil will liberate him from the prison of his visible body
(V 114-17): ‘Maximilla, stay firm against his treacheries, especially since I have seen my Lord telling me
“Andrew, Aegeates’ father, the devil, will free you from this prison.”’. On the relationship between Maximilla’s
decision to remain pure and Andrew’s martyrdom, see Sturhahn, Christologie, 147.
189 V 121-29.
determination to return to the most valuable part of her essence. After her long process of spiritual development, Maximilla has by now attained considerable self-knowledge that may help her to dismiss the noises (ῥῆμα ὁμιλείας) of persuasive speech and the illusions of her own judgement. The second ring or mythical section, consequently, concentrates on the culmination of the process of coming to know oneself and the insight it generates. Whereas ignorance and its concomitant error caused the suffering of going astray, the knowledge achieved by Maximilla enables the ‘inward turn’ or ἐπιστροφή and the correction of the mistake and the subsequent overcoming of the suffering that both soul and intellect have undergone.

The remake of the Paradise Scene is interrupted by the praise of transcendent man, which divides it into two parts. The first is mainly concerned with Maximilla-Eve and the second with Andrew-Adam. The first part focuses on the role of self-knowledge in opening the way for the ‘inward turn’ and for the correction of the error that provoked Eve’s suffering: ‘Rightly I see in you Eve becoming aware and in me Adam turning back to himself. Since what she suffered because of not knowing, you now, soul to which I’m referring, rectify it turning back to yourself.

This correction takes place in three stages and concerns the domains of sensorial perception, of affections and of intellect. Firstly, the knowledge transmitted by Andrew – described here as an ‘Adam turning back to himself’ – enables Maximilla to correct by changing her mind (ἁλαμπαδίζω) and by giving up her own judgement. This reorganisation of perception, which from now on focuses on a higher sort of reality beyond the realm of flux and change, leads to the second stage, i.e. the sphere of affections. The certainty supplied by the knowledge that comes from above enables Maximilla to eliminate the doubt that was caused by ignorance. Hence, phronesis as the capability of discerning what is morally right or wrong is no longer necessary. Deprived of the distraction of externalities Maximilla can turn back to herself and rectify Eve’s suffering. But this turning to oneself can do more. In the third stage, it can correct the dispersal that the intellect suffered with Eve: ‘And precisely that
which the Intellect suffered together with her when it was shattered\textsuperscript{195} and alienated from itself, I correct it with you, who recognised yourself as being lifted upwards\textsuperscript{196}. After this last stage, the nou\textsubscript{e} or ‘intellect’ regains its original condition of complete and unitary knowledge that was first altered with the appearance of doubt and uncertainty.

Yet the shattered human intellect cannot achieve its return to completeness on its own. Its alienation from itself implies the loss of the original transparency that characterised its acts of immediate and complete apprehension. The gap between (pristine) intuitive and (current) discursive knowledge can only be overcome if human intellect is acted upon. As a precondition for this, however, the intellect must suspend its discursivity and, a priori, understand its real nature by simply accepting it. In short, it must be receptive to the knowledge transmitted from above. Our text describes the last step of this process by relating the receptiveness of human intellect to Maximilla’s awareness of belonging to the higher realm, but it also relates the knowledge that comes from above to Andrew’s revelation. Once the process of knowing oneself has properly awakened the intellect, Andrew will supply it with suitable content to attain knowledge of God. Hence it is Andrew who restores the intellect’s original activity after Maximilla has prepared her nou\textsubscript{e} to become acquainted with transcendent knowledge\textsuperscript{197}.

The closing lines of this first part of the mythical section sum up the preceding thoughts and derive Eve’s and Adam’s imperfection from the ignorance that governed their behaviour and actions\textsuperscript{198}:

For what she was lacking you fixed it by not going through the same [errors]; and what in him was imperfect I brought it to perfection taking refuge in God. What she heard carelessly you listened to. And from what he agreed on I escape. And what tripped them up, we recognised. For it is pre-established that everyone’s correction amends his own error\textsuperscript{199}.

Eve’s incompleteness, which was due to ignorance, is overcome by her blind confidence in the knowledge that comes from without. Instead of trying to supersede ignorance and doubt by means of her judgement, Maximilla abandons rationality in order to attain a superior mode of apprehension. By doing so, she enables Andrew to correct what was imperfect in Adam. Instead of agreeing to the search for knowledge due to his philanthropic link with his partner,

\textsuperscript{195} For our interpretation of this passage see supra Chapter 3, note 58. On the notion of the intellect’s dispersal as the origin of the process of devolution, see infra Chapter 5, § 3.2.1.3.1, pp. 292-96.

\textsuperscript{196} V' 75-77.

\textsuperscript{197} For the process of recollection that inverts that of de volution and allows the intellect to recover its original unity, see infra this Chapter, § 5, pp. 233-40.

\textsuperscript{198} For the notions of ignorance and imperfection as first the cause of the devolution and perfection as the inversion of this process, see infra Chapter 5, § 4.2, pp. 316-19.
he flees and takes refuge in God. His attitude is exactly the opposite of that of Adam. Whereas
Adam’s attitude was characterised by λοθινω, Andrew’s is marked by θριλοδτμ or θριλον. In this sense, divine or transcendent knowledge enables both figures to correct their
share of responsibility in the error committed by the first couple.

The second part of the mythical section confirms this interpretation. In the same way
that Adam died in Eve by agreeing with her proposal, Andrew states, he now lives in
Maximilla because she is following the Lord’s order by transporting herself towards the most
valuable part of her essence, her spiritual or intellective being.

3.2.5. Supra-individual Approach: Overcoming Knowledge

The central part of the speech describes the highest culmination of the process we have
followed in the preceding section. This momentous step is properly emphasised by Andrew’s
introductory words of praise, which summarise the steps that have been taken thus far:

Having said these things as I said, I would also say the following. Well done you, saved
nature, since you were not strong and you did not keep yourself hidden! Well done you, soul,
shouting out which you suffered and returning to yourself! Well done Anthropos who
understands what is not yours and hastens towards what is yours!

In spite of the pressure of materiality and sensorial perception, the external call or recognition,
as we have seen in the first speech to the brethren, enables the saved nature to become
manifest and start the process of detachment from what is alien to it. Once the realm of
materiality has been superseded, there follows the realm of affections, the sphere of the soul.
The expression used to describe the overcoming of affections seems to imply a sort of
homeopathic method in which suffering is eradicated through the principle of similia
similibus. Once so far, in a third step, the Anthropos or transcendent man controls and
subdues that which does not belong to him by turning away from δοξα and persuasion. This
last stage was reached by listening to Andrew’s words of knowledge and by gradually leaving
aside the immanent ογοη, in its double aspect of own judgement and persuasion, by means of
self-knowledge. Once this last stage has been reached, words and self-knowledge can be left
behind in order to direct the thinking towards the intelligible, i.e. towards God:

Well done you, saved nature, since you were not strong and you did not keep yourself hidden!
Well done you, soul, shouting out which you suffered and returning to yourself! Well done
Anthropos who understands what is not yours and hastens towards what is yours!

199 V’ 77-82. For the translation of this difficult sentence, see supra Chapter 3, note 62.
200 V’ 102-06.
201 V’ 83-86. For the concentric structure of the section V’ 84-90, see supra Chapter 3, note 65.
202 See supra this Chapter, § 3.1.2, pp. 193-96.
203 See infra this Chapter, p. 204-05.
[you] who listens to what is said! For I see you [now] thinking much greater things than what is said; for I am aware that you are much stronger than what seems to oppress you; for [I see that] you excel above what brought you down into deformities and above what led you to captivity.

The words of the apostle have accompanied him along the stages of coming to know himself. Once the process has been completed, the Anthropos is able to think what is akin to him. By thinking the intelligible he overcomes both speech and knowledge itself, since in the act of thinking of the intellect, that which apprehends and that which is apprehended become one single reality. Subject and object become what they really are: pure thinking. In this way the intellect achieves its highest goal: the releasing of the shackles that bound it to the world:

Having recognised all these in yourself, Anthropos, that you are immaterial, holy, light, that you are akin to the unbegotten, [that you are] intellectual, heavenly, radiant, [and] pure and that you are above flesh, above the world, above the powers, above the authorities, beyond which you really are; having recollected and recovered yourself in your [true] condition, think that in what you excel. And since you have seen your face in your essence, breaking all the shackles (I do not mean those shackles of generation, but also those belonging to the realm beyond generation, of which we gave you outstanding appellatives), desire now to see that one who has not yet been seen by you, who has not been generated, whom you alone, if you have the nerve, will soon perceive.

By returning to a complete and unitary knowledge, the intellect regains its original intuitive apprehension. Discursive knowledge and speech are now futile. The intellect apprehends everything at once in one single act of apprehension, as it is now released from the constrictions of materiality and time. This is the moment at which the divinity reveals Himself to the individual.

3.2.6. Andrew’s Conclusion

Hence, the closing words of Andrew’s speech expose the manner in which Maximilla can

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204 V^\text{76-90}.
205 Thus far Maximilla has received knowledge that may provide her with the means to grasp the existence of the transcendent divinity. As she was still attached to the discursive means of her reason, it is only through names or appellatives that she can conceive the transcendent realm. However, once the culmination of her development has been achieved, discursive knowledge can be left behind in order to reach a direct apprehension of the divinity beyond the constrictions of discursive thought and, consequently, of names. For Festugière’s interpretation of the section, see \textit{supra} Chapter 3, note 68.
206 For our emendation of the \textit{passus}, see \textit{app. ad.} V^\text{79}.
207 See \textit{supra} Chapter 3, note 71.
208 V^\text{91-101}.
reach the culmination of her development and evade the impending threats to her achievements\textsuperscript{210}. She must keep her clear-sighted \textit{nous} safe and preserve it. She must understand that Andrew’s martyrdom will enable his perfection and allow her to know her real nature. It is only by accepting a suffering that is not (Andrew’s martyrdom) that she may escape the real suffering of falling again into materiality\textsuperscript{211}. By understanding what he is looking at, namely at his real being in transcendence, she can disable the influence of phenomena and turn away from what she actually must not see\textsuperscript{212}.

In this sense Aegeates’ \textit{básoj} seems to have a pregnant meaning. Whereas for Andrew it means ‘physical torture’, for Maximilla it is the ‘crucial test’ that will either culminate in or abort her liberation.

3.3. Andrew’s Speech to Stratocles

Andrew’s speech to Stratocles is preserved completely and has a quasi-dialogue form. Andrew’s concerns about Stratocles’ state of mind open the speech\textsuperscript{213} and create the right context for the latter’s response\textsuperscript{214}. A short answer by the apostle closes the discourse\textsuperscript{215}.

From the point of view of its content, Andrew’s speech to Stratocles is not as rich as the preceding discourses\textsuperscript{216}. The frequent repetitions of ideas and synonyms occupy a considerable part of the text and might easily exhaust, or even exasperate, a reader in the search for the exposition of a consistent message. This is due to the fact that Andrew’s \textit{básoj} does not aim here to transmit knowledge, but rather to ‘produce’ it by almost physically acting upon the soul of his addressee.

3.3.1. Character and Scope of the Speech

In spite of immediately following the speech to Maximilla, the speech to Stratocles presents rather diverse contents and style. Abundant references to affections, both as external expression or as internal feeling, draw readers away from the intellectualistic allure of the preceding speech and place them at another level of Andrew’s verbal psychotherapy\textsuperscript{217}. The

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{210} V\textsuperscript{v} 130-38.
\item \textsuperscript{211} Once again (see \textit{supra} this Chapter, pp. 203-04) the method of \textit{similia similibus} seems to be the only way to eradicate the suffering of physical existence.
\item \textsuperscript{212} See Liechtenhan, ‘Die pseudepigraphe Litteratur’, 295-96.
\item \textsuperscript{213} V\textsuperscript{v} 139-67.
\item \textsuperscript{214} V\textsuperscript{v} 168-82.
\item \textsuperscript{215} V\textsuperscript{v} 183-89.
\item \textsuperscript{216} V\textsuperscript{v} 139-89.
\item \textsuperscript{217} See the references to his crying (V\textsuperscript{v} 140-41), constrain (ibid.), despair (142), love (147), desire (147, 148, 149), exasperation (151), hate (152), distress (153), etc. On Andrew’s role as a psychotherapist, see \textit{supra} this
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
tone of Andrew’s words correlate with this new conceptual framework. Instead of gradually approaching the key theme of the discourse and tactfully exposing his point of view, Andrew comes directly to the point by attacking what in his view is bothering Stratocles. As a result, the speech presents a rather aggressive character.

The opening words are clear about the context in which Andrew’s speech takes place. Stratocles’ continuous crying, loud groans and clear signs of grief puzzle and even seem to worry the apostle. Given Andrew’s surprise, it seems obvious that Stratocles is supposed to have by now attained a considerable advance in the rational control of his emotions. Hence there are reasons for Andrew to be concerned, since his behaviour may either reflect a revitalisation of the affective or irrational part of his soul resulting in immoderate affections or is about to provoke it.

In order to dissipate his doubts, Andrew delivers an interesting speech that reveals the writer’s bipartite conception of the soul. Andrew’s speech has a clear goal: if the soul of his addressee preserves its sound internal disposition, the words will provoke a suitable reaction of the rational part that will help him to temper immoderate affections or their external manifestation. But if this sound disposition has been altered and the rational part of Stratocles’ soul appears to be numb under the pressure of irrationality, Andrew’s rough attack on the affectionate part will certainly awake it from its lethargy, provoking a crisis that may restore its original state.

3.3.2. Andrew’s Cathartic Logos

With this in mind, Andrew adopts, in his first intervention, a rather aggressive approach that will put the inner structure of Stratocles’ soul to the test. After the calm questions that open the speech, the increasing tension of Andrew’s words intentionally provokes a state of confusion and of emotional tension in his listener. Once this tension has reached its maximum, Andrew abruptly ends the speech resolving Stratocles’ confusion by means of a couple of appropriate expressions. This produces an emotional discharge in his listener, by means of which a quicker transition to this new order takes place.

The gradually increasing tension is achieved both by the reducing sentence pattern of
the speech and the vocabulary. On the basis of these stylistic traits we can divide the speech into four sections. The introduction or first part opens the speech with rather calm questions and states the main theme of the argument: Stratocles’ immoderate grief. With regard to the second part, it shares the calm tone of the former and develops Andrew’s point of view. The apostle describes the goal of the words as well as the way in which the affects the soul with a view to stating that only when it is present in the soul will rest appear. As we approach the end of this section, the gradually shortening sentence pattern prepares the way for the more tense tone of the following section.

The third section evaluates a possible debilitation of the rational part of the soul. Its very fast and hectic rhythm, achieved by means of reducing the sentence pattern to an average length of 2/3 words and a careful selection of vocabulary, intends to provoke Stratocles’ confusion. At first, Andrew simply hints at the effects of an eventual debilitation of the rational part of the soul: the disturbance resulting from the predominance of irrationality leads the individual to react against the words and their announcer. Then, in a second step, he evaluates the dangers of such a situation, since by rejecting Andrew’s words the soul gives up what is most inherent to it. This impending danger, first described as ‘alien’ (τιματικοὶ μού), is at last identified as ‘enemy’ (ἐκμοῖρος). Finally, the apostle predicts the factual results of giving oneself up to irrationality in order to provoke Stratocles’ reaction. The aggressive and emphatic tone of these last words seem to reach their goal and provoke Stratocles’ crisis and crying, since in the fourth section Andrew more calmly questions his listener in order to reorient him and help him to resolve his state of confusion. It is at this point that the transition to the new order of his soul is possible.

The closing words of the apostle show that the cathartic intentions of his speech have been accomplished. Stratocles’ crying, Andrew says, is the proof that he did not speak in vain. Andrew’s words, as they disclose the internal structure of the soul and the character and meaning of emotional response, intrinsically change the character of affections. Once the

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222 V‘ 140-42.
233 V‘ 142-50.
224 V‘ 150-60.
225 V‘ 150-53.
226 V‘ 153-56.
227 V‘ 156-60.
228 V‘ 164-67.
229 V‘ 160-62.
230 V‘ 163-67. Bonnet’s and Prieur’s editions present an artificial division of chapters that split the normal development of Andrew’s speech. Chapter 11 should be included in the preceding chapter, since it represents its
revitalisation or awakening of the rational part brings the soul into balance, instead of an expression of physical grief, crying becomes an expression of understanding and relief. This is the proof of the success of this \textit{katharsis pagenlw}, of this purification of affections by means of words.

3.3.3. Andrew’s Logos Restructuring the Balance within the Soul

Andrew’s emphasis on the immoderate character of Stratocles’ affections reveals the conceptual background of \textit{akrasia} or ‘ill mixture’ in the constitutive elements of the soul as the source of improper or unmeasured emotional responses\textsuperscript{231}. Whereas internal balance necessarily implies external balance – that is, health –, lack of inner balance cannot but produce external unbalance. That the soul’s ‘bad mixture’ arises from the preponderance of irrationality is obvious in Andrew’s appeal to Stratocles’ rationality: ‘Do you apprehend the uttered words (…)? Do you understand to whom the pronounced words were pronounced?’\textsuperscript{232}

If he really does, if the \textit{l ogoj} really dwells in him, he should dispose himself accordingly \textit{(scil. to this very l ogoj )}. The use of the verb \textit{diatigmi} ‘arrange’, ‘to be disposed in a certain manner’ (pass.), in this passage clearly points to Andrew’s words as ‘disposing suitably’ or ‘rearranging’ the inner structure of the soul\textsuperscript{233}.

Consequently, Andrew’s speech presents a clear therapeutic or healing goal. In order to understand the way in which rational speech affects the soul of the addressee, restoring its sound inner structure, we must pay attention to the vocabulary of the passage. The process presents similarities with a quasi-materialistic conception both of infirmity and of the healing process, which was widely held in antiquity. In this sense, \textit{AA} endows Andrew’s words with a \textit{du
\textnu
\textmaj} or ‘healing fluidum’ that is transmitted by touching\textsuperscript{234}. The action of the words on the rational part (\textit{h(di
\textno
\textia, to
di
\textno
\texti
tikou meroj}) of Stratocles’ soul is described using the verbs \textit{aptonai} ‘touch’ and \textit{qiga
\textnw} ‘touch, contact’\textsuperscript{235}. According to our text, this touching

\textsuperscript{231} Vr 141, pol l oj d kruj; stehej ej ekakouston 142, dusqunia; \textit{ibid.,} to\textit{pol u/sou al goj}; \textit{ibid.,} h\textit{pol l h\textja}; For this reading see \textit{app. ad} Vr 142.

\textsuperscript{232} Vr 142-44, gnwrtzeij ta\textbackslash egomena, kai\textbackslash\textbackslash dia\textbackslash\textbackslash ti\textbackslash se eu\textbackslash koma\textbackslash tek\textbackslash\textbackslash non o\textbackslash\textbackslash wj diate\textbackslash\textbackslash gej manq\textbackslash\textbackslash hej proj t\textbackslash\textbackslash nai ejhtai ta\textbackslash\textbackslash h\textbackslash\textbackslash mena; See \textit{supra} Chapter 3, note 85. This aspect of Andrew’s \textit{l ogoj} will be dealt with further later. For the time being, note that in Vr 192 the verb also describes Maximilla overcoming the threats of her husband. Her disposing herself according to the words allows her to act calmly and consciously \textit{(ouk akr\texti\textfw)}). See \textit{supra} Chapter 3, notes 92, 93 and 107.

\textsuperscript{233} The words are explicitly endowed with this \textit{du
\textnu
\textmaj} in the speech to Maximilla. See Vr 102.

\textsuperscript{234} Vr 144-45, h\textit{y\textat\textos e\textka\textk\textost\textjh} di\textno\textia; \textit{qiga\textnw sou tou di\textno\texti\texttikou meroj}; for the use of the verb \textit{aptonai} in healing contexts in the NT see \textit{supra} this Chapter, note 113.
produces a series of causally related effects. First, it seems to implant or to activate something already existing in the rational part that predisposes it to reasoned speech\textsuperscript{236}. This predisposition to rational speech generates the recognition of a mutual belonging or kinship, the awareness of an *eros* attracting like to like by means of which the εἰρωσία or ‘reunion’ of speaker and listener is enabled\textsuperscript{237}. The result of this reunion is rest\textsuperscript{238}. By focusing on the ἐνόοι the rational part becomes itself ἐνόοι and can easily subdue irrationality\textsuperscript{239}.

Whereas before the soul is touched it seems to be under the control of irrationality, once the ἐνόοι restores the soul’s inner balance, rationality is able to subdue irrationality and retake the control of the soul. From now on mastery over affections is possible without the need of external aid, since the irrational part of the soul is naturally disposed to listen to the dictates of the rational one\textsuperscript{240}.

3.3.4. The Goal of Rationality: *metriopateia* and *apateia*

That Andrew intends to temper the affections of the soul rather than eradicate them is clear both from the character of his speech and from its content. In the first place, as stated above, Andrew intends to provoke an emotional response from Stratocles rather than prevent one. At the same time, Andrew urging Stratocles to feel certain affections rather than others shows that in his view there are affections that have a positive effect on the soul.

Andrew’s main concern in this first part of his speech, consequently, is not the emotion itself but rather its unmeasured manifestation. This is due to the fact that, in Andrew’s view, Stratocles is still engaged in the learning process that will lead him to rational control over his behaviour. In order to achieve this, Stratocles must revitalise the rational part of his soul so that the overbearing character of the irrational one may be kept within bounds. But as this revitalisation takes place by dealing with emotions, a complete eradication would only produce negative results, since it would leave the rational part of the soul without

\textsuperscript{236} V\textsuperscript{r} 145-47.

\textsuperscript{237} Note the abundant references to filial love and affection in V\textsuperscript{r} 147-50. See *infra* this Chapter notes 243 and 244.

\textsuperscript{238} V\textsuperscript{r} 149-50.

\textsuperscript{239} However, if Stratocles’ rational part has not been properly acted upon by the words, it is likely that under the influence of the irrational part his soul might be turning away from Andrew and his speech. Instead of the agreement of the alike, there is the opposition of the unlike. Instead of εἰρωσία there is *neikos* or ‘strife’. In the background to this process we seem almost but not quite to have the Plotinian exposition of the fundament of magic spells, namely the existence of an agreement of like forces and an opposition of unlike. While in the nature of the former there is a love (*eros*) that attracts them to each other, in the latter there is a strife (*neikos*) that repels them (Plotinus, *Enn.* 4.4.40). The sorcerer of the white or true magic makes use of this innate attraction of like by like in order to join two souls, creating a pattern that in itself has an own δυναμὶ.

\textsuperscript{240} On the issue, see *infra* Chapter 3, note 88 and this Chapter, § 3.3.4, pp. 209-10.
It is precisely the rational part’s dedication to controlling emotions that allows the individual to distinguish what is own from what is alien, that is, what belongs to his rational nature and what does not. Only after the soul has achieved full consciousness of its rationality and become used to controlling affections by means of reason, an eventual overcoming of the passions as such is possible and recommendable.

In this sense Andrew’s speech intends firstly to moderate the affections that might be provoking Stratocles’ uneasiness. He does so by appealing to the words, to the ὁράμα, and the quasi-automatic restructuring of the soul that they seem to provide. If the words have reached the rational part and settled therein, they naturally generate in the soul the rational will and desire to exchange, to communicate and to join other kindred words and beings; in sum, they produce the rational desire to achieve reunion with the ὁράμα. As a result, when properly received and developed, the words substitute purely irrational and unmeasured affections with those that are rational and moderate expressions of filial love. By means of this procedure, reason controls and moderates the affections and allows the individual to rejoice and sorrow properly.

Given the fact that, at this stage, the soul has thus regained its sound, hierarchical organisation, the individual is no longer apt to be ruled by emotions. Instead, his serene character is free from their noxious influence and this liberation appears to be a natural result.

A nice illustration of this can be found in the anecdote by Herodes Atticus (ap. Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 19.127-10) quoted by P. Moraux (Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias II [Berlin/ New York, 1984]). A barbarian without any knowledge of agriculture buys a piece of land with olive trees and vineyards. One day he sees his neighbour pruning back his plants and asks him why he does so. The neighbour answers that this procedure is intended to augment the production of his plants. As the barbarian tries to imitate him, he cuts his plants so carelessly that they never give fruit again. This is exactly what happens with those who try to completely eradicate their affections.

Cf. Philo, Leg. alleg 3.127ff. for a similar process of achieving the purification of the passions. In a first stage or ‘tempering’ of the passions intends to avoid extreme reactions on the irrational part of the soul, thus preparing the soul for an eventual complete eradication.

Andrew urges Stratocles to control his feelings by focussing on the words and on the moderate and rational desire for the reunion with his φίλος, that they generate. In the present passage the terms denoting this reunion (Vr 148, κοινωνικός; ibid., συμφιλικός; ibid., συζυγός) do not present the slightest sexual undertone. One might even say that their use in the context of Andrew’s speech to express the effect of the ὁράμα on the listener’s soul rather points to a conscious recharacterisation of their meaning. The same is true of Stratocles’ answer (Vr 168-82). We do not agree with Nasrallah’s suggestion (‘Reader-Disciple’, 241-42) that the agricultural metaphor in Stratocles’ speech might be interpreted sexually, since nothing of the kind appears in the present context. On the contrary, Stratocles’ use of the agricultural simile clearly places us in the context of education (for parallels see infra this Chapter, pp. 212-13 and notes 256-258. See also pp. 226-28 with notes 307 and 312) and more precisely in that of ethical education.

See Aristotle, EN 1104b 11-13, διὸ δὲ ἐν τῇ ὁράσει τῆς φύσεως ἑκ τὸν ἐκ τῆς φύσεως, ὅπως ἠλείπῃ τῇ ὕμνῳ τῆς φύσεως, ὃ ἐν τῇ ὁράσει τῆς φύσεως ἑκ τὸν ὕμνῳ τῆς φύσεως.
culmination.  

3.3.5. Excursus on Stratocles’ Viewpoint

Stratocles not only responds positively to Andrew’s cathartic logos by physically expressing the new order within his soul under the primacy of rationality, he also intends to offer a well-reasoned answer with a view to showing the apostle that he is quite aware of the dangers of his attitude. In doing so, however, he involuntarily confirms Andrew’s concerns with regard to his spiritual development and state of mind. Even though he attentively follows Andrew’s thoughts, he does not quite seem to understand their deeper meaning.

Stratocles’ words intend to react to every relevant aspect of his master’s speech, delivering in each case a proper answer. However, although his reasoning uses approximately the same terms as the apostle, the nuances are rather different. Sometimes he understands Andrew’s words literally, sometimes he interprets them subjectively, and sometimes he does not grasp them at all. The resulting conceptual asymmetry between master and pupil transmits a certain irony since, though fully committed to his learning process, Stratocles seems to have quite a way to go. This textual irony, however, does not intend to deride him but simply to present his character as a work-in-progress, as something incomplete even though in the process of being completed. In addition, Stratocles is conscious both of his imperfection and of his need to continue his education. Let us look at some examples of this conceptual asymmetry.

The proconsul’s brother begins his speech with: ‘Do not think, blessed Andrew, that there is some other thing grieving me but you’. At first sight this affirmation is astonishing, since the goal of Andrew’s speech was precisely to show Stratocles the need to stop his grief. How can he expect to please the apostle with such an argument? It is obvious that his words are a literal answer to Andrew’s metaphorical questions in 42.13-15 and 42.28-31. The apostle’s enquiry as to whether he found himself within Stratocles or whether there was someone or something else within him were actually intended to discover in his soul either something συγγενής (‘akin’) or αληθινός (‘alien’), namely the principles that may determine

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246 In the first centuries of the era there is a vivid polemic between Stoics and Aristotelians as to the advantages and disadvantages of metriopatia and apatia. Interesting evidence of the growing relevance of the former in the historical period is the testimony of Philo, who combines metriopatia and apatia as subsequent stages in the sage’s quest for wisdom. Even if complete eradication is the ultimate ideal, this can only be attained after a long process of tempering the emotions. See supra this Chapter, note 242 and infra Chapter 5, §5.4, pp. 338-39.

247 V 168-82.

248 V 168-69.
his attraction to or repulsion of the 1ογοί.

More interesting is his following statement: ‘Since the words that from you are directed to me seem to flash with fire, and each of them reaches me and truly lights me up’\(^{249}\). It seems that Stratocles understands the verbs \(\text{ἀπτόμαι} \) ‘touch’ and \(\text{ὁγγα} \) ‘reach, touch’ rather differently from Andrew. As far as the former is concerned, he clearly takes it as meaning ‘to be set on fire’, a possible though not very frequent use of \(\text{ἀπτω} \)\(^{250}\). As to the latter, he probably understands it in an hostile sense, as meaning ‘to hit’\(^{251}\). These misunderstandings explain his version of Andrew’s words and the unexpected simile that compares their action with the burning effect of fire\(^{252}\).

Something of the kind might also be said of his use of \(\text{ἐπικινδύνει} \) ‘care’ and \(\text{στοργή} \) ‘affection’ to interpret Andrew’s references to filial love as attracting like to like in \(V^\prime\) 145-149\(^{253}\). Stratocles clearly fails to grasp Andrew’s intentions. This is obvious from the fact that whereas in Andrew’s words filial love has a double direction, namely that it emanates equally from like to like and vice versa in order to generate the mutual attraction, in Stratocles’ words it has only one direction, from Andrew towards him.

Notwithstanding and in spite of his limitations, he manages to reframe Andrew’s words, understanding them in his own way. His use of the agricultural metaphor successfully expresses his uneasiness without revealing an extreme dependence on the irrational or affectionate part of his soul. Indeed, in the last analysis his crying is but a projection of the rational part of his soul and a regret concerning the eventual frustration of the education of his \(\text{χαρακτήρ} \) or ‘character’\(^{254}\).

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\(^{249}\) \(V\) 168-69.

\(^{250}\) Cf. LSJM, s.v. \(\text{ἀπτω} \), B. Cf. Odyssey 9.379; Euripides, Hel. 107.

\(^{251}\) Cf. LSJM, s.v. \(\text{ὅγγα} \), II.3. Cf. Plutarch, Alex. 10

\(^{252}\) Indeed, this misunderstanding explains both the comparison \(\text{πυρὶ ἀντιζωτέοις ἐβικάσιν ἐξ ἐξουσίας ὑλὴς ἐκκαίεται} \) as ‘seem to flash with fire’ and the effect of the action introduced by \(\text{πρὸς τὸ σέ αὐτό} \) ‘lighting me up’. Similar is his use of the verb \(\text{καλαῖ} \) ‘reach’, which unlike \(\text{ὅγγα} \) focuses on the trajectory and goal of a movement rather than on its effect on a surface.

\(^{253}\) \(V\) 174-75.

\(^{254}\) The textual subtlety created by means of the conceptual asymmetry between Andrew’s questions and Stratocles’ answers completely vanishes in Prieur’s (and MacDonald’s) textual edition (see supra critical app. ad 171-172 and notes 85 and 87 to Chapter 3). The perfect correlation between question and answer disappears. Andrew’s intervention in \(V\) is due to Stratocles’ excessive grief and intends to induce him to moderate his emotional responses. In order to give a proper answer to his master – and we know from Andrew himself in \(V\) 164-67 that he does so –, Stratocles must eradicate Andrew’s concerns about his apparent immoderate emotional response. Stratocles’ moderate-good-pupil’s-answer in \(V\) satisfactorily explains that his crying responds to a rational projection of a future evil and emphasises in this manner the rational control of his soul. By contrast, Stratocles’ answer in Prieur’s text (\(\text{Α.Αγρ.} 44.5-6\)) becomes an outburst of emotions of all kinds. Stratocles is seen describing himself as ‘burning in love for you (scil. Andrew)’ (\(\text{kαταφιεύματι καθότι τὸν ἐν καρδία} \) ref) and to his ‘grief’ (\(\text{τῆς τοῦ καρδιῶν} \)).
Incidentally, the use of this simile shows that Andrew’s speech to Stratocles must be interpreted ethically. In our view, this agricultural metaphor does not present any resemblance to Mk 4:1-20 and parallels\textsuperscript{255}, since in our passage the emphasis is not so much on seeds (= words) or ground (= listener) as on the sower as the only artificer of the perfection of the future plant. Andrew’s care and attention is strictly necessary in order to complete the process that began with the preparation of the field (Stratocles’ soul) and the sowing. The metaphor must then be placed in the long tradition that saw a parallel between the process of learning and agriculture as documented by Pindar, Hippocrates and Plato\textsuperscript{256}. Under the influence of the Aristotelian application to ethics\textsuperscript{257} the simile would gradually specialise to express the process and result of ethical education. This is the stage we find in the second century, as Plutarch, Galen, AA and many other references testify\textsuperscript{258}.

3.4. Andrew’s Second Speech to the Brethren

Unfortunately Andrew’s second speech to the brethren is not only incomplete but also contains, especially in its last part, important textual corruptions\textsuperscript{259}. Whereas its incompleteness is due to simple material reasons – it occupies the last folios of the extant manuscript – this is not the case with the textual corruptions. Since the last folio of the ms only presents a couple of irrelevant imperfections, the errors must be attributed to the copyist who either found them already in his original or could not quite follow the complicated exposition of the text and committed some important omissions. It is no exaggeration to affirm that if this speech were complete and free from errors and omissions, we might have been able to fully reconstruct AA’s doctrine along its basic lines. This is due to the fact that Andrew discusses many new issues that had not yet been dealt with in the preceding speeches.

An important part of Andrew’s words, for instance, is dedicated to explaining his duty as ‘messenger of the Lord’ and his goal, which does not consist of announcing a new teaching, but rather of reminding people of their true nature (iδιὸς οὕτως)\textsuperscript{260}. While the preceding speeches mainly focused on defining this true nature as such, the current one intends to explain why this true nature needs to be reminded. In this way, the central theme of

\textsuperscript{255} Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 404, 496, and note to \textit{AAgr} 44.1.

\textsuperscript{256} In all examples there is a strict parallel between teaching, teacher and pupil and preparing the field, the sowing, and the attention of the farmer. Cf. Pindar, \textit{N} 8.40-42; Hippocrates, \textit{Lex} 3; Plato, \textit{R}. 491d-e.

\textsuperscript{257} Aristotle, \textit{EN} 1179b 23-26. See also, Bollok, ‘Poimandres and \textit{AA}’, 109, who already pointed out that the passage is closer to \textit{Poimandres} than to the ‘seedsower parable’.

\textsuperscript{258} See Plutarch, \textit{De lib. ed.} 4b-c; Galen, \textit{De cogn. an. morb.} 7, 40, 1-8; For other references see Moraux, \textit{Der Aristotelismus} II, 795 note 437.

\textsuperscript{259} V\textsuperscript{4} 205-71.
the ‘oblivion of the true nature’, which in the first speech to the brethren had only been hinted at, is now thoroughly developed.

Two reasons explain the perpetuation of forgetfulness. On the one hand, there is an internal reason, namely the co-operation between sensorial perception and the mind’s assent. Due to the soul’s degradation into materiality, man’s apprehension of his world exclusively relies on his senses. As his idea of reality depends on sensation, he seems to be trapped in the vicious circle shaped by his ‘deluding representations’ (epibl abhj fantasiā). The awakening effect of Andrew’s words puts an end to this situation. Everyone akin to the words can realise the flux in which they live and glimpse their true being.

On the other hand, there is also an external reason – the instability and influence of phenomena. A very important part of the speech is consequently dedicated to purporting a cognitive transformation of appearances. Instead of stating their fallacy and rejecting them a priori, Andrew’s speech defends a reorganisation of perception that may enable the ‘blessed race’ to see through appearances.

In this context, the long treatment of the principle of evil, the ‘shameless devil’ (αhaidoj diabol oj), and the narration of his fight against God, the ‘one without beginning’ (αharpoxoj), for the control of man takes place. Although at first sight this narration might seem to explain the existence of good and evil, it actually focuses on the need to discriminate between true and false appearances in order to escape from the vicious circle that keeps man attached to materiality. Whereas the principle of evil is objectively described as ‘enemy’ (połoηioj) and as ‘alien to peace’ (eirhnhj allotrioj), subjectively – from the perspective of his relationship with man – he is mainly a deceiver who disguises his malice towards mankind as friendship.

3.4.1. Character and Scope of the Speech

Andrew’s discourse to this group of followers has a more general character and is concerned, in a manner of speaking, with the basics of his doctrine. This more general character of the speech is not only stressed by mentioning the larger public that was attending it, but also by
certain traits of the speech. The abundant references to sensorial perception\textsuperscript{266} and to mental activities immediately related to or depending on perception\textsuperscript{267} already point to the lower level of spiritual development of his addressees. This is also suggested by another issue that deserves special attention. The last speech to the brethren is the only one mentioning Andrew’s ‘wondrous deeds’ (\textit{εὐγηρία})\textsuperscript{268}. Whereas the other three speeches seem to consider Andrew’s activities as purely consisting of the transmission of his words, this reference (isolated and passing though it may be) allows the assumption that the apostle’s deeds may have also played a relevant role in \textit{AA}. Admittedly, this assertion might, at first sight, seem to contradict the strong dualistic trend of the text. But the contradiction disappears if we consider that the \textit{εὐγηρία} might have been intended for an initial phase of Andrew’s activity and exclusively directed to those followers who, though advancing in the learning process, are not yet completely detached from their material condition and consequently from their senses.

This last consideration indeed explains the central position in the speech of notions such as perception (or more precisely \textit{right} perception), misleading and misunderstanding. Attention is not only paid to phenomena, to the perception thereof and to the information conveyed by the senses, but also and especially to man’s synthesis of this information in order to form an idea of reality. If in the preceding speeches to Maximilla and Stratocles the objective of Andrew’s \textit{οἰκείωσις} was the reorganisation of intellect and soul, respectively, in this speech it clearly intends to reorganise the realm of sensation.

Andrew is aware that his martyrdom might have a disastrous impact on those of his followers who are still dependent on appearances. Since at their stage both phenomena and words are equally relevant\textsuperscript{269}, an impressive \textit{εὐγηρία} such as his martyrdom might easily frustrate their previous achievements. Consequently, Andrew is mainly concerned with the way in which his addressees are to perceive and interpret his crucifixion. His words intend to provide them with a cognitive clue to how they must understand the events to come.

The apostle’s announcement of his impending death significantly occupies the central part of the speech\textsuperscript{270}. The preceding section or introduction provides a particular approach to the problem and mainly intends to urge the addressees to beware of deluding appearances\textsuperscript{271},

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{266} V\textsuperscript{r} 211, 215, 215-16, 222, 224-25, 227.
  \item \textsuperscript{267} As memory (V\textsuperscript{r} 207, 221), representation (V\textsuperscript{r} 209), error (V\textsuperscript{r} 214), disturbance (V\textsuperscript{r} 230).
  \item \textsuperscript{268} V\textsuperscript{r} 222-224.
  \item \textsuperscript{269} See V\textsuperscript{r} 218-229. The motif of the foundation (\textit{κατασκευή}) consisting both of deeds and of words eloquently highlights the equivalent relevance of phenomena and words in the spiritual development of beginners.
  \item \textsuperscript{270} V\textsuperscript{r} 230-37.
  \item \textsuperscript{271} V\textsuperscript{r} 205-229.
\end{itemize}
whereas the last part of the extant speech offers a universal approach to the problem. In order to reduce the impact of his death, the apostle reframes his martyrdom within a more stable mythical framework that may enable its transformation into something positive. From this perspective Andrew’s martyrdom is no longer an isolated example of a violent death inflicted by a wicked man, but rather an important act in the cosmological drama of the continuing strife between Good and Evil.

3.4.2. Particular Approach: Improving Man’s Condition

Despite their belonging to the higher realm, until Andrew’s intervention the brethren seem to have been trapped like any other individuals in the realm of materiality. Andrew’s words intend to enable those ‘akin to the words’ to glimpse their true natures, which may help them to detaching themselves from the senses. Despite its essential importance, however, the glimpse of the own nature is but the beginning of a long and gradual process that may eventually lead to the complete liberation from the constrictions of the physical world. Having recognised his original nature and taking it as the basis, man has to engage himself in a laborious deconstruction of the other aspects that form his untrue nature. First of all, however, man has to cope with and overcome the distortion that proceeds from the combination of his sensorial perception and unstable phenomena.

3.4.2.1. The Soul’s Current State

According to Andrew, the distortion at the level of perception of reality proceeds not only from the senses and phenomena, but also from the resulting inaccurate mental representations based on them. As a result of this combination, man not only lives in an alien environment but, what is even worse, he also seems to enjoy it. Andrew’s main goal is to alter this situation since, he declares, he has been sent to these latitudes ‘to remind each man akin to the words that they live among temporal evils, enjoying their [own] deluding representations.

It is an erroneous idea of reality that prolongs the brethren’s sojourn in an unsteady environment, in which physical and moral issues are subject to change and decay. If phenomena are always changing, the information transmitted by the senses to the mind will

272 Vr 238-271.
273 Vr 205-06.
274 For Aristotle, too, error does not proceed from aικοςία or ‘sensation’, since ‘the perception of proper objects is true, or is only capable of error to the least possible degree’ (De an. 428b 18-19). It is the fαντασία or ‘perceptual appearance’ that is responsible for error (see De an. 428b 11-28).
275 Vr 208-09. For fαντασία in our present passage, see supra Chapter 3, note 98 and infra Chapter 5, § 3.2.2.2.3, pp. 310-14.
also be continually changing, as will the resulting synthesis or mental picture. The combination of the variability of objects presented to the mind and their relative value due to the constant transformation of the frame of reference results in a highly negative instability with regard to ethics and behaviour.  

It is clearly stated in our text that this situation originates in the fact that the soul moves in an unnatural environment: ‘All this happens because the uninstructed soul went astray in the physical realm and [still] keeps the ties related to it going astray.’ Although the text is not clear about the ultimate cause that provokes this going astray of the soul, the adjective ‘uninstructed’ seems to relate it to an inherent ignorance that characterised its original condition. As we have already seen in the Paradise Scene, it is precisely this ignorance that causes Eve’s suffering and the concomitant process of degradation of the intellect, firstly to the level of soul, and finally to the realm of appearances. We seem to have here the final stage of the same process of degradation. Having reached its lowest level, the soul is lost in sensible reality and reduced to its most elemental activity. The abundant references to phenomena and sensation together with the absence of allusions to rational activity as such seem to suggest that Andrew is dealing with the soul as an irrational entity, which is purely engaged in apprehending phenomena.

This situation can be changed. By reminding the brethren of where they really belong, by declaring the futility of their current life and by encouraging them to focus on a changeless reality, Andrew makes them receptive to the words that will lead them to recover their real nature. Once they become ‘listeners to the proclaimed words’ they receive a glimpse of their real nature, i.e. the rational nature of their souls.

3.4.2.2. Andrew’s Foundation

The soul has achieved a glimpse of its true nature, but it is still trapped in an alien environment characterised by continuous movement and change. Given their dependence on irrational means, such as sense perception and representation, the brethren’s improvement cannot be achieved only by means of words. Something more tangible is necessary, since their perception and practical understanding still depend exclusively on the senses.

Andrew seems to understand this point, because he dedicates an important part of his speech to describing the foundation laid by him in order to provide the brethren with the

276 V 211-12.
277 V 213-14. For our interpretation of the term erekura, see supra Chapter 3, note 99.
278 See supra this Chapter, § 3.2.4, pp. 200-03.
stability and certainty they need to gain a proper understanding of the world. The first step then consists of searching for something stable, something which neither moves itself nor can be moved:

Therefore I command you, dear children, build firmly on the foundation laid for you, which is unshakeable and against which no evil power can conspire. Root on this foundation, Stay firm remembering all what has been achieved while I was living together with all of you²⁷⁹.

This foundation is what Andrew’s activities means to those who are still engaged in selecting the huge amount of information proceeding from the sensible. As they partake in Andrew’s activities mainly through their senses, they receive something to look at, i.e. Andrew’s deeds, and something to listen to, i.e. his words:

Works have you seen performed through me that you cannot disbelieve, [works] that have become such signs that even the irrational nature [in you] will acclaim them²⁸⁰. Words I transmitted to you, which I entreat you to receive in the way the words need to be [received]. Beloved, stay firm on all things that you saw, that you listened to and that you participated in, and the God you have believed in, showing mercy on you, will place you beside Him as those who please Him and who have achieved eternal rest²⁸¹.

Andrew’s separate treatment of deeds and words and the different way of describing their respective effect on the brethren suggests that a diverse effect is expected. Whereas his wondrous deeds provoke an immediate reaction, the effect of his words seems to be placed in the future. Far from describing their action, Andrew simply entreats the addressees to receive the words in the proper way. It is plausible to think that Andrew here is implying a similar process to the one described by Stratocles in his answer to the apostle²⁸². According to Stratocles, the words must first ‘touch’ (or ‘light up’) the soul of the addressee; then he has to receive them as the ground receives seeds and, finally, only after proper care and attention can they develop and be brought to perfection²⁸³.

Armed with the apostle’s deeds and words, the brethren have now a stable point of reference on which to focus their perception with a view, first, to neutralise the influence of fluctuating phenomena and, second, to overcome sensorial perception as well.

3.4.3. Central Section: An Impending Threat to the Foundation

The central part of the extant speech focuses on the crucial moment that will put the brethren to the test. The whole process of neutralising the effect of phenomena has now been completed. Andrew’s message has reminded the brethren that they originally belonged to the

²⁷⁹ V⁰ 218-229.
²⁸⁰ On our interpretation of this section, see supra Chapter 3, note 103.
²⁸¹ V⁰ 222-229.
²⁸² See supra Chapter 3, pp. 153-54.
higher realm and by means of the words they have had a glimpse of their real rational nature. At the same time, the foundation laid by Andrew by means of deeds and words has provided them with a stable horizon in order to develop insight without resorting to always changing external objects. The last step is now about to take place. The impressive ἐργον of Andrew’s martyrdom is the touchstone that will complete the laborious process of detachment from the senses:

With regard to what is about to happen to me do not let it disturb you as though it were a strange marvel that the servant of God – to whom God Himself allowed so many things through deeds and through words – is driven away from this ephemeral life so violently by a wicked man.

The reference to the ταραχή or ‘disturbance, disorder’ points to the quasi-physical effect that his death might signify for the brethren. This arises from the fact that the primacy of externals still determines their understanding.

3.4.4. Universal Approach: Andrew’s Logos Reorganising Perception

With a view to diminishing the weight of the portentous ἐργον of his own death, Andrew intends to create a stable frame of reference in which to place the events to come. In order to do so he states in the first place the future repetition of the event. His death is not an isolated incident that should be understood exclusively in the narrow current circumstances created by the antagonism with Aegeates. Rather it must be placed in the wider context of the devil’s enterprise to win the assent of those who share a common belief in and love of God:

This will not come upon me only, but also upon all those who loved and believed in Him and confess Him. [For] the completely shameless devil will arm his children against them in order that they may agree with him. But he will not get what he wants.

3.4.4.1. Creating Knowledge

Even though the announcement of the event’s future repetition presents Andrew’s martyrdom as the starting point of a process in progress, it must still be provided with a meaning. Andrew

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283 V’ 169-82 with our commentary supra, this Chapter, § 3.3.5, pp. 211-12.
284 V’ 230-33.
285 The importance of ἀισθήσεως (‘sensory perception’) and φαντασία (‘perceptual appearance’) in the speech to the brethren is once again clear. For the intrinsic relationship between ἀισθήσεως and φαντασία, see Aristotle, De an. 427b 15-17; 428b 11-18. Andrew appeals to the brethren in order that they may not be struck by his crucifixion as if it were a ‘strange marvel’, for the combination of appearance and certain unreflective assent might produce disturbance (ταραχή) in their souls. See the definition of fear in Aristotle, Rhet. 1382a 21-23: ‘Let be fear, then, a certain sort of pain and disturbance (ταραχή) out of the appearance (φαντασία) of an impending bad thing, either destructive or painful’. See, however, Nussbaum, The Therapy, 84-85. Andrew’s explanation of the reasons for this apparent ὑπάρξειν or ‘marvel’ intends to provide a rational belief or δόξα that may substitute their φαντασία or unreflective assent and that may help them to avert disturbance.
286 See supra this Chapter, notes 85, 92 and 93.
287 V’ 233-37.
achieves this by means of a mythical example. This historical excursus has a double goal. On the one hand, it completes the exposition narrating the past history of things that the brethren see happening before their eyes, and whose development reaches the future. Provided with a past, present and future, the events are included in a whole that has a beginning and an end. Andrew’s martyrdom is no longer the result of flux and contingency since it participates in the more stable frame created by the mythical exposition. On the other hand, the parallel in illo tempore annuls time since the comprehensive overview of what is actually taking place simultaneously presents present, past and future and transports the brethren to a higher level of insight.

Unfortunately the first section of this mythical excursus is too corrupt to give us a clear idea of the events that took place when ‘the one without beginning came down to his beginning’. Otherwise it might have given us a clearer idea of the period between the beginning of the world and the recognition of the blessed race by God. Although the text is extremely doubtful, a given antagonism seems to take place between the one without beginning and the enemy. Humankind, or at least those who were not able to know (?), becomes an involuntary ally of the enemy. With a view to dominating them, the devil disguises his enmity with a false friendship.

The continuation of the passage, however, is clear about the control the devil acquires over those who are inherently alien to him. The intelligent use of delights and deceit seem to have kept men under their spell for quite a long time. As a result of this long period of alienation, forgetfulness of the true nature and origin appear. As in the first speech to the brethren, this forgetfulness is described as the neglect of the mutual belonging that is expressed by the conceptual dichotomy ‘to become known-to know’.

To put an end to this situation, the goodness of the merciful one intervenes. When the mystery of the grace was revealed and the plan for repose was manifested, the blessed race rejected the presents through which the devil thought he might control them. This rejection of the devil’s presents by the ‘blessed race’ is in turn the cause of a last movement by the devil in order to regain his former followers by entangling them with hate.

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288 V 238-243.
289 V 239-40.
290 Speculative interpretation of the obscure section V 240-43.
291 V 250-51.
292 V 243-52. See supra this Chapter, § 3.1.2, pp. 193-95.
293 V 257.
enmity and revolts. This is the last test they must overcome.\(^{294}\)

It is in this context that the brethren must place Andrew’s impending martyrdom. They now know both its origins and reasons and that it is neither unexpected nor contingent. Being thus aware that that which is going to happen fits in the plan sketched from the beginning, this incident should not affect them: ‘Consequently, since we know what will happen, brethren, let us stay awake without despairing, without demeaning ourselves and without carrying on our souls his traces, which are alien to us.’\(^{295}\) Letting the events affect them would imply a return to the situation prior to Andrew’s intervention, a situation in which the brethren are simple toys of movement, ephemeral evils and their wrong representation of their untrue environment. Only by accepting what must happen can they neutralise time, phenomena and sensorial perception.

**4. Interrelationship and Complementary Character of the Speeches**

4.1. Differences between the Speeches

The preceding analysis reveals certain thematic differences between the speeches. Whereas the first incomplete speech to the brethren is concerned with general issues such as the recognition of the blessed race by God and the importance of coming to know him, the remaining three speeches present a more particular approach to the individual circumstances of the addressees.

This transition from the general to the particular is also underlined by the various degrees of involvement of the apostle in the different speeches. The general treatment of the first discourse, for example, neither refers to Andrew’s role in God’s recognition of his people nor to his task in helping the people to come to know God. By contrast, the speeches to Maximilla, to Stratocles and the second speech to the brethren ascribe to the apostle a very precise function in the development experienced by the addressees.\(^{296}\)

The same can be said of the vocabulary of the speeches, which also presents clear differences. In the first speech to the brethren it mainly focuses on defining knowledge and on distinguishing its different aspects, its subject matter, its conditions and its goals. In The speech to Maximilla, however, it mainly deals with wrong and right choice – that is, with error and correction. As it also describes the reason for error, the vocabulary also deals with

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\(^{294}\) Vr 252-58.

\(^{295}\) Vr 266-68.

\(^{296}\) See *supra* this Chapter, § 2.2.4, pp. 173-75.
persuasion and judgement. The vocabulary of Stratocles’ speech, in turn, covers the field of affections and distinguishes between immoderate and moderate emotional responses. In the second speech to the brethren, finally, the vocabulary mainly deals with externals, the individual’s apprehension of reality and the mind’s synthesis of the information received from outside.

But the most obvious difference is the thematic divergence of the different discourses. By leaving the first, incomplete speech to the brethren aside for the moment and focussing on Andrew’s other three discourses, it is possible to distinguish three clearly different thematic units. From the point of view of content, it seems clear that the speech to Maximilla is mainly concerned with the sphere of the intellect. Consequently, this speech focuses on rationality in order to distinguish between two varieties, an inferior or immanent one influenced by persuasion and judgement and thus engaged in discursive knowledge, and a superior one which transcends discursivity and strives for contemplation.

By contrast, Stratocles’ speech exclusively moves in the realm of the soul. Accordingly, it deals with affections and analyses their origin, seat and influence on the soul. The approach to emotional responses shows a differentiation between negative and positive affections. Whereas the former present an immoderate character, the latter are moderate and well-balanced expressions that result from the rational mastery of affections.

In its turn, the second speech to the brethren is concerned with the sphere of the body. Thus, it dedicates a good deal of attention to sense perception and to the externals apprehended by it. Distortion appears when, due to the lack of a conscious awareness of the external flux, the mind gives its unreflective assent and accepts perceptions as reliable. Representations derived from ever-changing externals will necessarily be inaccurate and hence false.

4.2. Similarities between the Speeches
Despite these clear differences, the speeches present obvious similarities as well. As all speeches have the same underlying motivation – that is, the doubts, fear or insecurity of the addressee – they also pursue one and the same comforting and exhortative goal297. Andrew naturally begins the speeches by considering the particular situation of the addressees and evaluates the apparent causes behind their dismay. When doing so, he always applies the same working procedure: first, he analyses the particular circumstances in order to proceed, next, to

297 See supra this Chapter, § 2.3.2.2, pp. 179-80.
transposing them to a more general or universal frame\textsuperscript{298}. By this procedure our text reframes the matter in order to show that what from one particular perspective may appear to be causes are, from a general perspective, merely the effects of another previous and hidden cause, of which the addressees are not aware before Andrew’s explanation. In all three speeches this first and hidden cause is equated with ignorance.

Andrew’s approach to the problem from both a particular and a general perspective allows the addressees to connect the effects with their causes and to reconstruct the intermediary steps in this chain of causality. The knowledge generated by Andrew’s words provides the addressees with the means to fully understand their current situation and to glimpse its possible improvement. It is this contrast between an initial ignorance and a final knowledge that permits a double approach, negative and positive, to the particular theme of each speech. Even though the body and the senses, the soul and the affections and the intellect and reason when governed by ignorance represent the three spheres of man’s captivity, they can also, under the guide of knowledge and understanding, be the starting point for his liberation.

Consequently, each speech confronts a negative with a positive side of the theme discussed. The speech to Maximilla first opposes ignorance to knowledge, but also judgement to understanding and immanent \textit{logos} (persuasion) to transcendent \textit{logos}. The speech to Stratocles, in its turn, contrasts excessive with moderate affections, irrationality with rationality and lack of balance of the soul with inner equilibrium. The second speech to the brethren, finally, poses the realm of movement against that of stability, material nature against a true, transcendent nature and sensorial perception and mental representation against introversion and self-knowledge.

4.3. Interrelationship and Coherence of the Speeches

The most obvious conclusion from the preceding analysis is that the thematic differences between the speeches arise from an intentional distribution of subject matter. The thematic distribution intellect/ \textit{logos}, soul/ affections and body/ \textit{psyche} shows that on the basis of a

\textsuperscript{298} Thus, for instance, Maximilla’s speech begins by referring to Aegeates’ persuasion, but immediately moves to a more comprehensive analysis of the situation. From the latter perspective persuasion appears to be accompanied by judgement and they are both considered as concomitant effects of an original ignorance. See \textit{supra} this Chapter, § 3.2.3, 199-200. Stratocles’ speech begins by referring to his particular excessive affections but quickly proceeds to placing them within the wider frame of the soul’s structure and to explaining them on the basis of the soul’s intrinsic characteristics (see \textit{supra} this Chapter, § 3.3.3, pp. 208-09). Likewise, the last speech to the brethren starts by stating the falsity of the world the brethren live in, but continues by transposing the argumentation from the particular to the general. Their being lost in fluent physical reality is explained on the
tripartite conception of man, AA intended to offer a thorough and exhaustive analysis of the current state of humankind. As all three human constitutive spheres are partly responsible for the falsification of man’s true nature, each speech evaluates both the impending threats that may proceed from one of them and the proper way to counteract them.

This is the reason why AA, in spite of despising man’s material existence, does not purport a radical rejection of these three constituent spheres of his immanent being. It is not externals, affections, and persuasion that keep man attached to the material world, but rather his ignorance concerning the characteristics and functioning of his body, his soul and his intellect. The knowledge generated by the words and by the addressee’s conscious and active scrutiny of these spheres provides him with the means to overcome his captivity, without demanding from him a radical and artificial negation of either his environment or of his cognitive resources. As ignorance is responsible for the perpetuation of man’s stay in an alien environment, knowledge allows a natural liberation from the fetters of his immanent existence in all three spheres.

The question arises, however, as to how this thematic distribution of the speeches is dealt with in our text. The fragmentary character of our source does not provide us with a clue to place this threefold analysis of human existence in a clear conceptual framework. Obviously, the visible thematic complementarity of the speeches seems to imply a relationship between them, but how should we interpret this relationship? At least two possibilities might be taken into consideration. On the one hand, this threefold analysis of man’s reality may rely on a threefold typological classification of mankind and, consequently, on a threefold differentiation of the major impending dangers to man’s true nature. Those akin to the body and to externals might betray their genuine nature due to their dependence on sensorial perception. Those akin to their soul, in turn, can expect distortion from the predominance of irrational tendencies in their souls. Those akin to the intellect, finally, may easily falsify their true being due to the influence of persuasion and judgement.

Accordingly, all three speeches might deal with the danger peculiar to each of these groups in order to provide a fitting antidote for each nature. This obviously implies that the same goal, i.e. the recovery of the true nature, might be equally and indifferently attained by any of these ways, depending on the different characteristics of each human type. This interpretation, however, seems to be disproved by the fact that AA actually distinguishes

basis of the soul’s wandering in the material realm. See supra this Chapter, § 3.4.4, pp. 219-221.
between two basic human sorts or ‘races’, those akin to the body and those akin to the words, without making any further differentiation within the latter group. Let us now consider the second possibility.

These three spheres might also be understood as parts of a whole, as referring to different aspects of one and the same human being. From this perspective, body, soul and intellect should be considered as three levels of existence or awareness that follow each other according to their implicit hierarchical sequence. All three speeches might then deal with successive steps in the gradual process through which an individual controls and neutralises the dangers to his true nature proceeding from all three spheres. Consequently, the speeches to the brethren, to Stratoecles and to Maximilla might symbolise the individual’s progressive steps in his quest for personal liberation from the constrictions of materiality.

4.3.1. The Spheres of \textit{Φύσις}, \textit{Δεινοί}, and \textit{Δοξοί} as Domains of Practical Virtue

At first sight, the thematic distribution of the speeches according to the domains of nature, soul and reason seems to reflect the tripartite division of philosophy into physics, ethics and logic which, though sometimes ascribed to the Stoa\textsuperscript{299}, was already implied by Plato and made explicit by Xenocrates\textsuperscript{300}. In addition, the structure of the speeches, which present both the threats to man’s life in each of these spheres and the means to counteract them, might seem to suggest that the scope of this comprehensive approach was as practical as the goal of philosophy according to Xenocrates, namely eliminating disturbance from man’s life by acting on its three possible origins: his nature, his habit or his reason\textsuperscript{301}.

Within the clear dualistic framework of \textit{AA}, however, which opposes an inferior immanent nature to a transcendent and higher level of being, the threefold analysis of man’s current state is clearly not directed at assisting him to achieve a happiness according to human standards. Rather, it intends to provide man with the means to overcome his human condition in its three constituent spheres. Hence philosophy, instead of being an end in itself as the best way to give man a happy life despite the handicaps of his current situation, becomes a lesser but necessary preparation in order to transcend this condition altogether and achieve a higher level of existence\textsuperscript{302}.

\textsuperscript{299} See Diogenes Laertius 7.39.
\textsuperscript{300} See Sextus Empiricus, \textit{Adv. math.} 7.16; Varro \textit{ap.} Cicero, \textit{Acad. Post.} 5.19.
\textsuperscript{301} See Pseudo-Galen, \textit{Hist. phil.} 8.7, aitlā defi o ofi aj eure swDe sti kata\textit{CenokrahtotaraxwDej en}
tbi ka ta pasaitw pragmatwn.
\textsuperscript{302} This conception of philosophy as a kind of preparatory study or exercise that gives access to a new and non-discursive act of apprehension is quite widespread in the imperial age. Thus for example the comparison of
This is the reason explaining the apparent contradiction of AA’s message. Even though repeatedly encouraging people to withdraw from externals and physical life and to pursue man’s highest and ultimate goal, namely the contemplation of divinity, AA actually mainly concentrates on describing man’s present condition and on establishing correct behavioural patterns for people to cope with it. Far from being contradictory, however, the paramount importance ascribed to right choice and behaviour within the realm of change is strictly coherent with AA’s conception of rationality as the most divine element in man. As rationality seems to be subject to the slumber of ‘oblivion’, it must not only be awakened but also strengthened. The awakening proceeds naturally from Andrew’s words, but the invigoration of rationality results from its continuous exercise in dealing with reality. Human virtue arises from man’s right choice and action guided by reason in any of the three spheres of existence.

It is precisely in the context of ethics and virtue the thematic distribution of the speeches must be placed. Hence, the spheres of the body, soul and intellect in AA should not be explained as reflecting the division of philosophy into physics, ethics and logic, but rather as the possible domains of human action in which virtue may appear. AA, however, does not consider these three domains as alternative ways of achieving virtue. In accordance with the thought of the historical period on the issue, our text conceives the three spheres as complementary.

Probably reacting to the Platonic Meno that seems to consider nature, habit and reason as alternative ways in the quest for virtue, Aristotle had already stated that although virtue

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303 Vr 83-101 and 205-11.
304 Thus, for example, Andrew encourages the brethren to change their attitude in Vr 1-3 and indicates to them the right way to behave in order to cope with their condition in Vr 17-19. Something similar happens in Andrew’s speech to Maximilla, which alternates between encouraging ethical advice (Vr 58-70, 106-24) and long descriptions of Maximilla’s situation. See Vr 139-143 for a similar procedure in the speech to Stratocles. As for the speech to the brethren, see Vr 209-17, 218-36, 266-271.
305 Andrew is appealing to an active awareness in his addressees in Vr 4-17: note the emphasis placed on rational understanding in Vr 4 (eiαwmen eutoiç, 14 (ēgnwrišanen), 16 (ērataiçen), 17 (−esioiçen). Similarly in Vr 73-82 (αιμονεw /gnwriçtw metañeow, epístrefw, diáçtw, katonqow, ebanqow, akouj w / paraqouw) and in Vr 85-89 (katamqow, noew, aqouw, gnwriçtw). See 142-46 (gnwriçtw, diatíqหมnanqow, diaqow, diaqow, dianqow, dianoqow, meroj). For rationality as the most divine element in man, see, for instance, Vr 85-96 and 130-32. See also infra Chapter 5, § 3.2.1.2, pp. 285-91.
306 According to Aetius (Plac. I, proem. 2), it is precisely a tripartite conception of virtue (φυσική/ἱστοχή/λογική) that is the origin of the division of philosophy into the familiar threefold division.
307 Plato, Men. 70a 1ff. Εξειξ μεν ειβεθες ωδε γρατειγα, αναι δακτονοθα μαθητες, αλλα αμακτον, houle aunikton oule macthon, allai αυει παραγγελαι τοια ακρωποίη ἡμᾶς τινι τρόποιν see also 99e;
proceeds from a combination of the three aspects, habit seems to be its main factor. The tendency to consider virtue as arising from a combination of natural and cultural aspects is quite extensive in the Imperial age. Philo adopts the same position in general. In *On Abraham*, for example, he states that no instruction may be completed without natural endowment and exercise; no natural endowment is complete without learning and exercise, and there is no real exercise without natural endowment and learning. Similarly, Pseudo-Plutarch *de liberis educandis* states that the highest degree of virtue, as in other arts and sciences, is attained by means of combining *fudij*, *akhsij* and *matshij*. The lack of any of these stages may frustrate its perfect result.

The need to combine the three aspects is once again stressed by means of the agricultural simile, which in this testimony presents a more precise description. Noteworthy is that in *AA* Stratocles describes his...
A similar conception of the quest for virtue as gradual process of development is also attributed to the Pythagorean Archytas by Stobaeus. As in the preceding example, the domains of $\text{f}_\text{u}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$, $\text{a}_\text{j}_\text{k}_\text{h}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$ and $\text{e}_\text{j}_\text{h}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$ represent the three stages by means of which knowledge is achieved. A closer parallel to $\text{A}_\text{A}$, however, appears in Maximus of Tyre. After mentioning in the same sequence the three spheres of virtue, the philosopher refers, like Andrew, to the sphere of $\text{f}_\text{u}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$ as the foundation on which virtue must be built.

$\text{A}_\text{A}$ significantly does not hesitate in the sequence of the factors. In accordance with the testimonies of Pseudo-Plutarch and Archytas, $\text{A}_\text{A}$ presents the sequence $\text{f}_\text{u}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$, $\text{e}_\text{h}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$, $\text{L}_\text{o}_\text{g}_\text{o}_\text{j}$ in the same order as preserved by Arius Didymus in his epitome of Peripatetic philosophy.

4.3.2. The Speeches as a Deconstructive Process of the Human Degraded Condition

The speeches to Maximilla, Stratocles and the brethren present, in inverse order, a gradual development of man’s virtue that begins with his nature and ends with his reason. This process is not a goal in itself but rather the means by which the addressee comes to know what is his and what is not, in order to attain in the last stage the complete and intuitive apprehension he strives for by nature. Given his current condition and the nature of his cognitive means, the preparatory knowledge about earthly matters is a necessary precondition to attain a higher perception of divine order. The parallelism with the process by which the likeness to God is attained in Alcinous is obvious, since a suitable nature, the proper habits, and reason are for him, too, the preconditions for the $\text{o}_\text{r}_\text{m}_\text{i}_\text{v}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$.

$\text{A}_\text{A}$’s threefold analysis of man’s current condition as well as the three stages in his quest for liberation from the fetters of materiality rely, as stated above, on the general

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314 The parallelism with $\text{A}_\text{A}$ is obvious. Our text not only presents the threefold conception of virtue, but considers the sphere of habit and ethics as the working of the ground before it receives the seeds of the words. See supra this Chapter, § 3.3.5, at p. 212-13.

315 Stobaeus, 2.31.120.1W: Fil osio i n fanta i of ecin elementwahalanbanhen hsi nek en au ta on en et h et #= praktik # kattah ef esintaj sof i aj di' au ta on tau taj d’ ai x a b men tan fu sin pro e de hen, me a de tah a jkhsin terma d e taba ejihsi n fem e n.

316 Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 1.5; 12.9; 27.9.

317 Differently, the sequence of the elements of the triad seems to have been subject to variation in the Stoa. According to Diogenes Laertius 7.40 the sequence is logic, physics, ethics. According to Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. 7.22), however, it is logic, ethics, physics. Cf. also SVF II 42 (Chrysippus). This variation in the Stoa may underlie Philo’s hesitation on the issue, for his sequence, though always beginning with $\text{f}_\text{u}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$, alternates the positions of $\text{a}_\text{j}_\text{k}_\text{h}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$ and $\text{m}_\text{a}_\text{t}_\text{h}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$.

318 Supra this Chapter, note 307.

319 For the reason explaining this inverse exposition of the sequence, see infra this Chapter, § 4.4, pp. 230-33.

320 Alcinous, Didask. 182.3ff. Cf. Aspasius, In EN 99.4-5 Heybut, for a comparison of virtue with the $\text{o}_\text{r}_\text{m}_\text{i}_\text{v}_\text{s}_\text{i}_\text{j}$.
tripartite conception of man as comprising a material body, a soul, and an intellect. This interest in describing the diverse aspects that contribute to man’s captivity is essentially directed at showing a method to reverse this situation.

As we suggested, liberation takes place by awakening and strengthening rationality, which is conceived as the most, or rather the only, divine element in man. The gradual process of acquiring virtue is essential because the realms of \( \text{fu}\$ij \), \( \text{ha}\$ej \) and \( \text{l} \, \text{o}\$o\$j \) are conceived as the domains of practical virtue or \( \text{fro}\$ch\$s\$ij \). The continuous exercise of virtue, conceived as the right action of a good man guided by reason, results in the mastery of rationality by means of which man always makes the right choice. The mastery of rationality originates, in its turn, a rather mechanical reversal of the (also mechanical) stages of degradation experienced by the intellect. In the same way that ignorance set in motion the chain of causality that brought down the intellect to the level of phenomena, knowledge can reverse this process and allow a progressive deconstruction of the successive stages of degradation. In this sense, man’s life under the leadership of reason actualised by knowledge seems to be considered as a deconstructive process, the ultimate goal of which is the restitution to the intellect of its pristine condition beyond the fetters of immanence. Consequently, the sequence \( \text{fu}\$ij \), \( \text{ha}\$ej \, \text{el} \, \text{o}\$o\$j \) present in inverse order the stages of degradation experienced by the intellect, which beginning with \( \text{l} \, \text{o}\$o\$j \) continued with \( \text{ha}\$ej \, \text{el} \, \text{o}\$o\$j \) and ended with \( \text{fu}\$ij \).

Two key sections in \( \text{AA} \) confirm the previous interpretation. The first is the incomplete first speech to the brethren, which, as analysed above, states that God’s recognition of his people establishes the co-ordinates of a cognitive process that will culminate in the people’s knowledge of God. As a result of the principle of ‘like knows like’, this recognition implies an existential promotion of the blessed race. The contrast between a true and a false nature, which functions as a \textit{principium contradictionis}, awakes reason. This awakening of rationality

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321 See \textit{supra} this Chapter, note 304.
322 Unlike Plato, for whom \( \text{fro}\$ch\$s\$ij \) includes both theoretical (\textit{Phdl.} 79d 6-7) and practical virtue (\textit{Symp.} 209a 5-7), Aristotle confines \( \text{fro}\$ch\$s\$ij \) to practical virtue. Theoretical knowledge is \( \text{so}\$fi\$a \) (\textit{EN} 1141b 2; cf. \textit{Metaph.} 981a 27-9) or \( \text{epi}\$st\$hm \) (\textit{EN} 1141a 5-7). This Aristotelian differentiation is also followed by Plutarch (\textit{De virt. mor.} 443d), Philo (\textit{Praem.} 81) and partly by Apuleius (\textit{De Plat.} 2.228). As Arius Didymus (ap. Stobaeus 2.145.19ff) reports, the differentiation between \( \text{so}\$fi\$a \) and \( \text{fro}\$ch\$s\$ij \) was current in the Peripatetic school. Alcinous, on the other hand, sticks to Plato’s conception (\textit{Didask.} 153.2ff, on which Dillon, \textit{Alcinous}, 55) and so does Clement of Alexandria (\textit{Strom.} 6.154.4; see also 1.178.1 and 2.24.1). On the issue Witt, \textit{Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism} (Cambridge, 1934) 42; S.R.C. Lilla, \textit{Clement of Alexandria. A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism} (Oxford, 1971) 73ff.

323 See \textit{V} “2-24, on which \textit{supra} this Chapter, § 3.1, pp. 191-95.
324 On the issue, \textit{supra} this Chapter, note 157.
now allows them to reach the knowledge of God dialectically. As they are now provided with a beginning and a goal, with the means and with a method, nothing hinders the perfect completion of this cognitive process that will finally liberate them from the physical world.

The second passage is the central section of The speech to Maximilla, namely the praise of transcendent man. Before proceeding to the categorical praise, Andrew summarises the three deconstructive stages that Maximilla, as a prototype of the perfect individual, will have achieved if she completes the last step of her development:

Well done you, saved nature, since you were not strong and you did not keep yourself hidden! Well done you, soul, shouting out which you suffered and returning to yourself! Well done Anthropos who understands what is not yours and hastens towards what is yours! Well done [you] who listens to what is said! For I see you [now] thinking much greater things than what is said; for I am aware that you are much stronger than what seems to oppress you; for [I see that] you excel above what brought you down into deformities and above what led you to captivity.

The spheres of nature, soul, and reason are not only explicitly referred to as domains of man’s captivity but are also presented as steps in a gradual process of liberation that culminates in the release from all the burdens that hampered the anthropos or transcendent man during his captivity in the material world.

4.4. Disposition of the Speeches

If this interpretation is correct, the question arises as to why these stages appear in an illogically inverse order. If the writer intended to depict the successive stages in a process of gradual development, why not simply begin with the lower level of \( \text{IXVL} \) in order to end with \( \text{ORJRM} \)? Two main reasons, literary and conceptual, account for the inverse sequence of the speeches.

4.4.1. Literary Perspective

From a literary perspective, the current sequence is perfectly coherent within the narrative framework. In order to understand the succession of the speeches, it must be kept in mind that a writer necessarily organises his material in the most effective way for the development of his plot. In spite of Andrew’s imprisonment, his life is not in danger until Aegeates’ speech to his wife takes place. The proconsul’s words to his wife are the real turning point of the plot, because the choice he offers Maximilla will determine the development of events in one or the other direction. It is obvious, consequently, that Andrew’s discourse to Maximilla had to

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325 Supra this Chapter, § 3.1.2, pp. 193-95.
326 See V' 83-101, on which supra this Chapter, § 3.2.5, pp. 203-04.
327 V' 84-90. See infra Chapter 5, § 5.2.2, pp. 328-30.
follow Aegeates’ speech because it encourages Maximilla to give the negative answer that will initiate the further sequence of events. As she represents the highest achievements within the material realm, in this speech the argumentation moves up from the highest levels of immanence to the highest of transcendence.

Maximilla’s negative answer, however, implies that the countdown to Andrew’s martyrdom has already begun. In order to avoid rough changes, the narration must, consequently, gradually modify the tone reached in this speech. Stratocles’ discourse already tones down the level slightly in order to return, in the last speech to the brethren, to the ground level of reality in which the martyrdom will take place.

In addition, the speeches play a pivotal role in the narrative sequence of the story. Although it is difficult to ascertain the character of previous sections of AA, it seems clear that since Andrew’s arrival in Patras, the story presented an ascending degree of tension initiated by Andrew’s activities in the familiar environment of the proconsul. After narrating Andrew’s first encounter with Maximilla and Stratocles, AA probably described the spiritual instruction of the latter and their progressive withdrawal from proconsul, husband and brother, respectively. All these events lead to Andrew’s imprisonment and his impending and inevitable martyrdom, and it is at this point that the text reaches its maximum tension. In this conjuncture the speeches play a central role because they function as a transition between the ascending line of Andrew’s successful activities as a messenger of the transcendent realm and his death at the hands of the personification of evil. The speech to Maximilla takes the narrative line to its highest point but already reduces the tone, in its last part, in order to allow a smooth transition to Stratocles’ speech, which, in its turn, presents a lesser level that may suitably connect it with the last speech. The discourse to the brethren receives this descending line and properly connects it with the last part of AA.

The transitional character of the speeches is also clear from the point of view of the content. As the discourses provide both addressees and readers with the means to transform the apparently negative death of the apostle into something positive and even desirable, they open the way for a new interpretation of the apostle’s martyrdom. By means of this interesting transevaluation, what from a standard point of view would be an anticlimax is transformed into the apex of his apostolic activities. From this perspective, then, the speeches create the possibility of transforming the descending line of his death into a prolongation of the ascending line of the previous part of the text that leads to his final and complete apotheosis.
4.4.2. Conceptual Perspective

The apparently inverse sequence of the speeches can be also explained from a conceptual perspective. As stated above, the liberation pursued by AA is conceived of as a process of the deconstruction of the current human condition, which step by step intends to release the intellect from the burdens it has acquired during a previous process of devolution. Liberation from immanence is consequently conceived of as a return to a pristine situation before this degradation took place. As we will see in the following section, this process of deconstruction fulfils in inverse direction the steps of devolution that, beginning with the appearance of judgement and persuasion at the level of intellect, continued at the level of soul with the development of affections as a result of ignorance, and ended with the wandering of the soul in the material world.

These processes of devolution and restoration are not, however, systematically presented. As already pointed out, our text has no systematic intentions and adapts its message to the narration. As a result of this complete intertwining, each speech associates its addressee to one of the three levels of being. In dealing with the problems of different individuals, each discourse depicts a factual stage of degradation and a potential restoration of the state previous to it. Consequently, the speech to Maximilla represents both the first step of degradation and the last of reversion; the discourse to Stratocles represents, simultaneously, the middle stage of degradation and of reversion; the brethren’s speech, finally, describes the last stage of degradation and the preliminary steps to the reversion. As the speeches comprise movement in both directions, it seems obvious that the disposition could not be otherwise than as it is. The need for regression is a result of degradation, therefore its first stage must occupy the first position.

328 See supra this Chapter, § 2.3.3, p. 181.
5. Recapitulation: Meaning and Intention of AA's Fragment in V

It is now time to attempt a comprehensive exposition of AA’s message. On the basis of AA’s fragment, a plausible conclusion is that our text intended to transmit a clear dualistic conception of reality and to explain how the blessed race, even if originally belonging to the transcendent realm, appears to be imprisoned in the immanent one.

5.1. A Process of Devolution

In order to bridge the enormous gulf between transcendence as origin and immanence as dwelling place of the blessed race, AA describes man’s present state as a result of a process of degradation. A careful analysis of its account allows the reader to distinguish not only the causes of the devolution, but also its stages and, naturally, its consequences.

5.1.1. Causes of the Degradation: Intellect’s dispersal, Discursive Knowledge, Ignorance and Error

In dealing with man’s devolution and its causes, AA significantly omits any reference to sin or culpability by the first couple. Rather, Eve and Adam appear to be victims of an inevitable and mechanical process of devolution.

Although the first cause initiating the process of decay is not mentioned in our text, the dispersal and the alienation of the intellect – either conceived of as concomitant effects of the same cause or as presenting themselves in a relationship of causality – work as factual causes of its suffering. It seems clear that as soon as the intellect loses its unitary character, its acts of knowing can no longer revert upon itself, since the intellect’s dispersion implies a discrepancy between subject and object in the act of knowing. The first consequence of this discrepancy is the intellect’s alienation from itself, since for the first time the intellect no longer knows itself. It is thus plausible to think that what initiated the degradation of the was the incorrect direction of its intellective activity. An interruption (of necessity related to creation?) in the intellect’s incessant activity of thinking itself – i.e. the intelligible or God - might have caused a first discrepancy between subject and object in the act of knowing.

This dispersal implies not only being immediately removed from its natural environment in transcendence, but also the loss of the intellect’s intrinsic characteristics. As a result of the discrepancy between subject and object and the concomitant appearance of

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330 See infra Chapter 5, § 3.2.1.3, pp. 291-96.
ignorance, a new sort of knowledge comes into being: discursive knowledge. This possibility is coherent with the reasons given for the degradation of Eve and Adam, namely ignorance and error. The deficiency of the \( \text{nous} \) and its subsequent intermittent thinking combined with Eve and Adam’s unawareness of this deficiency, might have led them to try to supersede their ignorance by their own means\(^{331}\).

5.1.2. Stages of Devolution: Intellect, Soul, Physis

This interruption in the intellect’s incessant activity initiates three causally related steps in a gradual withdrawal of the ‘intellect’ from its original, complete and unitary knowledge. The first is indeed the transition from intuitive to discursive apprehension due to the discrepancy between subject and object (and this also implies the appearance of number)\(^{332}\). As soon as the act of knowing does not revert upon itself, ignorance appears. It is this ignorance that is responsible for the second stage of degradation from \( \text{nous} \) to soul or \( \upsilon \alpha\tau\eta\nu\iota \) since it initiates the appearance of doubt and fear, i.e. affections\(^{333}\). Desire to achieve knowledge in order to overcome ignorance impels the soul to undertake the cognitive process. Paradoxically, however, this search for knowledge will only enhance its disgrace. Since \( \alpha\varphi\iota\tau\iota\iota \) or ‘discursive knowledge’ is intrinsically related to reason and speech, its application to gain knowledge will relinquish soul and intellect to the slumber of appearances and persuasion\(^{334}\). As was only to be expected, the original ignorance remains unaltered and characterises each of these stages of degradation.

5.1.3. Consequences of the Devolution: Oblivion, Captivity, Flux, Illusions

Whereas the original intuitive knowledge of the intellect apprehends all things at once in one single act of apprehension, discursive knowledge takes one thing at the time, implies chronological sequence and comprises many acts of perception. Instead of unity, omniscience and a-temporality, multiplicity, ignorance and time appear. The alienation is consummated and, given the characteristics of its new cognitive means, the chances for human intellect to recover its pristine situation are rather exiguous.

This is the reason why the intellect from now on is not only imprisoned in an alien

\(^{331}\) See supra Chapter 3, note 58. See V 73-82 and infra chapter 5, § 3.2.1.3 for the difference between AA’s version of this devolution and most of the possibilities collected by Iamblichus. For parallels to AA’s view of this devolution see infra chapter 5, § 3.2.1.3.1, pp. 292-96.

\(^{332}\) For the \( \text{nous}=\text{\( \epsilon\beta\varphi\iota\upsilon\alpha\nu\eta\iota \)} \) see H. Dörrie, ‘Zum Ursprung der neuplatonischen Hypostasenlehre’, Platonica Minora, 286-296.

\(^{333}\) For a similar process in the origin of affections see GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 17.10-15 and infra Chapter 5, § 3.2.1.3.2, pp. 295-96.

\(^{334}\) V 211-14.
environment but also unaware of its situation. As it is now forced to cope with externals, its apprehension is no longer a matter of an instant but depends both on sensorial perception and on representation\(^{335}\). The ever-changing character of externals implies a continuous restructuring of the cognitive frame and this, in its turn, a precarious and unstable knowledge of things that excludes the possibility of achieving a trustful conception of reality\(^{336}\). This situation is aggravated, moreover, by the exposure to affections and the interference of judgement. The combination of these factors is responsible for the intellect’s stay in materiality, for a wrong perception and representation of things causes a wrong judgement and this wrong judgement will inevitably impel man to strive for what he supposes to be good instead of for what really is good. The pleasure achieved by the fulfilment of desires is the last link in the chain. From now on the vicious circle is complete: man is not only captive in materiality, he will never come to realise this on his own.

5.2. Inversion of the Process: \(\text{epistrophe}\) or ‘Reversion’

All, however, is not lost. A reversion of the state of things is possible if man is receptive to the words transmitted by Andrew. True, the words are only the beginning of a process in which the individuals must actively engage. They are nevertheless essential because they provide a clear and distinct point of reference for people to turn to\(^{337}\).

5.2.1. Preconditions of the \(\text{epistrophe}\)/

5.2.1.1. God as \textit{causa efficiens}

Given its current condition, human intellect can only be awakened from the slumber of oblivion by being acted upon\(^{338}\). There can be no doubt that God’s active involvement in the destiny of the blessed race is the real turning point that allows the reversion of the state of things. Our text repeatedly refers to God’s intervention as a precondition for the deconstructive process in which the blessed race will engage\(^{339}\). The first speech to the brethren states both God’s supreme goodness (\textit{xhristotohta}) and his ‘unenvious sharing’ of his

\(^{335}\) That men cannot think without images was already stated by Aristotle, see \textit{Metaph.} 1029b 3ff and \textit{APO} 71b 33-72a 6; \textit{Phys.} 184a 15ff. See also Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Diss.} 11.7. Furthermore, Festugière, \textit{La Révélation} IV, 111.

\(^{336}\) \textit{V}^\textit{b} 209-14, on which see \textit{supra} this Chapter, § 3.4.2.1, pp. 216-17.

\(^{337}\) See \textit{supra} this Chapter, § 3.1.2, pp. 193-96.

\(^{338}\) As a matter of fact, Andrew’s activities mainly consist of awakening the awareness of his followers. Thus in the first speech to the brethren (\textit{V}^\textit{b} 1-5), in the speech to Maximilla (\textit{passim}, but notably in \textit{V}^\textit{b} 63 (\textit{epinarturw=Macinilla}), 73-83, 83 (\textit{epwvnoatautaeijpwhweijpnon,eijponoiai,}, 102 (\textit{taute ejpnon}), 130 (\textit{deamiai sou}), 131 (\textit{deamiai sou}), in the speech to Stratocles (\textit{V}^\textit{b} 140-62, 143-46), in the second speech to the brethren (\textit{V}^\textit{b} 207, 209-10, \textit{utama parekai es eksthmai}, ktl.; 218, \textit{ehtef lomai}, see the imperatives in 218, 221, 226, 230 and subjunctives in 267 and 270).
goodness with his people. By recognising them, God actualises the awareness of their origin and belonging that they seem to have forgotten. This recognition seems to have immediate and direct effect on the people. As likeness is the condition for cognition, being recognised implies a relationship of belonging between the one who knows and those who are known. Hence, the blessed race understands that it neither belongs to those cast to the ground, nor to time, movement or generation. The first part of the second speech to the brethren also refers to a plan sketched in advance in order to reveal to the listeners of the words their real nature. The second part of the same speech, in its turn, mentions the mystery of the grace and the light of that, thanks to the goodness of the merciful one, allows people to realise the deceptiveness of externals.

5.2.1.2. Awareness of Kinship

Yet God’s recognition is not enough to grant the inversion of the process of the state of things. It certainly provides the people with an external point of reference that liberates them from the vicious circle of their degraded condition, but in the next movement they must become aware of their deficiencies and of the possibility of superseding them. A key section of Andrew’s speech to Maximilla does indeed relate this becoming aware of the own incompleteness and imperfection to the previous recognition of kinship with the transcendent realm. Maximilla knowing herself as destined for transcendence allows her both to realise her deficiency and take the first step towards its correction. It is only after perceiving oneself as the effect of a cause and after inferring one’s potential identity with it that these shortcomings become evident. One’s lack of the perfection of the first cause and awareness of this generates the ‘will’ or to attain one’s original perfection. This is at the level of the individual, the real starting point of his or reversion to the first principle.

5.2.1.3. God as causae finalis

God, consequently, is simultaneously causae efficiens and causae finalis. As causae efficiens he
awakens human intellect and supplies it with certainty regarding its origin and belonging. As *causa finalis* he functions as *dóktos* or ‘desirable’, attracting the blessed race as the object of desire. The first principle is simultaneously the *arche* (‘beginning, cause’) and *telos* (‘goal’) of their existence. By retracing upwards the intermediary steps between cause and effect, the blessed race can recover the value lost in its devolution from the highest to the lowest stages of reality.

5.2.2. Stages of the epistémon

The process of deconstruction obviously follows in inverse direction the same stages of devolution. What came into existence by means of devolution from the first principle recovers now its original value by means of reversion.

5.2.2.1. Reorganising Perception

As we have already seen, the body and tangible reality are the lowest abode of the fallen intellect. In order to facilitate a liberation of the constrictions of materiality, a first step consists of the reorganisation of perception. The second speech to the brethren deals with this reorganisation in depth. Andrew’s intervention accomplishes a first and essential goal: he breaks the spell of externals and the passive and unreflective assent of the *phantasia*. Andrew’s words confront the transcendent with the immanent realms in order to denounce the futility of the latter due to its continuous movement and decay. If the brethren cannot see that they are wasting their time with temporal evils this is just the result of the wandering of the ignorant soul. Urged to cope with externals, the soul depends now on the body, on its sensorial perception and on *phantasia*. As Andrew’s words reveal to them their own (real) nature, they can now suspend the continuous apprehension of externals to focus on the relatively steady character of their own nature. This first introversion will prepare the way for the following steps that provide increasing awareness of the different aspects of their true being.

5.2.2.2. Reorganising Affections

Since the second stage of degradation is responsible for the appearance of emotions, Andrew’s scope in the second stage of reversion is to restore the predominance of rationality

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348 See *supra* this Chapter, § 5.2.1.1, pp. 235-36 and note 337.
349 See V. 99-101 and *infra* Chapter 5, § 5.4, pp. 338-39.
350 V. 205-71, on which *supra* this Chapter, § 3.4, pp. 213-14.
351 V. 206-12, with our commentary *supra* this Chapter, § 3.4.2.2, pp. 217-18.
352 V. 215-17.
within the soul. This step is essential, for a revitalisation of irrationality can endanger the previous stage of controlling perception. The introversion achieved in the previous step intended to reinforce rationality by interrupting the continual flow of information proceeding from sensorial perception. This introversion must now be developed in order to achieve a stable and complete mastery of rationality within the soul. The revitalisation of rationality results from the rational part’s commitment to controlling the development of affections\(^{354}\). By repressing immoderate emotional responses by means of reason and by substituting them with moderate and rational expressions of filial love, rationality succeeds in retaking control over the soul\(^{355}\).

5.2.2.3. Reorganising Rationality

If the two previous steps have been successful, the third has to accomplish a profound reorganisation of rationality. Thus far, Andrew’s goal has mainly been directed towards neutralising the negative influence proceeding from the senses and from excessive affections. Once these two sources of distortion have been properly cut off, the apostle must concentrate on the wrong ideas proceeding from the own judgement. Used to thinking improperly due to the influence of externals and emotions, rationality still preserves the imprint of both spheres even if it has already been detached from them. Judgement (\(\text{do\c{c}a}\)) is highly dangerous because it exposes rationality to the influence of persuasion\(^{356}\). Even if the individual has successfully subdued the inferior aspects of his being, persuasion can bring about exactly the same dangers menacing the successful conclusion of the whole process. By means of this last step the intellect is freed from the fetters acquired by the application of discursivity and recovers its original intuitive apprehension\(^{357}\). Nothing now holds the intellect within the immanent realm, for sensorial perception, affections and rationality have by now been properly neutralised\(^{358}\). Now the intellect is prepared to achieve what it by nature strives for: contemplation\(^{359}\).

\(^{353}\) See supra this Chapter, p. 216.

\(^{354}\) V. 140-50, see supra this Chapter, § 3.3.3, pp. 208-09.

\(^{355}\) See supra this Chapter, § 3.3.4, pp. 209-10.

\(^{356}\) For a differentiation between \(\text{fanta\c{s}ia}\) as ‘appearance plus unreflective assent’ and \(\text{do\c{c}a}\) as ‘appearance based on persuasion by argument’ in Aristotle, see R. Sorabji, \textit{Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate} (London, 1993) 33-56; Nussbaum, \textit{The Therapy}, 78-91.

\(^{357}\) V. 91-99.

\(^{358}\) V. 84-90 and our commentary supra this Chapter, § 3.2.5 at pp. 203-05.

\(^{359}\) V. 99-101. See supra this Chapter, § 3.2.5 at 203-05.
5.2.3. Scope of the epistrophe

5.2.3.1. Reorienting the Will

Once the spheres of man’s captivity have been conveniently neutralised, a reorientation of the will seems to take place. Due to the absence of distortion proceeding from all three spheres, man follows what is good and not what he thinks to be good. This seems to be obvious for the object of deicitj or ‘desire’ is now the same as that of thought. Deprived of the distraction of externals, the intellect now thinks properly, and ‘since desire is the result of opinion rather than opinion that of desire’, right thinking determines correct desire.

5.2.3.2. Providing Knowledge

The original error of the first couple seems to have been the wrong direction of their will. Unaware of their deficiency, they attempted to overcome ignorance by their own means. However, as they could not think properly due to the influence of affections, they followed the apparent instead of the real good. In their search for knowledge they not only failed in achieving it, but they were also trapped by the nature of their cognitive means.

These events explain why epistrophe or ‘reversion’ is a necessary precondition in order to achieve the ultimate knowledge they originally searched for. Before they can achieve theoretical knowledge, they must acquire the practical knowledge that will enable them to turn away from the realm of movement. The three stages that we have seen above, perception, affections and reason, provide the means to accomplish a gradual process of self-knowledge that once completed provides access to theoretical knowledge.

5.2.3.3. Recovering the Lost Condition

Once so far, the intellect seems to have recovered its lost condition. Freed from the burdens of perception, affections and judgement, it can now engage itself in contemplation. However, the process of degradation has not been wholly superfluous. The coming-into-being of the intellect has provided it with a clear idea about what belongs to its own nature and what is alien to it. First, its use of discursivity has not provided the knowledge the intellect was searching for. On the contrary, it has enhanced its first ignorance by hampering its natural capacity to know. Second, its confidence in its own means to supersede ignorance has ended in an admission of its own incapacity and, consequently, of its deficiency.

It is precisely the intellect being lost in materiality that causes God’s intervention.

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360 For the equivalence of the objects of desire and thought, see Aristotle, Metaph. 1072a 26ff.
361 V 73-82.
Thanks to the cognitive certainty concerning its origin and goal conveyed by God’s recognition, the intellect can now engage itself in the process that will free it from the alien ties that keep it attached to immanence. The successive steps of this deconstructive process, moreover, provide the intellect with progressively increasing insight into both its nature and its goal. Self-knowledge allows the intellect’s final conscious decision to avert itself from everything that interferes with the contemplation it by nature strives for. Only by completely releasing all these ties and being engaged purely in contemplation will the intellect come to know the divinity.

362 V 84-101. See supra this Chapter, note 357.

As we already stated in the first chapter of this study, scholars have not yet succeeded in reaching a consensus with regard to the orientation of AA’s thought. During the last century AA has been linked with almost every religious and philosophical orientation of late antiquity. Middle and Neoplatonism, Neopythagoreanism, Stoicism, mainstream Christianity and Gnosticism have all been adduced to explain AA’s conceptual peculiarities. We also stated that, in our view, this interpretative variety was due to the variety of available textual witnesses upon which to base almost every hypothesis.

On the basis of our study of AA’s textual transmission, we isolated AA’s fragment in V from the remaining extant textual testimonies and offered a textual and conceptual analysis of this document. We shall now proceed to a systematic study of the main features of its thought and compare them with parallel developments in the religious and philosophical world of late antiquity. This analysis should allow us, if not to place AA in a clear and distinct spiritual context, at least to establish convergences and divergences with contemporary authors in order to review the alleged contacts, consider new possibilities and to determine, as far as possible, the orientation of its thought.

1. Cosmology

1.1. Cosmological Dualism

AA’s thought is characterised by a marked dualism that dominates not only its cosmology but also its theology, anthropology, epistemology and ethics. AA’s cosmological dualism radically distinguishes two antithetic regions, the transcendent and supramundane realm and the immanent, worldly realm of change and decay. This opposition is enunciated both by conceptual pairs with a philosophical undercurrent, such as ‘unity/multiplicity’, ‘identity/difference’, ‘atemporality/temporality’, ‘stability/movement’ , ‘not-generated/generated’,

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1 V’15.
2 V’10, 267-68.
3 V’6-7.
4 V’7-8, 16-17, 209-11.
5 V’8-9, 91-92, 97-98.
‘supercelestial/terrestrial’ and by more common oppositions such as ‘light/darkness’, ‘above/below’, ‘eternal/ephemeral’, ‘righteous/unrighteous’, or simply ‘better/worse’.

Admittedly, dualism is a rather widespread view of reality in late antiquity and can be found in all philosophical and religious orientations of the period. In most cases, however, these dualistic views draw on Plato’s conception of tangible reality as a material and ephemeral reflection of the spiritual and eternal world of ideas. In spite of a certain degradation of the sensible, in this view tangible reality still retains some status, since being a reflection of the intelligible realm implies at least some participation in its model. Such dualism recurs in Philo and in Plutarch. It also appears in Middle Platonists such as Alcinous and Apuleius, as well as in Christian theologians such as Clement of Alexandria. Although a dualistic view is obvious in all these examples, the unity of the universe is never totally challenged. It is true to say, however, that the combination of the Platonic and Aristotelian views on matter, which would result in the statement that υφή is ‘without shape, or quality, or form’, would contribute to an increasing devaluation of the sensible. Aristotle’s distinction between, on the one hand, υφή (‘matter’) and, on the other, οὐκ ἕν ἐστι (‘essence’) and τὸ ὁ (‘real being’) seems already to have been adopted by Neopythagoreans, such as Moderatus of Gades and Numenius of Apamea, and would lead Plotinus to describe matter as μὴ ὁ ‘not real-being’. Unlike his Pythagorean predecessors,

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6 V' 15, 93-94.
8 V' 5-6.
9 V' 208-11.
10 V' 12-13.
11 V' 11-12.
13 Philo, Opif. 16; 36; 129; Heres 280; Plant. 50; Ebr. 133; Conf. 172.
14 Plutarch, De an. procr. Tim. 1013c; De Is. 373a.
16 Apuleius, De Plat. 1.192-9.
17 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5.93.4; 5.94.1.
18 Alcinous, Didask. 162.36. For Plato’s qualification of matter as ἀποικε, see Tim. 50d 7; for Aristotle’s qualification, see Coel. 306b 17.
19 The idea of matter as devoid of quality and form is widespread. See Wisdom of Salomon 11.17; Philo, Fuga 9; Spec. Leg. 1.328; Plutarch, De an. procr. Tim. 1015d; 1024c; Alcinous, Didask. 162.25ff; Apuleius, De Plat. 1.191, on which, see Lilla, Clement, 194 note 1; Diogenes Laertius 3.69; Justin, Apol. 1.10.2; 1.59.5, on which C. Andresen, ‘Justin und der mittlere Platonismus’, ZNW 44 (1952-53) 157-95 at 164-65; Hippolytus, Ref. 1.19.3.
20 Aristotle, Phys. 191a 8-12.
22 See Proclus, In Tim. 299c.
however, Plotinus never devalues the cosmos but rather emphatically denies a stigmatisation of tangible reality both in a specific treatise against the Gnostics and also elsewhere. 

Differently from the more current Platonic variety, AA’s dualism is clearly anticosmic. The material world is intrinsically negative: it is the abode of evil and darkness, and the realm of deceit, of movement and decay; in short, it is the prison (αἰκναλ ωσία) from which man has to escape. In order to find a proper parallel to this radical sort of dualism and depreciation of the physical world we have to look at certain Hermetic tracts and at Gnosticism. With regard to the Corpus Hermeticum, the attitude toward physical reality changes in the different treatises. Even if in some cases the Platonic view that the product of the Good is good prevails, in others there appears either a moderately negative view or a radical rejection of materiality. The most radical example of the latter view can be found in the second fragment of the Hermetic excerpts preserved by Stobaeus. In this text the transcendent and not-generated realm is declared to be true, while the immanent realm is deprived of any true existence and equated with a simple deluding representation of the information proceeding from sensorial perception. With regard to Gnosticism, Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria report a similar anticosmic attitude. Jonas reduces the large variety of Gnostic dualistic systems to two main groups: in the Iranian system the clash of two opposite principles set into motion the history of the world. Differently, in the Syrian-Egyptian system the origin of the world is explained as a result of a process of degradation, as a downward movement that originates in the upper realm and that finally results in the appearance of the lower one. The latter is clearly the case in, for example, the Treatise on Resurrection which contrasts the greatness of the pleroma with the nothingness of the sensible and argues that the inherent

adoption of the notion, see Lilla, Clement, 196; for Plutarch’s and Philo’s rejection of this view due to Stoic influence (SVF I 85: identification of υἱὸν and οὐδὲν), see C. Baeumker, Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie (Münster, 1890) 338 and Lilla, Clement, 196 note 3. Furthermore infra, pp. 254ff.

Plotinus, Enn. 2.9.11; 13; 14; 15.

Plotinus, Enn. 3.2.3; 9; 12.

See also infra this Chapter, notes 36-42. See also infra p. 257 and notes 159-161.

For a similar conception of physical reality in the Chaldaean Oracles see infra, pp. 258ff.

So, for example C.H. 5.11 (65.5 N-F); aγαθὸς δὲ καὶ γατὰ ποιεῖται 10.3 (114.7-8 N-F); τὸ γάτα ἀγαθεχτὰς 14.4 (223.11-12 N-F).


See C.H. 6.4 (74.17-18 N-F); οὐ γὰρ κόσμος πληρώμα κτιῶν τὸ χαίκαί.


Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1.5.1-6; 1.17.2; 2.3.2; Clement of Alexandria, Exc. Theod. 48.1.

deficiency of the immanent realm results from the breaking off of the sensible world from the higher realm.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{AA}’s dualism can be compared to the more radical Hermetic and Gnostic variety. According to Prieur, however, \textit{AA}’s dualism should be described as antisomatic rather than as anticosmic.\textsuperscript{35} In his view, the lack of an explicit condemnation of tangible reality does not allow us to affirm anything else than that for \textit{AA} the origin of evil was in the physical body. In our opinion, however, we should not forget that the lack of such an explicit enunciation might just be due to the fragmentary character of our text. Moreover, this lack by no means overshadows \textit{AA}’s obvious radical negative view of physical reality. \textit{AA} not only purports a manifest rejection of the body,\textsuperscript{36} but also puts the blame for the perpetuation of man’s sojourn in an alien environment on materiality and its externalities.\textsuperscript{37} The association of evil with matter is more than obvious in the equation of ‘life’ (\textit{bēβ}Α) with ‘violence’ (\textit{bēβ}Α)\textsuperscript{38} in the reference to the ‘shackles of existence’ (\textit{tα\iσσ\iνο})\textsuperscript{39} and in the rejection of the ‘(earthly) works of Cain’\textsuperscript{40}. In addition, \textit{AA}’s contempt of the physical body is one and the same as that of tangible reality.\textsuperscript{41} As we will have the opportunity to see, from its very first lines \textit{AA}’s fragment in V clearly stresses that \textit{τυφικ}, the realm of movement and change, must be avoided at all means.\textsuperscript{42}

1.2. Structure of the Cosmos in \textit{AA}

In its current form \textit{AA} does not include a clear exposition of its cosmological views. Despite this, there are occasional passing references that may help us to reconstruct the text’s position on the issue.

As already stated, \textit{AA}’s most obvious trait is its conception of reality as consisting of two opposite realms, which is expressed by means of numerous pairs of conceptual opposites.\textsuperscript{43} However, there is enough evidence to suggest that alongside this basic dichotomy, a tripartite conception of the cosmos is at work in \textit{AA}. In the first place, the


\textsuperscript{35} Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 291-93.

\textsuperscript{36} V 92-95, 108-12, 194-95, 254-55.

\textsuperscript{37} V 5-10, 14-17, 58-61, 88-90, 97-98, etc.

\textsuperscript{38} V 232-33.

\textsuperscript{39} V 97-98.

\textsuperscript{40} V 121. For an interpretation of the section see \textit{supra}, Chapter 3 note 75.

\textsuperscript{41} So, for example, when Maximilla finally decides to live a spiritual life, the writer tells us that she said ‘farewell to all externalities and to those things belonging to the flesh’ (V 194-95).

\textsuperscript{42} See \textit{infra} this Chapter, § 1.4.2.2, pp. 256-59.

\textsuperscript{43} See \textit{supra} this Chapter, § 1.1, pp. 242-43.
passage V 15-16 refers to a supercelestial realm (or God). Since the ‘earthly realm’ (ta\nepigea) is also mentioned in these lines, we may conclude that, in spite of silencing the
‘celestial realm’, our text presupposes a cosmos consisting of three regions, the sublunary,
celestial and supercelestial realms.

Support for this interpretation comes from another passage in which Andrew praises
the final liberation of the ‘intellect’ that transcends all aspects of material existence. In this
context, Andrew explicitly says that the noui\nper\ngenews\n is beyond the cosmos and that it finally breaks all the shackles, ‘not only those of generation (ta\nuper\ngenews\n) but also those belonging to the realm beyond generation’ (ta\nuper\ngenews\n). Passing though it may be, this reference clearly implies the same tripartite conception of the universe, in which the transcendent realm is opposed both to the realm of coming-to-be and passing-away and to another intermediate region. This latter region, even though beyond the processes of generation and corruption, still belongs to the cosmic world of movement. That this is the region subject to eternal movement – that is, the celestial spheres where planets, demons or powers dwell – seems further supported by an earlier reference, in the same passus, to ‘powers and authorities’ (a\nxa\nke\nousiai)\. As this intermediate realm between the lower and the highest region is normally considered as the region of fate and heimarmene, these must be the ‘shackles belonging to the realm beyond generation’ Andrew is referring to.

Such a tripartition of reality was first systematically applied by Aristotle, although it appears to have been stated by Xenocrates as well. Following his division of substance into sensible-perishable, sensible-eternal and non-sensible-immutable, Aristotle divides reality into the realms of the unchangeable, astronomicals and sensibles, a division which in turn accounts for his tripartite division of knowledge. In the Aristotelian system, the highest and everlasting realm, even though static with regard to spatial and qualitative change, is the

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44 V 97-99. For a commentary on this section, see supra Chapter 4, § 3.2.5, pp. 203-04.
45 V 93-94.
46 See on the issue the still attractive treatment by Festugière, L’Idéal religieux, 101-15, especially 105ff. See C H. 1.9.
47 For the Platonic origin of such tripartition and for the similarity between Aristotle’s and Xenocrates’ conceptions of the issue, see P. Merlan, ‘Aristotle’s Unmoved Movers’, Kleine Schriften, 195-224 at 198ff.
48 Xenocrates fr. 5 H (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. 7.147ff); fr. 15 H (Aetius, ap. Stobaeus 1.1.29b) and fr. 18 H (Plutarch, Plat. quaest. 1007 f), on which see H.J. Krämer, Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin (Amsterdam, 1967) 37 note 58.
49 Aristotle, Metaph. 1069a 30-36. For Xenocrates’ triadic division see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. VII 147ff with Krämer, Geistmetaphysik, 33ff.
50 Aristotle, Phys. 198a 30ff; Metaph. 1004a 2ff; 1026a 6-22; De an. 403b 10ff. For the similarity of Xenocrates’ degrees of knowledge (fr. 5 H, a\n\no\nsij, \nd\nsij, and \no\nsij) and for the ‘mixed’ or ‘composite’ character of the medium sphere, see Merlan, ‘Unmoved Movers’, 199 and Greek Philosophy, 17; Krämer, Geistmetaphysik, 34.
source of movement in the lower realm. Its causality, however, is not of an efficient but of a final nature. Due to the desire or ‘desire’ of the planetary spheres towards the first principle, they engage in an eternal and regular movement that in turn responds to the changes in the sublunary or lower region.

It is interesting to note that a different kind of causality appears here because the planetary spheres are the efficient causes of the processes of generation and corruption in the sublunary realm, where everything appears to be ruled by the movements in the astral region. Incidentally, this conception of the planets as efficient causes in combination with the frequent Platonic references to ‘world rulers’ might have been grounds for the latter Hermetic and Gnostic conception of the planetary spheres as inhabited by demons or rulers, who, as antidivine powers, influence or dominate the processes of the lower realm and, consequently, tyrannise humanity.

In Middle Platonism, although we also find the triadic conception of the universe there is not a negative view of the intermediary region. Such a tripartition does indeed seem to underlie Alcinous’s discussion of the parts of philosophy and also his description of God’s relationship to the Cosmic-soul and its intellect and that of the latter to the physical world. Maximus of Tyre seems to have held the same opinion: in his description of the Himmelsreise he lets the soul depart from the lower realm, reach the heavens and go beyond them, to the region of true reality. The same tripartition may be responsible for the frequent differentiation between sensible and intelligible Gods or between astral and supramundane Gods that is quite widespread in late antiquity.

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54 Aristotle, *Phys.* 194b 13ff; *Metaph.* 1071a 13ff; *Cael.* 289a 20ff; *GA* 336a 23-b 24; 338b 3-5; *Metaph.* 1072a 10-18; *Meteo.* 346b 20-23; *Cael.* 286b 2-9.
57 *C.H.* 1.9 (9.18-20 N-F); 13 (10.19-11.5 N-F).
58 See infra, pp. 248ff. For the role of Xenocrates’ demonology, see R. Heinze, *Xenocrates. Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente* (Leipzig, 1892) and Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 361.
59 Alcinous, *Didask.* 153.43ff.
60 Alcinous, *Didask.* 164.42-165.4 (the father fills the Cosmic-soul with his forms and rouses, in this way, its intellect. Once the Cosmic-soul’s intellect has been actualised, it confers order on the material world), *Kata* *At* thn *e* *b* *t* *o* *u* *t* *o* *u* *b* *l* *h* *s* *i* *n* *e* *h* *p* *e* *b* *l* *h* *k* *e* *p* *a* *t* *h* *u* *t* *o* *u* *b* *l* *h* *s* *i* *n* *k* *o* *m* *n* *u* *e* *b* *e* *g* *e* *i* *f* *a* *j* *b* *u* *t* *o* *h* *b* *i* *s* *t* *r* *e* *g* *e* *a* *j* *b* *u* *t* *o* *h* *s* *i* *s* *h* *b* *o* *x* *w* *m* *j* *k* *o* *m* *n* *h* *s* *i* *s* *h* *b* *u* *p* *o* *l* *u* *o* *j* *b* *a* *t* *o* *j* *d* *i* *a* *k* *o* *n* *e* *j* *s* *u* *m* *h* *p* *a* *n* *s* *a* *n* *f* *i* *s* *e* *n* *h* *t* *i* *s* *j* *t* *t* *d* *e* *t* *k* *o* *m* *n* *n* *j* *n*.
61 Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 11.10, 229-234; 10.9, 235ff.
62 Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 11.12, 291. *Ofatoi*a*lan*ej* *C.H.* Stobaeus fr. 21.1 (90.7 N-F), *n* *o* *n* *h* *m* *a* *t* *i* *k* *o* *j* *k* *a* *i* *l* *a* *i* *l* *a* *l* *e* *t* *h* *o* *g* *e* *o* *j* *j* *P* *o* *r* *p* *h* *r* *y* *r* *y* *d* *e* *a* *b* *t* *2* *3* *7* *r* *o* *f* *a* *s* *t* *o* *j* *a* *s* *w* *h* *t* *o* *j*.
63 Apuleius, *De Plat.* 1.11, caelicolae-ultramundanus; Alcinous, *Didask.* 181.40ff, *e* *b* *u* *r* *a* *n* *i* *o* *j* *u* *p* *e* *r* *o* *u* *r* *a* *n* *i* *o* *j*.
The testimony of Macrobius, however, already shows an interesting development in the conception of this intermediary zone. His commentary on Cicero’s *Scipio’s Dream* preserves a description of the *descensus animae*, which is one of the rare elaborated statements on ‘that metaphysical subject which the Ancients have left us’\(^{65}\). In a passage that seems to rely on Numenius\(^{66}\), Macrobius describes the soul’s descent from the eighth heaven to the depths of the earth. During its descent through the seven planetary spheres the soul acquires from each of them one of the powers that will mark its earthly existence. It is interesting that in this account the powers provided by the planets are not yet qualified as good or bad, they are simply conceived of as characteristics peculiar to their energies\(^{67}\).

An interesting first step towards the negative view of the planetary spheres appears in the *Chaldaean Oracles*, which also presents the same tripartite division of the universe. Following Aristotle’s conception of nature’s increasing degree of quality in proportion to the distance we are removed from the sublunary world\(^{68}\), the *Chaldaean Oracles* states the decreasing degree of quality of the planetary spheres in proportion to their proximity to the sublunary world, in which matter is preponderant\(^{69}\).

As a result of this gradual process of devaluation of the planetary spheres due to their participation in certain aspects of the lower realm, this intermediary zone loses its neutral character of a simple transitory area and becomes a border that separates men from their homes and perpetuates their exile. *AA* clearly fits in this vision of the world because it locates the ‘powers and authorities’ (ἀρχαὶ καὶ εὐσεβεία) in the celestial sphere and, although without explicitly referring to their negative role, clearly endows them with a sort of controlling task\(^{70}\).

A very similar conception can also be found in Clement of Alexandria. Physical world and divine realm are separated by the *hebdomas*, which is populated by angels and

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\(^{64}\) See Dodds, *Proclus*, 283. See also Festugière, *La Révélation* IV, 4 note 3.


\(^{67}\) G.R.S. Mead, *Thrice-greatest Hermes: Studies in Hellenistic Theosophy and Gnosis, being a Translation of the Extant Sermons and Fragments of the Trismegistic Literature I*. Prolegomena (London, 1906) 291ff. Differently, Servius’ commentary on Virgil’s *Aeneid* 6.714 already presents a negative interpretation, since the energy transmitted by the planets is seen as hampering the soul from using its own powers.

\(^{68}\) See on the issue Aristotle, *Cael. 269b 13-17; Meteo. 340b 6.


\(^{70}\) V\(^{6}\) 94-95.
The souls of the true Gnostics travel through these seven spheres before reaching the *αρχαπαυσία* of the *ογδοας* in order to attain, finally, the contemplation of God. A clear difference, however, is that for Clement the intermediary region of planetary spheres preserves a positive character, which is certainly not the case in *AA*. In any case, it should be noted that, however positive they may be, Clement’s angels nevertheless exert a controlling task by checking the souls during their ascent, stopping those without a sufficient degree of perfection and allowing the souls that show their *συντόμον* or ‘passport’ through. It has been suggested that Clement’s conception is influenced by Gnosticism and that its positive character is simply due to the fact that for him the sensible world and the seven spheres are not the product of the demiurge but of the creative activity of divine Logos. *AA*’s negative view of the sensible world sufficiently explains the negative, hampering role of the powers and authorities that populate its intermediary region.

In order to find explicit references to the negative character of the planetary spheres, one has to turn to the *Corpus Hermeticum* and Gnosticism. According to the *Poimandres*, for example, the planets represent different vices of which the soul frees itself during its ascension. The idea is further developed in Gnosticism. The most representative example of this view is without any doubt the Ophite diagram that has been reconstructed by Leisegang and others. According to Origen, the Ophites distinguished between a realm of light and the underworld of death and darkness. The highest part of the latter is the region occupied by the rulers (*ατζοντές*). Origen uses in this context the words *ατζών* and *εκτοσία*, the same terms that appear in *AA*. It is true, however, that unlike the Gnostic treatises *AA* neither names these powers and authorities nor ascribes to them a precise role in hampering or allowing the

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73 Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 7.57.1; *Exc. Theod.* 27.4-5.
75 Lilla, *Clement*, 182-84.
76 For a parallel between the vices corresponding to the spheres and those of the list of vices recorded by Irenaeus (*Adv. haer.* 1.29.4), see Nock-Festugière, *Corpus*, 25 note 62. A similar conception of the increasing burden of impurity of the soul as a result of its descent through the planetary spheres in Porphyry *ap. Stobaeus* 2,171.2 (fr. 388 H) and Iamblichus, *De myst.* 8.6. See on the issue Dodds, *Proclus*, 307.
78 Origen, *C. Cels.* 5.25-38.
soul to pass through the heavens\textsuperscript{79}. However, \textit{AA}’s tripartite conception of the universe, its location of God in the transcendent realm beyond the heaven, its view of the lower realm as intrinsically negative and its describing the powers and authorities as inferior to the immaterial and transcendent realm, seem to imply the negative character of its inhabitants.

\textit{AA}, consequently, presents a peculiar combination of the philosophical triadic conception of the world and the religious tendency explicitly to endow the intermediary region and the planets with negative traits or influences on man and his physical existence. \textit{AA} clearly considers these powers and authorities responsible to a certain extent for man’s captivity, but it does not name them and neither proceeds to analyse their influences nor to describe them separately\textsuperscript{80}.

1.3. Cosmogony

As far as cosmogony is concerned, \textit{AA}’s position is far from clear. The only section that deals with the issue appears in a passage presenting clear traces of textual corruption\textsuperscript{81}. At any rate, it seems obvious that \textit{AA}’s writer did not share the Aristotelian view that the cosmos has no origin and is imperishable\textsuperscript{82}. Rather, it seems to have held the view attributed by Aristotle to Plato that the world was generated at a certain point\textsuperscript{83} because it explicitly refers to ‘the beginning of all things’ (\textit{apomene th' pantwn axh'})\textsuperscript{84}. However, it is impossible to ascertain whether its writer was conscious of the consequences of the Platonic assertion\textsuperscript{85} and whether he deliberately took the side of Middle Platonists such as Plutarch\textsuperscript{86}, Atticus\textsuperscript{87} and Harpocratio of Argos\textsuperscript{88}. In line with Aristotle\textsuperscript{89}, the latter authors interpreted Plato’s \textit{Timaeus} literally and consciously rejected, as did Philo\textsuperscript{90} and Clement of Alexandria\textsuperscript{91}, the

\textsuperscript{79} As \textit{ap}. Origen, \textit{C. Cels.} 6.31; \textit{ApJohn} (BG 2) 41.16-42.7. The same list of names among the Valentinians, see Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. haer.} 1.5.3-4. However, passages such as \textit{ParaphShem} (NHC VII, 1) 31.22-34 at 34; 46.13-55 at 30; \textit{PS} 23.13-21; 40.8-22 also omit precise names and generally refer to ‘powers and authorities that tyrannise men’.

\textsuperscript{80} \textit{V} 87-96.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{V} 238-40.

\textsuperscript{82} Aristotle, \textit{Cael.} 280a 28; 300b 16; \textit{Phys.} 251b 17; \textit{Metaph.} 1071b 31-7. See \textit{infra} this Chapter, note 140.

\textsuperscript{83} Plato, \textit{Tim.} 27c-28c, esp. 28b 7. On Aristotle’s interpretation, \textit{infra} this Charter, note 85.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{V} 238-39.

\textsuperscript{85} For a detailed discussion of the problems concerned with Plato’s assertion that the world was generated in time, see Aristotle, \textit{Cael.} 279b 22ff.

\textsuperscript{86} Plutarch, \textit{De an. procr. Tim.} 1013a-1020c.

\textsuperscript{87} Atticus, \textit{ap}. Eusebius, \textit{PE} 15.6.

\textsuperscript{88} Schol. in Proclus \textit{In Remp.} II, 377, 15ff Kroll.

\textsuperscript{89} See \textit{supra} this Chapter, note 82.

\textsuperscript{90} Philo, \textit{Aet.} 13; 15; 19.

\textsuperscript{91} Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Strom.} 5.92.2.
metaphorical reading as defended by other Middle Platonists such as Alcinous, Apuleius, Celsus and Calvenus Taurus.

In any case, AA does refer to the ‘one without beginning’ (αὶ ἀρχῶν) and says of him that ‘he came down to the beginning below him’. This latter expression may be understood either as referring to a temporal descent of the αὶ ἀρχῶν – that is, to Christ’s incarnation for the redemption of humanity – or, more likely, as a metaphor to express the beginning of the first principle’s creative activity. At any rate, it clearly opposes God, or the first principle, to the cosmos on the basis of the latter’s participation in time. Whether AA considered, in spite of the world’s temporal creation, that matter pre-existed15 and that creation consisted of a transition from chaos to order is difficult to tell. It is doubtful, however, that AA was at all interested in such matters. Such a physical approach to reality is not likely in an author who, strictly speaking, denies the status of being to materiality. Consequently, even though the fragmentary character of our text may explain the lack of clues on the issue, it is improbable that AA’s writer paid much attention to the constitution of the material world, if not from the perspective of human destiny.

1.4. AA’s Basic Bipartite Distinction between the Transcendent and Immanent Realms

Despite the tripartite conception of the cosmos underlying AA, a more basic dichotomy distinguishes between the transcendent and immanent realms.

1.4.1. Transcendent Realm

It is significant that AA does not include a positive description of the transcendent realm, with the only exception, perhaps, the reference to its stability in V. Rather, the description of the higher realm is implicitly stated in the description of the lower, immanent realm to which it is antithetically opposed. This is not as strange as it may seem. Consistent with the tendency of the period, AA achieves the description of the divine by means of abstraction or subtruction (see infra) – that is, by abstracting all attributes that characterise the sensible. If

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92 The Aristotelian discussion on the issue mentioned above (see supra note 82) shows that the literal or allegorical interpretation of the Timaeus was already a disputed issue in the Old Academy. On the issue, see infra, pp. 255-56 with notes 144-147; Merlan, Greek Philosophy, 47-48 and note 1.
94 On the issue see infra, pp. 261f.
95 V. 239-40.
96 See Calzolari, ‘Version Arménienne’, 166-70, on which see supra Chapter 1, pp. 47-48.
97 For the possibility of interpreting AA’s conception of matter as a substantialisation of affections as in Valentinianism, see infra, pp. 295-96.
this world is the realm of materiality, the body and the senses, the transcendent one is the incorporeal realm of the intelligible.

AA describes the transcendent realm by abstracting the attributes of the physical world. By means of this procedure, the transcendent realm is depicted as the province beyond time, movement and generation98, and probably also beyond extension99. AA’s conception of transcendence reveals the background of the philosophical discussion of the period on the nature of the divine realm, which in a last analysis derives from the definitions provided by the ‘first hypothesis’ of Plato’s Parmenides100. Like AA, the ‘first hypothesis’ denies that the One can partake in time101, movement102 and the processes of coming-to-be and passing-away103.

1.4.1.1. The Transcendent Realm Is Beyond Time
Like AA104, many authors of the period locate the transcendent realm beyond time. Philo explicitly states that God is above time (and place)105. In a Middle Platonic context, Alcinous declares that God is eternal106, and Maximus of Tyre posits his God ‘in the firmer and more stable of them (scil. realms), the one which is free from all flux and change’107. According to Apuleius, God is above place and time and he describes Him as ‘non-temporal’ (neque tempore comprehensus)108 and as ‘eternal’ (inmortalis aevi)109. As far as Numenius is concerned, God is not liable to time for He is aitôn or ‘eternal’110. Clement of Alexandria, finally, also posits God beyond time and place111. Gnostics seems to have held the same view,
for, according to Hippolytus\textsuperscript{112}, Valentinians denied that God partakes in place and time, and the \textit{Apocryphon of John} clearly states that God is alien to time\textsuperscript{113}.

1.4.1.2. The Transcendent Realm Is Beyond Movement

As far as movement is concerned, \textit{AA}’s denial that the blessed race belongs to time clearly posits transcendence beyond the realm of movement\textsuperscript{114}. This assertion appears to have the same background as the Middle Platonic contention that God does not partake in movement. Alcinous’ assertion that God is motionless mainly derives from the \textit{Parmenides}’ ‘first hypothesis’\textsuperscript{115}, but by referring both to locomotion and qualitative change he shows that he is also drawing on the \textit{Republic}\textsuperscript{116} and perhaps even on Aristotle’s dialogue \textit{On Philosophy}\textsuperscript{117}. The aforementioned section of Maximus’ eleventh oration \textit{Plato on God}, which rejects that God could be subject to qualitative change, also implies the rejection of movement from God’s abode\textsuperscript{118}. As far as Numenius is concerned, the fragment\textsuperscript{119}, after stating that God is in an eternal present, denies that He can experience movement in respect of either qualitative change\textsuperscript{120} or locomotion\textsuperscript{121}.

1.4.1.3. The Transcendent Realm Is Beyond Generation and Corruption

All these statements logically imply that the divine realm is alien to the sphere of genesis. And indeed, \textit{AA} emphatically denies the blessed race’s participation in the processes of generation and corruption. A similar description of transcendence appears in Plutarch’s \textit{On the Delphic E}, where the sublunary realm is opposed to the supercelestial one on the basis of its participation in the processes of coming-to-be and passing-away\textsuperscript{122}.

The \textit{Corpus Hermeticum} states exactly the same view. The second of the fragments preserved by Stobaeus, even though focussing on the processes of generation and corruption peculiar to the sublunary world, introduces its description by referring to the abiding,

\begin{itemize}
\item Hippolytus, \textit{Ref.} 6.29.5, \textit{Patha de \textit{Alchamoj}, a \textit{garhhtoj}, ou \textit{Qianon ekwn, ouQroQian.}
\item \textit{ApJohn} (BG 2) 25.2-3. See also \textit{Allog} (NHC XI, 3) 63.21ff; \textit{TriTrac} (NHC I, 5) 52.8-21.
\item See \textit{supra} this Chapter note 102.
\item Alcinous, \textit{Didask.} 165.37f.
\item Plato, \textit{Rep.} 380d 8ff.
\item Aristotle, \textit{De philos.} fr. 16 Ross. As has been pointed out \textit{(Festugi\`ere, \textit{La R\`ev\`elation} IV, 101 note 1; G. Invernizzi, \textit{Il Didaskalikos di Albino e medioplatonismo} (Roma, 1976) II 83-84), this Aristotelian fragment may rely on Plato’s \textit{Republic} 380d 8ff (so, already Simplicius, \textit{In Cael.} 289.14ff Heiberg). Untersteiner (\textit{ap. Dillon, Alcinous}, 110) therefore even suggests that Alcinus may depend upon Aristotle’s dialogue rather than upon Plato. \textit{Contra Dillon, Alcinous}, 110-11.
\item See \textit{supra}, note 107.
\item Numenius, fr. 5 \textit{Des Places.}
\item Numenius, fr. 5.19-21 \textit{Des Places.}
\item Numenius, fr. 5.22-28 \textit{Des Places.}
\item Plutarch, \textit{De E} 392bff.
\end{itemize}
unchanging and impassible transcendent realm\textsuperscript{123}. Exactly the same might be said of Gnostic writings. It will suffice to refer to the frequent denomination of the pleroma as ‘incorruptibility’ (τιθαττάκο)\textsuperscript{124}. As Numenius puts it, since τοιού is eternal and unmoved it necessarily always remains the same and is, consequently, beyond the processes of generation and corruption\textsuperscript{125}.

1.4.1.4. The Transcendent Realm Is Beyond Extension

Finally, we can also suggest that the transcendent realm is incorporeal (αμέγεσθαι). AA’s corrected section coincides with the testimony of second century writers on the issue\textsuperscript{126}. Numerous testimonies by philosophers and writers of different orientations widely attest the statement of the One’s lack of extension\textsuperscript{127}. Alcinous is clear in denying extension (μέγεσθαι) to the intelligible\textsuperscript{128}, as are Maximus of Tyre\textsuperscript{129} and Justin\textsuperscript{130}. Apuleius\textsuperscript{131}, Celsus\textsuperscript{132} and Numenius\textsuperscript{133} defend the same view. The Corpus Hermeticum frequently echoes the notion\textsuperscript{134}, and in a Christian context, Clement and Origen also deprive God of human shape and all other attributes\textsuperscript{135}. Finally, such an assertion is also common among Gnostics\textsuperscript{136}.

1.4.2. Immanent Realm

In contrast to the absence of positive attributes or particular descriptions of the highest realm, immanence is extensively described in AA. It is interesting that, when doing so, our text presents a peculiar combination of an objective description based on philosophical statements on the sensible and a more subjective exposition of a very negative experience of physical life.

\textsuperscript{123} C.H. Stobaeus fr. 2A 15-16 (7.15-8.9 F).
\textsuperscript{124} See GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 35.24; HypArch (NHC II, 4) 87.1-21; 88.1-2; 93.30; 94.5; 95.22, etc.
\textsuperscript{125} Numenius, fr. 5.20-21 Des Places, οὐδεδελμέγεθεν οὐδεναὶ ἔθελεν οὐδεναὶ ἐμεγεσθαίντας οὐδεναὶ ἐθεωνίας οὐδεναὶ.
\textsuperscript{126} Vr 9-10.
\textsuperscript{127} On the basis of a passage preserved by Philo (Opif. 120) in a Pythagorean context, Whittaker, ‘Neopythagoreanism’, 115-17, suggests the Neopythagorean origin of this argument.
\textsuperscript{128} Alcinous, Didask. 164.13-17; cf. 166.7-14, esp. 166.6-7, οὐδεσείνωται αὐθεντίας οὐδεσείνωται.
\textsuperscript{129} Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 11.9, 202.
\textsuperscript{130} Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. 4 (PG col. 484).
\textsuperscript{131} Apuleius, De Plat. 1.190.
\textsuperscript{132} Celsus, ap. Origen, C. Cels. 6.64
\textsuperscript{133} Numenius, fr. 2.13 Des Places, ῥμδελς ὠμε ῥμδελμέγα ῥμδελς ῥμικρά.
\textsuperscript{134} C.H. 2.12 (36.19-37.4 N-F); 4.9 (52.20 N-F); 11.18 (154.15-16 N-F); 13.6 (202.14-17 N-F) and C.H. Stobaeus fr. 2 A 9 (6.4-7 N-F). In some cases the Corpus even attests the term μέγεσθαι, see C.H. 11.20 (155.12-15 N-F), τοιοῦ ὡς ἀπαθῆς ἀναλογίας; μεγάλης ἀναλογίας, τοιοῦ ὡς ἀπαθῆς ἀναλογίας, τοιοῦ ὡς ἀπαθῆς ἀναλογίας, τοιοῦ ὡς ἀπαθῆς ἀναλογίας, τοιοῦ ὡς ἀπαθῆς ἀναλογίας, τοιοῦ ὡς ἀπαθῆς ἀναλογίας, τοιοῦ ὡς ἀπαθῆς ἀναλογίας, τοιοῦ ὡς ἀπαθῆς ἀναλογίας.
\textsuperscript{135} Asclep. 29 (336.4-6 N-F).
\textsuperscript{136} Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5.68.3. According to Lilla, Clement, 213, the correspondence between this passage and Philo, Sacr. 96, clearly shows that in this idea Clement is dependent on Philo; Origen, De princip. 1.1.6 (PG 11.125).
1.4.2.1. Objective Description of Materiality

From a philosophical perspective, the earthly region is said to partake in time and movement\textsuperscript{137}, which implies that everything in the lower realm is ruled by the processes of coming-to-be and passing-away\textsuperscript{138}. Time is an intrinsic characteristic of the sublunary world. According to the Platonic \textit{Timaeus}, God created time as a moving image of eternity and the Greek differentiation between \(\alpha \iota \lambda \nu \mu \eta \eta \) and \(\chi \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) relies on this idea\textsuperscript{139}. While the former is eternal, the latter has a beginning and an end\textsuperscript{140}. The importance of the issue can be observed in the already mentioned discussion whether the \textit{Timaeus} myth about the creation of the world by the demiurge should be interpreted literally or allegorically\textsuperscript{141}. Calvénus Taurus’ distinction of the various senses of the term \(\textit{genhtoj}\) in his \textit{Commentary on the Timaeus} bears significant witness to the relevance of this discussion\textsuperscript{142}.

At any rate, all three notions, time, motion and generation, seem to be treated in \textit{AA} from the perspective of change. All three issues are simply stated as characteristics of perishability as opposed to imperishability and permanence. Therefore the central notion is that of motion, although more in its qualitative than in its spatial aspect. \textit{AA} repeatedly refers to this stability of the transcendent realm\textsuperscript{143}. In contrast to the permanence of the supramundane, everything in the sublunary world is subject to alteration. The lower realm is the region of change or, as \textit{AA} puts it in Heraclitean vein, it is the region of flux where everything experiences mutation and nothing stands firm\textsuperscript{144}.

\textit{AA} contrasting the mutability of human affairs to the steadiness of the divine is a commonplace in late antiquity and may be traced back to Plato and the Aristotelian

\textsuperscript{136} TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 51,9-53, 5; ApJohn (BG 2) 24.16-18.
\textsuperscript{137} V\textsuperscript{11} 6. \textit{talepheta}; cf. V\textsuperscript{6}, \textit{xamirrefej}.
\textsuperscript{138} V\textsuperscript{11} 6-9. See supra 251-52.
\textsuperscript{139} Plato, \textit{Tim}. 37c; see R. Brague, \textit{Du temps chez Platon et Aristote} (Paris, 1982).
\textsuperscript{140} Aristotle, \textit{Cael}. 279a 25ff. This is the reason why, according to the Aristotelian interpretation of the \textit{Timaeus}, Plato’s assertion that the cosmos ‘has come to be’ was not only wrong but also impious, since the temporal origin implies the possibility of an end. According to the Philosopher, the cosmos was eternal. See supra this Chapter, note 78.
\textsuperscript{141} According to the testimony of Philoponus (\textit{De aet. mund.} 145.13ff Rabe), Calvénus Taurus, beside the ground meaning of \(\textit{genhtoj}\) ‘in the sense in which we say that things which derive their existence from some beginning in time are \textit{created}’, distinguished four other meanings. We summarise Dillon’s version of the passage (Dillon, \textit{Middle Platonists}, 242-3) : ‘Created can have the following meanings: 1. That is said to be created which is not in fact created, but is of the same genus as things that are created ; 2. That is also called ‘created’ which is in theory composite, even if it has not been in fact been combined ; 3. The cosmos is said to be ‘created’ as being always in process of generation ; 4. One might also call it ‘created’ by virtue of the fact that it is dependent for its existence on an outside source, i.e., God’. See V\textsuperscript{11} 16, 17, 210-11.
\textsuperscript{142} V\textsuperscript{11} 211-14; cf. Heraclitus, D-K 22, B 12; 49a; 91; cf. Plato, \textit{Crat}. 402a. For the adjective \(\textit{rkeustof}\) to describe the instability of the sensible, see Aspasius, \textit{In EN} p. 13.8 H; Aetius, \textit{Plac.} 1.9.2 (\textit{Doxographie}, 307, a24); Sextus
The notion already appears in one of Seneca’s *Epistles* and the close similarity between this passage and a section in Plutarch’s *On the Delphic E* led Theiler to suggest a common source for the idea. Philo also contrasts human instability with the permanence of the heavens by means of the flux metaphor, but he develops it by combining it in connection with the theme of the ages of man. In Middle Platonism, Alcinous uses the same metaphor of flux to state the mutability of physical reality and oppose it to the immutable one. Maximus of Tyre not only repeatedly uses the Heraclitean metaphor of flux to stress the mutability of human affairs, but also refers, as does AA, to human illusion giving man a fallacious image of stability.

The *Corpus Hermeticum*, similarly, not only confronts permanence with change but also refers to the *fantasia* or ‘appearance’ as responsible for the fallacy that man really exists: only that which is eternal and remains unaltered truly exists. A comparable view of the immanent realm as a purely deluding representation can be found among the texts of Nag Hammadi. The *Treatise on Resurrection* plays with the same elements: the world is in continuous change and as such is pure illusion. The description of matter in continuous flux is also recurrent in the *Chaldaean Oracles*, in Numenius, in Plotinus and in Chalcidius.

Subjective Description of Materiality

Although this philosophical-like description of the lower realm already shows a pronounced depreciation of the sensible, its moral characterisation leaves no room for hesitation regarding AA’s radical dualism. By turning to God and to the transcendent realm, people turn away...
from what is worse, ugly and unrighteous. Passing though it may be, this reference makes clear that, as mentioned above, we are not dealing with a Platonic sort of dualism. In AA the physical world does not participate in the perfection of the higher one so as to partake in its, beauty, righteousness and superiority. Rather, it represents the antipodes of the supramundane and as such lacks all attributes that belong to it. This negative view of the sensible is evident in AA. The material world, which is sometimes called $\text{fu} \text{u} \text{i} \text{j}$ (‘nature’) or $\text{k} \text{l} \text{f} \text{n}$ (‘region’), is not only a place of ‘captivity’ ($\text{a} \text{i} \text{k} \text{m} \text{a} \text{l} \text{w} \text{s} \text{i} \text{a}$) or ‘bondage’ ($\text{t} \text{a} \text{d} \text{e} \text{s} \text{m} \text{a}$) where man is apt to be oppressed, but also the realm of ‘deformities’ ($\text{a} \text{i} \text{x} \text{h}$), the region of ‘ephemeral evils’, of ‘ephemeral life’ and, implicitly, of ‘violence’.

This view of materiality as the source of evil is also common in Middle Platonic writers. Even if Alcinous does not explicitly equate matter to evil, the fact is that incarnation is nevertheless seen as a punishment for man. There are, however, other writers of this period that take this view a step further. Plutarch, for example, conceives matter as being under the control of the Cosmic-Soul, which in his view is the real source of evil. Atticus’ position is rather similar because in his opinion evil is the result of the irrational and evil soul. According to the testimony of Origen, however, Celsus appears to have associated evil directly with matter. The most radical position was certainly taken by Numenius, his pupil Cronius, and Harpocrate. According to the testimony of Iamblichus all three philosophers identify matter with evil.

As already suggested, in some of its treatises the Corpus Hermeticum shares this view as well. The world is seen as completely evil and as the source of man’s suffering. Such a negative view is implicit in Poinandres’ use of $\text{k} \text{o} \text{t} \text{o}$ (‘obscurity’) to designate the sensible and to distinguish it from the intelligible realm of light. This conception presents a clear parallel to AA which, as we have seen, describes the physical world as the region of

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158 V° 10-13.
159 See V° 90, $\text{a} \text{i} \text{k} \text{m} \text{a} \text{l} \text{w} \text{s} \text{i} \text{a}$; V° 97-98, $\text{t} \text{a} \text{d} \text{e} \text{s} \text{m} \text{a}$.
160 See V° 233, $\text{e} \text{h} \text{k} \text{a} \text{o} \text{j} \text{t} \text{o} \text{i} \text{j} \text{p} \text{r} \text{o} \text{k} \text{s} \text{k} \text{a} \text{i} \text{r} \text{o} \text{j}$; V° 233, $\text{p} \text{r} \text{o} \text{k} \text{s} \text{k} \text{a} \text{i} \text{r} \text{o} \text{j}$.
161 V° 233. See also supra this Chapter, pp. 242-43 and notes 36-42.
162 Alcinous, Didask. 172.3-19. For parallels see Whittaker, Alcinoos, 121 note 318.
163 Plutarch, De an. procr. Tim. 1014b-1015f.
164 Proclus, In Tim. I 395.7ff; Witt, Albinus, 121.
165 Origen, C. Cels. 4.65.
166 Iamblichus, De an. 375.10ff.
167 Numenius’ view is more than clear in the fragment preserved by Chalcidius, In Tim. 295-99. For the philosopher matter is evil (fr. 52.32-37 Des Places), $\text{i} \text{g} \text{i} \text{t} \text{u} \text{r}$ Pythagorar quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam et sine qualitate silvam esse censet nec tamen, ut Stoici, naturae mediae interque bonorum malorumque vicinam, quod genus illi appellant indifferens, sed plane noxiam. See also fr. 52.92-95.
168 See supra this Chapter, note 30.
darkness. On the other hand, this antithesis between light and obscurity and the association of the latter with the physical world is also frequent in Gnosticism. In *On the Origin of the World* and in the *Hypostasis of the Archons* matter comes into being from the shadow, and in Zostrianus ‘matter is [begotten] from lost darkness’. This not only means that the material realm is inferior due to its being obscure, in flux and ephemeral, but also that it has a negative influence on man: matter contaminates man’s soul, is the origin of his passions and of sin. Similarly, Clement reports that for Valentine the terrestrial soul of man owes its intrinsic corruption to being created from ‘flowing matter’. Hermogenes postulated that evil originated from the residue of pre-existent, chaotic matter set in order by God, a theory which was followed by another Valentian referred to by Adamantius.

This negative view of matter is shared by the *Chaldaean Oracles*. Developing the Middle Platonic conception that denies matter a share in the divine illumination, the *Chaldaean Oracles* describe the lower realm as ‘the dark-glowing world, beneath which is spread the deep, for ever devoid of structure and form, dark all round, foul, joying in images, irrational, precipitous and sinuous, whirling round for ever its own maimed depth, in eternal marriage with a shape void of appearance, inert, not breathing’. However, in some of the *Oracles* matter is no longer a simple passive obstacle in man’s life: it becomes an active and even aggressive negative power. This can clearly be seen in another fragment in which the sensible, after being called the ‘enemy of light’, is described as the ‘abode of murder’, ‘sedition’, ‘pestilences’, ‘infirmities’ and ‘putrefaction’. Man should leave this region of darkness.

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170 V 14-15.
171 ParaphShem (NHC VII, 1), passim; *OrigWorld* (NHC XIII, 2) 98.20; *ApJohn* (NHC II, 1) 13.15-17.
172 *OrigWorld* (NHC XIII, 2) 99.11-22; *HypArch* (NHC II, 4) 94.9ff.
173 Zost (NHC VIII, 1) 9.10-16.
174 Zost (NHC VIII, 1) 26.10ff.
175 *Asclep*. (NHC VI, 8) 67.1-11, ‘[since] matter | is involved in the creation of [man] | of [    ], the passions are in it. Therefore | they continually flow over his | body, for this living creature would not exist | in any other way except that he takes this | food, since | he is mortal. It is also inevitable | that inopportune desires | which are harmful, dwell in him’. Cf. *Asclep*. 21 (323.23-324.6 N-F).
176 *GosMary* (BG 1) 7.10ff.
177 Clement of Alexandria, *Exc. Theod.* 50.1; Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 1.5.5, *ap·̂oltou·̂kexumhous kai·̂reustous·̂hj=
179 Adamantius, *Dial. de recta fide* 142.4.
180 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 305. See Alcinous, *Didask.* 162.25f; Apuleius, *De Plat.* 1.5.
182 Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 305.
gloom as soon as possible\textsuperscript{184}, since matter is evil\textsuperscript{185} or ‘worker of evil’\textsuperscript{186}. Therefore, man should not even leave his body, which is called ‘residue of matter’ in the abyss of the lower world, but rather lead it to the brilliant realm of light\textsuperscript{187}. The \textit{Chaldaean Oracles} in general agree with the Valentinian notion that the world is the result of a sediment of primal matter left aside by the demiurge because it was unfit for his purpose\textsuperscript{188}. This idea obviously implies the original corruption of the pre-existent matter. It is difficult to ascertain whether \textit{AA} shared this view. At any rate, \textit{AA} agrees with the \textit{Chaldaean Oracles} in conceiving of the lower realm as the abode of violence, enmity, hate and sedition\textsuperscript{189}. As such it must be left behind as soon as possible. For \textit{AA}, as for the \textit{Chaldaean Oracles}, there is a ‘practical identity of the material with the demonic principle’\textsuperscript{190}.

1.5. Conclusions concerning the Study of \textit{AA}’s Cosmology
The analysis of \textit{AA}’s cosmological views reveals that its writer was especially fond of a philosophical explanation of reality. This predilection is clear in the underlying trichotomic conception of the universe, which echoes the Aristotelian and Xenocratic tripartition of being\textsuperscript{191}, and especially in the description of transcendence and immanence by means of well-established philosophical tenets\textsuperscript{192}. The echoes of the statements regarding the One of the ‘first hypothesis’ of the \textit{Parmenides} are obvious in \textit{AA}’s denial of movement, time and change to transcendence.

These parallels, however, do not necessarily imply direct influence from this or from that philosophical school. \textit{AA} shares these views not only with different philosophical texts of the period, but also with Hermetic and Gnostic texts and with the \textit{Chaldaean Oracles}. The comparative analysis of \textit{AA}’s cosmological views with contemporary texts dealing with the same issues shows that as far as cosmology is concerned, a consensus seems to have been reached in the period as to the basic tenets and that differences are mainly a matter of emphasis. Given the widespread use of exactly the same argumentations, it is precisely nuances and small differences of emphasis that may help us to distinguish interpretative

\textsuperscript{184} The world of light is described as \textit{ahfifah} ‘visible all round’ (\textit{Or. Chald.} fr. 1) and of \textit{ol amph} ‘shining all over’, while the lower world is \textit{misofah} ‘hating the light’ (fr. 181; cf. Psellus, \textit{Comm.} 1124b) or \textit{ahfiknefah} ‘wrapped in darkness’ (fr.163.3).

\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Or. Chald.} fr. 88.2, \textit{kaitakakh=fu hj bl asthmeta}, of the demons, see Psellus, \textit{Comm.} 1137a.

\textsuperscript{186} Psellus, \textit{Scr. minor.} 446.21, \textit{ol(Xaldai= …)thn+hneikagoisn=wj kakiah ergafin}

\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Or. Chald.} fr. 158 with Psellus, \textit{Comm.} 1137a-c. Porphyry, \textit{Sent.} .29, p. 13.7-14.1, interprets it as the \textit{pneuma} or vehicle of the soul.

\textsuperscript{188} Lewy, \textit{Chaldaean Oracles}, 382ff.

\textsuperscript{189} V’232, violence; 245, 248, 258; enmity; 240, 243, 255, war; 258, hate; ibid., sedition.

\textsuperscript{189} Lewy, \textit{Chaldaean Oracles}, 305.

\textsuperscript{191} See \textit{supra} this Chapter, § 1.2, 245-50.

\textsuperscript{192} See \textit{supra} this Chapter, § 1.4.1, pp. 251-54.
groups. As the following summarising review will show, from this perspective AA’s use and interpretation of the cosmological views current in late antiquity allow us to group the mentality of our text with that underlying the Hermetic and Gnostic sources analysed above.

To begin with, AA’s dualism differs from the more widespread Platonic variety as adopted by most philosophers of the period. AA’s radical dualism and very negative view of the sensible has its best parallels in Hermetic and Gnostic texts. Similar conclusions might be drawn with regard to AA’s application of the trichotomic conception of reality. This three-storey view of the universe can also be found in a large number of contexts in late antiquity. However, AA’s negative conception of the intermediate region, which becomes a sort of frontier between immanence and transcendence, and of its inhabitants, who as watchdogs prolong man’s exile in immanence, is comparable to similar Hermetic and Gnostic views.

The same can be concluded from AA’s use of a bipartite view of reality that opposes transcendence to immanence. AA’s description of the supramundane and sublunary world by means of known philosophical tenets might seem to bring AA into close connection with Philo, Middle Platonism and Numenius. Yet exactly the same procedure and tenets can also be found in Hermetic and Gnostic texts. In this sense, AA’s use of the philosophical views is plausibly not due to direct philosophical influence. It either echoes the widespread use, in many different contexts, of the same philosophical arguments to state the superiority of transcendence and the nothingness of the sublunary world, or it owes its philosophical undercurrent to proximity to one of these groups. This latter possibility receives some support from the peculiar combination, common to AA, Hermetica and Gnosticism, of an objective and philosophical description of transcendence with a very subjective one of immanence, which is highly influenced and shaped by a very negative experience of reality.

193 See supra this Chapter, § 1.1, pp. 242-45.
194 See supra this Chapter, § 1.2, pp. 245-50.
195 See supra this Chapter, § 1.4.2.2, pp. 256-59.
2. Theology

2.1. The Knowledge of God

AA presents a characteristic combination of the way of eminence\textsuperscript{196} and the way of abstraction\textsuperscript{197} in the search for the knowledge of God. As we will see later, this combination arises from a hesitation as to the nature of God, who is sometimes conceived of as the supreme being and thus has a cosmic nature, and at other times as transcending all attributes of the realm of being. If on the basis of this hesitation AA’s notion of God might be called incoherent or inconsistent, AA’s inconsistency regarding this issue is shared by most of the authors of the second and third centuries dealing with the divinity\textsuperscript{198}.

AA intends to apply the method of abstraction already in the description of the transcendent realm. As we have seen, the description of the higher realm is achieved by negating all the attributes of the lower one in a way that resembles the ‘first hypothesis’ of the \textit{Parmenides}\textsuperscript{199}. However, given the fact that our text slides from the higher realm to the description of God, the method of abstraction is suddenly (unconsciously?) substituted for that of eminence. By means of the way of ascending degrees or \textit{via eminentiae}, which divides the realm of being into pairs of opposites and which proceeds from the lower to the higher by retaining always the most pre-eminent of both, AA attains a first idea of God\textsuperscript{200}.

The \textit{via eminentiae}, however, can only provide a dialectical idea of the divinity. When AA states the possibility and the need to come to know God, the way of eminence yields

\textsuperscript{196} This method has its remote origin in Plato’s \textit{Symposium} (210a-212a), where Diotima states a method to turn the vision of the soul from the sensible to the intelligible. \textit{Symp.} 211b 7-d 1: ‘Such is the right approach or induction to love-matters. Beginning from obvious beauties he must for the sake of that highest beauty be ever climbing aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; from personal beauty he proceeds to beautiful observances, from observance to beautiful learning, and from learning at last to that particular study which is concerned with the beautiful itself and that alone; so that in the end he comes to know the very essence of beauty’ (Transl. Lamb). Note that AA also states the way of eminence by referring to three realms of beauty, namely moral, physical and intellectual, which correspond, in the \textit{Symposium}, to the beauty of bodies, of institutions and laws, and of science and, in Alcinous (\textit{Didask.} 165.27-33) to physical beauty, beauty of the soul and beauty of customs and laws. See also Seneca, \textit{Ep.}, 58.16ff, \textit{per excellentiam}, on which Whittaker, ‘Seneca \textit{Ep} 58.16ff’, \textit{Studies} IV.

\textsuperscript{197} For the \textit{via negativa} as a direct continuation of an Old Academic discussion, see Krämer, \textit{Geistmetaphysik}, 105-08. For its development as a Neopythagorean revival of an Old Academic issue, Whittaker, ‘Negative Theology’, \textit{Studies} IX, passim.

\textsuperscript{198} As Whittaker, \textit{‘\v{E}pekeia nou ka\nu\thetaia’}, \textit{Studies} XIII, has properly shown, this hesitation is characteristic of almost all philosophical and religious texts of the period.

\textsuperscript{199} See V\textsuperscript{r} 6-9. See also supra this Chapter, § 1.4.1, passim, pp. 251-54.

\textsuperscript{200} See V\textsuperscript{r} 10-17. AA, however, does not slavishly endorse the Platonic theory, but adapts it and transforms it to its own scopes. In order to do so, AA begins the description of the way of eminence by referring to the three spheres of beauty, which roughly correspond to the examples in Plato and Alcinous (see supra this Chapter note 196), but develops the exposition by adding those aspects that are relevant to its conception of the divinity, such as salvation, light and unity. As a result, AA’s applications of the \textit{via eminentiae} seems to be based on groups of
ground to the way of abstraction, for it is only by means of overcoming all aspects of his
phenomenal being that an individual can come to grasp the divinity in a direct and immediate
act of contemplation. AA’s conception of the knowledge of God therefore presents similarities
with the Philonian version thereof. Like AA, Philo combines the *via eminentai*\textsuperscript{201} with the *via
negationis*\textsuperscript{202} and if the way of eminence allows the mind to rise from the sensible to the
intelligible and acquire a first dialectical idea of the divine, ultimate knowledge of God is only
achieved by means of revelation\textsuperscript{203}.

This combination of eminence and abstraction is also characteristic of Middle
Platonists, who add a third method, that of analogy. Even if Alcinous theoretically exposes all
three methods, he finally states that the *via negationis* is the only genuine method to grasp the
nature of the divinity\textsuperscript{204}. With regard to Celsus, he also states three ways to attain knowledge
of God, but his terminology is somewhat different than in the previous cases\textsuperscript{205}. For him, too,
the way of abstraction, *αναλυσις* or ‘analytical distinction’ in his terminology, is the only
valid method that may provide an approximation to the idea of divinity\textsuperscript{206}. Similarly,
Maximus of Tyre includes all three methods. Even though he initially seems to combine
analogy and eminence\textsuperscript{207}, it is only the *via negativa* that provides access to the divinity\textsuperscript{208}.
Clement of Alexandria combines eminence and abstraction, but as God is wholly abstract and
all human descriptions are simply symbolic, ultimate knowledge can only be attained by the
*via negativa*\textsuperscript{209}.

In certain milieus, however, the *via negativa* seems to have gained ground. Thus, for
instance, Plutarch defends only the validity of the way *κατ’ αναλυσιν* or ‘way of

\textsuperscript{201} Philo, *Leg. ad Gaium* 5; *Qu. Gen.* 2.54.
\textsuperscript{202} Philo, *Decal.* 26; *Opif.* 49; 98; *Leg. alleg.* 1.43f.
\textsuperscript{203} Philo, *Somn.* 1.186f. On the issue, see H. Chadwick, ‘Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought’, in
\textsuperscript{204} Alcinous, *Didask.* 164.31-165.19
\textsuperscript{205} Origen, *C. Cels.* 7.42. On the issue, see Festugière, *La Révélation*, IV, 115-23.
\textsuperscript{206} In Celsus’ terminology these three ways are *συγκεςις*, *αναλυσις* and *αναλυτικα*. According to Festugière,
*La Révélation*, IV, 115-23, in spite of their terminological differences Alcinous and Celsus basically coincide, for
Celsus’ synthesis is Alcinous’ *via eminentai* and his analytical distinction equates to the latter’s abstraction.
However, on the basis of Alcinous’ discussion of the analytical methods (*Didask.* 157.10ff), Krämer,
*Geistmetaphysik*, 105 note 279, has pointed out that Celsus’ synthesis, rather than the *via eminentai*, is an
inversion of the method of abstraction.
\textsuperscript{207} Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 11.7-9.
\textsuperscript{208} Symbolism of human descriptions in Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 2.72; *via negativa* in *Strom.* 2.6; 5.71.2-3;
5.71.81-2; 6.166; see, R. E. Witt, ‘The Hellenism of Clement of Alexandria’, *CQ* 25 (1931) 195-204 at 197;
abstraction\textsuperscript{210}. The exclusive use of the mode of abstraction is characteristic of those milieus in which God’s absolute transcendence is emphasised. According to the testimony of Eusebius\textsuperscript{211}, Numenius seems to have held that God can exclusively be grasped by means of abstraction\textsuperscript{212} and the \textit{Chaldaean Oracles} seem to defend the same view\textsuperscript{213}.

\textit{AA} does not go so far. Although it does describe the act of contemplation of the divinity as taking place once the individual has released all his shackles, this is the last step in a long process of withdrawal, the preliminary stages of which strictly follow the \textit{via eminentiae}\textsuperscript{214}. This is due to the fact that in \textit{AA} liberation from the fetters of physical existence is not something spontaneous or automatic. Rather, it is the result of conscious efforts by the individual in order to overcome the lower aspects of his being by means of self-knowledge and rational control\textsuperscript{215}.

2.2. God in \textit{AA}

\textit{AA}, consequently, significantly hesitates as to the nature of God. Whereas the sections that describe the way of abstraction present God as absolutely transcending the realm of being, those sections that expose the way of eminence imply a notion of the divinity as the supreme being and thus seem to hold a rather cosmic idea thereof. As we shall now see, this apparent contradiction arises from the combination of two ways of describing the divinity, an objective and rather philosophical description of his attributes, and a subjective, more religious portrayal that focuses on God’s attitude towards his people.

2.2.1. Objective Description of the Divinity

The preliminary description of the transcendent realm implicitly denied that God’s province partakes in time, movement and generation\textsuperscript{216}. Coherently with this description of his abode, \textit{AA} states that God is beyond time, for He is said to be ‘without beginning’ (α\textsuperscript{ē}ρξον)\textsuperscript{217}. This

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{210} Plutarch, \textit{Plat. quaest.} 1001c-1002a, κατ’ α\textsuperscript{ē}ρξον in his terminology.
  \item \textsuperscript{211} Eusebius, \textit{PE} 11.21.
  \item \textsuperscript{212} Numenius, fr. 2 Des Places. On the issue, Leemans, \textit{Numenius}, 36; Festugi\`ere, \textit{La R\`ev\`elation}, IV, 128-32; Kr\`amer, \textit{Geistmetaphysik}, 362 note 625.
  \item \textsuperscript{214} V\textsuperscript{r} 84-101.
  \item \textsuperscript{215} The \textit{via eminentiae} is stated in \textit{AA} in rather clear terms in the first speech to the brethren (V\textsuperscript{r} 1-24). However, note that, taken as a whole, Andrew’s other three speeches – the second to the brethren, the one to Stratocles and the one to Maximilla – also present a three-stage process of withdrawal, which after turning the attention from the lowest to the highest levels of reality culminates in the contemplation of God. This process of detachment also represents in a last analysis the application of the way of ascending degrees or way of eminence in order to reach the knowledge of God. See \textit{infra} this Chapter, § 3.1.2, pp. 279-81.
  \item \textsuperscript{216} See \textit{supra} this Chapter, § 1.4.1 \textit{passim}, pp. 251-54.
  \item \textsuperscript{217} V\textsuperscript{r} 239.
\end{itemize}
predication, which is already stated by Plutarch in *On the Delphic E*218, also appears in the *Corpus Hermeticum* in a context denoting the influence of the contemporary philosophical discussion on the nature of God219. Precisely in the same context as God’s description on the basis of a philosophical statement of His transcendence, God’s denomination as being ‘without beginning’ regularly appears in Gnostic texts such as *Eugnostos* and *Sophia Jesu Christi*, the *Apocryphon of John* and in the *Topography of the Heavenly World* of the Bruce Codex220. Both in *AA* and in all these parallels, the fact that God is without beginning implies that He is ‘unbegotten’ (α'βενθητον)221, that He has not been created (ου γενομένον) and, consequently, that He is alien to qualitative movement or change222.

In addition to these rather common Platonic predications, which mainly describe God’s everlasting nature, beyond movement and the processes of coming-to-be and passing-away223, *AA* insists on God’s transcendence by adding other traits that frequently appear in Middle Platonism. Our text speaks of God as being supercelestial, as unity and as that which remains unmoved224.

### 2.2.1.1. God as Supercelestial

As far as *AA*’s predication of God as supercelestial is concerned, the notion of a transcendent realm beyond the cosmos as the abode of truth already appears in Plato225. An important step towards placing God in this region seems to have been made in the Old Academy, for Speusipus appears to have postulated that the first principle, namely the One, was immaterial or above materiality226 and Xenocrates placed it ‘beyond the heavens’227. At any rate, the idea

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219 C.H. 4.8 (52.11-13 N-F).

220 *Eugnostos* (NHC III, 3) 75.2; *Sophia Jesu Christi* (BG 3) 91.3; *ApJohn* (BG 2) 23.6-7; *TopCael*. 228.1, 276.2. On the issue see M. Tardieu, *Écrits Gnostiques. Codex de Berlin* (Paris, 1984) 249, 360-61. See also *TriTrac* (NHC I, 5) 51.27ff, 52.9, 53.7, where the Father is said to be without beginning and unbegotten, *GosTruth* (NHC I, 3) 38.32-33; *ValExp* (NHC XI, 2) 22.23-24, 37-38. See also Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 1.11 ; 1.2.5.

221 On the double orthography θενθητον / θενθητον already in Plato, see Whittaker, *Alcinoos*, 114 note 264. For the different meanings of θενθητον as distinguished by Calvenus Taurus in his *Commentary on the Timaeus*, see supra this Chapter, p. 255 and note 142.

222 See supra this Chapter, § 1.4.1, 251-54 and 1.4.2.1, pp. 255-56. See also *TriTrac* (NHC I, 5) 52.1ff.

223 Plato, *Symp.* 211a, *Tim.* 28a, for the eternal character of the good; *Phd.* 78d; *Parm.* 135b-c, for its being beyond qualitative movement or change.

224 V*15-17.

225 The τοποῦ τῆς θείας οὐσίας is already described in Plato’s *Phaedrus* (247c 3ff) as the abode of truth, which is of a θείας οὐσίας. For Festugiére, *La Révélation IV*, 4-5 note 3, this passage of the *Phaedrus* is the origin of all later assertions on God’s transcendence.


227 Xenocrates, fr. 5 H (h(ektoj ouurancei kai nothh ouasia) with Witt, *Albinus*, 16 note 7 and Krämer, *Geistmetaphysik*, 109.)
that God is beyond or above the cosmos seems to be firmly established already in the first century BC, since Eudorus of Alexandria posits his God ‘beyond the cosmos’ (αὐ̂περανω νονοφί).228

AA describing God as supercelestial (ὑπερουρανιος) brings our text especially close to Middle Platonism, and more precisely to Alcinous’ denomination of his highest divinity229. In his commentary on the ομοιωσις or ‘likeness to God’, Alcinous indeed affirms that our goal must be the God ‘in the heavens’ (επουρανιος) and not the one ‘beyond the heavens’ (ὑπερουρανιος)230. Apuleius, in turn, in line with Alcinous, clearly conceives of God as transcending the realm of being and describes him as ultramundanus, summus231 or summus exsuperantissimus, adjectives which can also be found in the Asclepius232. Maximus of Tyre also presents such a view of the divinity, although his description follows Plato more closely than the preceding examples and places God ‘beyond the outermost vault of heavens’233. The absolute transcendence of God is stated in the Chaldaean Oracles as well, and if Lewis is right in assuming that the Theosophy of Tübingen 13 and 14 preserve fragments of an original Chaldaean mystagogy, we may even have an attestation of the same term as in AA and Alcinous234.

2.2.1.2. God as the Transcendent One

Regarding AA’s conception of God as the first and simple principle, namely as the transcendent One, we also find the idea in Middle Platonism235. As already mentioned, the idea of the unity of the intelligible realm originates in the ‘first hypothesis’ of the Parmenides,

228 Eudorus of Alexandria, ap. Simplicius, In Phys. 181.7 Diels. According to Alexander of Aphrodisias quoting Aspasius (In Metaph. 58.31-59.8 Hayduck), Eudorus even altered the text of Aristotle’s account of Plato’s philosophy (Metaph. 988a 10-11) in order to let Plato state the Pythagorean elevation of the One above the μνήμη and the διάρκεια. See Dodds, ‘Parmenides’, 139.

229 For the controversy concerning whether or not Alcinous stated that there was another entity above the θεόη (preparing in this way the θεόη of Plotinus), see T. Szlezák, Platon und Aristoteles in der Nuslehre Plotins (Bassel and Stuttgart, 1979) 213-14 and W. Deuse, Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre (Mainz, 1985) 82ff. In favour of such an interpretation, see Dörrie, ‘Zum Ursprung’, 340 note 4; Ph. Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness. Problems of the Soul in the Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic Tradition (The Hague, 1963) 62-65; Krämer, Geistmetaphysik, 381f. Cf. Invernizzi, Il Didascalikos I, 58-63. Against this view, see Mansfeld, ‘Three Notes on Albinus’, Theta-Pi 1 (1972) 61-80.

230 Alcinous, Didask. 181.40ff.

231 Apuleius, De Plat. 1.11, p. 95.8-9.

232 Apuleius, De Plat. 1.12; cf. Apuleius, De mund. 37. See also Asclepius 16 (315.17 N-F), summus; 41 (353.1 N-F), summus exsuperantissimus. See also infra this Chapter, p. 265, note 254.

233 See Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 10.9, 235-37, transl. Trapp. Cf. Plato, Phdr. 247a 8-b 1. Philo (Opif. 71) places God above the άκρα αυ των θεων. Further Asclep. 27 (332.9 N-F): supra verticem summi caeli consistens; [Aristotle] De mund. 397b 24; 398b 7; Eusebius, V. Const. 4.69; Kore Kosmou 17.2 (5.26 N-F). All passages quoted by Festugière, La Rédemption IV, 4-5. In general, Dodds, Proclus, 283.

234 On the Theosophy of Tübingen, Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles, 16-17. On the alleged fragments, see ibid. 83f. See also Proclus, In Parm. 1044.9f and the Chaldaean hymn in fr. 18 Kroll (its beginning in fr. 18 Des Places).
although until not long ago it was generally believed that Plotinus was the first to interpret the first five hypotheses of this Platonic dialogue ontologically (see below). In the Platonic Corpus, the notion of the One further appears in the Laws and in the Epinomis and, according to the testimony of Aristoxenus, Plato appears to have also stated that the Good was the One in his Lecture on Goodness. In spite of all these references, however, Merlan’s conclusion that ‘the One appears in Plato’s dialogues, but it is a somewhat ghostlike appearance’ seems to be justified, because it is never clear whether he is referring to the unity of the idea as opposed to sensibles or rather to a One transcending the ideas as well.

Consequently, it is plausible that the first hypothesis was first related to the ἐθόν or ‘transcendent One’ in the Old Academy. Be that as it may, Proclus knew of three different interpretations of the Parmenides, the third of which, according to Dodds, was the Neopythagorean interpretation that saw in the ‘first hypothesis’ the transcending One, in the second the ροι or ‘intellect’ and in the third the υγκ or ‘soul’. Moderatus in the first century AD bears witness to the Pythagorean origin of this interpretation of the Parmenides, which seems to be supported by Eudorus of Alexandria, who before him also stated the Pythagorean origin of his conception of the supreme God.

Pythagorean influence has also been adduced to explain Philo’s description of the supreme principle as the One or the Monad and, in fact, in an interesting passage he quotes Philolaus in order to give support to his argument. This notion of the One also turns up in Ammonius’ speech in the Plutarchean On the Delphic E. It is interesting that AA opposes unity and multiplicity (του ἑν, δι ὕπτα 

235 For the influence of the Old Academic stoixien metaphysics on Middle Platonism, see Krämer, Geistmetaphysik, 107-08.

236 Aristoxenus, Elem. harm. 39ff. See also Alcinous, Didask. 179.37-39ff; Proclus, In Parm. 688.10c; Simplicius, In Phys. 151.10; 454.18 Diels; In De an. 28.7 Hayduck.

237 Merlan, Greek Philosophy, 23; cf., however, H.J. Krämer, Arete bei Plato und Aristoteles (Heidelberg, 1959) 487-505. Platonic references to the One in Lgg. 962e-965e; Parm. 137d-142a; Epin. 986d; 991e-992b.

238 See supra, p. 264 and notes 226-227.

239 Dodds, ‘Parmenides’, 134-35.


242 Philo, Deus 11; Heres 187; Leg. alleg. 2.1.1-3; Opif. 100.

243 Philo, Opif. 100. Also quoted by J. Lydas, De mens 2.12, p. 34.1ff. W. See Philolaus, D-K 44, B 20. This fragment has also been attributed to Onatas, see H. Theis, Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (Åbo, 1965) 140. But, see C.A. Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, Pythagorean and Presocratic (Cambridge, 1993) 334-39.

name Apollo as ‘not-many’, or ‘one’ (α- privative and πολια), an etymology which is said to have been Pythagorean in origin. Another interesting similarity with AA is that Ammonius’ speech fluctuates peculiarly between a personal and an impersonal conception of divinity. AA indifferently refers to God as both τον θεόν (or οει) and οι (οι θεον)247. A similar hesitation already appears in Philo, who alternates the masculine designation ο(οθων) with the neutral τον θεόν οθων248. As has been pointed out, such a fluctuation may reflect efforts to combine the Neopythagorean transcendent One, τον θεόν, with the Platonic reality, ο(οθων)249.

Whether this conception is of Early or Neopythagorean origin250, or whether it represents a direct inheritance of the Old Academy discussion251, is irrelevant for our present purpose. For AA it is important that the conception of the transcendent One is especially relevant in Middle Platonism. To the previous passages may be added the testimony of Alcinous, who in spite of lacking God’s description as θεόν comes very close to it when he says that God is ανεξαναλογησις or ‘partless’252 or that he is απλος ‘simple’. In addition, Alcinous’ use of the way of abstraction to achieve an idea of the divinity seems to imply the conception of the One253. As far as Apuleius is concerned, a description of God as Unus frequently appears in his work254, although he does not state the method of abstraction as a way to know the divinity. Clement of Alexandria, by contrast, not only preserves a similar mathematical illustration of the method of abstraction255, but also shows the influence of the first two

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245 V’ 15.
246 The same etymology in Plutarch, De E 388f; De Is. 354f; 381f; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 1.24; Plotinus, Enn. 5.5.6; Porphyry, De abst. 2.36; Stobaeus 1, p. 10.5ff; J. Lydus, De mens 2.4.19; 2.11.35. For the Pythagorean origin of this etymology see Whittaker, ‘Ammonius’, 187 and P. Boyancé, ‘Études Philoniennes’, REG 76 (1963) 64-110 at 91ff, who thinks it is already implied in Philolaus (D-K 44, B 20, on which supra this Chapter, note 243). See also Macrobius, Sat. 1.17.65, attributed to Numenius (fr. 54 Des Places).
247 See V’ 15, τον θεόν (or οει) and V’ 18, 79, 107, 227, 231-232 for οι (οι θεον).
248 C.H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge, 1963 [1953]) 61. See Philo, Deus 12.1; Ebr. 83.2; Congr. 51.3 (οθων) and Opif. 172.3; Det. 160.8 (οθων).
249 On the issue, see Whittaker, ‘Ammonius’, 189. The same tendency is at work in Eudorus of Alexandria (ap. Simplicius, In Phys. 181.17ff Diels), in the view attributed to Pythagoras or Pythagoreans by Aetius 1.3.8 (= D-K 58, B 15) and 1.7.18 (Doxographie, 280, 302); Athenagoras, Suppl. 6.5 (= D-K 46, 4); Clement of Alexandria, Protr. 6.72.4; Iamblichus, Theol. ar. 3.21f.
251 Krämer, Geistmetaphysik, 105-19.
252 Alcinous, Didask. 165.30.
253 See also Alcinous, Didask. 167.33-34.
254 Apuleius, De Plat. 1.5.190; 1.11.204; De mund. 37.
255 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5.71.2, see Witt, ‘Clement’, 197; Krämer, Geistmetaphysik, 107-08; Whittaker, ‘Neopythagoreanism’, 112-15.
hypotheses of the Parmenides and describes the Father as and the Son as and the Father as and the Son as .

The notion appears in the Corpus Hermeticum as well. Even though in some treatises God or the Good is said to be superior to and the cause of the One in a way similar to that of Plotinus, in other treatises God is described with the formula and thus identified with the One. The Asclepius, for instance, frequently characterises God either as Unus or Unum. As for Gnosticism, the Nag Hammadi texts widely attest such a conception of the divinity. The beginning of the Tripartite Tractate is clear about the unity of the Father and so is the Gospel of Truth, where the Father is said to be ‘One and unique’. Numenius also presents such a conception. God’s predication as the One is not current in his fragments, but he does refer to God’s ‘simple essence’ or describes the first principle as ‘simple’ and even endorses Plato’s alleged equation of with the One.

2.2.1.3. God as Unmoved Mover

 describes God as the One or as unity already implies His lack of movement as both spatial and qualitative. This obviously means that the divine region is static and remains unchanged. But nevertheless explicitly refers to God’s stability as well. At the same time, even though unmoved, He attracts followers since He represents the ultimate goal of the laborious and gradual process of withdrawal from immanence in which they are engaged. The idea of God’s steadiness may well arise, as points out, from the Timaeus (37d 6), where it is already stated that the divine realm does not move or change, and Middle Platonists widely echo this Platonic notion. However, by combining the notions of God’s stability

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256 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.25.156.1. See Whittaker, Ῥᾶκείνα, 98-99. See also Witt, ‘Clement’, 197-98.
257 C.H. 2.12 (37.7-9 N-F); 5.2 (60.14-16 N-F).
258 Plotinus, Enn. 5.3.10-13, esp. 12.
259 C.H. 4.8 (52.11 N-F); 11.5 (149.9 N-F).
260 Asclepius 2 (298.3 N-F); 10 (321.7 N-F), Unus; 1 (296.10 N-F); 2 (297.23-24 N-F), Unum.
261 TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 51.9f, 51.18ff. The doctrine of TriTrac concerning the first principle’s unity differs from the dyadic primal source attributed by Irenaeus (Adv. haer. 1.11.1) to Valentinus and to the followers of Ptolomeus. According to H.Ch. Puech and G. Quispel, ‘Le quatrième écrit du Codex Jung?’, VChr 9 (1955) 65-102, however, this view was shared by other Valentinians as well; see also J. Zandee, The Terminology of Plotinus and Some Gnostic Writings, Mainly the Fourth Treatise of the Jung Codex (Istanbul, 1961); H.W. Attridge and E.H. Pagels, ‘The Tripartite Tractate’, in Attridge, Nag Hammadi Codices I. Notes, 217-497 at 218-19.
262 GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 23.15, 42.15. See also TopCael, passim.
263 Numenius fr. 11.11-14 Des Places, aπl ouj= 16.15, ουσία mâ nêh h(tou= prw=tou= 19.11-13 Des Places, to
264 See supra this Chapter, note 143.
265 Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles, 402; Alcinous, Didask. 170.24-26; Apuleius, De Plat. 1.10.1-2, tempus vero aevi esse imaginem, si quidem tempus movetur, perennitas fixa et immota natura est; Porphyry, Sent. 44.45-46; Chalcidius, In Tim. 104.
with the attraction force He exercises on his followers, AA reveals a clear Aristotelian background. And, as a matter of fact, numerous testimonies from late antiquity also reveal the influence of the Aristotelian conception of an unmoved prime mover. Middle Platonists, Corpus Hermeticum and Numenius equate the first principle with the Aristotelian intellect of the Metaphysics and with the unmoved prime mover of the Physics.

In a Gnostic context, many references to the incorruptibility of the transcendent realm clearly imply the notion of permanence and lack of qualitative motion or change. There are, however, explicit references as well. Thus, for instance, the Tripartite Tractate says that God is ‘invariable in his eternal existence, in his identity, in that by which he is established’. God’s immutability and lack of change is also implied in His description as the ‘unchanging good’ in Eugnostos and in Sophia Jesu Christi.

2.2.2. Subjective Description of God

The rather transcendent conception of God that is stated by means of the objective description is, however, counterbalanced by a more subjective characterisation. Whereas in the former approach God is described from the perspective of what He is, in the latter He is described from the perspective of what He represents for His people. This subjective perspective obviously implies, if not a cosmic or immanent conception of God, at least a less transcendent notion than the former one in so far as God is involved in the destiny of His people.

2.2.2.1. God as Light

An important subjective description of the divinity is achieved by means of the light metaphor. AA several times refers to light as the main trait of the divine realm. Light is said to be the origin of the blessed race and, consequently, the or ‘transcendent man’ (or intellect) is described as ‘light’ and as ‘transparent’. Finally, AA also mentions the ‘light of logos’, which seems to refer to the revelation or divine intervention that awakes the blessed race from the slumber of oblivion and allows it to remember its true origin.

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266 Alcinous, Didask. 164.20-31: God is described as an unmoved mover (cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 1072b 3ff); Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 11.12, 289-291.
267 C.H. 2.6; 8; 12; 10.14; 11; 13.11 (205.3 N-F). akl irhj, see Philo, Gig. 11.49 and Plotinus, Enn. 2.9.2.3 (akl irhj, rouj).
268 Numenius, fr. 15 (see Krämer, Geistmetaphysik, passim) and fr. 5 Des Places.
269 See Philo, Somn. 1.7-8.
270 Aristotle, Metaph. 1071b-1073a 14; Phys. VIII, passim.
271 HypArch (NHC II, 4) 88.18; GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 42.10; ApJohn (NHC II, 1) 3.19-20.
272 TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 52.10-14.
273 Eugnostos (NHC III, 3) 72.17 and SophJesChr (NHC III, 4) 95.10.
274 V 14-15.
275 V 91-92.
This reference to the light of logos has provided grounds for the suggestion that AA shows the influence of Tatian (due to his Oriental provenance?) but, as Prieur has rightly pointed out, the metaphor of light is too widespread to sustain such a hypothesis.

As a matter of fact, the light metaphor has frequently been considered an ‘Oriental influence’. As early as 1928, however, Dodds dismissed the alleged oriental origin of Plotinus’ metaphor of illumination in a famous article. Unlike in Middle Platonism, the metaphysics of light is an essential chapter in Plotinus’ philosophy. According to Dodds, the motif can be traced back to the simile of the sun in the Platonic Republic and to the description of the sudden moment of insight as ‘a light kindled from a leaping fire’ in Plato’s Seventh Letter. The real being for Plato is light and consequently illuminates all things. This identification of being with light and the correspondence between both light and the Good and between light and truth implies that by knowing the real being man is illuminated, although such illumination should not be thought of as a mystical sort of experience. As has frequently been pointed out, the contemplation of the light in Plato is not an end in itself but rather the means to understand reality.

AA’s view, however, is somewhat different from the Platonic and Plotinian conception of light. In the Acts of Andrew tangible reality is not conceived of as formed on the model of the intelligible realm but rather as opposed to it. Light, consequently, is no longer a means to attain a true knowledge of things but an end in itself. Man’s remembrance that his origin is in the light allows him to liberate himself from the constrictions of the sensible and to return to his supramundane fatherland. In this conception of light, AA clearly reflects the change in the light symbolism that takes place in Hellenistic times. Even though the original Platonic meaning is still traceable when authors such as Alcinous and Maximus of Tyre echo Plato’s Seventh Letter, light in this period is increasingly associated with the desired ‘Jenseits’ and

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276 V' 253-54.
279 Dodds, ‘Parmenides’, passim.
280 See, for example, Plotinus, Enn. 5.3.12.40-51; 5.5.7.17-35; 6.7.21; 22. See W. Beierwaltes, ‘Die Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins’, ZPhF 16 (1961) 334-62.
281 Plato, Rep. 508b-c; 509b; Epist. 7 341c. To these passages, C. Baeumker, Witelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts (Münster, 1991) 362 also adds the myth of Er in the Republic (614bff).
282 Plato, Rep. 518c.
283 Plato, Epist. 7 341c.
285 V' 5-17. See supra this Chapter, § 1.1, pp. 242-45 at 244.
286 V' 91-101, on which our commentary supra Chapter 4, § 3.2.5, pp. 203-04.
287 Alcinous, Didask. 163.30ff; Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 11.10.
the subsequent liberation from darkness of ‘Diesseits’. As light represents God and the transcendent realm, man’s illumination represents his divinisation.

This important semantic shift does not, however, arise from a radical change in the conception of light. Rather, it is the result of a more general change in the view of the world and of man’s place in it. The gradual development of a dualistic view of reality as a result of man’s alienation from his world is an essential factor in this change that Hellenistic testimonies widely attest. Plutarch, for instance, even though preserving the Platonic metaphors, already introduces a sort of mystical approach in which the light of God becomes the object of contemplation. Something of the kind can be seen in Philo, too, who in spite of drawing on Plato’s conception of light leaves room for a mystical understanding thereof. Although he accepts Plato’s view of the unity of the cosmos and considers sensible reality as formed on the model of the intelligible, the Alexandrian nevertheless tends to make light not the supreme level of reality but rather something that transcends it.

AA’s dualism implies an even more radical distinction between light as the divine, transcendent realm and ἄσκοτος ‘darkness’ as the lower, sensible reality. AA’s conception, therefore, finds a more proper parallel in the Corpus Hermeticum. Like AA, the Poimandres describes God as ‘light’ and the logos, as son of God, is also described as φωτείνος, in a way similar to AA, which refers to the ‘light of logos’ (τὸ όνομ ὁ λόγος φωτείνος). There are still other conspicuous similarities between both texts. Both Poimandres and AA emphasise the importance of man’s becoming aware of his origin in the realm of light in order for him to be able to return to it. They also present a very similar conception of the illumination by means of which this knowledge is achieved. If in AA the light of logos that allows the blessed

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290 Plutarch, Lat. Viv. 1129a-b (light-knowledge); Def. orac. 433d (light-truth); 419f (light-soul). The light as object of pure contemplation in De gen. Socr. 590b ff.

291 So, for instance, his opposing ‘light’ not to ‘darkness’ but to ‘sensible light’ in Somm. 1.115-117; Opif. 30; Abrah. 119; Mut. 4ff. See Conzelmann, ‘φωτεινός’, 322 note 135.

292 Philo, Conf. 61; Ebr. 208; Opif. 31. See F.N. Klein, Die Lichtterminologie bei Philon von Alexandrien und den hermetischen Schriften (Leiden, 1962).

293 See C.H. 1.6 (8.15-17 N-F), 295 (336.6-11 N-F).

294 C.H. 1.5 (8.5-6 N-F), 1.6 (8.17-18 N-F). Cf. Asclep. 18 (317.11-21 N-F); 29 (336.6-11 N-F).

295 V. 253.

296 V. 4-10 and 205-08.
race to reject the futility of externals is the result of God’s grace and goodness, Poimandres clearly describes the illumination as a gift or grace (xatij) of God as well. The clearest example of divine illumination as a gift of God that allows man to know the divinity, however, appears in the Asclepius. God’s illumination endows the individual with intellect, reason and knowledge by means of which he will come to know God’s real nature. This process of self-knowledge also culminates, as in AA, in a sort of ecstatic experience through which man is divinised and becomes light himself.

The association of light with God and the transcendent realm is further widely attested in Gnosticism. Hippolytus’ Refutatio corroborates its use in several Gnostic milieus. If Simon Magus appears to present Stoic influence when considering God’s power as invisible fire, Docetists speak of the realm of the aeons as light, and Sethians put light in their upper realm. But the clearest parallel for AA’s assertion that the belongs to the realm of light appears, perhaps, in the Gospel of Thomas: ‘If they say to you “Where did you come from” say to them “We came from the light, the place where the light came into being on its own accord and established [itself]”. The idea is also recurrent in the Apocryphon of John and pervades other Gnostic texts, such as Pistis Sophia and the Book of Jeu, in which references to the ‘kingdom of light and ‘children of light’ are abundant. Further, the comparison of light with revelation and its announcement by the word also appears in the Gospel of Truth and in the Authoritative Teaching which also refers to the ‘light of the word’.

The same symbolism frequently appears in works denoting Gnostic influence as well. In the Odes of Salomon light and darkness are clearly antithetical. As the divine realm is light, it is the goal and final destination of the soul’s ascent. By means of revelation,
which is also light\footnote{OdSal. 35.7.} and is announced by the light of the word\footnote{OdSal. 6.7; 10.1; 32.1.}, those who are redeemed put on the light\footnote{OdSal. 12.7; 41.14.}. In the Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions the divine realm is also frequently described as ‘immeasurable light’\footnote{OdSal. 21.3.}. The Chaldaean Oracles, finally, even though mainly presenting Stoic influence and thus referring to God and the divine realm as ‘fire’, nevertheless include an interesting reference to the patrogenē ἡμᾶς or ‘father-begotten light’\footnote{Recogn. 2.61.5ff; 2.70.1; 3.15.5. See W. Bousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis (Göttingen, 1973 [1907]) 89.}, which is the Chaldaean aeon\footnote{Or. Chald. fr. 49.1 Des Places and notes ad loc.}.\footnote{See on the issue, Lewy, Chaldaean Oracles, 99 note 138. On the Stoic influence ibid 427ff.}

2.2.2.2. God as Unenvious Sharer

\textit{AA} repeatedly refers to God’s attitude towards the blessed race as characterised by His ‘love’ and ‘pity’. Out of His goodness (χρηστότητα) He recognises His people and by recognising them allows them to know Him\footnote{V 1-24 with our commentary supra, Chapter 4, § 3.1.2, pp. 193-95.}. A similar conception appears in Clement of Alexandria. Even though asserting that God is incomprehensible and beyond our knowledge, and that He therefore is only approachable by means of the \textit{via negativa}, Clement can nevertheless define God, like \textit{AA}, as love, goodness and righteousness\footnote{Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.7-8; 1.62ff; 88; Strom. 4.100; 113; 5.13; 6.109; 7.15; Quis dives 37.} and say that His grace allows man to know Him\footnote{See in general supra this Chapter, § 2.1, pp. 261-63 and for Clement’s position ibid., p. 262 and note 209 to this Chapter.}.

However, \textit{AA} goes a step further than Clement. The Alexandrian’s wording shows that, in his view, God’s grace simply provides man with a clue to understanding what in normal circumstances is veiled or unknown to him and that this knowledge, consequently, is still of a discursive sort, because the subject and object of knowledge are still mediated by God’s logos. A similar conception of God’s grace appears in a passage in Irenaeus’ \textit{Against Heresies}, in which he tries to reconcile Exodus 33:20 with Matt 5:8: if man can see God and live, this is due to God’s grace\footnote{Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 4.20.5, Dominus ait: “Beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt”. Sed secundum magnitudinem eius, et mirabilem gloriam, “nemo videbit Deum, et vivet”; incapabilis enim Pater: secundum autem dilectionem et humanitatem, et quod omnia possit, etiam hoc concedit iis qui se diligunt, id est videre Deum, quod et prophetabant prophetae. Quoniam “quae impossibilita apud homines, possibilita apud Deum”.}. The underlying notion is once again that of an essential difference between human beings and God, namely between the subject and object of knowledge.
AA presents a rather different view of divine grace. In AA God’s grace is not primarily conceived of as a gift that allows people to know him. Rather, God’s grace consists of Him recognising those who belong to Him, this preliminary recognition being what allows people to know Him. If for Clement and Irenaeus, God’s grace consists of His making possible the impossible – namely that the unlike may know the unlike – in AA it consists of God elevating His people to His own level in order to allow an immediate and sudden knowledge of the like by the like. This is the reason why God’s grace is described in AA as His ‘unenvious sharing’. By recognising those who belong to Him, God endows them with a new ontological status. The very fact that God knows His people implies, through the principle of ‘like knows like’, that they are automatically removed from the sensible and partake in God’s nature.

A very similar approach can be found in the Corpus Hermeticum. According to The Key, God knows man and wants to be known by him. But not everyone is known by or can know God. Rather, as the Poimandres clearly states, God ‘wants to be known and makes himself known to those that belong to him’. As in AA, God’s recognition establishes (or is possible through) a predetermined relationship of belonging between subject and object that makes knowledge possible. This previous election of those who are allowed to know God also appears in the Gospel of Truth, since the ‘gospel of the one who is searched for’ is revealed to ‘those who are perfect through the mercies of the Father’.

This is the reason why, according to AA, God is ‘merciful’ and ‘saviour’ of His people. By recognising those who belong to Him, God endows the blessed race with a new status, with a kinship with the intelligible that allows the people to overcome the power and the realm of the destroyer and the unmerciful one.

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321 As in 1John 4:7-8; John 14:15-19; 1Tim 2:4; Heb. 8:11.
322 See V 2-6, 17-19. See also supra Chapter 4, § 3.1.2, pp. 193-95.
323 Clement’s position, however, is not always consistent. Witt, ‘Clement’, 197, has noted that while in Exc. Theod. 50.2 he rejects the Gnostic view that human and divine nature are of the same kind, he nevertheless applies this notion to explain the relationship of human soul with the divine (Strom. 6.113; 7.101.4). In addition, he also accepts the doctrine of the potential divinity of man (Strom. 4.149.8).
324 See supra Chapter 4, pp. 193-95 and note 157.
326 C.H. 1.31 (18.3-4 N-F).
328 V 13-4.
2.2.2.3. God as *causa finalis* and *causa efficiens*

Consequently, in *AA* God is simultaneously *causa finalis* and *causa efficiens*. As *causa finalis* he attracts His people as the object of desire. In recognising those who belong to Him, God provides them with their *tel oj* or ‘goal’, which coincides with their *a†xh/ or ‘origin’. The recognition of like by like assures the blessed race that they actually belong and facilitates the reorienting of their will toward the intelligible. As *causa efficiens* He awakens their consciousness of the kinship\(^{330}\). The light of logos intervenes in order to reorganise the disorder resulting from the interference of the sensible\(^{331}\).

The conception of God both as a final and efficient cause is recurrent in the second century AD. As we will see below, all testimonies preserving the conception of the double causality of God seem to rely heavily on Aristotle. On the one hand, God’s final causality is explicitly stated in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and Aristotle’s explanation of God’s attraction as *ofekton* or ‘object of desire’ was a successful one in late antiquity\(^{332}\). On the other hand, His efficient causality, even though not explicitly stated in the *Corpus*, was frequently concluded from the exegetical efforts to illuminate certain obscure passages or aporias in the works of the Philosopher.

God’s double causality appears, for instance, in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ interpretation of Aristotle’s noetics and in his development of the notion of the ‘adventitious intellect’ (*noij=quqaqen*). This intellect, which comes into man from outside, is the cause of the actualisation of the ‘material intellect’ (*u†ikoj noij*)\(^{333}\) which transforms it, first, into ‘acquired intellect’ (*epikthoj noij*)\(^{334}\) and, finally, into ‘productive intellect’ (*noij= po†htikoj*)\(^{335}\). It is noteworthy that, according to Alexander, man assimilates himself to the divine by means of this actualisation\(^{336}\).

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\(^{329}\) See V’ 2-10. This is not, however, an automatic matter, but rather the beginning of a long process of withdrawal that requires personal will and effort, see *infra* this Chapter, § 3.1.2, pp. 279-81.

\(^{330}\) See V’ 205-09 and 2-5.

\(^{331}\) See V’ 252-260.

\(^{332}\) See *supra* this Chapter, p. 247 and notes 53-54.

\(^{333}\) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De an*. 81.9-28.

\(^{334}\) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De an*. 82.1-6.

\(^{335}\) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De an*. 90.19ff.

\(^{336}\) See also Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De an*. 91.5-6. On the issue see our ‘Bridging the Gulf between Transcendence and Immanence in Late Antiquity’, in A.A. MacDonald et al. (eds), *Scholarship and Society in the Near-East, the Greco-Roman World, and the Early Medieval West* (Leuven 2003) 37-51 at 38-40. Since Alexander in this context uses the verb *omiousqai* (*De an*. 90.17), Merlan, *Monopsychism*, 16f, has suggested that we may have here a Peripatetic version of the Platonic ‘likeness to God’. Cf., however, Donini, *Tre Studi*, 36f.
The same combination appears in Alcinous’ explanation of God’s causality in turning the cosmic soul toward Himself\textsuperscript{337}. This passage of the Didaskalikos is interesting because it reveals many contacts with the conceptual background of $AA$. In the first place Alcinous, like $AA$, implies God’s double causality, final and efficient\textsuperscript{338}. The Cosmic-Soul is intrinsically related to God and as such is naturally attracted to Him. However, this does not seem to be enough, because according to Alcinous God ‘bestows order’ ($\text{NRVPHZ}$) on the Cosmic-Soul by rousing it from a deep sleep and by turning ($\text{episr}\text{w}$) it towards Himself\textsuperscript{339}. This is how the Cosmic-Intellect of the Cosmic-Soul is brought into actuality\textsuperscript{340}. Not only Alcinous’ ‘deep sleep’ is comparable with $AA$’s slumber of oblivion, the idea of God ‘ordering’ the human soul, as we will see below, also has a parallel in $AA$\textsuperscript{341}.

The *Gospel of Truth* presents a very interesting parallel to these issues which is even closer to $AA$ than the preceding examples. According to this Nag Hammadi text, God’s efficient causality is necessary because of the oblivion concerning the Father. The knowledge of the Father makes its appearance ‘in order that oblivion might be vanished and the Father might be known’\textsuperscript{342}. This knowledge, however, does not reach everyone, because God’s intervention reveals the hidden mystery only ‘to those who are perfect through the mercies of the Father’ and among them ‘enlightens those who were in darkness through oblivion’\textsuperscript{343}. We not only find here the notion of God’s efficient causality, but also that of oblivion as the main reason for God’s intervention, the equation of ignorance with sleep and of knowledge with the act of rousing from this sleep\textsuperscript{344}. Both in the *Gospel of Truth* and in $AA$ the elect remain ignorant of God because of the oblivion generated by the contact with the sensible. Although they belong to Him, they cannot know Him and this implies that they cannot return to Him. God’s intervention dissipates this oblivion by actualising their knowledge of themselves and by granting their perfection as a return to Him.

\textsuperscript{337} Alcinous, *Didask.* 164.23-165.4.
\textsuperscript{338} See Loenen, ‘Albinus’ Metaphysics. An attempt at Rehabilitation (I),’ 302ff; Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* II, 464.
\textsuperscript{339} Alcinous, *Didask.* 165.1-3.
\textsuperscript{340} For the Aristotelian influence on Alcinous, see our ‘Bridging the Gulf’ at 42-3 and notes 46-50.
\textsuperscript{341} Alcinous, *Didask.* 165.1-3.
\textsuperscript{342} For the Aristotelian origin of the motif of the ‘deep sleep’, see our ‘Bridging the Gulf’, notes 46 and 50. For a Middle Platonic origin, see Witt, *Albinus*, 131-132; for its origin in Plutarch, see J.H. Loenen, ‘Albinus’ Metaphysics. An attempt at Rehabilitation (II),’ *Mnemosyne* IV 10 (1957) 35-56 at 51. See the motif also in Aristides Quintilianus, *Mus.* 3.25, p. 128.29; A.P. Bos, ‘“Aristotelian” and “Platonic” Dualism in Hellenistic and Early Christian Philosophy and in Gnosticism’, *VChr* 56 (2002) 273-91 at 287 note 58.
\textsuperscript{343} *GosTruth* (NHC I, 3) 18.1-7.
\textsuperscript{344} *GosTruth* (NHC I, 3) 18.17-18.
\textsuperscript{345} *GosTruth* (NHC I, 3) 30.6-16. For a very similar conception of the rousing enacted by knowledge ($\text{episr}\text{w}$) and of ignorance as sleep, see Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 10.3, 73-76. On the issue, see our ‘Bridging the Gulf’, 43-44.
2.2.3. Conclusions Concerning the Study of AA’s Theology

The analysis of AA’s theology has produced interesting results. The philosophical tendency revealed by the study of the text’s cosmology is also confirmed by its theology. This is especially evident in the appearance of the two known ways to achieve knowledge of God, the way of eminence and that of abstraction, and in the objective description of the divinity by means of philosophical tenets that were widespread in the period. As far as the former are concerned, the combination of eminence and abstraction in AA is shared by most philosophical texts of the period, as they also share the peculiar hesitation concerning the nature of the divine. However, AA’s emphasis on the light of logos – that is, on revelation – brings our text into close connection with other religious-philosophical texts such as Philo, Clement, Corpus Hermeticum and Gnosticism.

As regards the latter, AA’s objective description of God presents a strong philosophical undercurrent. A comparative survey of the texts of the period, however, shows that this philosophical characterisation of the divinity is not confined to philosophical texts but has also been adopted by other religious writers. The authors of the Corpus Hermeticum, Nag Hammadi texts and the Chaldaean Oracles also describe God as the supercelestial, transcendent One and as unmoved mover. AA’s proximity to these latter groups becomes even clearer by combining this objective description with a more subjective portrayal. AA’s version of the notion of God as light, its view of the divinity as unenvious sharer and especially the double causality of the divinity, viz. final and efficient, even though present in philosophical writers as well, are particularly close to similar views in Hermetic and Gnostic texts.

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345 See supra this Chapter, pp. 261-63 and 263ff.
346 See supra this Chapter, § 2.2.1.3, pp. 268-69.
3. Anthropology

3.1. Preliminary Issues

3.1.1. Anthropological Dualism in AA

AA’s strong dualism is also evident in its conception of two clearly differentiated human races, that of the ‘kindred of the unbegotten’ (suggenei=tou=apennh=tou) and that of the ‘kindred of the body’ (suggenei=tou=what=oj). As far as the former is concerned, it owes its status to God’s recognition. Out of His love and pity and by means of His unenvious sharing, God endows the elect or ‘happy race’ with the superior ontological status that potentially removes them from the sensible realm and allows them to partake in the world beyond time, movement and decay. Yet this ontological promotion does not imply an automatic or predetermined salvation, as we will see below.

With regard to the second, inferior race of those ‘cast to the ground’ (xamairrif=ei), the ‘aliens’ (al=otrioi) who are akin to the body, it remains trapped in the processes of coming-to-be and passing-away of the lower sublunary world. Aegeates, as its main representative, is actively engaged in performing all ‘lower’ human functions and activities. He is prone to passions (love, anger, sexual desires), he adheres to social values and customs (family, marriage, friendship), and he is governed by physiological needs (sexuality, reproduction, food, etc.). But the lower race is not only negative for itself. The most negative side of its existence is the active threat it represents to the blessed race. It is clear in Aegeates’ description as ‘son of the devil’ and ‘son of the serpent’ that the human race akin to the body is conceived of as the ‘army of the devil’. Aegeates is also characterised as the ‘enemy’, as belonging to the enemy and as an instrument of the devil who arms ‘his offspring’ against all those who belong to God.

Consequently, these two races are genealogically and ontologically radically opposed to one another. Genealogically, the blessed race belongs to the merciful, to the best, to beauty,
to righteousness, to the saviour and to light. Ontologically it belongs to the supercelestial, to
the everlasting and to that which remains unmove. By contrast, the cognates of the body are
akin, genealogically, to the worse, to the ugly, to the unrighteous, to the unmerciful, to the
destroyer and to darkness\textsuperscript{356} and, ontologically, to the sublunary realm of time, movement,
flux and decay\textsuperscript{357}.

In spite of the rather irreconcilable character of these two groups, it has been suggested
that \textit{AA} does not, strictly speaking, purport a strict anthropological dualism because it
allegedly does not state a genealogical distinction between both races. According to this
interpretation, the differentiation between these two classes is instead due to the reception or
rejection of the message of salvation\textsuperscript{358}. Given the fragmentary condition of our text, it is
obviously difficult to ascertain the sort of dualism we are dealing with. One thing, however, is
sure: the ontological differentiation that allows the blessed race to overcome its state of
degradation does not proceed from their contact with the words or message of salvation but is
rather a previous step to it. It is not Andrew’s message which endows them with their special
status but rather God’s love and pity, which are equated with His recognising His people\textsuperscript{359}.
Andrew explicitly states that he was sent by his master in order to remind those akin to the
words that they are wasting their time among ephemeral evils\textsuperscript{360}. This reminder makes clear
that Andrew’s message does not alter their nature, but simply actualises what already was in
them in a potential state.

3.1.2. Is \textit{AA}’s Anthropological Dualism Deterministic?

It will become clear from what follows that this conception does not, however, imply a
deterministic concept of salvation\textsuperscript{361}. \textit{AA}’s anthropological dualism does not imply that the
‘blessed race’ is saved in advance. Rather, this race tends to remain trapped in an extraneous
environment and this is precisely the goal of Andrew’s message, which consequently is not

\textsuperscript{356} This relationship of material individuals with darkness is very widespread in Gnosticism, see \textit{TriTrac} (NHC I, 5) 89.26, 119.9ff.
\textsuperscript{357} V 4-17.
\textsuperscript{358} Hornschuh, ‘Andreasakten’, 272-73; Williams, \textit{Unmoveable Race}, 181-82.
\textsuperscript{359} V 4-6 with \textit{supra} Chapter 4, § 3.1.2, pp. 193-95.
\textsuperscript{360} V 205-09.
\textsuperscript{361} According to Irenaeus’ (\textit{Adv. haer.} 1.6.1-2; 7.5, for ‘material people’; 1.6.2; 7.5, for the salvation of the spirituals) and Clement’s (\textit{Exc. Theod.} 54) reports, Gnostics divided humanity into three ‘natures’. The question of determinism in the Gnostic conception of the human classes has received special attention in the last years. Against the statement of what has been called the ‘heresiological cliche’ (G. Luttikhuizen, ‘Gnostic Ideas about Eve’s Children and the Salvation of Humanity’, in Luttikhuizen (ed) \textit{Eve’s Children. The Biblical Stories Retold and Interpreted in Jewish and Christian Traditions} (Leiden, 2003) 203-17 at 203-07), recent studies on the issue in the large corpus of Nag Hammadi claim that such a conception is not supported by our Gnostic sources. See W.A. Löhr, ‘Gnostic Determinism Reconsidered’, \textit{VChr} 46 (1992) 381-90; Williams, \textit{Unmoveable Race}, 189.
directed to everyone, but to the race of the elect. Their salvation, however, is not automatic, since it depends on their accepting or rejecting the message of Andrew’s words.\textsuperscript{362}

*AA* especially focuses on the destiny of this race and analyses the different possible attitudes towards its a priori election. It is possible to say that God’s recognition, although a *conditio sine qua non*, does not imply that every member of this group will be saved. God’s recognition of His people is a potentiality that people must bring into actuality by means of personal effort.\textsuperscript{363} Our analysis has shown that it is possible to distinguish three different levels of awareness among Andrew’s followers.\textsuperscript{364} Although we concluded that this triadic differentiation does not imply a determinist sort of classification, it does state three different degrees of insight, which are equated to three stages in the progress towards salvation. Whereas the first of these stages is represented by those who receive the knowledge transmitted by Andrew (brethren), the middle stage already shows possession of this knowledge but not yet its active application (Stratocles). The most advanced stage, on the other hand, presents an active application of the received knowledge in order to achieve what the blessed race by nature strives for: knowledge of God (Maximilla).\textsuperscript{365}

To illustrate this differentiation, we can make a comparison with the Aristotelian analysis of three different levels of knowledge on the basis of the notions of potentiality and actuality.\textsuperscript{366} The first of our stages might be compared to the plain potentiality to know and to receive knowledge, like a child who, possessing the intellectual capabilities, attends school in order to acquire a given skill.\textsuperscript{367} The second stage corresponds with those individuals who, having already acquired a given knowledge or skill, do not actively apply it and possess it in a dormant or passive state, for example a general or grammarian who is sleeping or simply not exercising his knowledge.\textsuperscript{368} The third stage is that of the active exercise and application of

\textsuperscript{362} We cannot ascertain whether or not *AA* considered it to be possible for members of one class to migrate to the other or vice versa. Strictly speaking, it is not possible to state that Aegeates, for instance, will never reach salvation, because the material class of humans is not the main focus of our text and consequently no clear statement is made on the issue. What we can affirm, however, is that although salvation of the blessed race is not an automatic and deterministically pre-established matter, belonging to this human class is a necessary precondition to achieving it.


\textsuperscript{364} See *supra*, Chapter 4, § 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, pp. 225-30.

\textsuperscript{365} See *supra* this Chapter, note 215.

\textsuperscript{366} For Aristotle’s differentiation between capacity to know, possession of knowledge and active exercise thereof, see Aristotle, *De an.* 412a 9-11; 22-26.

\textsuperscript{367} Aristotle, *De an.* 417b 29-31.

\textsuperscript{368} In Aristotelian terminology this kind of knowledge is called *episthēmē*. See Aristotle, *GA* 735a 9-12.
knowledge, which would be the individual who is engaged in developing a given activity by means of the knowledge he or she has previously acquired.\footnote{This would correspond to the Aristotelian definition of \textit{qewrti}}.

3.1.3. \textit{AA}'s Combination of the Bipartite and Tripartite Division of Mankind

Consequently, we see that \textit{AA} does not simply endorse the known trichotomic division of humanity into three classes or natures. This tripartite division of mankind, which we already see in Aristotle’s distinction of the three ways of life, \textit{a poliaustiko}, \textit{politiko} and \textit{qewrti}, and which Heraclides of Pontus and Iamblichus attribute to Pythagoras, is indeed quite widespread in antiquity. It appears in Philo’s differentiation of men into earth-born, heaven-born and God-born in \textit{On the Giants}, in Plutarch and in Alcinous. A similar triad is at work in several tractates of the \textit{Corpus Hermeticum} and the same holds true for various Gnostic groups that classified mankind into the three known classes, viz. \textit{pneumatikoi, psychikoi} and \textit{hylikoi}. In \textit{AA} we instead find a more basic and probably earlier dichotomy that distinguishes between spirituals or individuals endowed with reason, and material or irrational beings. Whereas the latter seem to be excluded from salvation, the former are potentially saved.\footnote{For the earlier Gnostic differentiation between two human races, namely the spirituals and the materials, and for the later creation of an intermediate category as a result of historical developments within Christianity, see Jonas, \textit{Gnosis}, 212ff.}

However, when exposing the way in which man’s salvation is achieved \textit{AA} distinguishes three degrees of insight or stages in the process toward this salvation. In this sense, \textit{AA} combines a basic bipartite division of mankind into rational and irrational individuals with the tripartite subclassification of the former class. Plotinus seems to have applied a very similar human typology in his fifth \textit{Ennead}. Dillon compares this Plotinian passage with the aforementioned tripartite division of humanity in Philo’s \textit{On the Giants}, as if

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{\textit{This} would correspond to the Aristotelian definition of \textit{qewrti}. See Aristotle, \textit{De an}. 417a 21ff.}
\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{EN} 1095b 14-1096a 10; \textit{EE} 1216a 19ff. See, however, already Plato, \textit{Tim.} 30b, 90a.}
\footnote{Heraclides of Pontus, fr. 88 Wehrli (\textit{ap.} Cicero, \textit{Tusc. Disp.} 5.3.8-9).}
\footnote{Philo, \textit{Gig.} 60ff.}
\footnote{Plutarch, \textit{De facie} 943a-b.}
\footnote{Alcinous, \textit{Didask}. 156.41-44.}
\footnote{\textit{C.H.} 9.9 (100.6-9 N-F); cf. 10.19-21 (122.13-124.2 N-F) and \textit{C.H.} 1, \textit{passim}.}
\footnote{See Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. haer.} 1.1.14; 1.6-7; Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Exc. Theod.} 54; \textit{Strom.} 2.10-11; 3.3.3; 4.89.4; 5.3.3; Origen, \textit{De princip.} 3.1.2-4; in \textit{Joh.} 13.10.64; Hippolytus, \textit{Ref.} 10.9-10. See, however, supra this Chapter, note 361, but see also \textit{TriTrac} (NHC I, 5) 118.14-119.34.}
\footnote{For the earlier Gnostic differentiation between two human races, namely the spirituals and the materials, and for the later creation of an intermediate category as a result of historical developments within Christianity, see Jonas, \textit{Gnosis}, 212ff.}
\footnote{See, however, supra this Chapter, p. 280 note 362.}
\footnote{See supra p. 280.}
\footnote{Plotinus, \textit{Enn}. 5.9.1.}
\end{footnotesize}
Plotinus were stating the same triadic division. Admittedly, Plotinus’ editors have traditionally interpreted this section as a Platonic school polemic against Epicureans and Stoics, but interpreters tend to neglect the fact that Plotinus considers a fourth human group along with the other three that allegedly represent Epicureanism, Stoicism and Platonism, namely the class of men who live according to the dictates of sense-perception. An attentive reading, consequently, shows that this Plotinian passage distinguishes not three but four classes of people and that Plotinus does so on the basis of the more basic dichotomy irrationality-rationality, in order to distinguish afterwards three different levels of insight among those that possesses rationality. Obviously we are not suggesting a Plotinian influence on our text. We simply intend to show that Plotinus may preserve, like AA, the confluence of two different classifications of mankind: on the one hand, a basic differentiation on the basis of the dichotomy rational-irrational or spiritual-sensible; on the other hand, a tripartite division that may result from the triadic conception of the three degrees of virtue. Having analysed these preliminary issues let us now concentrate on AA’s conception of man.

3.2. AA’s Conception of Man

AA’s combination of bipartite and tripartite schemes in its classification of mankind is also at work in its conception of man at a particular level. This combination is clear in AA’s distinction between a transcendent and an immanent man and in its conception of the latter as consisting of body (σώματος), soul (ψυχή) and intellect (nous).

3.2.1. Transcendent Man

This basic dichotomy between a visible, physical being engaged in sense-perception and an invisible, incorporeal one that glances at the intelligible world appears to be of a Platonic coinage. Appearances, however, are deceptive, for unlike in the Platonic conception, this true and essential man is not identified with the soul or its higher part endowed with reason, but rather with his intellect.

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384 See supra Chapter 4, § 4.3.1, pp. 225-30 and infra this Chapter, § 5.3.1, pp. 331-32.
385 For Plato’s conception, see Phdr. 247b 7, where in spite of the apparent trichotomy intellect, soul, body, the nous is the guiding principle of the soul. On the issue, A.P. Bos, ‘The Distinction between “Platonic” and “Aristotelian” Dualism Illustrated from Plutarch’s Myth in de facie in orbe lunae’, in A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Casadesús (eds), Estudios sobre Plutarco. Misticismo y religiones mistéricas en la obra de Plutarco (Madrid and Málaga, 2001) 57-70 at 61.
3.2.1.1. The Concept of the Essential Man

AA’s distinction between a true and an untrue nature in man pervades our fragment. However, AA’s fragment in V never refers to it by means of the metaphor of the ‘inner man’, either in its Platonic (ο(ε)το ij ανθρωπος)386 or in its Pauline variant (ο(ε)τ w ανθρωπος)387. In order to define this superior or actually existent side of a human being, AA speaks of the ‘own, true nature’ (ιτια α ηρ devotion)388, of ‘essence’ (ουσία)389 or, on occasion, simply uses the term ‘man’ (ανθρωπος)390. This terminological diversity already indicates a semantic difference between AA’s conception of this real or essential man and the Platonic idea of the ‘inner man’ as man’s soul. But what does this ‘essential man’ mean in AA? Let us look for some parallels.

References to the essential man are numerous in the Corpus Hermeticum. According to the thirteenth tractate, man’s nature is clearly dual because it distinguishes between the physical body, which can be dissolved and is mortal, and the ‘essential generation’, which is indissoluble and immortal391. This is also the case in the Asclepius, which explicitly states that only man has a double nature, namely a simple and divine nature, which is called essential (ουσιωδός), and another material one (υιοκοφ), which is formed out of the four elements392. In spite of the positive view of the latter due to Stoic influence393, Asclepius nevertheless stresses the higher quality of man’s ‘essential’ part by describing it as ‘divine’, ‘eternal’ and ‘substantial’394 and by asserting that it is through this part that man ascends to heaven395. A similar approach can be found in the ninth tractate On Sensation and Intellection. After stating that the combination of sense perception and intellection is typically human, this treatise asserts that not every man partakes in intellection. While those akin to the body (υιοκοφ) seem to receive a sort of inferior understanding from demons, the ‘essential man’ (ουσιωδός) is essentially (ουσιωδής) saved or preserved by God396.

389 V 96-97.
390 V 85-90.
392 Man’s duality in Asclep. 7 (304.2-6 N-F); 8 (305.15-306.2 N-F); 11 (309.5-6 N-F); 22 (324.18 N-F).
393 Gersh, Middle Platonism, 379ff.
394 Asclep. 10 (309.3 N-F); 22 (324.18 N-F); 22 (323.25 N-F), ‘divine’; Asclep. 8 (306.4 N-F), ‘eternal’; for ‘substantial’ or ‘essential’, see supra, note 331.
395 Asclep. 10 (308.23-309.1 N-F).
396 C.H. 9.5 (98.13-17 N-F), ουσιωδος, δεν εν εικασι ιεναν θανατουον, αιτιον αθανασιος, οε θανατουον; ουσιωδος, εν δια του αθανασιος, αθανατος, ουσιωδος, ουσιωδος.
Some Nag Hammadi texts present a similar dualistic view of man. Some cases explicitly preserve the opposition exterior-interior or visible-not visible and contrast the inner and true man with the external and material, sensible being, as in the aforementioned passages of the *Corpus Hermeticum*. Thus, for example, *The Interpretation of Gnosis*, where the body is associated with the rulers and authorities and described as an imprisonment of the ‘man within’\(^{397}\). In other cases, however, the interest focuses on the true or essential man exclusively, like, for example, *The Letter of Peter to Philip*. In this text, as in the aforementioned passage of the *Asclepius*\(^{398}\) and in *AA*\(^{399}\), it is the ‘inner man’ who ascends to heaven and therefore the archons fight with him\(^{400}\).

All these passages provide parallels for *AA*’s conception of man as a dual creature, but they do not explicitly and unequivocally associate the essential man with the intellect as *AA* does. There are, however, a couple of texts in which this equation takes place. In *The Thought of Norea*, for instance, this essential man called Adamas allows Norea to see the pleroma and not to be deficient\(^{401}\). As in *AA*, this essential man needs to be awakened, reminded of or actualised, but it is through him that she is able to ‘inherit the first mind which <she> had received’\(^{402}\). We also have two interesting texts in the *Corpus Hermeticum*\(^{403}\). We are referring to the tenth Hermetic treatise *The Key* and to *Poimandres*. According to the former, once knowledge has illuminated man’s intellect and soul, it draws man upwards and transforms the individual in ‘essence’, by which he forgets all sense-perception and movement and remains in repose\(^{404}\). The clearest example, however, proceeds from *Poimandres*. According to its testimony, only man among all animals possesses a dual nature: while he is mortal through his body, he is immortal through the essential man\(^{405}\). The text further describes both the true nature and the current imprisonment of the anthropos. This particular treatise, however, seems to conceive the distinction between human types not on the basis of a natural but of a cultural difference. All humans are created by the demiurge in likeness to him (*C.H.* 9.5, 98.17-20 N-F). It is only man’s use of his capabilities that determines his belonging to the one or to the other group.

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\(^{397}\) *InterprKnow* (NHC XI, 1) 6.30-35. For a similar but more general opposition see *SentSextus* (NHC XII, 1) 34.16-20; *GosPhil* (NHC II, 3) 123, 82.30-83.9.

\(^{398}\) *Asclep*. 10, see supra this Chapter, note 394-95.

\(^{399}\) V\(^{n}\) 85-101.


\(^{402}\) *Norea* (NHC IX, 2) 28.3-5.

\(^{403}\) See also the passages quoted by Nock-Festugière, *Corpus*, 103 note 21.

\(^{404}\) *C.H.* 10.6 (115.14-19 N-F).

\(^{405}\) *C.H.* 1.15 (11.18-22 N-F).
essential man ‘even if he is immortal and has authority over all things, is affected by mortality because he is subject to fate; thus, although man is above the cosmic framework, he became a slave within it’\(^{406}\). The similarities between \(AA\) and \(Poimandres\) are interesting. Both texts not only call the essential man anthropos, but also equate him with the ‘intellect’ (\(\text{nous}\)) or ‘rational man’ (\(\text{noumenon}\))\(^{407}\). Most of the Hermetic and Gnostic texts quoted above implicitly or explicitly associate this essential man with man’s noetic activity. In \(Poimandres\), however, we find exactly the same conception of the anthropos that we see in \(AA\). On the one hand, as we will see below, the anthropos is the ‘transcendent man’ created in the likeness of the Father and, on the other, the highest aspect of terrestrial man, that is, the intellective part of his being that is in connection with the divine intelligible essence.

3.2.1.2. The Divine Element in Man: the Intellect

In line with the preceding parallels, \(AA\) does not follow the Platonic conception of the ‘inner man’ as the higher aspect of human soul endowed with reason. The ‘essential man’ or divine element in man is instead his intellect, which is not only the highest aspect of man but is also clearly differentiated from the soul and the body. This conception is interesting, for unlike the testimonies in a more Platonic tradition, \(AA\) does not seem to place special importance on human soul, which although certainly of higher rank than the physical body it can nevertheless be considered as part of man’s inferior being. Admittedly, \(AA\) repeatedly mentions the human soul and the term \(\text{uxh}\) may refer either to this intermediary part between intellect and body or to the whole person\(^{408}\). However, when \(AA\) describes or refers to the divine element in humans that transcends physical existence and can be liberated from the constrictions of the realm of movement, our text exclusively refers to the intellect and considers both soul and body as obstacles to this liberation\(^{409}\).

\(AA\)’s position on the issue is noteworthy, since numerous testimonies of the period significantly hesitate concerning the precise nature of the divine element in man. This hesitation is stressed (ridiculed?) by Celsus when he refers to ‘those who hope that they will possess their soul or mind eternally with God, whether they wish to call this mind spiritual, or holy and blessed intellectual spirit, or a living soul, or a supercelestial and indestructible offspring of a divine and incorporeal nature, or whatever nature they care to give it’\(^{410}\). This hesitation is also evident in the heresiologists’ interpretation of the nature of the Gnostic

\(^{406}\) \(C.H.\) 1.15 (11.20-12.1 N-F), transl. Copenhaver.

\(^{407}\) \(\text{V}^\text{a}\) 93, 130-31.

\(^{408}\) \(\text{V}^\text{a}\) 85, 128-29, respectively.

\(^{409}\) \(\text{V}^\text{a}\) 83-101.

yuxaiq yspinhv or ‘scintilla animae’, namely the ‘divine spark’ or portion of the intelligible light in man. Whereas according to some testimonies this Gnostic metaphor referred either to the soul or to the pneuma or ‘spirit’\textsuperscript{411}, according to others this spark is clearly identified with the nou=
od or ‘intellect’\textsuperscript{412}.

By contrast, \textit{AA} does not hesitate and clearly conceives the intellect as man’s divine element. A similar conception appears in the \textit{Treatise on Resurrection}, which states that neither the minds of those who have known the Son of Man nor their thoughts shall perish\textsuperscript{413}. The same holds for the \textit{Paraphrasis of Shem}, where the pneumatic race is exalted by their partaking in the mind of the light\textsuperscript{414} and in which salvation is achieved by those ‘who possess the mind and the mind of the light of the spirit’\textsuperscript{415}. The \textit{Gospel of Mary}, however, presents a more explicit description of the role and character of man’s intellect. After Mary relates to the Saviour that she has seen a vision of him, he says to her ‘Blessed are you, that you did not waver at the sight of me. For where the mind is, there is the treasure’\textsuperscript{416}. Mary does not seem to understand, because she asks whether he who sees a vision sees it through the soul or through the spirit. Jesus’ answer, then, leaves no doubt about his view: ‘he does not see through the soul nor through the spirit, but the mind which [is] between the two – that is [what] sees the vision’\textsuperscript{417}. The same ideas pervade the \textit{Teaching of Silvanus}, which presents a triadic conception of man formed out a physical body, a soul and a ‘divine mind which has come into being in conformity with the image of God. The divine mind has the substance of God’\textsuperscript{418}. As in \textit{AA}, liberation from the constrictions of the body and the soul takes place when the intellect by means of the light looks to things above\textsuperscript{419}.

It is obvious that, even though lacking the spark metaphor, \textit{AA} conceives of man’s intellect as a portion of divine light\textsuperscript{420}. This godly spark, however, appears to be numb under

\textsuperscript{411} See Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. haer.} 1.13.3; Satornil ap. Epiphanius, \textit{Pan.} 37.4.1-3; Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Exc. Theod.} 1.3; 3.1 generally refers to the spark and identifies it in 53.5 as ougkhoulia yuxaiq or ‘rational soul’.
\textsuperscript{412} Hippolytus, \textit{Ref.} 5.19.13-17; 10.11.7-10 at 10.11.10, where the pneuma is explicitly explained with QRX M.
\textsuperscript{414} \textit{ParaphShem} (NHC VII, 1) 24.15-30.
\textsuperscript{415} \textit{ParaphShem} (NHC VII, 1) 35.1-5.
\textsuperscript{416} \textit{GosMary} (BG I) 10.14-16, which, incidentally, appears to be an echo of Matt 6:21 and Luke 12:34.
\textsuperscript{417} \textit{GosMary} (BG I) 10.20-23.
\textsuperscript{418} \textit{TeachSilv} (NHC VII, 4) 92.23-26, the trichotomic conception in 92.10-32.
\textsuperscript{419} \textit{TeachSilv} (NHC VII, 4) 102.34ff, ‘My son, do not allow your mind to stare downward, but rather let it look by means of the light at things above. For the light will always come from above. Even if it (scil. the mind) is upon the earth, let it seek to pursue the things above. Enlighten your mind with the light of heaven, so that you may turn to the light of heaven’, transl. M. Peel and J. Zandee. Compare this text with \textit{AA}’s section \textit{Vr} 91-101.
\textsuperscript{420} \textit{Vr} 91-93.
the influence of body and externals on the one hand and, on the other, of the soul and its affections. This conception of the intellect as a potentiality explains why the anthropos or essential man is simultaneously the highest part of immanent man as well as the intellect transcending all the constrictions of its physical imprisonment. As God is conceived of as light, by means of the light of logos he sets the human intellect aflame, which until this moment existed in man as a simple potentiality. By exercising his intellective potential, man can gradually develop his intellect until in a last moment he achieves its full immanent actuality. However, the essential man only regains his original condition by superseding all bodily hampering and recovering his true separated nature.

The divine spark appears to have been conceived of as a potentiality in the Apophesis Megale as well. According to this work, which Hippolytus attributes to Simon Magus but which was actually composed in the second half of the second century, this blessed and indestructible element in man is immovable and is hidden in us as a potential not as an actuality and it develops, if it receives an appropriate discourse, from a very small spark into an incommensurable power. The Aristotelian or Peripatetic background to this conception is not only evident in the notions of potentiality and actuality of the intellect, but also in the everlasting and unchanging character of the soul and in the actualising effect of the divine element when it contacts human mind. Aristotelian influence is especially clear in the fact that none of these texts are concerned with the soul, which is conceived of as a part of man’s bodily or organic composite, but exclusively focus on the intellect. The same holds true for AA, since as we have already seen, rather than opposing human soul to human body it is mainly concerned with a clear distinction between intellect and the complex soul-body. Plato’s conception of an internal dichotomy in man opposing his soul to his body is redefined

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421 See supra Chapter 4, §§ 3.4.2, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, respectively.
422 V’ 253-54.
425 Hippolytus, 6.17.1. See Aristotle, EN 1178a 1-2.
426 Hippolytus, Ref. 6.17.7.
428 See supra 285ff.
by Aristotle when he opposes the ρνομ or ‘intellect’ to the υλόκτητος or ‘soul’\textsuperscript{429}. Aristotle not only denies immortality to the human soul, but repeatedly states that the intellect is man’s most divine and only eternal element\textsuperscript{430}.

As far as the notion of the potentiality and actuality of the intellect is concerned, its origin can be traced back to a key passage in the Aristotelian On the Soul\textsuperscript{431} or, more precisely, to the abundant discussions generated by this section within and beyond the Peripatos. Aristotle distinguishes in this passus between two intellects or between two aspects of human intellect. On the one hand, he refers to a potential and passive intellect that becomes all things and, on the other, to an active intellect that makes all things. So far so good, but Aristotle’s comparison in the following lines of the active intellect to light would give rise to numerous speculations about the nature and the relationship between these two intellects. According to the Philosopher, the active intellect might be compared to ‘a kind of positive state (ενέργος) like ‘light’; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colours’. Even though Aristotle seems to be concerned with two aspects of the same intellect, the ambiguity of the passus leaves room for the interpretation that there is a causal relationship between both intellects. This ambiguity and the fact that Aristotle defines the active intellect as ‘separable, impassive and unmixed’ would facilitate its later identification with the intelligence of Metaphysics XII and with the ‘adventitious intellect’ of Generation of Animals\textsuperscript{432}.

Paul Moraux has shown that this important section of On the Soul was at the core of the philosophical discussion in the first century BC. On the one hand, the Peripatetic Xenarchos appears to have identified the passive intellect of the Aristotelian passage with matter\textsuperscript{433}. On the other, Aetius’ Placita attribute to Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato, Xenocrates and Cleanthes the theory that the ‘intellect comes in man from without’, the wording of which

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{430} Aristotle, \textit{EN} 1177b 26-1178a 2: the intellect as divine element in man by which he achieves complete happiness and partakes in the divine. See his conclusion in \textit{EN} 1178a 2-7, that the intellect is man’s true self; \textit{EN} 1179a 22-32, the man who lives according to his intellect, that is, the man who pursues intellectual activity, cultivates his intellect and keeps it in the best condition is the most beloved of the Gods; \textit{EE} 1248a 24-29, where the intellect is said to be man’s highest element and to be connected with God; \textit{De an.} 430a 23-25; \textit{Metaph.} L, 1072b 23-26; \textit{PA} 656a 8; 10; 686a 27-28; \textit{GA} 736b 28; 737a 8-11; \textit{Protr.} fr. 108 Düring. See Moraux, \textit{Der Aristotelismus I}, 230 and additional bibliography in note 24.
\item \textsuperscript{431} Aristotle, \textit{De an.} 3.5.
\item \textsuperscript{432} Aristotle, \textit{GA} 736b 27ff.
\item \textsuperscript{433} Philoponus, \textit{De an.} 15.65-69 Verbeke.
\end{itemize}
implies the Aristotelian conclusion to the *Generation of Animals*\(^{434}\). More important is perhaps that the Aristotelian passage continues to be relevant in the discussion on the nature of the intellect in the first century AD. Philo’s philosophical allegory about the creation of a terrestrial and a celestial man bears witness to the relevance of the issue even beyond the Peripatos\(^{435}\). In *On the Creation of the Cosmos*, the Alexandrian compares the terrestrial man to the material and mortal intellect and the celestial man to the divine, celestial and immortal intellect once the material one has been actualised by means of the divine pneuma. The similarity of Philo’s conception on the relationship between the two intellects with Alexander of Aphrodisias’ interpretation of the Aristotelian noetics – that is, the theory on the intellect – shows the continuity and the relevance of the philosophical discussion on this topic in the first centuries of the Christian era. This continuity is further supported by the testimonies of Alcinous (below) and Aristotle of Mytilene\(^{436}\) in the first and second half of the second century, respectively.

In the context of Middle Platonism, Plutarch already elevates the status of the intellect and establishes a clear hierarchy intellect-soul-body\(^{437}\). Noteworthy is that when describing the relationship between intellect and soul and between soul and body, Plutarch introduces the idea that the intellect, as efficient cause, ‘turns to himself’ the soul, and the soul in its turn, once it possesses a nous, is able to turn matter to itself and to operate on it\(^{438}\). A very similar conception appears in Alcinous. Like Plutarch, Alcinous elevates the status of the intellect above that of the soul and distinguishes between a nous=εν δυνατεί or ‘potential intellect’ and

\(^{434}\) Aristotle, *GA* 736b 29, εἰστὶ δὲ ὁ θανάτος οὐκ ἡ κατάληψις καὶ οὐκ ἡ καταδίδεισις. Compare Aetius 4.5.11 (Doxographie, 392b), quae gen autem eiskrinesai tei ton nomou.

\(^{435}\) Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* II, 408-410. For Aristotelian echoes see Philo’s reference in *Opif.* 67 to the opinion of those who say that the intellect quagen autonom ephesisenai geien kai eiltai di on oixta. See also his discussion about the origin of the intellect in *Somn.* 1.30-31 and the expressions eindel ekeia and eiltgen eikristeai. See also A.P. Bos, ‘Philo of Alexandria. A Platonist in the Image and Likeness of Aristotle,’ *StudPhilon* 10 (1998) 66-86.

\(^{436}\) As far as Aristotle of Mytilene, the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias, is concerned, his testimony is especially interesting for the witness it bears to the polemic on Aristotelian noetics outside the Peripatos. As Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* II, 417, has pointed out, his fusion of Peripatetic and Stoic thought was intended to overcome problems and aporias raised against the Aristotelian noetics by his critics in other schools, such as those of Atticus (fr. 7.75-81 Des Places, criticism of the idea that something immaterial can change position; fr. 7.72-75 and 81-90, about the immortality of the intellect and mortality of the soul). Interesting is his interpretation of the ρουτος as first intelligible and hence as cause of the intelligibility of things that only possess it potentially (a somewhat causa finalis) and at the same time as causa efficiens in that it actualises the human passive intellect by providing it with intelligibles. On Aristotle of Mytilene’s interpretation of the Aristotelian noetics, Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* II, 406-25 at 411-21.

\(^{437}\) On the issue, see infra this Chapter, § 3.2.2.2, pp. 305-07. Plutarch, *De facie* 28, 943a, οὐκ ἀγαθὸς ὑπερηφάνη οἷς ἐχθροῖς ὁμολογεῖται, αἱρετῶς ὀδυ καὶ ὁλοικροί. See Dörrie, ‘Zum Ursprung’, passim; in particular Bos, ‘Distinction’, 57-70.
a nouē katēgoreian or ‘active intellect’ that thinks all things in one single act of apprehension\(^{439}\). There appears here also a relation of causality between both intellects: the actualisation of the Cosmic-intellect takes place owing to the ‘ordering’ bestowed by the first or highest intellect, namely the first God (prwtoz geq)\(^{440}\). After this, the Cosmic-intellect is fully actualised and can operate in the sublunary world.

The culmination of the Aristotelian noetics appears in the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias. For Alexander, too, there is a ‘material intellect’ in man that develops together with the other bodily parts and functions and as such dissolves with the body after death. However, this material, potential intellect that might be compared to the ‘unwrittenness’\(^{441}\) of a blackboard can be transformed, once it has been instructed, into the ‘acquired intellect’, which thus is the ‘form and perfection’ of the former. Whereas the material intellect can only perceive intelligibles in the presence of sensibles, once it has been actualised the acquired intellect can perceive them without the aid of sensorial perception\(^{442}\). By thinking the forms, the acquired intellect becomes itself the forms, for in the act of knowing the subject that knows and the thing known become one single reality\(^{443}\). Alongside these two intellects or double aspects of human intellect, Alexander includes the divine or ‘productive intellect’. This intelligence is not only an intelligible in the highest degree (kuriōj nohtōh), but also transcendent, pure, changeless, immaterial and everlasting\(^{444}\). Most important is that this intellect comes into man from without and is the cause (aiktioj) of the human material intellect and the acquired intellect’s turning into actuality. This adventitious intelligence transforms the capability to think first into the ability to think and finally into

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\(^{438}\) Plutarch, *De an. procr. Tim.* 1024c-d. See also 1026f, where God is said to originate this process of reversion. On the issue P. Thévenaz, *L’âme du monde: le devenir et la matière chez Plutarque; avec une traduction [du grec] du traité «De la genèse de l’âme dans le Timée’’* (1re partie) (Diss. Neuchâtel, 1938) 71ff.

\(^{439}\) Alcinous, *Didask.* 164.18-19. epeδελυ uxcj nouē ajtefn.\(^{440}\) Alcinous, *Didask.* 164.22; 31; 176.9. See the parallels to this idea collected by Whittaker, *Alcinoos*, 102 note 181. See also Alcinous’ differentiation in *Didask.* 181.44 between a supercelestial and a celestial God. On the latter issue, Dörrie, ‘Zum Ursprung’, 339 note 5. For the opposition epouraňioj / upeouraňioj, see Plato, *Phdr.* 247c 3; Apuleius, *De Plat.* 1.11.204; Asclep. 27 (332.8-13 N-F); Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 1.5.4; Acta Thomae 80 (Bonnet 196.9-10); Plotin, *Enn.* 5.8.3.27-36. Whittaker, *Alcinoos*, 138 note 459.\(^{441}\) Translation by Merlan, *Monopsychism*, 14.

\(^{442}\) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De an.* 85.20-26.

\(^{443}\) Of prime importance for the transformation of human into divine intelligence is Alexander’s restatement of the Aristotelian theory concerning the identity of subject and object in the intellect’s act of knowing things without matter (Aristotle, *De an.* 430a 2-4; 431a 1-3; *Metaph.* 1072b 20-22; 1074b 38-1075a 5). Before this act, the knowing faculty and the thing known stand apart and are opposed as members of a relationship. When they are actualised their opposition disappears and they become a single reality. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De an.* 86.23-28; see further Plotinus, *Enn.* 5.9.5.30-31.

\(^{444}\) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De an.* 88.23-89.12.
actual thinking, by providing the intellect with pure intelligibles\textsuperscript{445}. Therefore, on the one hand it causes the material intellect to be intelligible. On the other hand, as it is the cause of the intelligibles it provides the material intellect with intelligibles in order for it to fulfil its activity, that is, thinking\textsuperscript{446}. But the extrinsic intelligence does more. When the acquired intellect thinks the productive one it becomes ‘in some way’ (\textit{pwj gi\,netai}) the productive intellect. Consequently, whoever wishes to have something divine in himself should think something of this order\textsuperscript{447}.

Given the relevance of the issue within and beyond the Peripatetic school, it is plausible that discussions and interpretations of \textit{On the Soul} 3.4-5 provided a model for the explanation both for the trichotomic conception of man conceived as a body, a soul and an intellect and for man’s relationship with the divine. \textit{AA} not only considers the intellect as the highest aspect of a human being but also includes the notion of God’s intervention as the extrinsic activity that makes actual what the blessed race possesses potentially\textsuperscript{448}. Even though man possesses the capability to think, this capability seems to be numb under the influence of his soul and externals\textsuperscript{449}. Owing to the ‘light of logos’, however, this capability is transformed into ability. Once so far, the intellect can recover its original condition, it can become itself immaterial, light and intellectual. By thinking the intelligibles, or God, the human intellect becomes itself an intelligible, that is, man divinises himself\textsuperscript{450}.

3.2.1.3. The Fall of the Divine Element

Given the fact that man is intrinsically related to God and that their relationship is of the type \textit{quod propter alia, id maximum tale}\textsuperscript{451}, \textit{AA} has to explain how human intellect has been

\textsuperscript{445} The causality of the productive on the material intelligence is of ‘the type “whatever is eminently some kind of being imparts this kind of being to everything which is less eminently the same kind of being”’. Merlan, \textit{Monopsychism}, 39.

\textsuperscript{446} See \textit{Alexander of Aphrodias, De an.} 88.26-89.11.

\textsuperscript{447} See \textit{Alexander of Aphrodias, De an.} 91.3-5.

\textsuperscript{448} See supra this Chapter, § 3.1.2, pp. 279-81 and notes 363 and 365.

\textsuperscript{449} See supra this Chapter, note 421.

\textsuperscript{450} See supra this Chapter, notes 445 and 446. For this relationship between God and man, see \textit{V'} 1-24.
degraded to its present condition. Obviously this degradation cannot be attributed to God’s activity, since He has been previously depicted as ‘unenvious sharer’.

The idea of a devolution that brings the intellect (or the soul) to the lower abode of physical reality is very widespread in late antiquity. However, when comparing AA’s version of this fall with other examples of the period, obvious differences come to the foreground. None of the numerous examples collected and systematised by Festugière on the basis of Iamblichus’ overview provides a proper parallel for AA’s conception. On the one hand, the so-called ‘optimistic’ explanation based on the Timaeus presents a rather different view than that of AA, as it considers the fall due to the will of God. On the other hand, none of the subcategories included under the so-called ‘pessimistic’ view suits AA, as according to the first one (‘fault before the fall’) degradation results from the punishment inflicted for the soul’s curiosity, audacity, or disobedience. And according to the second subcategory (‘fault due to the fall’), devolution arises from the will to create, or from the contact with the demiurgical sphere, or, finally, from the union with physis.

Significantly, AA explains the intellect’s degradation without recurring to external factors such as the influence of affections or of matter. The devolution that affects the intellect and that will finally cause it to be constrained by externals arises from its own deficiency, which is conceived of as a dispersal or division. AA is silent about the cause of this primal dispersion, but it explicitly refers to the intellect’s split (kataxoeij) and to its alienation (apol is on) as the reason for its suffering. As soon as suffering appears, we move to the second stage of devolution, namely the sphere of the soul, which due to its ignorance and affections generates a third and final stage in the process of degradation: the wandering of the intellect and the soul in the realm of (f)ujij.

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452 V 3-4.
453 For AA’s view of this devolution, see V 73-82 and supra Chapter 4, § 3.2.4 and 4.1, passim; Festugière, La Révélation III, 73-77; Dillon, Middle Platonists, 245-46.
455 For example in Kore Kosmou 21-24 (IV, 7.6-8.6 N-F), see Festugière, La Révélation III, 83-85.
456 C.H. 1.11-13 (10.5-11.5 N-F); Gnostics of Plotinus (Enn. 2.9.11.21).
457 Numenius, fr. 11.16-20 Des Places, on which Festugière, La Révélation III, 91-2; Gnostics of Plotinus (Enn. 2.9.10.19ff).
458 As we shall see below, this dispersion seems also to be implied by Andrew’s statement that he corrects Adam’s (and the intellect’s) imperfection by taking refuge in God (V 78-79) and by his description of the transcendent intellect as ‘having recollected yourself’ (scil. the ajoypo) in your true condition’ (V 93-95). See infra, pp. 292-293.
3.2.1.3.1. First Stage of Devolution: the Dispersion of the Intellect

As far as the dispersion of the intellect in AA is concerned, its alienation must be explained as a result of the appearance of a discrepancy between subject and object in the intellect’s act of knowing\(^\text{459}\). As soon as the object of the intellect’s acts of knowing is not the intellect itself, it loses its self-centred activity and, consequently, its unity. As a result, knowledge is no longer a direct and immediate matter and ignorance appears. AA is not explicit about the first cause of this discrepancy within the intellect. This silence might simply be due to the fragmentary character of our text, but it is also plausible that AA was more interested in the effects than in the cause of this primal dispersal. As a matter of fact, this is also the case in the Gospel of Truth, a text that presents many similarities with AA’s conceptual background and begins its narration about the fall of the Totality by simply referring to the appearance of ignorance, without explaining how this ignorance originated\(^\text{460}\). According to this text ‘oblivion did not come into existence from the Father, although it did come into existence because of him’. It might be that in AA ignorance, even though not directly produced by God, is necessarily implied by his transcendence, as the Gospel of Truth and the Tripartite Tractate seem to imply\(^\text{461}\).

Be that as it may, the Tripartite Tractate may help us in understanding, if not the primary cause of the intellect’s dispersal that AA and the Gospel of Truth omit, at least its implications. The Tripartite Tractate includes a peculiar version of the Valentinian process of devolution, since unlike the versions of Irenaeus\(^\text{462}\) and the Gospel of Truth where the suffering is experienced by Sophia and by the Totality, respectively, in the Tripartite Tractate it is the Logos that experiences affections. Obviating now the fact that according to its writer the fall of the Logos has been planned by God\(^\text{463}\), it is interesting to note that, due to the Logos’ inability to grasp the ungraspable and to bear the intensity of the light, it ‘doubts’ and ‘looks down to the abyss’\(^\text{464}\). As a result, a ‘division’ and a ‘turning away’ take place and these in turn produce the appearance of ignorance and oblivion\(^\text{465}\).

\(^{459}\) See supra Chapter 4, § 5.1.1, pp. 233-34.

\(^{460}\) GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 17.10ff.

\(^{461}\) GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 18.1-3; 18.35-36, on which see Attridge-MacRae, ‘The Gospel of Truth’, 47. They follow Ménard (L’Évangile, 86) in relating our section to Irenaeus, Adv. haer 2.17.10 (magnitudinem enim et virtutem Patris causas ignorantiae dicitis) and link it with TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 62.12ff, 71.7ff, 121.7-8, where ignorance of the Father arises indirectly from his withholding his essence in virtue of his transcendence.

\(^{462}\) Irenaeus, Adv. haer 1.2.3; 1.4.1.

\(^{463}\) TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 76.23-77.11. See R. Kasser et alii, Tractatus Tripartitus Pars I: De supernis (Bern, 1973) 340 and Painchaud-Thomassen, Traité Tripartite, 333ff.

\(^{464}\) TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 77.15-20.

\(^{465}\) TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 77.21-25.
The motif of dispersal of the primal unity is rather widespread in Gnosticism⁴⁶⁶. According to the testimony of the heresiologists, the notion played an important role in the Valentinian system⁴⁶⁷. And indeed, it appears in the Gospel of Truth, where the return to the primal unity intends to restore the value lost in the dispersal. Whereas division in this text is a clear sign of deficiency, unity is equated to perfection⁴⁶⁸. Since this deficiency originates in ignorance, it will vanish with the knowledge of the Father and everything will be restored to its original unity: ‘So from that moment on the form is not apparent, but it will vanish in the fusion of Unity, for now their works lie scattered. In time Unity will perfect the spaces. It is within Unity that each one will attain himself; within knowledge he will purify himself from multiplicity into Unity, consuming matter within himself like fire, and darkness by light, death by life’⁴⁶⁹. Also, the Tripartite Tractate is clear about the need to restore ‘that which used to be a unity’⁴⁷⁰. Those who live among the multiplicity of forms, inequality and change are restored to this unity when they confess ‘the kingdom which is in Christ’⁴⁷¹. The restoration of what is dispersed is also due to the knowledge received by the perfect man ‘so as to return in haste to his unitary state’⁴⁷².

The motif of dispersal and gathering also appears in a fragment of the Gnostic Gospel of Eve preserved by Epiphanius. According to H.M. Schenke, this fragment transmits the Gnostic idea that the Urmensch is scattered among humans: ‘I am thou and thou art I, and wheresoever thou art, there am I; and I am sown in all things. And from wheresoever thou wilt gatherest thou me, but in gathering me, thou gatherest thyself⁴⁷³. Whereas the revealer is the Urmensch in its original state, he who receives the revelation is the scattered anthropos. By recollecting the anthropos, man recollects himself, that is, he knows himself and restores the dispersal originated by ignorance⁴⁷⁴.

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⁴⁶⁶ In general, Jonas, Gnosis I, 104-05; 139-40; Orbe, Cristologia, 293-98; Luttikhuizen, ‘Gnostic Hermeneutics’, 173-74.
⁴⁶⁷ Heracleon fr. 18 (ap. Origen, In Joh. 13.11); Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1.14.5; 2.12.3; Clement of Alexandria, Exc. Theod. 36.2.
⁴⁶⁹ GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 25.3-19, transl., H.W. Attridge and G.W. MacRae.
⁴⁷⁰ TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 133.7.
⁴⁷¹ TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 132.17-18.
⁴⁷² TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 123.6f. For the motif of dispersal and gathering in other Nag Hammadi texts, see StelesSeth (NHC VII, 5) 121.9-11; TrimProt (NHC XIII, 1) 49.36ff; Thunder (NHC VI, 2) 16.19-20; 19.11-14.
⁴⁷³ Epiphanius, Pan. 26.3.1, transl. F. Williams. See also TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 66.24-25; MunichKeph. 228.1-13; ManPs. 175.19.
A fragment of the Gnostic Gospel of Philip, also preserved by Epiphanius, stresses both the notion of dispersal and its counterpart, viz. the recollection achieved by means of self-knowledge: “I have recognized myself”, it saith, “and gathered myself from every quarter, and have sown no children for the archon. But I have pulled up his roots, and gathered my scattered members, and I know who thou art. For I”, it saith, “am of those on high”.

The same notions also appear in Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella, where he presents the Neoplatonic inner ascent from multiplicity to unity as the reunion of what was dispersed and scattered. This ascent has an ethical character in a first stage, but afterwards becomes theoretical and finally contemplative. We should not forget that Porphyry was Plotinus’ pupil and that the motif of dispersal and gathering plays a central and mystical role in the system of the latter.

In any case, AA clearly refers not only to the division and alienation of the intellect, but also to its imperfection. Since Andrew states that he restores the imperfection of the intellect/Adam by taking refuge in God, it seems obvious that the intellect’s original imperfection was its inability to focus its activity on God, as a result of which it was distracted or deviated from its source and origin. This internal discrepancy of the intellect corresponds to the duality between the subject who thinks and the objects of thought and therefore presents a clear parallel to Plotinus’ first hypostasis, which as it presents the duality occupies a lower rank of perfection than the One or absolute unity beyond thought.

3.2.1.3.2. Second Stage of Devolution: the Soul and the Affections
The ignorance that arises from the intellect’s dispersion is the cause of a second stage of degradation because it originates a series of affections: first of all insecurity and doubt, then fear and, finally, a desire to know, since knowledge can remove all previous affections. AA describes these affections by referring both to the intellect’s and to Eve’s ‘suffering’. The aforementioned Gospel of Truth presents a very similar exposition, since it puts the main

476 Porphyry, Ad Marc. 10; see Jonas, Gnosis I, 140; Orbe, Cristología, 296-97.
478 For Porphyry’s influence on Origen, see Jonas, Gnosis II, 177-225; on Augustine, see De trinit. 4.11; Confes. 10.14; cf. Orád. 1.3; see Jonas, Gnostic Religion, 61-62.
479 V 77-78, to autel; 78-79, to latel.
480 So already Orbe, Cristología, 162.
481 Plotinus, Enn. 5.1.5; 2.4.5; 5.3.11; 6.7.15; see Dörrie, ‘Zum Ursprung’, 286-87 and notes 7 and 8.
focus on the appearance and development of affections and on how they generate the psychic and hylic levels of reality. Anguish and fear appear as direct consequences of ignorance, and as anguish grows solid like a fog, it provides the suitable context for error to appear, which ‘became powerful’ and ‘worked on its own matter foolishly [or, in the void]’\textsuperscript{483}. Did \textit{AA} conceive matter as a substantialisation of the very affections, as the \textit{Gospel of Truth} implies and Irenaeus reports of the Valentinian system\textsuperscript{484}? Our fragmentary text does not allow a conclusive answer to this question, but the hypothesis is plausible. At any rate, as in Valentinianism, ignorance in \textit{AA} is the cause of all steps of devolution: first, it originates the degradation of the intellect to the level of the soul, and then that of the soul to the level of physical reality. Therefore, even if we cannot firmly state that the fall in \textit{AA} is not due to divine will, we can certainly affirm that it neither results from the punishment of sins such as curiosity, audacity or disobedience\textsuperscript{485}, nor from the intellect’s will to create\textsuperscript{486} nor from its union with the realm of \textit{fuṣṭaj}\textsuperscript{487}. \textit{AA}’s conception of ignorance not only as first motor of the process of devolution, but also as cause of each of the successive steps of degradation, clearly exonerates the intellect of responsibility in its current degraded condition.

3.2.1.3.3. Third Stage of Devolution: the Physical Body and Externals

The final stage of devolution is the intellect’s and the soul’s alienation in the realm of \textit{physis}\textsuperscript{488}. The original ignorance remains unaltered and is perpetuated by oblivion and by the deficiency of the body’s cognitive means. Sensorial perception not only does not help man to achieve knowledge but also prolongs his ignorance, since it delivers him to the delusion of externals\textsuperscript{489}.

As we shall see below, the conception of sensorial perception as an obstacle to the knowledge of intelligibles relies on Aristotle’s distinction between that which is more knowable by nature and that which is more knowable to us\textsuperscript{490}, which appears recurrently in

\textsuperscript{482} See supra Chapter 4, § 3.2.4, pp. 200-03.
\textsuperscript{483} \textit{GosTruth} (NHC I, 3) 17.10ff.
\textsuperscript{484} Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. haer.}, 1.2.3; see also Pseudo-Tertullian 4.4 (CCSL 2, 1406.24-1407.4), on which C. Markschies, \textit{Valentinus Gnosticus?} (Tübingen, 1992) 408-09. Jonas, \textit{Gnostic Religion}, 183-84.
\textsuperscript{485} See supra this Chapter, note 455.
\textsuperscript{486} See supra this Chapter, note 456.
\textsuperscript{487} See supra this Chapter, note 457.
\textsuperscript{488} V\textsuperscript{r} 213-14. See supra Chapter 4, § 3.4.2.1, pp. 216-17.
\textsuperscript{489} V\textsuperscript{r} 208-09.
\textsuperscript{490} Aristotle, \textit{Metaph.} 1029b 3ff; \textit{APo} 71b 33-72a 6, protera d'esti kaiçgnwrinvdo ral xwp, ougat proferon tv' fustei kaiçprod htef proferon, oude\textit{gnwrinvdo ron kaictihin gnwrinvdo ron lew depro htef men protera kaiçgnwrinvdo ral eugleron the ailefchew, aplw de protera kaiçgnwrinvdo tal porrovdo ral eitid proorwarw metalkaqo ou naijast, euglerw metalkaqo eλasta: kaiçhitietai taul al hfoj, ek prwdo d'estitolei aixwoidei an tautoloi gat lew prwdo kaiç'xh. See also \textit{Ph.}\textsuperscript{184a 15ff. See infra, pp. 298-99.}
Middle Platonism and Neo Aristotelianism\textsuperscript{491}. The end of the seventh Hermetic tractate plastically describes the obstacle of the senses, especially sight and hearing, and the need to neutralise their noxious influence\textsuperscript{492}. And this is so because otherwise, as the eleventh tractate puts it, it is impossible to understand the things that are beautiful and good\textsuperscript{493}.

3.2.2. Immanent or Terrestrial Man

As a result of this devolution, the transcendent man finds himself imprisoned in the physical realm. The original ignorance has not only not disappeared but has even increased. In addition to this ignorance, however, the intellect will have to cope with other consequences.

3.2.2.1. The Consequences of Man’s Fall

\textit{AA}’s description of man’s imprisonment in the lower realm is threefold. It first describes the unfree state of the intellect by stressing its oblivion to its true nature and origin\textsuperscript{494}. But \textit{AA} also refers to man’s bondage by describing the fetters or shackles that keep the soul attached to the realm of movement\textsuperscript{495}. Finally, our text points out that as a result of the previous issues, man is lost in the physical realm and that he therefore must cope with the consequences (\textit{ehekura}) of this wandering (\textit{pl a\rho\tau\eta}) in the lower, material world\textsuperscript{496}. These consequences, namely his dependence on sensorial perception, keep him in captivity (\textit{ai\kappa\nu\lambda\nu\sigma\iota\alpha\nu\sigma\iota\alpha})\textsuperscript{497}. As we will see now, such a conception of man’s condition was extensive in the second and third centuries.

3.2.2.1.1. Man’s Oblivion to his Kinship

As far as the notion of obliviousness is concerned, \textit{AA} sometimes explicitly calls it forgetfulness (\textit{h\eta\mu\eta}), sometimes refers to it by means of the metaphor of sleep and other times implies it by emphasising the need to remember the own true condition\textsuperscript{498}. The motif of the soul’s oblivion to its true nature and origin due to its contact with matter has an old Platonic tradition. It repeatedly appears in Plato\textsuperscript{499}, although especially in the context of his doctrine of

\textsuperscript{491} Alcinous, \textit{Didask}. 164.6-19; Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Diss}. 11.7, 131-34, on which Theiler, \textit{Vorbereitung}, 7-8; Alexander of Aphrodisias, \textit{De an}. 85.20-26.

\textsuperscript{492} \textit{C.H}. 7.3 (82.2-9 N-F).

\textsuperscript{493} \textit{C.H}. 11.21 (156.8-9 N-F). See also \textit{C.H}. 1.19 (13.15-16 N-F); 13.7 (203.5-6 N-F); \textit{C.H}. Stobaeus fr. 6.9 and \textit{C.H}. 4.6 (51.9-11 N-F).

\textsuperscript{494} V\textsuperscript{v} 206-08.

\textsuperscript{495} V\textsuperscript{v} 96-99.

\textsuperscript{496} V\textsuperscript{v} 213-14.

\textsuperscript{497} V\textsuperscript{v} 90.

\textsuperscript{498} V\textsuperscript{v} 250, 267, di\upsilon\rho\iota\iota\zeta\upsilon\iota\eta\varepsilon\varsigma\alpha; 207, upo\mu\nu\iota\nu\varsigma\iota\alpha\iota\sigma\iota. See supra Chapter 4, § 3.4, pp. 213-14.

\textsuperscript{499} In Plato the nuances and implications change with the context. In \textit{Phdr}. 248c oblivion seems to be conceived of as a punishment for faults committed by the soul and for its injustice (250a). According to \textit{Phd}. 75d, differently, forgetfulness appears when the soul is born, but knowledge can be recovered by means of the senses. Nevertheless, the soul is said to become ‘dizzy’ when it comes into contact with matter (79c). More generally the \textit{Timaeus} conceives of oblivion as a sickness of the soul (87a 5-7; 88b 5). Cf. also \textit{Thet}. 201d-202c; \textit{Rep}. 533c; 621a; 621c.
knowledge as ‘remembrance’. This notion, of course, may also be at work in AA, but unlike in Plato remembrance does not take place by means of sensorial perception but rather by means of revelation. The motif is also rather extensive in late antiquity and is sometimes explicitly referred to as ‘νησίμ’ or ‘oblivion’ and other times by means of the metaphor of intoxication (χαμάζω) or of sleep. Both metaphors appear in Philo, who frequently describes the soul’s oblivion as drunkenness due to the soul’s contact with the body\(^{500}\) or simply as sleep\(^{501}\). It further appears in Middle and Neoplatonism, in Gnosticism, in the *Corpus Hermeticum* and in the *Chaldaean Oracles*.

In Middle Platonism the motif of a dormant soul that is oblivious to its role and true nature due to the slumbering of its intelligence plays an important role in the cosmogony. Plutarch is the first one to refer to it explicitly in *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus* (1026e-f). Given the fact that it also appears in Alcinous, who uses the same term (καταρός) to describe the numbness of the Cosmic-soul before God’s ordering\(^{502}\), it has been suggested that both authors may rely on an earlier common source\(^{503}\). It is very interesting that Maximus of Tyre uses the same motif, but now applied to the individual, human soul\(^{504}\). In his tenth oration, Maximus compares the situation of the soul in the body to that of someone who is overwhelmed by stupor and repletion and the soul’s perception of reality with the ‘dim approximation of one dreaming’\(^{505}\). In this situation the sight of the soul by means of which it discerns and understands reality is covered by the thick mist of the physical embodiment\(^{506}\).

The intervention of reason, however, awakens the soul from its slumber. If ‘forgetfulness’ is the name of the sleep of the soul\(^{507}\), ‘knowledge is the awakening and organisation of true opinions’\(^{508}\). In his oration *Plato on God*, Maximus pays closer attention to the issues that hinder the intellect’s clear view of the intelligibles. As the intellect is ‘engrafted into the

\(^{500}\) Philo, *Sobr.* 2; *Ebr.* 15; 154ff; *Sonn.* 2.101ff; *Plant.* 177.

\(^{501}\) Philo, *Ad Gaium* 269; *Abr.* 70; *Sonn.* 1.165.

\(^{502}\) Alcinous, *Didask.* 169.32-41; cf. 164.40-165.4.

\(^{503}\) Witt, *Albinus*, 131-32, thinks of a Middle Platonic background; Theiler, *Vorbereitung*, 42, points out similarities with Antiochus; Dodds, *Proclus*, 218, on the basis of the parallelism in Seneca, Alcinous and Maximus of Tyre who refer in the same context to the idea of awakening, suggests Posidonius as a possible origin (*contra* Deuse, *Untersuchungen*, 84 note 11); Loenen, ‘Albinus’ Metaphysics (II)’ 51, is inclined to think that Alcinous depends on Plutarch (Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 206, considers this last hypothesis ‘chronologically possible’).

\(^{504}\) This does not mean, however, that Alcinous may not have conceived a similar process of awakening in the case of the individual soul, because, as *Didask.* 178.19-21 clearly states, the Cosmic and the human soul have the same nature, ‘since they partake of the same mixture’.

\(^{505}\) Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 10.1, 16-19.

\(^{506}\) Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 10.3, 68-72. Note the parallelism with the aforementioned section of the *Gospel of Truth*, see supra., pp. 295-96 and note 483.

\(^{507}\) Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 10.6, 159.

\(^{508}\) Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 10.6, 140-43.
whole conglomerate of the soul, is pulled this way and that by perception and kept in such a state of confused activity that is unable to maintain a clear view of its proper objects.\textsuperscript{509} That Maximus conceives the intellect’s situation as an intoxication caused by the surfeit proceeding from sensorial perception is clear in his declaring that is difficult to find a ‘sober intellect’ (ibid., xal ἐπιθέμενον ὄνομα).\textsuperscript{509}

It is noteworthy that Maximus includes these ideas in a discussion of that which is more knowable by nature and that which is more knowable to us that is clearly reminiscent of the similar Aristotelian distinction in the \textit{Posterior Analytics} and in the \textit{Physics}.\textsuperscript{510} Given the Aristotelian context in which this notion appears, it is plausible to think that we have here an echo of Aristotle’s definition of sleep as ‘inactivity of the soul’ in the \textit{Eudemian Ethics}\textsuperscript{511} and of his distinction in \textit{On the Soul} and in \textit{On Generation of Animals} between two sorts of potentiality, namely potentiality as a plain disposition to do or become something and potentiality as a latent actuality.\textsuperscript{512} And, in fact, Maximus is explicit in saying that reason (ὁ νοος) ‘coming to the soul like a doctor, does not bring and implant understanding (ἐπιστήμη), like something the soul did not posses; instead, it reawakens the understanding it does possess, but which is dim and constrained and torpid’\textsuperscript{513}.

A similar background can be traced in Plotinus, for he describes his ‘awakening’ out of the body and his coming into contact with the divinity and with the realm of intellect as a ‘supreme actuality’.\textsuperscript{514} As a matter of fact, later on, Neo-Platonists such as Porphyry would also establish this differentiation between two sorts of potentiality and would compare the latent actuality to sleep.\textsuperscript{515} Be that as it may, the notion of the body as a hindrance for the soul’s remembrance is a well-established issue in later Neoplatonism as well.\textsuperscript{516}

The notions of sleep and intoxication are also present in the \textit{Corpus Hermeticum}. The end of \textit{Poimandres} refers to the ignorance of God as ‘drunkenness and sleep’ and advises anyone who ‘is bewitched in unreasoning sleep’ to become sober and to put an end to his

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{509} Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Diss.} 11.7, 141-43. Cf. \textit{C.H.} Stobaeus fr. 1.2 (3.5-7 F)\textsuperscript{510} Aristotle, \textit{APo.} 71b 33f; \textit{Ph.} 184a 15ff.\textsuperscript{511} Aristotle, \textit{EE} 1219b 19ff.\textsuperscript{512} Aristotle, \textit{De an.} 417b 29ff; \textit{GA} 735a 9-11. See also \textit{EN} 1157b 5-11. On the Aristotelian influence on Alcinous see Mansfeld, ‘Three Notes’, 65; Deuse, \textit{Untersuchungen}, 84; Dillon, \textit{Alcinous}, 164. See our paraphrase of the Aristotelian distinction supra, p. 280-81.\textsuperscript{513} Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Diss.} 10.3, 72-76.\textsuperscript{514} Plotinus, \textit{Enn.} 4.8.1.\textsuperscript{515} Porphyry, \textit{Ad Gaur.} 33.14-18; 22-23. Deuse, \textit{Untersuchungen}, 84-85.\textsuperscript{516} Plotinus, \textit{Enn.} 4.23.26, 50-57; Porphyry, \textit{Sent.} 29.2, p. 14.17; \textit{Ad Marc.} 6, p. 278.2; \textit{Ad Gaur.} 34; Iamblichus, \textit{De myst.} 3.20, p. 148.3f; Proclus, \textit{In pr. Eucl. el. lib.} 47.1-4; \textit{In Alcib.} 226.6-7; 472.20; 502.3; 545.14; \textit{In Parm.} 670.16; \textit{In Tim.} 1.82.30; Synesius, \textit{Insomn.} 5, 1296b.}
drunken sickness\(^{517}\). According to *The Key* this ignorance is begotten by the soul when it comes into contact with the body\(^{518}\).

The theme is also recurrent in Gnosticism. It appears in the *Tripartite Tractate*\(^{519}\) and in the *Apocryphon of John* as simple oblivion\(^{520}\). Of all the Nag Hammadi parallels, however, the *Gospel of Truth* presents the closest similarities to *AA*. We shall return to this text in a moment. It also appears in the ‘Hymn of the Pearl’ of the *Acts of Thomas*\(^{521}\), in the *Odes of Salomon* and in the *Chaldaean Oracles*\(^{522}\).

As already suggested, the most interesting parallel to *AA*’s conception appears in the *Gospel of Truth*. Like *AA*, this text includes two different treatments of ignorance and oblivion. The first one, the ignorance of the Father that causes the appearance of affections, we have already seen above\(^{523}\). It is the second one that interests us in the present context. Whereas ignorance had produced affections, affections in turn produce many illusions and the slumber of oblivion into which people sink: ‘since it was terror and disturbance and instability and doubt and division, there were many illusions at work by means of these, and (there were) empty fictions, as if they were sunk in sleep and found themselves in disturbing dreams’\(^{524}\). As in *AA*, the oblivion and ignorance of the true origin and nature create the treacherous dream in which people waste their time among ephemeral evils, among empty fictions\(^{525}\). This emphasis on illusions or fictions marks off the thought common to the *Gospel of Truth* and *AA*, because in both texts, differently from the previous examples, individuals are not simply passive victims of deceitful externals or inappropriate sensorial perceptions; they rather seem actively to work to prolong or enhance their ignorant sleep\(^{526}\).

3.2.2.1.2. The Fetters of Materiality

In so far as the fetters or shackles of life in the sublunar realm are concerned, *AA* explicitly refers both to the fetters belonging to the realm of generation — that is, man’s dependence upon the processes of coming-to-be and passing-away— and to those beyond the realm of

\(^{517}\) *C.H.* 1.27 (16.21-23 N-F); see also *C.H.* 7.1-.2 (81.14-82.1 N-F).

\(^{518}\) *C.H.* 10.15 (120.18-21 N-F).

\(^{519}\) *TriTrac* (NHC I, 5) 77.22-25; 82.25-32.


\(^{523}\) See *supra*, pp. 292ff.

\(^{524}\) *GosTruth* (NHC I, 3) 28.32-29.11.

\(^{525}\) V\(^{\text{a}}\) 205-14.

\(^{526}\) Note the detailed description of this in *GosTruth* (NHC I, 3) 29.11-30.4.
As we already suggested these latter shackles must be interpreted as referring either to the *heimarmene* or fate influenced by the astral bodies or, more likely, to the control the powers and authorities have on human beings. AA clearly refers to the influence exerted on humans by these powers when it says that the *a[jorwpoj*, once he frees himself, is ‘more powerful that those who seemed to oppress him’. This bondage is explicitly referred to as *ta\(scil.\ des\ ma\) upet\ genesin*.

The other fetters, the shackles of the realm of genesis (*ta\peri\ genes\ ej* ) must be interpreted as the limitations imposed by the physical body and its being subject to the processes of generation and corruption. Besides, Andrew explicitly refers to these bondages by pregnantly referring to the tortures ‘belonging to the prison’, which obviously refers both to his confinement in prison and to his body, as the following lines clearly show and the similar double meaning of *des\with\ion* ‘prison’ seems to confirm.

This latter use of *des\ma* has an old tradition that relates the term both to the Orphic conception of the body as a prison and to the Platonic myth of the cave, which also conceives the material world and human body as the shackles that tie up the soul. Plato himself in the *Phaedo* already brings the Orphic view into close connection with the Pythagorean one attributed to Philolaus that sees in the body a grave.

The motif was taken a step further when the relationship of the soul with the body was compared to being tied up to a corpse. Aristotle in the *Protrepticus* reports the opinion of those who believe that for man being born is a sort of punishment. In this context he compares the union of soul and body to the torture applied by Tyrrenian pirates who tied up their

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527 V 97-98.
528 See *supra*, pp. 246-50.
529 V 88-89. For the whole section and its concentric structure, see *supra*, Chapter 3, note 65.
530 V 108-09, *kai\him\ont\\im\weisow basa\oj* ta\=kata\ta\*des\ma\kl.
531 This conceptual pregnancy already appears in the Platonie use of *froura* (*Phd*. 62b). See *infra* this Chapter, note 549.
532 V 109-12.
533 See also Plato, *Crat*. 400c.
534 Plato, *Rep*. 514a-515c; 516e 9; 523b 6; see also *Phd*. 67d 1, philosophy as providing liberation from the bodily fetters; 82e 2, the soul tied up to the body and forced to perceive through its means (= prison); *Tim*. 43a 5 and 44b 1, the soul tied up and subject to the body.
536 Plato, *Phd* 62b-e; see Philolaus D-K 44 B 14, on which Huffman, *Philolaus*, 402-06, who includes it among the spurious or doubtful fragments. About the difference between the Orphic and Pythagorean view see Mansfeld, ‘Bad World’, 292-93.
prisoners to dead bodies. This passage seems to have had a great impact among late antiquity writers, since it is paraphrased by Clement of Alexandria in order to describe the relationship of idolaters to the idols, by Iamblichus and it even came, through Cicero’s *Hortensius*, to the attention of Augustine. Given the fragmentary character of the passage, the question as to whether or not this was really Aristotle’s opinion is uncertain. However, this view is coherent with the opinion held by one of the interlocutors of the Aristotelian dialogue *Eudemus*, who introduces the relation of Silenus to king Midas in order to support his statement that for man the best is not to have been born. Since it has been suggested that king Philip of Macedonia might have been one of the conversation partners, it has also been suggested that Aristotle might have been the leading interlocutor. Even if at first sight these opinions might seem to contradict the general tenor of Aristotelian philosophy, as a matter of fact the *Corpus Aristotelicum* frequently stresses man’s un-free condition due to his dependence upon externals and consequently defends contemplative life as the only means to supersede his external constrictions.

This conception of the relationship of the soul to the body is widely attested in the first centuries of the era. It appears several times in Philo, who not only speaks of the relationship soul-body as a bondage, but even compares human body to a tomb or to a prison and stresses the need of getting rid of these fetters. In Middle Platonic context the notion appears in Plutarch, as the aforementioned fragment of the Aristotelian *Eudemus* clearly shows. Also Ammonius, according to the testimony of Porphyry, seems to have spoken of the relationship soul-body in terms of bondage and Alcinous conceives the goal of philosophy as ‘the freeing and turning around of the soul.


539 This fragment is preserved by Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apoll.* 115b-e; Aristotle, *Eud.* fr. 6 Ross.


541 Aristotle, *Metaph.* 982b 22-983a 5; *EN* 1178a 33-35; *Ph.* 253a 12ff; 259b 11.


543 Philo, *Conf.* 177; *Leg. alleg.* 3.71; *Qu. Gen.* 1.70, 1.5-7. See also Marcus Aurelius 4.41; 9.24.


545 Philo, *Heres* 14.68.

546 See supra this Chapter, note 539.

from the body. A similar conception of terrestrial life as a prison also appears in Maximus of Tyre.

The motif is also recurrent in the *Corpus Hermeticum*. According to the seventh tractate the soul is shut up in the body, which prevents it from ‘anchoring in the havens of deliverance’. The body is described not only as the ‘bondage of corruption’, but also as ‘the living death, the sentient corpse, the portable tomb’. The body is conceived as clothing for the soul, as is also the case in the tenth tractate, entitled The Key. Even if the emphasis of this tractate lays on the liberation of the intellect, which leaves behind soul and body, this text describes the soul ‘as clinging to the body, held down and smothered by it’. However, the clearest example appears perhaps in the thirteenth tractate, in which the body is conceived as a prison that tortures the inner man with the suffering of the senses.

According to the heresiologists, the notion of the fetters or ***semei*/ seems also to have been frequent among Gnostics. Hippolytus reports that the Naassenes also referred to the body as a tomb and Carcoprates, according to the testimony of Irenaeus, spoke of the body as a prison. Nag Hammadi texts widely attest these views. We have already seen some of these testimonies above. The *Paraphrasis of Shem* refers to the ‘severe bondage of the body’ and in the closing hymn of the *Apocryphon of John* Pronoia is said to have ‘entered into the middle of their prison, which is the prison of the body’, while the one who was in deep sleep answering to her call asks, ‘who is it that calls my name, and from where has this hope come to me, while I am in the chains of the prison’. The statement in the *Origin of the World* is very similar, as it says that the souls ‘were shut up in the prisons of the moulded bodies

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553 *C.H.* 13.7 (203.15-17 N-F). On the use in the present context of *hêdon* and its possible corruption see W. Scott, *Hermetica: the Ancient Greek and Latin Writings which Contain Religious or Philosophic Teachings Ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus* II (Oxford, 1925) 386.
554 Hippolytus, *Ref.* 5.8.22; Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 1.25.4. For other examples in Clement and Irenaeus, see infra this Chapter, pp. 305-06.
555 For the testimony of the *Interpretation of Gnosis* and the *The Sentences of Sextus*, see supra this Chapter, p. 384 and note 397.
556 *ParaphrShem* (NHC VII, 1) 35.17; *GosTruth* (NHC I, 3) 31.25, ‘bonds’.
557 *ApJohn* (NHC II, 1) 31.3-4 and 31.8-10, respectively.
<until> the consummation of the aeon\textsuperscript{558}. Also the \textit{Book of Thomas the Contender} refers to the body as a tomb a couple of times\textsuperscript{559}.

These views are further attested by Clement of Alexandria, who echoing Philo refers to the body as a \textit{sarkikoj desmoj} or ‘fleshy bondage’\textsuperscript{560} and compares it to a prison\textsuperscript{561}. He also echoes the Aristotelian comparison of the union soul-body to the torture used by Tyrrhenian pirates\textsuperscript{562}. Later on, the same ideas would play an important role in Plotinus, Porphyry and the later Neoplatonism\textsuperscript{563}.

The abundant parallels in such a variety of contexts show that the conception of the fetters imposed to the \textit{a\[uq\]wpoj} by his material existence had become a commonplace. In \textit{AA}, however, this view is not a simple topos, for the releasing of the bondages that tie up the \textit{a\[uq\]wpoj} to a false existence is at the core of its message. \textit{AA}’s radical negative view of material realm and of the physical body brings our text into close connection with the parallels of the \textit{Corpus Hermeticum}, particularly those of the seventh tractate, and the Gnostic examples from the Nag Hammadi library.

3.2.2.1.3. Man’s Imprisonment

Due to his forgetfulness and to the shackles of soul and body, the intellect has been thrown into the deformities (\textit{ai\[\xi\]kh})\textsuperscript{564} of material realm and driven into the captivity of the spell of externals. If the oblivion and the fetters might be seen as cause and means of the captivity, respectively, the spellbound of externals represent its consummation. \textit{AA} repeatedly refers to the ‘presents’ or ‘bribes’ (\textit{dwrfa}) of externals and relates them to the devil, with whom externals are closely associated\textsuperscript{565}. We have already commented on the conception of immanent realm as in continuous flux above\textsuperscript{566}. What interests us now is the notion that man, unaware of his deceit, remains trapped in this realm of change and decay and contributes through ignorance to the perpetuation of his alienation.

The conception of the sensible as the imprisonment of the true man who due to sense-perception and deluding representation (\textit{fartasi\[a\]}) remains unaware of its forgery appears

\textsuperscript{558} \textit{OrigWorld} (NHC II, 5) 114.20-24.
\textsuperscript{559} \textit{ThomCont} (NHC II, 7) 141.15-18; 143.10-22.
\textsuperscript{561} Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Strom}. 7.62.
\textsuperscript{562} See supra, p. 301-02 and note 539-539.
\textsuperscript{563} Plotinus, \textit{Enn}. 4.8.22ff; 4.9.9.55; 4.3.17.27; 3.4.3.26; 1.9.1.5ff; Porphyry, \textit{Sent}. 7.8; 32; 40; \textit{Ad Marc}. 33; Iamblichus, \textit{De myst}. 1.12; 2.1; 2.5; 3.20; Synesius, \textit{Hymn}. 1.731ff; 1.553f; Proclus, \textit{In Remp.} II 119.5ff (See Lewy, \textit{Chaldaean Oracles}, 187) and Psellus, \textit{Comm}. 1141a (Lewy, \textit{ibid.}, 298 note 151).
\textsuperscript{564} V\[\textit{\textsuperscript{4}}\] 89-90.
\textsuperscript{565} V\[\textit{\textsuperscript{4}}\] 252, 256.
\textsuperscript{566} \textit{Supra}, this Chapter, § 1.4.2.1, pp.255-56.
both in the *Corpus Hermeticum* and among Gnostics. According to the second Hermetic fragment preserved by Stobaeus, only the transcendent realm is true, while everything that is generated is essentially a forgery, which is perpetuated by means of fantasia or ‘perceptual appearance’.

Like in *AA*, only intellection or thought (nohsij) can liberate the true man from his captivity in the realm of the sensible. A comparable idea of the immanent realm can be found in the Gnostic *Treatise on Resurrection*, where the totality of the sensible world (kolesmi) is equated to a mere false or deluding representation.

Beside this deformation of reality resulting from sensorial perception and fantasia, externals may also actively persuade the immanent man by bribing him with the satisfaction of his senses and the resulting affections and desires. Given his current lack of rationality, man’s life has become a mere fulfilling the needs of his physical being. In this sense, it seems obvious that the use of dwpon to refer to that which flatters man’s senses and desires must be understood either in its pejorative sense ‘bribe’ or at least as an ironical use of the positive sense ‘presents’.

3.2.2.2. *AA*’s Trichotomic Conception of the Immanent Man

*AA*’s conception of man reveals a clear trichotomic scheme that distinguishes intellect, soul and body. We have already pointed out that the intellect, even if the only divine element in man, appears to be constrained to such an extent by his soul and his body that it needs to be awakened or reminded of. As far as the soul is concerned, it is mainly conceived as the seat of affections and its predominantly irrational character subdues rationality. The body, finally, contributes with its sensorial perception to the prolongation of the intellect’s captivity.

A similar trichotomy of man appears for the first time explicitly stated in Plutarch’s *On the Face of the Moon*. In this dialogue, Sulla defends the view that man does not consist of two parts, namely soul and body, but rather of three, viz. intellect, soul and body, and in order to support his point disproves the opinion that considers the intellect a part of the soul.

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568 v 130-32.
569 C.H. Stobaeus fr. 2A 5 (5.13-17 N-F). For *AA*, see *supra* Chapter 4, § 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, pp. 214-18.
570 *TreatRes* (NHC I, 4) 48.15; 26-27.
571 See *supra* this Chapter, pp. 292ff.
572 v 140-62 and 186-82, with Chapter 4, § 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
573 For the Aristotelian background of this assertion see Bos, ‘Distinction’, *passim* and *The Soul*, 280.
Sulla, moreover, establishes a clear hierarchy among the parts: nouÃ¢ y uxhÃ©, oÃ§ y uxhÃ© sÃ»atoj, aÃ°noÃ°ti kal' aÃ°i aeron. The same hierarchy is at work in the tenth Hermetic tractate, called *The Key*, which not only clearly distinguishes body, soul and intellect, but also stresses the higher rank of the intellect, without which the soul resembles an irrational animal. According to this text, only the intellect is divine and recovers its true nature after taking off the clothes of the soul that served it as a vehicle. Such a distinction was also current among Gnostics. The heresiologists report a very similar conception among the Valentinians, although in this case the nouÅ« has been replaced by the pneuma. Indeed, Clement reports that according to the Valentinians the spiritual elements must leave behind their souls before they can achieve the vision of God and Irenaeus similarly points out that in their view souls are not admitted in the Pleroma. According to the Marcosians of Irenaeus, the spiritual element also leaves behind its bondage (desmoy), namely the soul, before returning to its abode. Besides, as we have already seen above, numerous Gnostic texts establish a clear differentiation between intellect and soul.

As already stated, this conception of the intellect as the divine element in man reveals a Peripatetic background. When paying attention to the development of the trichotomic view of man that appears in Plutarch, the *Corpus Hermeticum* and among Gnostics this background becomes even clearer. Deuse suggested that on the basis of Timarchus’ myth in the Plutarchean *On the Sign of Socrates* it is possible to see how Plutarch develops his distinction between intellect and soul from a basic bipartite conception of the soul consisting...
of a rational and an irrational part\(^{585}\). This conception recurrently appears in Aristotle, both in the *Corpus* and in the fragments, and can be traced back to Plato\(^{586}\). It is interesting, however, that the Peripatetic Cratippus seems to have held an opinion similar to that of Plutarch. According to the testimony of Cicero\(^{587}\), Cratippus conceived human soul as consisting of two parts, namely a mortal and non-separable soul related to bodily functions such as perception, movement and desire, and an immortal and divine soul exclusively engaged in thought. His emphasis on the separability of the rational part and the fact that it comes into us from without (*extrinsecus*) evokes the combination of *On the Soul* 3.5 and the *Generation of Animals*, which already seems to appear in Theophrastus\(^{588}\) and in Dicaearchus\(^{589}\).

### 3.2.2.2.1. Man’s Intellect as a Potentiality and its Actualisation by the Logos

In *AA* man’s intellect appears to be a simple potentiality and as such remains unnoticed and subdued by the irrational soul and the body. We have already commented both on the precedents and on the parallels to *AA*’s views\(^{590}\). What is of interest in the present context is that this dormant, potential intellect can be awoken from its slumber by means of the light of the \(\alpha\gamma\omega\) \(^{591}\). Whereas until this point man remained trapped in the realm of physical existence, the glance at his own, true nature facilitated by the words allows for the first time the appearance of rationality\(^{592}\). This will permit, first, a rational selection of the influx of information proceeding from sensorial perception and, secondly, a control of the \(\phi\alpha\tau\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha\) or ‘perceptual appearance’\(^{593}\). Besides, owing to his being engaged in rationality, the individual is able now to check the irrational part of his soul and consequently affections and this continuous controlling exercise in turn invigorates the rational part of the soul\(^{594}\).

The effect of this development of rationality is that human intellect is for the first time able to exercise its own activity. Having reorganised the spheres of sensorial perception and affections, the \(\alpha\gamma\omega\) allows the intellect to achieve its full actualisation in order to liberate itself, in the next step, from all physical constrictions\(^{595}\).

\(^{585}\) See *supra* this Chapter, note 576

\(^{586}\) On the issue, Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* I, 230 note 23 with abundant bibliography. See furthermore *infra* this Chapter, § 3.2.2.2.2, pp. 307-10.

\(^{587}\) Cic., *De div.* 1.70.


\(^{589}\) Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus* I, 245-247.

\(^{590}\) See *supra* this Chapter, § 3.2.1.2, pp. 285-91.

\(^{591}\) V\(^{2}\) 252ff. See also *supra* Chapter 4, § 5.2.1.1, pp. 235-36 and note 336.

\(^{592}\) V\(^{2}\) 215-17. See *supra* Chapter 4, § 3.4.2 and 3.4.2.1, pp. 216-17.

\(^{593}\) See *supra* Chapter 4, p. 215 with note 267.

\(^{594}\) V\(^{2}\) 140-50, with *supra* Chapter 4, § 3.3.2 to 3.3.5, 206-13.

\(^{595}\) V\(^{2}\) 83-101.
3.2.2.2. The Soul

AA endorses the Platonic-Aristotelian bipartition of the soul that we have seen above.\textsuperscript{596} Indeed, AA distinguishes between a rational part (τοίδιανοητικήν ημετρό)\textsuperscript{597} of the soul naturally engaged in thought and an irrational one, which is seat of the affections and which due to its close connection with the body is directly affected upon by sensorial perception.\textsuperscript{598}

As far as the former is concerned, it is also responsible for reaching and preserving the balance within the soul that may protect it from an excessive exposure to externals.\textsuperscript{599} In doing so this rational part works with two sorts of materials, namely with internal and external stimuli. On the one hand, reason provides the soul with a rationally correct idea of what the individual receives from sensorial perception. On the other hand, the rational part is open to external stimuli in the form of rational speech,\textsuperscript{600} by means of which it either corrects or completes wrong or deficient information proceeding from outside. As for the irrational part, it mostly reacts under the influence of externals, as a result of which it is naturally prone to excess. The individual’s positive or negative experiences are immediately transformed in equivalent affections whose measure or intensity depends on the intensity of the stimulus. Due to the incapacity of the irrational part to keep by itself affections within borders, individuals with an unsettled or excessively strong irrational part will dangerously be apt to fall not only under the domination of moveable externalities, but also under the tyranny of the very excessive character of emotions.\textsuperscript{601}

In ideal conditions rational and irrational parts of the soul appear to be in an original balance, a condition in which the natural hierarchical disposition of rationality governing irrationality remains unaltered. This balanced constitutive structure and the hierarchical disposition of the soul redound to a coherent perception of reality, for reason controls perception, and to a harmonious experience of affections, for reason subdues and controls immoderate emotional responses.\textsuperscript{602}

However, man’s current state is far from this ideal absence of external stimuli. On the contrary, materiality is exerting an incessant influence on the individual and this influence is immediately transformed into affections.\textsuperscript{603} The influx of information combined with a lack of attention by the rational part may easily alter the internal structure of the soul, changing the

\textsuperscript{596} Supra this Chapter, § 3.2.2.2 and notes 576 and 584.
\textsuperscript{597} V\textsuperscript{1} 145.
\textsuperscript{598} V\textsuperscript{1} 140-82 and 208-17.
\textsuperscript{599} Supra Chapter 4, § 3.3.3, pp. 208-09.
\textsuperscript{600} V\textsuperscript{1} 168-73.
\textsuperscript{601} V\textsuperscript{1} 150-161, with supra Chapter 4, § 3.3.3, pp. 208-09.
\textsuperscript{602} See supra Chapter 4, § 3.3.4, pp. 209-10.
natural hierarchy between both irrational and rational parts\textsuperscript{604}. The uncontrolled appearance and development of affections such as love and fear, grief and sorrow strengthen the irrational part of human soul and put the individual in the dangerous vicious circle of passionate extreme reactions towards externals. In this vicious circle rationality is completely subdued by irrationality and affections follow one another in a quasi-causal sequence\textsuperscript{605}.

This bipartition of the soul, although it might be traced back to Plato\textsuperscript{606}, is recurrent in Aristotle and very widespread in the first centuries of the era\textsuperscript{607}. Philo not only distinguishes between rational and irrational parts\textsuperscript{608}, he also states against Chrysippus that affections cannot have their origin in judgement or reason\textsuperscript{609} and brings the irrational part of the soul, affections, body and sensorial perception into close connection with one another\textsuperscript{610}. The same bipartition is a rather established issue in Middle Platonism. Like Philo, Plutarch disproves the Stoic view that considers passions wrong judgements. In his opinion, the soul is divided into the rational and irrational parts\textsuperscript{611} and the affections have their origin in the latter part, due to its close connection with the body\textsuperscript{612}. Alcinous not only distinguishes between the rational and irrational parts within the human soul and locates them in different parts of the body; he also stresses their intrinsic differences, the continuous conflict between both and the diverse ways to cultivate them\textsuperscript{613}. However, their radical different character comes to the foreground in Alcinous’ treatment of affections, which he considers neither judgements nor opinions, but rather motions of the irrational part of the soul\textsuperscript{614}. Whereas the rational part of the soul is immortal, the irrational one dissolves with the death of the body\textsuperscript{615}.

\textsuperscript{603} V\textsuperscript{7} 209-11.
\textsuperscript{604} V\textsuperscript{7} 140-161. See previous note.
\textsuperscript{605} V\textsuperscript{7} 150-61.
\textsuperscript{608} Philo, \textit{Spec. Leg.} 1.333; \textit{Heres} 132; \textit{Leg. alleg.} 3.116.
\textsuperscript{609} Philo, \textit{Leg. alleg.} 2.6.
\textsuperscript{610} Lilla, \textit{Clement}, 92; Philo, \textit{Leg. alleg.} 2.6; 1.24; 2.50; \textit{Fuga} 91; \textit{Sonn.} 2.255; see W. Völker, \textit{Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien: eine Studie zur Geschichte der Frömmigkeit} (Leipzig, 1938) 79-85.
\textsuperscript{611} Plutarch, \textit{De Is.} 371a-b.
\textsuperscript{613} Alcinous, \textit{Didask.} 176.37-177.15. See also \textit{Didask.} 156.35-36; 173.11-15; 183.39-41; 185.29. On the similarity between Plutarch and Alcinous, see Donini, \textit{Tre Studi}, 82-84.
\textsuperscript{615} Alcinous, \textit{Didask.} 178.24-32; Deuse, \textit{Untersuchungen}, 91-95; Mansfeld, ‘Three notes’, 77.
Also Galen of Pergamon states the inner division of the soul and considers, like Alcinous, that they have different \( \text{ouklo} \)\(^{616} \), as a result of which their relationship is frequently conflictive. In his view, the rational part is immortal and the irrational one mortal\(^{617} \). In line with the previous examples, Galen also disproves the Chrysippaeans conception of \( \text{pa} \text{a} \text{p} \text{o} \text{j} \) and relates affections to the irrational part of the soul\(^{618} \). Maximus of Tyre presents a similar conception of the soul, although he tends to equate the rational part with the intellect and calls it \( \text{e} \text{pi} \text{r} \text{o} \text{n} \text{u} \text{p} \text{h} \text{y} \text{c} \text{i} \text{s} \)\(^{619} \). He nevertheless distinguishes between a mortal part of the soul that includes all irrational aspects and an immortal part endowed with reasoning\(^{620} \).

Given the presence of these ideas in all these Middle Platonic sources it is not surprising to find them in Clement of Alexandria too. Even if sometimes he echoes Plato’s tripartition of the soul in \( \text{e} \text{k} \text{l} \text{a} \text{t} \text{a} \text{t} \text{h} \text{e} \text{a} \text{n} \text{a} \text{s} \)\(^{621} \) and locates them in different parts of human body\(^{621} \), he tends to group the last two in the irrational part and presents thus the known bipartite division\(^{622} \). Besides, as Lilla has pointed out, Clement’s distinction of two different \( \text{pneuma} \) dwelling in man must be related to this basic distinction between the rational and the irrational parts of the soul. The \( \text{pneuma} \text{a} \text{t} \text{h} \text{i} \text{k} \text{o} \text{n} \) or \( \text{sw} \text{m} \text{a} \text{t} \text{i} \text{k} \text{o} \text{n} \) includes the irrational functions in itself and is clearly differentiated from the rational faculty of the soul\(^{623} \).

According to all these documents the rational part of the soul is clearly superior to the irrational one and in normal circumstances it should easily rule over and control irrational drives. In accordance with these examples, \( \text{A} \text{A} \) not only conceives human soul as consisting of two parts, but also sees in the rational part the ruling principle. However, given the fall of the intellect and its wandering in the realm of physis, irrationality appears to have taken over the control of the soul and to subdue the rational part by means of affections. As we shall see in the next section, this is due to the predominance of sensorial perception, which seems to bring soul, or at least its irrational part, and body into close connection with one another.

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\(^{616}\) Galen, \textit{In Tim.} 76e 7-77c 5.


\(^{618}\) Galen, \textit{De plac. Hipp. et Plat.} 5.

\(^{619}\) Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Diss.} 10.3.

\(^{620}\) Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Diss.} 6.4; see also 11.7-8.

\(^{621}\) Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Paed.} 3.1.2; \textit{Strom.} 3.68.5; 5.80.9.

\(^{622}\) Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Strom.} 4.9.4; 5.53.1.
3.2.2.2.3. The Physical Body

AA’s conception of the physical body is very negative. Man’s body represents a major obstacle for the achievements of his real being, for on the one hand, it urges him to the satisfaction of bodily functions and needs, and, on the other, obscures man’s understanding by means of sensorial perception and fantasiā or ‘perceptual appearance’. Given the fact that the intellect is constrained by the soul and the body there is an absolute lack of control of the information provided by the senses. As a result man is trapped not only by externals but also by a false perceptual appearance of things that triggers his affections and urges him to satisfy the concomitant desires.

The close connection of perception and affections—i.e., of body and soul—shows that despite the trichotomic conception of man, a more basic dichotomy distinguishing between an essential part endowed with reason and a material one comprising soul and body comes nevertheless to the foreground. A comparable combination appears in the Corpus Hermeticum. In the ninth tractate sensorial perception is equated with matter (uīkh), while intellection is described as ‘essential’ (oušiwdh). As Scott has pointed out, in spite of minor differences this notion seems to rely on Asclepius, where a similar distinction is stated. We have already seen that, according to Asclepius, man consists of two parts, one of them ‘essential’ and another ‘material’. It is interesting that while the essential part is equated with the intellect, the material one seems to comprise, like in AA, soul and body. This close connection body-soul, which as we have seen is of Aristotelian origin, is further echoed by a Hermetic fragment preserved by Stobaeus that describes sensorial perception as equally affecting body and soul. According to this fragment there is no sense-perception without joy (xara) and pain (uiph): ‘pain and enjoyment, being corporeal are stirred up by sensations and take hold of the irrational parts of the soul; and therefore I say both of them work mischief. Enjoyment causes sensation to be accompanied by pleasure, and so forthwith becomes the

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623 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 6.134.1; 136.6; Lilla, Clement, 86.
624 See supra this Chapter, § 3.1.1, pp. 278-79.
625 V 208-09.
626 The responsibility of fantasiā in triggering affections is clear in the intrinsic relationship between pleasure (V 208, tepornoi) and perceptual appearance (V 209, tai epiblabei aulwm fantasiāij). Note, moreover, that some lines below (V 210-12), Andrew appeals to sensorial perception in order that the brethren ‘see’ (V 211, ote) the things how they really are.
627 C.H. 9.1 (96.6-8 N-F).
628 See Scott, Hermetica III, 45-46. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the material part is formed out of the four elements, of which the two lighter ones should form the soul.
629 See supra, pp. 287ff.
cause of many evils to the man who feels it; and pain, producing intense distress and anguish <spoils a man’s life>631.

A similar conception is at work in AA, for sensorial perception seems to be transformed into pleasure and fear632 thus affecting the irrational part of the soul. The Peripatetic background of this conception both in the Corpus Hermeticum and in AA seems to be clear, for the Aristotelian On Sleep and Waking clearly puts sense perception in relation both to body and soul when it states that sensation is a ‘movement of the soul through the agency of the body’633. This background is further supported by the appearance in AA’s section of the notion of fantasiā, a ‘perceptual appearance’ that is in close connection both with sensorial perception and with the irrational part of the soul but has no share in thought. We cannot agree with Hornschuh when he suggests that the appearance of the term fantasiā in this context might imply Stoic influence634, for Stoics closely associate sensation with thinking and this is certainly not the case in AA. According to the testimony of Sextus Empiricus, indeed, Stoics equated sensation with thought635 and the same can be concluded from Diogenes Laertius’ report that for Stoics rational beings as opposed to animals have ‘rational representations’ (fantasiā i logiαi) and that these are ‘thoughts’ (nohseij)636. In AA, the speech to the brethren deals with sensorial perception and to a certain extent with the resulting affections without including in this context any reference to the relationship of both with intellection or thinking637. AA, therefore, seems to conceive sensorial perception, fantasiā and affections as following one another in a quasi automatic fashion. This is clear in the fact that as soon as rationality (re)appears by means of Andrew’s intervention, it interrupts the normal sequence sensation-fantasiā-affection and liberates man from his dependence on externals638.

In this sense, it seems more reasonable to put AA’s conception of sensorial perception, perceptual appearance and affections in connection with the Aristotelian views on the issue. As a matter of fact, Aristotle distinguishes in On the Soul perceptual appearance both from

631 C.H. Stobaeus fr. 4.21-22 (26.7-19 F) = 3. 19-20 Scott, transl. Scott. In this case we follow Scott’s text and emendations and not Festugière’s.
632 See V 208-09 and 230-31, respectively.
633 Aristotle, De somn. 454a 7-12. See also De sensu 436b 2-8.
635 Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. 7.307; see also Actius 4.11.1-4 (Doxographie, 400 = SYF 2.83).
636 Diogenes Laertius 7.51; 7.61; Stobaeus 1, 136.6 Wachsm. (= SYF 1.65). Cf. also Philo, Leg. alleg. 2.18.71, quoted by Scott, Hermetica II, 207 note 3; Sorabji, Animal Minds, 40.
637 See supra, Chapter 4, § 3.4.1, 214-16.
638 V 215-17 and see supra this Chapter, note 626.
discursive thinking in all its stages and forms\textsuperscript{639} and from intuitive thinking (\textit{noûja})\textsuperscript{640}. As we shall see in the section dealing with ethics, it is precisely the mediating position between sense-perception and thought attributed to perceptual appearance by Aristotle that allows \textit{AA} to conceive affections not as ‘wrong thoughts’ in Stoic sense, but rather as movements in the irrational part of the soul directly depending on \textit{fantasia}. Aristotle not only asserts that error is likely to appear at the level of perceptual appearance\textsuperscript{641}, but also that many ‘living creatures frequently act in accordance with them (\textit{scil. fantasiai}), some, viz., the brutes, because they have no mind, and some, viz., men, because their mind is temporarily clouded over by emotion, or disease, or sleep\textsuperscript{642}. It is precisely the latter case that fits \textit{AA}’s conceptual background, for as we have repeatedly mentioned, man’s mind in \textit{AA} appears to be numb under the influence both of affections and of the slumber of oblivion.

This interpretation of \textit{AA}’s conception of sensorial perception and perceptual appearance as exclusively related to the material being on the basis of the Aristotelian discussion on the issue receives support from a passing reference in Alcinous’ \textit{Didaskalikos}. As we mentioned above, Alcinous sharply distinguishes between rational and irrational parts of the soul, attributes to them different \textit{oujia} and considers one of them immortal and the other mortal\textsuperscript{643}. In explaining this fact, one of the reasons he adduces is that irrational souls are driven by mere representation (\textit{yiil= fantasia el aumhena}) and do not make use of reason or judgment\textsuperscript{644}. It has been suggested that Alcinous refers here not to human but to animal souls, for he does not speak of ‘different souls’ in man but rather of ‘parts’ within his soul, namely the \textit{logistikon} and the \textit{paqtikon}\textsuperscript{645}. But even in this case, it is clear that for Alcinous the irrational part of human soul is equivalent to irrational souls of animals, for the \textit{paqtikon} is said to be also in animals\textsuperscript{646} and both of its constitutive parts, namely \textit{epiqumhtikon} and \textit{qumikon}, to be mortal\textsuperscript{647}. Besides, Proclus also attributes to Alcinous the theory that

\textsuperscript{639} Aristotle, \textit{De an}. 427b 14-15, perceptual appearance is different from reasoning (\textit{dianoia}); 427b 27-28, is different from apprehension (\textit{upof hyij}); 427b 8-14; 24-26, it is also different from scientific understanding (\textit{episthm}), practical understanding (\textit{fronhij}) and belief (\textit{data}).


\textsuperscript{641} Aristotle, \textit{De an}. 428b 10-429a 9.


\textsuperscript{643} See supra, p. 307.

\textsuperscript{644} Alcinous, \textit{Didask}. 178.26-32.

\textsuperscript{645} Mansfeld, ‘Three notes’, 77; Dillon, \textit{Middle Platonists}, 292.

\textsuperscript{646} Alcinous, \textit{Didask}. 176.40-41.

the irrational part of human soul is mortal. It seems clear that Alcinous, in line with the Aristotelian statement, brings into close connection with the material and mortal part of the soul and conceives it as clearly separated from thought. On the other hand, this seems also to be the case with Plutarch, for in *On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus*, he endows the irrational soul with a *fantastikohn* ('imagination') or a *fantastikh* foral ('imaginative impulse') or *kithsij* ('imaginative motion').

The relevance of this conception of *fantasia* in the thought of the period is further attested by its frequent appearance in the *Corpus Hermeticum*, in which 'perceptual appearance' is related to bodily perception and distinguished from thought. So, for instance, in the fifth tractate, which after stating that everything that appears (τὸ φανομένον) has been generated and that God as not-generated and ever-existent is not manifested, puts *fantasia* in connection with generation and consequently with matter and the senses. Only thought (νοέσι) can perceive the real being, while *fantasia*, receiving its material through the senses is exclusively based on externalities. This distinction between real being and the world of sense-perception is once more stressed in one of the Hermetic fragments preserved by Stobaeus that opposes the truth of the abiding realm of stability to the deceit of the ephemeral realm of movement and corruption, which is simply produced as a sketch by *fantasia*. However, it is the second of the fragments preserved by Stobaeus that presents the most thorough discussion of *fantasia* as opposed to real being and thought. The sensible, due to its continuous change and movement is diametrically opposed to truth and it is only our representation that provides us with a fake appearance of stability so as to form, later on, abstractions such as 'humanity' (ἄνθρωπόν) while we only see an always changing man, which as such presents the least degree of reality. The images or representations of the *fantasia* are thus compared to a painting representing a human body that has eyes and ears but cannot actually see nor hear.

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649 Plutarch, *De an. procr.* *Tim.* 1014c; 1017a; 1024a; cf. Plutarch, *Soller. anim.* 960d; *Quomodo quis sentiat profect.* 83a-c; *Def. Orac.* 437e; *Coriol.* 38.4. According to Deuse, *Untersuchungen*, 93 note 42, this similarity between Alcinous and Plutarch does not necessarily imply an influence of the latter on the former, but simply shows how widespread the idea was. See also Deuse, *Untersuchungen*, 44-45.

650 *C.H.* 5.1. (60.6-13 N-F).

651 *C.H.* 5.2 (60.13-61.18 N-F).

652 *C.H.* Stobaeus fr. 1.1. (2.4-3.1).

653 *C.H.* Stobaeus fr. 2A.17 (8.9-16 F).


655 *C.H.* Stobaeus fr. 2A.4 (5.7-13 F).
All these examples show, in our view, that the Aristotelian conception of *fantasia* as a middle stage between sense-perception and thought and his locating it in the soul had a great impact in later anthropological conceptions because it suited both the cosmological and anthropological dualism characteristic of the period. If reality consisted of two realms, intelligible and sensible, and man was formed out of an essential and intellective part and a physical one, by relating *fantasia* to the irrational (and material) part of the soul writers of the period could blame it for providing man with a wrong picture of the lower realm and exonerate the intellect from responsibility in prolonging man’s sojourn in an alien environment.

3.3. Conclusions to *AA*’s Anthropology

The results of this comparative analysis of *AA*’s anthropology are clear as to the philosophical undercurrent of our text. This is especially evident in its tripartite conception of man and more particularly in its views concerning the intellect, the bipartite conception of the soul and the idea of a close relationship between sense perception and perceptual appearance. All these issues have a parallel in Middle Platonism and more precisely in those Middle Platonists who present the influence of Aristotelian and Peripatetic anthropology. But they can also be found in numerous Hermetic and Gnostic texts. This, together with the fact that *AA*’s conception of the intellect’s devolution through dispersion and ignorance is especially close to the Valentinian system, seems to allow us to conclude that *AA*’s thought is very close to the Gnostic world of ideas. This conclusion seems further to be supported by our text’s description of the consequences of the intellect’s devolution. Even if numerous philosophical texts of the period echo the notions of oblivion, of the fetters of materiality and of man’s imprisonment, none of them goes so far as *AA* and its Hermetic and Gnostic parallels in putting the liberation of man’s slavery in the sublunary world as goal of its message.

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656 For the Aristotelian position, see *supra* § 3.2.2.3 at 312 and notes 639-642.


4. Epistemology

4.1. Foundations

As could be expected, epistemology plays a cardinal role in our text. Since the origin of man’s devolution is ignorance, knowledge is the only means to reverse his degradation. If ignorance provoked the dispersion of the intellect, knowledge can restore its original unity by providing the means for an immediate and absolute understanding.

Given the fact, however, that the original ignorance also has to cope with misleading modes of cognition, *AA* pays a great deal of attention to the refutation of the delusion proceeding both from sensorial perception\(^{659}\) and from judgement or opinion\(^ {660}\). As these inferior modes of cognition obscure and hinder the intellect’s direct perception of the single reality, they must be neutralised before the intellect can achieve complete understanding. After this long process of deconstruction, the intellect regains its original mode of apprehension in order to attain the first reality.

*AA* shares this conception with most of the religious and philosophical texts of the age, which conceive of philosophy as a preparation for the contemplation of higher truths\(^ {661}\).

4.2. Ignorance and Knowledge: The Epistemological Framework of the Processes of Devolution and Restoration of the Primal State

Obviating now the effects of the intellect’s devolution\(^ {662}\), man’s current degraded condition can be explained from a purely epistemological perspective. On the one hand, the downward movement, which is equated with deficiency and imperfection, actually depicts the progressive dispersion of discursive thinking in its search to supersede lack of knowledge. As this movement begins in ignorance it unavoidably conduces error, then to wandering in the realm of phenomena and finally ends up in oblivion. On the other hand, the upward movement, which is equated with perfection and completion, describes the inversion of the (discursive) cognitive process, by means of which what was dispersed is gradually recollected in order to recover the primal unity preceding ignorance. The starting point for this inversion is the external, divine intervention that facilitates the remembrance and subsequent understanding that allows the change of mind, which in turn generates the \(\text{epistrophē}\), i.e. the ‘turn around’ of the intellect toward its proper objects. At this point the first error is corrected.

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\(^{659}\) V 205-33, with Chapter 4, § 3.4.2, p. 216-18.

\(^{660}\) See supra Chapter 4, § 3.2.4, pp. 200-03.

\(^{661}\) On the issue see infra, pp. 328-330.

\(^{662}\) For which see supra Chapter 4, § 5.1, pp. 233-35.
and this provides direct knowledge and understanding. Once so far, the next step is intelligising, and this direct and immediate act of knowledge is no longer described in cognitive terms but simply as ‘to see, to look at’.

The abundant terminology regarding the semantic field knowledge/ignorance not only allows us to reconstruct the five successive steps of dispersion of the discursive cognitive process, which arises from a first discrepancy between subject and object in the act of knowledge, it also allows the reconstruction of the five equivalent inverted steps that will lead from dispersion to the unity of intuitive or theoretical knowledge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column A</th>
<th>Column B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deficiency: Discrepancy Subject-Object</td>
<td>Perfection: Reunion of Subject and Object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGNORANCE (ἀγνοεῖν)</td>
<td>KNOWLEDGE (ἐπισταμαι, ὁδεικα, καταμαναχθῶ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISPERSION (καταγρυμιν, ἀπολισχαρίω)</td>
<td>RECOLLECTION (συλλαμβανω, ἀπολαμβανω)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERROR (σφαλμα, πταισμα)</td>
<td>CORRECTION (διοργ(q)ω, κατοργ(q)ω, ἐπανοργ(q)ω)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANDERING (πλανεῖ)</td>
<td>RETURN (μετανοεῖ, ἐπιστρεφω)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBLIVION (λήψη)</td>
<td>REMEMBRANCE (ὑπομνῆς, κω, ὕμνη)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The Epistemological Framework of the Processes of Devolution and Restoration

As the figure shows, from an epistemological perspective it is possible not only clearly to distinguish the single stages of the processes of dispersion and recollection, but also to realise that each of the steps in the latter represents the exact reverse of those in the former. It seems obvious that the inversion intends to deconstruct each of the steps in the discursive cognitive process that caused the increasing distance between subject and object in the act of knowledge.

Many aspects included in this representation have already appeared in the preceding pages: ignorance, dispersion and oblivion are recurrent issues in the historical period. The same can be said of notions such as awakening, returning to the primal unity and
recollection. What interests us here is the peculiar combination of elements, which we have seen dispersed through various philosophical and religious milieus, so as to provide a purely cognitive explanation of the devolution as well as of the method to restore the value lost in the downward movement. The closest parallels to AA’s conception are to be found in Hermetic and Gnostic sources, where ignorance is indeed the origin of disgrace and degradation, and knowledge that of redemption. The seventh Hermetic tractate, for instance, states that lack of knowledge is the origin of evil and urges people to take off the ‘cloth of ignorance’, and similar instances can also be found both in The Key and in the eleventh tractate. At the same time, knowledge is the only means to put an end to evil and to restore man’s true nature to where it belongs. But it is in the Gnostic milieu that we find the best parallels for AA’s views. As we have already seen, the discrepancy between subject and object in the act of knowledge as the origin of primal ignorance can be found in different Nag Hammadi texts. These very same texts tend to consider that the result of this ignorance is dispersion, but that knowledge restores the unity of what was dispersed.

The heresiologists also reported that these notions were current among Gnostics. As stated above, the ideas of dispersal and ignorance and that of the restoration of unity through knowledge appear in the fragments of the Gnostic Gospel of Eve and Gospel of Philip preserved by Epiphanius. Most interesting is that, according to the testimony of Irenaeus, these notions played a central role in the Valentinian system. If ignorance originates deficiency, knowledge resolves lack of knowledge and imperfection. Also, the notions of sleep or slumber originated by ignorance as well as that of awakening seem to have played an important role in this system. Most significant, however, is that we also see exactly the same combination of ideas among Valentinians: metanoia and epistrofi, correction and

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663 See supra, pp. 292-96; see also 296-305.
664 See supra, pp.292-95.
665 C.H. 7.12 (81.18-19 N-F), totiagwsiag uf asra.
666 C.H. 10.8 (117.4 N-F), 11.21 (156.9-10). See also C.H. 13.8 (204.3-6 N-F).
667 C.H. 10.15 (120.7-12 N-F); 13.8 (204.3-6 N-F); 13.18 (208.3-13 N-F).
668 See supra, pp. 292-93 and note 461, for the references in GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 18.1-3; 18.35-36; TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 62.12-13; 71.7-8; 121.7-8, to ignorance concerning the Father as arising from his transcendence.
669 See supra, pp. 292-93 and notes 460-465, for the references to ignorance as deficiency and dispersion in GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 24.25-29; TrimProt (NHC XIII, 1) 49.36ff.
670 See supra, p. 293.
671 See supra, pp.293-95.
672 For ignorance = deficiency, see Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1.21.4; cf. 1.16.2; Adv. haer. 1.186.10; Epiphanius, Pan. 34.20.9-12. See Valentinus fr. 5 (= Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.13.90.1). For knowledge = restoration, see Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1.16.2; 1.161.11-13.
673 For the former, see Jonas, Gnosis I, 113ff; Painchaud-Thomasassen, Traité, 342. GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 17.10ff; TriTrac (NHC I, 5) 77.22-25 and Clement of Alexandria, Exc. Theod. 3.1-2
674 See infra this Chapter, pp. 332ff.
675 See Plotinus, Enn. 2.9.15.21ff, on which Orbe, Cristologia, 163.
recollection of dispersal follow one another in the way to the recovery of the primal knowledge and the unity of perfection\n
Both the parallel between AA’s views and the ideas preserved by the heresiologist reports on the Valentinian system and the frequent contacts with Nag Hammadi texts with a Valentinian background suggest a close proximity between AA’s thought and this Gnostic group.

4.3. AA’s Epistemic Tripartition

The analysis of the elements involved in cognition shows that AA’s epistemology presents the same overlapping of bipartite and tripartite schemes that we encountered in its cosmology, theology and anthropology. At first sight, AA appears to present a dualistic conception of knowledge that correlates with the dualistic thought of our text. The truth of the intelligible and the organ that perceives it, viz. the intellect, are clearly distinguished from the deceit of the sublunary realm and the inferior modes of perception proper to it, such as sensorial perception and reasoning. A closer analysis, however, shows that at the same time AA works on a threefold classification of cognition that distinguishes the clear-sighted intellect (\(\text{eu\betaij nouj}\))\n
\[\text{QRX M}\]

thinking or reasoning (\(\text{diao\etaia}\))\n
\[\text{GRFD QRKVLM}\]

and sensorial perception (\(\text{ai\phiqhsij}\))\n
\[\text{DT\hspace{1pt}V TK VLM}\]

Whereas the former is simple and provides access to the unchangeable and simple reality, the latter two have a clear composite or mixed character and deal with the lower aspects of reality.

This threefold conception of knowledge has its origins in the Old Academy. Xenocrates already substituted the Platonic epistemic dualism \(\text{ai\phiqhsij} \text{ (‘sensation’)} - \text{nophij} \text{ (‘thought’) with the tripartition}\n
\[\text{ai\phiqhsij}, \text{dota}, \text{nophij} : \text{objects of sensation within (ehtoij) the celestial sphere, objects of opinion in the heavens and objects of intellection outside the celestial sphere}\]

\[\text{XR\hspace{1pt}M}\]

This tripartition of being also occurs in Aristotle\n
\[\text{Xenocrates, fr. 5 Heinze.}\]

\[\text{See supra this Chapter, p. 246 and notes 47-50.}\]

\[\text{See Merlan, ‘Unmoved Movers’, 199ff.}\]

\[\text{Aristotle, Ph. 198a 29.}\]

\[\text{Aristotle, EN 1142a 25-26; 1143a 35-1143b 5; 1151a 17-18; cf. 1144b 8-13.}\]
belongs to the sphere of demonstration, involves discursive steps and implies time. This is also the reason why belief (doxa) is included in the sphere of reason, because it implies a rational process by which we are persuaded. But Aristotle’s conception of this epistemic tripartition can clearly be seen in his discussion of representation or perceptual appearance (fantasia) in On the Soul 3.3. When defining this notion, the Philosopher first considers whether fantasia is any of the four knowing faculties, sensation, opinion, knowledge or intelligence. His analysis presupposes the same tripartition, for he first compares representation to sensation, which is always true, then to knowledge or intelligence (episthē h)νojej), which is also always true, and finally to opinion, which may be either true or false, since it belongs to the sphere of reasoning.

A similar tripartition can be found in the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. According to Archytas, only those things that are evident in themselves can be a criterion for knowledge, i.e. the intelligibles (noata) and the sensibles (ai$qata). Those in the middle, namely objects of science (epistata) and opinion (do casta), are not evident in themselves. But it is perhaps the testimony of Brotinus that provides us with the clearest parallel for this epistemic tripartition, because he establishes a strict distinction between ηνojej and dia$noia. Whereas the intellect is simple and directed toward primal reality, reasoning is characterised by multiplicity, and its objects are those of science and demonstration (apodekta).

Alcinous seems to have implied the same triadic conception of knowledge. In the section dedicated to the theory of knowledge, Alcinous distinguishes between intellect (νojej), reasoning (logoj) and perception (ai$qhsij). He also distinguishes two levels of reasoning, one that is accessible only to God, which we may compare to the νojej or ‘intellect’ since it is infallible and possesses its objects immediately, and another that is accessible to humans. This latter sort of reasoning is open to error due to the variability of its objects. But the clearest proof of the underlying tripartition of knowledge is his division of human reasoning into two parts according to the objects it is directed towards. His differentiation between episthēmarti koj and do casti koj logoj relies on whether reason is directed towards objects of intellection or of

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685 Aristotle, APo. 100b 5ff.
687 Aristotle, De an. 428a 1-25.
689 Brotinus, De intell. 55.22-29. On Brotinus, a Pythagorean of the third or second century BC, see Thesleff, Pythagoreans Texts, 54; Moraux, Der Aristotelismus II, 630.
690 Alcinous, Didask. 154.8ff.
sensation. Interesting for AA is that Alcinous only considers that which focuses on the stable and the permanent to be true knowledge, while opinion, because it is based on sensation and discursive reason, is open to error. So, even though preserving the Aristotelian tripartion, sensation is no longer considered a trustful mode of cognition.

An equivalent tripartition appears in Plotinus and Neoplatonism. Plotinus distinguishes the intellect both from discursive thinking and sense perception. Man seems to occupy a middle position between the intelligible and the sensible, and this partaking in both spheres is what determines his discursive nature. Discursive reason or dia noia partakes in both intellection and sensation and is an activity of the soul as opposed to the intellect. In contrast to the latter, discursive thinking implies discursive steps, progression and consequently time. The intellect, in turn, is simple and apprehends its objects immediately and directly. The commentaries on Aristotle by Simplicius further attest that this differentiation continued to play a role in later Neoplatonism. He clearly distinguishes the unchanging and simple cognition of the intellect from the multiplicity of reason, which as a function of the soul deals with what is composite and makes transitions, takes things in succession and, consequently, implies time.

4.4. Elements Involved in Cognition
4.4.1. The Intellect and Its Immediate Apprehension
In AA the immediate apprehension of the intellect owes its unity to the identity of the subject that thinks and the object thought. Since the intellect is divine, when it thinks itself, it thinks the intelligible. This self-centred act of cognition confers upon its activity an undiverted, simple and unitary character. Therefore, when describing this direct contemplation of the intellect AA resorts to the expression ‘to see, to look at’. Such a conception of the intellect and of the cognition proper to it is very widespread in the early centuries of the Christian era, as the numerous parallels offered above clearly show.
4.4.2. Discursive Thinking and Its Mediated and Mixed Character

In *AA*, reasoning, which may be described as ‘(discursive) thinking’ (diānoia)\(^{702}\) or as ‘reflection, cogitation’ (ēnoia)\(^{703}\), has its seat in the rational part of the soul\(^{704}\). This location determines its mixed character because it is also liable to be influenced by the irrational part, although no explicit mention of this part as such can be found in *AA*’s fragment in *V*\(^{705}\), or the affections proper to it\(^{706}\). Due to this mixed character reasoning can be misleading, because it leads the individual to form opinions and judgements on the reality he partakes in, but only rarely provides a reliable and detached analysis thereof. *AA*’s views, therefore, completely coincide with those authors who inherited the Aristotelian or Peripatetic epistemology\(^{707}\).

4.4.3. Sensorial Perception: The Senses and Representation

As far as sensorial perception is concerned, *AA* mainly focuses on two of the five senses: sight and hearing\(^{708}\). Sensorial as they are, this kind of perception is completely dependent upon externalities and can therefore mislead the individual\(^{709}\). It consists of two stages: the perception of the information through the senses proper and the ‘representation’ (fantasiá) or synthesis of individual perceptions that is presented to reason. It is noteworthy that in spite of its dualism, *AA* does not strictly speaking condemn the senses and the information they convey as evil. Rather, it is the objects of sensorial perception that are problematic for man, due to their unstable and deluding character. This is, incidentally, clear proof that *AA* is not antisomatic but clearly anticosmic\(^{710}\). To a certain extent we might affirm that for *AA* sensorial perception is trustful insofar as it conveys reality as it is\(^{711}\). The problem therefore does not proceed from the senses themselves, but rather from the objects of sensorial perception. The second stage of sensorial perception, the representation or fantasiá, seemingly complicates the situation since it transforms the unstable and changeable realm by giving man a fallacious impression of stability\(^{712}\).

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\(^{702}\) V\(^{1}\) 145.

\(^{703}\) V\(^{1}\) 26, 62, 185.

\(^{704}\) V\(^{1}\) 144-45.

\(^{705}\) See, however, the reference to the irrational nature (a[oj f]usuy) in V\(^{1}\) 224, on which supra Chapter 3, note 103.

\(^{706}\) V\(^{1}\) 140ff; see *supra* Chapter 4, § 3.3.2, pp. 206-08.

\(^{707}\) On which see *supra* this Chapter, pp. 319-22.

\(^{708}\) V\(^{1}\) 211, 215, 226-27, 232.

\(^{709}\) For a similar depreciation of sensorial perception in Alcinous, see *supra* this Chapter, p. 321 note 692.

\(^{710}\) See *supra*, p. 245.

\(^{711}\) See V\(^{1}\) 211-12, where it is assumed that the brethren do see that everything is changeable and in flux. See *supra* this Chapter, note 626.

\(^{712}\) On fantasiá, see *supra* this Chapter, § 3.2.2.2.3, pp. 310-14.
4.5. The Two Stages on the Way to Knowledge: Practical and Theoretical

We may conclude that AA distinguishes two kinds or stages of knowledge. The first may be equated with practical knowledge and concerns the self-knowledge that allows the individual to deconstruct those cognitive aspects that may interfere in his achieving the highest kind of knowledge. Sensorial perception and representation transmit a distorted picture of reality and must consequently be controlled by a selective attitude of the percipient individual. This control is essential, otherwise unchecked perceptions and representations will contribute to the forming of affections. The rational control of affections also plays a cardinal role in this first stage of knowledge because it allows the individual to understand the nature of his soul and helps him to keep affections within certain limits. Finally, there is the rational control and the understanding of the fallible character of opinion and judgement. It is this third step that will allow the ‘change of mind’, which in turn facilitates the real ‘turn’ of the intellect towards its proper objects.

The second stage of knowledge may be equated with theoretical knowledge. The change of mind and the epistrofhy are the starting points of a gradual process that leads to contemplation. By turning towards himself, man recognises his purely intellectual nature and can engage in contemplation of the true and divine reality. First, he corrects the original error and, by correcting it, he recollects himself. This recollection of what was dispersed through ignorance produces knowledge. The original lack of knowledge has by now been superseded and the intellect recovers its original unity. This reunion of subject and object, finally, provides complete understanding.

4.6. Conclusions from the Study of AA’s Epistemology

The study of AA’s epistemology confirms the results of the analysis of the previous sections. When paying attention to particular issues the philosophical tendency of our text is more than obvious. The numerous contacts with earlier and later philosophical texts that adopt the Aristotelian or Peripatetic epistemology allow us to recognise the lineage of the ground elements of its conceptual construction. This can clearly be seen in the elements involved in cognition and in the underlying epistemic tripartition based on the Xenocratic and Aristotelian tripartition of being. However, the comparative analysis of AA’s use and application of these elements reveal conspicuous similarities with the Hermetic and Gnostic world of ideas. With both movements AA shares the conception of ignorance as primal evil and of knowledge as the only means to redeem the degraded mankind. But it is possible to be more precise. A

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713 See supra, § 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, pp. 208-11.
closer analysis of the epistemological framework in which AA places the processes of devolution and of restitution of the lost condition brings our text into close connection with Gnosticism and more precisely with Valentinianism. Admittedly, notions such as dispersal, ignorance, error and oblivion and their counterparts are, as we have seen, rather widespread in numerous and widely differing texts. However, AA’s peculiar combination of all these issues in providing a coherent explanation of man’s current condition and its possible correction has its closest parallel in the Valentinian context.

714 See supra this Chapter, § 3.2.1.3.1, pp. 292-95.
5. Ethics

5.1. Foundations

AA’s ethics are highly influenced by its cosmological and anthropological dualism. Given the text’s distinction between a lower and a higher realm and between a false and a real being, it is logical that AA’s ethics are aimed at liberating the true man from his external constrictions and at reorienting him towards the truly existent. As we have pointed out, this does not, however, mean a blind and radical rejection of everything that is considered to be alien to the true man. On the contrary: AA urges the individual to face the inferior sides of his nature and to become aware of their functioning in order to neutralise them. This is also a natural consequence of AA’s anthropology. Since AA conceives of man’s current condition as a result of an original dispersion of the intellect and of a subsequent devolution due to ignorance, the recovery of man’s pristine state can only take place after recollecting what is disperse and after achieving the knowledge that may bring to perfection the imperfection generated by ignorance. In order to do so, however, individuals must first awaken their intellect and succeed in dismantling the obstacles posed to its unhampered activity.

AA therefore purports the individual’s active involvement in his current degraded situation as the only means to achieve his highest ideals of transcending his physical being. By consciously dealing with the lower aspects of his immanent being – that is, by becoming aware of his sensorial perception, of his affections and of his doxa or ‘opinion’ –, the individual can neutralise the hindrance they represent for his true being and, by neutralising them, liberate his intellect from its inferior accretions. Andrew’s role is very important in this process because he not only transmits the essential knowledge that allows his people to have a first glimpse of their true nature, but he also accompanies them in their laborious ethical process of detachment from their untrue nature.

5.2. The Good

5.2.1. The Highest Good: Contemplation

Given AA’s conception of the intellect’s degradation, its imprisonment and the subsequent hampering of its own activity, it seems obvious that the Good will be the recovery of the

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715 See supra Chapter 4, §§ 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, pp. 225-30.
716 V’ 130-38.
717 See our commentary, supra Chapter 4, § 4.3.2, pp. 228-30.
718 For Andrew’s role as a teacher, supra Chapter 4, § 2.2.4, pp. 173-75. For his function as a psychotherapist or psychagogue, supra Chapter 4, § 2.3.2.2, pp. 179-81.
intellect’s unrestrained contemplation of its proper objects. This achievement puts man on the right track to attain his telos or goal of his life. As the intellect is his divine part and as this part is essentially akin to the divinity, by contemplating itself the intellect simultaneously glimpses the true realm of being. The reuniton of subject and object generated by this process provides complete and direct understanding.

Alcinous stated that, even though Plato had already dealt with the primal good in his Lecture on Goodness, an attentive reading of his works reveals that ‘he placed the Good for us in the knowledge and contemplation of the primal Good, which one may term God and the primal intellect’. The first explicit statement on the issue, however, is by Aristotle, who explicitly equates man’s happiness with contemplative life in the tenth book of the Nicomachaeae Ethics. He provides many arguments to support his statement, of which the most interesting for us in the present context is that contemplation is the activity of our best part. Since happiness is for him an activity in accordance with virtue, ‘it is reasonable that it should be the activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part in us’. Man therefore achieves the happiest way of life not in virtue of his humanity but in virtue of something within him that is divine, and this something is clearly superior to his composite nature: ‘if then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life’.

If the contemplative life is the happiest way of life from the point of view of the analysis of what the intellect is ‘for us’, the same can be concluded from the analysis of what the intellect is ‘in itself’. When commenting on the four intellectual faculties by means of which we search for the truth, the closing section of the Posterior Analytics distinguishes those faculties that are always true, such as scientific knowledge and intuition, from those that admit falsity, such as opinion and calculation. Of the first two, intuition or contemplative life is said to be the most

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719 On this famous lecture, supra this Chapter note 236. See H. Dörrie, Die geschichtlichen Wurzeln des Platonismus (Stuttgart and Bad Cannstadt, 1987) 74-80, 227-94.

720 Alcinous, Didask. 179.39-42. See Apuleius, De Plat. 2.1220; Aetius 1.7.31 (Doxographia, 304a 1-8).

721 Aristotle, EN 1177a 20ff; further, contemplation is the most continuous activity, EN 1177a 21-22; the most pleasant, ibid. 1177a 22-27; the most sufficient, ibid. 1177a 27-1177b 1; it is an end in itself, ibid. 1177b 1-4 and is the most leisureed activity, ibid. 1177b 4-26. See also Aristotle, Protr. fr. 41 Düring.

722 Aristotle, EN 1177a 12-13, transl. H. Rackham.

723 Aristotle, EN 1177b 26-34. See furthermore the conclusion to this section in 1178a 2-8, similarly, Metaph. 1072b 22-24; De an. 408b 29; Barbotin, La theorie, 222f, Bos, The Soul, 223-24.
accurate, since it directly apprehends the first principles which, being more knowable than demonstrations, cannot be apprehended by scientific knowledge. As Zeller and Merlan have pointed out, Aristotle’s use of the term αρχαί or ‘principles’ in this context might be interpreted in two ways. Either the αρχαί are to be the logical principles of reasoning, in which case we have a rationalistic conception of the intellect; or they must be understood as ‘principals’ or intelligibles, in which case the Philosopher conceives the goal of the intuition of the intellect as suprarationalistic. The end of the Eudemian Ethics, however, seems to weaken the first of these interpretations of the term αρχαί because it clearly states that the contemplation of the divinity (h(tou=qeou=qewrih)) is the telos or ‘goal’ of the theoretical faculty (to=qewrhtikon).

Contemplation is also the highest good in numerous religious and philosophical contexts in later periods. Also, fraōhsij, although in its Platonic sense of ‘wisdom’ and thus including both theoretical and practical knowledge, is at the core of Eudorus’ conception of the ‘assimilation to God’, which according to Cicero he attributed to Socrates, Plato and Pythagoras. By living according to his intellect and developing its virtue, viz. wisdom, man becomes like God, who consequently is also conceived of as intellect. For Philo, too, contemplation, which represents the most divine part of philosophy, is the highest good. Pure contemplation as the goal of philosophy is an established issue in Middle Platonism as well. Plutarch repeatedly refers to the ultimate goal of philosophy as a mystery-like contemplation. But it also appears in Justin, Alcinous and Maximus of Tyre, and through Philo and Middle Platonism the notion even reaches Clement of Alexandria. It further appears in Neoplatonism where, as we will see below, it is considered as the culmination of man’s education after he has left behind all hindrance proceeding from the lower aspects of his being.

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725 Aristotle, EE 1249b 16ff.
726 Cicero, De fin. 5.26.
727 Philo, Plant. 36; Inmut. 151; Somn. 250; Abrid. 162; V. contempl. 11; 67. In general, R. Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen (Leipzig, 1927) 317-18; Lilla, Clement, 168-69.
728 Plutarch, Quaest. Conv. 718d; Def. orac. 422 e.
729 Justin, Dial. c. Tryph. 2: Alcinous, Didask. 152.5-6; 152.8ff; 152.30ff; Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 10.3, 53-58; 10.9, 232 ad fin.; 11.9-10, 205-44.
730 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 1.15.2; 1.166.2; 2.46.1; 2.47.4, etc. See numerous other passages in Lilla, Clement, 163-64.
5.2.2. Preconditions for Contemplation

The idea of human good consisting of contemplation is a rather common issue in late antiquity. However, paying attention not only to contemplation as such but also to the previous steps that make it possible places our text in the context of those who follow Aristotle in considering or ‘practical virtue’ a necessary precondition for an unrestrained contemplation. Even though contemplation is the highest good, it is only the control and organisation of perception, affections and intellection that, by eliminating the deficiencies and excesses, provide the individual with a suitable balance that allows him to freely engage in contemplative life.

In the closing section of the Eudemian Ethics quoted above, Aristotle compares the role of or ‘practical wisdom’ to that of slaves in the household. Just as a slave takes care of the necessary business of the house so as to allow his master to have leisure and to engage in the activities proper to free men, so facilitates the right choice and acquisition of those natural goods that, avoiding defect and excess, may allow the free contemplation of the divine.

A similar view can be found in Philo. In spite of hesitating as to whether only moral virtue is sufficient for happiness or whether the Good may also include bodily and external things as well, Philo states that virtue in practical life necessarily precedes attaining the highest good, namely engaging in a contemplative way of life. In defining virtue as a mean as Aristotle does in his treatise On Moral Virtue, Plutarch also clearly distinguishes between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. Whereas the latter is necessary due to our physical limitations since it eliminates excess and deficiency, only the former ‘is that in virtue of which the most divine and blessed element of knowledge becomes possible for us’.

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731 Plotinus, Enn. 1.2.3. For more passages see infra this Chapter, p. 328ff and note 717; Porphyry, Sent. 32.3.
732 See supra Chapter 4, § 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, pp. 225-30.
733 Aristotle, EN 1140a 24-1140b 30. See the definition of in 1140b 6-8, Donini, Tre Studi, 105 note 104, still quotes Metaph. 981b 13-25; 982b 22-28; Protr. B 25-27 Düring. On the rank of theoretical and practical wisdom, see Moraux, Der Aristotelismus II, 448-49.
734 See our summary in Chapter 4, § 5.2.2, passim, pp. 237-38.
735 Aristotle, EE 1249b 10-23.
736 Philo, Fuga 148; Immut. 6-8; Virt. 147; Mut. 32ff; Somn. 2.9.
737 Philo, Sobr. 6; Heres 285ff; Qu. Gen. 3.16.
738 Philo, Spec. leg. 2.20ff; Mut. 32; Fuga 38.
739 Plutarch, De vitr. mor. 443d 11ff.
740 On Plutarch’s treatment, see Donini, Tre Studi, 108ff.
741 Plutarch, De virt. mor. 444c. For a similar differentiation see Plutarch fr. 143.
Even though Alcinous is said to present a Stoic conception of virtue, as he upholds the idea of the self-sufficiency of virtue, he also considers ethical virtue a necessary precondition to attaining the highest contemplative virtue. His analysis of the contemplative and practical life already states that although the former is of primary value, the latter is a matter of necessity. This combination of praxis and contemplation can also be clearly seen in his discussion of the various ways to attain the ‘likeness to God’, and especially that part that establishes the preconditions for this assimilation. Apuleius also clearly distinguishes between the highest good, viz. the knowledge and contemplation of the primal good, and the secondary goods that owe their character to their participation in the primal good.

Especially interesting is that, when discussing the four cardinal virtues, Apuleius emphasises the difference between practical virtue, concerning the knowledge of what is good and evil as well as those things that are a mean between the two, and theoretical virtue, regarding the knowledge of things divine and human. The Aristotelian or Peripatetic influence seems to be clear. This is further supported by the fact that in the same passage Apuleius also differentiates between imperfect and perfect virtue, the latter consisting of a combination of the spheres of contemplation, action, and theoretical knowledge.

A section from the sixth Ennead of Plotinus offers a proper description of the two-stage way to contemplation: ‘We learn about it (scil. the Good) by comparison and negations and knowledge of the things which proceed from it and intellectual progress by ascending degrees; but we advance towards it by purifications and virtues and adornments of the soul and by gaining a foothold in the world of Intellect and settling ourselves firmly there and feasting on its contents’.
We can therefore conclude that AA’s conception of the Good as consisting of contemplation corresponds to the paramount place given by Peripateticising Middle Platonists to ἡσιομορία or ‘theoretical wisdom’. On the other hand, in line with all these authors, AA considers practical virtue as a necessary preparation for achieving the highest goal. Obviously, practical virtue is not conceived of as essential to the highest good, but it is certainly necessary because it releases the obstacles that hinder the exercise of the intellect and provides access to the desired ἔγκλημα.

5.3. The Goal of Man’s Life
The first good or contemplation by the intellect is essential because it contributes to attaining the human τέλος or goal of his life. By turning to itself and by understanding its own true essence, human intellect understands at the same time the true nature of God. This contact means the reunion of subject and object of knowledge, a reunion in virtue of which nothing obscure remains and the intellect achieves complete apprehension.

The process of approaching the goal of man’s life in AA can be considered as consisting of two stages. The first stage acquires a preparatory character and is strictly necessary because of the intellect’s loss of its primal condition. The return of the divine element in man to its original abode represents the reverse of the process of devolution. Given the characteristics and consequences of the latter, it seems obvious that this return implies a previous laborious process of deconstruction or dismantling of the accretions that the intellect gained during its devolution. This preliminary process of deconstruction will allow the second stage, namely the recovery of the intellect’s primal unity.

5.3.1. The Ethical Progress toward the Goal
That the parallelism between its three progressive steps and the three spheres that contribute to virtue shows that this process of deconstruction is conceived of as an ethical progress by means of which man achieves practical virtue seems to be clear. We have already commented both on the meaning and on the numerous parallels in writers of the period. What interests us here is that in attributing a preparatory role to human virtue, AA significantly adopts a middle position between two antithetic tendencies within Middle Platonism with regard to the means and the goal of the likeness to God or ὁμοιόμορφον. Admittedly, this goal can be

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748 See supra Chapter 4, § 4.3.2, pp. 228-30.
749 See supra, p. 230.
750 See supra this Chapter, § 4.1, p. 316.
751 Supra, pp. 227-28.
considered a common characteristic of the school: it appears in Eudorus, Plutarch, Theon of Smyrna, Alcinous, Apuleius, Maximus of Tyre and the anonymous *Commentary on the Timaeus* alike. This θεωρία formula, however, does not seem to always have been interpreted in the same way. As has been pointed out, the report of Arius Didymus shows that for Eudorus and for other Alexandrian Platonists and Pythagoreans the goal of the assimilation was not the ‘celestial God’ of Plato’s *Phaedrus* 246e, but rather the transcendent divinity or θεωρία. On the other hand, Alcinous’ emphasis that the assimilation of the θεωρία formula concerned the ‘visible God’ and his denying that man’s goal could be the transcendent God who is above virtue shows that the issue was a matter of controversy within the school. This view seems to be supported by Plotinus’ discussion of the issue and by his assertion that by means of virtue man may very well become assimilated to that which is beyond virtue. According to Plotinus, virtues have a predominantly purificatory function and the θεωρία becomes θεωρία or reunion. *AA* speaks neither of ‘assimilation to God’ nor of virtues, but its conception of the previous process of detachment as an ethical progress that prepares the intellect for its highest goal on the one hand and, on the other, its view both of the θεωρία as a return to the primal unity and of contemplation as direct apprehension of the like by the like may be compared to both Middle Platonic conceptions of the θεωρία.

In this sense *AA* shares the tendency, quite widespread in the imperial age, to conceive of philosophy as an introductory or preliminary study in order to attain contemplation. Plato seems already to have hinted at this distinction in the *Symposium*, and this might be one of the passages Plutarch has in mind when he affirms that for Plato philosophy culminated in a

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753 Arius Didymus, *ap* Stobaeus 2.49f Wachsmut.
754 Alcinous, *Didask.* 181.36ff; but see already Aristotle, *EN* 1145a 25-27, 1178b 7-22. Dörrie, ‘Die Frage’, 223-25; Dillon, *Alcinous*, 173-4. For the *unio mystica* as the goal of the *θεωρία* in Ammonius and his circle, namely the Platonist Origen and Plotinus, see Dörrie, ‘Die platonische Theologie’, 244.
757 See, for instance, V 83ff with *supra* Chapter 4, § 3.2.5, pp. 203-04.
758 See V 74ff with *supra* Chapter 4, § 3.2.4, pp. 200-03.
759 See V 2-19 with *supra* Chapter 4, § 3.1.2, pp. 193-95 and V 791-101 with our commentary *supra* pp. 203-05.
760 Plato, *Symp.* 209e 5ff. See Merlan, *Monopsychism* 33 and note 1, who adds passages such as *Ep.* 7 344b; *Phdr.* 250a-251a; *Phd.* 69c-d. Dillon, *Alcinous*, 176.
kind of mystery-like illumination\textsuperscript{762}. In the same passage Aristotle is also said to have shared this view, and may centuries later Psellus would affirm that for Aristotle the ultimate contemplation took place by the illumination of the \textit{rhoi} \textsuperscript{763}. Philo also states that philosophy is a preparation for higher wisdom\textsuperscript{764}, and he speaks of this last stage as the ‘greater mysteries’\textsuperscript{765}. A similar idea appears in a Middle Platonist of the beginning of the second century, Theon of Smyrna, who compared the five successive steps in the study of Plato to the five steps of initiation into a mystery religion\textsuperscript{766}. The same idea appears in Alcinous’ closing remarks to the section on the ‘likeness to God’\textsuperscript{767}. True, the contents of the preparatory studies are instead the encyclopaedic sciences, but Alcinous’ use of the term \textit{mueisqai} ‘to be initiated’ reflects the same conception of philosophy as a mystery-like initiation. Through Philo and Middle Platonism the notion even reaches Clement of Alexandria\textsuperscript{768}.

5.3.2. The Return of the Divine Element to its Original Unity

\textit{AA}’s conception of a complementarity of the practical and theoretical virtues is certainly similar to Plotinus’ conception of the \textit{poli}tikai\textit{a}x\textit{etai} or ‘civic virtues’ as the previous purification in order to achieve a higher stage in which contemplation is possible\textsuperscript{769}. However, we should not consider this similarity as due to Neoplatonic influence. In spite of the resemblance there remain important differences. \textit{AA} neither argues the necessity of the previous process by defending the purificatory character of practical virtue nor equates the final stage of purification with the reunion with the divine. Rather, \textit{AA} conceives of the process of deconstruction as that which allows the intellect to turn to itself (\textit{ebistrefein})\textsuperscript{770}. Through the knowledge gained by this introversion the intellect is said to recollect itself and to recover its true condition, to overcome the fetters that imprisoned it and to supersede what seemed to oppress it\textsuperscript{771}. At this point the intellect is able to fulfil the return to its original abode.


\textsuperscript{766} Theon of Smyrna, \textit{Expos.} 14.17-16.2 Hiller.

\textsuperscript{767} Alcinous, \textit{Didask.} 182.2-14 with Whittaker, \textit{Alcinoos}, 140 and note 466, with many parallels to this conception. See also supra this Chapter, note 744.

\textsuperscript{768} Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Strom.} 5.19.2-3, 5.56.3, 5.57.2.

\textsuperscript{769} See supra this Chapter, pp. 329-30 and note 747.

\textsuperscript{770} V\textdegree \textsuperscript{73-75}.

\textsuperscript{771} V\textdegree \textsuperscript{86-101}.
The intellectualistic undercurrent of this return is due to the fact that the origin of the process of devolution was also considered in an intellectualist manner. If a primal ignorance generated a deviation of the intellect from its proper objects, the knowledge provided by Andrew’s words allowed the intellect to wake up from its lethargy and to reorient its sharp sight to what is akin to it. It is at this point that a voluntary ‘change of mind’ is possible; knowledge about the own origin and nature for the first time allows a free choice, since the original ignorance prevented the first humans from acting or choosing freely. The return or metanoia presents a clear voluntaristic charge and is conceived of as a free and unconditional ‘turn around’ towards what man really is. R.E. Witt defines this sort of metanoia as a ‘turn around of the mind, an “intention of the will and the intellect”’. He contrasts it with the more ‘popular’ use of the term in the sense of ‘conversion’, such as attested in Matt 18:3 or Acts 15:3. However, Witt further argues that metanoia in its philosophical sense owes its development to Stoics and Platonists alike. He refers both to Seneca and to Marcus Aurelius and compares their views to Platonic, Middle Platonist and Neoplatonic conceptions of the metanoia as if the return to the original unity as defended by these sources could be reduced to the same underlying motivation. Dodds arrives at a similar conclusion when, finding the motif in Alcinous and Seneca, he suggests its possible Poseidonian origin. In our opinion, the Stoic and the Platonic conceptions, despite their terminological similarity, are radically different both in their premises and in their goals. If the Stoic notion implies the view that the metanoia represents an alteration of the self that provides the individual with the restitution of his unity with the all, the Platonic notion implies recalling the own true nature, which stresses man’s intrinsic difference from and alienation in the cosmos. Whereas the Stoic conception intends to allow man’s consciousness of his being a part of the whole and therefore urges him to live according to nature, the Platonic version intends to deny man’s kinship with the cosmos and to remove him from the realm of nature.

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772 See supra this Chapter, § 4.2, pp. 316-19.
773 See supra this Chapter, § 3.2.1.3.2, pp. 295-96.
774 Witt, ‘Clement’, 203. This aspect has also been stressed by H. Dörrie, ‘Die Lehre von der Seele’, in H. Dörrie et al., Porphyre: huit exposés suivis de discussions. EAC 12 (Geneva, 1966) 172ff at 173, who emphasises the ‘willentliche Bezüglichkeit’ of the notion as compared to the anépsis.
775 Seneca, Ep. 41; Marcus Aurelius 8.34, 8.48, 9.42.
776 Dodds, Proclus, 218, quotes Seneca, Epist. 65.16 and 79.12.
777 So already in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.6.
778 Seneca, Epist. 41, ad fin.
This turn of the mind in AA has its remote origin in Plato’s Republic and his imagery about the ‘turning of the eye of the soul’\textsuperscript{779}. The motif was reinterpreted by Alcinous, who combines the notions of ‘awakening’ and ‘turning’ in order to explain the relationship between the first God and the intellect of the Cosmic-soul, an explanation that already merges the Timaeus with Aristotelian noetics. By turning the soul towards itself, the first God allows the Cosmic-soul to look at the nohta/or ‘intelligibles’ by which the Cosmic-soul’s intellect achieves its full actuality and is able to operate in the sublunary world\textsuperscript{780}. Alcinous states that the cosmic and human souls have been shaped out of the same material\textsuperscript{781} and, in this sense, even if he is not explicit on the issue, we might expect that this ‘awakening’ and this ‘turning’ are also enacted in the individual soul.

In order to find an explicit reference we have to look to Maximus of Tyre, who explicitly refers to the soul turning the intelligence towards itself as a means to re-encounter ‘pure truth, free from imperfect images’\textsuperscript{782}. Even though Maximus may elsewhere associate the motif of the inward turn with that of the flight of the mind or Himmelsreise\textsuperscript{783}, his tenth oration On Learning and Recollection closely links the motif with that of ‘awakening’\textsuperscript{784}. It is precisely this stage of development that allows us to see the different character of the Middle Platonic notion when compared with the Stoic one. In Maximus the epistrofh\textsuperscript{785} is not a metastrofh\textsuperscript{786} or ‘turn around towards the divine’. Rather, it is an inward turn, for the divine is in oneself and this not by virtue of man’s partaking in the all but by virtue of his absolute difference to the all and due to his kinship with transcendence. The same can be concluded from another parallel to AA’s view in the Corpus Hermeticum, which also implies the notion of man’s sunderes nef or ‘kinship’ with the divine instead of that of a sunderes mof or ‘bond of union’. In Poimandres, as in AA, self-knowledge occupies a central position, for by knowing oneself one knows God. The first Hermetic tractate not only states that ‘he who knows himself goes to himself’, but also that when man recognises that he is made out of light and life like God, he discovers his kinship with the divine. Therefore this text claims, ‘Let he who has intellect recognise himself’, since by recognising himself he is automatically reunited with God’s essence\textsuperscript{785}.

\textsuperscript{779} Plato, Rep. 519b; Dodds, Proclus, 218. Supra Chapter 3, note 56.

\textsuperscript{780} On Alcinous’ conception, see supra this Chapter, pp. 275-76, 289-90. As already mentioned, Plutarch, De an. procr. Tim. 1024d ff presents a very similar view. See supra this Chapter, p. 289 and note 438; see also supra 275-76.

\textsuperscript{781} Alcinous, Didask. 178.18-21. See supra this Chapter, note 504.

\textsuperscript{782} Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 10.3, 49-53.

\textsuperscript{783} Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 11.10; cf. 9.6; 10.2. For his precedents see Plato, Phdr. 246d-247e; Tht. 173e.

\textsuperscript{784} Maximus of Tyre, Diss. 10.3, ad fin.

\textsuperscript{785} C.H. 1.21 (14.1-10 N-F).
In AA, however, the motif is elaborated more than in these Middle Platonic and
Hermetic parallels. AA’s references to imperfection (επιστροφή) and to
deficiency (συντιθεμενί), together with references to the turning to oneself as bringing this
deficiency to perfection, brings our text especially close to the Valentinian version of
Irenaeus, indeed, reports the relevance of the notion in the system of Ptolemy and interestingly refers to a
necessary previous ‘disposition’ (διαθέσει) for this turning (to the father)786. This reference is
particulary interesting because the term repeatedly appears in AA as opposed to
(‘agree’) precisely in those contexts in which Andrew urges his listeners not to agree with
externals but rather to ‘dispose’ themselves according to the words787.

Even more interesting is the parallel provided by the Gospel of Truth. This text not
only shares with AA the view of the soteriological process as a ‘return to the source of all
being, which is simultaneously a return to one’s true self788, as Gnostic texts generally do.
Like AA, it also argues that knowledge provides the final and desired restoration of the
incompleteness and imperfection that originated in the primal ignorance789. This interpretation
is supported by the following passage, which almost looks like a paraphrase of Andrew’s
statement in AA that he and Maximilla bring to perfection ‘what was imperfect in Adam’ and
‘what Eve was lacking’790: ‘For he who is ignorant is in need and what he lacks is great, since
he lacks that which will make him perfect’791. The similarities are obvious. The Gospel of
Truth not only conceives of knowledge as restoring the primal perfection, it also implies that
imperfection came about as a result of dispersion792. In order to reverse this process of
devolution, individuals must become aware of their origin and belonging. This is the reason
why the Gospel states that ‘it is about themselves that they receive instruction, receiving it
from the Father, turning again to him’793. The Gospel of Truth repeatedly refers to the fact that
the perfection of the Totality is in the Father himself and that, therefore, in order to recover it,
the Totality must return to him. This lack is not negatively dealt with, since it is precisely that
which allows the Totality to return to the Father, ‘for if this aeon had thus [received] their

786 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1.2.3, 1.4.1-2.
787 See supra Chapter 3, notes 85, 92, 93 and 107.
788 TryTrac (NHC I, 5) 78.1-3, 123.32-33; Attridge-MacRae, ‘Gospel of Truth’, 53; see GosTruth (NHC I, 3)
789 V’ 73-109 and especially the conclusion in 77-79.
790 V’ 74-79.
792 See GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 17.4ff, for dispersion and 24.9-27.7 for the reunification effected by revelation,
especially 26.5. For the recurrence of the motif of the return to unity see Heracleon, fr. 18 (ap. Origen, In Joh.
[perfection], they could not have come [...] the Father'. This imperfection is perfected by the Father who, although he originally retained their perfection, 'grants it to them as a return to him and a perfectly unitary knowledge' (Gospel of Truth, NHC I, 3 19.1-4). In commenting upon the use of metanoia in the Tripartite Tractate, Kasser et al. follow Norden and rightly translate the term as 'régipiscence, prise de conscience de soi-même'. This 'becoming aware' is precisely the sense that suits AA, since there is no place for 'repentance' in a text in which ignorance and not free will caused the process of devolution. The term metanoia, consequently, must be understood as the process by which one becomes aware and distances oneself from one’s former way of life, but without including moral undertones: it is the detachment from what is worse due to the remembrance of what is better. This becoming aware and the subsequent process of introversion provide the necessary self-knowledge in order to overcome man’s inferior being. This process, however, should not be understood as

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794 GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 19.1-4.
795 See Attridge-MacRae, ‘The Gospel of Truth’, 52, ad 18.36: ‘In the TriTrac there is a similar description of the reason for which the aeons of the pleroma search for the Father, the fact that he retains their perfection in himself by preserving his transcendent being in himself until he makes it known by a revelatory act. Cf. TriTrac 62.12-13; 64.37-65.1’.
796 GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 19.4-7. Cf. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1.2.2; 1.4.2.
797 GosTruth (NHC I, 3) 35.22-23.
799 This is, by the way, also the case in the Gospel of Truth, which does refer to ‘sin’ but in a context in which the term has lost every moral sense. On the notion of sin in Hellenistic mysticism, see Ménard, L’Évangile, 167, who rightly points out that this notion in such a context depends on the heimarmene or fate and not on human will.
800 On the absence of the concept of ‘sin’ in Gnosticism, Luttikhuiizen, ‘Gnostic Hermeneutics’, 174. See also H.C. Puech, in M. Malinine et al., Evangelium Veritatis, Suppl. Codex Jung F.XVIIr-F.XVIIIv (p.33-36) (Zürich and Stuttgart, 1961) 17 and Ménard, L’Évangile, 17, who points out that metanoia originally referred to ‘la libération de la sensibilité qui élève l’âme à un contact avec Dieu’, for which meaning he quotes Philo, Praem. 15f, Mut. 124, Deus 8f, Heres 6f, Spec. leg. 1.201.
801 A very interesting parallel to this conception appears in Clement of Alexandria’s explanation of the notion diulismos or ‘filtering’ (Paedag. 1.6.32.1). Diulismos de apollhousin ton ton apo to pneumatikon hetaion meta nohsan ahamanei. Note that, even though Clement
the qualitative change that transforms man’s nature. It is rather the contrary: by means of the epistrof/ man rejects what he is not and what he has never been in order to recover what he really is.

The concept of the epistrof/ as we find it in AA and in the Gospel of Truth is also attested (due to Gnostic influence?) by Clement of Alexandria. He, too, equates the process of introversion with an ‘undiverted return towards God’ by means of which the mind becomes a unity with itself and with God. The continuity of this train of thought is further attested by the cardinal importance of the issue both in Plotinus and in later Neoplatonism.

5.4. Affections

In dealing with affections, AA, then, does not purport a complete extirpation thereof, but rather their control and balance by means of reason. The essential role of metriopaçia in our text is not only due to the fact that the continuous exercise of reason reinforces the controlling function of rationality, but also because the rational recharacterisation of affections is essential in order to achieve the highest goal of man’s life, viz. the contemplation of the divine that reunites him with the transcendent. In a last analysis Andrew’s activities are concerned with the ethical education of his followers in order for them to pursue the real good and not the apparent good.

Even though metriopaçia is a rather widespread issue both in the Hellenistic period – it appears in the Old Academy, Aristotle and Peripatos, Middle Stoicism and apparently even

\[\text{interpretations: in this passage as ‘remorse’, ‘repent’, he mentions the very same terms that appear in AA, namely ‘reminding’ (V’ 207, upomhsa) and metriopaçia as preconditions for the return.}\]

\[\text{802 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 7.43.5.}\]

\[\text{803 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5.80.9; Protr. 88.2; cf. Strom. 4.9.5. See Witt, ‘Clement’, 203.}\]

\[\text{804 Plotinus Enn. 6.2.9.35f; 6.9.2.40ff; 5.6.5.10ff 5.3.13.13f. See the numerous references included by Witt, ‘Clement’, 203 note 12. For Plotinus’ conception of the epistrof/ as a ‘return to oneself and to the One’ and as identity or reunion of subject and object, see Krämer, Geistmetaphysik, 317 and notes 469 and 470; D.J. O’Meara, Plotinus. An Introduction to the Enneads (Oxford, 1993) 100-10. For the notion in later Neoplatonism, see Porphyry, Ad Marc. 24.11, Sent. 7, 13 (on which see Deuse, Untersuchungen, 176f; 195f); Proclus, Inst. Th. 31, In Tim. 65, In Alcib. 103a.}\]

\[\text{805 See supra Chapter 4, § 3.3.4, pp. 209-11.}\]

\[\text{806 The crucial role played by affections in the achievement of contemplation is obvious in the appearance of two affections in the description of the moment previous to its fulfilment. See V’ 99-101, where ‘desire’ (SRTZH) and ‘to be of good courage’ (TDUHZ) appear to be preconditions for the accomplishment.}\]

\[\text{807 That Andrew regards his activities as an ethical teaching that may help his followers to desire properly is clear from the fact that his speeches repeatedly intend to dissociate appearance – that is, how reality appears to his addressee – from belief – that is, the addressee’s interpretation of this appearance. By means of this dissociation Andrew achieves an important goal: he suspends the normal sequence appearance-belief that constitutes the starting point of the affection. By doing so he creates a suitable context for a convenient rational argument that in turn will allow the transformation of irrational affections into rational and balanced emotional responses to reality.}\]
in Antiochus\textsuperscript{808} – and in late antiquity, AA’s use and application to the achieving of man’s goal might help us to give our text a more precise place in the intellectual world of the period. Due to Middle Platonic influence, moderation of affections appears in Philo and in Clement of Alexandria, although these two writers consider it a kind of preparation for the ideal and complete extirpation of affections that characterise the sage. Thus, for instance, although Philo may praise the moderation of affections\textsuperscript{809} he does so only insofar as it represents a gradual process leading to the absolute apateia\textsuperscript{810}. Due to Philonian influence, Clement defends exactly the same view\textsuperscript{811}: he also conceives it as a first stage in which man proceeds to control affections by means of reason and which must finally be superseded by the state in which passions have been completely eliminated\textsuperscript{812}.

AA’s position is rather different because it considers that affections, when controlled through moderation and reason, contribute to man’s well-being and help him to achieve his highest goal\textsuperscript{813}. Once so far, obviously, rational affections are completely superseded, but this is a natural process that does not include a conscious extirpation. It is possible to connect AA’s views with Middle Platonism, a context in which moderation of the passions is a standard issue. The Aristotelian origin of this conception of affections hardly needs elaboration. In addition to the numerous passages in the Corpus Aristotelicum, many testimonies of late antiquity identify it as definitely Peripatetic\textsuperscript{814}. It already appears in Plutarch, who denies not only the usefulness but also the possibility of completely eradicating affections\textsuperscript{815}. In a clear Aristotelian vein, Alcinous not only considers certain affections necessary and beneficial when controlled by moderation, but also bases his defence of metriopatheia on the Aristotelian definition of virtue as a mean\textsuperscript{816}. In line with Alcinous, Maximus of Tyre adopts

\textsuperscript{808} See Cicero, Acad. post. 1.38; De fin. 5.62-4; cf., however, Acad. pr. 2.135-6, but see on the issue Lilla, Clement, 100 note 4.
\textsuperscript{809} Philo, Virt. 195, Leg. alleg. 3.129. On the need to keep the irrational part of the soul under the control of reason: Leg. alleg. 1.41, 3.116, Sacr. 80, Post. C. 71. Agr. 17.38; Plant. 144.
\textsuperscript{810} Philo, Leg. alleg. 2.100, 102, 3.131,132, 134, 140, Prov. 1.56 and 1.66 Aucher.
\textsuperscript{811} Lilla, Clement, 96-106.
\textsuperscript{812} Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.3.3, parallelism between medical care of the body and education of the soul; 1.6.1, the οὐσία of the Father heals the soul by means of holy charm; Strom. 1.159.3, reason as the ruling principle that masters affections; 6.136.1-2.
\textsuperscript{813} Supra, 328ff.
\textsuperscript{814} See Arius Didymus, ap. Stobaeus 2.116.19ff and Diogenes Laertius 5.31.
\textsuperscript{815} Plutarch, Cons. ad Apoll. 102 c-d; De virt. 441c; 443c; 44b-c, on which Dillon, ‘Metriopatheia and Apatheia: Some Reflections on a Controversy in Later Greek Ethics’, Golden Chain, Chapter 8.
\textsuperscript{816} Alcinous, Didask. 184.27-36.
the same position\textsuperscript{817} and, according to the testimony of Aulus Gellius, Calvenus Taurus also defended metriopatheia against Stoic apa\textsuperscript{818}neia.

Plotinus’ position has been compared with Philo’s and Clement’s conception\textsuperscript{819}. As we have seen, he regards virtues as purifications that lead to the superseding of the constrictions that hinder unrestrained contemplation\textsuperscript{820}. However, his view of the apa\textsuperscript{821}neia cannot, strictly speaking, be equated with the Stoic notion thereof, for he never speaks of an active repression or elimination.

Unlike these previous examples, \textit{AA} does not purport the eradication of affections, because they contribute to the last goal of contemplation.

5.5. The Virtues
As far as virtue is concerned, the preceding discussion makes clear that \textit{AA} considers both ethical and theoretical virtue as essential. Ethical virtue is achieved by reason, which allows man to attain the right mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency. This mastery of reason in all three spheres of human existence helps the individual to eliminate his dependence upon issues that are alien to his true rational nature. The active exercise of reason facilitates a natural superseding of these alien aspects without requiring the individual to repress or to extirpate what is not his. The underlying notion is the old Socratic tenet that no one errs voluntarily. Once the right internal balance is restored and man recovers the full capacity of his understanding, he naturally chooses the real and not the apparent good.

5.6. Conclusions Concerning the Study of \textit{AA}’s Ethics
The above sketch of \textit{AA}’s conception of virtue as well as the other ethical aspects reviewed in the previous sections show that as far as ethics are concerned our text can be placed within the Aristotelian-Peripatetic ethical tradition\textsuperscript{822}. This is not surprising: this tradition is the most fitting for \textit{AA}’s theology and anthropology since it provides the method by means of which man can transcend his degraded condition and recover his primal state. Given the fact that numerous Middle Platonists adopt the Peripatetic ethical framework as well, it is plausible that \textit{AA}’s writer received this conception through their mediation and not directly from the

\textsuperscript{817} Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Diss. 27.7}, 120-24.
\textsuperscript{819} Lilla, \textit{Clement}, 105, compares the Plotinian apa\textsuperscript{821}theia with that of Philo and Clement.
\textsuperscript{820} \textit{Supra} this Chapter 328f and note 747; see also 330f.
\textsuperscript{821} See Armstrong, ‘Plotinus’, 229.
\textsuperscript{822} Given the obvious Peripatetic orientation of \textit{AA}’s ethics, we cannot agree with the interpretation that sees traces of Stoic thought in our text’s ethical views (Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 377-79).
Aristotelian Ethics or indirectly from other doxographical works. Middle Platonic inspiration of AA’s Peripateticising ethics is especially evident in its combination of two antithetic positions within the school with regard to the ways to and goal of the ‘assimilation to God’. On the one hand, AA adopts the view defended by Alcinous that ethical virtue is the necessary preparation that allows the intellect to focus on its proper objects. On the other hand, it adopts the view defended by Eudorus and others that the goal of the assimilation was the transcendent and not the visible God.\(^8\)

6. Conclusions from the Systematic and Comparative Analysis of AA’s Thought

The study of AA’s thought on the exclusive basis of AA’s fragment in V provides much more uniform results than those achieved by previous analyses based on an indiscriminate use of the extant textual witnesses. Isolated from the remaining textual testimonies and analysed in itself, AA’s fragment in V presents a consistent and coherent thought without serious internal contradictions.

The five parts into which we divided our analysis, cosmology, theology, anthropology, epistemology and ethics, are not only compatible with one another but even present a high degree of internal cohesion. This seems to rule out the possibility of seeing in AA’s views the expression of an indiscriminate combination of ideas that were widely held at the time of its composition. AA’s thought naturally reflects the religious and philosophical atmosphere of the second half of the second and first half of the third centuries, but not haphazardly. Its internal coherence shows that the author of AA neither provides a combination of commonplaces nor an eclectic arrangement of those ideas that best suited his purposes. Rather, AA expresses the convictions and views on reality of its writer, whose ideas were naturally influenced by contemporary religious and philosophical thought.

6.1. Philosophical Influences on AA’s Thought

As far as AA’s philosophical influences are concerned, the closest parallels to our text are to be found in the Middle Platonic context. As our previous analysis has sufficiently shown, most cosmological, theological, anthropological, epistemological and ethical views in our text, despite its peculiar use and application to its own purposes, are attested in Middle Platonic sources as well.

Regarding cosmology, AA’s tripartite conception of the universe, which was first stated by Xenocrates and Aristotle, is an established issue in the imperial age and, as such, can

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\(^8\) See *supra* this Chapter, § 5.3.1, pp. 331ff.
be frequently found in Middle Platonism. AA’s conception of the transcendent realm as the region beyond time, movement and change and that of immanence as the unstable sphere subject to flux and the processes of generation and corruption is widely attested in this context.

The same can be said of AA’s theology. The application of the methods of eminence and abstraction to achieve knowledge of God has its best parallels in Middle Platonic sources. In spite of stating that ultimate knowledge of the divinity is attained by means of the *via negationis* only, Middle Platonists also admit the preparatory validity of other methods, such as eminence or analogy. This combination of cognitive methods is obviously related to another issue, which is characteristic of the period and which AA shares with Middle Platonists, namely the hesitation as to the nature of God, who is sometimes conceived of as the supreme being and other times as transcending the realm of being altogether. The former notion has an old Platonic origin and the latter might already have appeared in an Old Academic context. Given the fact that the notion of the One or transcendent divinity that derived from the ‘first hypothesis’ of the Platonic *Parmenides* is also recurrent in Middle Platonic philosophers, the hypothesis of a Neopythagorean influence on AA’s notion of God is unnecessary.

As far as anthropology is concerned, AA shows the influence, already perceptible in the first century BC, but especially evident in the second half of the second and first half of the third centuries AD, of Aristotelian noetics. Aristotle’s views on the intellect, both as divine and as divine element in man, had a great impact on later thought. Although they are developed and systematised especially by the Peripatos and Neoaristotelianism, our testimonies show that their influence went far beyond Aristotle’s successors. In point of fact, in a Middle Platonic context Plutarch already establishes the hierarchy intellect-soul-body, also adopted by Alcinous, which echoes the Aristotelian distinction of the intellect from soul and body. The same is true for AA’s bipartite conception of the soul, consisting of a rational and an irrational part. This Platonic-Peripatetic notion is at the core of Middle Platonic psychology, as the numerous (mostly controversial) Middle Platonic testimonies clearly show. The same can be said of AA’s conception of the physical body and sensorial perception.

AA’s epistemology appears to have the same philosophical background. It echoes the Xenocratic and Aristotelian tripartition of being and of knowledge, which not only played a role in Middle Platonism and Neopythagorean pseudepigrapha, but also appears in Plotinus and later Neoplatonism. The intellect and its immediate apprehension, discursive reasoning
with its mediated character and sense perception conform to the established epistemic tripartition common to all these contexts.

Regarding ethics, AA endorses the main lines of Aristotelian ethics, like most Middle Platonists. Not only the idea of the highest Good as consisting in contemplation, but also its preparatory stages by means of present clear Aristotelian traces and are also attested in Middle Platonism. The idea of the reunion with the divinity as the goal of man’s life is certainly different from the Middle Platonic conception of the ‘assimilation or likeness to God’. However, in arguing the way to attain this reunion, AA significantly combines the ethical character of the in Alcinous, who rejected that man’s goal could be the God beyond the heavens, with the idea that the objective of this assimilation was the transcendent divinity, as defended by Eudorus and other Alexandrian Platonists. On the other hand, AA’s application of moderation to controlling affections is certainly not surprising, for was a widely held attitude towards emotions in late antiquity. True, authors like Philo or Clement show a tendency to combine Aristotelian and Stoic ethics and to conceive of and as complementary. In their view, both ideals represent successive stages in the ethical progress toward the state of mind of the sage. Nothing of the kind can be found in AA, which strictly follow the Aristotelian view that only moderation, and not eradication, can free man from the influence of affections. Again, this view is extensive in Middle Platonism.

Given the fact that most of AA’s views are also attested, if not by all Middle Platonists, at least by a representative number of them, and that there is no relevant issue that may suggest the contrary, we can dismiss the hypothesis of Neopythagorean influence on our text.

The same is true for the alleged Plotinian or Neoplatonic influences. In the first place, the alleged Plotinian influence poses an obvious chronological problem. Given the time span of Plotinus life (204/5-270) the influence of his writings on AA is a theoretical possibility. The problem is, as Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus reports, that he did not begin writing until the age of fifty, thus around 254/5, and that his writings were only accessible to a close group of disciples and copies were not easily available. It was only 30 years after Plotinus’ death, thus around 301, that his pupil Porphyry finally completed his edition of the Enneads and made Plotinus’ writings accessible to a wider public. If AA’s writer is supposed to have read the Enneads, AA’s date should be considerably delayed. On the other hand, assuming a rather improbable direct (oral) influence on our writer creates approximately the same problems.

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824 Porphyry, VP 4. See Rist, Plotinus, 8-9.
Admittedly, \textit{AA}'s writer could have come in contact with Plotinus but this could have only happened in Rome, after the philosopher was established there and began to teach at the age of forty, thus around 244/5.\textsuperscript{825} but the distinctive features of his thought only developed later.

Secondly, there are no relevant issues that may induce us to accept such a hypothesis. Since the second half of the twentieth century, studies on the philosophy of late antiquity emphasise that most of the seeds of the elements normally held as typically Plotinian can already be found in many of his predecessors. According to these studies, Plotinus’ genius consists not so much in his innovation as in his combining and bringing into a coherent system the ideas that were developing in the intellectual and religious atmosphere of the previous centuries.\textsuperscript{826} Given that the alleged similarities between \textit{AA} and Plotinus concern certain issues that also appear in his Middle Platonic predecessors, Plotinian influence can be also dismissed.\textsuperscript{827}

As far Stoic influence on \textit{AA}'s ethics is concerned, our previous analysis clearly rules out such a hypothesis: \textit{AA}'s ethics present a clear Peripatetic background with numerous parallels in Middle Platonic sources.

\textbf{6.2. Orientation of \textit{AA}'s Thought}

In this part of our conclusions our main concern is to determine whether \textit{AA}'s thought should be grouped with that of mainstream Christianity or should rather be associated with other groups that would, later on, be labelled as heretics.

As far as we can judge on the basis of \textit{AA}'s fragment in \textit{V}, there is absolutely no evidence that might induce us to bring \textit{AA} into close connection with mainstream Christianity. Such a suggestion, if at all possible, could be drawn only from an analysis of different textual testimonies than our fragment. \textit{AA} notably lacks relevant scriptural references. Excluding the obvious allusions to the Old Testament in the figures of Eve, Adam and Cain, a vague echo of 1Cor 15:20 and a more convincing allusion to Matt 8:20,\textsuperscript{828} \textit{AA} completely ignores both OT and NT.\textsuperscript{829} The general philosophical tenor of our text, as well as the particular application of

\textsuperscript{825} Porphyry, \textit{VP} 3.

\textsuperscript{826} On Plotinus’ indebtedness to his predecessors, see Merlan, \textit{Monopsychism}, 4-84; Armstrong, ‘Plotinus’, 211-14; Rist, \textit{Plotinus}, 169-87.

\textsuperscript{827} There is only one issue in \textit{AA} that might, to a certain extent, present a certain similarity with Plotinus, namely \textit{AA}'s rather ecstatic notion of man’s reunion with the divinity. However, a closer examination immediately shows that both versions, in spite of certain resemblance, nevertheless present distinctive features. Thus, for Plotinus the \textit{etweis ij} can take place at any moment and should not be consciously searched for (see Plotinus, \textit{Enn.} 5.5.8.4, on which J.M. Rist, \textit{Plotinus. The Road to Reality} [London, 1967] 222-30). In \textit{AA} it takes place after death and is only attained after a conscious and long process of preparation.

\textsuperscript{828} See \textit{V} 103-06 and 150, respectively.

\textsuperscript{829} Other scriptural references alleged by Prieur, \textit{Acta}, 404-05, such as Mark 4:1-20 in \textit{Vr} 168-82 and Luke 24:19 in \textit{Vr} 232 can be dismissed. As we already pointed out above, \textit{Vr} 168-82 should not be brought into connection
philosophical views to the explanation of man’s reality, clearly places our text in a context very different from mainstream Christianity.

As we have repeatedly pointed out in this chapter, AA presents conspicuous similarities with Hermetic and Gnostic thought. At a general level, AA shares with the Corpus Hermeticum the strong philosophical undercurrent of its views and the use of a (pseudo-) philosophical framework in order to expose, to analyse and to provide solutions for mainly religious matters. Especially similar is the way in which philosophical tenets also found in Middle Platonic contexts are used and applied to substantiate a strong dualistic conception of reality and a very negative view of man’s physical existence. But our analysis also revealed conspicuous similarities at a particular level. Conceptual correspondences are especially visible between AA and Poimandres, the seventh, the tenth and thirteenth tractates, but can also be found in the second Hermetic fragment preserved by Stobaeus and on occasion in the Asclepius.

With reference to cosmology, the Corpus Hermeticum, like AA, not only attests the three-storey conception of the cosmos, but also tends to conceive of the intermediary zone as a border between the realm of light and that of darkness. Also similar is the Hermetic view on transcendence, its association with light and its description mainly from a philosophical perspective. At the same time, the conception of the sublunary world as a place of darkness and doom and, especially, as a ‘prison’ for man are equivalent in Hermetica and in AA.

There are also numerous contacts in the matter of theology. Especially interesting is the combination of an objective description of God, which generally follows widespread philosophical tenets, with a more subjective characterisation of the divinity. In Hermetic texts and in AA God is at the same time the One beyond time, space and movement of the philosophers, and the luminous divinity, the unenvious sharer and the origin and goal of the believers.

As regards anthropology, the similarities are also evident. Noteworthy is the exact equivalence in AA and Hermetica of the notion of the ‘essential man’ as the divine intellect dwelling in man. Also equivalent is the conception of man’s incarnation as his captivity, which is prolonged through oblivion, the fetters of materiality and the delusion proceeding with Mark 4:1-20, but should rather be placed in the long tradition that saw a parallelism between the learning process and the working of the land. See supra Chapter 4, § 3.3.5, pp. 211-13 and 4.3.1, pp. 225-28. We can also dismiss the alleged echo of Luke 24:19 in V’232: the expression δι᾽ ἐν χώρᾳ καὶ ὁ ἄγων is so common in Greek literature that no interdependence can be stated on the basis of this evidence. For Sturhahn’s view on the parallelism between AA’s and NT’s conception of the apostolic figure, see supra Chapter 1, note 210.
both from externals and from man’s own representation of reality. The anthropological
affinities also concern the tripartite conception of man.

But correspondences are especially visible in the paramount position occupied by
epistemology in both contexts: ignorance and knowledge, the beginning and end of the
discursive epistemological process, are conceived of as the beginning and end of man’s
physical existence.

As far as AA’s affinities with Gnosticism are concerned, the numerous similarities
between AA and the Corpus Hermeticum already seem to imply an even closer relationship
with Gnosticism. Gnostic texts present exactly the same philosophical undercurrent common
to AA and Hermetic texts and also show the same use and application of philosophical
conceptions to elucidate religious matters. In addition, the Gnostic texts analysed above attest
all the conceptual correspondences between AA and the Corpus Hermeticum as well. If to
these similarities we add the tendency towards mythological exposition common to AA and
Gnostic texts alike, and, most importantly, the fact that both move in a Christian context and
work on Christian elements, it seems obvious that the closeness of AA to Gnosticism will be
even greater than to Hermetic literature.

We shall not dwell on a tedious repetition of the numerous particular correspondences
between Gnostic texts and AA, for as we have already pointed out, these are the same as with
the Corpus Hermeticum. We will simply add those issues that can be considered characteristic
of Gnosticism and AA.

Especially significant is the congruence on the theme of man’s devolution due to
ignorance and his redemption through knowledge, which serves as a framework for the
analysis of man’s existence. As far as ignorance and devolution is concerned, Gnostic texts
and AA agree in considering ignorance as the first cause of man’s devolution and the
subsequent dispersal of the intellect as the imperfection that is responsible for its further
degradation, first to the level of soul and then to the lowest level of materiality. We even
considered that, in spite of our lack of conclusive evidence on the issue, AA might have shared
the Valentinian conception of matter as a substantialisation or materialisation of affections, as
the Gospel of Truth attests. Also, the consequences of the intellect’s devolution are equivalent
in Gnosticism and AA. Men find themselves trapped in the realm of movement and actively
prolong their sojourn due to their oblivion to their true origin and to the fetters of materiality.
The intervention of the redeeming knowledge transmitted by Andrew allows the inversion of
this downward process.
AA’s conception of the restitution of the primal state also presents similarities, especially with Valentinian Gnosticism. The return of the intellect to its original abode is conceived of as the recollection of what is dispersed and as a return to the primal unity. AA not only envisages the goal of the soteriological process as a return to the source of all being, which is equated to the return to one’s true self, it also states that through knowledge man restores the incompleteness and imperfection originated by ignorance. AA’s affinity with Valentinianism is supported by its frequent contacts with Nag Hammadi texts of Valentinian affiliation, such as the Tripartite Tractate, the Treatise on Resurrection and the Gospel of Truth, and in particular with the latter text. Like the Gospel of Truth, AA works on notions such as the primal imperfection as a result of dispersal and those of \text{metanoia} and \text{epistrophi} as preconditions for the return to one’s true self. The same can be said of AA’s idea that man through knowledge supersedes his original imperfection and corrects in this way the first error committed through ignorance. AA’s use in this context of terms such as \text{epanorgaw}, \text{katorgaw} and \text{diorgaw} is a clear Valentinian echo.

AA and the Gospel of Truth also share a view of God and of His relationship to man. In the first place, both texts present a monadic instead of a dyadic first principle, as was customary in Valentinianism. At the same time, their similar emphasis on God’s unenvious attitude towards His people is noteworthy. If in the Gospel of Truth the Father grants to them their perfection ‘as a return to him and a perfectly and unitary knowledge’, AA similarly states that God’s unenvious sharing, by acknowledging the blessed race, allows them to know Him and supersede their deficient, ignorant condition. Also significant is AA’s similarity to GosTruth in considering ‘error’ as the central motor of the flaw that will result in the emergence of the lower world. Unlike the more widespread view both in western and oriental Valentinianism that sees in Sophia’s foolish behaviour the cause of the fall, AA and GosTruth attribute it to error. The origin and character of this error remains equally unclear in both texts.

As far as anthropology is concerned, AA and GosTruth also present similarities since they do not endorse the current tripartite division of humanity and follow a more basic bipartition that divides humanity into those who accept and those who reject the revelation.

Consequently, in spite of the absence of references to many typically Gnostic issues – an absence which, incidentally, may easily be explained by the fragmentary condition of our text –, such as the pleroma or the aeons, the Gnostic orientation of AA’s thought appears to be plausible. AA does explain the fall of the intellect as due to ignorance and dispersal and conceives of its earthly existence as an exile in an alien environment. At the same time, it
emphasises the redeeming function of knowledge and the recollection of the true self that it enacts when the individual’s conscious choice and efforts allow him to gradually detach himself from the lower realm of movement. The final stage of this process restores the intellect’s primal state of perfection before its devolution and AA’s vivid description of this supreme moment of plenitude supplies the lack of an elaborate exposition of the pleromatic region very well.
EPILOGUE: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

It is now time to draw to a close and summarise the main results of our investigation of the Acts of Andrew.

1. The Acts of Andrew and its Original Textual Character

On the basis of the textual testimonies available today, it seems impossible to elucidate what the primitive Acts actually looked like. As we showed in the first chapter, two main positions can be found in the scholarly literature on the Acts of Andrew. On the one hand, some scholars tend to believe that the primitive text consisted of two differentiated parts, the peregrinations and the martyrdom. Many texts – Epitome, Vita, VitaEsc, VitaParis, Narratio and Laudatio – seem indeed to allow such a hypothesis, but their testimony is not unequivocal. As far as Andrew’s travels are concerned, these texts present three different versions of the apostle’s itinerary: that of Epitome, that of the different Vita versions and Laudatio, and that of Narratio, with only sporadic contacts among them. As to the martyrdom, Epitome, Vita, VitaEsc and VitaParis actually lack a so-called martyrdom and include, at most, a couple of quick notes about Andrew’s end. True, Laudatio’s and Narratio’s close contacts with the testimonies for the martyrdom seem to imply their dependence upon a common source that included Andrew’s martyrdom, but horizontal contamination of sources cannot be excluded.

Did our text really consist of two differentiated parts, or is this impression only due to later editorial activity? And if it did, which text, if any, reliably reflects the primitive text? Which of the three preserved versions transmits the allegedly primitive itinerary of Andrew’s peregrinations? And concerning the second part or passion, was the martyrdom originally as short as in Epitome and VitaParis, or was it more developed as in Laudatio, Narratio and the testimonies for the martyrdom? Did the primitive text actually include a martyrdom in the developed form we know today? The texts simply do not provide conclusive evidence to help us to answer these questions in a proper way.

On the other hand, according to other scholars Acta Andreae mainly consisted of the martyrdom. Admittedly, the textual witnesses for the martyrdom are more numerous and their testimony somewhat more homogeneous. However, the appearance and development of martyrdom texts as a literary genre can be dated with precision to the fourth to fifth centuries and the numerous texts preserving Andrew’s passion may also have appeared in this same period to suit the new literary taste. As for their allegedly homogeneous character, the cohesion of the testimonies should not be overstated. The different texts present rather
divergent accounts of Andrew’s passion and, as we showed in the second chapter, these divergences concern both general and particular issues. In addition, these texts are so reworked and transformed that they can hardly offer anything more than a general idea of the last section of AA.

In spite of the not always reliable character of our sources, however, we cannot afford a priori to disprove their testimony. Given the exiguous trustworthy materials at our disposal, the best solution appears to be an a priori acceptance of all the testimonies as plausible though transformed versions of an original account, in order to proceed, in a second stage, to carefully select potentially primitive from secondary issues on the basis of an internal critical scrutiny. This is indeed the method we followed in sketching our tentative reconstruction of the process of AA’s textual diversification (below).

2. The Textual Reconstruction of the Primitive Acts of Andrew

Given the peculiar textual situation of the Acts of Andrew, i.e. the highly transformed character of our sources and the diverging accounts they provide, a textual reconstruction on the basis of their testimony appears to be, at the very least, questionable. Of course, any attempt to find some order in the chaos of our mass of material is not only legitimate but also meritorious. We should, however, be careful not to present our results as the text of the Acts of Andrew and always emphasise the purely hypothetical character of a given reconstruction, since textual comparison reveals that all our documents, excluding V, present revision and textual transformation. This is especially visible in the testimony of H and S, which exclude the text of V almost totally.

Until new texts come to light and provide us with new clues in order to reconstruct Andrew’s itinerary and the character of the primitive text with certainty, the only reasonable solution appears to be retaining as potentially primitive those episodes that are preserved by a representative number of textual testimonies. These events are the following: Andrew’s rescue of Matthias (below), the episode of the demons of Nicaea and the section that begins with Andrew’s arrival at Patras and includes the abundant additional information provided by texts other than H and S. The references to Sosios, the Lesbios episode, the healing of Maximilla and the sequence of a paralysed man, a blind man and a leper being healed are attested by a representative number of witnesses and, in this sense, there is no reason to begin after Stratocles’ and Aegeates’ return to Patras, as H and S do.

As far as the story of Andrew’s and Matthias’ adventures among the cannibals is concerned, Flamion may well be right in asserting that AAM is a later text composed in Egypt.
Hilhorst and Lalleman, moreover, have recently clearly demonstrated the different character of this text on the basis of its stylistic comparison with AA. As it is today, the account of AAM does not seem to belong to the primitive textual core. However, this does not necessarily mean that we must a priori exclude the possibility that the story in a simpler form appeared in the primitive Acts. As a matter of fact, the versions of the story preserved by Epitome, Laudatio and Vita, and Narratio are so different from one another and from AAM that they can neither depend on the latter text nor upon each other. As this seems to imply that they go back to another source different from AAM, the hypothesis that the primitive text included a short account of the episode cannot, therefore, be ruled out. This story may have provided the raw material that inspired both the author of AAM and the other texts.

3. AA’s Fragment in V and the Primitive Acts of Andrew

But although we can get a general picture of Andrew’s itinerary and martyrdom on the basis of these numerous testimonies, the texts do not seem to provide anything more than a textual skeleton of the primitive text. Our study of the research on AA as well as the textual comparison of all the available textual testimonies point to V as the most (only?) reliable document for the study of the primitive text, its thought, message and intention. As we showed in the second chapter, the comparison of all the documents that include a version of the section preserved by codex Vaticanus graecus 808 (Laudatio, Narratio, S/H, Arm and Conversante) shows that V retains the most primitive account of all of them. This may not necessarily mean that V is untouched; it is possible that it underwent revision as well and future new textual discoveries may demonstrate that this was indeed the case. For the time being, however, V’s testimony appears to be our only reliable witness to elucidate the character of the primitive AA. Its testimony is precious, not only for preserving the ground text for the section it covers, but also because its account can be checked against six other textual witnesses of different provenance, time and character.

4. The Historical Development of AA’s Textual Diversification

AA’s circulation in a complete form can be plausibly ascertained between its date of composition in the second half of the second century (below) and the end of the fourth. From the beginning of the fifth century, however, our text came under pressure due to its alleged Manichaean affiliation.

On the basis of the texts at our disposal and taking V as a touchstone, we can hypothetically suggest the historical development that could have led to AA’s textual
diversification. A comparison of V with the six texts that include a version of its contents shows that the latter always present a revised version of this section. Given that these versions always eliminate and preserve the same sections, we can state that all six versions depend upon a source which was already revised. This revised version did not include the following sections: Vr 1-19 (Vb 38.21-20), Vr 71-103 (Vb 40.10-41.8) and Vr 130-162 (Vb 41.36-42.31), that is, the three sections that contain the essentials of AA’s thought as presented by V.

On the basis of these divergences we can distinguish two branches in AA’s transmission, non-transformative and transformative, respectively. Whereas the former includes with certainty V’s testimony and hypothetically the Latin translation postulated by Bremmer, the remaining extant witnesses can be considered as transformative versions of the primitive account, which are based on an already revised source. The critical internal scrutiny and the comparative study of the texts allows us to discriminate certain groups or textual families on the basis of the reduction pattern they apply in their textual adaptation. As these versions proceed from an already revised source, a logical conclusion is that their textual transformations are not due to revisory activity, but rather result from AA’s adaptation to suit the literary tastes of the historical period in which they were composed. Miraculous literature, martyrdom texts and biography are three visible literary genres among AA’s textual testimonies. Whereas the two former developed in parallel but independently during the fourth/fifth to seventh centuries, the latter can be dated to the eighth to tenth centuries.

5. Re-editing AA’s Fragment in V

Given its prominent position in the large amount of reworked and revised texts, AA’s fragment in V must be the starting point for an analysis of the mentality, character, style, message and intention of the primitive Acts of Andrew. Due to its more primitive character, V may also provide us with a precious touchstone to test the reliability of other witnesses and to evaluate other potentially primitive sections preserved in them. In this way we may proceed to widen our knowledge and get a better picture of what the text originally looked like, without creating anachronisms or falsifications due to an indiscriminate use of texts.

Our re-editing of AA’s fragment in V, therefore, mainly intends to restate its essential value and return its testimony to the relevant position that it occupied among AA’s textual witnesses until the 1980s, and which began to diffuse after Prieur’s and MacDonald’s edition.
6. AA’s Message as Presented by AA’s Fragment in V

AA’s fragment in V mainly consists of four speeches by Andrew: the first speech to the brethren, the speech to Maximilla, the speech to Stratocles and the second speech to the brethren. Our conceptual analysis in Chapter 4 has revealed that all four speeches present an intentional distribution of their subject matter in order to provide a complete description of man’s current imprisonment in the flux of tangible reality as well as the means to liberate himself from the material constrictions of his existence.

The first speech to the brethren, by stating that transcendence is the origin and final destination of the blessed race, provides, in a manner of speaking, the conceptual framework in which the remaining speeches must be placed. These three speeches, in turn, describe both man’s devolution from his source as well as the possible return to his transcendent origin. On the basis of a trichotomic conception of man consisting of intellect, soul and body, the speeches to Maximilla, to Stratocles and the second speech to the brethren illustrate, respectively, the involvement of each of these spheres in perpetuating man’s exile in immanence. Discursive thinking, with its concomitant judgement and persuasion, immoderate affections and a combination of sensorial perception and representation keep man attached to the lower world. But the spheres of nature, soul and reason are not only dealt with negatively, they are also presented as gradual steps in man’s quest for his liberation. The rational reorganisation of the three spheres enacted by a combination of Andrew’s words and self-knowledge allows us to control impending distortions and retrace backwards the successive steps of devolution in order to recover man’s pristine intellective nature.

7. Intention of AA’s Fragment in V

In spite of its strong dualistic conception of reality, AA’s thought is, in a last analysis, clearly monistic, since it explains the appearance of the lower world as a process of devolution from an original unity. As far as we can judge on the basis of our fragmentary evidence, however, AA’s interest is not so much cosmological as anthropological. In this sense, it focuses mainly on the explanation of how transcendent man came to be imprisoned in the physical world. Consequently, the three speeches to Maximilla, Stratocles and the second to the brethren, depict the gradual stages of degradation that account for man’s current condition. The main intention of this description, however, is not expository but clearly soteriological. By describing the successive stages of this gradual devolution that ends up with the dispersion of the intellect in the realm of nature, AA actually intends to show the way to deconstruct this
process and facilitate the recollection of what used to be a unity, in sum, to achieve salvation. Oblivious of its origin and real condition, the intellect remains unaware of its degradation until Andrew’s intervention. Owing to the effect of the apostle’s words, it awakes from its lethargy and man, for the first time, consciously rejects the flux of externals. This is the starting point of a long and laborious process of self mastery that will lead him, first, to know his current condition and proceed to gradually deconstruct the accretions gained during his degradation. Once sensorial perception, affections and discursive thinking have been superseded, direct apprehension is again possible and the transcendent man or intellect regains his inherent condition. At this point subject and object of knowledge disappear and at this moment of plenitude they fuse in the primal unity.

8. Orientation of AA’s Thought

The systematic analysis of AA’s thought and its comparison with contemporary authors in Chapter 5 has revealed conspicuous parallels between AA and philosophical texts of Late Antiquity. This systematic analysis was deliberately organised according to the philosophical branches that are relevant for our text in order both to show to what extent AA’s views imply the philosophical thought of the historical period and to allow a more precise discrimination of the provenance of AA’s conceptual peculiarities. AA’s cosmology, theology, anthropology, ethics and epistemology show a marked influence from Middle Platonism, notably from those Middle Platonists who incorporated Aristotelian thought into the common Platonic heritage.

The Platonic-Peripatetic background is clear in our text. AA’s view of the universe presents a clear tripartite conception of being; the idea of God shows the combination of the One beyond time, place, generation and corruption of Plato’s Parmenides and the Aristotelian unmoved Mover, the intellect that thinks himself. The tripartite conception of man consisting of intellect, soul and body, however, is more distinctively Aristotelian, since it tends to elevate the status of the intellect, the only immortal element in man, and to oppose it to the complex soul-body. The same can be said about AA’s epistemology: in our text distortion proceeds not from sense perception, which is always true, but from perceptual representation, viz. a kind of automatic picture based on the sensorial information but without a share in thought. The Aristotelian character of AA’s epistemology, moreover, can clearly be seen in the epistemic tripartition that distinguishes the immediate apprehension of the intellect both from discursive thinking and from sensorial perception. As far as ethics are concerned, the Platonic-Peripatetic background is evident, as the emphasis on virtue (which is conceived as a mean between excess and deficiency) seems to imply.
All these philosophical influences, however, should not deceive us. AA is not a philosophical text and has no philosophical intentions. It does not even show a conscious use or adaptation of philosophical categories in order to suit its expository needs. In this sense, it is right to wonder to what extent we are really dealing with direct philosophical influence. Of course, the distinctive philosophical background of our text may be explained as due to the author’s acquaintance with Middle Platonic ideas, but it is also possible that these views had already been incorporated into the thought of the religious community he belonged to. Given AA’s close proximity to Hermetic and Gnostic thought (below), the second possibility seems more plausible, although a combination of both cannot, naturally, be excluded.

Our analysis has indeed revealed conspicuous general similarities with the Hermetic and in particular with the Gnostic world of ideas. Gnosis is a central idea in our text: whereas lack of knowledge or ignorance accounts for man’s current degraded state, knowledge allows the restoration of his primal condition. The explanation of man’s exile in immanence as resulting from a process of devolution that follows three causally related stages, namely intellect, soul and physis, presents obvious similarities with Gnostic cosmogonical myths. AA even seems to derive matter from a substantialisation of affections, as was customary in Valentinianism and as the Gospel of Truth clearly transmits. Also Gnostic are the ideas of dispersion of the primal unity of the intellect and need to recollect the divine elements that appear scattered in the world of nature: man’s intellect is his most divine part, but appears to be numb under the influence of the soul and the body and is, consequently, in need of actualisation. Owing to Andrew’s intervention, the intellect awakes from its lethargy and, after becoming aware, man consciously begins his process of recollection.

The recovery of man’s pristine intellective condition is only fulfilled after a long process of self-knowledge, which will lead him, first, to control the lower aspects of his immanent being and, finally, to transcended their influence altogether. To these clear Gnostic motifs we could add still others, such as Andrew’s function as a redeemer who comes to remind the blessed race of its true origin or the strong dualistic view of reality opposing the transcendent world of light to that of the lower, material darkness.

9. Date of Composition of the Acts of Andrew

As we pointed out in our first chapter, AA is usually dated either to the second or to the third century. On the basis of our conceptual analysis of AA’s fragment in V in Chapter 4 and, especially, on the basis of our systematic and comparative study of its thought in Chapter 5, we prefer the earlier dating. On the one hand, most of the philosophical parallels to AA’s
views can be dated to the second century, and then to the second rather than the first half. Admittedly, Philo and Plutarch in some cases provide earlier parallels to AA’s thought. However, given the lack of conclusive evidence to suggest AA’s direct dependence on these authors and, especially, given the fact that these views belong to the Middle Platonic conglomerate as represented by authors of the second half of the second century, such as Alcinous, Apuleius, Celsus and Galen, an earlier dating appears to be unnecessary. In addition, the type of Platonism that influences AA presents distinctive Aristotelian issues, notably Aristotle’s noetics or theory on the intellect and ethics. As the influence of the Corpus Aristotelicum on Middle Platonism is especially perceptible from the second half of the second century onwards, this seems to be a more proper date for AA. In favour of this dating is also the testimony of Clement of Alexandria, which on occasion also presents views similar to AA. In addition, the Hermetic and Gnostic parallels to our text point in the same direction. Whereas the dating of the Hermetic tractates is not a simple matter, the Valentinian traces in our text imply the second half of the second century. AA’s close contacts with The Gospel of Truth appear to support this dating further. Finally, additional support comes from the parallels to AA’s views provided by the Chaldaean Oracles and the Odes of Salomon.

Nevertheless, most of parallels and echoes to AA’s thought referred to in the preceding lines do not allow us to do anything other than roughly date our text between 150 and 200 AD. There is, however, a literary echo that may permit a more precise terminus a quo. We are referring to AA’s almost literal echo of Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Cleetophon (5.27.1) in V 55-56. AA not only recreates Melitte’s visit to Cleitophon in prison, but also her lover’s gesture of kissing his hands and bringing them to her eyes. For obvious reasons, AA alters the last part of Melitte’s gesture: Maximilla does not take Andrew’s hands to her bosom but to her mouth. The closeness between both texts and AA’s deliberate adaptation of this passage to suit the relationship between Maximilla and Andrew implies the author’s knowledge of this text, the composition of which is customarily dated to c. 170.

A terminus ante, in turn, appears more difficult to elucidate. As far as the external evidence is concerned, Origen’s alleged reference appears to be too vague to be taken into account. Our first evidence, consequently, is Eusebius’ History, which was written in the first years of the fourth century. This date might perhaps be pushed back some decades if the alleged references in the Manichaeans Psalm-book could be substantiated, but their testimony is problematic. As to the internal evidence, the philosophical influences on our text are clearly Middle Platonic. Since there is nothing in AA that might imply the Plotinian system and many issues seem even to exclude it, we may take Plotinus as a terminus ante. Unfortunately, this
evidence does not seem to improve our dating, since we cannot rely on Plotinus’s life span, but only on the publication of his work by Porphyry (beginning of the fourth century).

Consequently, given the lack of relevant evidence not to do so, we subscribe a \textit{terminus ante} to the end of the second century, as defended by previous scholarship on the basis of both external (Hornschuh) and internal evidence (Bremmer).

10. Place of Composition

Given the character of our sources, it seems impossible to determine where in the antique world our text was composed. Three locations have been proposed by scholarly literature as the possible place of origin: Alexandria, Achaia and Asia Minor or Bithynia. The first hypothesis is mainly based on the rich intellectual atmosphere of the city; the second is due to fact that most of Andrew’s activities take place in this region; the third hypothesis, finally, is based on the language and on certain expressions in the text. In our opinion, our textual testimonies simply do not allow a definitive answer. We consequently refrain from speculating on the issue.
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Op basis van de beschikbare tekstgetuigen valt niet meer te achterhalen hoe de apocriefe *Handelingen van Andreas* (*Acta Andreae*, afgekort: *AA*) er oorspronkelijk hebben uitgezien. Er zijn tegenwoordig twee theorieën die hierin meer duidelijkheid proberen te brengen. Volgens sommige onderzoekers bestond de primitieve *AA* uit twee verschillende gedeeltes, namelijk de reizen van de apostel en het verhaal over zijn martyrium. Een representatief aantal tekstgetuigen lijkt een dergelijke hypothese te ondersteunen, maar hun bewijs is niet vrij van onduidelijkheid: de teksten bewaren maar liefst drie verschillende versies van de reisroute van de apostel en ongeveer hetzelfde geldt voor hun verhaal van het lijden van Andreas. Sommige teksten hebben een redelijk ontwikkeld lijdensverhaal; andere bevatten slechts een paar korte verwijzingen en in weer andere ontbreekt het lijden helemaal.

Bestond *AA* oorspronkelijk uit twee gedeeltes of is die indruk een gevolg van activiteiten van latere uitgevers van de tekst? Welke van de drie verschillende versies van Andreas’ reisroute is het meest oorspronkelijk? En wat het lijden en het martelaarschap betreft: welke versie is het oudst? Bevatte de oorspronkelijke tekst al een ontwikkeld lijdensverhaal? De tekstgetuigen laten een definitief antwoord op deze vragen niet toe.

Volgens andere onderzoekers ging de primitieve tekst exclusief over het martyrium van de apostel. Het is waar dat de tekstgetuigen van het lijdensverhaal talrijker zijn en hun inhoud iets homogener. Maar de verschijning en verbreiding van dit literaire genre kan vrij nauwkeurig in de vierde of vijfde eeuw gedateerd worden. Het lijdensverhaal van de apostel Andreas zou daarom ook in deze periode kunnen zijn ontstaan om aan de literaire smaak van de tijd te voldoen. Wat de homogeniteit van hun getuigenis betreft, moet de cohesie van de teksten niet overdreven worden. Zoals het tweede hoofdstuk laat zien, hebben de tekstgetuigen nogal verschillende versies van het lijden van Andreas en hun afwijkingen betreffen zowel algemene elementen als details.
Bovendien lijken deze tekstgetuigen zo bewerkt te zijn dat ze slechts een zeer algemeen idee over dit gedeelte van de *Handelingen* geven.

Maar ondanks het niet altijd betrouwbare karakter van de tekstgetuigen kunnen we hun getuigenis niet *a priori* negeren. Vanwege het geringe aantal betrouwbare documenten is de beste oplossing aan te nemen dat, hoewel vervormd, het bewijs van de tekstgetuigen waarschijnlijk is, om vervolgens, op basis van een interne, kritische analyse, mogelijk primitieve van secundaire elementen te scheiden.

Gelet op de staat van onze tekstgetuigen en onze geringe kennis van hun verband met de oorspronkelijke tekst, is het de vraag of een reconstructie van de primitieve *AA* mogelijk is. Het is natuurlijk wel legitiem en zinvol om te proberen wat orde in de grote hoeveelheid tekstmateriaal aan te brengen. We moeten echter altijd voorzichtig zijn en ons resultaat niet als *de* tekst van de *Acta Andreae* voorstellen. Een tekstuele vergelijking laat duidelijk zien dat alle documenten, behalve het fragment in codex Vaticanus gr. 808 (V), revisie of een tekstuele transformatie hebben ondergaan.

Zolang er geen nieuwe teksten gevonden worden die ons betere aanwijzingen geven over Andreas’ reisroute en over het karakter van de primitieve tekst, is de enige redelijke oplossing alleen die episoden als potentiële oorspronkelijk te behandelen die door een representatieve hoeveelheid tekstgetuigen overgeleverd worden. Deze episoden zijn de volgende: de bevrijding van Matthias door Andreas (zie onder), de demonen van Nicea en de sectie die met Andreas’ aankomst in Patras begint. Hierbij hoort ook de aanvullende informatie die verschillende documenten leveren bij het getuigenis van twee recentelijk gevonden handschriften (H en S): de verwijzingen naar Sosios, de Lesbios-episode, de genezing van Maximilla en de genezing van achtereenvolgens een verlamde, een blinde en een melaatse. Deze episoden zijn te vinden in een representatief aantal handschriften. Er is daarom geen reden om de *Handelingen* pas na Stratocles’ en Aegeates’ aankomst in Patras te laten beginnen zoals Prieurs uitgave doet op basis van H en S.

Wat het verhaal over de avonturen van Andreas en Matthias tussen de kannibalen betreft, zou Flamion gelijk kunnen hebben met zijn bewering dat de *Acta Andreae et Matthiae apud anthropophagos* (*AAM*) in Egypte werd geschreven. Maar Hilhorst en Lalleman hebben onlangs op basis van een stilistische vergelijking met *AA* laten zien dat beide teksten geheel verschillend zijn. Het verhaal van *AAM*, zoals wij dat vandaag kennen, lijkt dus niet een deel van het primitieve verhaal te zijn geweest. Inderdaad, de versies daarvan die overgeleverd zijn in de *Epitome* van Gregorius van
Tours, de zogeheten *Laudatio Andreae* en de *Narratio* verschillen zo veel van elkaar en van de *AAM* zelf, dat ze noch van de laatst genoemde tekst noch van elkaar afhankelijk kunnen zijn. Aangezien dit feit lijkt te impliceren dat al deze teksten teruggaan op een oudere bron, kan de hypothese dat de primitieve tekst een kortere en eenvoudigere versie van de episode bevatte niet worden uitgesloten.

*Het Fragment in codex Vaticanus gr. 808 en de primitieve Acta Andreae*

Maar zelfs als men op basis van de talrijke getuigen een algemeen idee over Andreas’ reisroute en lijden kan krijgen, lijken de teksten niet veel meer dan het tekstuele skelet van de primitieve tekst te hebben bewaard. Onze bespreking van het onderzoek naar de tekst en de vergelijkende analyse van alle beschikbare testimonia wijzen naar V als het meest betrouwbare (het enige betrouwbare?) document om de primitieve tekst, zijn mentaliteit en zijn boodschap te bestuderen. Zoals het tweede hoofdstuk aantoont, laat een vergelijking van V met de documenten die een versie van zijn inhoud bevatten duidelijk zien dat V de meest oorspronkelijke tekst van het verhaal bevat. Dit betekent niet noodzakelijkerwijs dat V een niet bewerkte tekst is. Het is best mogelijk dat ook zijn tekst een revisie heeft ondergaan. Toekomstige tekstontdekkingen zullen dit eventueel kunnen onthullen. Tot nu toe is V echter het enige handschrift waarop we ons kunnen baseren als we het oorspronkelijke karakter van de tekst willen achterhalen.

*Oorspronkelijke tekst en tekstuele diversificatie*

*AA’s* circulatie in complete vorm kan met zekerheid tussen de tweede helft van de tweede eeuw (zie onder) en het eind van de vierde worden vastgesteld. Vanaf het begin van de vijfde eeuw kwam onze tekst blijkbaar in een moeilijke positie, omdat beweerd werd dat hij geschreven was of in elk geval gelezen werd door de Manicheeërs.

Aan de hand van de beschikbare teksten en met V als toetssteen, kunnen wij hypothetisch de historische ontwikkelingen schetsen die de tekstuele diversificatie van *AA* vermoedelijk hebben veroorzaakt. De vergelijking van V met de zes teksten die een versie van zijn inhoud bevatten, laat zien dat deze teksten altijd een resumerende bewerking van V geven. Omdat deze versies steeds dezelfde tekstgedeeltes weglaten en bewaren, kan vastgesteld worden dat alle zes teksten afhangen van een gezamenlijke bron die al een revisie had ondergaan. In deze bron moet een drietal secties hebben
ontbroken die niettemin de essentie van het gedachtegoed van AA, zoals weergegeven
door V, bevatten (zie onder).

Op basis van deze divergenties kunnen twee aftakkingen in de overlevering van
AA aangenomen worden, een niet-transformerende en een transformerende. Terwijl de
niet-transformerende met zekerheid de tekst van V en hypothetisch ook de door
Bremmer gepostuleerde Latijnse versie omvat, behoren alle andere tekstgetuigen, die
van een al herziene tekst afhankelijk zijn, tot de transformerende aftakking. De kritische
analyse van de versies en een vergelijkende studie van de toegepaste reductiepatronen
laten verder toe bepaalde groepen of tekstfamilies te onderscheiden. Omdat al deze
versies van een al herziene bron afhankelijk zijn, kan men concluderen dat hun
afwijkingen van het origineel niet allemaal het gevolg zijn van een doctrinaire revisie
van de tekst. De veranderingen zijn eerder het gevolg van de wens van hun schrijvers
om de teksten aan de smaak van nieuwe lezers aan te passen. In de teksten zijn drie
literaire genres duidelijk vertegenwoordigd: wonderverhalen, lijdensverhalen en
levensbeschrijvingen. Terwijl de eerste twee genres zich parallel, maar onafhankelijk
van elkaar, gedurende de vierde en de vijfde eeuw ontwikkelden, kan de derde in de
achtste of negende eeuw gedateerd worden.

Vanwege zijn prominente positie tussen vele bewerkte teksten moet de analyse
van de stijl, de mentaliteit en de boodschap van de primitieve AA beginnen bij het
fragment in de codex Vaticanus. Omdat het karakter van dit fragment primitiever is, kan
het voor ons ook een toetssteen zijn om de betrouwbaarheid van de andere documenten
te testen en mogelijke primitieve secties in deze documenten op het spoor te komen. Op
dezelfde manier kunnen wij onze kennis steeds meer verbreden, anachronismen ten gevolge
van een onkritisch gebruik van tekstgetuigen vermijden en een beter idee krijgen van
hoe de oorspronkelijke tekst er heeft uitgezien.

De voornaamste bedoeling van onze nieuwe editie van het fragment van AA in
de codex Vaticanus gr. (hoofdstuk 3) is daarom om opnieuw zijn essentiële waarde te
laten zien en om het fragment de prominente positie terug te geven die het had tot de
jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw.

**Boodschap en betekenis van de Acta Andreae op basis van de codex Vaticanus graecus**

Het fragment van AA in V bestaat uit vier redevoeringen van Andreas: de eerste rede tot
de broeders, de toespraak tot Maximilla, de toespraak tot Stratocles en de tweede rede
tot de broeders. Volgens onze conceptuele analyse in hoofdstuk 4 zijn de vier toespraken zo opgebouwd dat ze een volledige beschrijving geven zowel van de gevangenschap van de mens in de zichtbare wereld als van de manier om zich van de beslommeringen van het materiële bestaan te bevrijden.

De eerste toespraak tot de broeders geeft met de bewering dat transcendentie oorsprong en doel is van alle ‘gezegenden’ het begrippenkader aan waarin de drie volgende redevoeringen geplaatst moeten worden. Deze drie toespraken beschrijven enerzijds het verval van de mens uit zijn transcendent bron en anderzijds zijn mogelijke terugkeer naar die oorsprong. Op basis van een driedelig mensbeeld – lichaam, ziel en verstand (geest) – beschrijven de redevoeringen tot Maximilla, Stratocles en de tweede tot de broeders respectievelijk hoe de drie sferen hun invloed op de mens in diens gevangenschap in de lagere wereld voortzetten. Discursief denken, onmatige passies en zintuiglijke voorstellingen houden de mens gebonden aan de materiële werkelijkheid. De sferen van de lagere natuur en de ziel worden echter niet volledig negatief behandeld; zij markeren ook de eerste stappen in het menselijke streven naar bevrijding. De rationele reorganisatie van alle drie sferen, mogelijk gemaakt door een combinatie van de woorden van Andreas en zelfkennis, geeft de mens controle over zijn dwalingen. Zo kan de mens weer tot zijn oorspronkelijke intellectuele of geestelijke natuur terugkeren.

Ondanks zijn sterk dualistische werkelijkheidsvoorstelling is AA’s denken in laatste instantie monistisch, omdat het het verschijnen van de zichtbare wereld als een proces van devolutie vanuit een oorspronkelijke eenheid uitlegt. Voorzover wij kunnen oordelen op basis van het fragmentarische bewijs was AA echter minder in kosmologische dan in antropologische kwesties geïnteresseerd. AA concentreert zich voornamelijk op de uitleg van hoe de transcendent mens in de gevangenschap van de tastbare werkelijkheid terecht is gekomen. De drie redevoeringen tot Maximilla, Stratocles en de tweede aan de broeders beschrijven de graduele fasen van degradatie die de huidige situatie van de mens verklaren. De inhoud van de toespraken is echter vooral van soteriologische aard. De beschrijving van de opeenvolgende stadia van deze devolutie, die met de verstrooing van het intellect in de natuurlijke wereld eindigt, wil namelijk een methode laten zien om dit proces om te keren, d.w.z. om het herwinnen van de vroegere eenheid gemakkelijker te maken; kortom om verlossing te bereiken.

Omdat het intellect zijn oorsprong en ware natuur is vergeten, is het zich niet bewust van zijn verval tot de interventie van Andreas. Dankzij zijn woorden ontwaakt
Het uit zijn lethargie. Voor het eerst kan de mens bewust de steeds veranderende werkelijkheid afwijzen. Dit is het begin van een lang en moeizaam proces van zelfcontrole dat hem in staat stelt zijn huidige toestand van verval te erkennen en om zich los te maken van wat hem tijdens zijn neergang gebonden heeft. Wanneer de mens zijn zintuiglijke waarneming, zijn hartstochten en zijn discursieve wijze van denken achter zich heeft gelaten, is direct inzicht weer mogelijk en krijgt het hogere deel van de mens – zijn verstand – zijn ware natuur terug. Subject en object van kennis zijn dan weer verenigd en in de oorspronkelijke volkomenheid opgenomen.

Het gedachtengoed van de Acta Andreae

De systematische analyse van het gedachtengoed van AA en het vergelijken daarvan met contemporaine teksten in hoofdstuk 5 heeft talrijke parallellen met filosofische geschriften van de Late Oudheid blootgelegd. Onze systematische analyse is volgens de voor AA relevante filosofische thema’s georganiseerd om te laten zien in hoeverre AA’s ideeën met het filosofische denken van de tijd overeenstemmen en om de oorsprong van de bijzonderheden van AA’s gedachtengoed gemakkelijker te kunnen traceren. Kosmologie, theologie, antropologie, epistemologie en ethiek laten een duidelijke invloed van het Midden-Platonisme zien, in het bijzonder van die Midden-Platonisten die het denken van Aristoteles in het algemene Platoonse erfgoed hebben geïntegreerd.

De Platoons-peripatetische achtergrond is duidelijk aanwijsbaar in onze tekst. AA heeft een driedelige conceptie van de werkelijkheid; zijn Godsvoorstelling combineert het Ene boven tijd, plaats, ontstaan en vergaan van Plato’s Parmenides met Aristoteles’ Onbewogen Beweger, het Intellect dat zichzelf denkt. Het driedelige mensbeeld, bestaand uit intellect, ziel en lichaam is echter karakteristiek Aristotelisch, omdat het de neiging heeft de status van het intellect (het enige goddelijke in de mens) te verhogen en het in tegenstelling te zien tot ziel en lichaam. Hetzelfde geldt voor AA’s epistemologie: volgens onze tekst wordt afdwaling niet veroorzaakt door zintuiglijke perceptie, omdat die altijd waar is, maar door perceptuele voorstelling - d.w.z. een soort automatisch beeld dat op zintuiglijke informatie gebaseerd is, maar dat geen deel heeft aan het eigenlijke denken. Bovendien blijkt het Aristotelische karakter van AA’s epistemologie duidelijk uit haar driedelige conceptie van het kennen: AA maakt een onderscheid tussen direct begrip, enerzijds, en discursief denken en zintuiglijke waarneming, anderzijds. Wat de ethiek betreft, laat de nadruk op het belang van de
deugd – begrepen als het midden tussen overmaat en gebrek – weer de invloed van Platoons-peripatetische denken zien.

Al deze filosofische invloeden moeten ons echter niet misleiden. AA is niet een filosofische tekst; het heeft geen filosofische bedoelingen en maakt in zijn uiteenzettingen geen bewust gebruik van filosofische categorieën. Het is daarom verstandig ons af te vragen in hoeverre wij te maken hebben met directe filosofische invloed. De duidelijke filosofische achtergrond van AA zou op zichzelf uitelegd kunnen worden als gevolg van directe kennis van de schrijver van Midden-Platoonse ideeën, maar het is ook mogelijk dat deze ideeën al in het gedachtegoed van zijn religieuze gemeenschap geïntegreerd waren. Gelet op AA’s overeenstemming met hermetisch en gnostisch denken, lijkt de tweede mogelijkheid waarschijnlijker, hoewel een combinatie van beide natuurlijk niet uitgesloten kan worden.

Onze analyse laat inderdaad talrijke overeenkomsten zien met de Hermetica en vooral met gnostische denkpatronen. Gnosis is een centrale notie in onze tekst: terwijl gebrek aan kennis of onwetendheid verantwoordelijk is voor de tegenwoordige staat van de mens, maakt kennis het herstel van de oorspronkelijke toestand mogelijk. De verklaring van de menselijke ballingschap in de immanente werkelijkheid als gevolg van een proces van devolutie – via drie causaal-verbonden stappen (van het intellect naar de lagere natuur) – vertoont duidelijke overeenkomsten met gnostische kosmogonische mythen. AA lijkt zelfs de materie te zien als een verzelfstandiging van de passies, zoals gebruikelijk in het Valentinianisme en zoals het Evangelie der Waarheid duidelijk beweert. Ook gnostisch zijn de ideeën over het uiteenvallen van de oorspronkelijke eenheid en de noodzaak om de verspreide goddelijke elementen in de natuurlijke wereld te herenigen. Het intellect is het meest goddelijke in de mens, maar doordat het opgesloten is in ziel en lichaam en daardoor ongevoelig is geworden, moet het worden geactualiseerd. Andreas schudt het intellect uit zijn lethargie wakker en eenmaal gewekt en bewust van zichzelf, kan de mens aan het herstel van zijn oorspronkelijke staat gaan werken.

Het herwinnen door de mens van zijn vroegere staat kan pas na een lang proces van zelfkennis worden voltooid. In eerste instantie wordt de mens in staat gesteld om de lagere aspecten van zijn immanente bestaan te controleren en het is alleen in een laatste fase dat hij hun invloed volledig kan overstijgen. We zouden ook andere gnostische elementen kunnen noemen, zoals Andreas’ functie van verlosser die zijn toehoorders
Datering en plaats van compositie


Hoewel al deze parallellen slechts een globale datering van de tekst tussen 150 en 200 AD toelaten, hebben wij een literaire echo gevonden die ons een preciezer terminus a quo zou kunnen opleveren, namelijk de bijna letterlijke echo van Leucippe en Cleitophon van Achilles Tatius (5.27.1) in V 55-56. AA imiteert niet alleen Melittes bezoek aan Cleitophon in de gevangenis, onze tekst kopieert ook haar liefdesgebaar van het kussen van de handen, ze naar haar ogen brengen en vervolgens naar haar borst. Om voor de hand liggende redenen verandert AA het laatste deel van Melittes gebaar: Maximilla brengt Andreas’ handen niet naar haar borst maar naar haar mond. Deze
nauwe overeenstemming tussen beide teksten en AA’s verandering van de passage om het aan de relatie Maximilla-Andreas aan te passen, impliceren dat de schrijver van AA kennis had van deze tekst, die gewoonlijk in ca. 170 AD wordt gedateerd.

Een terminus ante is moeilijker te bepalen. Wat het externe getuigenis betreft: Origenes’ veronderstelde verwijzing naar onze tekst is te vaag om serieus te worden genomen. De eerste aanwijzing is dus Eusebius’ Kerkgeschiedenis, die in de eerste jaren van de vierde eeuw werd geschreven. Deze datum zou enkele decennia terug gebracht kunnen worden, indien aangetoond kan worden dat het Manicheese Psalmboek naar de AA verwijst, maar dit is problematisch. Wat de interne aanwijzingen betreft, zijn de Midden-Platoonse invloeden op onze tekst van belang. Aangezien er niets is in de AA dat invloed van de filosofie van Plotinus zou kunnen impliceren en omdat er zelfs elementen zijn die een dergelijke invloed lijken uit te sluiten, zouden we Plotinus als een terminus ante kunnen nemen. Helaas kan dit onze datering niet veel verbeteren, omdat wij niet van het leven van Plotinus maar van de uitgave van zijn werk door Porphyrius moeten uitgaan (begin vierde eeuw). Bijgevolg, en omdat er geen bewijs is van het tegendeel plaatsen wij onze terminus ante aan het eind van de tweede eeuw, zoals eerder onderzoek naar AA heeft voorgesteld op basis van extern (Hornschuh) en intern (Bremmer) bewijs.

Gelet op het karakter van onze bronnen, is het onmogelijk te bepalen waar in de antieke wereld onze tekst werd geschreven. Onderzoekers hebben drie verschillende locaties voorgesteld: Alexandrië, Achaia en Klein-Azië of Bithynia. De eerste hypothese is voornamelijk op het rijke intellectuele milieu van die stad gebaseerd; de tweede is gebaseerd op het gegeven dat de meeste daden van Andreas in dit gebied plaatsvinden; de derde hypothese is afgeleid van de taal en van bepaalde uitdrukkingen in de tekst. Ons inziens laten de bronnen geen definitief antwoord toe. Daarom onthouden wij ons van speculatie over deze kwestie.